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FOREWORD TO THE SECOND EDITION
The Political Economy of  Subsistence
“Let Them Eat Baklava” was the title of  a recent article in The Economist about 
how rising food prices help explain unrest and revolution in much of  the Middle 
East during the so-called Arab Spring of  the early 2010s.1 The venerable London 
magazine saw no need to explain the jocular title; the story on which it draws—a 
sovereign suggests luxury desserts as a substitute for basic food—long ago became 
the stuff  of  legend. Indeed, it might be the world’s best-known anecdote about the 
politics of  food: reacting to news that the people of  Paris could not afford bread 
on the eve of  the French Revolution, Queen Marie Antoinette exclaimed, “Let 
them eat cake!” The cartoonish evil of  the scenario might help explain its endur-
ing appeal in spite of  scholars long ago having debunked it, noting, for example, 
that already Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s Confessions, written when Marie Antoinette 
was still a young girl, had mentioned “a great princess who was told that the peas-
ants had no bread, and who responded: ‘Let them eat brioche.’”2 As a histori-
cal trope, a cruel ruler taunting her famished subjects lies somewhere beyond the 
realm of  simple memes or urban legends, being timeless and prevalent enough 
that countless variations of  it, dating at least as far back as the Eastern Jin Empire 
in fourth-century China, have received the classification number AaTh 1446 in 
the influential Aarne-Thompson typology of  folktales.3 Although apocryphal, or 
rather because apocryphal, it speaks to the sprawling and often undigested array 
1 “Let them Eat Baklava,” The Economist, 17 March 2012. For analysis, see Jane Harrigan, The 
Political Economy of  Arab Food Sovereignty (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).
2 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Confessions, trans. Angela Scholar (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2000), 262. This popular misconception regarding Marie Antoinette was influentially attacked 
by Antonia Fraser, Marie Antoinette: The Journey (New York: Anchor, 2002), 135. Fraser’s argument 
was effectively translated onto the big screen by Sofia Coppola and, in this particular scene, 
a strikingly gothic Kirsten Dunst in Marie Antoinette (Columbia Pictures, 2006). On such evil, 
though he does not use this particular example, see Chuck Klosterman, I Wear the Black Hat: 
Grappling with Villains (Real and Imagined) (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2013).
3 On the polyvalence of  this tale and its scholarship, see Véronique Campion-Vincent and 
Christine Shojaei Kawan, “Marie-Antoinette et son célèbre dire: deux scénographies et deux 
siècles de désordres, trois niveaux de communication et trois modes accusatoires,”Annales 
historiques de la Révolution française, no. 327, (2002): 29–56, building on Antti Aarne and Stith 
Thompson, The Types of  the Folktale: A Classificaiton and Bibliography, 2nd edition (Helsinki: 
Suomalainen Tiedeaktatermia, 1961), 424.
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of  thoughts and emotions—from incredulity through consternation to righteous 
rage—that food can evoke across time and space. Disentangled from the particular 
circumstances of  Marie Antoinette and the dawning of  a particular Revolution, 
this infamous trope speaks to far deeper transhistorical processes. The incompre-
hension between rulers and subjects to which it testifies, the sometimes opaque 
wall between popular and elite politics, strikes at the very core of  human coexis-
tence. Material inequality is a polyvalent and often poorly understood force in any 
society, conducive simultaneously to emulation and jealousy, to social progress and 
disintegration, but food is somehow different. Food is so conspicuous because it is, 
by nature, existential.4
The book being republished here, almost forty years after its initial appearance, 
remains the most thoughtful and rigorous reconstruction of  the political economy 
of  subsistence in eighteenth-century France and, arguably, anywhere. No scholar 
has done more to unpack the real and symbolic importance of  bread, in France 
and elsewhere, in the past and the present, than Steven L. Kaplan. Though his 
Bread, Politics and Political Economy in the Reign of  Louis XV has often been lauded as 
magisterial, it was merely the opening salvo in what would eventually become a 
tetralogy if  not a heptalogy of  often massive tomes dedicated to analyzing and 
explaining what Kaplan would later call the “breadways” of  French history.5 To 
a naïve modern reader, this might seem like an easily circumscribed task, even in 
a bread-obsessed country like France. Yet Kaplan’s mastery, not only of  the histo-
rian’s art, but also of  its craft, makes of  the “bread nexus” a lens through which 
to view practically all aspects of  society, from popular culture to high theories of  
4 An old argument made from a variety of  ideological perspectives, for good examples of  
which see Ferdinando Galiani, Dialogues sur le commerce des bleds (Paris: N.P., 1770); Frances 
Moore Lappé and Joseph Collins, Food First: Beyond the Myth of  Scarcity (Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin, 1977); and Peter M. Rosset, Food is Different: Why We Must Get the WTO Out of  
Agriculture (London: Zed Books, 2006).
5 The main arc of  analysis could be seen to consist of  Steven L. Kaplan, Bread, Politics and 
Political Economy in the Reign of  Louis XV (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976); idem, The Famine 
Plot Persuasion in Eighteenth-Century France (Philadelphia, PA: The American Philosophical 
Society, 1982); idem, Provisioning Paris: Merchants and Millers in the Grain and Flour Trade During the 
Eighteenth Century (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984); and idem, The Bakers of  Paris and 
the Bread Question 1700–1775 (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1996), though his edition 
of  Ferdinando Galiani, La Bagarre: Galiani’s “Lost” Parody, edited with an introduction by 
Steven L. Kaplan (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1979), his Good Bread is Back: A Contemporary 
History of  French Bread, the Way it is Made, and the People who Make It, trans. C. Porter (Durham, 
NC: Duke University Press, 2006), and Le pain maudit: Retour sur la France des années oubliées, 
1945–1958 (Paris: Fayard, 2008) obviously partake in the same project. For ego-textual 
reflections on this project, see Steven L. Kaplan with Jean-Philippe de Tonnac, La France 
et son pain: Histoire d’une passion (Paris: Albin Michel, 2010) and, more obliquely, Steven L. 
Kaplan, “The 1960’s: Was Braudel a Turning-Point?,” Review, a Journal of  the Fernand Braudel 
Center XXIV, no. 1 (2001): 185–210. See also The Stakes of  Regulation: Perspectives on Bread, 
Politics and Political Economy Forty years Later (London: Anthem, 2015). On breadways, see 
idem, The Bakers of  Paris, p. 16 and passim.
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political economy: a trenchant, conscious example of  what a Lucien Febvre or a 
Fernand Braudel might have called a “total history.”6 The volume indeed straddles 
diverse historiographical traditions that all too seldom communicate: the high and 
the low, the intellectual and the socio-economic, theory and practice, focused tex-
tual analysis and broad archival wisdom.7
Fundamentally, Bread, Politics and Political Economy in the Reign of  Louis XV grap-
ples with the politics, economics and culture of  subsistence in the century leading 
up to the French Revolution. It centers on the ravages of  chronic food insecurity, 
the nature of  governmental regulation, the relationship between incessant polic-
ing of  every aspect of  the grain trade—from the planting of  seeds to the sale 
of  baked loaves—and emerging theories of  political economy, and, most par-
ticularly, on the radical nature and consequences of  dangerously flawed reforms 
adopted from 1763 onward to liberalize the grain trade. The immediate inspira-
tion for these reforms was the extremely successful work (both in theoretical terms 
and with regard to public relations) of  a sect of  political economists known as the 
Physiocrats, named for their advocacy of  “Physiocracy,” or “the rule of  nature.” 
The roots of  the modern discipline of  economics lie deep in Physiocracy, invari-
ably mentioned in scholarly work and mainstream media as the beginning of  
“scientific” economics.8
Grain regulation was not a peripheral issue in the larger enterprise of  politi-
cal economy; it cut to the core of  French society and contemporary notions of  
the social contract—not the ideal social contract theorized by the likes of  Jean-
Jacques Rousseau, but the tacit and continuously renegotiated relationship 
between citizen and authority, subject and sovereign. The Hungarian social scien-
tist Karl Polanyi asserted that all economies are by necessity embedded in wider 
social and cultural matrices, and that modern societies are subject to destabilizing 
shocks when excessive faith in nature’s supposedly self-regulating proclivities cre-
ates disorders that in turn generate counter-movements to safeguard the social 
fabric.9 As Kaplan demonstrates, Enlightenment France represents an exemplary 
6 On the “bread nexus,” see Kaplan, Bakers of  Paris, p. 9. On “total history,” see among others 
Fernand Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of  Philip II, vol. II, 
trans. Siân Reynolds (Berkeley: University of  California Press, 1995), 1238; and, generally, 
Geoff  Eley, A Crooked Line: From Cultural History to the History of  Society (Ann Arbor: University 
of  Michigan Press, 2005), 37.
7 On the difficulty of  repeating such projects today, see the similarly interdisciplinary Michael 
Sonenscher, Work & Wages: Natural Law, Politics & the Eighteenth-Century French Trades, with a 
new preface (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), xx.
8 On Physiocracy and its recent scholarship, see Sophus A. Reinert, Translating Empire: Emulation 
and the Origins of  Political Economy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011), 176–81.
9 Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of  Our Time, with a 
foreword by Joseph E. Stiglitz and a new introduction by Fred Block (1944; repr., Boston: 
Beacon Press, 2007). On Polanyi’s theory, see among others Fred Block and Margaret 
R. Somers, The Power of  Market Fundamentalism: Karl Polanyi’s Critique (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2014), 10.
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case of  these dynamics. The idea that the king was “victualer of  last resort” was 
sacrosanct in much of  Europe, and the Physiocratic project was revolutionary 
in freeing people from such conceptual paternalism in favor of  a radically new 
cosmology based on private property and a “natural order” of  self-interested and, 
crucially, self-regulating market transactions.10 Grain prices were to move freely 
according to the dictates of  supply and demand, and, in a country characterized 
by great regional variety in agricultural output, food was to find its own way to 
where it was needed most.
The theoretical tenets and reformist zeal of  Physiocracy strikingly prefigure 
the general direction taken by the economics profession in the decades leading 
up to the current crisis: indeed, the dramatic and wide-ranging reforms of  1763 
represent the original “shock doctrine,” the ur-case of  radical overnight market 
liberalization for the explicit purpose of  increasing future growth, no matter the 
short-term costs.11 However, the consequences of  real dearth—bad harvests in 
many regions—were amplified in the echo chamber of  subsistence anxiety, with 
disastrous results in a context that was simply unready for liberalization, even in 
crude infrastructural terms. The reform measures quickly led to negative supply 
shocks as grain failed to materialize when and where necessary, provoking surging 
prices as well as speculation and generating widespread unrest, suffering, riots and 
a deadly delegitimation of  royal sovereignty that would explode, under similar 
circumstances, in the years of  the Revolution.
As Kaplan observed, later scholars have nonetheless treated the Physiocrats 
well and been “warmly sympathetic to their enterprise.” Though that assess-
ment still largely holds true among professional economists, Bread, Politics and 
Political Economy in the Reign of  Louis XV represents a historiographical turning 
point, inspiring much subsequent work more attentive to the real-world conse-
quences of  economic ideas and reforms.12 Yet there is no revanchism here, no 
vilification; instead it offers a remarkably even-handed exposition of  how and 
why different actors proposed dramatically divergent policies in the face of  very 
real challenges, and why even the best of  theoretical intentions—individual free-
dom and economic development—might come to naught, and indeed become 
downright destructive, when faced with the merciless complexities of  real life. 
Many scholars have since traced the failures of  the Physiocratic “shock doc-
trine,” the emergence and eventual victory of  the so-called Antiphysiocrats and 
10 Kaplan, Bread, Politics, 7.
11 The literature on modern “shock doctrines” is extensive; see for an iconic example Naomi 
Klein, The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of  Disaster Capitalism (New York: Picador, 2007).
12 Kaplan, Bread, Politics, 115, note 43. For more recent arguments downplaying their centrality 
to the Enlightenment and the history of  political economy, not to mention their ostensible 
success, see John Shovlin, The Political Economy of  Virtue: Luxury, Patriotism, and the Origins of  the 
French Revolution (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2007), 3–4; Paul Cheney, Revolutionary 
Commerce: Globalization and the French Monarchy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
2010), 6.
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the degree to which the historical experiences of  the eighteenth century inspired 
a more Fabian mainstream of  political economy acutely aware of  the dangers of  
radicalism and the comparative virtues of  gradual reforms on the British model. 
But they stand squarely on Kaplan’s shoulders.
It is not merely rhetorical to observe that Bread, Politics and Political Economy 
may be more timely today than when it was first published. Having long enjoyed 
subsistence safety—even subsistence overabundance—in large parts of  the West-
ern world, we have come to take it for granted. In many countries today, the 
problem is not that people don’t eat enough but that they eat too much, and 
we find ourselves unfit to face the cruel, de-civilizing dynamics of  hunger and 
unrest. Yet after this long period of  seemingly increasing food security, the world 
suddenly seems more complicated again; even its most advanced market societ-
ies have had to learn once more that supply and demand for crucial goods and 
services do not always reach ideal equilibria in emergencies, and that the veneer 
of  civilization can be fatally thin in the face of  nature’s fury.13 Indeed, questions 
of  subsistence, security and political economy, and most crucially of  our rela-
tionship to nature and the right role for government, are now more central to our 
preoccupations than they have been since World War II. And by most accounts, 
large parts of  the world are again—or still—facing great uncertainty regard-
ing climate, resources and the most basic access to food and water.14 A more 
 historically-grounded awareness of  past experiences can help us navigate our 
uncertain future, and Kaplan’s magnum opus remains our most rigorous recon-
struction of  precisely such a moment. 
Social disintegration has been hunger’s constant companion throughout the 
ages, from the ancient world through the great man-made famines of  the nine-
teenth and twentieth centuries. The Stoic philosopher Seneca, after all, warned 
of  “the general revolution that follows famine,” because “a hungry people neither 
listens to reason, nor is appeased by justice, nor is bent by any entreaty.”15 And 
even when dearth and famine have failed to foment revolution, they have invari-
ably been vehicles of  trauma and the destruction of  social bonds, even descending 
to the unfathomable point, in such settings as Stalinist Russia and Maoist China, 
of  familial cannibalism.16 To think about the political economy of  subsistence is 
13 For the case of  buses to facilitate escape from New Orleans during Hurricane Katrina, for 
example, see the essays in Cedric Johnson, ed., The Neoliberal Deluge: Hurricane Katrina, Late 
Capitalism, and the Remaking of  New Orleans (Minneapolis: University of  Minnesota Press, 2011).
14 For an impressionistic sample, see Brahma Chellaney, Water: Asia’s New Battleground (Washington, 
D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2013); Ian Christoplos and Adam Pain, eds., New Challenges 
to Food Security: From Climate Change to Fragile States (Milton Road: Routledge, 2015).
15 Seneca, De brevitate vitae, 18.5, in Seneca, Moral Essays, vol. II, trans. John W. Basore 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1932), 349.
16 See, among endless others, Peter Garnsey, Famine and Food Supply in the Graeco-Roman World: 
Responses to Risk and Crisis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); Emma C. Spary, 
Feeding France: New Sciences of  Food, 1760–1815 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 
270; Christine Kinealy, The Great Irish Famine: Impact, Ideology, and Rebellion (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
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to think about the nature of  society, and one can ask for no better guide to these 
abundant fields than Kaplan, whose Bread, Politics and Political Economy is among 
those all-too-rare works that transcend their subject matter to speak to perennial 




Macmillan, 2001), 27; Mike Davis, The Late Victorian Holocaust: El Niño Famines and the Making of  
the Third World (London: Verso, 2000); Orlando Figes, A People’s Tragedy: The Russian Revolution, 
1891–1924 (London: Penguin, 1998), 15 and passim; Timothy Snyder, Bloodlands: Europe Between 
Hitler and Stalin (New York: Basic Books, 2012), 50–55 and passim; and Yang Jisheng, Tombstone: 
The Great Chinese Famine 1958–1962, trans. Stacy Mosher and Guo Jian; ed. Edward Friedman, 
Guo Jian and Stacy Mosher (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2012).
17 For Kaplan's own take on his first book, and on much of  the relevant scholarship since its 
publication in 1976, see The Stakes of  Regulation, a sort of  companion volume to the second 
edition of  Bread, Politics and Political Economy.
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Modern times has invented its own brand of  apocalypse. Fam-
ine is no longer one of  the familiar outriders. The problems of  
material life, and their political and psychological implications, 
have changed drastically in the course of  the past two hundred 
years. Perhaps nothing has more profoundly affected our insti-
tutions and our attitudes than the creation of  a technology of  
abundance. Even the old tropes have given way: neither dollars 
nor calories can measure the distance which separates gagne-pain 
from gagne-bifteck.1
Yet the concerns of  this book seem much less remote today than 
they did when it was conceived in the late sixties. In the past few years 
we have begun to worry, with a sort of  expiatory zeal, about the state 
of  our environment, the size of  our population, the political economy 
and the morality of  the allocation of  goods and jobs, and the future 
of  our resources. While computer projections cast a Malthusian pall 
over our world, we have had a bitter, first-hand taste of  shortages of  
all kinds. The sempiternal battle between producers and consumers 
rages with a new ferocity, as high prices provoke anger on the one 
side and celebration on the other. Even as famines continue to strike 
the Third World in the thermidor of  the green revolution, so we have 
discovered hunger in our own midst. The historian of  pre-industrial 
 1 Although the French have substantially reduced their bread consumption, nutrition experts 
still accuse them of  eating too many cereal calories. Michel Cépède, “Le Régime alimentaire 
des Français,” in Encyclopédie française, ed. by G. Berger (Paris, 1955), XIV, 14. 42. 4. The 
Paris bakers, drawing with fine discrimination on the popular medical literature, claim 
on the the contrary that consumers eat too much meat and not enough bread. The most 
engaging source for this point of  view is Pierre Poilâne, 8, rue du Cherche Midi, Paris 6e.
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Europe has always been able to find analogies and metaphors in press 
reports from Asia and Africa about “famine plots,” crowds pillaging 
storehouses, governments promulgating draconian measures against 
food hoarders and speculators, and famished consumers obdurately 
rejecting unfamiliar staple substitutes. Now the historian experiences 
the same eerie feeling of  déjà-vu when he reads front-page articles in the 
New York Times about monstrous international wheat deals. Now that 
scarcity looms as part of  our future, it is easier to make the case that 
it is also a heritage of  our past—a heritage worth knowing, if  not 
commemorating. Though we are not terrified by the same fears that 
obsessed our ancestors, we now have a keener sense of  the burdens 
of  subsistence and survival.
The subsistence problem dominated life in old-regime Europe in 
a merciless and unremitting way. No issue was more urgent, more 
pervasively felt, and more difficult to resolve than the matter of  
grain provisioning. Cereal-dependence conditioned every phase of  
social life.2 Grain was the pilot sector of  the economy; beyond its 
determinant role in agriculture, directly and indirectly grain shaped 
the development of  commerce and industry, regulated employment, 
and provided a major source of  revenue for the state, the church, 
the nobility, and large segments of  the Third Estate. subsistence 
needs gave cereal-dependence its most telling expression. The vast 
majority of  people in the Old Regime derived the bulk of  their 
calories from cereals, in bread or some other form. Never did the 
old proverb “a man is what he eats” hold truer. Because most of  
the people were poor, the quest for subsistence preoccupied them 
relentlessly; the study of  how they dealt with their never-ending 
subsistence problem tells us a good deal about who and what they 
were.
Grain dependence was an obsession as well as a servitude because 
the cereals economy was an economy of  scarcity and uncertainty. 
The dread of  shortage and hunger haunted this society. The line 
separating critical from ordinary times was perilously thin and 
 protean. The menace of  crisis never disappeared, for it was impos-
sible to predict, assure, or apportion the harvests, or to evade the 
consequences of  nature’s caprices or of  human vice or error. 
Cereal dependence produced a chronic sense of  insecurity, which 
 2 The fact that in ordinary times the bulk of  the population had to spend about 50 percent of  its 
income on the bread ration and in critical times virtually all of  it is one striking measure of  
this dependence. see Labrousse’s works, cited below in note 6 and Georges Lefebvre, Études 
orléanaises (Paris, 1962), I, 218.
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caused contemporaries to view their world in terms that may strike 
us as lugubriously overdrawn.3 This dependence generated fears and 
attitudes which had a powerful reality of  their own, apart from the 
“objective” reality of, say, harvest results. Indeed, these fears and 
attitudes helped to make prices, to determine trade patterns and 
practices, and to prompt governmental action. Eighteenth-century 
administrators and writers insisted emphatically on the distinction to 
be made, in terms of  cause, between a “real” dearth and a dearth “of  
opinion,” but they could not deny that the effects were very much the 
same in the two cases.
While cereal dependence reinforced the deep cleavages in society 
between the haves and the have-nots, the consumers and the produc-
ers, and the city and the countryside, the subsistence obsession also 
forged curious ties of  solidarity between the governors and the gov-
erned. The government, at all levels, worried about the food supply as 
earnestly as the consumers. subsistence was the chief  common interest 
that attached them to each other; their shared anxiety to deal success-
fully with the subsistence problem served as a sort of  mutual guaran-
tee of  fidelity and responsibility. A particularly disastrous harvest, or a 
series of  short crops, in addition to setting the ration and price of  sur-
vival, unleashed a terrible multiplier effect, producing widespread dis-
order: social, economic, and psychic. The government strained to do 
everything in its power to avert this kind of  disarray, or at least to limit 
its depredations. It nervously tracked the phases of  the harvest cycle, 
as if  vigilance, like some rite of  propitiation, were itself  a mode of  
prophylaxis. The ministry gathered data on the planting immediately 
following the harvest; it waited impatiently through the course of  the 
winter until the spring began to betray “appearances” and the serious 
wagering on the likelihood of  a good crop could begin; it agonized 
as the tension mounted during the soudure, that seemingly intermina-
ble period, sometimes a month, sometimes as many as three or four, 
which marked the time after the supply of  “old” grain had become 
scarce and before the new crop was ready to be taken. Meanwhile, 
 3 staff  of  life and symbol of  salvation, grain was also, in the eyes of  several eighteenth century 
social critics, the mark of  bondage and misery. s.-N.-H. Linguet, Réponse aux docteurs modernes 
(London, 1771), parts I and II, 158–90; Linguet, Du Pain et du bled in Oeuvres, VI (London, 
1774), passim; Linguet, Annales politiques, civiles et littéraires du 18e siècle, VII (Nov. 1770), 169–78; 
L.-s. Mercier, Tableau de Paris (Amsterdam, 1783) VI, 124 and passim.
On the anguish over tomorrow’s subsistence, see the illuminating remarks of  Robert 
Mandrou, Introduction à la France moderne: essai de psychologie historique, 1500–1640 (Paris, 1961), 
21, 34–35.
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regional and local agencies of  government took various measures 
designed to meet their own provisioning requirements.
Nor were subsistence doubts fully allayed even by a good harvest, 
for there were still perils and delays to face. A “good” harvest crudely 
measured in terms of  visible output did not necessarily mean high-
quality, high-yield grain. Freshly-cut grain (and, to a lesser degree, 
new flour) could not be used immediately for consumption, except 
at the risk of  endangering the health of  consumers or producing 
unpalatable bread—a terrible provocation. In some seasons, atmo-
spheric calm, flooding, freezing, or low water resulted in a secondary 
form of  subsistence crisis—a flour crisis, for in these conditions the 
 millstones could not convert grain, however abundant it was, into 
usable  foodstuff.
It would be wrong to give the impression that subsistence was purely 
a function of  meteorological accidents, before or after the harvest.4 Ideal 
weather, from september through August and beyond, was not by itself  
a guarantee of  subsistence. There was still a vast distance to traverse 
between the fields and the tables of  consumers. This was the space (and 
the time) covered by the process of  distribution. Distribution was an 
even more delicate and complex matter than production, for it was con-
tingent upon many more variables—economic, administrative, legal, 
geographical, historical, technological, social, psychological, and politi-
cal. Distribution depended upon modes of  transporation and communi-
cation links, conservation techniques, market systems, the organization 
of  the grain and flour trades, the degree of  integration and commer-
cialization of  the milling and baking industries, the brokerage function, 
the development of  credit institutions, local foodways, the availability 
 4 Although weather was an admittedly capricious, irresistible, and politically neutral force, 
superbly equipped to absorb consensual blame, it rarely functioned as a credible scapegoat 
for dearth in the Old Regime. Public officials were more favorably disposed to a non-
naturalistic explanation because acknowledging publicly that a dearth was due to natural 
calamity was tantamount to confessing that it was beyond control. Authorities believed that 
such an avowal of  helplessness would exacerbate difficulties by reinforcing the disaster cues 
received by the public. Moreover, the consumers and many officials believed deeply in the 
natural abundance of  France, even as they dreaded the recurrence of  scarcity. Given the 
inordinate richness of  French arable, ceteris paribus, dearths should not have erupted as often as 
they did. This attitude nurtured a conspiratorial turn of  mind: the conviction that dearths 
were more often than not unnatural in their origins, the result of  evil-doings along the path 
of  distribution. see, in this regard, the vain efforts of  the comte de st.-Priest to persuade 
a band of  Parisian women early in the Revolution that the dearth was the product of  bad 
weather and that “... the king was no more capable of  making wheat grow than of  making 
it rain....” Mémoires, ed. by baron de Barante (Paris, 1929), II, 14–15.
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of  food surrogates, local social structure and employment patterns, 
relationships between town and country, competition for hinterland, 
local and regional “custom” in legal and socioeconomic terms, the 
implantation and operation of  overlapping or rival police jurisdic-
tions, the collective subsistence memory of  the community, local atti-
tudes toward commerce, the conventional understanding of  the law, 
the degree of  interest of  regional and central administrators in local 
affairs—the list could be extended generously.
Though the subject is far from exhausted, it has been many years 
since historians have seriously studied provisioning in the eighteenth 
century.5 There are a number of  reasons for this neglect. First of  
all, the evidence: it is elusive and scant, despite the overwhelming 
presence of  the subsistence problem in the Old Regime. Moreover, it 
tends to focus on the pathological experiences, the record of  devia-
tion rather than the chronicle of  what was normal (though, to be 
sure, the boundary separating them is not always clearly marked). We 
can learn a good deal about times of  catastrophe but it is much more 
difficult to see what happened in the ephemeral years which left no 
monuments to their passage. The inherent bias of  the evidence rein-
forces the indifference that historians often manifest toward the study 
of  the banalities of  everyday life. Understandably, the subsistence 
problem has generally acquired importance, from the historian’s van-
tage point, in the breach, when it leads to one sort of  disaster or 
another. It is no accident that the subsistence question has most often 
been investigated in the context of  the French Revolution.
 5 The most important contributions in recent years have been made by Richard Cobb. They 
pertain almost exclusively to the Revolutionary period. see below, note number 14. When 
Jean Meuvret’s thesis on agricultural and subsistence problems in the seventeenth century 
appears it will render invaluable service to those interested in grain questions. Despite 
the handful of  pioneering studies which appeared in the early part of  this century (e.g., 
J. Letaconnoux, Les Subsistances et le commerce des grains en Bretagne au XVIIIe siècle (Rennes, 1909); 
Charles Desmarest, Le Commerce des grains dans la généralité de Rouen à la fin de l’ancien régime 
(Paris, 1926); Louis Viala, La Question des grains et leur commerce à Toulouse au 18e siècle (Toulouse, 
1909); Pierre Lefèvre, Le Commerce des grains et la question du pain à Lille de 1713 à 1789 (Lille, 
1925)), there is still a great deal of  work to be done on the grain trade and the entire 
bread nexus on the local level. The standard work on the grain trade on a national scale, 
G. Afanassiev, Le Commerce des céréales en France au 18e siècle (Paris, 1894), though it contains 
much useful information, is often misleading or erroneous, sketchy, superficial or tendentious 
in interpretation, and badly dated. A. P. Usher’s The History of  the Grain Trade in France 
1400–1700 (Cambridge, Mass., 1913) is extremely suggestive but it is a very rapid survey. For 
Paris, Léon Cahen’s articles—too numerous to cite here—mark a beginning. But here too 
the bulk of  the work remains to be done.
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secondly, given its very character, eighteenth-century France 
invites attention elsewhere, particularly during the long reign of  
Louis XV. It was a century of  extraordinary national efflorescence 
in virtually every domain. France was the richest, the most popu-
lous, and among the most cohesive states in Europe. Culturally, the 
French exercised an astonishing hegemony, throughout the Western 
world and in some instances beyond. If  domestic politics were often 
turbulent, nevertheless there were remarkably few social repercus-
sions: compared to the seventeenth century, the eighteenth century 
seems placid. Economically, this was an era of  expansion and vitality, 
especially after 1730. And it seemed less noteworthy that the poor—
the bulk of  the population—remained poor or became poorer than 
that certain segments of  society enjoyed heady prosperity. Histori-
ans of  the eighteenth century are always gazing beyond, diverted 
if  not transfixed by the great moments which mark the end of  the 
epoch. Quite naturally, they have tended to concentrate on the por-
tents of  change and the innovations rather than on the familiar and 
the immutable.
Finally, the conceptual and methodological framework which has 
had the greatest influence on the shape of  historical inquiry into 
eighteenth-century France during the past generation—the brilliant 
Labroussean model, derived from exhaustive studies of  grain prices—
has ironically deflected attention away from subsistence-type problems.6 
It has encouraged surrender to the historiographical tyranny exercised 
by the Revolution, reducing the Old Regime to a mere prelude. It has 
also given primacy to the “long-run” view. skillfully employed, the 
long-run approach is a superb analytical tool. But it is capable, too, of  
obscuring and distorting historical reality. subsistence and provision-
ing are questions of  short-run determination and significance. In the 
long-run perspective, it is hard to take stock of  day-to-day problems 
of  survival; they are overlooked, averaged out, or grouped and sub-
sumed under certain clinical rubrics and treated more or less casually 
as predictable and tiresome accidents, spasms, or outliers. In complic-
ity with the disdain for the “event” which has accompanied it, the 
 6 C. E. Labrousse, Esquisse du mouvement des prix et des revenus en France au 18e siècle (Paris, 1933) 
and La Crise de l’économie française à la fin de l’ancien régime et au début de la révolution (Paris, 1944); 
Fernand Braudel and Labrousse, eds., Histoire économique et sociale de la France, Vol. II: Des 
Derniers temps de l’âge seigneurial aux préludes de l’âge industriel (1660–1789) (Paris, 1970).
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long-run approach can generate an abstract, homogenized social his-
tory devoid of  flesh and blood and unconvincing despite its scientific 
cachet.7
Labrousse’s pioneering achievements helped to inspire interest in 
historical demography, a field which has made stunning conquests 
in the short time that it has existed. The ardor of  the demographic 
historians has tended to bolster a certain long-run insouciance. 
On the one hand, demographers are interested in individuals and 
events—the vital events of  birth, death, etc. On the other hand, these 
historians are understandably impatient to make sense of  the long-
term transformations which imperceptibly yet radically modify the 
character of  society. One of  their foremost teachers and forebears, 
the late Jean Meuvret, was perhaps the first to suggest the chang-
ing nature of  demographic crises, from the murderous crises of  
the grim seventeenth century to the “larvated” crises of  the far less 
 Malthusian eighteenth century. For Meuvret, a “revolution” separated 
the two worlds, though neither he nor his followers have succeeded 
in clearly defining and ranking the causes of  this putative revolution.8
The implications, however, are plain: for whatever reasons, sub-
sistence problems were far less acute under Louis XV than they had 
been under his immediate predecessors. Indeed, it is now even pos-
sible to infer that subsistence was no longer really an issue for the 
men of  the Enlightenment and the flourishing “phase A.” No one 
has since questioned the claim that the era of  famines ended in 1709. 
One economist, with the slogans of  May 1968 reverberating in his 
mind, has marked 1709 as the beginning of  the age of  the “society 
of  consumption.”9 Historical demographers of  the “young school”—
Dupâquier at their head—now confidently contend that “nobody 
died of  hunger any more in France after 1710,” an assertion which 
 7 There is some evidence, though it is not without ambiguity, that the “event” is making a 
discreet comeback in French scientific circles. see the special number of  Communications, 18 
(1972).
 8 Jean Meuvret, “Les Crises de subsistances et la démographie de la France d’ancien régime,” 
Population, I (Oct.–Dec. 1946), 643–50; Meuvret, “La Géographie des prix des céréales et les 
anciennes économies européennes: prix méditerranéens, prix continentaux, prix atlantiques 
à la fin du 17e siècle,” Revista de Economia, IV (June 1951), 64; Meuvret, “Les Mouvements des 
prix de 1661 à 1715 et leurs répercussions,” Journal de la société de statistique de Paris, LXXXV 
(May–June 1944), 109–19; Labrousse, Crise, 182–84; Marcel Reinhard, “Les Répercussions 
démographiques des crises de subsistances en France au 18e siècle,” Actes du 81e Congrès des 
Sociétés Savantes, Rouen et Caen, 1956 (Paris, 1956), 67. Armand Husson crudely anticipated 
Meuvret’s conclusions. Les Consommations de Paris (Paris, 1875), 180–81.
 9 Jean Fourastié in l’Express (9–15 Feb. 1970), 70–71.
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continues to trouble some old hands like Pierre Goubert, Meuvret’s 
leading student, and some new ones like Michel Morineau and 
Georges Frêche.10
There are a number of  points to be made about the findings of  
the demographic school. Firstly, as I suggested above, the history of  
the subsistence problem is not coterminous with the history of  subsis-
tence crises, for the former was chronic and omnipresent rather than 
spasmodic. secondly, until there is more evidence, and until we have 
a better understanding of  the relationship between scarcity on the one 
hand and morbidity and mortality on the other, it is premature to 
pronounce the eclipse of  even the “killing” subsistence crisis. Thirdly, 
mortality is not always a reliable or sufficient measure for the signifi-
cance or acuity of  a subsistence crisis. subsistence crises can have a 
seismic impact on individuals, communities, and institutions without 
claiming lives on a massive scale. The demographic test should not be 
the sole litmus for the existence of  a subsistence crisis.
Fourthly, we must place the results of  demographic research in his-
torical context; we must not allow the total picture of  the past which it 
retrospectively constructs to distort our vision of  what actually hap-
pened at any given point in time. We know, for example, all the naiveté 
which Maxime du Camp required to write: “Contemporary testimo-
nies unanimously show that the whole eighteenth century was but 
10 Jacques Dupâquier, “sur la population française au 17e et au 18e siècles,” Revue historique, 
CCXXIX (Jan.–Mar. 1968), 66 and passim and his extremely provocative “De l’Animal à 
l’homme: le mécanisme autorégulateur des populations traditionnelles,” Revue de l’Institut de 
Sociologie (1972), no. 2, 177–211. Cf. Voltaire’s similar opinion, setting the eclipse of  killing 
subsistence crises even earlier. Petit écrit sur l’arrêt du conseil du 13 septembre 1774 (Jan. 1775) 
in Oeuvres complétes de Voltaire, ed. by Beaumarchais, et al. (Kehl. 1784–89), XXX, 541; J.-B. 
Briatte, a philosophe interested in the problem of  poverty, attacked Voltaire (“the philosophe 
adulator of  power and opulence”) for claiming that the “horrible famines” of  1709 and 
1740 did not kill (“this consoling lie”). Offrande à l’humanité (Amsterdam, 1780), 132n. In the 
present-day controversy, Goubert, if  he is not frankly in the Briatte camp, nevertheless has 
serious reservations about the Voltaire-Dupâquier position. see Goubert’s contribution in 
Braudel and Labrousse, eds., Histoire économique et sociale, II, 3–84 and “Un Quart de siècle 
de démographie historique: bilan et réflexions,” Hommage à Marcel Reinhard (Paris, 1973), 
315–23. see also Morineau’s iconoclastic work, cited in note 15 below and Frêche’s mass 
of  granite, Toulouse et la région Midi-Pyrénées au siècle des lumières (N.p., 1974–75). A recent study 
which argues for the extinction of  killing crises (they “died mysteriously with the second 
decade of  the eighteenth century”), but for the proliferation of  misery is Olwen H. Hufton, 
The Poor of  Eighteenth Century France, 1750–1789 (Oxford, 1974), 13–15. Pierre Chaunu also 
charts out a moderate (but vigorous!) position on this issue. Histoire, science sociale (Paris, 1974), 
346–47.
 INTRODUCTION xxvii
one long dearth.”11 Yet there is no doubt that many contemporaries 
perceived their world in this way. From this psychological perspec-
tive, it would be pointless to belabor the significance of  the shift from 
one demographic “régime” to another or to insist upon the reduction 
of  amplitude of  price oscillations, for there is little indication that 
contemporaries received the news. Without the benefit of  moving 
averages and a comparative framework, they were much less likely to 
be impressed by the advent of  new times than we are today. In this 
sense, regardless of  the global balance sheets of  the demographic 
historians, we will still be able to acknowledge the validity of  the por-
traits painted by Michelet and Taine of  the extreme precariousness 
of  “popular” life.
Finally, within the problématique of  the demographic school, there 
remain a number of  crucial unanswered questions. One I mentioned 
above: why did the “old demographic régime” give way to a new one? 
Historians have hinted at many possible explanations, none of  which 
has yet been rigorously tested: better hygiene and medicine, less harsh 
climate, better transportation, innovations in technology, improve-
ments in market organization and linkage, the emergence of  a more 
refined style of  warfare, changes in the nature of  diseases and per-
haps also in the characteristics of  their carriers and the susceptibilities 
of  their hosts, development of  new food tastes and variation of  diet, 
improved administrative practices, and progress in agriculture.12
Among these, the question of  agricultural production and produc-
tivity has received the most careful attention in recent years. Unless 
it can be shown that agriculture progressed (in one sense or another) 
significantly in the eighteenth century, it will be extremely difficult to 
account for the population growth, which is universally acknowledged. 
To be sure, historians no longer write about a “demographic  revolution,” 
11 Maxime du Camp, Paris, ses organes, ses fonctions et sa vie dans la seconde moitié du 19e siècle (Paris, 
1869–75), II, 23.
12 see Goubert in Braudel and Labrousse, eds., Histoire économique et sociale, II, 55–84; Labrousse 
in ibid., 694–95; Pierre Léon, Économies et sociétés pré-industrielles, 1650–1780 (Paris, 1780), 
II, 221–22; Jean Meyer, La Noblesse bretonne au 18e siècle (Paris, 1966), I, 488n; Louis Henry, 
“The Population of  France in the 18th Century,” in Population and History, ed. by D.V. Glass 
and D.E.C. Eversley (London, 1965), 448; Karl F. Helleiner, “The Population of  Europe 
from the Black Death to the Eve of  the Vital Revolution,” in The Cambridge Economic History 
of  Europe, IV, ed. by E.E. Rich and C.H. Wilson (Cambridge, 1967), 92–93; F. Braudel and 
F. spooner, “Prices in Europe from 1450 to 1750,” in ibid., 395–96. Cf. François Lebrun, Les 
Hommes et la mort en Anjou aux 17e et 18e siècles (Paris, 1971), 368 and Joseph Ruwet, et al., Marché 
des céréales à Ruremonde, Luxembourg, Namur, et Diest aux 17e et 18e siècles, Recueil de Travaux 
d’Histoire et de Philologie (Louvain, 1966), 43.
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but it is generally accepted that the population of  France on the whole 
advanced by between one-fifth and two-fifths in the course of  the cen-
tury. (Nor can one even here dispose of  “causes” with absolute cer-
tainty: were mortality changes alone responsible for this increase?)13 The 
best recent scholarship on agricultural production points to a differen-
tial scheme of  growth, varying from thumping development in certain 
areas to stagnation in others, but with a generally positive balance-sheet 
for the kingdom as a whole.14
At the same time, Michel Morineau has challenged the sanguine 
portrait of  a decidedly “modern” eighteenth century which breaks 
with the past in demographic and economic terms. He is not at all 
convinced that the eighteenth century witnessed the emergence of  
a new demographic regime, he rejects the idea of  an agricultural 
13 Though the analysis is not yet complete, it is likely that Louis Henry’s I.N.E.D. study will 
show that population growth was faster and greater in the eighteenth century than we have 
supposed. Perhaps the next generaton of  historians will again feel authorized to write about 
a “demographic revolution”!
14 E. Le Roy Ladurie, “Première esquisse d’une conjoncture,” in J. Goy and Le Roy Ladurie, 
eds., Les Fluctuations du produit de la dîme: conjoncture décimale et domaniale de la fin du moyen âge au 
18e siècle (Paris, 1972), 367–74. see also Labrousse in Braudel and Labrousse, eds., Histoire 
économique et sociale, II, 696–97; E. Le Roy Ladurie, “L’histoire immobile,” Annales: économies, 
sociétés, civilisations, XXIX (May-June 1974), 673–692; E. Le Roy Ladurie, “Pour un modèle 
de l’économie rurale française au 18e siècle,” Cahiers d’histoire, XIX (1974), 5–27; B.H. slicher 
van Bath, “Eighteenth Century Agriculture on the Continent of  Europe: Evolution or 
Revolution,” Agricultural History, XLIII (Jan. 1969), 173–79; André J. Bourde, Agronomie et 
agronomes en France au 18e siècle (Paris, 1967), I, 20–21 and II, 1572–85; J.-C. Toutain, Le 
Produit de l’agriculture française de 1700 à 1958 in Cahiers de l’I.S.E.A., supplement, no. 115 
(1961); Le Roy Ladurie, “Les Comptes fantastiques de Gregory King,” Annales: économies, 
sociétés, civilisations, 23rd year (sept.-Oct. 1968), 1086–1102; Robert Mandrou, La France 
aux 17e et 18e siècles (Paris, 1967), 124–25; Jean Bastié, La Croissance de la banlieue parisienne 
(Paris, 1964), 82; Marc Bloch, “Transformations techniques,” Journal de psychologie normale et 
pathologique, XLI (Jan.-March 1948), 107; A. Moreau de Jonnès, “statistique des céréales de 
 la France. Le blé, la culture, sa production, sa consommation, son commerce,” Journal des 
économistes, IV (Jan.–March 1843), 129–66, 309–19. Léon Cahen, who did such remarkable 
work on material culture, took a markedly pessimistic view of  French agriculture (“The 
production of  grain is on the average deficient.”). “Le Pacte de famine et les spéculations sur 
les blés,” Revue historique, CLII (May–June 1926), 35. Cole and Deane saw little evidence for a 
rise in output per head. W.A. Cole and Phyllis Deane, “The Growth of  National Incomes,” 
in H.J. Habakkuk and M. Postan, eds., The Cambridge Economic History of  Europe (Cambridge, 
1966), VI, part I, 5–6, 11. Richard Cobb, the leading authority on subsistence questions in 
the revolutionary period, has steadfastly maintained that throughout the eighteenth century 
the subsistence problem was above all a problem of  distribution rather than production. 
“Le Ravitaillement des villes sous la terreur; la question des arrivages,” Bulletin de la Société 
d’Histoire Moderne, 53rd year (April–June 1954), 8–12; Terreur et subsistances, 1793–95: Études 
d’histoire révolutionnaire (Paris, 1965); and The Police and the People: French Popular Protest, 1789–
1820 (Oxford, 1970).
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revolution along with the notion of  a demographic one, he persists 
in attributing significant “mortalities” to recurring subsistence crises, 
and he questions the now classical dichotomy between a somber sev-
enteenth century and a dynamic eighteenth century.15 Recently, too, 
it seems that Labrousse has retreated slightly from his earlier position, 
maintaining now that the Malthusian race between population and 
agriculture in the eighteenth century ended in what looks very much 
like a tie.16
A great deal of  research in this domain is just coming to fruition. 
Louis Henry’s massive retrospective survey at the Institut National 
d’Études Démographiques and Jacques Dupâquier’s pioneering 
investigations at the École des Hautes Études en sciences sociales (the 
ci-devant sixième section) will clarify our notions about population. 
We will know considerably more about production and productivity 
after the second round of  the tithe studies—this one of   international 
scope—conducted by Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie and Joseph Goy 
of  the E.H.E.s.s. Georges Frêche promises a vast publication on the 
mercuriales; it is to be hoped, too, that he and Michel Morineau will 
continue to challenge the conventional definitions and methods. sev-
eral of  Pierre Goubert’s students are engaged in regional inquiries—
on the model of  Beauvais one trusts; and Goubert himself  is preparing 
Jean Meuvret’s long-awaited “thesis” for publication.
To complement this work on supply and demand, we urgently need 
a series of  studies on the distribution side of  the subsistence problem. 
shockingly little is known about the grain and flour trades even in 
metropolitan areas. Nor have the baking and milling industries fared 
any better.17 Attention must also be addressed to the police of  provi-
sioning, market organization, public victualing, and the dearths and 
crises of  the eighteenth century. No one will be able to deal con-
fidently with the subsistence question until this solid foundation is 
erected on the local and regional scales.
15 Michel Morineau, “Y a-t-il eu une révolution agricole en France au 18e siècle?” Revue 
historique, CCXLII (April–June 1968), 299–326 and more fully in Les Faux-Semblants d’un 
démarrage économique: agriculture et démographie en France au 18e siècle (Paris, 1971), 67–68, 86, 
passim. see also his “Réflexions tardives” in Goy and Le Roy Ladurie, eds., Dîme, 331. It 
seems to me less important to catalogue Morineau’s methodological crimes and interpretive 
inconsistencies—as many reviewers have done—than to take note of  the enormous heuristic 
value of  his contribution.
16 Labrousse in Braudel and Labrousse, eds., Histoire économique et sociale, II, 697–98.
17 I am completing monographs on the bakery and the bread problem in eighteenth century 
Paris and on the grain and flour trades and the milling industry in the Paris region.
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II
This book deals with the subsistence problem in the 1760’s and 1770’s 
when the concerns of  politics and of  provisioning dramatically inter-
sected at the national as well as the grassroots levels. There are two 
major focuses of  analyses. The first, which I call liberalization, is a 
radical reform of  the grain trade undertaken in 1763–64. The second 
is a severe subsistence crisis which jarred the entire kingdom in the last 
decade of  the reign of  Louis XV. The aim of  this book is to explain 
the genesis of  the reforms and the crisis, examine their relationship, 
and assess the profound impact they had upon French life.
The main theme of  liberalization is the shift from control to free-
dom, from intervention to laissez-faire, from police to political econ-
omy. I consider the liberal laws of  1763–64 to be among the most 
daring and revolutionary reforms attempted in France before 1789. 
Renouncing a stewardship it had exercised, so it seemed, from time 
immemorial, the royal government broke an unwritten covenant with 
consumers and proclaimed that subsistence was no longer its overrid-
ing responsibility. The consumers lost their privileged identity as the 
people even as grain lost its privileged status in commerce and public 
life. The politico-moral claims of  the people were superseded by the 
natural rights of  proprietors in the esteem of  the king. subsistence 
became a matter for the individual to work out on his own.
Trapped in a political, economic, and fiscal cul-de-sac, the gov-
ernment conceived the grain reform as a gateway to a new age. It 
assigned itself  a new role and endorsed values alien to the corporate 
ethos of  the Old Regime. Liberalization was not merely an experi-
ment in (a theoretically) free market economy, though in this regard 
alone it was of  enormous significance. It was a crucial stage in the 
transformation of  the relations between state and society, the gover-
nors and the governed, the individual and the collectivity, political 
power and economic power, producers and consumers, the public sec-
tor and the private sector. Liberalization was the story, on the one side, 
of  an avid appetite for change based on an exciting and liberating 
view of  the future free from the barbarities and stupidities of  the past, 
and, on the other, of  passionate resistance, not to change per se, but to 
a specific kind of  change that seemed to strike at the very heart of  the 
public interest and promised a future replete with uncertainties and 
 insecurities. The crisis which engulfed liberalization was a crisis in the 
process of  modernization—a crisis at once political, socioeconomic, 
administrative, intellectual, and moral.
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This crisis began as a subsistence crisis; its course of  development 
is my other chief  preoccupation. It was marked by the most serious 
and widespread eruption of  disorder in the long reign of  Louis XV. 
The consumer-people became desperate as prices doubled and tri-
pled, supplies became scarce, wages lagged behind prices, unemploy-
ment spread, and “panic terror,” as contemporaries called it, set in. 
Though they were startling in their incidence and intensity, the reac-
tions of  the consumers threatened by shortage and hunger were more 
or less predictable. What jolted the royal government was the response 
of  the police. In a sense, the police rioted, too. They rioted against 
the liberal reforms which tied their hands and which they blamed for 
the acuity of  the subsistence difficulties. The police and the people 
formed the nucleus of  a powerful, albeit disparate,  coalition of  oppo-
sition to liberalization which crystallized between 1765 and 1768. 
Ultimately, several of  the parlements took the lead in the campaign 
against the liberal reforms, even as several other parlements had been 
at the head of  the liberal lobby. Just at the moment when historians 
usually emphasize the unity of  the sovereign courts, on this crucial 
issue they were deeply divided. similar fissures appeared in the com-
munity of  philosophes; traumatized by the crisis, many philosophes 
found that they could not support liberty in all its avatars.
The sixties have always been known to historians as a decade of  
crisis, but for different reasons than the ones I have proposed. In the 
standard view, the crisis was the Brittany Affair and the dénouement 
was the “coup d’état” mounted by Chancellor Maupeou. Without 
denying the importance of  the constitutional issue, I suggest that the 
standard view requires major revisions.18
Throughout the troubles in the four or five years following the 
reforms, the ministry did not flinch in its commitment to liberaliza-
tion. Rarely in the course of  the Old Regime had a government shown 
greater determination to defend a highly controversial innovation. At 
first, the ministry blithely denied that there was a genuine provision-
ing problem; later, it argued that the difficulties would resolve them-
selves, provided public officials refrained from taking action (save to 
18 Obscured as a result of  the traditional emphasis on the constitutional issue and the recent 
tendency to locate a surge of  prosperity in the post-war years, the crisis of  liberalization has 
also been eclipsed by the flourishing historiographical cult of  Turgot. see, for example, the 
serious misapprehensions about the liberalization experience and the crisis of  the late sixties 
and early seventies in an otherwise fascinating piece by Pierre Vilar, “Motín de Esquilache 
et crises d’ancien régime, Historia Iberica (1973), 11–13.
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repress disorders). An exception was made in favor of  Paris, for which 
a special fund of  king’s grain had been constituted. Ironically, the assis-
tance that the government tried to organize for the benefit of  the capi-
tal provoked charges that the government was secretly speculating on 
the people’s hunger under the cover of  liberty. Liberalization helped 
to give shape to what came to be called the “famine pact.” Though the 
famine plot persuasion was nothing new, liberalization gave it a cor-
rosive political edge. It seriously compromised the liberal ministries of  
the sixties and continued to undermine public confidence in the king 
and in public authority until the end of  the Old Regime.
A deepening economic crisis, proliferating disorder, persistently short 
crops, and an ever-burgeoning public opposition compelled the govern-
ment to abandon liberalization in 1770. De-liberalization, however, did 
not abruptly stem the crisis. Nor was the police restoration a smooth, 
uniform process throughout the realm. Gradually, tranquility returned 
to much of  the kingdom in the next few years. The Midi, bastion of  lib-
eral strength, suffered the last violent spasms in 1773. Inclined to a mod-
erate position and not wholly unsympathetic to the liberal thesis, Terray, 
the new Controller-General, found himself  increasingly obliged to take 
an authoritarian, interventionist stand. To combat dearth, he finally 
countenanced all the classical police tactics: market constraints, decla-
rations, requisitions, and so on. The king’s grain operation expanded 
prodigiously in his hands; largely as a result of  this massive intervention 
on the supply side, the famine plot accusations continued to stigmatize 
the government and discredit king and kingship.
Nevertheless, experience convinced Terray that laissez-faire and 
a monarchical system resting upon a society of  orders were essen-
tially incompatible. Economically alluring, the sociopolitical costs of  
liberalism were prohibitive in his estimation. Terray perceived the 
subsistence problem in national terms and devised a model of  con-
trol and coordination that was as audacious in conception as it was 
unworkable in practice.
Louis XV died in mid-1774, a king no longer beloved by his sub-
jects, in part because of  his betrayal of  their subsistence interests. With 
the nomination of  the administrator-philosophe Turgot to replace 
Terray, liberalism was assured another chance. Turgot’s hopes, how-
ever, went up in the smoke of  the Flour War, really the last battle in a 
struggle that had begun more than a decade before.
The first two chapters of  this book investigate the police tradi-
tion and the subsistence mentality. They discuss the relations between 
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the police and the people and the assumptions that each made about 
subsistence. They deal with the police apparatus of  control as well 
as the police ideology, with the actual way in which the police func-
tioned as well as the role theoretically prescribed for them. Against 
this background, it will be easy to understand why the liberal reforms 
embodied such a drastic departure from the past. The following 
chapter looks back to the intellectual, political, and socioeconomic 
roots of  liberalism and the liberty movement.
Chapter four traces the beginning of  the crisis that united the 
police and the people against the royal government and the liberty 
lobby. The fifth chapter focuses on the tenacious refusal of  the liberal 
ministry to give ground on the new reforms. Chapter six attempts 
to gauge the impact of  liberalization upon the grain trade. Chap-
ter seven scrutinizes the effects of  the crisis on Paris. In the hope of  
neutralizing Paris while the rest of  the kingdom assimilated liber-
alization, the government provided the capital with large doses of  
the king’s grain. This victualing operation, its organization, and its 
political significance are the subjects of  chapter eight. Resistance to 
liberalization continued to develop as the subsistence troubles deep-
ened and spread. By the end of  1767, a number of  parlements began 
to press for a sweeping modification of  the liberal legislation. At the 
same time, other parlements rushed to the defense of  the reforms. 
Chapters nine and ten treat this clash and the repercussions it had in 
the marketplaces, the salons, and the corridors of  Versailles.
The last three chapters consider the restoration of  the police way, 
or what I have called de-liberalization. With extreme reluctance, in 
the face of  a generalized economic crisis, the government renounced 
the reforms. Terray’s appointment as Controller-General marked the 
end of  a decade of  liberal ministries. Chapter eleven examines the 
state of  the kingdom in 1770 and Terray’s plans for dealing with sub-
sistence problems in the short run as well as the long run. In addition, 
it evokes some of  the connections between the grain question on the 
one hand and the Brittany affair and the Maupeou coup on the other. 
Chapter twelve studies Terray’s efforts to implement his subsistence 
policy throughout the kingdom in the years 1771–74. Even as the 
government abjured liberalization, so many philosophes turned their 
fire on its intellectual patrons, the physiocrats. The last part of  this 
chapter looks into the “grain quarrel”—a debate which turned not 
on airy postulates, but on the grim facts of  the national crisis. Chapter 
thirteen concentrates on the king’s grain operations under Terray’s 
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management. It closes with the ascension of  a new king, who anxiously 
groped for a new beginning in public affairs, and with the advent 
of  a new Controller-General who believed deeply in the principles 
of  1763–64.
Chapter I
THE POLICE OF PROVISIONING
I
At every level of  administrative life, public officials expended enor-
mous amounts of  time, energy, and money in dealing with the sub-
sistence question. Virtually everyone who practiced or wrote about 
public administration, or what was commonly called “police” in the 
Old Regime, considered provisioning to be among its paramount 
concerns. “The abundance of  grain,” intoned Colbert, “is the thing 
to which we must pay the most attention in the police.” A hundred 
years later his eulogist, Necker, wrote that “the subsistence of  the 
people is the most essential object which must occupy the adminis-
tration.” Dupont, physiocracy’s chief  merchandiser and a mordant 
critic of  what he believed to be the Colbert-Necker continuum of  
policy, remarked ironically on the “abundance” of  the subsistence 
subject and deplored the fact that it dominated so much of  public 
business: “nothing can better prove to you that this branch of  Admin-
istration is truly the first of  all [of  them] than the multitude of  Laws, 
Regulations, Arrêts of  Parlements, Ordinances of  Judges, Ordinances 
of  Municipalities, Ordinances of  intendants or royal agents which 
have come into place in all times on the matter of  the provisioning 
of  grain.”1
Management of  food supply was directly or indirectly connected 
with some of  the policies we associate with the growth of  the state. 
 1 Colbert cited by Jacques St.-Germain, La Reynie et la police au grand siècle, d’après de nombreux 
documents inédits (Paris, 1962), 261; Necker to Sartine, 14 Feb. 1778, AN, F11* 1, fol. 238; 
P.-S. Dupont de Nemours, Analyse historique de la législation des grains depuis 1692 à laquelle on a 
donné la forme d’un rapport à l’Assemblée Nationale (Paris, 1789), 51. Cf. Nicolas Delamare, Traité 
de la police, 2nd. ed. (Paris, 1729), II, the richest single source for questions of  subsistence 
administration; N.-T.-L. Des Essarts, Dictionnaire universel de police (Paris, 1786–90), I, 328–
29 and II, 193. For a perspective on modern provisioning problems, see Paul Leblond, 
Le Problème de l’approvisionnement des centres urbains en denrées alimentaires en France (Paris, 1926).
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To sustain cities, huge supplies of  food had to be wrenched from 
the countryside (and partly because of  the difficulty of  provisioning 
them, old-regime governments tried to limit the size of  certain urban 
centers). To promote industrial development and enable France to 
compete internationally—so Colbert maintained—an easy and sure 
subsistence had to be provided for the working population. On a 
more general plane, without regard to particular economic or politi-
cal doctrines, an easy subsistence seemed to serve the public inter-
est. A sufficiently nourished people would produce more (goods and 
children), earn more, buy more, and pay more taxes, and thereby 
enhance national prosperity and strength. To support an army, the 
government had to marshal regular stocks of  food. Food manage-
ment was a bewilderingly complex business and it generated many 
conflicts of  interest, between various public institutions such as the 
armed forces or hospitals and the society at large, between cities and 
hinterland, between competing regions, etc. The state itself  was often 
a party to these disputes, which it was supposed to mediate. Its missi 
dominici dispatched to displace local, seignorial, or old-time royal offi-
cials in the exercise of  police and justice inherited responsibilities for 
provisioning which they could not renounce.
The state had many other reasons for wanting to create and expro-
priate part of  an agricultural surplus. Whether subsistence consid-
erations shaped the development of  fiscal policy or not, fiscal policy 
affected the government’s ability to control the food supply. Direct 
taxation promoted the commercialization of  agriculture, forced 
peasants into the market, and helped make grain supply visible and 
available. Partly in order to facilitate provisioning, the government 
 sporadically endeavored to eliminate the labyrinth of  fiscal (and feu-
dal) excrescences which hindered market transactions and impeded 
the circulation of  goods. The state encouraged investment in agricul-
ture with an eye toward increasing national wealth yet, in deference 
to subsistence demands, when cultivators sought to shift, say, from 
grain to wine in response to market incentives, it prohibited the move. 
Decisions about the floating population and public assistance policy 
in general were always made in reference to the subsistence situation 
in the cities and the countryside.
Connections like these underline the intimate relationship between 
the management of  subsistence and the development of  the state. 
They suggest that by the beginning of  the early-modern period the 
state was already deeply enmeshed in the regulation of  production, 
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consumption, and distribution. But the extraordinary urgency which 
administrators at all levels, not just the agents of  the central state, 
attached to the question of  subsistence was the result above all of  
their overriding concern for social stability. The growth of  the state 
itself  generated forces of  instability, but the concern for “tranquility,” 
as contemporaries called it, was neither peculiar to France nor to the 
Old Regime.
The policy of  provisioning as a means of  social control had been 
practiced, in one form or another, since the beginning of  urban civi-
lization. It was not, at least in the French case, the product of  a par-
ticularly cynical view of  man, society and polity. It was based upon 
the familiar conviction, informed by a rapid reading of  the history 
of  the plebs and the state, that the failure to assure an adequate food 
supply could jeopardize the political and social structure of  the king-
dom. Nicolas Delamare, author of  the most influential treatise on 
“police” in the Old Regime, drew the lesson from antiquity. The 
Roman experience taught that hunger caused depopulation and 
moral and physical deterioration and—far worse—threatened to 
“excite the greatest revolts, the most dangerous seditions.” In the 
same vein, the author of  an essay on “the history of  subsistence,” 
written in the early 1770’s, argued that dearths “preceded, prepared, 
and caused” grave and sometimes lethal disorders in the empires 
of  Rome, Constantinople, and China. “Everywhere,” he warned, 
“you will see subsistence gives the first start to revolutions.” Necker 
was the first major public figure in the Old Regime who dared artic-
ulate these fears in detail and make the case for social control in 
terms of  a full-blown model positing the inherent fragility of  social 
organization and the ineluctability of  class conflict, but many of  his 
assumptions and conclusions were drawn from the common stock of  
 administrative or police thought.2
The police theory of  containment assumed that the state was not 
only menaced, from within, by magnates and their clans, religious 
minorities, mutinous constituted bodies, and other fractions of  society, 
but that it was vulnerable, too, in its relations with the mass of  people, 
the vast majority of  whom saw themselves above all as consumers. 
As a rule, the people “submitted” provided their elementary needs 
were more or less satisfied. When the people felt their existence to be 
 2 Delamare, Traité de la police, II, 566; Journal de l’agriculture, du commerce, des arts et des finances 
(Jan. 1772), 48; Necker, Sur la législation et le commerce des grains (Paris, 1775).
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threatened, however, their threshold of  tolerance plummeted. They 
not only became enraged by prolonged periods of  shortage, soaring 
prices, and extreme and unusual misery, but they became resentful 
of  burdens which in other circumstances they ignored or reluctantly 
accepted. When the people took on this mood, they could be con-
tained only with the greatest difficulty. When the routine of  daily life 
was disrupted, the government could not carry out its business. In the 
worst of  circumstances, it found itself  submerged in chaos.
Implicit in this view was the idea that the government which exposed 
itself  by dereliction or insouciance to this kind of  menace deserved 
what it reaped, for the people should not have to be put to this sort 
of  terrible test. To be sure, there were other sources of  popular dis-
order, such as excessive or novel fiscality, military or militia conscrip-
tion, and the abrogation of  certain customary franchises. yet none of  
these was as permanent and as pervasive a prod to disruption, none 
caused such profound disaffection toward the state and society, and 
none aroused the people to such a pitch of  fury as threatened subsis-
tence. Ultimately, the government, not the people, had to answer for 
this sort of  breach of  tranquility. In the absence of  order, government 
could not endure and society could not hold together. The “prerequi-
site” for order, in the words of  an eighteenth-century intendant, was 
“to provide for the subsistence of  the people, without which there is 
neither law nor force which can contain them.”3
This is not to suggest that this simple model of  containment 
guided all decisions made by the government, though the further 
one moves from the center the more compelling it becomes and the 
more nearly it describes the instincts of  local authorities for whom 
social control was a firsthand, visceral matter. The ministers, if  
not the échevins and the royal procurators, did not believe that they 
could govern by bread alone or that what worked for antiquity 
would function well in what they self-consciously felt to be a mod-
ern state and society. State policy had its own imperatives aside 
from social control or solicitude for the hungry. yet the exigencies 
of  social control, and ultimately the concern for survival, placed 
serious constraints on the freedom of  the state to elect certain strat-
egies for its own development and for the growth of  society. The 
subsistence preoccupation influenced social and economic policy in 
obvious ways, but perhaps its most important implications were in 
 3 Bertier de Sauvigny, “Observations sur le commerce des grains,” BN, mss. fr. 11347, fol. 228.
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the end political. The state committed itself  to the consumer inter-
est. The consumer interest embraced the overwhelming majority 
of  the population. It included not only the laboring people of  
the cities, but vast numbers of  peasants, workers, and craftsmen 
inhabiting the countryside.
The commitment to the consumer interest was symbolized by the 
king and embodied in the idea of  the king as father-to-his- people. 
Probably every king would have liked to see himself  regarded as 
father to his people; the history of  kings shows that the paternal met-
aphor was a slogan for all seasons. In France, however, it acquired 
at least one specific and consistent meaning. In the Old Regime it 
was widely believed that the king had a duty to safeguard the exis-
tence and therefore the subsistence of  his subjects. The origin of  the 
notion is obscure, though eighteenth-century commentators traced 
it as far back as the time of  Charlemagne.4 Whether it began as a 
sincere statement of  royal intention or as a device for propaganda, 
it was taken very seriously by both the kings and the people. The 
fatherly monarch was, d’office, by his own proclamation and by uni-
versal anticipation and acclaim, the supreme victualer. What more 
solemn duty could a father have than to make it possible for his chil-
dren to enjoy their daily bread? Though it never found expression 
in the coronation oath or achieved the fundamental stature of, say, 
the salic law, the commitment to subsistence–the social contract of  
subsistence–became, informally, a responsibility and an attribute of  
kingship. It was not merely something the king did for his people; it 
was something he was expected and in some sense required to do. 
The people counted on royal intervention and took the measure of  
a king partly in terms of  his fatherly success. Morally and politically, 
the king was highly motivated to play the role well. Royal paternal-
ism and the policy of  social control were two sides of  the same coin; 
both dealt with the relationship between the ruler (or his deputies) 
and the ruled. But whereas social control spoke the chilling language 
of  raison d’état and stressed the checks placed upon the people and 
the supremacy of  the interests of  the state, this brand of  paternal-
ism exuded the compassion characteristic of  familial ties, emphasized 
not the constraints upon the subjects but their claims upon the State, 
not the prerogatives of  the government but its obligations, and found 
 4 F. Aubert, “Réflexions sur le commerce des grains,” (1775), BN, mss. n.a. 4433, fol. 33; 
Leprévost de Beaumont, “Additions,” Arsenal, mss. Bastille 12353. Cf. Ambroise Morel, 
Histoire abrégée de la boulangerie en France (Paris, 1899), 45.
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its rationale in the very nature of  the royal mission, consecrated by 
tradition and religion.
If  the medieval myths of  the princely héros nourriciers no longer had 
currency in the Old Regime, still the idea of  linking kingship and sub-
sistence elicited enduring support.5 The theoretician of  absolutism 
and divine monarchy, Bossuet, argued that the king’s responsibility to 
assure subsistence was the “foundation” of  all his claims on his sub-
jects.6 His master, Louis XIV, did not always practice what Bossuet 
preached, but he understood the significance of  the charge and he 
performed the victualing part self-consciously and convincingly. “I 
entered personally into a very detailed and very exact knowledge of  
the needs of  the peoples and the state of  things,” he proudly told the 
dauphin, in reference to the millions he spent importing grain during 
the great dearth in the early 1660’s; “I appeared to my subjects as a 
veritable père de famille, who makes provision for his house and shares 
the food equitably with his children and his servants.” If  Parisians 
forgave Louis XIV for some of  his brutal excesses, it was at least in 
part because he had been their “pharaoh.”7
Though the Enlightenment raised probing questions about its 
validity, this conception of  governmental responsibility found influ-
ential adherents in the eighteenth century. Montesquieu asserted that 
the state owed its citizens “an assured subsistence”; in this he differed 
little from the author of  Politics Drawn from the Holy Scriptures, though 
he hardly shared Bossuet’s view of  Louis XIV as the ideal of  king-
ship incarnate. The imperious human right to existence, which the 
radical social critics Mably and Linguet claimed the Sovereign was 
bound to guarantee, had more in common with the old vision of  the 
providential and liturgical vocation of  kingship than with the new 
conception of  the rights of  man that was beginning to emerge in the 
second half  of  the eighteenth century. In a crude essay submitted to 
the government during the subsistence troubles of  the 1770’s, a peti-
tioner contended that “if  by divine right the peoples owe a tribute to 
their Sovereign, there is one [tribute] perhaps equally indispensable 
 5 Jacques Le Goff, La Civilisation de l’occident médiéval (Paris, 1967), 292–93.
 6 Jacques St.-Germain, La Vie quotidienne en France à la fin du grand siècle (Paris, 1965), 191.
 7 Cited by P. Bondois, “La Misère sous Louis XIV: la disette de 1662,” Revue d’histoire économique 
et sociale, XII (1924), 61–62, 78; Le Magasin pittoresque, 43rd year (1875), 110. See also Edme 
Béguillet, Description historique de Paris et de ses plus beaux monumens.… (Paris, 1779), I, 66–67; 
Pierre Clément, Portraits historiques (Paris, 1855), 189–92; George Rosen, Madness in Society 
(New york, 1969), 167ff.
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due them and that would be that which would act to guarantee them 
against dearth.” Another memorandum, composed at about the time 
of  the Flour War by a lawyer and knight of  the order of  St. Louis, 
declared that, among the “obligations” which a “father owes to his 
children,” the “necessity to furnish the essential food, which is bread” 
stood first. Writing at a time when the king’s authority to undertake 
provisioning came under sharp attack, Desaubiez, author of  a trea-
tise on “Public Happiness,” insisted that royal grain supplying was a 
“sacred right of  the crown.” Nor were the women who marched on 
Versailles in October 1789 engaged in an act of  irrational fury: their 
view of  the king as baker-victualer of  last resort had a long tradition.8
Although Louis XV did much to discredit it, the paternalistic idea 
and the expectations it engendered remained very much alive at the 
end of  the Old Regime and the traditional connection between king/
government and subsistence went on to trouble the revolutionary 
leaders. The wistful, consoling vision of  a king-provider served as a 
major theme in counter-revolutionary popular propaganda. On a 
number of  occasions Parisians besieged the bakers shouting slogans 
of  a mood similar to that of  the southern Italians who revolted in 
the mid-nineteenth century to the nostalgic refrain “the king fed us.”9 
Beset by serious subsistence problems and unable to devise new meth-
ods to deal with them, the revolutionaries were haunted by the specter 
of  the old-regime victualing state whose successes they simultaneously 
exaggerated, denounced, and envied. Indeed, if  one were to study 
prerevolutionary France through the eyes of  a Creuzé-Latouche, one 
would believe that “under the Old Regime the government itself  fur-
nished Parisians with bread,” a grave distortion of  fact but a revealing 
 8 J. Hecht, “Trois précurseurs de la sécurité sociale au 18e siècle,” Population, XIV (Jan.-March 
1959), 73; André Lichtenberger, Le Socialisme au XVIII e siècle; étude sur les idées socialistes dans 
les écrivains français du XVIII e siècle avant la révolution (Paris, 1895), 91 (the relevant passage 
from the Esprit des lois is in book XXIII, chapter 29); S.-N.-H. Linguet, Du Pain et du bled in 
(Oeuvres (London, 1774), VI, 67 and Annales politiques, civiles et littéraires du dix-huitième siècle, 
VII, 203–204; D.-Z. [Desaubiez], Le Bonheur public (London, 1782), 146; “Essay sur le 
moyen d’établir des greniers d’abondance” (30 May 1771), AN, F11 265, fol. 7; F. Aubert, 
“Réflexions,” BN, mss. n.a. 4433, fols. 20–21, 24, 27.
 9 C. Tilly, “Collective Violence in European Perspective,” in H. Graham and T. Gurr, 
Violence in America: Historical and Comparative Perspectives. A Report to the National Commission 
on the Causes and Prevention of  Violence (N.y., 1969), 17; AN, AF12 1470 (16, 17 Apr. 1793). 
Cf. Colfavru, “Question des subsistances,” La Révolution française, V (July-Dec. 1883), 330. 
Cf. an anonymous pamphlet of  1791, “Sous un roi nous avions du pain.”
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acknowledgement of  the legacy and the memory of  the traditional 
provisioning policy.10
If  the old-regime governments did supply bread, of  course, 
as Creuzé-Latouche pointedly added, it was not for wholesome 
motives. The bread was tainted, and the revolutionaries heaped 
scorn upon Frenchmen who would still succumb to its blandish-
ments. “The Ministry in the Old Regime,” explained an essayist 
in 1792, “afraid of  the people in the big cities, tried to give them 
cheap bread in order to hold them in a sort of  lethargy.…” Pari-
sians of  the Old Regime sold out to the government, Manuel con-
temptuously remarked in his Police Unveiled; in return for bread, 
they offered their “cadaverous tranquility.” “If  the Old Regime 
bought your silence,” asked another revolutionary in 1791, “must 
you not, now that you are free, repulse far from you everything 
which can recall your servitude?”11
II
For the sake of  its own conservation and in pursuit of  its interests, 
for the well-being and peace of  society, to meet its traditional, quasi-
contractual obligations, and for still other reasons which we touched 
upon, the state intervened in subsistence affairs and encouraged or 
condoned in most instances the intervention of  other public authori-
ties not acting expressly upon its instructions. But what forms did 
this intervention take? Extended to its logical extreme, the govern-
ment’s promise to give “its first attention … to procuring an easy 
and convenient subsistence” for the people would imply that it was 
prepared actually to furnish consumers with grain or bread.12 In fact, 
this was not at all the government’s intention, nor indeed did the 
public expect it. To be sure, in dire emergencies, Louis XIV turned 
the Louvre into a bakery, Louis XV commissioned great bankers and 
a legion of  petty  merchants to buy and sell grain in his name, and 
 municipalities throughout the kingdom  undertook a large part of  
10 Archives parlementaires, recueil complet des débats législatifs & politiques des chambres françaises 
(Paris, 1898), LIV, 683.
11 Ibid.; Pierre Manuel, La Police de Paris dévoilée (Paris, 1794–95), I, 10; “La Cherté du pain,” 
(1792), AN, T 6441–2; “Mémoire présenté par M. de Monchanin déposé au Secrétariat de la 
Municipalité, 30 Octobre 1791…,” AN, F10 215–216.
12 Arrêt du Conseil, 5 Sept. 1693 cited by Cherrière, “La Lutte contre l’incendie dans les halles, 
les marchés et les foires de Paris sous l’ancien régime,” in Mémoires et documents pour servir à 
l’histoire du commerce et de l’industrie en France, 3rd series, ed. by J. Hayem (Paris, 1913), 107.
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the supply burden. But the government was victualer only in the last 
resort. It had no desire to go into the grain, flour and baking business. 
Its refusal reflected a realistic appraisal of  the limits of  its power and 
its resources. The government simply was not equipped to handle 
the primary food trade, nor could it hope to marshal the capital and 
mount and maintain the leviathan machine that would be necessary 
to undertake day-to-day provisioning operations on the scale of  a 
kingdom as vast as France.
This keen sense of  its own incapacity, coupled with a desire not to 
frighten off  those persons whose profession and social function it was 
to deal in grain and flour, induced the government not only to eschew 
ordinary trading activities, but also to refrain from establishing orga-
nizations of  “abundance” on the model of  Joseph’s Egypt, sixteenth-
century Venice, or contemporary Geneva. “Most nations,” wrote the 
farmer-general Claude Dupin, “have placed themselves on guard 
against the disastrous events of  dearth and of  excessive abundance by 
means of  magazines which cause grain to disappear when there is too 
much and from where it resurfaces when it is lacking.…” “We alone,” 
he complained, “who have the glory to possess the wisest regulations 
in the Universe on other matters, have remained far behind our neigh-
bors on this one which is nevertheless the most important, since the 
wealth or poverty and even the life of  all the Subjects depend upon 
it.”13 For all its anxiety about subsistence, the state never elaborated 
a master-plan for lean years or fat. Directly on the supply side, the 
government intervened as most Frenchmen lived, au jour le jour, some-
times massively, sometimes selectively, and always reluctantly. On the 
municipal level, the state encouraged the institutionalization of  fore-
sight, without, however, offering any serious material incentives for the 
establishment of  granaries. A plan to mobilize all the convents and 
monasteries in the kingdom into a network for funding grain storage 
never received serious implementation outside the Paris area, and not 
even the capital could count on a modest state-sponsored reserve until 
the second half  of  the eighteenth century.14
13 Dupin, “Mémoire sur les bleds,” (1748), BN, mss. n.a. 22777, fols. 155, 167. Cf. the 
anonymous memoir to the IN. of  commerce de Montaran: “The means of  assuring bread 
do not seem to stir interest until we are at the point of  not finding any more … the defect is 
ordinarily only perceived at the moment of  need.” 19 June 1784, AN, F11 294–95. See also 
P. Macquer, Dictionnaire portatif  des arts et métiers (Paris, 1766), I, 564.
14 On the Parisian “community” granary system see Degand to Hérault, 14 Sept. 1728, Arsenal, 
mss. Bastille 10274; AAP, Délibérations du Bureau de l’Hôtel-Dieu, #97, 9 Jan. 1728 and
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The characteristic expression of  government intervention was reg-
ulation. The burden of  public authority was not to feed the people 
but to make sure they would be fed. This distinction implied a fairly 
simple division of  social labor. Cultivators grew the grain; it was their 
responsibility, aided by a host of  commercial agents, to market it. It was 
up to the government to make sure that it reached the public in “due 
time,” in good condition, and at a price accessible to the bulk of  the 
consumers. Authorities stalked grain from the time it was seeded until 
the bakers transformed it into bread. They kept track of  all the agen-
cies of  the grain and flour trade, in the countryside, on the roads, at 
the inns, in the marketplace. They labored to preserve the custom-
ary division of  hinterland, to protect the channels of  provisioning, 
and to keep the supply optimally visible and reassuringly ubiquitous. 
By so doing they expected by and large to be able to prevent major 
disruptions in the flow of  grain, serious shortages, and excessive rises 
in prices.
Except in certain maritime and frontier areas, public authorities 
throughout the kingdom depended upon the nation’s own produc-
tion to meet provisioning needs. They expected fluctuations and 
sometimes failure here and there, but they believed that “abun-
dance,” in the words of  one Controller-General, was the “natu-
ral state” of  affairs. Her rich arable land was France’s granary of  
abundance. Certain observers estimated that a “common” year 
yielded at least one-third and often one-half  more than the king-
dom required. Others claimed that France harvested three times its 
annual needs in wheat and that even a “bad” year furnished enough 
to nourish the people. Public officials on the whole tended to be 
more cautious and their attitudes varied considerably from place 
to place and level to level, but few doubted that provisioning was 
for the most part a matter of  “good police.”15 When they could not, 
  #98, 20, 23, 30 Dec. 1729; BN, Coll. Joly 1428, fols. 168–87; Assemblée de police, 8 March 
1736, BN, mss. fr. 11356, fols. 297–98. On the effort by Machault to establish a granary 
system by linking military and civilian victualing at the end of  the forties, see “Extrait d’un 
mémoire sur les bleds communiqué par M. de Machault à M. Pâris-Duverney…” and Pâris-
Duverney, “Extrait de l’avis de M.P.D. sur le mémoire précédent,” AN, F12 647; Dupont, 
Analyse … rapport, 92–98; Marcel Marion, Machault d’Arnouville: étude sur l’histoire du contrôleur-
général des finances de 1749 à 1754 (Paris, 1891), 429–30. For granary or dearth-prevention 
plans after mid-century, see below chapters eight and thirteen.
15 M. Reneaume, “Sur la manière de conserver les grains,” Mémoires de l’Académie des 
Sciences for 1708 (Paris, 1709), 76; H.-L. Duhamel du Monceau, Traité de la conservation 
des grains (Paris, 1753), iv; Antoine A. Parmentier, Le Parfait boulanger, ou Traité complet 
sur la fabrication et le commerce du pain (Paris, 1778), 118; Claude Dupin, Mémoire sur les
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for one reason or another, prevent dearths or price rises by regulation, 
they repressed and redressed. They punished cultivators and mer-
chants for violating the rules governing the trade (“contravening the 
police”) more or less severely according to the gravity of  the crime; 
they went after “hidden” supplies in the name of  the law when they 
believed owners were willfully withholding them from consumption; 
often they set the price of  bread and sometimes the prices of  grain 
and flour; much less frequently they intervened on the wage side, for 
it was prices rather than wages which fixed public attention through-
out the Old Regime. “Police” was the means by which government 
sought to assure the subsistence of  the people. As a rule, government, 
central and local, undertook ordinary supply tasks only when “police” 
by itself  could no longer deal with the situation.
Before we explore the ways in which provisioning was a police mat-
ter, we ought to take note of  the word “police” itself, for it was a much 
more important and versatile expression in the Old Regime than it 
is for us today. By police we commonly mean today a branch of  gov-
ernment, one of  whose primary missions is the enforcement of  law. 
To some extent that applies here; we are dealing with a wide range 
of  public officials, operating at many different levels of  government, 
who performed this and other tasks. Commonly, in the Old Regime 
as today, the police were associated with the business of  repression, 
inspiring as a result respect from some segments and dread and hatred 
from other portions of  society. During the Old Regime, however, 
the police as an agency of  administration were responsible for an 
extraordinary scope of  public functions, ranging from the regulation 
 bleds (1748), BN, mss. n.a. 22777, fol. 155; Claude J. Herbert, Essai sur la police générale, sur 
leurs prix et sur les effets de l’agriculture (London, 1755) in Collection des économistes et des réformateurs 
sociaux de la France, ed. by E. Depitre (Paris, 1910), 40; Regnaud, “Histoire des événements 
arrivés en France …,” BN, mss. fr. 13734, fol. 180n; Laverdy to First President Miromesnil 
of  Normandy, 8 March 1768 in Correspondance politique et administrative de Miromesnil, ed. by 
P. Le Verdier (Rouen and Paris, 1899–1903), V, 107; Etienne François, duc de Choiseul, 
Mémoires, ed. by J.-L. Soulavie (Paris, 1790), I, 45–50; E. Chevalier, “Mémoire sur les 
moyens d’assurer la diminution du pain… (n.p., 1793), 9; F. Aubert, “Réflexions simples et 
pratiques sur le commerce des grains” (1775), BN, mss. n.a. 4433, fol. 165; “Histoire de ce 
qui s’est passé au sujet des bleds en 1725,” Bibliothèque de l’Arsenal, Recueil Fevret, ms. 
3308; “Mémoire sur la police des grains” (ca. 1758), BN, mss. fr. 14296, fol. 181. Cf. C. 
Benoist, “Compte rendu,” Revue historique, XXXVII (May–Aug. 1888), 194; J.-C. Colfavru, 
“La Question des subsistances en 1789,” La Révolution française, V (July–Dec. 1883), 391; and 
Augustin Rollet, Mémoire sur la meunerie, la boulangerie et la conservation des grains et des farines (Paris, 
1846), 133–34n.
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of  both wet-nurses and prostitutes, to the control of  guilds and prisons 
and the enforcement of  rules pertaining to the observance of  religious 
holidays, the cleaning and lighting of  streets, and the production and 
sale of  a host of  goods and services. In other words, they were con-
cerned with every aspect of  daily life, moral and material, not just the 
affairs of  deviance and disorder.16 The relations between the police 
and the people, even in a large city, were intimate and much can be 
learned about urban life from studying them. Although it is generally 
believed that those relations were strained, they were often symbiotic, 
instrumentally if  not sentimentally; people were willing to differenti-
ate among the myriad police functions and react selectively.
The universality of  the police function derived from another sense 
which the word had in pre-modern times. Under the Old Regime 
police meant managing and maintaining the life of  the community, 
as Plato was understood to have defined it. It embraced, in the words 
of  one writer, “everything which treats of  the public good.” Indeed, it 
was the public good, for it was an end as well as a means, an ideal type 
as well as a method for achieving it, a political as much as an admin-
istrative notion. As noun, verb, and adjective, it was used to describe 
the way in which social and civil life should be organized. It was also 
a measure of  the progress of  civilization, for nations without a police 
were viewed as barbarous. States with a vicious or imperfect police 
perished quickly, while those with a “good police” endured. Without 
proscribing growth or change, police implied a social process which 
tended inevitably toward equilibrium and continuity. The vocation 
of  police, according to one jurist, was to assure that “harmony and 
concord” prevailed among citizens.17
16 See, for example, the tables of  contents in the four volumes of  Delamare, Traité; Des Essarts, 
Dictionnaire, I through VIII; Jacques Peuchet, ed., Collection des lois, ordonnances et règlements de 
police depuis le XIII e siècle jusqu’à l’année 1818 (Paris, 1818–19). I through VIII; Edme de la Poix 
de Fréminville, Dictionnaire ou traité de la police générale des villes, bourgs, paroisses et seigneuries de la 
campagne (Paris, 1758).
17 Léopold Pelatant, De l’organisation de la police (Dijon, 1899), 10; F. Olivier-Martin, Cours 
d’histoire du droit public. La Police économique (Paris, 1944–45), 13–15; Marc Chassaigne, 
La Lieutenance générale de police de Paris (Paris, 1906), 24; Goyon de la Plombanie, cited by 
Simone Gout, Henri de Goyon de la Plombanie, économiste périgourdin (Poitiers, 1933), 105; 
BHVP, mss. series 142 or Bournon 459; J-B. Dénisart, Collection de décisions nouvelles et de 
notions relatives à la jurisprudence actuelle (Paris, 1777), III, 529. Cf. Robert H.I. Palgrave, ed., 
Dictionary of  Political Economy (London, 1894–99), III, 124; Vivien, “Police,” in C. Coquelin 
and Guillaumin, eds., Dictionnaire de l’économie politique (Paris, 1873), II, 376–78; Charles 
Musart, La Réglementation du commerce des grains au XVIII e siècle: la théorie de Delamare, étude 
économique (Paris, 1922), 39 and passim; article “Police,” Diderot, et al., Encyclopédice, XII, 911; 
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For the working police, the commissaires, the lieutenants, and their 
counterparts, police was above all a concrete program of  action. 
Commissaire Delamare tried to place the full range of  options, strat-
egies, precedents, and laws, along with explicit instructions on how 
to use them in different circumstances, at the disposition of  all public 
authorities in his mammoth Traité de la Police published during the 
last years of  Louis XIV. Although Delamare self-consciously tried to 
give the notion of  police a more “limited sense” than it had before 
in order to make it as widely accessible and as clearly understood as 
possible, his work is a staggering monument to the range, complexity, 
and pretension of  the police enterprise. Schooled in Delamare yet 
sensitive to the fashions of  his own times, the Parisian Commissaire 
Lemaire, writing in 1770, was led to define police as “the science of  
governing men.…”18
Such a notion of  police did not thrive in the climate of  the Enlight-
enment. Police, for many philosophes, epitomized what was wrong 
with government in the Old Regime, and the idea of  a scientific police 
must have struck them as ludicrous or grotesque. They saw police not 
as a general method of  governing or as a loosely-defined commit-
ment to the public good, but as an elaborate defense of  and apol-
ogy for a specific and pernicious system of  rule. They equated police 
with Tradition, which they rightly saw as one of  their most resource-
ful enemies. Police was the political pretext and the administrative 
mechanism that authorities used to diminish and enslave men. Pro-
hibition and constraint were its leitmotivs and its very pervasiveness 
was a mark of  corruption and abuse. To be sure, the critics of  police 
were not hostile to law and order, but to the spirit of  the laws and 
the nature of  the order which the police of  France embodied and 
symbolized. In this sense all police was basse police. For many philos-
ophes, as we shall see, there was no difference between the police 
which terrorized merchants and monitored or requisitioned grain, 
 Pierre Richelet, Dictionnaire de la langue françoise ancienne et moderne (Lyon, 1759), III, 197; 
the definition of  the abbé Fleury, cited in Jean Egret, Le Parlement de Dauphiné et les affaires 
publiques dans la deuxième moitié du dix-huitième siècle (Grenoble, 1942), I, 122; the definition of  
Malesherbes cited by Pierre Grosclaude, Malesherbes et son temps (Paris, 1964), II, 404; the use 
of  the word police by the abbé Coyer, Chinki, Histoire cochinchinoise qui peut servir à d’autres pays 
(London, 1758), 94; and the use of  the term by eighteenth century German writers and 
jurists: Albion Small, The Cameralists (Chicago, 1909), 328, 436–39, 505ff.
18 Delamare, livre 1, titre 1, cited by Pelatant, De l’organisation, 11; A. Gazier, ed., “La Police de 
Paris en 1770,” 27–28.
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on the one hand, and the police which burned books and deprived 
men of  their freedom, on the other.
At the end of  the Old Regime a writer in the Encyclopédie Méthodique 
noted that the historical concept of  police had lost its old meaning 
and had become “hardly respectable.” He blamed its demise on jurists 
in the service of  the system who used the concept of  police to justify 
and perpetuate ingrained errors instead of  reestablishing it on ratio-
nal principles and adapting it to the needs and the ideas of  the age. 
The revolutionaries cared even less than the philosophes for making 
fine distinctions on this matter. For them the “old police” meant the 
regime of  “spies, lettres de cachet, bastille” and associated evils. Revil-
ing the police en bloc was one thing, however, and destroying it en 
bloc quite another. The revolutionaries found it considerably easier 
to raze the Bastille than to do without some of  the less ostentatious 
institutions and practices which characterized the “policed state” of  
the Old Regime.19
III
The hallmark of  a “well-policed state,” according to the old-
regime specialists in this matter, was its “police of  provisioning” 
or “grain police.” This police took priority over all others because 
it concerned the “common,” “urgent,” or “first” needs of  the citi-
zenry and because it was the key to maintaining “good order” or 
 “public tranquility.”20 In order to understand this police we must 
first examine its organization and then the apparatus of  controls, 
with special reference to the provisioning of  Paris. Remember that 
by “police” we mean two things at once: the exercise of  a certain 
kind of  authority, in this instance authority over provisioning, and 
the agencies which exercised this authority, regardless of  their nom-
inal charges or titles. For the sake of  clarity we shall begin at the 
top, with the caveat, however, that the view from the summit and 
19 “Discours Préliminaires,” Encyclopedie méthodique, jurisprudence, police et municipalités (Paris, 
1789), IX, cx, cxii–cxiii, cxxxix–cxliv; Prudhomme, Révolutions de Paris, #7(22 Aug. 1789), 7.
20 Des Essarts, Dictionnaire, I, 328–29; Duchesne, Code de la police ou analyse de règlements de 
police (Paris, 1767), 261; Macquer, Dictionnaire des arts et métiers, I, 564; Béguillet, article 
“Abondance,” Encyclopédie (Supplément), I, 30; Dumas, “Mémoire sur le commerce des 
grains au 18e siècle,” Bulletin du Comité des Travaux Historiques et Scientifiques, Section des Sciences 
Économiques et Sociales (for 1891) (Paris, 1892), 86; A. Clément, article “Approvisionnement,” 
Dictionnaire de l’économie politique, ed. by Coquelin and Guillaumin, I, 61. This theme 
permeates Delamare’s Traité.
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center invariably distorts the focus, for it implies much more coher-
ence in the organization and operation of  the police than actually 
existed.
The king exercised the supreme police power in the land. Royal 
legislation devised or reaffirmed the general rules which were meant 
to govern the provisioning trade throughout the realm. The mon-
arch invested officials at the regional and local levels with authority 
specifically to enforce these rules and, more broadly, to assure the 
provisioning of  their areas. On an irregular basis, several of  the royal 
 councils, especially the Councils of  Dépêches (interior) and Commerce 
(which had a sporadic existence) reviewed the state of  subsistence in 
the kingdom, discussed proposals for legislation, entertained petitions 
from individuals and institutions concerning the grain trade, and 
adjudicated disputes.21 In periods of  dearth, which required extraor-
dinary measures of  relief, the king became personally involved.
The king’s chief  deputy for matters of  provisioning (and indeed 
for all domestic affairs) was the Controller-General.22 His was a sort 
of  super-ministry which embraced virtually everything pertaining 
to the economy, finance, public works, public assistance, and gen-
eral administration. Mercier hardly exaggerated when he wrote 
that “the history of  the reign of  Louis XIV and of  Louis XV could 
be [read] in its entirety in the history of  the  Controllers-General.”23 
For most of  his business, the Controller-General circumvented the 
councils, preferring to “work” directly with the king or in inti-
mate ministerial committees. His  recommendations were carefully 
21 For the royal council, see the excellent thesis of  Michel Antoine, Le Conseil du Roi sous le règne 
de Louis XV (Paris, 1970).
22 There is no modern scholarly study on the Contrôle-Général comparable to Antoine’s work 
on the royal council. Montyon’s Particularités et observations sur les ministres des finances les plus 
célèbres depuis 1660 jusqu’en 1791 (Paris, 1812) is piquant but heavily dated and tendentious. 
Henri de Jouvencel’s Le Contrôleur-Général des finances sous l’ancien régime (Paris, 1901) is better 
than most law theses, but is still of  very limited utility. Paul Viollet, Le Roi et ses ministres pendant 
les trois derniers siècles de la monarchie (Paris, 1912) is of  little service. For the most part, one is 
obliged to rely on primary materials (for example, in the G7 series in the AN), on general 
histories of  the eighteenth century such as L.-E.-A. Jobez, La France sous Louis XV (Paris, 
1864–73) which, despite its age, remains one of  the most useful, or on specialized studies of  
royal finances which tend to focus on only one aspect, albeit a vital one, of  the Controller-
General’s activities. Among the latter are Marcel Marion, Histoire financière de la France depuis 
1715 (Paris, 1914–17); Charles Gomel, Les Causes financières de la révolution française: les ministères 
de Turgot et Necker (Paris, 1892); and René Stourm, Les Finances de l’ancien régime et de la révolution 
(Paris, 1885) and Bibliographie historique des finances de la France au 18e siécle (Paris, 1895).
23 Mercier, Tableau de Paris (Amsterdam, 1782–1788), II, 142. Cf. ibid., VIII, 237–238, 242.
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prepared in his bureaus, “these little kings of  France,” as they were 
called by the physiocrat Baudeau, who hated “bureaucratie” with 
all the ardor of  a Maoist on the rue d’Ulm.24 Among these bureaus 
was the “grain department,” also known as the bureau of  subsis-
tence or the department of  abundance. Managed by an intendant of  
finance or commerce and staffed by clerks who provided a continuity 
of  expertise by surviving frequent ministerial changes, this bureau 
collected data on production, consumption, and prices and assessed 
the mass of  information on subsistence, which the minister needed to 
make his decisions.25
The Controller-General tried to anticipate deficits and surpluses 
and facilitate regional distribution of  supplies. In emergencies, he 
coordinated regional and local efforts to cope with dearth and orga-
nized relief  operations. He was interested in every aspect of  the grain 
trade and the provisioning police and he kept track of  them through 
the enormous correspondence he maintained, not only with the 
intendants of  the generalities who were directly responsible to him, 
but with myriad lesser officials as well.
yet, despite his omnicompetence, and to some extent because of  
it, the Controller-General had little influence in day-to-day provision-
ing affairs. In part, this was a matter of  voluntary restraint, for the 
government conceived of  subsistence as a preeminently local prob-
lem. Its policy was to leave provisioning to the grain trade under 
the supervision of  local authorities who were encouraged to resolve 
subsistence problems on their own. But this policy itself  reflected the 
government’s inability to deal with this vast and infinitely complex 
business from the center. France was too big and too diverse, the royal 
administration was too small, too jerry-built, and too ill-equipped, 
particularism was too deeply entrenched, and communications too 
slow and uncertain to afford the minister real control. The infor-
mation he received was characteristically incomplete, of  uneven 
 quality, and often  tendentious. Frequently it arrived too late and the 
24 “Chronique secrète de Paris sous le règne de Louis XVI,” Revue rétrospective, III (1834), 62, 72. 
The historiographer of  France, Duclos, described the same phenomenon as “conocratie.” 
Ibid., 79. Cf. Gournay, cited by F. M. Grimm, et al., Correspondance littéraire, philosophique 
et critique, ed. by M. Tourneux (Paris, 1877–82), VI, 30 and Mirabeau, cited by G. Weulersse, 
La Physiocratie à la fin du règne de Louis XV (Paris, 1959), 84–85, 91.
25 On the grain department, see the Almanach royal for virtually any year in the eighteenth 
century. See also Labrousse, Esquisse; the F11 series in the AN; and works devoted to 
individuals who played a prominent role in the department such as Trudaine de Montigny.
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orders in reply were often stale once they reached the field where 
they sometimes met with a lukewarm reception and an indifferent 
execution. Moreover, the vast scope of  his ministry seriously reduced 
the  Controller-General’s effectiveness. Overwhelmed with pressing 
responsibilities in many different domains, he was rarely able to 
delve deeply into the intricacies of  provisioning. The “presumptuous 
commis” of  the grain bureau, whom Baudeau accused of  “governing 
the kingdom,” were few in number and confined to technical mat-
ters with no authority to deal with police questions in the minister’s 
behalf. The field administrators were the real protagonists in the 
police of  provisioning. The Controller-General played the role of  
deus ex machina, keeping vigil from above and swooping down upon 
the stage when the drama required his intervention.
A survey of  the police must also include the Secretaries of  State, 
colleagues of  the Controller-General in the ministry, though their part 
was generally quite modest.26 In addition to specific ministerial duties 
based on a functional division of  labor (war, marine, foreign affairs, 
etc.), each secretary was supposed to exercise a general stewardship over 
the administration of  a block of  generalities or provinces. His responsi-
bilities in this capacity were not precisely defined. Except in territorial 
matters that had a direct bearing upon his ministerial interests (e.g., the 
ports and the secretary of  the marine, the frontier fortresses and the 
secretary of  war), the secretary habitually ceded authority for the man-
agement of  provincial affairs to the Controller-General. Officially, the 
secretary “dispatched” royal will to the regions in his department, but 
he also served as a conduit and sometimes as a spokesman for provincial 
opinion in the king’s councils. He registered the fears of  provincial offi-
cials over prospective shortages, their complaints against encroachment 
upon their supply zones or other practices they perceived as threatening, 
and their desires for assistance from the center. In consultation with 
the Controller-General, the secretary tried to promote distribution 
26  On the Secretaries of  State there is also a severe paucity of  useful literature. For want of  any 
alternatives, see Comte H. Luçay, Des Origines du pouvoir ministériel en France: les secrétaires d’état 
jusqu’à la mort de Louis XV (Paris, 1881) and A. Dumas, “l’Action des secrétaires d’état sous 
l’ancien régime,” Annales de la Faculté de Droit d’Aix-en-Provence, new series, No. 47 (1954), 5–92. 
See also the O1 series in the AN and scattered materials in the Maurepas papers at Cornell, 
in the AN (257 AP) and at the BHVP (mss. 719–21, letters between the Secretary for Paris 
and the Lieutenant General of  Police, to be supplemented by A. de Boislisle, ed., Lettres de 
M. de Marville, Lieutenant Général de Police, au Ministre Maurepas (Paris, 1896–1905)).
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within his jurisdiction, prevent conflicts between institutional and 
civil provisioning, and encourage cooperation among the authorities 
in the field.
As a rule, the Secretary for the Royal Household had in his sphere 
the department of  Paris which, in the words of  Mercier, “is a sort of  
kingdom [in itself] given the fact that the Government of  the Capital 
has a very great influence and that it extends far abroad.”27 Although 
he did not deal directly with the Parisian provisioning trade, he kept 
a close eye on the subsistence situation, for he was personally respon-
sible to the king for the tranquility of  the capital. He supervised the 
capital’s municipal and police administrations and served as liaison 
both between the Parisian authorities and the central government 
and between the Parisian authorities and the host of  public servants, 
from the intendants to the local officials, who exercised police powers 
in the vast area that Paris claimed as its hinterland.
The intendants of  the généralités constituted the first line of  royal 
police in the field. The crucial role they played in the development 
of  the administrative monarchy and the astonishing range of  their 
activities are too well known to warrant rehearsal here.28 The inten-
dant was deeply involved in the police of  provisioning, though it 
must not be imagined that he achieved on the level of  the généralité 
a procrustean control which eluded the Controller-General on the 
national scale. The same constraints that inhibited the minister at 
Versailles hampered the intendant. Assisted only by a small corps 
of  subdelegates and inspectors, the intendant was dependent upon 
a staggering array of  local officials, each of  whom retained consider-
able autonomy, for the conduct of  the grain police. Unless they were 
27 Mercier, Tableau de Paris, IX, 34–38. See also William Mildmay, The Police of  France (London, 
1763), 43–44; R. Darnton, ed., “The Memoirs of  Lenoir, Lieutenant of  Police of  Paris, 
1774–85,” The English Historical Review, LXXXV (July 1970), 549. Cf. Malesherbes, who 
found the post “boring.” Grosclaude, Malesherbes, I, 343.
28 On the intendants and their powers, see Charles Godard, Les Pouvoirs des intendants sous 
Louis XIV (Paris, 1901); P. N. Ardashev, Les Intendants de province sous Louis XVI (Paris, 1909); 
H. Fréville, L’Intendance de Bretagne (Rennes, 1953); V. R.Gruder, The Royal Provincial Intendants: 
A Governing Elite in 18th Century France (Ithaca, 1968); Maurice Bordes, D’Étigny et l’administration 
de l’intendance d’Auch (1751–67) (Auch, 1957); Bordes, “Les Intendants de Louis XV,” Revue 
historique, CCXXII (1960), 45–62; Bordes, “Les Intendants éclairés de la fin de l’ancien 
régime,” Revue d’histoire économique et sociale, XXXIX (1961), 57–83. Cf. the perspicacious 
remarks of  Sénac de Meilhan, himself  an intendant: “For a long time, the intendants, 
led by public opinion, have sought more to distinguish themselves by their tenderness 
for the Peoples and by useful works than by their subservience to the ministerial wills.” 
Du Gouvernement, des mœurs, et des conditions en France avant la révolution (Paris, 1814), 102–103.
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perplexed by a special problem, afraid to make a decision likely to 
be controversial, or locked in conflict with a public or private party, 
the local authorities had little reason to solicit instructions from the 
intendant or anyone else. Aside from certain local idiosyncracies, 
their police was fashioned from the common fund of  rules which 
had remained substantially unchanged for generations. Based on 
his assessment of  the harvest and the diagnosis of  needs which his 
subdelegates, scattered throughout the province, helped him make, 
the intendant recommended a more or less strict application or enforce-
ment of  those rules. With the aim of  unifying control procedures or 
eliminating abusive practices, he sometimes issued interpretive ordi-
nances which clarified the meaning or redefined the terms of  the 
existing laws and customs. The intendant could also influence policy 
by systematically favoring the officials who followed his line in the 
frequent disputes that erupted among police authorities. Occasion-
ally he caused local sentences or statutes of  which he disapproved to 
be quashed, impugned the claim of  a locality to its hinterland, or, in 
drastic situations, peremptorily suspended local self-government.
The intendant exercised his greatest leverage, however, not by pun-
ishing recalcitrant subordinates or expropriating control of  individual 
markets, but by regulating the circulation of  grain across time and 
space. He had the power to ease and speed the flow of  grain within 
the province or impede its movement. He could nullify the permis-
sion to trade granted by lesser authorities or issue licenses which they 
had denied. Although he could not always prevent interceptions and 
requisitions of  grain, he could nullify them and demand exemplary 
compensation or condone them, selectively or generally. In certain cir-
cumstances, the intendant took it upon himself  to prevent the “export” 
of  supplies outside the boundaries of  his jurisdiction. A decision such 
as this affected other généralités and invariably aroused the ire of  their 
intendants. Intendants often clashed bitterly over matters of  policy 
and jurisdiction; want of  solidarity and mutual understanding were 
not defects peculiar to the local police in the Old Regime.29 A king’s 
man par excellence, the intendant was charged with the mission of  
enforcing the royal will. yet he was also responsible for the well-being 
of  his généralité. He faced a cruel dilemma when the former struck 
29 See, for example, the attitude of  the intendant of  La Rochelle, who ardently supported 
the idea of  free internal circulation, but refused to tolerate the export of  grain from his 
generality to Bordeaux in 1759. Courteille to IN., 12 Jan. 1759, C. 191, A.D. C-M.
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him as contrary to the latter. The subsistence issue often generated 
this divergence and the intendants demonstrated that they were no 
less skilled than local officials in the discreet disobedience of  royal 
instructions.
Of  all the missi dominici, the intendant of  the Paris généralité was least 
competent and least inclined to defy royal authority, largely because 
of  his propinquity to Versailles. He also had the least influence in 
provisioning affairs because his jurisdiction did not include the city 
of  Paris—the capital was subject to no intendant—and because the 
police of  the capital exercised extensive authority in the hinterland.30
The police powers that we have considered so far emanated directly 
from the king and fit logically into a pyramidal hierarchy which 
extended from the center apex to the more than thirty généralités. 
There was, however, yet another major police authority, exercised on 
the regional scale by the thirteen sovereign courts called parlements. 
Though royal in origin, the parlements owned a generous measure 
of  institutional and constitutional independence—infinitely more 
than any of  the other police agencies—and they functioned to a 
large degree outside the royal hierarchy. The parlements’ police 
role cannot be understood in terms of  some grand political design. 
The narrow political prism through which we habitually view par-
lementary life has obscured the extremely important administra-
tive role played by the courts and exaggerated the extent to which 
the parlements can be seen as a single-minded force. The parle-
ments exercised a sort of  parallel police vis-à-vis royal adminis-
tration, sometimes complementing it, sometimes supplanting or 
challenging it. When a parlement favored a royal measure—and 
that one court did is no warrant to believe that the other parle-
ments followed suit—it not only registered the act expeditiously, 
but it served as a far more vigorous and effective watchdog for its 
execution than the agents of  the royal administration. In some 
parlements, the First President and Gens du Roi, whom the king 
appointed by commission, had particularly cordial relations with 
the central government. The First President of  the Parlement of  
30 On the Paris intendancy, see Robert Conte, L’Administration de la généralité de Paris à la fin du 
règne de Louis XIV, 1681–1715 (Lille, 1926); Jacques Phytallis, et al., Questions administratives dans 
la France du 18e siècle (Paris, 1965), 195; M. Barroux, Le Département de la Seine et de la Ville de 
Paris: notions générales et bibliographiques pour en étudier l’histoire (Paris, 1910), 178. The papers of  
the Bertier de Sauvigny, who did a great deal to reinvigorate the intendancy in the second 
half  of  the century, are quite useful. AN, 80 AP.
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Provence exemplified the intimacy of  the connection in the extreme, 
for he was also intendant of  the généralité.
The parlements are better known, however, for taking issue with 
royal authority. The most spectacular cases, upon which we need not 
dwell, involved the refusal to register royal legislation. They resulted 
in a direct confrontation between crown and courts. But there were 
many other less conspicuous points of  opposition concerning more 
prosaic matters which were only incidentally related to the politi-
cal resurgence of  the parlements in the eighteenth century. Without 
throwing down the gauntlet, the parlements could deform or dilute 
royal legislation by formal ordinances and informal instructions of  
interpretation. Sitting as a civil and criminal court, a parlement could 
thwart royal intentions by finding in favor of  parties who were indicted 
or convicted for putatively illicit acts. As in the first half  of  the seven-
teenth century, though generally with less éclat, the parlements strug-
gled with the intendants and other royal officials for authority over 
many issues, including control of  the grain trade and other police 
business. The courts dared to annul the actions of  royal officials, issue 
contradictory measures, or, through the offices of  the Procurator 
General, one of  the Gens du Roi, instruct local police officials to follow 
a given line. Many of  the Gens du Roi were deeply attached to their 
companies and unwilling to rubber-stamp royal decisions. One does 
not need to rely upon singular figures like La  Chalotais to make the 
point (though it is worth noting that on certain issues, the freedom of  
the grain trade for example, the Breton Procurator General warmly 
supported the crown). As faithful a royal servant as Miromesnil, First 
President at Rouen and future Keeper of  the Seals, often apologized 
for the recalcitrance of  his fellow magistrates.31
For our purposes, however, it is just as important to note the rivalry 
among the parlements for jurisdiction and police control as it is to 
take account of  the competition between the royal administration and 
the parlements. Shared political ambition was no more a guarantee of  
parlementary solidarity on issues affecting them unequally than com-
mon service in the elite corps of  maîtres des requêtes assured cooperation 
among the intendants. The Parlements of  Paris and Rouen fought for 
many years over rights to hinterland. Neighboring parlements angrily 
protested every time a court declared an embargo on the  shipment of  
31 See the Correspondance politique et administrative de Miromesnil, ed. by P. Le Verdier, especially 
volumes 4 and 5.
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grain outside its jurisdiction, or ressort. It is well known that the pro-
vincial parlements resented the pretensions to superiority flaunted by 
the Paris court; the argument over the proper locus of  the court of  
peers is probably the most famous example of  this jealousy. yet the 
most sustained and widespread friction resulted not from sensational 
political issues, but from conflicts over administrative jurisdictions. 
The Paris Parlement was itself  the largest provincial parlement. The 
other sovereign courts viewed its vast ressort an as irritant and a men-
ace. It encompassed areas which had closer geographical, economic, 
and cultural ties with the nearby provincial parlements than with the 
Paris-based court. Even when it did not actually overstep its bounds, 
the Paris Parlement made decisions that directly affected regions in 
the other parlementary ressorts.
We have already noted in passing some of  the levers by which 
the parlements exercised their police. The most familiar are the 
captious tactics by which the courts subverted laws, by overt oppo-
sition and by more subtle devices (judicial decisions, filibustering, 
inadequate publicity, etc.), or remolded them to conform to their 
own needs or views. Much of  this was a matter of  adaptation 
rather than obstruction, for the crown gave the courts fairly wide 
latitude in the interpretation and implementation of  the bulk of  
royal legislation. Less well known is the authority which the parle-
ments possessed to enact quasi-legislative decrees called arrêts de 
règlement.32 In this capacity they acted on their own initiative and 
in their own terms rather than in reaction to measures taken by 
the central government. Unless the king’s council decided to quash 
their regulatory decrees on grounds that they contradicted new 
or existing royal legislation, they had “force of  law” within each 
 ressort. They dealt with a sweeping range of  issues affecting pub-
lic, private, and criminal law, as well as police affairs. The acts 
by which the Paris Parlement limited bakers in a dearth period 
to the making of  only two sorts of  bread and by which the Dijon 
Parlement placed an embargo on the removal of  grain outside its 
jurisdiction were arrêts de règlement. Whereas the rights of  registra-
tion and remonstrance gave the parlements significant political 
32 A. Esmein, Cours élémentaire d’histoire du droit français (Paris, 1898), 538–39; F. Olivier-Martin, 
Cours d’histoire du droit public, (Paris, 1945–46), 165–67; Germain Martin, Les Associations ouvrières 
au 18e siècle (Paris, 1900), 56. Olivier-Martin’s students began to catalogue and inventory the 
arrêts de règlement in the thirties. Their work remains extremely incomplete; much of  it is 
unpublished.
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influence, this quasi-legislative power to render arrêts enabled the 
 sovereign courts of  justice to function as authentic regional govern-
ing  institutions.
Another powerful instrument of  parlementary police, which we 
tend to overlook, is the juridico-administrative apparatus directed 
by the Procurator General. It was particularly important in the Par-
lement of  Paris whose Procurator General commanded great pres-
tige and whose jurisdiction stretched over a third of  the kingdom.33 
The Procurator had substituts, or deputies, in scores of  towns and 
hamlets scattered throughout the ressort. These deputies, often called 
royal procurators (procureurs du roi ), functioned as local officers of  
justice and police as well as representatives of  the Gens du Roi. The 
 substituts regarded the Procurator General as their protector and as 
the authority to whom they were ultimately accountable. Many of  
them corresponded with him regularly, keeping him closely informed 
on general affairs such as the state of  the market and the price of  
grain, as well as on matters of  justice. They often solicited his advice 
and instructions for the proper conduct of  affairs; he was supposed 
to keep them posted on changes in laws, regulations, and procedures 
and he gave them specific orders either in his capacity as a superior 
police official himself  or as the spokesman for the court. The substituts 
constituted an extraordinary network of  grassroots intelligence and 
enforcement. In many instances the Procurator General was better 
informed than the intendants and even than the Controller-General, 
and better placed than they to see his commands executed.
As long as the Procurator General behaved like a faithful king’s man, 
the central government did not begrudge him his enormous adminis-
trative influence. The parlements made excellent use of  his network for 
conducting investigations and diffusing their propaganda as well as their 
arrêts. Intermediary between the crown and the sovereign companies, the 
Procurator felt intense pressure from each side during the eighteenth 
33 I do not know of  any studies specifically devoted to the Procurator General and his 
administrative role. The best sources are in manuscript: the Joly de Fleury Collection at the 
BN, the surviving minutes of  the ordinary police assemblies (BN, mss. fr. 11356), and the 
parlementary or X series at the AN, especially the Conseil Secret. On the general functions 
of  the Procurator, see E.D. Glasson, Le Parlement de Paris, son rôle politique depuis le règne de Charles 
VII jusqu’ à la révolution (Paris, 1901), 2 vols., J. Shennan, The Parlement of  Paris (Ithaca, 1968), 
and sporadic references in F. Olivier-Martin, Histoire du droit français des origines à la révolution 
(Paris, 1951). On the foremost dynasty of  Procurators of  Paris, see the informative but 
unimaginative work of  Paul Bisson de Barthélémy, L’Activité d’un Procureur Général au Parlement 
de Paris à la fin de l’ancien régime: les Joly de Fleury (Paris, 1964).
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century. The Procurator of  the Paris Parlement and the Controller-
General cooperated closely, especially on provisioning affairs, until 
the 1760’s. When the Controller-General suspected that the Procu-
rator was out of  sympathy with his position, he did not hesitate to 
go over his head and deal directly with the substituts. How flattered 
a modest substitut must have felt to be courted by two of  the most 
powerful men in France!
The Paris Procurator General was also the organizing force behind 
the informal “assembly of  police,” which met sometimes once a 
month, sometimes once a week, to discuss all matters pertaining to 
the administration of  the capital.34 Composed of  the First  President, 
the Lieutenant General and the Prévôt des Marchands as well as the 
Procurator, it took a special interest in subsistence questions. The 
Lieutenant General reported on the state of  public opinion, the situ-
ation in the Halles, or central markets, the conduct of  the bakers, 
and the conditions in the markets and the farms of  the nearby hin-
terland; the Prévôt told his colleagues about the port markets and 
the river trade; and the Procurator passed on data from his substituts 
on the harvests, stocks, and market conditions throughout the ressort. 
The officials assessed the situation and tried to decide upon a com-
mon course of  action (or inaction). Decisions did not come easily, for 
the Prèvôt and the Lieutenant were bitter rivals, and both of  them 
resented the “tutelage” which the First President, in the name of  par-
lement, pretended to exercise over them. On balance, the assembly 
of  police seems to have been fairly successful in coordinating general 
policy for the police of  provisioning, at least during the first half  of  
the reign of  Louis XV, the only period for which the minutes of  the 
meetings survive.
The parlements practiced what was called the “grand police.”35 To 
the abbé Véri, a critic of  parlementary officiousness, this was nothing 
more than a convenient pretext, “a passport” for “interfering” in all 
34 See the minutes of  the assemblies, BN, mss. fr. 11356, plus references to meetings and 
discussions in Arsenal, mss. Bastille, 10875 and 10270 (Bourlon to Hérault, 12 Oct.1725); 
BN, mss. fr. 21651 (Delamare papers), fols. 285–86; BN, Coll. Joly 1117, fol. 219; Coll. Joly 
1118, fols. 180–81; Coll. Joly 1310, fol. 2.
35 On the parlements’ grande police, see Glasson, Parlement de Paris; Shennan, Parlement of  Paris; 
Olivier-Martin, Police économique and Histoire du droit français; Egret, Parlement de Dauphiné and 
Louis XV et l’opposition parlementaire (Paris, 1970); J.-L. Gay, “L’Administration de la capitale 
entre 1770 et 1789,” Mémoires de la Fédération des Sociétés Historiques et Archéologiques de Paris et de 
l’Ile-de-France, VIII–XII (1956–61).
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the affairs to which their “caprice” leads them. His sarcasm aside, Véri 
was not very wide of  the mark. The straightforward definition given by 
a prominent jurist emphasized the open-ended nature of  this power. 
The grand police, wrote Dénisart, was the authority of  the parlement 
to take action “on its own” on matters “which interest essentially the 
public order and the public good.”36 Provisioning fitted this criterion 
admirably and elicited close attention from many of  the sovereign 
courts. The Rouen Parlement, for example, in the 1750’s and sixties 
not only published general instructions for a strict enforcement of  the 
traditional grain police, but also issued specific orders for “visits” to 
private granaries in search of  clandestine hoards and for investigations 
of  suspected merchants. As early as the fourteenth and fifteenth cen-
turies, the Paris Parlement punished millers who sold bad quality flour 
and passed measures for the fixation of  the price of  bread. The Paris 
court claimed to be “the first protector of  the capital” and competed 
with the king for recognition as its material providence. Visitors to the 
Parlement’s chambers were invited to view the portrait of  a former 
first president who earned the sobriquet “the baker” for having spent 
a large part of  his personal fortune to import grain for Parisians during 
a severe dearth.37
It would be absurd, however, to reduce the police of  Paris subsis-
tence to a popularity contest. It was an extremely delicate and oner-
ous responsibility with which both the crown and the Parlement were 
loath to trifle. Still, it would be naive to pretend that they were disdain-
ful of  Parisian opinion or that they did not sometimes mix police and 
politics. Thus, for example, a contemporary observer characterized 
the Parlement’s decision to parade the relic of  Sainte Geneviève in 
the midst of  serious shortage and disorder in June 1725 as a “mischie-
vous” action, “a vengeance of  the parlement” against the crown, pre-
sumably for having forced the registration of  a fiscal package, including 
the new fiftieth tax, in a lit de justice several days before. Apparently 
the Parlement’s aim was to emphasize the misery of  the people and 
its solicitude for their lot in  juxtaposition to the fiscal  cupidity of  the 
36 Abbé J.-A. de Véri, Journal de l’abbé de Véri, ed. by B. Jehan de Witte (Paris,1928–30), I, 213; 
Dénisart, Collection de décisions, III, 530.
37 E. Boutaric, ed., Actes du Parlement de Paris (Paris, 1863–67), I, lxii; Guy Lemarchand, “Les 
Troubles des subsistances dans la généralité de Rouen,” Annales historiques de la révolution 
française, 35th year (Oct.–Dec. 1963), 419–20; H. Monin, L’État de Paris en 1789, études et 
documents sur l’ancien régime à Paris (Paris, 1889), 287; Pierre Vinçard, Les Ouvriers de Paris, 
alimentation (Paris, 1863), 3–4.
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crown, which not even a dearth could temper. According to another 
observer during a subsistence crisis fifteen years later, the ministry 
ordered a forced reduction in the price of  Parisian bread in order to 
steal a march on the Parlement, which was rumored—erroneously as it 
turned out—to be preparing some sort of  subsistence remonstrance. A 
year later, with the situation still grave, the Parlement invoked the “high 
prices” and “the calamity common to all classes [conditions]” to protest 
the levying of  the dixième. In 1740–41, as in all the other subsistence 
crises of  the eighteenth century, rumors and suspicions swirled about, 
implicating public officials including ministers and magistrates in vari-
ous maneuvers designed to produce high profits on grain at the cost 
of  public suffering. Although the Parlement was reported to be under 
heavy public pressure to launch an independent investigation to expose 
the “speculators” and “monopolists”—an inquiry which, regardless 
of  outcome, would have sparked new rumors and undermined confi-
dence in the royal government—it refused.38
In 1752, during another brief  period of  soaring prices 
and mushrooming suspicions of  speculative plots, the marquis 
d’Argenson allegedly learned from parlementary informants that 
the court would “seriously investigate that which concerns the cherté 
of  grain and go all the way to the source, which involves M. de 
Machault [Controller-General and then Keeper of  the Seals].” The 
lawyer Barbier confirmed the fact that “everyone is half-persuaded 
that there are frauds concerning grain.” Here was a chance for the 
Parlement to embarrass and discredit the government, for accord-
ing to d’Argenson, to be sure not a wholly disinterested witness, 
“the people was, in advance, very grateful” to the Parlement for its 
“patriotic démarches.” In fact, the abbé de Vougny, a forty-seven 
year old counselor in the Grand’Chambre (and not, as the stereotype 
would have us believe all parlementary hotheads to be, a young Turk 
from the Enquêtes), wanted to denounce the grain perfidies in the 
Parlement and demand a debate and an inquiry. His impassioned 
appeal won no support, in large measure because the magistrates 
38 Mathieu Marais, Journal et mémoires sur la régence et le règne de Louis XV, ed. by de Lescure (Paris, 
1863–68), III, 198, 202; Gazetins, 18–19 October and 27–28 November 1740, Arsenal, 
mss. Bastille 10167, fols. 161, 185; remonstrances of  6 Sept. 1741, J. Flammermont, 
ed., Remontrances du Parlement de Paris au 18e siècle (Paris, 1888–98), I, 379–83. But note the 
rumors implicating the Procurator General and the magistrates in maneuvers alleged to be 
responsible for the dearth in 1740: Gazetins, 25, 28–29 Sept. 1740, Arsenal, mss. Bastille 
10167, fols. 142–43, 167.
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were preoccupied with the ongoing Unigenitus affair, but doubt-
less also because the idea of  such an inflammatory action fright-
ened them.39
“There’s smut in wheat,” runs a Middle Western American 
adage, “but there’s dirt in politics.” In eighteenth-century France, 
wheat politics were among the dirtiest politics. On balance, how-
ever, at least till the sixties, the restraint of  the government and 
the Parlement of  Paris and their efforts to avert political confronta-
tion on grain questions are much more striking than the skirmishes 
recorded above. By tacit accord, it was their wish that subsistence 
remain a non-partisan issue. Political rivalry between crown and 
Paris Parlement had no perceptible effect on the provisioning of  
Paris and, until the sixties, there were virtually no differences in 
their conception of  the proper police.
Even at the highest levels, the police of  provisioning was neither a 
highly centralized nor a rationally organized affair. Though they shared 
a common concern and in many cases followed the same general 
program of  regulation and intervention, the regional and provincial 
authorities were divided by jurisdictional and institutional rivalries and, 
in some cases, by personal and political animosities. Their powers and 
claims overlapped, their downward lines of  authority crisscrossed, and 
their control over their field subordinates was never certain. They were 
divided, too, by interest and this was the cruelest division of  all, for in 
the worst of  circumstances, it meant a struggle for subsistence which 
set off  généralité against généralité, ressort against ressort. The ideal of  the 
police was fraternal as well as paternal. In a well-policed state, the 
regions gifted with a surplus were supposed to rush to the assistance of  
those areas in deficit. From the center, the Controllers-General labored 
to encourage these exchanges; this was perhaps their most important 
single police responsibility, and in the eighteenth century they exercised 
it with mixed success. One of  the most serious charges that its critics 
39 E.-J.-F. Barbier, Chronique de la régence et du règne de Louis XV (Paris, 1857), V, 313–314; R.-L. de 
Voyer, marquis d’Argenson, Journal et mémoires du marquis d’Argenson, ed. by E.-J.-B. Rathery 
(Paris, 1859–67), VII, 286, 325–26. In 1752, as later in 1768, the Rouen Parlement preceded 
the Paris court in its exposure of  dubious grain “maneuvers.” D’Argenson, Journal et mémoires, 
VII, 278. yet several months after reporting on the popularity of  the Paris Parlement with 
the people for the stand it took on the grain question, d’Argenson noted public resentment 
against the magistrates for failing to deal effectively with high prices. Journal et mémoires, VII, 
446. On the magistrate who denounced the alleged maneuvers to the Paris court in 1752, 
see F. Bluche, L’Origine des magistrats du Parlement de Paris au 18e siècle in Mémoires de la Fédération 
des Sociétés Historiques et Archéologiques de Paris et de l’lle-de-France, V–VI (1953–54), 411.
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made against the police of  provisioning on the regional and provin-
cial scale was that it fostered the very sort of  reactionary particular-
ism that the modern state was dedicated to eradicating.
IV
Particularism took its most extreme form at the local level where 
authority for the police of  provisioning was widely diffused and frag-
mented in a crazy quilt of  unintegrated, poorly defined, and over-
lapping jurisdictions. Virtually every public official dealing with 
administrative and/or judicial affairs, no matter how humble his ori-
gins or functions, “held” some sort of  grain police. In addition, below 
or beyond these local authorities, myriad specialized officers such as 
grain measurers and porters and market stewards, and a host of  more 
or less private individuals such as engagistes of  the royal domain or less 
mighty seigneurs, lay or ecclesiastical, noble or bourgeois, who owned 
or farmed market “rights” or related tolls and duties, all claimed or 
exercised some sort of  police power.40
The leading figures in the police of  a given community are easy 
to identify—though we think of  them as petty officials, they loomed 
large in the lives of  the citizenry—but the cast of  characters, the 
attributions of  function, and the system of  recruitment vary from 
place to place and make it difficult to conceive of  a typical structure.41 
Mayors, échevins, capitouls, jurats, prévôts, lieutenants of  police, commis-
saires of  police, procurators (royal and fiscal), and others shared or 
vied for the police in different towns and hamlets and villages. The 
common aim of  these officials was to assure that their communities 
enjoyed a sufficient supply of  grain at a reasonable price. By apply-
ing royal legislation, parlementary arrêts and local statutes, by issu-
ing their own regulations, by rendering or causing to be rendered 
40 BN, mss. fr. 12595, fols. 472–503. Cf. Missonnet report, BN, Coll. Joly 1112, fol. 18.
41 See, for example, Provins in the Brie: Lobinod to PG of  the Paris Parl., 28 July1725, BN, 
Coll. Joly 1117, fol. 102.
For an excellent account of  local authorities and their relations with their superiors, see 
Jean Ricommard, La Lieutenance générale de police à Troyes au 18e Siècle (Troyes, 1934). Also 
relevant is his “Les Subdélégués des intendants aux 17e et 18e siècles.” Information historique, 
24th year (Sept.–Oct. 1962), 139–48; (Nov.–Dec. 1962), 190–95; 25th year (Jan.–Feb. 
1963), 1–8. Another useful treatment of  local police can be found in Maurice Bernard, 
La Municipalité de Brest de 1750 à 1790 (Paris, 1915).
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 criminal, civil and police sentences, by monitoring and registering 
transactions, and by exhorting and threatening the parties involved, 
the local authorities sought to control the flow of  grain, stocking, sell-
ing, and buying, on and off  the marketplace. In principle, the officials 
of  each community were supposed to cooperate among themselves, 
respect the needs and rights of  their neighbors, and act in harmony 
with the wishes of  their various superiors.
In fact, however, officials within the same community often quar-
reled among themselves and clashed with their superiors, and com-
munities fought one another. Conflicts arose over the competition 
for supplies and over jurisdictional rivalries, two questions that were 
usually, though not necessarily, closely related. The competition for 
subsistence characteristically took the form of  a dispute over rights 
of  jurisdiction, administrative and moral. Did a big community have 
priority, regardless of  the circumstances, over a small one? Could a 
major city (say, Paris) expropriate supplies which “belonged” to one 
of  the little towns in its metropolitan supply network when that town 
found itself  inadequately provisioned? Could a community forbid 
“foreigners” from entering its market or its hinterland? Could it force 
merchants to sell grain and sell it at a fixed price?
Sometimes officials used the subsistence issue as a pretext for 
administrative aggrandizement, but it is not usually difficult to 
tell when the struggle was genuine, that is, when the communities 
urgently needed the supplies and the contest for power was subsidiary 
to the competition for grain. The communities fought over the grain 
itself, the control of  the supply zones, the allegiance of  merchants, 
the legitimacy of  certain regulations and the validity of  sentences 
pronounced against individuals. Feuds developed with the police of  
one place intercepting grain bound for another or punishing a mer-
chant enrolled somewhere else in order to avenge an affront and take 
an eye for an eye, or since it is a question of  cereals, an ear for an 
ear. In some instances a confrontation mobilized the inhabitants of  
a community, more or less spontaneously or in response to cues from 
the police. Disorder was the ultimate weapon of  the police authorities 
in their efforts to maintain public order.
Tensions over jurisdictions were not epiphenomenal byproducts of  
price oscillations or grain shortages. They were woven into the very fab-
ric of  a system that diffused authority broadly and clouded the lines of  
authority in uncertainty. Rivalry was one of  the motors of  the system and 
mutual mistrust was the fuel on which it ran. The tensions fed on every 
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issue of  authority, precedence, perquisites, and patronage. Sometimes, 
they were brought to the surface by the competition for subsistence 
itself  or by the competition to determine who would exercise the police 
of  provisioning, the control of  which could be profitable as well as 
prestigious. On other occasions, they resulted in bitter rows which had 
nothing to do with subsistence, but incidentally complicated or crip-
pled the efforts to police the provisioning trade and assure a regular 
supply. On the local level, as on the regional or national scale, conflicts 
erupted horizontally (between “peer” or approximately equal offi-
cials) and vertically (officials against their superiors or subordinates): 
between jurisdictions within the same community (for instance, the 
conciliar municipality against the lieutenant of  police), between offi-
cials dependant on different jurisdictions (the procurator and the sub-
delegate) or in a general way between representatives of  central and 
local authority or between hometown officials and outsiders.
It is not surprising that intra-community rivalries often erupted dur-
ing dearths when common action was most urgently needed, for it was 
precisely then, under stress, that the old administrative patterns broke 
down and new initiatives had to be taken. In September 1725, for 
example, the substitut at Vitry and the subdelegate quarreled violently 
over strategy to combat rising prices. The Controller-General charac-
terized the dispute as one of  many caused “by jealousy of  authority 
and of  function, which is only too common in small towns.…” In the 
same year at Versailles, the police commissaire Narbonne and the royal 
procurator Regnier were “en froid,” partly due to a disagreement on 
grain policy, partly because Regnier claimed the “glory” for contain-
ing a riot, an achievement that Narbonne said was his. At the same 
time the subdelegate based at Poissy denounced the prévôt for “jealousy 
of  métier” and “little knowledge of  the public interest” as manifested 
in his conduct of  the grain police. In 1740 Guillemin, procurator of  
Châlons-sur-Marne, sharply criticized the municipality for a draconian 
measure that prohibited the exodus of  grain and bread from the city. 
“The market is free to everyone,” he declared, “and if  it is permit-
ted to buy merchandise which is sold in the city, can it be prohibited 
to take it away?” The prévôt of  the échevinage responded by physically 
assaulting Guillemin in the public marketplace.42 At Calais it was the 
42 Dodun to PG, Sept. 1725, BN, Coll. Joly 1117, fol. 185; Pierre de Narbonne, Journal de Pierre 
de Narbonne (Versailles, 1955), 124, 127; Legrand to Hérault, LG of  Police of  Paris, 15 Dec. 
1725, Arsenal, mss. Bastille 10371; Guillemin to Joly de Fleury, 15 Nov. and 4 Dec. 1740, 
BN, Coll. Joly 1123, fols. 196, 204–205.
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 municipality that took what one might call, somewhat tremulously, 
the liberal stance. While it purchased grain abroad and in the interior 
for sale to the public, the municipality believed that the best way to 
assure abundance was to guarantee “a complete liberty in the sale of  
grain on the markets.” The lieutenant of  police and his huissiers did 
not, however, share its faith in free exchange and effectively sabo-
taged the policy of  the town fathers by harrassing sellers, examin-
ing and verifying goods, and forcing the price. That the lieutenant 
also interfered with the shipment of  grain to Paris—a service adroitly 
rendered by the municipality—probably sealed his fate with the 
 Controller-General Orry, who recommended that he be suspended 
from his functions for six months.43
Inter-community subsistence rivalry understandably reached its 
peak during dearths, but even in good times, relations sometimes 
remained troubled. This is most strikingly illustrated by the recurrent 
clashes between Paris and the multitude of  towns and villages in the 
borderless expanse surrounding it. A great many factors, of  course, 
besides subsistence contributed to this chronic strain. On one level, 
it can be viewed in terms of  the familiar struggle between city and 
countryside common to virtually all societies through many different 
stages of  development.44 The city was the seat of  power and wealth. 
It was the embodiment of  privilege. It obtained exemptions from or 
dilutions of  a plethora of  burdens, which almost everyone outside had 
to bear. City dwellers controlled much of  the countryside through 
ownership of  land, capital, and the production instruments of  rural 
industry. In the eighteenth century, moralists and political economists 
frequently portrayed the city as tyrannical, egotistical, vulturous, and 
decadent. In their view, the city wantonly drained the countryside of  
all its riches without the slightest regard for its well-being.
43 Petition of  mayor and échevins, BN, Coll. Joly 1123, fol. 133; Orry to PG, 20 Oct.1740, ibid., 
fol. 150.
44 See S.P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, 1968),72–78 and passim. 
We need studies of  the notion of  the city, the tension between city and country, and the 
process by which a provincial, especially someone of  rural origins, becomes Parisianized 
(a special case of  becoming urbanized) in the Old Regime. The impact of  the change in 
material culture and habit alone must have been jarring for a newly-arrived Parisian. In 
rural France, for example, it was perfectly normal for a peasant or a rural worker to consume 
secondary grains. But in the capital even the poor people ate a wheaten bread.
On the provincial dislike of  Parisians, see Louis Chevalier, Les Parisiens (Paris, 1967), 
13–15 and passim.
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On another level, however, the conflict was not merely between a city, 
not even a particularly mighty city, and the countryside, but between 
Paris, city sui generis, and the rest of  France.45 The antinomy Paris-France 
or Paris-province—where everything outside the capital is known, almost 
pejoratively, as provincial—forms one of  the great and enduring themes 
of  French history, and the Revolution, which is sometimes credited with 
sinking the abyss between them, only modernized it and gave it vast 
new dimensions. Regional power, one of  the most passionately debated 
political issues in the France of  the late 1960’s and the 1970’s, has roots 
deep in the Old Regime. Mercier’s wry “supposition,” which he knew 
would be considered “bizarre, frantic, extravagant,” still seems fresh:
If  all the orders of  the state assembled, having recognized after a mature examina-
tion that the capital exhausts the kingdom, depopulates the countryside, retains far 
from it the great proprietors, ruins agriculture, hides a multitude of  bandits and 
useless artisans, corrupts morals little by little, postpones the epoch of  a govern-
ment more formidable abroad, freer and happier; if  all the orders of  the state, I 
say, everything considered and reviewed, ordered the whole city to be burned after 
having previously given the inhabitants a year’s warning, what would be the result 
of  this great sacrifice made for the fatherland and for future generations? Would it in 
fact be a service rendered to the provinces and the kingdom? I leave it to you, reader, to study 
and decide this interesting problem.46
The grain trade, a matter of  life and livelihood, gave the old-regime strug-
gle between Paris and the provinces its most visceral expression. Perceived 
as Babylon by critics like the abbé Coyer who condemned it for “suck-
ing the blood” of  the provinces, Paris loomed as a new Rome in the eye 
of  commentators on subsistence questions. The chemist and physician 
Malouin deplored Paris’ short-sighted, selfish provisioning policy which 
worked “to the detriment of  the countryside because it places [the people 
of  the provinces] in dearth.” This approach, he warned, 
contributed to the ruin of  Rome & of  its empire. Rome’s grain provisions were 
immense. It was the provinces of  the empire which were obliged to furnish these sup-
plies, as tributaries; which exhausted them.
45 Though the epic battles over grain opposed Paris to the rest of  France, the provinces 
regularly fought against each other for the control of  provisioning terrain. See, for example, 
Machault to IN. of  Alençon, 23 May 1750, C. 90, A.D. Orne; Parl, of  Bordeaux to Louis 
XV, c. fall 1748, C. 1439, A.D. Gir; Bertin to IN. of  Burgundy, 26 July 1760, C. 80, A.D. C 
d’O.
46 L.-S. Mercier, Tableau de Paris, IV, 309–310.
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The sovereigns of  Rome, noted the journalist-philosophe Linguet, 
“favored its provisioning by the most odious violence” and “watched 
famine desolate the provinces without misgivings, provided it did not 
extend to the Capital.” Paris does not “devour” the “entire kingdom,” 
noted Mercier judiciously, only that part of  it within a range of  40 
leagues. The “sacrifices” which the central government imposed upon 
France in favor of  Paris, wrote the physiocrat Dupont, “are the object 
of  the jealousy of  the whole kingdom.” While certain revolutionaries 
chided Parisians for having tamely submitted to the blandishments of  
the old-regime victualers, the counter-revolutionary essayist Rivarol 
reproached the old government for “its predilection and its profusions 
for the capital which always ate cheaper bread than the provinces and 
always at the expense of  the royal treasury.” Revolutionaries, too, 
sounded the theme that Paris could not expect to play the “monster” 
in the new regime as it had in the old.47
Paris owed its privileged position in the competition for subsistence 
to the conviction held by the government that “outcries of  need there 
would be more dangerous than anywhere else and would set a fatal 
and contagious example.”48 Political experience had demonstrated well 
before the eighteenth century that it was cheaper to take risks with provi-
sioning in the provinces than in the capital. Paris was considered highly 
vulnerable because of  the immensity of  its population— contemporary 
estimates ran as high as a million though historians today prefer a fig-
ure between six and 700,000 around the mid-century point—and 
47 Abbé G. Coyer, Essai sur la prédication (Paris, 1781), 15; P.-J. Malouin, Description des arts du 
meunier, du vermicellier et du boulanger, new edition, ed. by J.-E. Bertrand (Neuchâtel, 1771), 
429; Simon Linguet, cited by abbé André Morellet, Théorie du paradoxe (Amsterdam, 1775), 
99–100; P.-S. Dupont de Nemours, Analyse, 182; Rivarol, cited by Léon Biollay, Études 
économiques sur le XVIII e siècle. Le pacte de famine; l’administration du commerce (Paris, 1885), 60; 
Du Vaucelles in AN, F10215–216. Cf. J.-J. Rousseau, “De l’économie politique,” in Œuvres 
complètes, ed. by A. Houssiaux (Paris, 1852), I, 602 and H.E. Jacob, Histoire du pain depuis six 
mille ans (Paris, 1958), 89.
48 Mercier, Tableau de Paris, IV, 203. On the special urgency of  provisioning Paris and on the 
vulnerability of  the capital and the volatility of  its population, see: Delamare, Traité, II, 828; 
remonstrances of  Paris Parl., 2–4 March 1776, Flammermont, ed., Remontrances, III, 300; 
Regnaud, “Histoire des événements arrivés en France depuis 1772…,” BN, mss. fr. 13734; 
d’Argenson, Journal et mémoires, ed. by Rathery, VII, 81; anonymous memoir to CG, 1784, 
AN, F11 294–95; Marc Bloch, “Les Aliments du Français.” in Encyclopédie française, ed. by 
G. Berger (Paris, 1955), 14.42.10.Cf. Max Weber, The City, ed. and trans, by D. Martindale 
and G. Neuwirth (Glencoe, Ill., 1958), 73; Max Beloff, Public Order and Popular Disturbances, 
1660–1714 (London,1938), 129 and passim.
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potentially volatile, among other reasons, because the vast majority 
of  its inhabitants led a marginal and uncertain life and were more 
likely to react collectively and violently to threats to their subsistence 
than to any other stimulus.49 Paris was the historical capital of  the 
kingdom and, even after the government shifted to nearby Versailles, 
it remained the nerve-center of  the realm. Given the scale and inten-
sity it could achieve, a Parisian uprising, it was believed, could over-
turn the government.
“As long as the bread of  Gonesse is not lacking,” wrote Mercier, 
“the commotion will not be general; but if  Gonesse bread lacks for 
two consecutive markets, the revolt will be universal.”50 Mercier took 
49 For estimates that place the population under 600,000, see: A.-J.-P. Paucton, Métrologie, ou 
traité des mesures, des poids et des monnaies (Paris 1780), 482 (589,000); William Mildmay, The 
Police of  France (London, 1763), 125–26 (between 492,000 and 580,000); N.-F. Dupré de 
Saint-Maur, Essai sur les monnaies (Paris, 1746), 48–55 (under 600,000); Messance cited in 
Journal économique (Feb. 1766), 82 (576,630); Armand Husson, Les Consommations de Paris, 
2nd ed. (Paris, 1875), 27 (under 600,000); B. Gille, “Fonctions économiques de Paris,” in 
Paris: fonctions d’une capitale, Colloques, Cahiers de Civilisations (Paris, 1962), 131 (500,000 
in 1789); J. Dupâquier, “Sur la population française au 17e et au 18e siècles,” Revue historique, 
(Jan.–March 1968), 54n (500,000 at the beginning of  the century); P. Goubert in F. Braudel 
and E. Labrousse, eds., Histoire économique et sociale de la France (Paris, 1970), II, 73 (not much 
above 500,000 at end of  century).
For estimates between 600,000 and 800,000, see: Délibérations du Bureau de l’Hôtel de 
Ville, 3 May 1775, AN, H* 1876, fols. 127–29 (700,000–800,000); E. Béguillet, Description 
historique, I, 36–41 (over 700,000); article “Paris,” in Diderot, et al., Encyclopédie XI, 944 
(700,000); M. Brion, État actuel de la France (Amsterdam, 1774), 36 (750,000); Mercier, Tableau 
de Paris, I, 60 (700,000); Arrêté sur les subsistances, 27 Sept. 1791, Conseil Général de la 
Commune de Paris, AN, T 6441–2 (700,000).
For estimates over 800,000: Délibérations du Bureau de l’Hôtel de Ville, Aug. 1755, AN, 
H* 1866 (1,000,000); Gazier, ed., “La Police de Paris en 1770,” 30 (1,000,000); Béguillet, 
Description historique, I, 164n and Traité des subsistances, 658–60n (over 800,000); J. Rutlidge, 
Le Babillard (5 Aug. 1778), 291 (1,000,000); Des Essarts, Dictionnaire, I, 332 (1,000,000).
On the Paris population, see also L. Cahen, “La Population parisienne au milieu du 18e 
siècle,” Revue de Paris, 26th year (1 Sept. 1919), 146–70 and J. Kaplow, “Sur la population 
flottante,” Annales historiques de la révolution française, 39th year (Jan.–March 1767), 1.
On the government’s preoccupation with the size of  the capital and its efforts to limit 
further growth, in part for reasons of  police and subsistence, see the letters patent of  April 
1672, the royal Declarations of  July 1724 and Jan. 1726, and the letters patent of  July 1766. 
AN, G7 446–447 and Q1 1099 159ff.: Archives Seine-Paris, 2AZ 2 47 pièce 3f; Recueil général 
des anciennes lois françaises depuis l’année 420 jusqu’à la révolution de 1789, ed. F.-A. Isambert (Paris, 
1821–33), XXI, 273–75; L.-E-.A. Jobez, La France sous Louis XV, II, 373–74; Albert Babeau, 
Paris en 1789 (Paris, 1892), 8.
50 Mercier, Tableau de Paris, XII, 136. Mercier echoed the Cardinal de Retz who remarked 
that the Parisian Fronde could not endure because the bourgeois of  the capital 
could not do without their pain de Gonesse, an unusually savory white wheaten loaf  
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some poetical liberties with the facts, for the contribution of  the 
 Gonessiers in his time was relatively modest and the allure of  their 
bread had declined over the years. On the other hand, it was not at 
all farfetched to anticipate an explosion if  the usual supply of  bread 
at the Wednesday and Saturday markets in the sixteen marketplaces 
of  the capital failed. Voltaire joked that Paris needed only “bread and 
circuses” to flourish, but Delamare took the Roman lesson seriously, 
and his successors in the police felt confident about their ability to 
keep peace in Paris only when they could steadily assure the provi-
sioning of  the markets and occasionally provide “aliments to divert 
the people” as well.51 Its enormous size made Paris logistically difficult 
as well as politically urgent to provision. Without the special admin-
istrative advantages that the capital enjoyed, suggested the author of  
a dictionary of  police, “one would have trouble imagining that there 
are sources capable of  meeting the needs of  this vast pit.”52 Finally, 
authorities believed that it was important for there to be “a secret and 
invisible hand”—the police, not self-interest!—in the provisioning of  
the capital because Paris served as a regulator market, setting a price 
standard which had an impact, like Parisian fashion and Parisian out-
cries, far beyond the limits of  the city.53
Although the protests of  the provinces were sometimes exaggerated—
“it is necessary to complain,” Voltaire allowed, “so that you are drained 
 made by the “forains” or itinerant bakers of  the village of  Gonesse located northeast of  
Paris. Mémoires du Cardinal de Retz, ed. by Petitot in Collection des mémoires relatifs à l’histoire de 
France (Paris, 1825), XLIV, 274. Cf. Voltaire to Imbert, 21 Jan. 1771 in Œuvres complètes, ed. 
by Moland, XV, 331 (#8185) and Delamare, Traité, II, 823.
51 Voltaire to François de Chennevières, 22 Oct. 1760 in Voltaire’s Correspondence, ed. by 
T. Besterman, vol. 37, p. 156 (#7823); Voltaire to Suzanne Necker, 6 Feb. 1770, ibid., 
vol. 74, p. 81 (#15144); Delamare, Traité, II, 600; Bachaumont, Mémoires secrets, XXIV, 176–77 
(22 Aug. 1772). Cf. Béguillet, Description historique, I, 28n.
yet Lenoir was correct in claiming that “there had been few popular insurrections in Paris 
as long as the old ordinances were strictly observed.” Lenoir, “Essai sur la guerre des farines,” 
in R. Darnton, “Le Lieutenant de Police Lenoir, la guerre des farines et l’approvisionnement 
de Paris à la veille de la révolution,” Revue d’histoire moderne et contemporaine, XVI (Oct.–Dec. 
1969), 612. Mercier felt that Parisians were on the whole a tranquil people, yet he noted 
that once the populace became agitated, it was likely to explode, with terrible violence. 
Tableau de Paris, VI, 26–30 and XII, 6–8. Cf. Prudhomme’s claim, written of  course from 
the perspective of  1789, that the people “rose up” frequently and violently because of  
subsistence problems during the Old Regime. Révolutions de Paris, no. 7 (22 Aug. 1789), 2.
52 Des Essarts, Dictionnaire, I, 329.
53 PG Daguesseau fils to CG, 24 Feb. 1709 in A. de Boislisle, ed., Correspondance des contrôleurs 
généraux des finances avec les intendants des provinces (Paris, 1874–97), III, 102; Gazier, ed. 
“La Police de Paris en 1770,” 116.
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a little less”—they had a solid basis in fact.54 The Paris provisioning 
machine was a juggernaut; when it spared towns and villages, the rea-
son was inefficiency, not solicitude. Over centuries, the city extended 
its hinterland in all directions. It encroached upon areas which had 
traditionally served the needs of  Rouen, Orléans, Reims, Troyes, 
Bourges, Dijon, and other towns at an even greater remove. Once 
Paris staked out a region as its turf, it tried, with considerable suc-
cess, to shut out competitors. yet to assure its access to areas which it 
could not wholly appropriate, the capital opportunistically espoused 
the cause of  free internal circulation and preached a rhetoric of  soli-
darity of  city and hinterland.55 Absorbed by their own task, Parisian 
authorities evinced little sympathy for local subsistence needs and 
the problems that the local police faced. Often, without taking the 
trouble to investigate, they imputed a delay or an obstruction, which 
hindered the flow of  grain, to local ill will and malicious design. Even 
as the provincials tended to regard the Parisians as parasites, so the 
Parisian police, like the sans-culottes of  the Revolution, tended to see 
the provincials as “egotists” capable of  the most horrid crimes of  lèse-
Paris.56
The Parisian authorities were determined to see the capital provi-
sioned. That the producing areas might suffer did not matter. Paris dis-
dained what a parlementary commission called “this ancient principle 
[which “the peoples bear in their heart”] that grain is first reserved 
to the province where it is born.” The textbook authority on Parisian 
imperialism, Delamare, conceded that “natural equity” spoke strongly 
in favor of  local claims, but equity had to be weighed against other 
demands. Throughout the Old Regime (and afterwards), there were 
tensions of  the sort that developed at Châlons-sur-Marne in 1740, 
which suggest the nature of  the problem. The news that buyers for Paris 
would soon descend upon that town with official commissions from the 
Paris municipality “cast alarm in all the minds.” “The trouble,” wrote 
54 Voltaire, article “Blé ou bled” (1770), Dictionnaire philosophique in Œuvres complètes, ed. by 
Moland, XVIII, 11.
55 See, for example, CG to IN. of  Burgundy, 12 Sept. 1725, AN, G7 34. When circulation 
was interrupted, Paris faced serious problems. See BN, mss. fr. 16741, fols. 9–11; CG to 
Legendre, 21, 31 August and 27 Sept. 1709, in Correspondance des contrôleurs généraux, ed. by 
Boislisle, III, 204; d’Argenson to CG, 27 Dec. 1698, cited by R. Conte, L’Administration de la 
généralité de Paris à la fin du régne de Louis XIV (Paris, 1926), 149.
56 R. Cobb, Terreur et subsistances 1793–1795: Études d’histoire révolutionnaire (Paris, 1965), 217–19; 
Cobb, Les Armées révolutionnaires (Paris, 1961–63), II, 368, 395–96, 438.
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the substitut, “is universal, I don’t know of  any remedy to contain a 
populace of  ten to 11,000 men who have no bread at all and who will 
watch [Parisians] take away that on which they seem to have the right 
to count.” Paris, he asserted, “has many resources which a Province 
cannot find; if  Paris draws this year from Champagne, it is to put the 
knife at the throat of  all the people of  this country.”57
Provincial opposition to Parisian exactions took several forms. 
Popular resistance was often the most effective and always the most 
worrisome to the central government. It ranged in scope from a sim-
ple demonstration in the marketplace or before the house of  an offi-
cial to mass armed attacks on grain warehouses or on wagon convoys 
and boats. Generally spontaneous, with simple demands for immedi-
ate gratification, the eruptions were affirmations of  the intensely felt 
right of  the community to its subsistence. The popular rising was 
a political act by which the population expressed its dissatisfaction 
with the management and protection of  local interests and protested 
against changes in market organization or violations of  conventional 
patterns of  distribution that had developed over the years. Frequently, 
field authorities shared the resentment of  the people and on occasion 
made common cause with the insurgents, covertly or openly. Popu-
lar intervention occurred throughout the Old Regime—at Joigny in 
1693 where a troop of  women armed with billhooks marched against 
a Paris-bound grain convoy; at Nogent-sur-Seine in 1725 where a 
vigilante group patrolled the marketplace and expelled Paris buyers; 
at Montlhéry in 1728 where “the populace” forced a Paris merchant 
“to cede part of  his purchases at the same price at which he had 
bought” and the procurator vigorously defended their action; at Ver-
sailles in 1740 where a crowd shouting “kill the bastards” intercepted 
a flour train led by Paris bakers en route to the capital; and at scores 
of  other places during the second half  of  the eighteenth century, 
including the revolutionary years.58
57 Chambre des Enquêtes, “Mémoire” (Aug. 1771), BN, Coll. Joly 1111, fol. 145; Delamare, 
Traité, II, 823; Guillemin to PG, 4 Oct. 1740, BN, Coll. Joly 1123, fols. 177–78.
58 Factum for J. Roger, BN, mss. fr. 21642, fol. 369; St.-Germain, La Reynie, 266; Herlaut, “La 
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Resistance was not only popular but administrative, and Paris 
encountered it on all levels. Until Colbert succeeded in disciplin-
ing them, the neighboring parlements, especially the court at Rouen, 
boldly challenged Parisian inroads. The intendants formed an obdu-
rate and resourceful bulwark against the demands of  the capital. 
When they could not entirely isolate or insulate their généralités, they 
did not hesitate to lie, stall, wrangle with superiors, contest the claims 
of  colleagues, and bargain to reduce the burdens imposed upon them. 
Toward the end of  the reign of  Louis XIV, the Lieutenant of  Police 
d’Argenson complained to the Controller-General that the intendants 
were not faithfully enforcing the regulations governing the provisioning 
of  Paris. He ultimately found it more expeditious to do the job him-
self  by dispatching commissaires like Delamare. Serving as a sort of  
super-intendant with his own “subdelegates,” Delamare led armies of  
occupation into Champagne, Burgundy, the Orléanais and elsewhere 
in 1693–94, 1698, and 1709–10.59 The Paris police lieutenants during 
the reign of  Louis XV, confident of  support from Versailles and con-
scious of  their mounting prestige and influence, tended to deal directly 
with intendants, to send them what amounted to orders, and to rebuke 
them when necessary. In 1725 the intendants of  the généralités sur-
rounding the capital offered no hospitality to Paris merchants seeking 
grain and allowed their subdelegates to harass them. The Controller- 
General countered by imposing grain-for-Paris quotas on these inten-
dancies under a program personally supervised by the Paris police 
chief. Intendants on the path of  foreign grain bound for the capital 
were severely reprimanded for diverting those supplies for local usage. 
In the forties, the Controller-General Orry, himself  a former intendant, 
requisitioned grain for Paris and other destinations and monitored the 
conduct of  the intendants through extra-administrative channels.60
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The resistance most difficult to prevent or repress, because it was 
so scattered, came predictably from the local police. In defense of  
their supply and their jurisdiction, they protested vehemently against 
Parisian intrusion, commandeered Paris-bound grain, and hampered 
Paris dealers in countless ways. They invoked current royal legislation 
which, if  understood literally without regard to dispensations made 
for Paris, often seemed to favor their cause. They pointed to local prec-
edents which in non-subsistence matters were generally respected by 
higher authorities. They also justified recourse to supra-legal emer-
gency measures in the name of  the salus populi, a doctrine which their 
superiors denounced as casuistry. In some instances, to thwart Parisian 
buyers, they used their authority informally, making it difficult for the 
offended parties to document their complaints. In other cases, they 
issued ordinances which they knew would buy time until news of  them 
doddered to the center where the royal council (or a parlement on the 
regional level) could eventually review and quash them.
The nature of  the issues that opposed the local and the Parisian 
police changed very little over the years. In 1725 the police at Soissons 
and Vitry-le-François refused to permit licensed merchants “for the 
provisioning of  Paris” to ship the grain they purchased to the capital. 
Enraged by the arrogance of  these local authorities—“it is against all 
the rules that a city of  the kingdom billets itself  off  against all the 
 others”—the Controller-General, without scruple for consistency, 
insisted that “the liberty of  commerce” be maintained and that Pari-
sian buyers receive not merely equal but preferential treatment. Simi-
larly, he castigated a subdelegate at Bourges for allowing a Paris dealer 
to be “insulted and threatened by the people” and for failing to “sup-
port her and furnish her all the necessary help.” The Paris Procurator 
General acted in the same fashion to prevent the local officials from 
“troubling” Paris merchants. Hérault, the Paris police chief, accused 
the bailli of  Versailles of  trying to stop Versailles bakers from bringing 
their bread to the Paris markets. Jealous of  the success of  the Versailles 
market in attracting flour merchants, Hérault sent an agent on a secret 
mission to “engage them to prefer Paris.” Of  the fifty-two substituts 
who replied to a parlementary questionnaire of  1788, twelve blamed 
grain removals for Paris as a major cause of  the dearth.61
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Opposition to Paris was not a unifying force; the towns and vil-
lages of  the provinces battled among themselves even as each contin-
ued to resist the capital. We have already indicated the sorts of  issues 
and the tactics that characterized these conflicts. They did not vary 
much from place to place, within or outside the Parisian sphere of  
influence. Beyond the reach of  Paris, other centers of  metropolitan 
demand played a role similar to that of  Paris, albeit on a more modest 
scale. Even within the Paris zone, the larger towns tried to lord it over 
the lesser communities in imitation of  the way the capital colonized 
its hinterland. Ironically, within the Paris zone, it was not uncommon 
for a town in open conflict with the capital to invoke its solidarity with 
Paris in order to justify its encroachment on other communities. The 
police of  the Brie market-town of  Provins, for example, sought to 
repel Parisian incursions while at the same time they moved against 
neighboring communities on the grounds that Provins was a vital link 
in the all-important Parisian supply system.62
In fact there were many towns like Provins which had an ambigu-
ous attitude toward Paris, for they alternately suffered (usually in bad 
times) and benefited (usually in “normal” years) under its aegis. When 
they were not competing for subsistence, these towns were competing 
for clients: laboureurs, blatiers (petty grain traders), grain and flour mer-
chants, millers, and bakers. They competed for Parisian patronage 
even as they suffered Parisian oppression. For the concentration of  
Parisian demand on the markets was, in many cases, the chief  source 
of  income in such towns, and employment depended almost entirely 
on the vitality of  the grain market. Town fathers and influential sei-
gneurs lobbied with Parisian officials against rival towns in the hope 
of  securing certain most-favored-market privileges. Just as the inva-
sion of  Parisian buyers in the Hurepoix town of  Montlhéry sparked 
a defensive riot against the outsiders in the dearth year 1725, so the 
news that this market-town would be put off  limits to Parisian buyers 
incited a popular uprising in 1737 in favor of  the outsiders.63
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In bad times, inter-community rivalry resulted in a war of  prohibi-
tions; in good times, it produced a war of  indulgences. To make their 
market more attractive, the officials of  Etampes, a market-town set in 
the rich wheatlands of  the Beauce, relaxed the police regulations and 
tolerated informal and covert trading practices that were against the 
law—national, Parisian, and local. For fear of  losing clients, other mar-
kets responded with an equally permissive attitude. The breakdown of  
controls alarmed the Parisian police, who feared that it would upset 
the orderly provisioning of  the capital, as much as it delighted Pari-
sian buyers and local sellers. Parisian commercial pressure and Parisian 
police pressure worked at cross-purposes and posed a dilemma for local 
authorities. The royal procurator of  Dourdan complained that when 
he rigorously enforced the rules recommended by the Paris police, buy-
ers and sellers fled his market in order to trade in places which showed 
“more tolerance.” Arguing that it was unfair to force him into actions 
which ruined his market while strengthening those of  rival towns, he 
appealed to the Procurator General to require all the local police to 
enforce the rules with the same diligence. Etampes responded to Pari-
sian criticism in the same vein. “Would you please,” an official asked 
the Procurator General, “order your substituts to execute the Declara-
tions of  the King in the other markets [as well?]”64
Across the breadth of  the kingdom and the span of  a century, it is 
easy to compile a long list of  local and regional administrative con-
flicts. But it is difficult to measure their incidence and impact through 
time and space. On balance, it seems clear local affairs were not in 
a perpetual state of  disorder. Surely in most respects local life in the 
eighteenth century was far less chaotic than it had been a century ear-
lier. All that can be safely said about local administration is that it was 
more or less incoherent in organization and erratic in performance. 
In most places it functioned well enough to pass all the major tests, 
despite occasional lapses into anarchy. In many places, it resulted in a 
permanent atmosphere of  cold war among officials and jurisdictions. 
But chronic cold war itself  generated conventions and compromises 
by which officials managed to get along. The tensions in the system 
had salutary as well as deleterious effects. They kept officials alert and 
stirred emulation among them. Administrators checked each others’ 
excesses and pretensions and from these encounters a rough balance 
of  power and division of  labor sometimes emerged.
64 Odile to PG, 19 Oct. 1738 and Montulle to PG, 13 Nov. 1738, BN, Coll. Joly 1119, fols. 
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In this way administrative rivalry was not a wholly dysfunctional 
principle of  administrative operation. The Controller-General (or, 
on a different scale, the intendant) manipulated these rivalries to his 
advantage, playing one official off  against another, using the reports 
of  one to verify those of  another, and so on. The central government 
was not strong enough to implant itself  decisively and permanently 
at the base, but it was far too powerful and prudent to permit any 
genuine, long-term independence of  action. Subsistence, however, 
required constant attention and the central government simply could 
not intervene everywhere at once. The responsibilities of  provision-
ing placed great strains on a flawed structure. It placed the greatest 
burdens on the bottom, where the structure was weakest.
V
The style and operation of  the local police depended upon the 
personnel as well as the structure of  administration. Large-scale 
prosopographic studies of  local administration have not yet been 
undertaken. Fragmentary data suggest a wide range of  variation 
among officials in family background, social origin and status, for-
tune, modes of  recruitment, etc.—not only among different classes 
of  officials (say, mayors, judges, commissaires, and procurators,) but 
also within the same categories (i.e., the substituts of  a substantial 
town and of  an unobtrusive hamlet). Some officials were “notables” 
or even nobles (albeit usually “incomplete”), while others were simple 
bourgeois; some had considerable education, while others had little 
formal schooling or training for public service; some municipalities 
were dominated by merchants, others by lawyers, still others by land-
owners or mixed elites, while in some places the municipal govern-
ment per se was of  little consequence in day-to-day administration; 
some posts were venal, others non-venal but practically hereditary, 
still others filled by commission, cooptation, or some semblance 
of  election.
Diverse pressures played upon the local police agent of  whatever 
stripe. He was concerned about his career and he understood that obedi-
ence was the virtue his superiors esteemed most highly, yet he knew that 
his chances for advancement were probably slim and he could not 
afford to overlook the incentives for disobedience. When he needed 
advice or authorization he found the system frustrating and demoralizing, 
but when he wished to act on his own account he took refuge in its 
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 complexity and unwieldiness. On the one hand, he was ferociously jeal-
ous of  his authority and, even if  he sympathized with a given decision 
or policy (say, to fix the price of  grain), he was tempted to oppose it 
vehemently if  it infringed upon his competence, menaced his autonomy, 
or issued from a tainted source. On the other hand, he was as a rule 
extremely solicitous of  the interests of  what we shall call his constituency, 
though not always for the purest motives, and he hesitated to act (or not 
to act) without carefully assessing the likely effect on “his” public opin-
ion. Finally, his personal affairs, obligations to his benefactors and clients, 
and his business connections doubtless also entered into his reckoning.
The quality and the personnel of  the local police of  provision-
ing came under stinging attack in the eighteenth century. Ministers, 
intendants, and parlementarians at various times expressed impa-
tience with the fecklessness, the obtuseness, the indifference, the over-
zealousness, or the insubordination of  these local authorities. The 
harsh portrait of  the local police as a band of  benighted, brutish, 
and undependable subalterns fashioned by the physiocrats in their 
onslaught against the regulatory regime in the sixties and seventies 
was not an original canvas; they merely elaborated upon what must 
be considered the semi-official picture.65
The Paris police had little sympathy with their counterparts in the 
hinterland and they often cited misconduct as a pretext for intervening 
in local affairs. On the one hand, as we shall later see, Paris denounced 
them for indiscreet, excessive, and presumptuous action; on the other, 
they stood accused of  a lack of  zeal, firmness, and sense of  mission. 
One Paris agent in 1725 deplored the “negligence” of  the judges at 
Provins and the prolonged absence of  the lieutenant of  police who 
“liked his pleasure too much.” Another decried their indolence and 
their apathy toward their duties: “I talked [about the situation] sev-
eral times to these officers who told me that things were going quite 
smartly… [a] reply which made me laugh.” At Auneau, reported still 
65 On the physiocratic attitude, see: Mirabeau, La Philosophie rurale, ou économie générale et politique 
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(25 April 1767), 320; Journal économique (June 1768), 261 and (April 1769), 177; Roubaud, 
Représentations aux magistrats (London, 1769), 66; Baudeau, Avis au peuple sur son premier besoin 
(Paris, 1768), 158; Condorcet, Le Monopole et le monopoleur in Collection des principaux économistes, 
ed. by E. Daire and G. de Molinari (Osnabruck, 1966; orig. 1847), XIV, 465; Ephémérides du 
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another correspondent of  the Lieutenant General of  Paris, the 
police was “very badly observed” in large measure because the fis-
cal procurator was “very inattentive.” “The officers charged with 
the police in these markets [around the capital] could, if  they so 
wished, prevent the augmentation of  the price of  grain as we do at 
Paris,” wrote the commissaire Duplessis, a colleague of  Delamare; 
“a bit of  vigor or of  good will on their part would be necessary, 
that is what they lack.” In 1740 the Paris police received similar 
complaints about the conduct of  the royal procurators at Dourdan, 
St. Arnoult, Rambouillet, and Auneau. Towards the end of  the fif-
ties Poussot, the inspector of  police assigned to the Halles, urged 
that the intendant of  Paris be asked to review meticulously the 
behavior of  the local officials responsible for the grain police. “It is 
sure,” he maintained, “that the majority fail in their duty and in the 
fervor which they must have.…”66
Even those high-placed officials who were generally well- disposed 
towards grass-roots administrators scorned their ignorance. One 
royal procurator, for example, whose father and grandfather had 
also been substituts at Joigny, submitted a series of  earnest mem-
oirs recommending reform in the system of  tax collection and the 
administration of  justice as well as the suppression of  useless offices. 
 Commenting on the projects and their author, the secretary of  the 
Paris Procurator General noted that he was a person “who might 
have zeal, but who has neither logic nor expression; he knows nei-
ther how to write nor how to think; the whole thing is not worth the 
trouble of  reading.”67
On balance, it was less the “lack of  enlightenment” of  the local offi-
cials than their devotion to material “self-interest” that troubled their 
Parisian critics.68 Throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
local authorities were repeatedly accused, by unjaundiced witnesses as 
well as by their professional adversaries, of  engaging in surreptitious 
and illicit grain trading, and manipulating police regulations in order 
to further their personal ventures. Included in this indictment were not 
only the officials formally charged with police responsibilities, but a 
66 Lobinod to PG, 22 Aug. 1725, BN, Coll. Joly 1117, fols. 110–11; Bourlon to LG, 13 Dec. 1725, 
Arsenal, mss. Bastille 10271; Marchais to LG, 14 Dec. 1725, mss. Bastille 10271; Duplessis to 
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10027; 29 March, 7 April 1760, mss. Bastille 10141; Foucaud, “Mémoire concernant les abus 
… dans le commerce du bled” (July–August 1725), BN, Coll. Joly 1117, fols. 236–37.
67 BN, mss. fr. 8128, fols. 135, 158.
68 Foucaud to PG, 18 Oct. 1740, BN, Coll. Joly 1121, fols. 265–66.
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 multitude of  other officials, many of  whom had family, political, and 
business connections with them: officers of  the minages (grain- measuring 
stations), measurers at the markets, collectors of  royal, ecclesiastical 
and seignorial impositions, clerks and lawyers attached to the courts.
Although many of  them were entangled in everyday grain 
commerce, the officials aroused the greatest resentment for 
speculating in time of  dearth. In 1630 the extraordinary General 
Assembly of  Police learned that “officiers” in the countryside were 
hoarding and dealing in grain. In the early 1660’s evidence reached 
Paris that officials at Châlons-sur-Marne, Vitry-le-françois, Sois-
sons, and Coulommiers were associated with grain merchants or 
personally involved in the traffic. In 1693–94 Colmet, receiver of  
the domain at Bray and a commissioner for the powerful Paris grain 
dealer Jean Roger, bought, sold, and stored grain with the help of  his 
wife, collector of  tolls at the local bridge, who was well placed to fol-
low the movement of  grain to and from market. Several years later, 
the Parisian Lieutenant General of  Police d’Argenson denounced two 
receivers of  the taille at Châteaudun and several municipal officials at 
Etampes for regrating, that is, buying and reselling illegally. “Grain 
is in the possession of  those who govern,” he lamented, “and their 
interest will always predominate.” Delamare in 1709 urged the Paris 
police agents on mission in the countryside to pay special attention 
to the activities of  local authorities who “quite commonly undertake 
a sort of  grain commerce.” Among those he accused were the presi-
dent of  the election of  Rozoy, the fiscal procurator of  Coulommiers, 
and the president of  the presidial at Melun.69
Charles Foucaud, an itinerant agent who collected intelligence in the 
supply zone for the Paris police, found numerous examples of  regrating 
and engrossing by local authorities between the mid-twenties and early 
forties. “All the justice of  the place, right up to the Lieutenant-General,” 
reported a commander of  the maréchaussée [rural constabulary] in refer-
ence to Rozoy-en-Brie, “is mixed up in regrating.” “Almost all the offi-
cers” in the Vitry area, a substitut claimed, “do this commerce secretly, 
buying whole granaries.” In 1748 a grain merchant formally filed a 
complaint with the Châtelet, the Parisian criminal, civil, and police 
69 BN, mss. fr. 21641, fol. 130; Bondois, “Disette de 1662,” Revue d’histoire économique et sociale, 
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court, against the fiscal procurator of  Rambouillet for illicit specula-
tions. The Procurator General Joly de Fleury marveled at the story of  
the officer of  the poids le roy [measuring station] at Vitry who traded 
extensively in grain as well as hemp, wool, candles, mercerie, and épic-
erie. The physiocrats reviled the local police for their venality as well 
as their stupidity, but one of  their own, Letrosne, was apparently both 
an officer of  municipal police at Orléans and a grain speculator.70 A 
correspondent of  the intendant of  Languedoc complained that the 
city fathers of  Toulouse “steeped their hands in the iniquities and 
maneuvers” of  the grain dealers. Themselves proprietors or fermi-
ers in many instances, the local authorities in Brittany and Picardy 
commonly entered the grain trade, in their own names and through 
intermediaries.
For many years one Sieur Bedel served the busy market of  Pont 
Sainte-Maxence as royal procurator and juror-grain measurer while 
simultaneously engaging in grain traffic and acting as broker for flour 
and grain dealers. In 1774 the grain trader Gayard accused Bedel 
of  masterminding an “odious maneuver” aimed partly against him. 
Gayard’s plaintive account of  his inability to win redress underscores 
the enormous influence exercised by local merchant-police:
that [Bedel] being royal procurator at the seat where the litigation took place, he was 
supposed to take charge of  and enforce the police on the fact of  grain, and that far 
from demanding respect for the laws so wisely established, he was on the contrary the 
first law-breaker, misleading the judge and the parties in whose name he wished to 
force the delivery of  the grain… in order to appropriate for himself  the price without 
having furnished the value.71
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The alleged cupidity of  local officials manifested itself  in still another 
way. The grain trade regulations required the Paris bakers, unlike the 
merchants, to conduct all their grain-buying exclusively at the markets 
and to do the purchasing themselves, not through agents. The same 
rules strictly prohibited the millers from engaging in grain trade and 
the mealmen from selling their flour off  the markets. The aim of  these 
controls was to prevent a confusion of  function among the principals 
of  the provisioning trade and the bread industry, to enable the police 
to keep track of  supplies and suppliers, and to force a large segment 
of  the traffic onto the public market, especially the Paris Halles, which 
the police believed to be declining in importance toward the middle 
of  the century. In order to enforce these controls, the Paris police 
required the bakers to procure an attestation from one of  the officials 
at the market where they purchased their grain indicating the amount 
purchased and the date of  the transaction. As part of  the mandatory 
declaration which they had to make upon bringing their merchandise 
into the capital, the bakers, or the millers who converted the grain for 
them, or their drivers, had to present the certificate for examination. 
The bakers, millers, and flour dealers all found the restrictions on 
their freedom extremely irksome. The bakers relished the liberty to 
scour the countryside for the best buy and the best quality or to spare 
themselves the travail of  purchasing and transporting by delegating the 
task to millers. The millers enhanced their chances in the competition 
for baker clients by agreeing to purchase the grain—which in effect 
made them flour merchants—and the flour traders wanted to be able 
to prepare flour on speculation and deliver it directly to the bakers’ 
shops without bothering to stop at the market.
With the collusion of  the local officials who, for a price, supplied 
fraudulent or blank certificates covering fictitious sales in the names 
of  real or imaginary bakers, the bakers, millers, and flour dealers were 
able to evade the regulations. In November 1749, for example, two 
Paris grain measurers, part of  a corps of  sometime venal officers who 
exercised important police functions on the markets, ports, streets, and 
on the periphery of  the city, challenged a baker transporting 16 sacks of  
unbolted flour to show the certificate authenticating the purchase of  the 
flour or of  the wheat from which the flour was made. The baker, Bon-
tems, from the faubourg St. Antoine, produced a certificate from Meaux 
which the measurers denouned as “fraudulent” because the informa-
tion concerning date and amount appeared in fresh ink and in a hand 
 different from the one which signed and filled in the other  formalities. 
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The certificate, they charged, was issued in blank and “not for pur-
chase made upon the market.”72
In another incident several years later the measurers stopped 
the driver of  the flour dealer Sorel, who was carting ten sacks of  
bolted flour to the widow Massy, mistress baker in the Marais. 
The certificate displayed by the driver, bearing the imprint of  the 
Versailles poids le roy and the signature of  Girard, police clerk, was 
blank. Seizing the flour, the measurers denounced “three formal 
violations of  the regulations of  police”: the first committed by 
Sorel, who sold flour without exposing it on the market; the sec-
ond by the widow Massy, for buying off  the market; “the third 
and the most considerable” by the official Girard, who “delivers 
certificates in blank for money, [certificates] that the millers and 
flour merchants fill out in the name of  such-and-such a baker… 
that occasions a clandestine commerce, which is very prejudicial 
to the provisioning of  the city of  Paris, and contemptuous of  all 
the ordinances.” The Pont Sainte-Maxence market (where Sieur 
Bedel served) had a reputation for providing spurious certificates. 
In the early thirties, the Paris police lieutenant Hérault fined its 
royal procurator 1,500 livres, an enormous sum, for issuing such 
documents, and thirty years later, Poussot charged that three-
quarters of  all certificates from Pont were “false.”73
A case that occurred in 1761 illustrates the extent to which the 
distribution of  fraudulent papers and the illicit trading practices of  
bakers had become the “usage.” Confronted by two measurers at 
7 a.m. at the barrier of  Chaillot, the baker Leduc, driving a wagon 
with 17 septiers of  wheat, confessed that he had no certificate. Cheer-
fully, without any sense of  self-incrimination, Leduc recounted that 
after buying the grain at a farm, he stopped at the nearby Rambouil-
let market to pick up the necessary documents. The officers there, 
however, refused to issue him papers. Their rigidity—the measurers 
called it probity—surprised him, for in the past, he said,
Every time that he had purchased grain in the farms either on the Rambouillet side or 
on the Dammartin side [respectively southwest and northeast of  Paris] and elsewhere, 
he had been in the habit of  taking certificates from the nearest market.74
72 AN, y 9622 (28 Nov. 1749).
73 AN, y 11241 (17 Aug. 1754) and y 9539 (6, 17 May 1758); Arsenal, mss. Bastille 10141 
(10 March 1760 and 8 April 1761).
74 AN, y 9539 (11 Sept. 1761).
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Generally the Paris police were the market modernizers and the local 
officers the defenders of  antiquated forms of  market organization. In 
these instances, albeit for wholly unworthy motives, the local police 
of  the hinterland were on the side of  flexibility and change.
Much of  the evidence presented here for local police corruption 
and incompetence is tendentious and heavily biased in favor of  a 
single region. yet it seems clear that a considerable number of  offi-
cials at one time or another betrayed their public trust and broke the 
laws by engaging in a trade from which they were explicitly banned 
and by using their police authority to personal advantage. Perhaps 
a larger number of  local officials, more circumspect or less brazen, 
were guilty of  what our public servants fastidiously call a conflict of  
interest. While the central government “destituted” and punished 
culpable officials now and then, it never found a systematic method 
for policing and purging the local police. Local administration was 
too atomized and too inaccessible to subject to thorough reform. 
Moreover, in a system built upon privilege, favor, venality, fiscality, 
hereditary succession, nepotism, “usage,” and neo-feudal fidelities, 
and in which the idea of  bureaucracy hardly existed and the bound-
aries separating public and private enterprise remained obscure, 
corruption was a difficult thing to define and locate. Then, as now, 
it was a phenomenon of  degree and circumstance. Often it was tol-
erated where it did not do great damage. Issuing false documents, 
despite the self-serving hyperbole of  the Paris police, was unlikely 
either to jeopardize the provisioning of  the capital or enable these 
white collar (or black-robed) brigands to lead an opulent existence. 
For the most part, the local officials who practiced grain speculation 
were petty nuisances, not robber-barons in the mold of  a Fouquet.
Then again, such activities might have had a more subtle and pro-
found impact on public opinion than on public administration. They 
prepared certain portions of  the public to lend credence to grave sus-
picions that circulated, especially in times of  dearth, implicating the 
highest officials in the kingdom in conspiracies to reap huge profits 
by manipulating the supply of  grain. These charges found their most 
shocking expression in the so-called pacte de famine, a plot denounced 
publicly for the first time in the late sixties, but they appeared in vari-
ous forms throughout the eighteenth century, commanding wide-
spread belief  and heaping discredit upon the leading figures of  the 
central government. Viewed upon the background of  the local expe-
rience, which taught many people to expect to find local authorities 
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involved in secret grain trafficking, it is easier to understand the willing-
ness of  Frenchmen to believe that more highly placed officials, with far 
greater appetites and powers, could launch massive, illicit speculations 
on grain. The idea that government could have some sinister connec-
tion with the provisioning trade had solid local roots.
Nor can the local police be fairly assessed without considering the 
extremely difficult conditions under which they operated. The confu-
sion of  the system afforded them real advantages but, as I suggested, 
it victimized them as well. Often they had no clear idea of  where they 
fit, of  how they should function, and to whom they should or should 
not defer. If  they were insular, unsophisticated, or excessively wedded 
to the past, frequently it was because they were not kept abreast of  
changes in law, procedures, and policies—the fruit of  the neglect and 
contempt of  their superiors as well as of  systemically poor communica-
tions. Although it is impossible to say how often such gaps occurred, the 
case of  Lanson, fiscal procurator of  a small market-town near Chartres, 
graphically illustrates the danger of  isolating and abandoning the local 
forces of  order. “In the two years that I have been fiscal procurator at 
Auneau,” he wrote, “I have neither seen nor received any old or new 
regulations on the matter of  grain.” He learned “from common rumor” 
that it was forbidden for grain to be sold by sample. After consultation 
with the judge at Auneau, Lanson wrote his own ordinance prohibit-
ing such transactions on pain of  a hundred livres fine and requiring all 
grain to be exposed for sale in sacks on the open market. He worried, 
however, about the wisdom and legitimacy of  his initiative and about 
how to handle such situations in the future. His letter to the Procurator 
General Joly de Fleury is a pathetic and revealing plea:
As I have no Regulations in my hands at all, I very humbly implore your Grandeur to 
please address them to me [as soon as possible]… if  it pleases your Grandeur, when 
there will be new Edicts, Arrêts or Regulations on the matter of  the police, have a copy 
sent to me .…75
If  the local police were demoralized and easy prey to lassitude or 
venal temptation, it was partly because their superiors ignored their 
hunger for recognition and recompense for service rendered. Demon-
chu, procurator at Compiègne, must have seemed ludicrous with his 
75 Lanson to PG, 9 Dec. 1738, BN, Coll. Joly 1119, fols. 53–54. Cf., on the communications 
gap, Odile to PG, 29 Nov. 1738, ibid., 108–109; Morin at Nogent-le-Rotrou to IN. of  
Alençon, 13 Oct. 1773 and Soalhat of  Sées to same, 20 Oct. 1773, C. 89, A.D. Orne.
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puffed-up sense of  importance (“I am a magistrate,” he emphasized), 
his pompous manner (“It is in dispensing justice exactly and filling 
his function with distinction that he [a procurator] must pay his court 
[faire sa cour]; it is in his bureau and on the tribune that one must find 
him diligent, not in the antichambres of  the great.”), and his reform-
ist ardor (“It is indecent that justice is sold for the price of  money.”). 
But Demonchu, doubtless like many other local officials with pride 
and a certain dose of  ambition, believed that he served the public and 
the government well and that he deserved something more than the 
117 livres he earned in gages (“all my work is free”), most of  which was 
devoured by the dixième, capitation, and paulette. To “reanimate the cour-
age” of  the police, he urged—in vain—that the local magistrates be 
salaried and that a special “order,” akin to the honors accorded mili-
tary achievement, be created to pay homage to outstanding officials.76
76 BN, mss. fr. 8128.
Chapter II
THE REGULATIONS  
AND THE REGULATORS
The police were structurally fragmented and often divided by inter-
est and ambition, but they shared a number of  basic ideas about the 
provisioning question. This chapter deals with the police view of  the 
grain trade and the ways in which the police translated their attitudes 
into action. It is the story of  persistence rather than change, of  an 
overwhelming sense of  continuity informed by a belief  that things—
at least subsistence things—are at bottom always the same. The police 
clung to the old ways because they were proven ways. Yet it would be 
a mistake, I argue, to infer from the immobility and the tone of  police 
regulations that the police operated in a mindless, mechanical, and 
timeless fashion. On the other hand, there were limits to flexibility 
and adaptability. The police were wholly unprepared for the radical 
innovations that they had to face in the 1760’s when the government 
turned against the multisecular tradition of  regulation.
I
The rules developed to govern the grain trade were based upon the 
tenet that grain was essentially unlike any other commodity com-
monly exchanged and thus must be treated differently. As an item 
of  “first necessity” and ultimately a matter of  life or death for mil-
lions of  consumers, grain could not be legitimately compared 
with goods whose exchange merely complemented subsistence or 
enhanced pleasure. As a rule, in other sorts of  commerce, shortage, 
tardiness, deception in transaction, or other defects and vices caused 
inconvenience only to individuals and never in lethal doses. In the 
grain trade, however, “the least error almost always affects the pub-
lic,” threatening the entire community at its most vulnerable point. 
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Given its special nature, those who undertook to deal in grain, the 
police believed, assumed solemn responsibilities toward society.1
Since society depended entirely on grain commerce for its sub-
sistence in ordinary times, the police viewed the trade as a kind of  
public service. They made demands and imposed restrictions upon 
grain traders that other merchants escaped. The grain merchant 
had obligations to the public that would sometimes require him to 
resist the promptings of  his self-interest, which the police recog-
nized as his chief  source of  motivation. He had to be satisfied with 
a “just and legitimate gain” based upon his investment, his labor, 
and the energy with which he served the public rather than on the 
cunning with which he manipulated supply and demand factors. 
There was no room in the grain trade for dealers “corrupted by 
amour-propre and immoderate cupidity for a sordid profit.” Certain 
customs and laws in the Old Regime violated property rights as 
defined by the absolutist standards whose consecration the Revolu-
tion first began. Implicit in the police conception of  the grain trade 
was the notion that the grain held by a merchant (or cultivator) was 
not perfectly and exclusively his own to dispose of  as he saw fit. As 
the primary source of  subsistence, grain was a “common good” 
upon which society had certain claims. The police, as guardians of  
the commonwealth, stood ready to enforce those claims according 
to the needs, not of  social justice (though there are hints that some 
police officials thought of  it in this way), but of  social tranquility.2
The grain merchants gave the police little reason to believe that 
they would honor those claims voluntarily and the police made little 
effort to conceal their distrust of  the merchants. In part the police 
attitude reflected the low esteem in which commerce was generally 
held. Commerce never overcame the stigma attached to it by mor-
alists and theologians. “To fornicate,” the canon law proclaims, “is 
always forbidden to anyone, but to trade is sometimes allowed and 
sometimes not.” The indulgence which certain medieval doctors and 
their followers accorded trade did little to modify the deeply-rooted 
and widely-held idea that there was something odious about the trader. 
The merchant remained the prototype of  the liar who menaced the 
 1 Delamare, Traité, II, 619, 796.
 2 Ibid., II, 775; Gazier, ed., “La Police de Paris en 1770,” 117; La Reynie to CG, 13 July 1695 
in Correspondance des contrôleurs-généraux, ed. by Boislisle, I, 397. Cf. E. F. Heckscher, Mercantilism 
(London, 1935), II, 271–74; Emile Coornaert, Les Corporations en France avant 1789 (Paris, 
1941), 143.
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well-being and the bonds of  solidarity of  society. In the popular 
religious literature, the merchant always stood last in the order of  
salvation, if  indeed there was to be a place for him at all. The clas-
sics taught the kingdom’s future elite that mercury, god of  mer-
chants, was also god of  thieves.3
Although mercantilist doctrine portrayed the merchant as a bene-
factor of  the state, most Frenchmen continued to see commerce as a 
dishonorable profession well into the eighteenth century. In his  English 
Letters, Voltaire deplored the “disdain” which commerce aroused in 
France, inhibiting social and economic progress. The abbé Coyer 
encountered the same attitude in his efforts to induce the nobility to 
undertake certain kinds of  commerce. The principles upon which 
French society was stratified invited the merchant to despise himself  
and produced a constant hemorrhage of  successful men out of  busi-
ness and into professions or estates, which brought dignity.4
The reputation of  the grain merchants, whose commerce con-
cerned the public more than any other, was particularly execrable (a 
distinction they shared with mealmen and millers, as Daudet’s tales 
evocatively suggest). The merchants and their supporters blamed the 
police for creating the stereotype of  the grain-trader-criminal in their 
ordinances and sentences and for teaching the people to regard mer-
chants as their born enemies. The police rejoined that the traders’ 
image was the fruit of  their own perfidy and that the people needed 
no lessons from the authorities in perceiving villainy in their midst.5
The police view of  the merchants was deeply ambivalent. On the 
one hand, provisioning was fundamentally a commercial operation 
and traders were absolutely necessary in order to fulfill this public 
 3 R. de Roover, “The Scholastic Attitude toward Trade and Entrepreneurship,” Explorations 
in Entrepreneurial History, n.s., I (Fall 1963), 76; Roover, “Scholastic Economics: Survival and 
Lasting Influence from the 16th Century to Adam Smith,” Quarterly Journal of  Economics, 
LXIX (1955), 179–80; G. Bollème, “Littérature populaire et littérature de colportage au 
18e siècle,” in F. Furet, ed., Livre et société dans la France du 18e siècle (Paris, 1965), I, 78–79. 
Cf. mandrou, Histoire de la France aux 17e et 18e siècles, 163; Le Goff, Occident médiéval, 437; 
R. Cobb, Les Armées révolutionnaires, I, 188–189.
 4 Voltaire, Lettres philosophiques in Œuvres complètes, ed. by moland (Paris, 1877–1885), XXII, 
110–111; G.-F. Coyer, La Noblesse commerçante (London, 1756).
 5 See, for example, Prior-consuls of  St. malo, mémoire, Feb. 1762, C. 3911, A.D. I-et-V. and 
Letter of  the Grenoble Parl. to the king, 26 April 1769, B. 2314, fol. 111, A.D. Isère. For 
the physiocratic portrayal of  the police, see chapter one above and especially chapters nine 
and ten below. Cf. the speech of  Creuzé-Latouche, 8 Dec. 1792, Archives parlementaires, LIV, 
679 and J.-B. Biot, Lettres sur l’approvisionnement de Paris et sur le commerce des grains (Paris, 1835), 
58–59.
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mission. On the other hand, the police could not help themselves 
from thinking that this traffic, like usury, tended to recruit men of  
contemptible character who harbored evil designs. For it was in the 
nature of  commerce to speculate and who but vicious men would 
speculate on the subsistence of  their fellow-citizens? The international 
négociant dealing in precious metals or other goods was a man without 
a country, but the grain trader was a man without a conscience. Grain 
merchants, as a sixteenth-century statute noted, were often motivated 
only by “rapacity and avarice, having neither God, charity or salvation 
before their eyes.…” Their aim was “to profit from public misfortune” 
and they did not hesitate to promote such misfortune by maneuvers 
which fomented “panic terror amongst the people.” They were “justly 
suspect” because they had “no views other than their [own] interests.”6
The salient trait of  the evil grain dealer was his “avidity.” A local 
police official writing in 1725 explained what he meant by this stric-
ture. Instead of  selling, the merchants buy grain and hide it away 
in order to drive the price up. They offer it for sale “only when they 
wish” and often they sell it to men who are their own agents in order 
to keep it from the people. These merchants, “real rogues,” were the 
“cause of  the cherté” in the provisioning crown (as the hinterland was 
called) around the capital.
Throughout the Old Regime, the police and the people frequently 
blamed shortages and outbreaks of  high prices on merchants.7 Com-
missaire Delamare’s analysis of  the origins of  the subistence crisis 
of  1692–93 captures the themes of  the scenario. In the spring of  
1692 a blight ruined half  of  the prospective harvest. The situation 
did not alarm the authorities, for a half  year’s crop combined with 
ample stocks of  old grain appeared to cover needs. “But,” reported 
Delamare, 
 6 Cited by molinari, article “Céréales,” in Charles Coquelin and Guillaumin, Dictionnaire de 
l’économie politique (Paris, 1873) I, 303.
 7 Reneaume, “Sur la manière de conserver les grains,” 76; Lepoupet to LG of  Police, 
30 Oct. 1725, Arsenal, mss. Bastille 10271; “mémoire” (1725), mss. Bastille 10270, fol. 374; 
BN, mss. fr. 21647, fol. 9; Daguesseau to CG, 24 Feb. 1709, Correspondance des contrôleurs-
généraux, ed. by Boislisle, III, 102; Narbonne, Journal, 460; La Reynie to Delamare, 24 July 
1693, BN, mss. fr. 21639, fol. 161; Louis Thuillat, Gabriel Nicolas de la Reynie, premier Lieutenant 
Général de Police de Paris (Limoges, 1930), 84–111; St.-Germain, La Reynie, 270; Lemarchand, 
“Troubles,” Annales historiques de la révolution française, 35 (Oct.–Dec. 1963), 409; Trennin to 
PG, 26 Oct. 1768, BN, Coll. Joly 1142, fol. 154; Dépêches, 31 may 1770, AN, O1* 446, fol. 
124. For a striking expression of  police suspicion of  grain merchants, conditioned of  course 
by the terrible circumstances of  the hour, see the acts of  the Chambre des Blés of  1709, AN, 
X2b 1090.
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since only a pretext is necessary to determine evil-intentioned merchants, always avid 
for gain, to exaggerate matters pertaining to a dearth, they did not fail to profit from 
this one; they were immediately observed resuming their ordinary style and putting 
into use again all their bad practices for making the price of  grain go up; associations, 
dashes into the Provinces, false rumors spread about, monopolies through purchases 
of  all the grain, overbidding in the markets, down payments on grain still uncut or in 
the barns and granaries, retention in the magazines; thus the whole commerce was 
reduced to a certain number among them who made themselves its master.8
The most serious and damaging charge leveled against the merchants 
was that they engaged in monopolistic activities, a vague and sweeping 
indictment derived from Roman, canonical, and patristic sources and 
richly embroidered in the fabric of  French jurisprudence from earliest 
times. One of  the major aims of  the corporate structure of  the Old 
Regime and one of  the chief  justifications for its labyrinthine regula-
tions was the prevention of  monopoly (though this sometimes entailed 
the creation of  official monopolies in the sense that we understand the 
word). monopolies did not occur exclusively in grain; the police often 
denounced their presence in the commerce of  wine, wood, and other 
goods. But because it involved the subsistence of  the people, monopoly 
in grain preceded the other kinds in importance.9
Instinctively, the police and the public linked the onset of  dearth 
and suffering with the existence of  monopolies. In hard times, the 
monopolist was ubiquitous. The revolutionaries excoriated the monopo-
leurs in the same breath with the most unregenerate malveillans and the 
term survived as a general description and epithet in its loose, protean 
sense well into the nineteenth century, especially in the socialist vocab-
ulary of  exploitation. Throughout the Old Regime the police tire-
lessly hunted monopolists. mercier, who considered them “assassins,” 
arranged to ban them from his utopia. Linguet proposed erecting gal-
lows in every major marketplace to punish and deter them. monopoly 
was an abomination because it was a social crime; blindly and indif-
ferently, it struck down thousands of  innocent people. The authori-
ties never defined the term with precision because the phenomenon 
 8 Delamare, Traité, II, 866. Cf. Ibid., 855, 879.
 9 Roover, “monopoly Theory Prior to Adam Smith: A Revision,” Quarterly Journal of  Economics, 
LXV (Nov. 1951), 492–524; John W. Baldwin, “The medieval Theories of  the Just Price,” 
Transactions of  the American Philosophical Society, XLIX, part 4 (1959), 1–92; Roman Piotrowski, 
Cartels and Trusts, Their Origin and Historical Development from the Economic and Legal Aspects 
(London, 1933), 281–82; Coornaert, Corporations, 249; AN, H 2192, fol. 50; BN, mss. fr. 
11356, fol. 345. See also A. de Tarde, L’Idée du juste prix (Paris, 1907).
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could take very different forms in different circumstances. “monop-
oly” did not so much describe the modus operandi of  a crime as it did 
its effect. Practices deemed monopolistic in a period of  stress might 
conceivably pass for reasonable mercantile operations in a more tran-
quil moment. An action was not intrinsically monopolistic; it became 
monopolistic to the extent that it menaced the public interest or 
caused inconvenience and woe.10
Virtually any “bad maneuver” qualified as a monopoly. Char-
lemagne denounced as monopolists “those who by tricks, surprises, 
and other unjust means amass goods with the aim of  a shameful 
gain.” In 1660 the Paris Parlement censured for “monopoly” sev-
eral merchants who scoured the countryside buying at any price and 
withheld grain from the market in secret hoards. The first Parisian 
Police Lieutenant, La Reynie, used the term to account for any untow-
ard incident in the markets. For example, when the price of  grain in 
the supply zone “suddenly increased substantially without any reason” 
in 1693 he blamed a handful of  monopolists whose machinations 
were hardly original: they constituted hoards, spread “false rumors,” 
uttered “seditious discourses,” and endeavored in other ways to drive 
up prices. Eighty years later the official sense of  monopoly had not 
changed: it characterized an insolent, almost treasonous posture, 
a willful disregard of  the law and the state of  affairs, and a series 
of  maneuvers that tended to make grain scarce, inflate prices, and 
propagate fear. In these instances the “monopolies” were “exercised” 
by laboureurs and fermiers in the markets of  Gonesse and Choisy, near 
Paris, and in Pontrieux in Brittany.11
10 AN, H * 1874, fol. 17 (29 Aug. 1770); Journal politique (Sept. 1770), first quinzaine, 57; 
Mercure historique et politique, 81 (July 1726), 104; BN, mss. fr. 21642, fols. 1ff.; madame 
d’Epinay to Galiani, 29 Oct. 1770 in Lettres de I’abbé Galiani à Madame d’Epinay, ed. 
by Eugène Asse (Paris, 1882), I, 162–63; Prudhomme, Révolutions de Paris, #3 (26 July 
1789), 41; Lettres patentes, 12 Nov. 1768, BN, mss. fr. 6680, fol. 186; Cobb, Armées 
révolutionnaires, II, 339; Jean Dubois, Le Vocabulaire politique et social en France de 1869 à 
1872 (Paris, 1962); Linguet, Réponse aux docteurs modernes (1771) cited by G. Weulersse, 
La Physiocratie à la fin du règne de Louis XV, 158; L.-S. mercier, Tableau de Paris, III, 198 
and L’An 2440, rêve s’il en fût jamais, 145; Necker, De L’Administration des finances en France 
(n.p., 1784), III, 226–230; L.-J. Bourdon-Desplanches, Lettres à l'auteur des observations sur 
le commerce des grains (Amsterdam, 1775), 25–26; C.E.D. Roonptsy (R.-A. de Pellisery), Le 
Caffé politique d’Amsterdam (Amsterdam, 1776), II, 2–3, 11.
11 Mercure Suisse (Sept. 1740), 74–75; BN, mss. fr. 14295, fol. 12; BN, mss. fr. 21641, fol. 177; La 
Reynie to Delamare, 28 July 1693, BN, mss. fr. 21642, fol. 190; ordonnance, 27 July 1694, 
BN, mss. fr. 21643, fols. 13–14, 28–29; Dépêches, to CG, 26 June 1776, AN, O1 416; SD to 
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In many cases monopoly implied conspiracy: the premeditated 
design of  a number of  collaborators. But monopolies were often the 
work of  individuals reacting to market conditions. monopoly did not 
necessarily connote bigness of  enterprise or breadth of  offense; two 
brothers, humble laboureurs, committed monopoly simply by ceasing 
their normal monthly deliveries to the Paris Halles, and three bakers 
who independently sold their bread at an “exorbitant price” were 
judged culpable of  “a marked monopoly, prejudicial to the citizens.” 
Of  course the larger the monopoly, the more dreadful it was likely to 
be. Visions of  behemoth grain monopolies furtively run by bankers 
like Samuel Bernard or Isaac Thellusson or by “societies” like the 
Indies Company tormented the collective consciousness throughout 
the eighteenth century. monopoly associated with shortage was not 
merely a crime; it was a general explanation for disaster on a scale 
which all men could seize. By denouncing monopoly Frenchmen pro-
claimed the innocence of  nature and the guilt of  men: dearth “was 
not so much caused by lack of  grain as by the nasty maneuvers of  
certain monopolists.”12
In almost every monopoly arraignment the police accused the 
merchant(s) of  “illicitly,” “illegitimately,” or “criminally” forcing prices 
up.13 Again, it is worth noting that the merchant was not condemned 
for his trading practices per se; in other conditions the same techniques 
might elicit no reprobation. What made them illicit and dangerous was 
the effect they had on the price structure at a given moment. When 
merchants drove the price above a certain level, which varied in time 
and space and depended upon such factors as the “ordinary” price 
and wage scale, the elasticity of  demand, and the likelihood of  har-
vest recovery, they wronged the whole society. Implicit in the notion 
of  monopoly and stemming from the same moralistic tradition was 
the idea of  a just price. Lieutenants general of  police, commissaires, 
inspectors, grain measurers, and local officials repeatedly invoked the 
“just price,” which they construed as their obligation to assure. Their 
conception was a relativistic and empirical one that sprung from no 
12 Sentence, 28 June 1727, BN, mss. fr. 21633, fols. 283–84; Sentence, 20 Aug. 1728, BN, mss. 
fr. 21640, fol. 158. For examples of  the accusations implicating Bernard and the Indies 
Company, see: “Histoire de ce qui s’est passé au sujet des bleds en 1725,” Arsenal, mss. 3308; 
Gazetins, 15 Nov. 1725, Arsenal, mss. Bastille 10155, fol. 126; Gazetins, 23 march 1726, 
mss. Bastille 10156, fol. 121; Gazetins, 29–30 Sept. 1741, mss. Bastille 10167, fol. 333.
13 Mercure Suisse (Sept. 1740), 75–76; extrait des registres du Parl. de Dauphiné, 12 July 1768 in 
Mercure historique (Sept. 1768), 288–89.
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 coherent theory of  social or commutative justice. The just price was a 
price which would neither “disgust” merchants nor “wound” consum-
ers. It was predicated upon an ideal of  moderation, which tended to 
vary with the circumstances. A price was thought just when merchants 
settled for a moderate profit and the bulk of  the people, who lived in 
a state of  chronic misery, did not suffer immoderately, that is to say, 
more than they did usually. In untroubled moments, the just price was 
simply the current price (as the theologians had recommended), fixed 
by common estimation rather than imposed by merchant maneuvers 
or governmental fiat.14
In a dearth, which grotesquely distorted standards of  moderation, 
the just price became much more difficult to define. For most police 
officials, it no longer bore any relation to the current price, which was 
warped by the effects of  monopoly, panic, or inclement weather. For 
many authorities, the just price now became, the price of  social stabil-
ity, the price that would still be accessible to the majority of  the popu-
lation. In the midst of  a crisis, few administrators believed that the just 
price could be attained without some form of  governmental interven-
tion. In some parts of  the kingdom, this action took the form of  price 
“taxation” or fixation by local officials. In the Paris area, more com-
monly, it involved all-azimuth war against the monopolies by means 
of  closer surveillance, intimidation and harassment, and competitive 
buying and selling by governmental suppliers.
Critics of  police ideology and practice disputed the conventional rep-
resentation of  monopoly. Upon examination, they argued, monopoly 
14 On the theory of  the just price, see: Baldwin, “The medieval Theories,” 7–78; Roover, 
“Scholastic Economics,” Quarterly Journal of  Economics, LXIX (1955), 168–69; Roover, 
“monopoly Theory,” Quarterly Journal of  Economics, LXV (1951), 492ff.; Roover, “The 
Concept of  the Just Price: Theory and Economic Politics,” Journal of  Economic History, 
XVIII (Dec. 1958), 418–34; E.A. J. Johnson, “Just Price in an Unjust World,” International 
Journal of  Ethics, XLVIII (Jan. 1928), 165, 169–71; Alfred des Cilleuls, Le Socialisme municipal à 
travers les siècles (Paris, 1905), 38; B. Bailyn, The New England Merchants in the Seventeenth Century 
(New York, 1964), 20–21. For the sense that the notion had in the eighteenth century, see: 
La Reynie to Delamare, 5 march 1694, BN, mss. fr. 21643; Journal économique (Jan. 1754), 98; 
missonnet to Joly, 6 may 1754, BN, Coll. Joly 1113, fol. 122; Arsenal, mss. Bastille 10141 
(20 Jan. 1760); Gazier, ed., “La Police de Paris en 1770,” 117; AN, Y 9474 (24 Aug. 1771); 
SD of  Valenciennes, “Observations sur l’arrêt du conseil d’état du Roy du 14 juillet 1770,” 
C. 6690, A. D. Nord; Diderot, et al., Encyclopédie, XIII, 392. Cf. Turgot’s view in which the 
“just price” was always supposed to be the true market price, whether times were troubled or 
not. In his sense the just price was the natural price, or what the économistes called the bon prix. 
See “Lettres sur le commerce des grains,” 30 Oct. and 2 Dec. 1770 in Œuvres, ed. by Schelle, 
III, 267, 315–16; Turgot to IN. of  Alençon, 16 July 1775, C. 90, A.D. Orne; déclaration du 
Roi, 5 Feb. 1776, BN, Coll. Joly 1111, fol. 48.
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turned out to be a manifestation of  popular fear and an outlet of  
popular frustration rather than an objective reality. Hungry people, 
remarked one observer, find a strange consolation in blaming their dis-
tress on monopolists. Under the stress of  shortage, everyone’s “first 
thought is to believe in monopoly,” noted the abbé de Véri. monopoly 
is a “war cry,” commented the Journal d’Agriculture, du Commerce, des Arts 
et des Finances, which people instinctively shriek when put upon by high 
prices. Herbert, the leading exponent of  free grain trade before the 
physiocrats, likened the belief  in monopolies to Charlemagne’s exor-
cism of  the evil grain-devouring demons. We ought to be ashamed, 
he suggested, in an age of  Enlightenment, that our anxieties and, 
far worse, our jurisprudence, still give credence to gothic “preju-
dices” and spectral “phantoms.” Addressing the Convention in 1792, 
Creuzé-Latouche similarly compared the monopoly preoccupation 
with “the ancient popular visions of  sorcerers and ghosts.”15
According to their critics, the police found it useful to cultivate the 
monopoly obsession. It diverted popular hostility away from the gov-
ernment and it gave them added leverage in dealing with recalcitrant 
merchants. If  by monopoly we mean “exclusive sale, the control of  
which a single party has seized,” asked a commentator in the seven-
ties, then how can we accuse a host of  independent traders compet-
ing against one another of  engaging simultaneously in monopoly?16 
The muddled notion of  monopoly exasperated the eminent lawyer 
Target:
monopoly! the people see only this monster … when the government makes purchases, 
they cry out monopoly; when individuals form magazines, they cry out monopoly; 
when one preaches an absolute general liberty, a full and entire competition, they 
reply to you: Oh! my God, monopoly! Apropos exportation, apropos importation, 
apropos the King’s grain, apropos the grain of  the subjects, apropos commerce, 
stagnation, competition, privileges, liberty, slavery, always it is monopoly! If  one 
takes grain to a province which lacks [or] if  one lets it languish, the humanity which 
15 Véri, Journal, ed. by J. de Witte, I, 150; Journal de l’agriculture, du commerce, des arts et des finances 
(Sept. 1772), 17; C.J. Herbert, Essai sur la police générale des grains, ed. by E. Depitre (Paris, 
1910), 4; Archives Parlementaires, 8 Dec. 1792, LIV, 682. Cf. “Observations de Dampierre de la 
Salle (1770), BN, mss. n.a. 22777, fol. 249 and “Deuxième avis des députés du commerce” 
(1764), BN, mss. fr. 14295, fol. 26. For a similar view, see Tolosan, Mémoire sur le commerce de la 
France et de ses colonies (Paris, 1789), 85.
16 “Observations de Dampierre de la Salle,” BN, mss. n.a. 22777, fol. 249.
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comes to its aid is a monopoly [and] the indifference which neglects it is a monopoly!  
Alas! … let us try to have some clear ideas about the words which we use.17
Although the adversaries of  the police assailed the common con-
ception of  monopoly, they nevertheless agreed that certain kinds of  
monopoly frequently occurred in the grain trade and were often the 
true cause of  dearth. While they did not define the notion with any 
more rigor than their opponents—they viewed it from a purely com-
mercial rather than a social perspective and subsumed under the 
heading monopoly any practice that served to restrain trade in any 
way—they had no doubts whatsoever about what caused it. Unlike the 
police, who argued that the tendency toward monopoly was inherent 
in the “very nature” of  the grain trade, these critics maintained that 
this tendency was inherent in the nature of  the controls and regula-
tions that governed the trade. The police not only used the image 
of  monopoly to manipulate the people and the merchants, but they 
created the very conditions which make monopoly possible. “They 
engender monopoly,” the physiocratic journalist Roubaud charged, 
“and then they torment themselves in order to wipe it out; and the 
regime which they use to destroy it is the very same one which pro-
duces it.” “It is the legislative precautions against monopoly,” argued 
a writer in the Journal Economique, “which cause the terrible monopoly 
which could starve us all.”18
The critics were not calling the police criminal accomplices of  
the monopolists, though they pointed out that subaltern officials fre-
quently engaged in rascally grain dealings. Rather, they contended 
that monopoly was in the nature of  the police system because the 
system was based upon grants of  exclusive privilege and special 
favors and the imposition of  arbitrary controls and other servitudes 
that stifled competition, trammeled exchanges, and violated natural 
rights. “To constrain the grain trade,” as a reviewer in the Journal de 
Trévoux dryly put it, “is to place in the State a source of  dearth and of  
monopoly.” It followed, then, that the only sure remedy for monopoly 
was the dismantling of  the entire police apparatus. A “total  liberty” 
of  trade featuring “the most free and extensive competition” was the 
17 G.-J.-B. Target, Observations sur le commerce des grains, écrites en décembre, 1769 (Amsterdam, 
1775), 31–32.
18 N. Baudeau, Premiére introduction à la philosophie économique, ou analyse des états policés (Paris, 1771), 
84; Roubaud, Représentations aux magistrats (London, and Paris, 1769), 56; letter to the editor, 
probably by the marquis d’Argenson, Journal économique (may 1754), 81.
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radical solution recommended by these critics whose drive against the 
police regime we shall have occasion to deal with again later. “Liberty 
and monopoly are so contrary,” epitomized the Journal Economique, 
“that they cannot exist together.”19
The police of  course took a very different position: monopoly was 
the fruit of  liberty run amuck; unregulated competition crushed small 
traders and concentrated commerce in the hands of  a few; “total” 
liberty would produce chronic dearth and disorder. Yet their view of  
liberty was not flatly negative. Long before the great debates on the 
grain trade in the second half  of  the eighteenth century, the police 
were aware of  the advantages of  the liberal market model. They them-
selves believed that an unencumbered market system was, at least in 
principle, the most efficient and economical vehicle for the distribution 
of  supplies. They felt that competition was one of  the surest ways to 
keep prices at a reasonable level. They knew that “liberty was the soul 
of  commerce,” the medium most congenial to commercial enterprise. 
Nor did the architects of  controls ever forget that provisioning was a 
fundamentally commercial operation and that commerce simply could 
not function without a certain amount of  freedom of  action.20
The problem was fixing the proper dosage. The police never for a 
moment imagined that “police” and liberty were antithetical notions. 
The liberty, which they considered tonic and salutary, had serious 
limitations and necessarily operated in conjunction with rules and 
restraints. They viewed liberty not as a right derived from nature, but 
as a concession granted by society on a conditional basis. This liberty 
was contingent, never absolute—contingent upon the good faith of  
the merchants, upon local supply conditions, and ultimately upon the 
pleasure and the sapience of  local authorities. From this perspective, 
the polar opposite of  police was not liberty but “license” or “libertinage,” 
words meant to convey moral degeneration and perversion as well as 
19 Journal de Trévoux (April 1754), 804; Condorcet, Le Monopole et le monopoleur in Collection des 
principaux économistes, ed. by Daire and molinari, XIV, 468, 470; Journal économique (June 
1768), 261; “mémoire sur l’exportation et l’importation des grains,” BN, mss. fr. 14296. See 
also similar views of  Nicolas Baudeau, Avis au peuple sur son premier besoin (Amsterdam and 
Paris, 1768), 130; Roubaud, Représentations aux magistrats, 122–23; Condillac, Le Commerce et 
le gouvernement (1776), in Collection des principaux économistes, ed. by Daire and molinari, XIV, 
417–20; D’Argenson, Mémoires et journal inédit du Marquis d’Argenson, Ministre des affaires étrangères 
sous Louis XV, ed. by marquis d’Argenson (Paris, 1857–58), V, 36.
20 Delamare, Traité, II, 775. Cf. Heckscher, Mercantilism, II, 271–74; Coornaert, Les Corporations, 
143. For eighteenth century uses of  the word “liberty,” see Ferdinand Brunot, Histoire de la 
langue française des origines à 1900 (Paris, 1930), VI, 129.
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chaos in trade. Experience taught the police that sooner or later unbri-
dled or excessive liberty gave way to license, which resulted in antisocial 
crimes such as monopoly. If  liberty meant nothing more than the right 
of  an owner to dispose of  his property unconditionally as he saw fit, 
it was inadmissible to the police, for it denied society any convincing 
guarantee that public needs would be met.21
Liberty, police-style, was supposed to be a filter rather than a sieve, 
but it was no easy matter to set the gauge correctly. The police dis-
agreed among themselves on the optimal doses and the appropriate 
conditions for application. As much as they worried about license 
and monopoly, the authorities were also aware that over-police might 
destroy commerce. In order to assure provisioning, the police endeav-
ored to “excite” and to “contain” the grain trade at the same time, 
two strategies that were often in flagrant contradiction and always in 
uneasy tension.22
II
To enable and, if  necessary, to compel commerce to perform its vict-
ualing services, the police relied upon a large body of  regulations. 
They were an amalgam of  royal laws, parlementary arrêts, local stat-
utes, and lessons discriminately gleaned from the testing ground of  
past experience (“There occurring nothing new under the sun,” wrote 
Delamare, “… it is primarily in past events that we can draw the rules 
of  prudence and conduct for the present, and for the future.”23), and 
21 Journal économique (may 1752), 121–27; L. Viala, La Question des grains, 29–30.
22 AN, K 908.
23 Delamare, Traité, I, préface. Delamare’s multi-volume Traité was the most important work on 
and of  police in the Old Regime. Foreign princes kept it in their libraries, local officials and 
jurists based their sentences and codes on it, and Parisian magistrates expressed astonishment 
when they could not find a piece of  information within its thousands of  folio pages. The 
highest administrative and judicial officials in eighteenth century France continually referred 
 to the Traité and to the Delamare mss. (much of  which is preserved today in the BN) and 
often consulted his collaborator, Lecler, a lawyer and procurator in the Admiralty Court. 
See Bondois’ useful but unimaginative assessment, “Le Commissaire Nicolas Delamare 
et le Traité de la police,” Revue d’histoire moderne, X (Sept.–Oct. 1935), 313–51; musart, La 
Réglementation du commerce, 33–36; Desmaze, Châtelet, 198–99. For examples of  use in the 
eighteenth century, see: Mercure de France (Jan. 1743), 120; Délibérations, Hôtel de Ville, 22 
may 1758, AN, H * 1867, fol. 436; BN, Coll. Joly 2432, fol. 324; Code Duchesne, vii; Joly to 
Lecler, 7 Dec. 1738, BN, mss. fr. 21636, fol. 339; Joly to Lecler, 24 Oct. 1749, BN, mss. 
fr. 21632, fol. 211; Grimperel note, march 1768, AN, Y 13396; A. Zahorski, “L’État et la
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modernized and adapted to meet local needs. The only regulations 
that can usefully be considered from a national or regional standpoint 
are those concerned with the movement of  grain across provincial 
and international frontiers. They were also the only ones which were 
more or less frequently modified by actual changes in the law rather 
than informal adjustment. Since they were the most visible and the 
most sweeping in breadth, they gave the French grain police a reputa-
tion for desultoriness at the top, accompanying its reputation for both 
rigidity and capriciousness at the bottom.24
As a rule, the export of  grain was forbidden on the grounds that 
it jeopardized the subsistence of  the French people. Throughout the 
Old Regime, however, the government accorded numerous provi-
sional, partial, short-term, and individual authorizations to export, 
subject to revocation without notice and dependent upon such fac-
tors as harvest circumstances, the remaining stock of  old grain, the 
conservability of  new grain, the state of  public opinion, and the influ-
ence of  individual courtiers and regional grain lobbies.25 Since occa-
sional exportation did not represent a threat in their eyes, it was never 
an issue of  importance for the bulk of  the provisioning police.
Legislation devoted to internal grain circulation also varied frequently 
during the Old Regime, but its significance is more difficult to assess.26 
Although it occasionally subjected interprovincial grain commerce 
 modernisation de 1’administration urbaine,” in P. Francastel, ed., Utopie et institutions au 18e 
siècle, le pragmatisme des lumières (Paris, 1963), 189; m. L’Héritier, “Le Despotisme éclairé de 
Frédéric II à la révolution française,” Bulletin of  the International Committee of  Historical Sciences 
(Paris, 1937), IX, 181–225. There remains an important book to be written on Delamare.
24 See, for example, Véron de Forbonnais’ complaint on the caprice of  national grain 
legislation. Recherches et considérations sur les finances de France depuis 1595 jusqu’en 1721 (Liège, 
1758), I, 291.
25 See, for example, the arrêts du conseil of  6 Dec. 1735, 10 Jan., 24 April and 18 Sept. 1736, 17 
April 1737, etc.
26 See Afanassiev, Commerce des céréales, whose treatment differs fundamentally from mine. Paris, 
as I indicated, had a vested interest in the freedom of  internal circulation (see, for example, 
the remarks due probably to commissaire Lemaire in Gazier, ed., “La Police de Paris en 
1770,” 117). Although the customs barriers and the jungle of  fees and duties on rivers, roads, 
and bridges—the marketplace “droits” are another problem—seriously hampered trade in 
most places, neither the Paris police nor the merchants serving the capital complained of  
their existence, in part because the areas ordinarily subject to Parisian commerce were not 
thickly overgrown with these obstacles and in part because the exemptions from paying 
these fees which the government accorded in times of  dearth to Paris-bound grain and flour 
may have become permanent. See the arrêt du conseil of  22 Dec. 1725, BHVP, no. 92218 
and the arrêt of  Dec. 1740, Mercure historique et politique, 109 (Dec. 1740), 700. Cf. Conte, 
L’Administration de la généralité de Paris, 147.
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to the issuance of  licenses and sometimes prohibited the transfer of  
grain from one part of  the kingdom to another in response to special 
circumstances, characteristically, the government favored “free” circula-
tion in the interior as a function of  the interplay of  supply and demand. 
Yet the measures it took to promote internal trade were generally weak 
and half-hearted and bespoke its reluctance to jar established habits and 
patterns of  trade. They were vague and hortatory, without a specific 
program of  action and machinery for enforcement; they were not vigor-
ously publicized; tacitly or expressly, they provided for countless excep-
tions; they paid little attention to the natural, customary, privileged, and 
fiscal obstructions to communication; and they were powerless to reduce 
the physical cost of  transportation, the chief  economic impediment to 
large-scale, long-distance trade in the interior.
In ordinary times, the government left effective control of  grain 
circulation in the hands of  the intendants. Regardless of  the law, 
intendants whose generalities were chronically short of  grain tended 
to be fervent (one-way) free traders, while intendants of  the most fer-
tile regions acted magnanimously toward their neighbors in surplus 
years and parsimoniously in deficit periods. But even if  France had 
had a more compelling, better integrated national makeup and the 
police and the public had been willing to renounce their special sub-
sistence claims, it seems probable that the grain trade would have 
remained overwhelmingly intra-regional and local until the age of  
the railroad, steamboat, and telegraph. In day-to-day business, the 
general regulations governing internal and external circulation had 
little bearing on the police of  provisioning.
The regulations that mattered most to the police concerned 
the operation of  the local grain trade. The purpose was to orga-
nize the commercial process into a reliable, orderly provisioning 
system. Instead of  allowing the trade to chart its own course, the 
police undertook to give it a secondary structure, supple enough 
to accommodate market forces, yet designed to stabilize its com-
position, its loci of  activity, its patterns of  exchange, and the 
rhythm of  supply. If  the grain trade assimilated this graft, the 
controls embedded in the structure would become simple com-
mercial conventions and the suppliers would be spared more vio-
lent forms of  police correction. The controls were meant to define 
the primary and extraordinary crowns of  the supply area, to establish 
clear-cut lines of  supply, and to keep them open at all costs. They 
aimed at forcing grain into commerce as rapidly as possible,  keeping 
it visible and moving, and directing it to market through the 
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hands of  as few middlemen as possible, where it would be sold 
quickly and openly at a reasonable price. In return for a firm com-
mitment to furnish the market steadily with grain, the regulations 
offered the suppliers certain facilities of  exchange, and competi-
tive advantages vis-à-vis “foreign” dealers.27 But the consumers were 
the chief  beneficiaries of  the regulatory structure. In a confrontation 
with the supplier, without benefit of  police mediation, the authorities 
believed that the consumer would be trampled. Without rules, the 
owners of  grain would impose impossible conditions. The regulations 
were social contrivances aimed at redressing a social imbalance that 
menaced the peace and well-being of  the community.
Like the police who interpreted and enforced them, the regulations 
differed from place to place despite common sources and strong substan-
tive resemblances. To understand how they worked, one would have to 
view them in the peculiar context of  each community’s subsistence sys-
tem, a task clearly beyond our compass. We can, however, identify some 
of  the most important regulations which governed the Parisian provi-
sioning system and which had close parallels throughout the kingdom.
The first rule of  the trade, virtually universal in application, 
required all persons who wished to deal in grain to register with the 
police. Paris-based traders furnishing the Halles (which received all 
land-borne grain and almost all flour) enrolled at the Châtelet, and 
those serving the ports signed the books of  the Hôtel de Ville. The 
majority of  merchants supplying Paris resided in the hinterland (they 
commonly took the title “merchant for the provisioning of  Paris” 
and sometimes the name “forain” or itinerant merchant) and reg-
istered with the clerk of  the police in the locality in which they pri-
marily operated. The police in Paris and in the provisioning zones 
exchanged information in order to keep track of  new entries and 
verify the claims made by the merchants outside their home commu-
nities. The Prévôt des marchands usually issued formal written com-
missions to his merchants (rarely more than thirty at a given moment, 
most of  whom lived on the same street in Paris) and to their “commis-
sioners” or buying agents in the hinterland to facilitate their dealings.
27 The value of  the “protection” which merchants “for the provisioning of  Paris” enjoyed from 
the Parisian police authorities and the central administration should not be underestimated. 
See, for example, AN, H * 1864, fols. 205–206 (16 Dec. 1751); marville to Joly, 22 Aug. 1740, 
BN, Coll. Joly 1124, fol. 213; Sentence of  Bureau de l’Hôtel de Ville, BN, F 23720, p. 207 
(imprimé) and arrêt of  Paris Parl., 17 Jan. 1742, BN, F 23673, fol. 136 (imprimé); Des Essarts, 
Dictionnaire, I, 331.
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In presenting themselves to the police, all the merchants had to 
declare, in addition to name and address, the places where they made 
their purchases, the names of  their correspondents, the location of  their 
storehouses or magazines, the anticipated scale of  their commerce, and 
the usual place of  destination (Paris in our example, though a “forain” 
could also be expected to supply his hometown). Informally, the police 
investigated the moral character, business capacity, and reputation of  
the enrolled merchants. “All this knowledge carefully established,” wrote 
Delamare, “it is not difficult to make them [the merchants] obey and 
to engage them to contribute to the replenishment of  abundance.” 
Legally, the merchant could hide nothing; theoretically, the police could 
trace him at any moment, examine his situation, and pressure him to 
increase his service or modify it in a publicly useful fashion. The police 
viewed marked deviations in the pattern and cadence of  a merchant’s 
trade with suspicion and concern. They considered undeclared dealers 
as dangerous monopolists whose only motive in evading registration was 
to commit crimes against society. Although the police frowned upon 
partnerships or associations (“societies”) for fear that they would lead to 
efforts to manipulate supply and price, they tolerated them provided the 
parties informed authorities of  their commercial relations and signed 
contracts before notaries.28
The regulations barred certain persons from the grain trade in any 
capacity and severely limited the kinds of  commerce which others 
could perform. Nobles could not become grain traders because the 
profession was incompatible with their quality and status. As cultiva-
tors and rentiers of  the soil, however, they could market the grain 
they harvested or received as revenue. This distinction invited eva-
sion, but very few nobles in the Paris area became directly involved 
in the capital’s provisioning trade, and it seems likely in any case that 
the police would have tolerated, if  not welcomed, their presence so 
long as they remained unobtrusive and followed the other rules. Pub-
lic officials and judges were explicitly excluded from the grain trade 
on the grounds that it would conflict with their administrative and 
judicial responsibilities.
The police prohibited laboureurs and fermiers from dealing in grain: 
they could only sell their own production and only buy for seed 
upon demonstration of  need. The authorities feared that regular par-
ticipation in grain traffic would divert these cultivators from their 
28 Delamare, Traité, II, 227, 823.
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primary role as producers and that the laboureurs would abuse the 
permission to buy by forming secret hordes easily masked in their 
farms. And, although the police did not want a few giants to dom-
inate the trade, neither did they wish to see it atomized into “an 
infinity of  small proportions” difficult to detect and mobilize. Simi-
larly, the regulations permitted bakers to buy grain and flour “for 
the exercise of  their profession” but expressly proscribed them from 
conducting any “commerce,” that is, from buying for purposes of  
resale (regrating) because prices might thereby be driven up. millers 
were strictly forbidden to buy or sell grain (except that which they 
received as tolls) for their own account or as agents for others. The 
police felt that the license to trade would give the miller too much 
leverage in the provisioning chain and would distract him from the 
crucial task of  manufacturing public and baker flour. In practice, the 
laboureurs frequently took the title of  merchant, especially in times of  
shortage, in response to speculative opportunities, and the millers 
would have found it difficult to stay in business had they faithfully 
conformed to the rules.29
To bring order and regularity to the provisioning trade, officials 
throughout the kingdom counted most heavily on the rule that 
required all transactions to take place on the public marketplaces. 
“Nothing is more important,” proclaimed the Code Duchesne, “than 
to maintain the ban on selling elsewhere.” Elsewhere usually referred 
to the farms and granaries of  the laboureurs (and country inns as well) 
where merchants could conduct business without regard to market 
customs or prices, take possession of  all grain immediately available, 
and make down-payments on future purchases or on grain which the 
laboureurs would continue to keep in their own storehouses—all of  
which practices were illegal. To prevent hoarding or engrossing, the 
laboureurs were not permitted to stock their grain production for more 
than two years, a limitation reinforced by the constraints of  crude 
conservation technology, and merchants could not amass grain at 
all except to prepare shipments for market. Nor could merchants 
or other persons intercept provisions on the way to market (forestall-
ing) or buy grain in the market with the intention of  reselling it in 
29 Des Essarts, Dictionnaire, I, 17; Gazier, ed., “La Police de Paris en 1770,” 118; BN, Coll. Joly 
1111, fol. 174; BN, mss. fr. 21640, fol. 64 and 21644, fol. 165. The English authorities also 
banned millers from grain traffic. See R. A. macCance and E. m. Widdowson, Breads White 
and Brown, their Place in Thought and Social History (London, 1956), 13 and Richard Bennett and 
John Elton, History of  Corn Milling (London, 1898–1904), III, 169.
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the same market or nearby, immediately or shortly after purchase 
(regrating). Laboureurs and merchants planning to sell had to transport 
their grain in its physical entirety to market for exchange; sales based 
on examination of  samples carried in pouches were forbidden. All 
transactions had to take place formally in public view on the carreaux, 
not in the taverns surrounding the marketplace or other private loca-
tions, and secrecy was considered prima facie evidence of  illicit intention. 
All eligible buyers had to have the opportunity to bid for goods, and 
parties to a prospective deal were expected to show signs of  “bargain-
ing,” that is, proof  that they had not prearranged the transaction and 
that the price agreed upon resulted from genuine haggling.30
The grain (or flour), like the merchant who bought it, had to be 
registered and had to have a passport, a lettre de voiture, or a certificate 
of  purchase. The buying merchant informed the market police (or, in 
many cases, the measurers exercising police functions) of  the amount, 
price, and quality of  the merchandise he purchased and received a 
receipt which he had to present to the authorities at its destined market. 
 Officials at the market of  purchase in the supply zone kept a copy for 
their records or forwarded it to the Paris police to enable them to dou-
ble-check the merchant. Depending upon the gravity of  the offense, the 
 circumstances involved, and the past record of  the dealers, the police 
punished  violations of  trading regulations with the confiscation of  goods 
and equipment (including animals, wagons, and even boats), fines, and, 
in extreme cases (recidivism or an abuse deemed particularly odious or 
inopportune), jail sentences and interdictions from the profession.31
The aim of  the mandatory market was to flush all supplies out of  
the countryside. If  they could concentrate all of  the available supply 
in a single place and assemble buyers and sellers to engage in open 
exchanges, the police believed they could prevent artificial shortages 
and violent price oscillations, satisfy subsistence needs in a regular, 
30 Declaration of  19 April 1723, BN, Coll. Joly 1829, fols. 302–303; Archives Seine-Paris, D5Z 
carton 9: Des Essarts, Dictionnaire, I, 19, 330, 402; Delamare, Traité, II, 790–97; Fréminville, 
Dictionnaire, 72; Code Duchesne, 99; mildmay, The Police of  France, 99; Diderot, et al., Encyclopédie, 
XIV, 34–35; BN, Coll. Joly 1312, fol. 117; Des Cilleuls, Socialisme, 53, 324. Cf. the English 
attitude toward regrating: Beloff, Public Order, 69, 73 and Donald G. Barnes, A History of  the 
English Corn Laws from 1660 to 1846 (London, 1930), 39, 81–83.
31 The “regime” under which “Paris” merchants operated differed from the general conventions 
in a number of  ways. For example, on the one hand they were invariably fined more heavily 
than others for the same offenses and on the other they were excused from certain obligations 
(e.g., procuring lettres de voiture) which were mandatory for other merchants.
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predictable fashion, establish a climate of  “just balance” between buy-
ers and sellers, and guarantee the quality of  goods. If  all exchanges 
took place on the market, the police would have a fairly clear notion 
of  the magnitude of  the supply in relation to local and metropoli-
tan demand and sufficient information to assess the performance of  
the traders. The market made the supply highly visible. The police 
insisted on the need “to keep the universal mass of  this wealth in 
the greatest possible evidence” not only in order to set a just price 
but also to reassure the consumers. “The people,” noted an Advocate 
General of  the Paris Parlement, “as a matter of  fact, never is satisfied 
that there is abundance except when it sees the Halles, the markets 
well-provisioned.” When the market lacked grain, the police strained 
their ingenuity devising ploys to create the impression of  continuing 
plenty.32
The marketplace at which the police labored so intensely was not 
simply a concourse of  buyers and sellers. It was an institution, like the 
church or the law courts, with which it shared certain characteristics. It 
was a place for celebrating festivals and punishing criminals, the point 
from which authorities frequently broadcast news and propaganda, 
and a permanent forum in which people found sociability, established 
reputations, defended (or impugned) honor, shared ideas, and gave 
expression to grievances. The market was the vital center of  police 
activity because there, the grain trade most dramatically revealed 
itself  to be a social and political as well as a commercial matter.
If  he registered with the police, eschewed all clandestine business, 
restricted his operations to the market, constituted no hoards, and 
suborned no other buyers or sellers into illicit traffic, the merchant 
complied with the requirements to which the police attached the most 
significance. Still, there were other obligations which followed from 
and complemented the first-line prohibitions. many took the form of  
rules instituted by local police in scores of  markets in the  Parisian 
supply zone. They concerned strictly local needs and preoccupa-
tions: access to the market, days and hours of  sale, priorities for buying, 
the system for measuring grain and flour and recording sales, arrange-
ments for loading and delivery, and limitations on quantity of  purchase. 
many of  these regulations were meant to shield the local market from 
metropolitan demand, favor local dealers over Parisian merchants, 
32 Gazier, ed., “La Police de Paris en 1770,” 117; speech of  Advocate General of  Paris Parl., 
5 July 1763, in Recueil des principales lois relatives au commerce des grains … (Paris, 1769), 59–61. 
Cf. Cobb, Police and People, 268 and Roubaud, Représentations aux magistrats, 461.
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commissioners, and bakers, and, above all, satisfy the needs of  resi-
dent consumers. Parisian authorities had an ambivalent attitude 
toward these local controls. In order to win the cooperation of  the 
zone police in maintaining a steady flow of  grain to the capital, they 
tolerated many local idiosyncracies and vexations. If, however, local 
law and custom began seriously to impede traffic and hamper pro-
visioning operations, they intervened to quash them through royal, 
parlementary, or municipal channels, or by means of  informal pres-
sure from high-ranking officials.33
Certain regulations regarding supply practices and market con-
duct were peculiar to the capital, though in some cases they were imi-
tated elsewhere. The police created a sort of  de-commercialized zone 
extending for a radius, first of  eight and later of  ten leagues (36 and 
45 kilometers), around Paris in which no merchants or bakers could 
purchase any grain, even in the marketplaces. The aim was to force 
the Paris-provisioning merchants to look beyond the close hinterland 
and extend the supply zone deep into the countryside, compelling 
the zone laboureurs themselves to make the journey to the capital. The 
producer-laboureur, from the police perspective, was the ideal supplier, 
for by eliminating the middle-man he reduced the cost of  the grain. 
“The inconvenience of  the trip [a grain wagon could cover approxi-
mately eight leagues in a single day] and the rush to return home,” 
noted Delamare candidly, “induce the laboureurs and the others who 
bring their own grain to the market to relax on the price, and there 
results a kind of  fixation which obliges the merchants to do likewise.” 
Or, in the words of  another official, the laboureur finds it in his interest 
to set a “reasonable” price which “then serves as the Standard for the 
course of  the market and as remedy against the monopolies of  the 
merchants.” The de-commercialized zone formed the first “crown” 
of  the Parisian supply system. Theoretically, all the grain produced 
therein and not consumed locally had to reach the capital. Once it 
entered this zone, grain from outside could not turn back but had to 
proceed to the capital.34
33 See, for example, the cases of  the Paris (Grève) grain merchants Jauvin (at Crécy and meaux) 
and Armet (at St. Dizier). BN, Coll. Joly 1123, fols. 81, 287, 290–91, 302; 1313, fols. 86–100; 
1130, fols. 227–37, 247–53.
34 Delamare, Traité, II, 621–22; BN, Coll. Joly, 1116, fol. 247. In the seventeenth century the 
police envisioned extending the de-commercialized zone to 20 leagues. BN, mss. fr. 21644, 
fol. 10. many provincial towns maintained a two-league forbidden sector. See Conte, 
L’Administration de la généralité de Paris, 146 and Afanassiev, Commerce des céréales, 75.
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Nor were the laboureurs the only suppliers to be incommoded by 
the rules governing sale on the markets and ports within Paris. To 
“rush” the merchant and engage him to offer his grain at what one 
high official called the “natural price,” the regulations enjoined him 
to sell his entire stock within three market days (which meant usually 
within a calendar week, though bakers could purchase grain or flour 
on any day). Regardless of  the price at the end of  the third market 
day, he had to dispose of  his grain. Despite changes in the current 
price, on the second and third market days he could not ask more 
than he had initially demanded on the first offering. Instead of  stor-
ing unsold grain as the merchants would have preferred, the police 
seized it and arranged for its sale through a broker on the ports or at 
the Halles. Finally, to discourage the suppliers from losing interest in 
returning to Paris regularly, the police required them to keep the ports 
and markets “sufficiently furnished” on pain of  fines, exclusion from 
the trade, or worse. Delamare referred specifically to the “obliga-
tions” of  the merchants and the “contract” they had with the public. 
The police expected them to come at least once and preferably twice 
a month and more often in difficult times, when “so instructed.”35
III
The historian must not let himself  be intimidated or misled by this 
elaborate array of  regulations and prohibitions any more than the 
grain merchant did. If  it is impossible to understand the grain trade 
without examining the regulations, it is equally impossible to under-
stand it without taking a step beyond them. Heavily armed with 
weapons from their legal and administrative arsenal, the police knew 
when to hold their fire. Delamare himself  envisaged a differential 
police of  grain: a police for periods of  abundance, one for middling 
years, another for dearth, and still another for famine.36
During the normal years—most of  the eighteenth century—the Paris 
police adopted a posture of  benign neglect. To be sure, the police nei-
ther repudiated procedures which had become fully assimilated to com-
mercial practice nor condoned blatantly illicit activities considered to be 
dangerous, but they refrained from enforcing many of  the regulations 
35 Gazier, ed., “La Police de Paris en 1770,” 121–22; BN, Coll. Joly 1312, fol. 117; BN, mss. fr. 
21549, fols. 5, 6; Delamare, Traité, II, 618; Code Duchesne, 105, 121.
36 Delamare, Traité, II, 794.
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with rigor and they permitted others to lapse into virtual desuetude. 
The traditional controls, especially the mosaic of  rules locating all 
commercial activity in the markets, Joly de Fleury, the Procurator 
General of  Paris, informed the intendants and his substituts, “are not 
strictly executed in times when there is no dearth to fear.” Although 
the central government had insisted on the uninterrupted application 
of  the old system of  constraints as recently as April 1723 in a royal 
Declaration which was widely disseminated, the “usage,” said Joly de 
Fleury, was to ignore it. To a local official who earnestly complained 
of  violations of  the 1723 law, he urged caution and restraint:
You must exhort and engage, as much as you can, the grain merchants to furnish the mar-
kets; you could not even be blamed for threatening [them] sometimes. But when grain is at 
a reasonable price, you must resort to judicial pursuits only with a great deal of  circumspec-
tion and with precautions and you must do it only after having carefully investigated the 
abuses and after having received my reply on the action that can be taken.37
In another letter he described the traditional prohibitions, in terms 
which a physiocrat could not have reproached, as “regulations which 
hamper the grain trade .…” “I do not know,” the Procurator General 
wrote yet another of  his substituts, “if  in the present circumstances … 
it is not more prudent to close your eyes to what transpires.” When the 
harvests are good, he added, we must make a greater effort to favor 
“the liberty of  the grain trade.”38 Although he did not shy away from 
using force on most matters, Joly frequently counseled the local pro-
visioning police to avoid the “authoritarian ways” whenever possi-
ble. Remember that Joly was not mouthing slogans or affecting an 
enlightened pose for purposes of  a public debate or a parlementary 
remonstrance. In intimate administrative correspondence, the official 
37 BN, Coll. Joly 1130, fols. 156–57 and 2418, fol. 177; Joly to fiscal procurator of  Charly, 23 
Nov. 1757, Coll. Joly 1107, fols. 6, 7.
38 Letters of  PG to two local procurators, BN, Oct. 1739, Coll. 1107, fols. 8, 9. See also 
Letaconnoux, Le Commerce des grains en Bretagne, 87–88, 91–93; P. Binet, La Réglementation du 
marché, 43; musart, La Réglementation du commerce des grains, 64; L. Cahen, “A Propos du livre 
d’Afanassiev: L’Approvisionnement de Paris en grains au début du XVIIIe siècle,” Bulletin de la 
Société d’Histoire Moderne, 22nd year (5 march 1922), 162; Dénisart, Collection de décisions nouvelles, 
I, 263; Jean meyer, La Noblesse bretonne au 18e siècle (Paris, 1966), I, 521; A.-P. Floquet, Histoire 
du parlement de Normandie (Rouen, 1940–42), VI, 414–19. Two of  the severest critics of  the old 
system. Lemercier de la Rivière and the revolutionary leader and physiocratic sympathizer 
Creuzé-Latouche, both conceded that the police regime seemed to be substantially more 
moderate in the eighteenth century than it had been in earlier times. Lemercier, L’Intérêt général 
de l’état (Paris, 1770) and Creuzé’s speech, 8 Dec. 1792, Archives parlementaires, LIV, 679.
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who embodied the idea of  police in the eyes of  judges and procurators 
throughout the kingdom was promoting a strikingly loose construc-
tion of  the law and a remarkably subdued, indulgent line to follow in 
the grain police.
Whether they self-consciously followed Joly’s line or arrived there 
by their own wiles, there is no question that many local authori-
ties practiced a seasonally lenient police. Bertier, intendant of  Paris, 
observed with consternation that the police of  grain seemed to 
hibernate all year long in normal times.39 The Parisian lieutenants of  
police, as we have seen, complained frequently about the lackadai-
sical attitude of  local officials. The dossiers of  prohibition, repres-
sion, and punishment are easier to find because they are thicker and 
they tend to cluster, but the archives of  the Châtelet, the municipal 
Bureau (the little that is left), the maréchaussée, and the Parlement are 
replete with examples of  tolerance for or inattention to patently ille-
gal activities (normally called “crimes” or “abuses”), such as surrep-
titious transactions, sample selling, regrating, purchases via unau-
thorized intermediaries, shipments without passports, and hoarding. 
Unfortunately the data are too discontinuous and heterogeneous to 
be plotted on a curve against grain prices. On such a curve one 
would expect to find a significant positive correlation between price 
stagnation and police lethargy, though it should be noted that low 
prices often induced the suppliers to stay away from the markets and 
thus pricked the police back into action.
Throughout the kingdom as well as in the Paris area, officials, in 
the words of  the Controller-General Bertin, “ordinarily shut their 
eyes” provided the supply situation was untroubled. They reserved 
their “rigor” for “preventing abuses in times of  dearth.” “It is impor-
tant in moments of  cherté to hold severely to the execution of  the 
regulations which prohibit all persons from selling grain in their 
granaries, with the injunction to furnish the public markets,” wrote 
Levignen, intendant of  Alençon, “but in periods of  abundance and 
tranquility there is no disadvantage in relaxing the stringency of  the 
prohibitions.” His subdelegates confirmed that the “usage” in their 
localities was to overlook violations in normal times. Nor was the 
39 Bertier de Sauvigny to PG, 13 June, 11 July 1760 (?), BN, Coll. Joly 1130, fols. 158–59, 
162–63; Bertier de Sauvigny, “Observations sur le commerce des grains,” (1763), BN, mss. fr. 
11347, fols. 226 and passim. See the similar warning by the first LG of  Police against a police 
of  occasional neglect. La Reynie to CG, 13 July 1695, Correspondance des contrôleurs-généraux, ed. 
by Boislisle, I, 396.
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market obligation insisted upon in the Soissonnais save, significantly 
enough, in those markets frequented by merchants buying for Paris, 
where it was applied only to traders not committed to the provision-
ing of  the capital. According to the intendant of  Brittany, off-market 
transactions were “always” tolerated in his generality. Conceiving 
the mandatory market law of  1723 as a psychological device meant 
“to frighten” and “to disconcert” potential monopolists—“a sort of  
ostentatious display of  rigor”, the parlementaires of  Aix claimed 
that magistrates who registered it never intended a strict enforce-
ment and the local police “never executed [it] seriously.”40
Laxity or permissiveness, however, was sporadic and rarely indis-
criminate. It would be wrong to imagine that under the cloak of  every 
police official there beat a heart of  laissez-faire. The point is not that 
the police of  the grain trade was a myth; rather the myth, immortal-
ized by the critics of  the regime, is that the police was inexorable, 
iron-handed and tropismatic, or that the grain trade was relentlessly 
oppressed and trod under foot. Doubtless the authorities had a keener 
sense of  their own self-restraint and solicitude than the merchants 
and grain owners who still had to live with great uncertainty about 
the future, comply with many vexatious rules, and face inconsisten-
cies in police attitudes in different places as well as different times. But 
the merchants appreciated and profited from the distinctions made 
between law and usage and had as little or as much trouble antici-
pating major changes in police orientation as they had in forecasting 
weather and predicting the harvest.
The manner in which they treated the mandatory market require-
ments, the keystone in the regulatory arch, best illustrates the flexibil-
ity of  the Paris grain police. On the one hand, they demanded that 
local authorities oblige the cultivators and dealers of  the area to obey 
the market rule in order to expose the local supply to the full inten-
sity of  metropolitan demand. On the other hand, for the same pur-
poses of  promoting abundance and facilitating the operations of  the 
suppliers, the Paris police authorized merchants trading specifically 
for the provisioning of  the capital to buy in the barns and granaries 
40 Bertin, “mémoire à consulter sur la liberté du commerce des grains,” 1761, C. 69, A.D. 
I-et-V. and C. 2420, A.D. B-du-R.; Levignen to Bertin, Aug. 1761, C. 89, A.D. Orne; SD of  
Verneuil and SD of  Falaise to Levignen, 14 Aug. 1761, C. 89, A.D. Orne; IN. of  Soissons to 
Bertin, 19 Aug. 1761, AN, K. 908; IN. of  Brittany to Terray, ca. may–June 1774, C. 1653, 
A.D. I-et-V; Parl. of  Aix to Louis XV, 21 Nov. 1768, B. 3677, A.D. B-du-R. Cf. the IN. of  
montauban to Terray, 16 Dec. 1771, AN, F11 223.
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of  the laboureurs in contravention of  the law. The promulgation of  the 
royal Declaration of  April 1723, however, alarmed the Paris suppli-
ers, for it seemed to invite all police officials, without exception, to 
repress off-market transactions in all times. Despite “verbal and writ-
ten permissions to buy in the countryside, in the farms, houses, and 
anyplace else” which they received from the Paris police, the mer-
chants who openly traded off  the markets were harassed by certain 
hinterland officials who issued summonses, levied fines, or seized their 
merchandise. The Parisian police almost invariably managed to have 
these sentences quashed and the goods restituted but the merchants 
complained that the insecure atmosphere stifled their commerce and 
that the remedies were too slow and cumbersome. Instead of  short-
term relief, they demanded a durable solution.41
The leading group of  Parisian merchants made a strong case that 
the “liberty” to buy in the countryside “which we have always enjoyed” 
was of  “an absolute necessity in order to procure and maintain the 
abundance of  grain in Paris.” The market organization of  the hin-
terland, they suggested, was inadequate to serve the capital. If  they 
were bound to the market, the rhythm of  Paris supply would be con-
siderably slackened and the prices would mount—that is to say, the 
obligatory market rule would produce the very consequences it was 
supposed to prevent. Normally, contended the merchants, the laboureurs 
took their time in bringing grain to market; in some seasons, they did 
not come at all. Furthermore, most zone markets were held only once a 
week. Forced to await the day of  the market, the merchant could never 
buy enough grain in a single session to fill a boat and would thus be 
compelled to camp in the market for several weeks. This caused him 
to waste time and added significantly to his costs, which were further 
increased by the exaction of  market fees and the obligation to bid com-
petitively against other buyers for the market stock.42
41 “mémoire pour les marchands de bled pour l’approvisionnement de Paris,” BN, Coll. Joly 
1428, fols. 38–48; assembly of  police, 10 may 1731, BN, mss. fr. 11356, fols. 157–58. The 
most vigorous opponents of  the off-market tolerance were the local zone police who claimed 
that it depleted the local supply, raised prices and discriminated unfairly against merchants 
whose destination was not the capital. Other objections came from persons with a material 
vested interest in the sanctity of  the marketplace—farmers or owners of  minage and other 
market “rights” (droits). They lobbied strenuously and always in the name of  the common good 
and a “bonne police” to prohibit practices which diminished turnover at the market. See, for 
example, the violent denunciations of  merchant “license” by the comte de Rochebrune, baron 
of  Bray, an important Brie market-town. BN, mss. fr. 21635, fols. 244–45.
42 “mémoire pour les marchands de bled,” BN, Coll. Joly 1438, fols. 38–48. Cf. an earlier 
“mémoire concernant le commerce des grains” (ca. 1725), Coll. Joly 1116, fols. 266–69.
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Although habitually skeptical of  special pleading by the provi-
sioning interest groups, the police in this instance clearly sympa-
thized with the merchants’ argument. They hesitated, however, to 
recommend a statutory abrogation of  the mandatory market rule, 
for they were loath to abandon a control that they believed to be 
extremely useful in difficult times. Also, they feared that merchants 
outside the Paris system, and the public generally, would misappre-
hend the limited scope and significance of  the projected changes 
in the law. Finally, after years of  deliberation, in September 1737, 
a shrewdly phrased royal declaration expressly “maintained” the 
merchants regularly supplying the capital in the “faculty” of  buying 
outside the market without, however, exempting them from con-
forming to the mandatory market rule when the Paris police chose 
to enforce it. Since it virtually guaranteed them immunity from 
constraint except in periods of  disorder, the declaration delighted 
the merchants.43
The significance of  this case lies partly in the fact that the deci-
sion did not please everyone in the Parisian police administration. 
The police remained divided on the wisdom of  granting conces-
sions. The market tolerance violated a rule “reiterated since the 
Capitularies of  Charlemagne,” remarked one agent, and it cre-
ated a “monopoly” spirit which emboldened the merchants to 
buy up all the supplies with a view toward driving the price up. 
 missonnet, another agent charged with encouraging Paris provi-
sioning from a base in the hinterland, was convinced that purchases 
made by Parisian merchants and commissioners at the farms served 
only to reduce the circulating supply, boost prices, and encourage 
“abuses.” Along with Foucaud, the operative who toured the pro-
visioning crowns for the Paris police, missonnet favored a return to 
exclusive market transactions.44 It appears that police authorities 
in closest contact with the hinterland and the markets tended to be 
less liberal about grain trade rules than their superiors who never 
left Paris except to go to Versailles. Whether this rigidity resulted 
43 Assemblies of  police, 22 June, 30 Nov. 1730 and 10 may 1731, BN, mss. fr. 11356, fols. 127, 
138, 157–58; 11 mar. 1734, 30 June 1735, BN, Coll. Joly 1428, fols. 63, 65; Lecler to PG, 
25 April 1736 and 16 Dec. 1736, Coll. Joly 1428, fols. 72–73; BN, mss. fr. 21640, fol. 63.
44 “mémoire contre la Déclaration du 9 septembre 1737,” BN, mss. fr. 21635, fols. 168–69; 
missonnet to PG, 31 July, 30 Oct. 1752 and 2 April 1753, BN, Coll. Joly 1112, fols. 114, 
192–93, 220; Foucaud to PG, April 1757, BN, Coll. Joly 1113, fols. 240–41.
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from a fair-minded, first-hand assessment of  conditions or from a 
myopic perspective and an appetite for authority is a question that 
remains to be answered.
Another set of  attitudes tended to inhibit the rigorous execution of  
provisioning trade rules. The police, especially at the highest levels, did 
not have a blind confidence in the efficacy of  the regulatory approach. 
On occasion, they acted on the premise that so-called precautionary 
regulations were more likely to provoke than to prevent the evils they 
confronted, in much the manner that some persons shun the umbrella 
for fear that it will incite rain. Or, to use the image which the police 
found most congenial, they feared that the remedy of  regulation 
might prove worse than the disease. Though they remained vigilant, 
in normal times the police relaxed the rules. Because Parisians, and, 
indeed, the vast majority of  Frenchmen, were deeply apprehensive 
about subsistence and therefore in permanent expectation of  disaster, 
the police believed that any official suggestion in the form of  preemp-
tive or restrictive measures would raise the probability of  occurrence 
in their minds. Anxieties thus created might cause “murmurs,” “sedi-
tions,” pillaging, consumer hoarding, and other antisocial behavior. At 
certain moments in the eighteenth century the authorities esteemed 
that the unintended disorganizing and disruptive consequences of  
energetic regulation and intervention were prohibitively costly.
In these instances, the attitudes of  the police engendered a policy 
of  inertia for the sake of  discretion. This does not mean, to be sure, 
that the police stood by and did nothing at critical junctures. But the 
paralysis of  discretion tended to sap the initiative of  the highest offi-
cials, confuse their subordinates in the field, and postpone or dilute 
action which might have been more effective if  it had been taken 
earlier or more lustily. At its worst, the reasoning of  the police was 
timid and circular; it revealed a lack of  administrative imagination, 
or perhaps too much of  it, and a grievous incapacity to deal with 
public opinion. In times such as these, the police, not the people, 
proved to be the great “trembleurs” of  the Old Regime. Indecisive-
ness and micawberism masquerading as sang-froid were rarely to be 
found at the local level; they were as peculiar to the police at the 
top as impulsive outbursts of  authority were to the police at the bot-
tom. At its best, the discretion argument bespoke a genuine sensitivity 
to the psychological elements which help transform a dearth or any 
other threatening situation into a social and political crisis and an 
awareness of  the dangerous side-effects of  government intervention.
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Examples of  the paralysis of  discretion abound in the eighteenth 
century. In 1708, despite the demands of  several intendants and evi-
dence of  a short crop, the Controller-General refused to rescind a 
permission to export that the government had granted, for fear of  
frightening the people and causing an “artificial” price rise. Yet by 
not acting to stem the outflow, he risked public vilification for provok-
ing a real price rise and for failing to preserve the national subsistence. 
In the beginning of  the following year, perhaps the worst in the cen-
tury, Daguesseau fils, the Procurator General of  the Paris Parlement, 
wrote: “It is certain that some remedies must be brought to bear but 
since the matter is so delicate that the remedies often only aggravate 
the illness, it is only tremulously that one can propose several of  the 
precautions that it appears that one could take to reassure the spirit 
of  the people and calm their nervousness a little.” Daguesseau might 
have taken his inspiration from Delamare who warned that “… 
it would often be dangerous to expose to the public everything that 
there is to fear, & that an alarm given too precipitately could cause 
grain to become scarce or rise in price & produce several other bad 
effects.” In 1710 the police decided not to publish an arrêt meant to 
dissuade people from pillaging grain convoys in order not “to renew 
the sad ideas of  dearth,” that is, in order not to incite them to pillage 
grain convoys!45
Similar incidents occurred during the reign of  Louis XV. In 1723 
the Controller-General Dodun urged administrators to eschew the 
heavy-handed “authoritarian way” in dealing with the dearth: “The 
éclat that the regulations cause amplifies the alarm of  the peoples and 
causes the grain supply to contract.…” The assembly of  police in 1730 
instructed the Lieutenant General of  Vitry not to enforce the grain rules 
strictly “because that would be to sound the alarm and maintain the 
high prices.” For many years the assembly delayed asking the king for 
a declaration clarifying the status of  the Paris-provisioning merchants 
in part because “any new law on this subject would cause it to be 
45 CG to IN. of  Languedoc, 24 Aug., 1 Sept. 1708, in Correspondance des contrôleurs-généraux, ed. 
by Boislisle, III, 12; Daguesseau fils to CG, 24 Feb. 1709, ibid., III, 102; Delamare, Traité, 
II, 809; BN, mss. fr. 21634, fol. 280. Cf. similar attitudes in England, Sylvia Thrupp, A Short 
History of  the Worshipful Company of  Bakers of  London (London, 1933), 33; and the remarks of  
 Linguet on the urgency for, but difficulty of  attaining, discretion, Annales, VII (Nov. 1779), 
233. Arthur Young condemned the French police for taking action on subsistence matters 
which provoked “alarm.” Travels in France during the years 1787, 1788 and 1789, ed. by Jeffry 
Kaplow (Garden City, N.Y., 1969), 106. Cf. ibid., 376–77, 380, 474.
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believed that we fear a dearth.” Similarly, for fear of  generating “too 
much alarm,” the assembly refused in 1738, on the eve of  a great 
dearth, to issue a “general regulation” of  discipline for the grain trade 
or to authorize coercive measures to force grain out of  hiding. In the 
same year the intendant of  Orléans rebuffed insinuations that he was 
not showing sufficient industry in the campaign to find grain for the 
capital. One wonders whether his explanation, that he moderated his 
zeal because “… these sorts of  searches [for grain] cast alarms and 
fears in the spirits which usually cause the augmentation [of  prices],” 
was very convincing in Paris. In 1772 an experienced royal procurator 
of  melun, who had served as a subdelegate for a quarter century, 
wanted to extend an investigation sponsored by the Parlement into 
every parish in his jurisdiction in order to amass data on population, 
taxes, and subsistence. The Procurator General vetoed his plan on 
the grounds that it would “stir anxiety, cause éclat, inspire distrust, 
fears, and complaints; and that is precisely what must be avoided.”46
The dangers of  inaction and benign neglect worried a number of  
police authorities. In 1760, Bertier, the intendant of  Paris, warned 
against the bad example that police inertia set for the people. If  we 
tolerate clandestine grain transactions, he wrote sarcastically, “at least 
it would be useful to appear to pay attention from time to time” to the 
law. If  we never enforce the law in normal times, he argued, we will 
have no credibility in the merchant community or with the public 
when we want to insist upon its execution in a crisis. Finally, if  we do 
implement it in an emergency after years of  indifference, it will stir a 
great “sensation” and inevitably arouse alarms. And if  we are confi-
dent that it will arouse alarms, the intendant hinted, we will probably 
not want to enforce it. Such was the cycle of  indulgence, inatten-
tion, conditioning, and rationalization in the management of  police 
affairs.47 In 1771, a memoir prepared for the Procurator  General 
took a step away from the discretion syndrome:
46 CG to First President of  Rennes Parl., 4 July 1725 and to d’Angervilliers, 21 Oct. 1725, AN, 
G7 34; assemblies of  police, 30 Nov. 1730, 27 Nov., 4 Dec. 1738, BN, mss. fr. 11356, fols. 
137, 369, 371; Baussau to CG or Hérault, 26 Nov. 1738, Arsenal, mss. Bastille 10275; 
PG to Cadot, 5 Jan. 1772, BN, mss. fr. 8128, fol. 191. Cf. Controller-General Laverdy’s 
reproach to the First President of  the Rouen Parlement for stirring popular fear by meeting 
too conspicuously with the intendant of  the province. To miromesnil, 10 may 1768, in 
Correspondance Miromesnil, ed. by LeVerdier, V, 193.
47 B. de Sauvigny to PG, 13 June, 11 July 1760 (?), BN, Coll. Joly 1130, fols. 158–59, 162–63.
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Nothing being more delicate without doubt than the matter of  subsistence, a measure 
of  éclat taken inopportunely can cause much ill; but absolute silence is also very dan-
gerous. Between doing too much and doing nothing at all there is a middle position to 
take: it consists of  acting with prudence in favorable circumstances.48
middle ground is extremely difficult to find and occupy. 
Administrators are inclined to believe they are there when they oscil-
late, more or less evenly, between extremes. In 1725, for example, the 
Controller-General Dodun preached, on the one hand, a low-profile 
approach to the problem of  rising prices in order to avoid alarming 
the public and, on the other hand, he realized that “… in avoiding 
precautions for fear of  making the public anxious, we expose ourselves 
to seeing the markets go empty which is a greater evil than the anxiety 
that we wish to avoid.”49 Invariably, at some point in the development 
of  a crisis, or what passed for one, the police reached Dodun’s conclu-
sion. The famous “murmur,” the key variable in the simplistic police 
model of  public opinion, was a treacherous index of  popular feeling, 
for it was difficult to tell whether it came from the stomach or from 
the mind, whether it was a product of  dearth (in which case it was 
probably too late or pointless to apply a strategy of  discretion) or of  
the fear of  dearth (in which case it might still make sense to suppress 
cues likely to reinforce the fear). Past a certain point, alarm was no 
longer the chief  preoccupation; assuring an adequate supply of  grain 
and flour became the overriding problem, even at the cost of  enhanc-
ing short-run anxieties. Once the police agreed among themselves that 
a situation was critical and unlikely to prove ephemeral, they spared 
no effort and overlooked no useful control in coming to grips with it. 
When conditions were normal, or when they were irregular and the 
authorities half-hoped and half-expected that they would remain so 
only temporarily, the discretion syndrome operated most effectively to 
liberalize the police of  the grain trade.
Another indication of  the determination of  the Paris police to 
use their authority judiciously and to allow the grain trade consider-
able latitude was their rejection of  price-fixing, or taxation, as it was 
called. They did not, of  course, abstain from trying to influence the 
price. Indeed, all their efforts aimed not merely at assuring a regu-
lar supply but assuring it at a reasonable or just price. In the Paris 
48 “mémoire” (1771), BN, Coll. Joly 1111, fol. 147.
49 Dodun to PG, 29 July 1725, AN, G7 34.
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markets and in the zone, there were, as we have seen, a number of  
regulatory constraints on the price-making machinery. To encourage 
merchants and laboureurs to lower their prices, the police entreated, 
hounded, wheedled, and threatened, and sometimes punished a few 
harshly as an example for the others. At certain times the government 
marketed grain belonging to the religious communities and hospitals 
or to the king in order to depress the current price. But the Paris 
police never applied a taxation policy to grain and flour in any system-
atic way and they rarely resorted to it at all.
Price-fixing was often proposed, for it seemed to follow logically 
from the regulations which the police imposed on commerce and from 
their deep mistrust of  merchants. moreover, it appeared to be a rela-
tively straight-forward way to implement the police theory of  price jus-
tice, and it was a technique which had Roman and biblical pedigrees 
and was still practiced in a number of  French and European towns. 
In Paris itself, the prices of  certain goods, such as wood, candlewax, 
meat, and hay were subject to fixation. “Nothing seems easier than 
to fix the price of  grain,” noted Delamare, “it is an expedient which 
comes easily to mind because it appears at first to be a prompt remedy 
to pressing ills & it is this pretended advantage which gives birth to this 
speculative proposition as many times as we have this misfortune to be 
afflicted with dearth.” But every time the idea received a hearing—in 
1630, 1662–63, 1709, the police turned it down.50
The police rebuffed price-fixing not from scruples about violat-
ing the property rights of  merchants and laboureurs—the physiocrats 
and doubtless the dealers themselves regarded  taxation as “theft”—
but because they considered it unwise, unfeasible, and much less 
simple than generally supposed.51 Delamare viewed price-fixing 
as a “specious remedy … rather an evil than a remedy.” The pur-
pose of  police control was to contain and excite commerce, not 
eradicate it. Price-fixing would be disastrous because, Delamare 
contended, it would “stop the circulation of  grain and destroy 
the principle of  all the commerces which is that of  gain.” In 
a dearth it was especially important to stimulate a “free trade” 
50 Delamare, Traité, II, 922–34; BN, mss. fr. 21647, fols. 64–74; Bondois, “Disette de 1662,” 
Revue d’histoire économique et sociale, XII (1924), 53–118; P.-J. malouin, Description et détails des arts 
du meunier, du vermicellier, et du boulanger, avec une histoire abrégée de la boulangerie et un dictionnaire de 
ces arts (Paris, 1761), 270.
51 Ephémérides du citoyen (Aug. 1767), cited by G. Weulersse, Le Mouvement physiocratique en France 
de 1756 à 1770 (Paris, 1910), I, 538; François Lacombe (d’Avignon), Le Mitron de Vaugirard, 
dialogues sur le bled, la farine, et le pain, avec un petit traité de la boulangerie (Amsterdam, 1777), 41.
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between surplus and deficit areas and to attract supplies from 
abroad. Police pressure by itself  could not produce these results: 
“the hope of  profit,” the primary motive for commercial activ-
ity, had to be kept alive. Although he showed no indulgence for 
merchant abuses, Delamare was no partisan of  what he called a 
“forced commerce.” Within certain bounds, commerce had to be 
free if  it was to fulfill the subsistence needs of  the capital. Price-
fixing upset the delicate balance between freedom and regulation 
upon which the Paris trade was based.
Even if  price controls were adopted, Delamare argued, it would be 
virtually impossible to implement them in a reliable, intelligent fash-
ion. One could not devise a system pliant enough to take account of  
the great diversity of  weights and measures and commercial customs 
in different regions, the different qualities of  grain, the relative scarci-
ties in different places, and the varying costs of  transportation. Nor 
could one amass and keep up to date the vast amount of  data on the 
whereabouts of  the grain and the merchants and laboureurs that would 
be necessary for such an operation.52
During the reign of  Louis XV, practitioners and the theorists 
of  good administration, both of  whom considered problems 
from within a framework highly favorable to state intervention, 
decried price-fixing on the same grounds as Delamare. Trained 
by  Delamare, commissaire Duplessis, in charge of  the depart-
ment of  the Halles during the dearth of  1725–26, proved that he 
had learned his lessons well. In the midst of  the crisis, he urged an 
“entire liberty of  commerce.” Only liberty would keep supplies 
flowing into the capital. Although he anxiously wanted to see a 
diminution of  both the grain and flour prices in January 1725, he 
told the Procurator General that “it must come on its own, you 
know better than anyone that everything which is forced produces 
a bad effect.”53
more than thirty years later, another police officer assigned to the 
Halles, inspector Poussot, wrote in the same vein that “the more lib-
erty is established between seller and buyer, the more the Halles will 
be furnished and consequently this abundance will of  itself  cause a 
52 Delamare, Traité, II, 923–34; BN, mss. fr. 21647; fols. 64–74; St.-Germain, Vie quotidienne, 
208–209. Cf. the remarks attributed to the banker-victualer Samuel Bernard, cited by 
A. de Boislisle, “Le Grand hiver et la disette de 1709,” Revue des questions historiques, LXXIV 
(1903), 505.
53 Duplessis to PG, 2, 5 Jan., 21 Sept. 1726, BN, Coll. Joly 1118, fols. 5, 8–9, 206–207.
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[price] diminution.” Intensely interested in the revitalization of  the 
Halles market, he claimed that a “fixed price” drove away buyers and 
sellers and made the carreau a desert. Similarly, the Controller-General 
Dodun, hardly the most enlightened or liberal finance minister in the 
eighteenth century, viewed the question in terms of  stimulating provi-
sioning as well as trade. “Nothing is in fact more dangerous,” he cau-
tioned, “than to undertake to fix the price of  grain and of  bread when 
one is not sufficiently supplied.” “It is better,” he added, “even for the 
people to pay more dearly for their grain and to have some than to lack 
totally as a result of  the effort to procure it [for them] more cheaply … 
the liberty of  the price and the cherté itself  attracting large numbers of  
merchants … soon abundance by itself  causes the price to fall.” Turgot 
could not have put it any better.54
On an ad hoc basis the police occasionally fixed prices or used pres-
sure tactics to influence prices that bordered on price-fixing. In 1725 
Lieutenant of  Police Hérault set the price—probably a simple maxi-
mum rather than a qualitative schedule—on flour at the Halles. The 
millers and mealmen complained bitterly that the established price 
was too low to sustain their commerce. Partly in order to appease 
them, Hérault authorized his agent at Pontoise, one of  the major flour 
entrepôts in the zone, to fix the price of  wheat despite the orders of  
the Controller-General to “allow liberty of  the price” in the markets 
around Paris. Hérault imposed the price in a desperate effort to hold 
down bread prices. But a decline in flour arrivals, plus the objections 
of  the ministry and his own commissaire Duplessis, apparently per-
suaded Hérault to loosen his grip at the end of  the year. Yet four years 
later, when he felt that the going price was excessive, the Lieutenant 
General again fixed the “head” price of  the flour. A police official at 
54 Arsenal, mss. Bastille 10141 (28 Sept., 16, 26 Oct. 1759); Dodun to PG and First President 
of  Rennes Parl., 1 July 1725, AN, G7 34. Subsistence commentators outside the government, 
who were not in principle hostile to government intervention in provisioning affairs, 
rejected grain price-fixing as “impracticable,” “senseless,” and fatal to commerce. Camus, 
“mémoire sur le bled,” Journal économique (Nov. 1753), 155; J. Necker, Sur la législation et le 
commerce des grains, 282–83; Galiani, “memoir to Lieutenant General of  Police Sartine,” ca. 
1770, in Lettres, ed. by Asse, I, 416; Doumerc to PG, 17 Feb. 1789, BN, Coll. Joly 1111, fols. 
203–205. For the eighteenth century argument in favor of  price-fixing, see: Delamare, Traité, 
II, 930–34; “mémoire concernant la fixation du prix du bled,” BN, Coll. Joly 1111, fols. 
158–67; Couet de montbayeux to PG, 11 Nov. 1725, BN, Coll. Joly 1117, fols. 248–50; 
 Therbaud, “moyens pour empêcher l’augmentation…,” July 1739, BN, Coll. Joly 1120, 
fol. 33; anonymous memoirs, ca. 1725, Arsenal, mss. Bastille 10270, fols. 313–14, 374–75; 
Narbonne, Journal, 309.
 THE REGULATIONS AND THE REGULATORS 85
Versailles, whose mealmen ordinarily furnished Paris, protested that 
the set price “seriously disconcerted” the flour merchants and made it 
impossible for them to supply Paris because the cost of  wheat, which 
remained unfixed, absorbed the entire price of  flour. “It is not,” he 
said apologetically, as if  he were embarrassed for being too soft on 
traders, “that I am unaware of  how much the cupidity of  men is 
great, how much it is necessary to contain it, but the great point [after 
all] is not to go lacking [for flour]…”55
I have found no other example of  outright grain or flour price-
fixing in Paris during the reign of  Louis XV. The police generally 
insisted on respect for “the current.” If  a merchant, laboureur or baker 
tried to force up the current, he was liable to prosecution for monop-
oly. In threatening or troubled times, the police tried to shape the 
current price by pressuring merchants and laboureurs and by selling 
government grain in the open market. In the short run—for a mar-
ket day or two—the police could arbitrarily hold the line against an 
upsurging current price. But once a new level clearly declared itself, 
the police ventured to strike at the sources of  the price rise rather 
than to annul it by ukase.
Temperate, tolerant, flexible—however far one wishes to go in 
rehabilitating or demythologizing the police of  provisioning, the 
fact remains that it was a police regime: a regime of  prohibitions 
and constraints, of  permissions rather than permissiveness. Less 
rigid and oppressive than often imagined, it was still officious and 
forbidding. If  the authorities frequently overlooked the rules in 
easy times, in hard times they often enforced them vengefully, as if  
to atone for their indulgence, or discarded them in favor of  a new 
set of  brutal expedients including household searches and seizures, 
requisitions, imposition of  quotas, and profit controls. If  the crit-
ics of  the police system exaggerated its oppressiveness by focus-
ing on the extraordinary episodes of  police intervention, it was 
after all not so unreasonable because the dearth experience was 
the ultimate test and it left the deepest imprint on the minds of  
traders, officials, and consumers. Even in times called normal, it 
was the prospect of  dearth, of  tomorrow, which preoccupied every-
one. Good times were merely truces; if  the police withdrew, they 
55 Cleret to Hérault, 5, 10, 15 Oct. 1725, Arsenal, mss. Bastille 10270, fols. 224, 248, 315; 
CG to d’Angervilliers, 25 Nov. 1725 and to Hérault, 22 Nov. 1725, AN, G7 34; Regnier to 
Hérault, 21 June 1729, mss. Bastille 10275; Anon, to marville, 1740, mss. Bastille 10027, 
fols. 391–92; Laurent to Hérault, may 1726, mss. Bastille 10273.
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remained coiled to strike. For they believed that the grain trade was 
too important to be left to the grain traders. Whatever the defects of  
the police system, the authorities, who were not unaware of  them, felt 
that without it provisioning would be  jeopardized.
IV
Allowing generously for local, regional and social variations, a sub-
sistence calendar for the eighteenth century would show five cycles, 
each from ten to twenty years in length, of  relative ease interrupted 
by episodes of  severe troubles.56 If  one takes as criteria harvest fail-
ures or markedly short crops, the doubling or tripling or the wild 
fluctuation of  prices above normal levels, unusual proliferation and 
deepening of  distress among the laboring poor and the marginal 
population, pronounced social unrest on a collective scale, violent 
disruption of  the provisioning trade, and in some instances and 
some places, far-reaching economic dislocation and demographic 
repercussions, then we can point to subsistence crises, in the Paris 
area and through a considerable portion of  the kingdom, in 1709, 
1725–26, 1738–42, and 1765–75. There were, in addition, in the 
late forties and fifties some threatening moments for the capital and 
some grave difficulties for some of  the outlying provinces. These 
were the times of  maximal police intervention on all levels. Gov-
ernment, central and local, interceded directly on the supply side, 
spending millions on the purchase of  domestic and foreign grain. 
For the suppliers (including producers as well as intermediaries), 
they were years of  quick profits and speculative dreams, but also of  
inquisition, abuse, and sometimes commercial failure. The police 
trailed them, inspected them, and goaded them mercilessly, and 
consumers occasionally subjected them to popular forms of  sum-
mary justice.
Each of  these crises was occasioned by what Delamare defined as a 
disette, or dearth: “a famine commenced,” that is, a situation in which 
56 For “lists” of  dearths and famines of  extremely unequal value, see Dictionnaire de Trévoux 
(1771), III, 375; Husson, Les Consommations de Paris, 180; molinari, “Céréales,” in Coquelin 
and Guillaumin, eds., Dictionnaire de I’économie politique, I, 322; morel, Boulangerie, 39–40; 
Andre Schlemmer, Le Blé et le pain (Brevannes, n.d.), 6–7; “Famines et disettes,” Magasin 
pittoresque, 10th year (1842), 166–67; E. Levasseur, Les Prix. Aperçu historique (Paris, 1893), 
105. See also François Vincent, Histoire des famines à Paris (Paris, 1946); michel Cépède and 
maurice Lengellé, L’Economie de l’alimentation (Paris, 1964); michel Cépède and Hugues 
Gounelle, La Faim (Paris, 1967); and Cornelius Walford, The Famines of  the World, Past and 
Present (London, 1879).
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grain was in short supply, “rare” as well as “dear.” By the commis-
saire’s standard, the eighteenth century knew no famine, for a famine 
“is nothing other than a dearth consummated to its last extreme,” a 
total absence of  supplies.57 In the contemporary hierarchy of  hard 
times, the first stage, at once the most common and most fluid, was 
called cherté. It meant a period of  extremely variable duration in which 
prices had already climbed above the level conventionally deemed 
normal and might go still higher. Although it often gave way to dearth, 
cherté did not necessarily imply a physical shortage of  supply. Nor 
was it considered to be a truly critical situation. The police derived 
a certain amount of  comfort from being able to categorize a given 
problem as a cherté, for it gave them some breathing space before they 
committed themselves to a definite course of  action. Turgot and the 
physiocrats always insisted that cherté did not mean “penury” of  grain 
and thus was not a harmful or alarming phenomenon.58 Exasperated 
by what he considered to be precious, academic distinctions, Linguet, 
who wrote extensively about subsistence, argued that for the “people” 
a cherté was “absolutely equal” to a famine since bread was out of  their 
reach in both instances. Using Linguet’s cost-of-living measure, every 
year was a trying year for large segments of  the population in the 
eighteenth century.59
It is worth noting that despite the unmistakable signs of  cri-
sis that characterized each of  the episodes mentioned above, there 
were no universally acknowledged dearths in the century before the 
 Revolution—not even the legendary “grand hyver” of  1709. By that 
I mean that some of  the men who dealt with subsistence problems 
in the eighteenth century, as well as some who wrote about them, 
were not convinced that these dearths were “real.” They conceded that 
some so-called dearths resembled real dearths in their immediate con-
sequences, but they contended that no genuine grain shortages were 
involved. The most vocal debunkers were the physiocrats, who were also 
the most determined critics of  the police regime. “Everyone knows that 
the one in Paris in 1725 was artificial,” wrote Lemercier de la Rivière. 
Roubaud concurred and added 1740 to the list of  “phony dearths.” 
57 Delamare, Traité, II, 794; “mémoire joint à 1’avis des Députés du Commerce” (1764), BN, 
mss. fr. 14295, fol. 64.
58 Edgar Faure, La Disgrâce de Turgot (Paris, 1961), 230.
59 Linguet, Annales, VII (Nov. 1779), 204, 224. Cf. Année littéraire, IV (1768), 98–99; remonstrances 
of  2–4 march 1776 in Flammermont, ed., Remontrances, III, 303; F. Gohin, Les Transformations 
de la langue française pendant la deuxième moitié du 18e siécle (Paris, 1903), 127.
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Quesnay and Dupont both believed that most dearths were “dearths 
of  opinion” rather than “real dearths.” Even Galiani, who reviled the 
physiocrats, claimed that “dearth is, for three quarters [of  the cases], 
a malady of  the imagination.”60
What is interesting is that the police did not dispute this assess-
ment. As suggested earlier, the police were habitually disinclined to 
blame dearth upon natural shortage. The staunchly traditionalist 
intendant Bertier wrote that dearth “is almost never real” and the 
Code Duchesne echoed this attitude. But whereas the physiocrats 
ascribed these dearths, in the words of  Condorcet, to “bad laws,” 
the police blamed them, in the words of  Delamare, “on the malice 
of  men” or, as Bertier put it, “on the avidity of  some and on the 
fear and fermentation of  others.” The physiocrats held the police 
responsible for causing the false dearth while the police blamed 
themselves only for not having held the line rigorously enough 
beforehand. Both sides agreed that fears and anxieties (“opinion”) 
played a major part in the difficulties but whereas the police saw 
no difference between “real” needs and needs which “exist only in 
opinion,” the physiocrats maintained that while appeasing opin-
ion, police action heightened anxieties by suggesting the possibil-
ity of  real shortage. Naturally the physiocrats’ idea that dearth was 
unreal led them to deprecate the gravity or the urgency of  the situ-
ation, whereas police tended to view dearth as a potential social 
crisis regardless of  its origins. In fact, an artificial dearth could be 
even more serious than a real one, for if  the people learned that 
they were suffering shortage in the midst of  abundance they were 
likely to react furiously. It was precisely in cases of  false dearth that 
disagreement was most pronounced: the police believed that their 
methods would be extremely effective and their critics believed that 
they would be both harmful and futile. To concede that dearths 
were normally real would have required both sides to modify 
their basic positions. Thus, by reinforcing the notion that dearths 
were artificial, both the police and their adversaries invited the 
60 Roubaud, Représentations aux magistrats, 412; Lemercier de la Rivière, L’Intérêt général, 269; 
Dupont, Analyse … rapport, 29; Quesnay, “Grain,” in Diderot, et al., Encyclopédie, VII, 825; 
Galiani, memoir to Sartine in Lettres, ed. by Asse, I, 420. Cf. Journal économique (Nov. 1768), 
521; Condillac, Le Commerce et le gouvernement, in Collection des principaux économistes, ed. by Daire 
and molinari, XIV, 329; and Turgot, who conceded the “reality” of  the 1740 dearth, Œuvres, 
ed. by Schelle, III, 339.
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public to believe that either there was something wrong with the 
grain trade or something wrong with the government, or both.61
There are some indications that the police regime was gener-
ally milder during the reign of  Louis XV than it had been under 
Louis XIV. None of  Louis XV’s Lieutenants General of  Police was 
as suspicious of  merchants as La Reynie or as mistrustful of  bakers 
as d’Argenson had been. Nor did they brutalize the hinterland as 
mercilessly as those two Lieutenants General. Although these signs 
of   moderation may very well be the result of  general changes in 
the political, economic, and military conditions rather than a spe-
cific revulsion against authoritarian methods, it is possible that indi-
vidual police officials in the reign of  Louis XV were influenced by 
some of  the critical currents we associate with the Enlightenment. 
A great deal continued to depend on the personal styles and attitudes 
of  different Controllers-General, Lieutenants General, and others in 
authority. machault thought more seriously about dearth prevention 
than Dodun; Sartine was more interested in subsistence problems 
than marville. However, prior to the 1760’s, the police of  provision-
ing, at least in the Paris area, did not undergo any profound transfor-
mations, either in day-to-day regulation or in strategies for dearth, 
real or artificial.
The ministers of  Louis XV seem to have intervened more readily 
and more decisively on the supply side than their predecessors had. 
Perhaps the most striking aspects of  the campaigns against the dearth 
in 1725 and 1740 were the operations for the purchase of  “king’s 
grain,” grain purchased by the government or under its sponsorship 
for use especially in Paris and surrounding markets. Prior to the reign 
of  Louis XV Paris had no emergency reserve system at all. In 1725 
Hérault, the Lieutenant of  Police, marshaled the hundreds of  religious 
and hospital “communities” in and around the capital into a crude 
granary network which served Paris, on a very limited basis, until the 
61 Condorcet, Le Monopole et le monopoleur, in Collection des principaux économistes, ed. by Daire and 
molinari, XIV, 467; Delamare, Traité, II, 795–96; Bertier de Sauvigny, “Observations,” BN, 
mss. fr. 11347, fol. 229; Code Duchesne, 103; L.-J. Bourdon-Desplanches, Projet nouveau sur la 
manière de faire utilement en France le commerce des grains (Brussels, 1785). 110; Lenoir, “Vivres, 
subsistances et approvisionnements,” Lenoir papers, Bibliothèque municipale d’Orléans, 
ms. 1421; Terray to Esmangart, 12 Nov. 1773, C. 1439, A. D. Gir. For the persistence of  
the distinctions between real and artificial subsistence crises and their relation to the plot 
mentality, see Révolutions de Paris, #18 (7–14 Nov. 1789) and #61 (20–27 Aug. 1791), and 
R. Cobb, “Le Ravitaillement des villes sous la terreur: la question des arrivages,” Terreur et 
subsistances, 211–192.
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seventies. With the same aim in mind, the Controller-General 
machault tried to launch a larger reserve scheme based on military 
 provisioning in the fifties. Although he was unsuccessful, his efforts 
indirectly led to the establishment of  a permanent king’s grain fund 
which did give the Parisian police a modest safety valve of  a kind that 
they never had before.
In the second half  of  the eighteenth century, the Paris police 
became deeply involved in the technological side of  the subsistence 
question. They sponsored experiments in milling and baking to 
improve yield and quality, and they paid serious attention to foodways 
and to the development of  new forms of  bread and of  wheaten-white 
bread surrogates. Future investigation will probably also show that 
police methods changed across the century in response to changes 
in the structure of  the provisioning trade. There is strong evidence 
that the flour trade was displacing the grain trade as the major vehi-
cle of  Parisian supply; that the quondam grain barons of  the port 
of  the Grève were losing interest (and perhaps losing money) in the 
grain trade even as their alleged protectors in the Hôtel de Ville were 
losing influence; that the brokerage system was more important in 
1750 than it had been half  a century earlier; that the most powerful 
Paris bakers were more deeply enmeshed in grain and flour purchas-
ing operations than their fathers and grandfathers had been. The 
impact of  some of  these changes was reflected in the resurgence of  
the Halles as the center of  Parisian provisioning after mid-century; 
the consequences of  others have yet to be charted.62 Yet despite many 
signs of  aggiornamento, the fundamental disposition of  the police and 
their conception of  their task did not change. Although the police 
read Delamare more critically in 1760 than in 1710, they still looked 
to him for their basic texts.
V
By a Declaration of  may 1763 and an Edict of  July 1764, the 
government of  Louis XV broke radically with the provisioning 
tradition.63 The king renounced the old police, the entrenched 
62 The evidence for these claims is too scattered to cite here. It forms the basis of  my forthcoming 
study, “The Paris Grain and Flour Trades in the Eighteenth Century.”
63 The bulk of  the following discussion is based upon an analysis of  the texts of  the two reform 
laws. Isambert, ed., Recueil, XXII, 393; Recueil, 30–33, 58–63.
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priorities, and the very premises upon which the provisioning pol-
icy had been based. He proclaimed an era of  liberty in which grain 
would be freed from the controls which had inhibited its move-
ment, spied on its whereabouts, and governed the conditions of  its 
exchange. The first of  these liberal measures, the may  Declaration, 
is best known for the freedom which it accorded grain to circu-
late interprovincially without passports or permissions. We have 
seen that the principle of  liberty of  internal movement was not 
alien to the police tradition. Officials viewed it, however, not as an 
imperative precondition for trade but as an allowance to be made 
in discretionary fashion depending upon the circumstances and the 
advantages it portended for a given moment and place. Good times 
usually meant a relatively untrammeled flow of  grain; real, imag-
ined, or anticipated difficulties tended to generate an obstructionist 
and xenophobic stance that reflected not merely subsistence anxi-
ety, but the lessons of  an intensely parochial world characterized 
by primitive communications, a multitude of  different customary 
laws, collective traditions, and weights and measures, and a con-
stricted sense of  community.
The liberty of  circulation postulated in the may Declaration defied 
established practice in two ways: it deprived officials of  the freedom to 
mete out liberty as they saw fit and it imposed the principle as a uniform, 
integrative law of  the land, a “general” law of  the sort that French gov-
ernments rarely succeeded in enforcing until the time of  Napoléon.64 
It proclaimed a national market where none had existed before, based 
upon an identity of  purpose in a single national community which most 
contemporaries could not yet discern. The may Declaration repre-
sented the finest expression of  a form of  enlightened kingship, which 
manifested itself  intermittently in the Europe of  lumières: the exercise of  
central authority to eradicate popular habit, administrative caprice, and 
widespread parochialism; the use of  a grand prohibitive law to prohibit 
prohibitive laws; absolutism in the service of  liberalism.
64 Historians have paid much more attention to the promulgation of  (therefore, to the aspiration 
for) general or national laws than to their execution. Careful investigation of  implementation 
would probably raise serious questions about the efficacy of  the administrative monarchy 
and the meaning of  centralization. See P. Goubert’s perceptive remark in E. Labrousse and 
F. Braudel, eds., Histoire économique et sociale, II, 571. Often local officials did not receive word 
of  important royal and parlementary arrêts or lettres until many months after publication. 
See, for example, Coueseau to the PG of  the Paris Parl., 20 July 1769, BN, Coll. Joly 1146, 
fol. 15. Sometimes word of  new legislation did not reach certain sections of  the kingdom at 
all. See G. Afanassiev, Le Commerce des céréales, 154. See also below, chapter one.
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By itself, the injunction against interference with grain circula-
tion would have proven insufficient to effect a truly free commerce 
in the interior. It afforded an impersonal and negative type of  inde-
pendence to a commodity; because it did not deal with the men who 
traded in grain, it left them subject to a wide range of  constraints. 
Far more significant than the freedom proclaimed for grain was the 
blanket invitation bestowed upon all citizens, of  whatever quality 
or conditions, including nobles and privilégés, to engage in this com-
merce “as it will seem to please them.” This permissive immunity 
breathed real iconoclasm into the liberal measures. For in the past 
it had not been so much the grain as the owner and the trader 
who were “prisoner” of  the police nexus.65 The declaration utterly 
destroyed the system of  controls. By granting everyone a mandate 
not merely to trade but to deal anonymously, clandestinely, and/or 
in association, to transact business off  the markets, and to stockpile 
limitlessly, it made it practically impossible for the police to oper-
ate. Explicitly, the declaration forbade officials to subject dealers to 
“any formalities,” such as registration of  names and addresses and 
declarations of  amounts purchased and destination. To promote 
greater facility of  movement, another article prohibited “subjects” 
who owned or farmed rights of  péage, passage, pontonage, or travers—
the major customs barriers—to demand payment on any grains, 
flour, or legumes. A similar measure, in the precarious form of  an 
arrêt du conseil, had been promulgated in 1739 in the midst of  a grave 
dearth. In many places it was simply ignored by officials unwilling 
to join the issue with the influential interests who stood to lose rev-
enue as a result of  the law. In other areas it provoked wearisome 
litigation which postponed execution indefinitely or open warfare in 
the marketplaces between consumers who claimed—incorrectly—
that the arrêt freed them from paying all fees, not just transit tolls, 
65 michelet made the wheat-as-prison image famous in his Histoire de France, Œuvres complètes 
(Paris, ed. Flammarion, n.d.), XVI, 192. Herbert used it in his pioneering treatise in favor of  
liberty, Essai sur la police générale des grains, ed. by E. Depitre (Paris, 1910), 33. Necker employed 
it in his Sur la législation et le commerce des grains, 176 and Galiani also adopted it in the Dialogues 
sur le commerce des bleds (1770), ed. F. Nicolini (milan, n.d.), 159. Simon Linguet, too, viewed 
wheat as “trapped in the prisons,” not of  a tyrannical police, as michelet contended, but of  
the oppressive “opulence” of  a perverse and disequilibrated society. Du Pain et du bled, 37. 
Similarly, for L.-S. mercier, wheat was the “bourreau” and man the victim. Tableau de Paris, 
IV, 132. Voltaire saw the city, center of  opposition to liberalization, as archetypal “prison.” 
“Voltaire à l’auteur des Représentations aux magistrats,” July 1769 in Mercure de France (Aug. 
1769), 134.
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and the owners of  the droits who threatened to “demolish” the mar-
kets in retribution. By giving the abolition project the form of  “a 
permanent law,” Bertin expected that “it would be recognized in 
all the courts and generally enforced.” In fact it proved as contro-
versial in the sixties as it had a quarter century earlier, especially in 
those regions, such as the Bordelais and lower Normandy, where 
tolls were numerous and owners exacting. Diversely interpreted, 
contested, mired in a labyrinth of  legal niceties, and subsequently 
modified, the clause did not give commerce the sort of  thrust for 
which the ministry hoped.66
The last two articles, inspired by very different concerns, delimited 
the ambitions of  the declaration. One extended the new law to its logi-
cal conclusion by abrogating all previous legislation and regulations 
contrary to it. The other pledged, “for the present time,” to maintain 
in force all the rules heretofore elaborated for the provisioning of  Paris.
The may Declaration treated the grain trade as a national 
affair; the Edict of  July 1764, by permitting the export of  grain 
and flour, added an international dimension. It marked, in the 
words of  a distinguished Breton magistrate, the entry of  France 
into “the common market of  Europe.”67 Habitually, in times of  
stress and shortage, Frenchmen of  all conditions blamed illicit traf-
fic abroad as a major cause of  hardship. When a climate of  fear 
and uncertainty enveloped the kingdom, modest convoys of  grain 
were reported as huge caravans, small barges became leviathan 
ships, while agitated witnesses spoke of  plots and maneuvers to 
plunder the countryside and starve the people.68 Sensitive to these 
anxieties, and cognizant of  the real material threat which inoppor-
tune exports could pose, government policy, as we have seen, had 
always been circumspect and variable. In periods of  dearth, it often 
proscribed grain exporting on pain of  death. Henri IV underlined 
the link between kingship and subsistence by making unauthorized 
66 Orry to IN. of  Alençon, 17 Nov. 1739 and SDs of  Falaise and Argentau to IN., 28 Nov. and 4 
Dec. 1739, C. 89, A.D. Orne; Bertin to IN., 4 July 1761, C. 89 and 13 April 1762, C. 90, ibid. 
For a discussion of  the limitations of  this article and the effects of  the maintenance of  the 
“droits de marché,” see Afanassiev, Commerce, 153–58; Georges Weulersse, “Les Physiocrates 
et la question du pain cher au milieu du dix-huitième siècle, 1756–1770,” Revue du dix-huitième 
siècle, I (Jan.–march 1913), 180.
67 La Chalotais, charge to the Parl. of  Rennes, 20 Aug. 1764, cited by D-Z [Desaubiez], Le 
Bonheur public, 36.
68 For an example of  this syndrome, see Gazetins, 5 may 1729, Arsenal, mss. Bastille, 10159, 
fol. 155.
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exportation a crime of  “lèse-majesté.”69 In times of  relative ease, 
the government issued new instructions, sometimes as frequently as 
every six months, licensing exportation through certain provinces, 
certain ports, or certain individuals for limited durations.
The July Edict introduced a fundamentally different approach. It 
established “free” or open exportation as the rule and interdiction 
as the exception. It named 27 ports as points of  embarkation and—
this was one of  several mercantilist remnants in the liberal legisla-
tion—required traders to use French ships captained by nationals 
and manned by crews composed of  at least two-thirds Frenchmen. 
Article seven imposed a negligible one-half  percent duty on the value 
of  exports. Export by land could take place at all border points where 
the General Farm maintained collection bureaus. Whenever the 
price of  grain at the port or town of  sortie passed 12 livres 10 sous the 
quintal (30 livres the Paris septier or approximately twice the average 
national price of  the early sixties) during three consecutive markets, 
exportation would automatically cease from that point until the royal 
council specifically decided to reinstitute it by issuing a new piece of  
legislation. The edict also allowed traders of  all nations to import 
grain and flour in national or foreign bottoms upon payment of  a 
1% duty on wheat and a 3% levy on all other cereal types. merchants 
who re-exported foreign wheat within one year and flour and other 
grains within six months did not have to pay these fees. Finally, the 
July law reaffirmed the critical innovations concerning internal trade 
contained in the may Declaration.
The liberal legislation dealt with the grain trade, not from the per-
spective of  subsistence and distribution, which had been the traditional 
focus of  concern, but from that of  agriculture. In its myopic solicitude 
for the consumers, the old system was now said to have discriminated 
against the producers, “this precious portion of  our Subjects,” and 
to have neglected the land “whose product is the most real and sur-
est source of  the wealth of  a state.” The king determined to redress 
the balance by offering the producers—the “owners” and “fermiers”—
“special signs of  the care we take of  their interests.” The may and July 
laws aimed at reinvigorating French agriculture. In concrete terms, 
69 “mémoire joint à l’avis des Députés du Commerce” (ca. pre-July 1764), BN, mss. français, 
14295, fol. 45. Cf. Dupont de Nemours, Analyse … Rapport, 32; Edme Béguillet, Traité 
des subsistances (Paris, 1780), 362; Pierre Lefèvre, Le Commerce des grains à Lille, 176. For 
traditional policy towards exportation, see Afanassiev, Commerce des céréales, 187–204; musart, 
Réglementation du commerce, 77; Delamare, Traité, II, 776.
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the king’s favor meant the powerful incentive of  higher prices in order 
to indemnify the cultivators for their labors, compensate the propri-
etors for their investments, and induce the landed interests to expand 
and intensify the exploitation of  the realm’s most productive resource. 
The new laws would promote the circulation of  grain and legitimize 
their quest at home and abroad for a more profitable return.
According to this new approach to subsistence, the higher cost to 
consumers would represent, in the long run, a reasonable premium 
on the best possible insurance policy against scarcity and suffering. For 
only a revitalized, ambitious agriculture and an unfettered commerce 
could create a situation of  permanent and widely diffused abundance, 
and only a “free and entire competition” in the marketplace could 
prevent the abuses of  monopoly. Consumers who  assimilated this les-
son in political economy would have no cause for anxiety. moreover, 
they would enjoy the largesse of  an unlimited importation, which 
would deter grain from reaching a price “onerous to our Peoples.” To 
the weak-willed and the worriers “who would not yet feel sufficiently 
the advantages that liberty must procure,” the king conceded, not as 
a matter of  principle, but as a sop, the 30 livres price ceiling above 
which exportation would cease.
For the moment, Paris was allowed to retain a special status. Quali-
fying articles reiterated in the Edict of  1764 maintained the capital’s 
traditional provisioning police. In principle the Parisian authorities 
could do what they had always done to assure a regular supply for the 
capital. But the legislation did not indicate the specific modalities by 
which the city would be quarantined. Presumably it could be isolated 
in time and space and cut off  from its multiple hinterlands simply by 
royal command. Prudential and political considerations prompted 
the government to apply this temporary double standard. Implic-
itly, the government conceded that the transition from prohibition to 
liberty would involve certain risks and adjustments. The ministry did 
not want the success or failure of  the reform to pivot on this massive 
and unpredictable variable represented by the capital. Paris neutral-
ized, the reform would have the opportunity to establish itself  firmly 
in the rest of  France. At some future date, Paris could be integrated 
into a national system of  liberty. Nor was this the only ransom that the 
government was willing to pay in order to deliver the grain in the rest 
of  the kingdom from captivity. Informally, outside the context of  the 
reform legislation, it offered positive tribute to Parisian anxieties. In case 
of  need, the capital had first call upon the large stock of  king’s grain 
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and flour stored in depots near the city, which the government 
arranged to purchase by the contract which later became known as 
the Pact of  Famine.
By the liberal decrees, Louis XV estranged himself  unequivocally 
from the past and dissociated his reign from the policies which it had 
inherited and faithfully executed for almost a half  century. The king 
repudiated the over-government and excessive rigor of  his predeces-
sors which he held responsible for agricultural lethargy and com-
mercial demoralization. Nor was the old police merely vexatious and 
inordinate; grounded on false precepts, it was bound to stumble and 
miscalculate. The old system was niggardly, pessimistic, suspicious, 
and prohibitive; the new mood would be generous, sanguine, trusting, 
and permissive. Oblivious to the social utility of  economic egotism, 
the police approach stunted growth and initiative; liberty, through the 
harmonious concourse of  self-interests and in conformity with “the 
order established by divine providence,” would release constructive 
energies and encourage progress. In place of  a quixotic multiplicity 
of  restrictive laws, which mistook simple mills for hideous monopolies 
and proved ineffective even in face of  real abuses, the king proposed 
a self-disciplining commerce animated and regulated by the purga-
tive forces of  competition. The hubris that impelled the police to 
intervene in every affair would cede to a sophisticated administrative 
humility informed by an understanding of  natural law.
At the same time it dismantled the police apparatus, the liberal leg-
islation desacralized grain. Grain lost the privileged status with which 
custom, liturgy, and the terror of  hunger had invested it. The may and 
July laws distinguished grain from any other merchandise only insofar 
as it represented the paramount source of  national wealth. Styling his 
measures as “solemn and perpetual,” the king made it patently clear 
that he viewed them as neither tentative nor experimental. Agricul-
ture and commerce required security and confidence in order to bear 
fruit; Louis assured merchants and cultivators that there would be “no 
return” to the old ways.
The government labored mightily to keep the pledge it made in 
the king’s name. But before examining the impact of  liberalization 
and the problems it posed, let us inquire into its origins.
Chapter III
THE ORIGINS OF LIBERTY
A dramatic innovation, liberalization, I shall argue, took shape 
directly from the needs and circumstances of  the early 1760’s. Yet 
insofar as it embodied a certain vision of  public administration and 
economic life—a theory of  political economy—it had an ample criti-
cal tradition upon which to draw. It is beyond the scope of  this chap-
ter to sketch a history of  the development of  political arithmetic or 
political economy in the Old Regime, though such a study, fully inte-
grated into the context of  political, economic, and social change, is 
sorely needed. Nor can it attempt to do for the idea of  liberty what 
Mauzi did for “happiness” and Ehrard for “nature,” though such an 
undertaking, too, would be of  great value. I wish only to suggest that 
liberalization had an important intellectual as well as political and 
economic preparation, leaving it to others to pursue these connec-
tions in detail. I have already discussed on several occasions the critics 
of  the police. Most of  them were part of  what became the movement 
for liberalization. I refer to all persons who favored a fundamental 
reform of  the police in the direction of  greater liberty as liberals. 
By liberalism I mean to indicate nothing more than those political, 
economic, and social ideas that informed the attitude of  the grain 
trade reformers and their allies. To others, too, I leave the task of  
charting out the links between this grain-centered liberalism of  the 
Old Regime and the Liberalism which triumphed in the nineteenth 
century.
I
Like many of the notions that became preoccupations of the 
 Enlightenment, the liberal idea crystallized during the reign of 
Louis XIV. It appeared in several versions in the anti-mercantilist, 
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 Christian-agrarian, and utilitarian currents which traversed the king-
dom in the second half of the seventeenth century.1 Already the land-
owners were plotting the political resurgence and the revenge taken in 
prices and profits which the eighteenth century would allow them. A 
large part of the merchant community rejected Colbertism on grounds 
that would become familiar to eighteenth century reformers.2 Politi-
cal dissenters criticized the methods of government for their arbitrari-
ness and their oppressiveness—that is, for their excessive police in all 
domains of life: administration, religion, and foreign policy as well as 
the economy. At the turn of the century, when delamare began to 
codify the principles of good police, Boisguilbert, the archetypal officier-
reformer, assailed the regulatory apparatus and ascribed the general-
ized economic, financial, and human catastrophes which marked the 
last years of Louis XIV to benighted government policy. Ardent par-
tisan of free trade, he enunciated the fundamental liberal proposition 
that low prices spelled agricultural ruin and national depression and 
that high prices were the only cure for high prices.3 Neglected in his 
own time, in the second half of the eighteenth century his stature rose 
as sharply as the rent on land. Niggardly with praise, the économistes 
ranked him as one of their few authentic precursors.4
The regency is often celebrated as a period of  revulsion for the 
fiercely regimented style of  the classical world. It is better known for 
its libertinage than for its philosophy, but it is worth noting that John 
Law postulated liberty of  commerce as a precondition for agricul-
tural development, which he tied to his grand scheme for increasing 
the gross national product.5 His collaborator, Jean-François Melon, 
espoused a modulated free trade policy in the interior contingent upon 
 1 See L. Rothkrug, Opposition to Louis XIV: The Political and Social Origins of  the French Enlightenment 
(Princeton, 1965).
 2 The English example made a deep impression on the merchant community. See the 
remarks of  Turgot, “Lettres sur le commerce des grains,” 30 Oct. 1770 (#1), Œuvres, ed. by 
G. Schelle (Paris, 1913–1923), III, 270. Cf. donald G. Barnes, A History of  the English Corn 
Laws from 1660 to 1846 (London, 1930).
 3 See his Détail, Factum and Traité des grains (1696–1707). Cf. Marguerite Leblanc, De Thomas 
More à Chaptal. Contribution bibliographique à l’histoire économique (Paris, 1961), 20; Henri 
Curmond, Le Commerce des grains et l’école physiocratique (Paris, 1900), 28–34; André J. Bourde, 
Agronomie et agronomes en France au dix-huitième siècle (Paris, 1967), I, 129–30; Labrousse in 
Labrousse and Braudel, eds., Histoire économique et sociale, II, 368–69.
 4 Le Mercier de la Rivière, L’Intérêt général de l’état, 236–37; A. Morellet, Réfutation de l’ouvrage 
qui a pour titre: Dialogues sur le commerce des bleds (London, 1770), 301.
 5 Bourde, Agronomie, I, 161; Labrousse in E. Labrousse and Braudel, eds., Histoire économique et 
sociale, II, 370.
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the sufficiency of  supply and subject to evaluation by an elaborate 
central data-collecting agency. Albeit philosophically “very superfi-
cial,” his achievement, observed diderot, “… and it is not a small 
merit, is to have been the first in recent times to stir up economic 
matters.”6
In the 1740’s, buoyed by the English example and alarmed by 
evidence of  agricultural stagnation, Claude dupin, one of  several 
eighteenth century farmers-general who labored publicly for reform, 
composed a vigorous Mémoire sur les Blés. He denounced the unfrater-
nal and “cowardly” attitude of  intendants who sealed off  their prov-
inces as if  “surrounded by enemies” and argued that a global free 
trade policy founded on a belief  in national social solidarity would 
preserve France from both “the horror of  sterility” and “the burdens 
of  superfluity” by maintaining a price acceptable to consumers and 
producers. dupin’s “projet d’édit,” which he submitted to two Con-
trollers-General, stopped short of  authorizing an absolute liberty. He 
subjected merchants to constant police surveillance, imposed a slid-
ing cut-off  ceiling on exports, and proposed import bounties when 
the price surpassed 24 livres the two hundred pound sack. Orry, a tough-
minded interventionist minister, apparently manifested genuine inter-
est in the financier’s plan. His ephemeral Arrêt du Conseil of  Septem-
ber 1743, however, lamely endorsed interprovincial grain movement 
only when undertaken in compliance with “the different regulations 
made in the different provinces.”7
The next Controller-General, Machault, also gave the project  serious 
consideration. His biographer strained apologetically to  portray him as 
a forward-looking statesman whose avid liberal ambitions were thwarted 
by unfavorable circumstances.8 Viewed in broader perspective, it is clear 
 6 diderot, 15 Nov. 1769, in F. M. Grimm, Correspondance littéraire, philosophique et critique par 
Grimm, Diderot, Raynal, etc., ed. by Maurice Tourneux (Paris, 1877–82), VIII, 372; Georges 
Weulersse, Le Mouvement physiocratique en France (1756–1770) (Paris, 1910), I, 17–21.
 7 C. dupin, “Mémoire sur les bleds,” BN, mss. n.a. 22777, published in 1748 and reprinted 
in the Journal économique, Feb. and March 1760; Journal de Trévoux (April 1754), 821–28; Orry 
to IN. of  Alençon, 2 Oct. 1743, C. 89, A.d. Orne; Afanassiev, Commerce des céréales, 106. 
Tessier, in the Encyclopédie méthodique, credited dupin with being “the first [who] wrote in 
favor of  the liberty of  this commerce” but remarked that he argued with “so much timidity 
and circumspection that his work would suffice to demonstrate to what extent we were 
then removed from true principles.” Article “Commerce des grains,” Encyclopédie méthodique, 
Agriculture (Paris, 1793), III, 355.
 8 Marcel Marion, Machault, 425, 429. For a similar opinion, see E. Levasseur, Histoire 
des classes ouvrières … en France (Paris, 1901), II, 578n. Cf. G. Schelle, Vincent de 
Gournay (Paris, 1897), 43 and “Extrait d’un mémoire sur les bleds communiqué par
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that Machault faced the same imbroglio which bedevilled intelligent 
administrators throughout the century. Ideally, he would have preferred 
to rely solely on an unencumbered grain trade to provision the realm; 
police control and government operations were onerous and costly. But 
on numerous occasions he found commerce unequipped and unwilling 
to perform the mission. Faced with imperious demands, he felt obliged 
to intercede.9
On the one hand, Machault affirmed with considerable ardor 
“that it is of  the greatest importance to maintain full liberty in the 
grain trade, never to chance impairing it in the slightest.…” On the 
other hand, “since this unlimited liberty, lacking fixed and wise rules, 
could give rise to the most dangerous abuses,” the Controller-General 
felt that “it is of  an equal importance to take quite specific measures 
which, without impairing the liberty of  trade, will restrict its exercise within 
the boundaries prescribed by different regulations and prevent this 
unlimited liberty from serving as a pretext for disorders and monop-
olies.” Among the measures he had in mind were merchant regis-
tration, mandatory market transactions, monitoring of   circulation 
by intendants, and regular searches of  granaries in order to stamp 
out hoarding. As if  to reassure himself, Machault emphasized that 
none of  this “could ever be considered as a blow against liberty of  
trade.” Appalled by the glaring contradictions, the next generation 
of  reformers viewed Machault’s position as an astonishing act of  self-
parody and -deception at best and as an access of  hypocrisy at worst. 
Schooled in the same prudential tradition as the Controller-General, 
administrators perceived no inconsistency in his dual commitment 
to freedom and regulation. Precisely in order to make “free circula-
tion” socially useful, Machault wanted to “direct” the activities of  
merchants, to establish uniform control procedures throughout the 
realm, to match supply and demand in time and space, and, on occa-
sion, to intervene on the supply side, in the short run with govern-
ment grain purchases and in the long run with publicly-sponsored 
 M. de Machault, contrôleur-général à Mr. Pâris duverney …,” AN, F12 647. d’Argenson’s 
estimation is harsh but not wholly without merit. See his Journal et mémoires, ed. by E.J.B. 
Rathery (Paris, 1859–67), III, 340 (10 July, 1750).
 9 On the circumstances of  Machault’s interventions, see “Additions,” Arsenal, mss. Bastille, 
12352; Michel Lhéritier, L’Intendant Tourny (Paris, 1920), I, 391–404, 411–414; Pierre 
Clemént and Alfred Lemoine, M. de Silhouette, Bouret, les derniers fermiers-généraux du XVIIIe 
siècle (Paris, 1872), 155–64; Marcel Marion, “Une Famine en Guyenne (1747–48),” Revue 
historique, XLVI (May–Aug. 1891), 247ff.; dupont, Analyse … rapport, 90ff.
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granary organizations. In a word, he regarded liberty not as an alter-
native, but as an adjunct to the police way.10
Between 1748 and 1751, the Age of  Enlightenment produced some 
of  its greatest monuments: The Esprit des Lois, the Discours, and the first 
installments of  the Encyclopédie. In 1753 Claude-Jacques Herbert, a 
middle-rank public servant at Bordeaux alert to the changing mood 
of  the times, published a treatise which argued forcefully for a central 
place for political economy and the grain question in particular in the 
movement of  lumières. Offering his Essay on the General Police of  Grain, on 
its Prices, and on the Effects of  Agriculture as a contribution to “the happi-
ness of  people,” he dedicated it to his friend Maupertuis and invoked 
the patronage of  Locke and Newton, both of  whom had at some point 
dealt with “Economic Subjects.”11 The Essay, which enjoyed six editions 
in the next four years, was the most detailed and cogent critique yet 
written on the public administration of  the grain commerce. The écono-
mistes of  the sixties and seventies borrowed heavily from Herbert, gen-
erally without attribution; he charted out the lines of  reasoning which 
they refined, amplified, or incorporated into their more ambitious 
systems.12 Herbert wrote with none of  their truculence; his approach 
was self-consciously sober and judicious. Nonetheless, the essay read 
as a searing indictment of  the police, a sort of  anti-delamare in which 
Herbert turns the ponderous innocence of  the commissaire to his own 
advantage.13 A glance at Herbert’s Essay thrusts into relief  the major 
points of  contention between the police and the liberals.
Herbert charged that delamare misused history and misunderstood 
the significance of  the past for present needs. The commissaire’s infatu-
ation with remote Rome was one source of  police sophistry. “But these 
laws so necessary to the Romans,” Herbert asked, “are they applica-
ble to our present situation?” Within our own past, he wrote, there 
was a time, in the age of  Saint Louis, when the police of  grain was 
simple, clear, and restrained. Ever since, despite occasional flashes 
 10 Machault to IN. of  Rouen, 12 dec. 1751, C. 103, A.d. S-M. His reflections were prompted 
by the subsistence alarm of  1751 which he attributed in large measure to trader “cupidity” 
and “maneuvers.”
 11 Herbert, Essai, ed. by depitre, iii–iv.
 12 Though there is no sure way to measure its influence, Herbert’s Essai was certainly more 
widely known in the sixties by local officials and notables than any of  the works of  the 
économistes. See, for example, the “Mémoire” (1762) of  the prior-consuls of  St. Malo, 
C. 3911, A.d. I-et-V.
 13 See, for example, the discussion of  delamare’s work, Herbert, Essai, ed. by depitre, 23, 40, 
passim.
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of  light, it seems “the more we wanted to perfect this Police the more 
we strayed from the right path.” The proof  of  the failure of  the police 
Herbert drew from delamare himself  and from dupré de St. Maur’s 
price series in which “one could read … a part of  the History of  our 
Monarchy.” Characteristically, when the police intervened in the bleak 
years they drove rising prices higher, frightened off  or dried up the 
sources of  supply, and prolonged public suffering. In addition to exac-
erbating present difficulties, the police regulations compromised future 
prospects, for they gravely damaged agriculture by making cultivation 
economically unattractive.14
In Herbert’s judgment, a fatal confusion of  priorities misled the 
police. To be sure, the aim of  the grain trade was to feed the nation as 
well as to enrich it. But in order to assure the success of  this mission, 
agriculture had to be protected and rewarded. The land is our “com-
mon mother” and agriculture furnishes the “most real” source of  our 
wealth and well-being. The government, Herbert admonished, must 
realize that “the severe police of  grain never caused an ear to grow.”15 
A good subsistence police would consist of  stimulating increased pro-
duction while leaving the rest to a free commerce. The current English 
example in this regard was far more relevant than the Roman. A lib-
eral policy has enabled English agriculture and trade to flourish while 
ours has languished, though “our peasants work more cheaply than the 
English [and] our land is generally better [and] easier to work.” Nor 
have we “… seen England afflicted by any dearth or any marked cherté” 
as a result of  this policy of  letting men pursue their own interests in the 
most favorable conditions.
The Enlightenment was so exhilarating because it told men that 
they could find within themselves the seeds of  progress and happiness. 
In order to release these progressive energies, men had to be freed of  
artificial internal and external constraints. Self-interest was the psy-
chological foundation of  all human activity and the proper agency for 
this emancipation. “It is the destiny of  humanity,” Herbert intoned, “to 
be highly motivated only by personal interest.” The police shared this 
view, but drew from it stark conclusions which prompted them to see 
interest as a potentially antisocial force in need of  constant discipline. 
On the contrary, Herbert argued, the sum of  all interests was inevita-
bly congenial, and their interplay socially concordant and profitable: 
 14 Ibid., 2–3, 33, 74. Cf. ibid., 25–29.
 15 Ibid., 1, 32, 44, 51, 103.
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“needs and interests govern the Universe; unite these wellsprings; and 
men by a natural instinct will direct themselves in concert towards the 
objectives of  their needs and their country.”16
Needs and interests, in Herbert’s reckoning, invariably find their 
own equilibrium. When government undertakes to satisfy the one 
and curtail the other, it undermines the balance and hurls the system 
into disarray. Nor could government, inspired by the best intentions, 
fulfill the needs as rapidly, economically, and neatly as private indi-
viduals. The dynamics of  greed excluded elements of  risk, waste, and 
inefficiency. In pursuit of  their interests men performed prodigies of  
public service. For the police to insist upon an ideal of  disinterest, at 
least in matters of  commerce, was to deprive men of  their most pow-
erful incentive to do good and to deny society the benefits of  social 
organization. “The Ordinances,” concluded Herbert, “conduct little 
grain to the market; it is interest which brings them there.”17 Left 
unimpeded, the multiplicity of  interests, through competition, will 
generate their own rules and snuff  out abuses. Appetite for profit will 
propel grain wherever there is need and rivalry for clients will assure 
the public of  a reasonable price and suitable quality.
The first step in the process of  police reform must be demystifica-
tion. The fetishistic attitude toward grain, along with all the “phan-
toms” accused of  subtilizing it, had to be exorcised. Grain must be 
frankly treated as an “object of  commerce” and its dealers as simple 
merchants. Herbert deplored the factitious distinctions that the law 
had made between good trade and bad, usurious and honest, covert 
and open. There was only one sort of  trade, that by which businessmen 
tried to make as large a profit or sustain as little loss as possible. Lurid 
scenarios of  merchant turpitude written into police codes served only 
to dissuade the ablest men from entering the commerce and to dis-
credit the entire profession in the eyes of  the public.18 Rehabilitated, 
the grain trade had to be opened to everyone without distinction and 
without any formal obligations to register and report to authorities. No 
restrictions of  any kind would hamper interior circulation. In the name 
of  “family” cohesion and “public utility,” France would cease to be 
shamefully “at war with herself.” Open communication from province 
 16 Ibid., 7, 57.
 17 Ibid., 95. Cf. ibid., 21.
 18 Ibid., 14–15, 50, passim. Cf. Grimm’s concurrence, despite his general lack of  sympathy with 
grain liberalism. Correspondance littéraire, ed. by Tourneux, III, 100–104 (Oct. 1755).
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to province would attenuate cherté in sterile areas, temper the dis-
couragement of  glut in surplus regions, and generally equalize prices 
throughout the realm. On exportation, this precious boon to agricul-
ture, Herbert took a cautious and somewhat evasive stand. Experi-
ence will instruct and embolden us, he suggested; for the moment, he 
foresaw a general permission to export only in “the time of  a super-
fluous abundance.”19
In Herbert’s estimation, nothing impeded reform so much as the 
tacit pact of  collaboration which bound together the police and the 
people. Over the course of  the years, they developed a lamentable 
symbiosis which reinforced their attitudes towards the subsistence 
question to the detriment of  reason, prosperity, and good habits of  
government. From the earliest times, ignorance and dread underlay 
suspicion of  the grain trade and malaise over provisioning. Instead of  
combating these primitive instincts, the police indulged them; instead 
of  exposing popular prejudices, they wrote them into law. The police 
cultivated a constituency of  fear and rationalized brutal interventions 
in the grain trade by the need to contain a frightened population. 
The police codes conditioned the public to expect authorities to pro-
vide for its well-being at any cost. “But it is dangerous for the people 
and for the State,” warned Herbert, “to maintain bread at too low a 
price.” Overly cheap bread maimed the state by reducing its revenue 
and drying up the sources which produced it and it corrupted the 
people and threatened the social order by encouraging “idleness, the 
mother of  vice,” and engendering “the race of  beggars.” Consumers 
had to learn that the entire economy depended upon the pilot grain 
sector, that their interests were the same as those of  the producers, 
and that this solidarity precluded discriminatory treatment geared to 
assure them a “too easy subsistence.” “Opinion is the queen of  the 
world,” noted Herbert, reciting one of  the Enlightenment’s favorite 
aphorisms. The old police, “timid and fickle” like the people, had to 
bear the responsibility for shaping the popular mentality on the grain 
issue. The “new police” had to begin by re-educating the nation in 
the school of  “absolute liberty.”20
None of  the liberals ever devised a convincing strategy for waging 
the battle for mass opinion. Herbert himself  aimed at winning adher-
ents among the highly literate and informed who could influence the 
course of  public affairs. On the whole, his Essay received a warm 
 19 Ibid., 15, 31–32, 61.
 20 Ibid., 4–5, 7, 10, 29, 91, 95–96, 108.
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reception. Two of  the foremost mauvaises langues of  the century, 
d’Argenson and Grimm, heaped praise upon the author. The mar-
quis judged the liberal spirit of  the work “in my taste” because it con-
firmed his contention that “to govern better, one must govern less.” 
Grimm, the editor of  the Correspondance Littéraire, who later became 
one of  the most stinging adversaries of  économiste dogma and bom-
bast, lauded the Essay for the clarity and vigor of  its language and its 
great good sense. Herbert revealed “the contradiction of  our laws, 
their perpetual conflict, and the evils which result from them” and he 
rescued grain dealers from the gratuitous opprobrium which dishon-
ored them. Writing many years later, Grimm viewed the Essay as the 
first salvo in the “combat” which, “à force de brochures,” led to the 
liberal legislation of  1763–64. The propagandists who followed Her-
bert merely repeated his ideas, “but this very repetition was necessary 
in order finally to achieve so salutary a project.” In a joyful but dubi-
ous analogy, an anonymous correspondent of  the Journal Economique 
proposed to crown Herbert “the second Joseph of  our fertile Egypt.”21
The most auspicious applause came from an unlikely source, the 
Journal de Trévoux, a periodical not notorious for its hospitality to icon-
oclastic propaganda. The editors confessed that they did not under-
take to publicize Herbert on their own humble initiative:
We give notice to our readers that a number of  very distinguished persons who have 
influence in the Government wanted the two works., extracts of  which have just been 
presented [the Essay on the General Police and dupin’s Mémoire of  1742] to make some 
impression on the public. It is that which inspired us to enter this important discussion.
Even with a quasi-official imprimatur, the editors felt uneasy with Her-
bert’s assault on traditional government. A fastidious reading of  the 
text revealed to them a fortunate distinction which reassured them on 
Herbert’s purpose. On first sight Herbert “appears to oppose the laws 
received among us regarding the general Police of  grain,” but “at bot-
tom” he quarreled with “the disadvantages of  the letter” rather than 
with their guiding “spirit.” Herbert was an amiable critic of  good will, 
not a hostile subversive. He impugned neither the “intentions” of  the 
law nor “the sentiments of  our Princes for their Subjects.” He demon-
strated “only that we have not entered the route consonant with the 
public needs and with the desire that we had to satisfy them.”
 21 d’Argenson, Mémoires, ed. by Rathery, IV, 168 (Feb. 1754); Grimm, Correspondance littéraire, 
ed. by Tourneux, III, 100–104 (Oct. 1755); ibid., VI, 30 (July 1764); Letter to the Editor, 
Journal économique (May 1754), 80–82.
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Once they discovered an appetite for change, traditionalists showed 
remarkable ingenuity in making the reform menu palatable. The edi-
tors of  the Journal de Trévoux distorted the recipe but they devoured 
the pièce de résistance. “To disturb the grain trade,” they averred, “is to 
place in the State a source of  dearth and monopoly.”22
In 1754, five months after the Journal de Trévoux launched this 
trial balloon at its urging, the government issued an arrêt du con-
seil proclaiming the liberty of  internal circulation and authorizing 
exportation by two southern ports.23 Given the sequence of  events, 
it would be tempting to view this legislation as a resounding victory 
for liberalization at the highest levels, the fruit of  the collaboration 
of  a ministry predisposed to reform, a handful of  propagandists 
led by Herbert, and an influential liberal clique, animated perhaps 
by the intendant of  commerce Vincent de Gournay, which had the 
government’s ear.24 To sustain such a view, however, one would have 
to make an artful distinction, as the editors of  the Journal de Trévoux 
did, between the elusive spirit and the actual letter of  the law. For the 
letter was flatly pedestrian and conventional, resembling a number 
of  earlier laws of  occasion meant to promote communications in 
the interior and to relieve specific areas of  burdensome surpluses. 
The arrêt suppressed the obligation to obtain passports or permits 
for interprovincial trade, a requirement very frequently ignored in 
good times. It did not touch the crazy quilt of  police regulations 
and controls which governed the trade at the grass roots. Prefaced 
by no declaration of  principles and published without fanfare, the 
arrêt enjoyed little resonance and gradually died of  inanition. Local 
police, if  they knew of  its existence, remained blithely indifferent 
and the intendants executed it without conviction.25 The form of  
legislation chosen to convey the act deprived it of  the prestige and 
 22 Journal de Trêvoux (April 1754), 802–804, 810.
 23 See copies of  the arrêt in C. 80, piece 22, A.d. C d’O and C. 89, A.d. Orne. Cf. CG to IN. 
of  Champagne, 29 Sept. 1754, C. 418, A.d. Marne.
 24 Marion argues unconvincingly that the liberal spirit pervaded the ministry under 
Machault. Machault, 433–35. Skeptical of  Marion’s claims, Schelle believed that Gournay, 
backed by the new Controller-General Moreau de Séchelles, was the moving force of  
liberalization in many different domains. Gournay, 74–76. dupont later included Herbert 
on the select list of  Gournay’s disciples. Léonce de Lavergne, Les Economistes français du dix-
huitième siècle (Paris, 1870), 174 and Schelle, Gournay, 238.
 25 On the indifference of  authorities, even at the highest provincial level, to the enforcement 
of  the arrêt, see the complaints of  the Controllers-General Peirenc de Moras and 
Bertin. Moras to IN. of  Rouen, 31 Jan. 1757, C. 104, A.d. S-M.; Moras to IN. of  
Provence, 23 June, 25 July 1757, C. 2420, A.d. B-du-R.; Bertin, “Mémoire à consulter 
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authority it needed to be successful and suggested that the govern-
ment did not consider it to be a crucial affair. The arrêt du conseil 
was not an “immutable law;” not enveloped in letters patent and 
thus “unknown to the parlements,” it was incommensurate with 
the task of  transforming the police of  grain.26
Intrinsically banal, the arrêt of  1754 acquired significance only 
isofar as it followed closely behind the liberal propaganda offensive. 
If  it is to be construed as a response to such pressure, rather than 
as an act of  circumstance prompted by a series of  unusually good 
harvests, it must still be seen less as a sign of  the political strength 
of  the expanding liberal camp than as a measure of  its continuing 
weakness. If  the government sought a way to gratify liberal opin-
ion and benefit owners of  surplus grain without engaging any seri-
ous political or social risk, then the arrêt was shrewdly conceived. 
To be sure, the arrêt heartened liberal commentators not so much 
for its substance, which inspired virtually no discussion, as for its 
symbolical quality. They saw it as a personal “triumph” for Her-
bert, specifically crediting his Essay with having “occasioned” it.27 
This attitude bespeaks an idealized conception of  reform which 
was widely held in the Age of  Enlightenment and to which many 
historians, searching for the connection between philosophy and 
politics, have since subscribed. The basic idea was that the govern-
ment, albeit susceptible to change, lacked the imagination and the 
will to generate it. The plan and the impetus had to come from 
 sur le libre commerce des grains,” 1761, C. 2420, A.d. B-du-R. On the other hand, the 
intendant of  Burgundy, Joly de Fleury, tried vainly to enforce the law in the late 1750’s, 
but the dijon Parlement adamantly refused to cooperate. Indeed, on the grounds of  a 
threatened scarcity in 1759, the magistrates brazenly flouted the royal legislation by imposing 
an embargo on the shipment of  grain outside the Burgundian ressort. Though this measure 
incensed the Controller-General Silhouette, he esteemed that it would be inopportune for the 
king’s council to annul the parlementary arrêt “in the current circumstances.” His decision 
must have demoralized the intendant even as it encouraged the Parlement to pursue its 
autonomous course. IN. to CG, 10 Oct. 1759 and CG to IN. 13, 19 Oct. 1759, AN, H 187.
 26 Forbonnais [?], “Mémoire sur la police des grains,” (April 1758), BN, mss. fr. 11347; 
Bertin to Turgot, Sept. 1774, cited by Weulersse, Mouvement, II, 210-lln; Bertier de 
Sauvigny, “Observations sur le commerce des grains” (1765), BN, mss. fr. 11347, fol. 224; 
Montaudouin de la Touche, Supplément à l’essai sur la police générale des grains …, ed. by depitre, 
(Paris, 1910), 149; Journal encyclopédique, VIII (1 July 1759), 49.
 27 Journal de commerce (Brussels, Sept. 1759), 84; Savary des Bruslons, Dictionnaire portatif  de 
commerce (Copenhagen, 1761), III, 137; Journal de Trévoux (Oct. 1755), 2598–99; Journal 
encyclopédique, VIII (1 July 1759), 48–49. Cf. Journal économique (Aug. 1755), 113. In the 
aftermath of  a family financial disaster, Herbert committed suicide in 1758. Grimm, 
Correspondance littéraire, ed. by Tourneux, III, 482 (March 1758).
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outside. First the case had to be put before the public. If  it passed 
the test, and in addition proved technically feasible, the government 
could reasonably be expected to receive it with favor. In this view the 
courtier-intellectual played the higher role of  citizen-intellectual. In 
less progressive times, ministers had made decisions and afterward 
commissioned books and pamphlets to popularize and justify them. 
Now patriots wrote books, mobilized enlightened opinion, and pre-
sented the government with a program and a pretext to act.
In Herbert’s sober estimation, liberty had not yet won the day. For 
the idea that liberty was “dangerous” still commanded support in 
the kingdom.28 Muffled by the peal of  acclaim for the Essay, several 
strains of  criticism played on the perils of  liberalization. The reviewer 
in the Journal des Sçavans admired Herbert’s earnestness but warned 
against his method of  analysis and the side-effects of  the remedy he 
proposed. Without specifically articulating his fears, he sensed some-
thing sinister in Herbert’s approach, the seed of  a powerful disinte-
grating force reaching far beyond our “alimentary code.” Laws and 
rules which seem defective when torn from their context may prove 
to be “very wise” when viewed as part of  a larger scheme:
Everything holds together in a well-regulated Government and to reason about it cor-
rectly one must see the ensemble of  its different parts and the bond which they have 
with one another.29
This appeal to the whole and the cohesion of  a complex and intri-
cate design became the refuge of  beleaguered conservatism in the Age 
of  Enlightenment. But it should be remembered that the argument 
enjoyed a certain philosophical respectability—Montesquieu used a 
nuanced version of  it—and it served a school of  system-building phi-
losophes who became the chief  proponents of  the liberal spirit in the 
sixties and seventies. Vague and portentous, this objection is interesting 
precisely because it raises the specter, not of  famine and suffering and 
the immediate risks which seemed to make liberalization dangerous, but 
of  the long-run political implications that lurked beneath the surface, 
an aspect of  the problem which did not receive sustained consideration 
until the following decade. Just as Herbert questioned the relevance 
of  dated historical and cultural models, so the reviewer in the Jour-
nal des Sçavans challenged the applicability of  the contemporary foreign 
examples upon which the author of  the Essay drew. different nations 
 28 “Avertissements” to the 1755 edition in Essai, ed. by depitre, v.
 29 Journal des sçavans (April 1754), 366–77.
 THE ORIGINS OF LIBERTY 109
not only had different resources and interests; they possessed different 
constitutions. Was liberty compatible with the French system of  gov-
ernment? The Journal de Trévoux reconciled Herbert’s reform plans with 
the traditional aims of  government. It approved his onslaught against 
unfounded “prejudices”: “it is to destroy them that this excellent work 
was written.” But, it cautioned, “why destroy everything?” Herbert’s 
tendency to categorize all “privileges” and “exemptions” as “abuses” 
alarmed the editors and prodded them to wonder whether he did not 
extend the cutting edge of  his logic too far.30
The Journal Economique, purging its conscience before its total con-
version to the liberal cause, published several pieces sharply critical 
of  Herbert’s reform program. Herbert strenuously denied that the 
grain trade was inherently flawed and given to deceptions which 
mangled the public interest. He treated monopolies as byproducts of  
police controls which liberty would dissipate or as imaginary bogeys 
contrived by authorities to conceal their ineptitude and embraced by 
a susceptible populace in search of  scapegoats. “To that we reply,” 
wrote a commentator in the Journal, “that monopolies of  grain are 
neither a chimera nor a prejudice.” Perpetrated by cunning men who 
operated clandestinely, they “produce the greatest evils.” It was the 
urgent business of  authorities to pursue them relentlessly and expose 
their maneuvers.31
Another critic writing for the Journal took particular exception to the 
notion that “everyone indistinctly should have a hand in the commerce 
of  grain.” Such a policy would invite social disorder, confusion of  roles, 
and conflicts of  interest. The hierarchy of  orders which assured social 
stability also had functional value. It guaranteed that jobs would be well 
done. An open grain trade would encourage men to abandon their 
professions in search of  windfall lucre without regard for public needs 
and for proper care of  their merchandise. Nobles would be tempted to 
derogate and judges to associate themselves with merchants for whose 
conduct they were responsible. Under such conditions, “monopoly” 
and “usury” would flourish.32
Anxious to avoid an unseemly polemic, Herbert did not respond 
directly to these objections. But the debate that was brewing served 
his purposes. Flushing defenders of  the traditional system from their 
redoubt of  impassive silence, it would compel them to justify their 
 30 Ibid.; Journal de Trévoux (Oct. 1755), 2604, 2622.
 31 Journal économique (Feb. 1754), 116–119.
 32 Ibid., (Aug. 1755), 113–118.
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position publicly. In the preface to a new, enlarged edition of  the Essay, 
Herbert called for a strenuous campaign of  propaganda to expose 
their errors at every turn and to disseminate “economic knowledge” 
among the profane.33
Criticism from the enlightened left surprised and nettled Herbert 
more than disapprobation from the benighted right. In 1756 Mon-
taudouin de la Touche, a specialist in commercial affairs and member 
of  a prominent shipping family, published an article rebuking Her-
bert for his “excessive prudence” and “timidity,” the very qualities 
for which the latter reproached the traditionalists. Montaudouin rep-
resented the mood of  unconditional and impatient liberalism remi-
niscent of  Boisguilbert, which would find its fullest expression in the 
next decade. He assailed Herbert for his lack of  faith, for betraying 
his own principles, and for abandoning the “entire liberty” which he 
pretended to espouse.
The crucial issue was exportation. Herbert recoiled at the thought 
of  granting unlimited and irrevocable authorization. In order to pro-
tect France from pillage and uncertainty, he advocated either duties on 
shipments abroad or a sliding price ceiling which would automatically 
cut off  exportation at certain junctures. Beneath Herbert’s fleshy lib-
eralism, Montaudouin detected the sallow bones of  neo-mercantilism 
and “a residue of  respect for old prejudices.” Herbert did not under-
stand that the nations of  the world were “like a great family formed by 
commerce.” The power of  self-interest transcended national bound-
aries; the solidarity of  individuals merged imperceptibly with the 
harmony of  nations. Ideally situated in the middle of  Europe, and 
endowed with extraordinary natural abundance, a free-trading France 
would become the breadbasket and entrepôt of  the continent. A nig-
gardly, partial liberty would leave the kingdom vulnerable to dearth. 
Only a total liberty promised a total cure.34
 33 Preface to the 1759 edition of  the Essai, ed. by depitre, vii.
 34 Supplément à l’essai sur la police générale des grains, ed. by depitre, 149–54 and Réplique à la lettre 
précédente, ibid., 159–64. The latter appeared in the Journal de commerce (Brussels, Oct. 1761), 
68–82.
 In the sixties, when the most vocal exponents of  economic liberalism consolidated their 
efforts under Quesnay’s aegis, Montaudouin again found himself  constrained to demur. 
His position underscores the ambiguities in the physiocratic argument. He deeply 
resented Quesnay’s contention that commerce was a sterile occupation, that merchants 
were vagabond aliens, and that agriculture was the sole source of  national wealth. See his 
“Observations sur le commerce,” with Quesnay’s peremptory notations in François Quesnay 
et la physiocratie (Paris: Institut National des Études démographiques, 1958), II, 879–883.
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In a pointed rebuttal, Herbert deplored Montaudouin’s doctri-
naire approach, political naiveté, and carping attitude. In order to 
effect political change, Herbert believed it was necessary to win pub-
lic confidence. At all costs, he wanted to avoid “alarming” citizens 
and ministers with his proposals:
It is not by a peremptory tone that one persuades; one must have discretion and care 
and conform to the standard manner of  thinking in order to scandalize no one, and 
obtain first the easiest to arrive [later] at the most difficult.
Nor was it merely a tactical regard for sensibilities that motivated 
Herbert’s program. Unbounded exportation genuinely worried him. 
It would imperil the nation’s subsistence. In his lust for liberty, Mon-
taudouin “confused … times of  penury with those of  plenty.” The 
national interest demanded a flexible export policy responsive to 
changing conditions. Learned in commerce, Montaudouin ignored 
the rudiments of  government. Insouciantly, “he admits of  no prepa-
ration, forms no doubt, [foresees] no difficulty with total liberty.”35 
Herbert’s cautious attitude in general, and his stand on exports in 
particular, sharply distinguished his brand of  liberalism from that of  
his successors in the grain liberation movement.
II
Herbert deserves credit for sparking the liberal effervescence of  the 
fifties but he was not alone in a wilderness. Concurrently, or shortly 
afterwards, a host of  writers began to give shape to the publicity cam-
paign which the author of  the Essay so ardently desired. In these for-
mative days, the criteria for militancy were still generously defined. 
Although Montaudouin’s purist stance presaged a deep fissure which 
would soon develop in the liberal camp, for the moment it was possi-
ble to rally men of  diverse ideas around a commitment to overthrow 
the old regime of  grain. Forbonnais, later excommunicated by the 
ultras, roundly denounced traditional police principles as “against the 
order of  nature.” He decried the policy of  treating grain exclusively 
from the vantage point of  consumers to the neglect of  producers and 
traders. He called for a “just equilibrium” of  their interests, which 
meant a sweeping liberalization of  trade in the interior aligned with a 
 35 “Lettre à M. de Boissy au sujet des observations sur le livre de l’essai sur la police générale 
des grains,” in depitre edition of  Essai, 155–58 and Journal de commerce (Oct. 1761), 58–68.
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general permission to export subject to suspension when prices 
jeopardized the balance.36 The agronomist duhamel du Monceau 
eschewed general theories but unequivocally condemned “popular 
prejudices” against the freedom to stock and exchange grain which 
victimized in the first instance the cultivator:
The public … never finds the price of  grain low enough: it seeks to make us consider 
without distinction any reserve as criminal; it pushes the injustice to the point of  refus-
ing the fermier the honest profit which is due him.
This mentality, he believed, led ineluctably to the “decadence” of  
agriculture.37
The Journal de Commerce, edited by a future physiocrat, focused on 
the plight of  the négociant whose calling was stifled by the police. Unlike 
the cultivator who works mechanically and instinctively, the cosmo-
politan merchant “meditates, he weighs, he measures, he calculates, 
he combines ideas, he discusses principles … he foresees Abundance, 
dearth, War & Peace.” Freedom of  the grain trade would liberate 
his syncretic “genius,” which contained elements of  Locke, New-
ton, Richelieu, Cromwell, and Colbert. Convinced of  the pragmatic 
nobility of  commerce, the abbé Coyer inveighed against a policy of  
suspicion of  trade and disdain for agriculture: “one would say that 
we are hearing in our turn the awful voices of  the Evil Spirits who 
devoured grain under the reign of  Charlemagne.” “Is it grain that 
you want?” he asked. Then “render it more useful to the laboureur 
by the liberty of  exporting so that he is assured of  its sale, so that he 
never fears abundance.” A lieutenant des chasses at Versailles, Leroi, one 
of  the many bridges between Encyclopedism and physiocracy, found 
it “astonishing” that France “followed false measures for such a long 
time” and urged a policy of  internal and external liberty.38
 36 François Véron de Forbonnais, Éléments du commerce (Paris, 1754), cited by depitre in his 
edition of  Herbert, Essai, xxv–xxx. See also Forbonnais’ Recherches et considérations sur les 
finances de la France depuis 1595 jusqu’à l’année 1721 (Basel, 1758), II, 160–61 in which he 
condemns the police excesses, such as the ban on stockage, which stifle the grain trade, 
but in which he also criticizes the idea of  a “total liberty.” On Forbonnais’ contemporary 
reputation, see M.-F. Pidansat de Mairobert, Journal historique de la révolution opérée dans la 
constitution de la monarchie françoise (London, 1776), II, 191 (21 Oct. 1771).
 37 duhamel du Monceau, Traité de la conservation des grains (Paris, 1753), xxi–xxiii. On duhamel’s 
work, see Gazette de l‘agriculture, du commerce, des arts et des finances (7 Aug. 1770), 582–583.
 38 Journal de commerce (Sept. 1759), 37–38, 54, 56; G. Coyer, Développement et défense du système de 
la noblesse commerçante (Paris and Amsterdam, 1757), 94–95; Article “Froment,” in diderot, et 
al., Encyclopédie (Paris, 1757), VII, 336.
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In the same decade Plumart de dangeul, the Chevalier de Viv-
ens, Pinczon du Sel des Monts, O’Heguerty, Goudar, Piarron de 
Chamousset, Mirabeau, and Abeille were among the critics who 
struck one or another of  the liberal chords.39 Nor was freedom of  
the grain trade the only liberalizing current of  the fifties. In a kin-
dred spirit, administrators like Gournay and Trudaine, seconded 
by a band of  energetic pamphleteers, assailed the guild structure, 
controls placed on manufacture, prohibitions against enclosure, 
internal customs barriers, and a congeries of  other restraints 
placed on domestic and foreign commerce.40
The man with whom the destiny of  the liberal theory would be 
most closely associated posed his candidacy for ideological leadership 
of  the movement in the last years of  the fifties. François Quesnay, a 
peasant’s son who rose to membership in the Academy of  Sciences 
and to the place of  confidant and physician to Madame de Pom-
padour, followed the path of  a number of  eminent European phi-
losophes who shifted quite naturally and fruitfully from medicine to 
other forms of  scientific investigation and therapy.41 In volumes VI 
and VII of  the Encyclopédie, Quesnay published two articles on politi-
cal economy. “Fermiers” dealt with the practice and the significance 
of  agriculture and “Grains” developed the same themes and included 
the first enumeration of  the “Maxims of  Economic Government,” 
which became the catechism of  his followers.
Quesnay saw himself  not as “a dreamer of  philosophy” but as 
an analyst with practical cures. Not satisfied merely to enlighten 
the public, he wanted to influence the king and his council. 
 39 Plumart de dangeul, Remarques sur les avantages et les désavantages de la France et de la Grande-
Bretagne par rapport au commerce et aux autres sources de la puissance des états (Leyden, 1754); François 
de Vivens, Observations sur divers moyens de soutenir et d’encourager l’agriculture principalement dans 
la Guyenne (1756–1761); Pinczon du Sel des Monts, Considèrations sur le commerce de Bretagne 
(Rennes, 1756); Pierre-André O’Heguerty, Essai sur les intérêts du commerce (The Hague, 1754); 
Ange Goudar, Les intérêts de la France mat entendus, dans les branches de l‘agriculture, de la population, 
des finances, du commerce, de la marine et de l’industrie (Amsterdam, 1756); Journal économique (Jan. 
1760), 6; Journal de commerce (Feb. 1759); Journal encyclopédique, VIII (1 July 1759), 47–58; 
Abeille, Corps d’observations de la Société d’Agriculture, de Commerce, et des Arts établie par les États de 
Bretagne (Rennes, 1760 for 1757 and 1758).
 40 For an important recent work dealing with one such “economic” movement, the campaign 
against the exclusif, see Jean Tarrade, Le Commerce colonial de la France à la fin de l’ancien régime 
(Paris, 1972), I, 223ff.
 41 For Quesnay’s life, see J. Hecht, “La Vie de François Quesnay,” François Quesnay et la 
physiocratie, 211–94. For the medical nexus and metaphor in the Enlightenment, see Peter 
Gay, The Enlightenment: An Interpretation (New York, 1969), II, 12–23.
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He conceived the famous Tableau Economique as a clear and schematic 
expression of  the principles of  his new science, written in the tough-
minded language of  “interest” and geared to attract official attention. 
In an incredible mise-en-scène representing the king accosting Philoso-
phy, Quesnay arranged to have Louis XV himself  run the first edition 
of  the Tableau on the private royal printing press. Whether the exer-
cise imprinted the zig-zag and its complicated linkages on the king’s 
mind or merely amused him is a matter of  conjecture. The experi-
ence, however, amply demonstrated the extraordinary opportunity 
for reaching the summit of  authority which Pompadour’s patronage 
assured Quesnay. And the Tableau, despite its opacity, won an audi-
ence beyond the corridors of  Versailles.
With the doctrinal foundation laid, Quesnay began to recruit pros-
elytes. At about this time he established amicable relations with Gour-
nay and Turgot, sympathizers rather than disciples, and he converted 
the parlementaire Lermercier de la Rivière, whom Quesnay thought 
was admirably suited to become minister of  finance. The pretentious 
“Ami des Hommes,” Mirabeau, Quesnay’s most important early 
pupil, came to him “no more économiste than his cat.”42 They collabo-
rated on a number of  works, including the Théorie de l’Impôt (1760) 
which Mirabeau hoped would make him prime minister, but which 
instead cost him a brief  sojourn in jail for affronting the farmers-gen-
eral and criticizing the management of  royal finances. By the mid-
sixties, Quesnay and the économistes acquired a journal, established a 
public lecture course in “economic arithmetic,” gained a score of  new 
adherents, the most enterprising of  whom were dupont, Letrosne, 
and the abbé Baudeau, and achieved international notoriety and 
quasi-institutional status. To their friends, they were a “school,” a 
forum of  educators devoted to the dissemination of  the principles of  
good government; to their adversaries, they formed a “sect,” a clique 
of  shallow zealots who preached a gospel of  nonsense and disorder.
Between the late fifties and the mid-sixties, Quesnay and the écon-
omistes transformed the liberal critique into an ideology, or, as they 
preferred to have it, into a science. Pioneer liberal propaganda had 
been a mélange of  audacity and diffidence, pugnacity and accom-
modation, captious denigration and constructive suggestion. Even 
at its best, it was fragmented, disjointed, and incomplete. Rarely did 
it venture beyond the single issue of  grain; it failed to develop the 
 42 Hecht, “Quesnay,” François Quesnay et la physiocratie, 256.
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germ of  the potent liberal theory into a coherent, global conception 
of  political economy. Quesnay dramatically enlarged the perspec-
tive by redefining the methodological premises and philosophical 
bases of  the argument and connecting it to a sweeping program of  
economic, social, and political reform. Physiocracy, as dupont bap-
tized it, was a system, ontologically, as it emerged from the nature of  
things, and politically, in terms of  the kinds of  solutions it imposed. 
It was a science to the extent that it elaborated a universally valid 
method, combining rational analysis, empirical diagnostics, and 
model-making in the pursuit of  immutable laws which explain 
social and economic relations and make policial decision-making 
intelligible.
For a proper discussion of  the physiocratic doctrine, the reader 
must be referred to the prolific specialized literature which extends 
from Marx to the erudition of  modernization.43 In brief  let us note 
that the physiocratic conception resulted from a study of  the “natural 
order” which convinced them that the “imprescriptible,” “inviolable,” 
and “holy” right of  property and the concomitant power to dispose 
of  property with “absolute” and “total” liberty were the formative 
principles, anterior to all manner of  social life, from which all rela-
tions and activities developed. Everything in the “moral” order derived 
from the “physical” world which was nature’s peculiar domain. Their 
integral, dynamic analysis of  economic mechanisms demonstrated 
 43 The best recent work on physiocracy is warmly sympathetic to their enterprise: 
R. L. Meek, The Economics of  Physiocracy (Cambridge, Mass., 1963). Georges Weulersse’s 
classic Le Mouvement physiocratique en France (1756–70) (Paris, 1910), 2 vols., is brilliant, 
exhaustive and still invaluable after more than sixty years’ wear. See also Léonce de Lavergne, 
Les Economistes français au dix-huitième siècle (Paris, 1870); G. Schelle, Dupont de Nemours et l’école 
physiocratique (Paris, 1888); Michel Bernard, Introduction à une sociologie des doctrines économiques 
des physiocrates à Stuart Mill (Paris, 1963); Henri Curmond, Le Commerce des grains et l’école 
physiocratique (Paris, 1900); Joseph A. Schumpeter, History of  Economic Analysis (New York, 
1954); and the essays and bibliography in François Quesnay et la physiocratie, I. Among the 
économiste sources upon which my considerations are based are: Nicolas Baudeau, Avis au peuple 
sur son premier besoin (Amsterdam and Paris, 1768), premier traité, 72–73; P.-J.-A. Roubaud, 
Représentations aux magistrats, 379, 395, 398; Mirabeau, cited by Weulersse, Mouvement, II, 37; 
dupont, cited in ibid., I, 214; “Observations sur les effets de la liberté … par l’Auteur des 
Ephémérides,” Journal économique (Aug. 1770), 348; dupont, Analyse … rapport, 12; Quesnay, 
article “Fermier,” diderot, et al., Encyclopédie, VI, 534–35 and article “Grains,” ibid., VII, 
830–31; Ephémérides du citoyen, II (1767), 22, 33, and IX (1768), 83–84; Nouvelles éphémérides, 
I (1775), 30–31; J.A.N. de C. Condorcet, Lettre d’un laboureur de Picardie à M. N***, auteur 
prohibitif  (Paris, 1775), in E. daire and G. de Molinari, eds., Collection des principaux économistes 
(1847; reprint: Osnabruck, 1966), XIV, 485; Quesnay, Physiocratie, ed. by dupont (Paris, 
1767); G. Weulersse, La Physiocratie à la fin du règne de Louis XV, 80.
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that the land was the unique source of  national wealth. The discovery 
of  nature’s laws showed men the range of  their options—what they 
could do through positive law—and the scope of  their errors—what 
they must undo in order to make the best use of  their lives, individually 
and collectively. As a consequence of  their study, the économistes pro-
posed ideas for changes in economic policy, financial administration, 
modes of  political participation, education, and the structure of  society.
Virtually all of  the major threads of  their thinking converged on 
the question of  the grain trade. They argued that grain was a com-
modity like any other, that the traditional, invidious police amounted 
to theft, and that real abundance and low prices were mutually exclu-
sive and contradictory ambitions. Liberalization represented the pre-
condition and the take-off  stage for their program to renew agricul-
ture and revitalize the management of  public affairs.
Thanks to Quesnay’s enduring charisma and the energy of  the 
économistes, a relentless surge of  propaganda appeared, rehearsing over 
and over again their favorite themes. Overbidding their predecessors 
and preempting the center stage, they expropriated the liberal argu-
ment and recast it in their own image. They became so intimately 
identified with the liberal critique that it seemed to be something of  
their own creation. Turgot, who shared many of  their ideas without 
adopting their posture, noted with alarm and annoyance the tendency 
to confound the issue and the party of  its most visible partisans:
I am well aware that those who for some time have written or spoken against the 
liberty of  the grain trade affect to regard this opinion as exclusively that of  several 
writers who have given themselves the name of  économiste and who may have preju-
diced a part of  the public against themselves by the air of  sect which they have quite 
blunderingly assumed and by a tone of  enthusiasm.44
But Turgot gave their enemies too much credit. The économistes them-
selves fostered the confusion and relished the role of  intellectual van-
guard. Sure of  their science and doctrinaire by temperament as well 
as by conviction, they found moderation no virtue and left little mar-
gin for discussion. While they broadened the objectives and responsi-
bilities of  liberty, they narrowed the base of  possible consensus. They 
changed the test for adherence to liberal principles from a simple 
litmus to a difficult rorschach. Their inflated style was easy prey for 
 44 Turgot, “Lettres sur le commerce des grains,” 30 Oct. 1770 (#1), Œuvres, ed. by Schelle, 
III, 270.
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caricature, but it was their ideological rigidity which cost them most 
dearly. It repelled many potential sympathizers who were unwilling to 
take physiocracy en bloc. Purged by the économistes for nonconformity 
and excoriated by their adversaries as fellow-travelers, they lapsed 
ineffectually into the tepid limbo between the two camps. To be sure, 
not everyone who publicly endorsed liberty embraced physiocracy. 
But it became, as Turgot discovered, increasingly difficult to accept 
the one while abjuring the other.
The price of  ideological coherence was also heightened vulnerabil-
ity. As pendant to its added strength, the liberal argument exposed 
many more flanks to attack. In addition to provoking new enmities, 
physiocracy breathed life into the inert, unreconstructable opposi-
tion. Embarrassed and on the defensive during the period of  low-key 
liberalism, the incorrigibles returned to the attack against the écono-
mistes. In response to ultraliberalism, their brand of  relative extremism 
again seemed reasonable. A great debate ensued, buffeting both the 
political and the intellectual establishments, dividing ministers, mag-
istrates, and philosophes. Later we shall have occasion to consider it 
more carefully. In anticipation, it is worth noting that it was not a 
rhetorical and stylized rendition of  the quarrel between the ancients 
and the moderns nor a recondite scholastic dispute over fine points 
of  doctrine. The debate turned specifically on the political, social, 
and economic impact of  liberalization on the French nation and it 
was fiercely argued in practical as well as theoretical terms in this age 
whose triumph it was to bridge the gulf  between these perspectives.
To suggest that physiocratic thought, by itself, would not have 
caused such a seismic stir is not to demean its originality but to under-
score both its precocity and its concrete political ambitions. Physioc-
racy became significant in its own time only after the idea of  liberty 
moved from the rarefied air of  Quesnay’s entresol to the volatile atmo-
sphere of  the marketplaces. The royal legislation of  1763–64 contrib-
uted more to économiste notoriety than all their apothegms, paradigms, 
and preciosities.
There is no way to gauge the achievement of  the Herberts and 
the Quesnays in arousing and educating public opinion on the lib-
erty issue. But the furor of  interest in all matters pertaining to the 
economy, not only the grain trade, which erupted at this time suggests 
that their work was as much a symptom as a cause of  this growing 
sophistication. In 1763 the Journal Economique noted with satisfaction 
that “the genius of  the nation today seems turned almost entirely 
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to the side of  the economy.” Voltaire commented on this vogue in 
the Dictionnaire philosophique, dating its origin “at about 1750.” during 
these years, Linguet wrote, a metamorphosis occurred, transforming 
the “philosophical insect” into the “economist insect.”45
To be sure, it had been developing in larva for a long time. It 
emerged in the fifties and sixties as the Enlightenment reached matu-
rity, accelerating in pace and expanding in scope to encompass all the 
dimensions of  human activity. The Encyclopédie epitomizes this omniv-
orously curious and critical spirit; it treats the economy as a subject 
of  practical, universal, and urgent concern in scores of  articles. The 
ubiquitous example of  the English, in commerce and agriculture as 
well as in government, stimulated inquiry into economics. Indeed, the 
accomplishments of  England in war and peace, thrust into high relief  
in the decade of  the Seven Years’ War, had a traumatic impact on the 
French. Anglomania was suitably cosmopolitan for philosophic taste 
but it masked a sense of  profound disarray and provoked a bout of  
intense introspection. Enthusiasm for England soured rapidly; even 
at its most buoyant, admiration had implied national humiliation and 
infirmity. Nevertheless, tracts on political economy and treatises on 
husbandry, planting and conservation crossed the channel regularly 
in response to growing French demand.
Fiscality was one form of  economic discourse which everyone 
understood. The attempts of  Machault, Silhouette, and Bertin 
to reform finances and restructure the tax system focused pub-
lic attention on the state of  the economy and confirmed the idea, 
promoted by the critics, that fundamental change was necessary. 
The parlementary opponents of  these reforms tried to refute them 
substantively—economically; they rarely contested the need for 
reforms per se and in fact painted a gloomier picture of  the econ-
omy than the ministers. Perhaps, too, there is something to Vol-
taire’s sally that the nation turned to the clinical problems of  pro-
duction, investment, circulation, and exchange because it was “fed 
up with verses, tragedies, comedies, operas, novels, romantic stories 
and even more romantic moral reflections, and theological disputes 
on grace and on the convulsions.…”46 Political economy found a 
congenial mood in which to flourish after mid-century. School of  
 45 Journal économique (Jan. 1763), 11; Article “Blé ou bled,” (1770), Dictionnaire philosophique, 
in Œuvres complètes, ed. by Moland, XVIII, 7; Réponse aux docteurs modernes (1771), cited by 
Weulersse, Mouvement, II, 683.
 46 Article “Blé ou bled,” Dictionnaire philosophique, in Œuvres, ed. by Moland, XVIII, 11.
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citizenship and utility, it channelled the passion of  the French into the 
prosaic and the concrete.
The fifties were the halcyon years of  agronomy and agromania. 
A profusion of  tracts, pamphlets, manuals, and catechisms appeared 
ranging in subject from specialized studies of  black vetch and dru-
idic potions to augment seed productivity to broader frescoes of  rural 
life redolent of  Olivier de Serre’s classical Théâtre d’agriculture. “So 
much has been written on this matter [grain and agriculture],” wrote 
Voltaire, “that if  a laboureur planted as much weight in grain as we 
have of  volumes on this product, he could aspire to the most ample 
harvest.…”47 duhamel du Monceau, chemist-naturalist and consul-
tant to the naval ministry, collected and synthesized a vast amount of  
material which, combined with his experiments in the laboratory and 
in the field, formed the basis for a French science of  agronomy.48 
A throng of  popularizers rewrote the technical treatises in simple, 
didactic language in an effort to reach deeply into the rural world. 
They importuned cultivators to abandon pernicious and dated prac-
tices and tried to instill in them an enhanced sense of  their worth by 
insisting that agriculture was the nerve of  the state and that no other 
profession merited more esteem. The Patriarch of  Ferney himself  
symbolized the fresh prestige which agriculture enjoyed. “Besides, I 
have become laboureur, vintner and shepherd,” he confided in a letter 
of  december 1758; “that is worth a hundred times more than being 
a man of  letters in Paris.”49
Through the complicity of  the government and local notables, 
agricultural societies with central coordinating and branch bureaus 
sprung to life in the provinces.50 Soon afterward the government 
 47 Ibid., 7. Cf. Bourde, Agronomie, I, 369ff. and passim; Simon Linguet, Canaux navigables 
(Amsterdam and Paris, 1769), 152; P.-J.-B. Legrand d’Aussy, Histoire de la vie privée des français 
(1783), ed. by de Roquefort (Paris, 1815), I, 30.
 48 duhamel du Monceau: Éléments d’agriculture (Paris, 1762), 2 vols.; Traité de la culture des terres, 
suivant les principes de M. Tull, anglois (Paris, 1750–61), 6 vols.; École d’agriculture (Paris, 1759).
 49 Voltaire to Joseph Saurin, 27 dec. 1758, Voltaire’s Correspondence, ed. by T. Besterman 
(Geneva, 1953–1965), XXXIX, 269 (#7294).
 50 See Bertin’s call for the organization of  “assemblies of  agriculture” aimed at 
“perfecting agriculture” by drawing upon the “local knowledge” and “practical 
skills” of  farmers, notables, administrators, etc. Circular to INs., 22 Aug. 1760, 
AN, F12 149 and Bertin to IN. of  La Rochelle, 28 March, 11 May 1761, C. 195, A.d. 
C-M. According to a report prepared for Bertin’s “department of  Agriculture,” by 
the mid-sixties there were 18 societies established in 21 generalities with 2000 active 
members. AN, K 906. There is some evidence that these estimations may have been 
conservative. On the societies, see: E. Labiche, Les Sociétés d’agriculture au XVIIIe siècle (Paris, 
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invested a secretary of  state with responsibilities closely resembling 
the tasks of  a minister of  agriculture and promoted, through legisla-
tion and propaganda, the clearing of  new land and the rationaliza-
tion of  production. Seminars called agricultural assemblies met peri-
odically and agricultural fêtes celebrated the rural awakening. A priest 
with a reputation for “profane” language scandalized the Académie 
Française by preaching a sermon on “holy agriculture.”51 Lesser lit-
erary academies did not hesitate to incorporate the topic into their 
agendas for discussion and prize competitions.
dosed heavily with salon sensibility, sometimes excessively senti-
mental and patronizing in attitude, and largely based in urban cen-
ters, agromania aroused the skepticism of  many observers who chal-
lenged its authenticity, or at least doubted its efficacy.52 But it should 
not be forgotten that the shortest route to the countryside, then as 
now, often passed through Paris. Eighteenth-century agronomists did 
not succeed in revolutionizing French agriculture in terms of  organi-
zation, production, or technology. The publicists, however, by chal-
lenging the habit of  neglect and indifference to agriculture, thrust 
it into the forefront of  national preoccupations. They made them-
selves the moral representatives of  the single largest constituency in 
the kingdom and made rural France—or rather the agribusiness elite 
that dominated it—a powerful, self-conscious political force in the 
last decades of  the Old Regime.
The sixties were preeminently the economic years: the decade of  
“economic bread,” “economic milling,” “economic industry,” “eco-
nomic invention.” But the focus of  interest shifted from technology to 
policy, from agronomy to political economy. The élan and the ambi-
tions of  the improvers and reformers seemed to be in fundamental con-
tradiction to traditional patterns of  managing the commonweal. The 
first stage in the process of  reform had been reached. Ignorance was no 
 1908); P. S. Lavergne, La Société d’agriculture de Paris (Paris, 1859); Mauguin, Études historiques 
sur l‘administration de l‘agriculture en France (Paris, 1876–77); Louis Passy, Histoire de la Société 
nationale d’agriculture de France (Paris, 1912), I.
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longer an insuperable barrier to progress. The necessary knowledge, 
practical and theoretical, was available. The major obstacle to imple-
mentation, apart from the inertia of  entrenched habit, was political. 
Partisans of  change looked to the government to create the conditions 
in which innovations could bear fruit. The government had to clear the 
law codes of  dead weights and blockages even as enterprising farmers 
had to clear the land of  hedges and stumps before it could be reclaimed 
and rendered fertile. The doctrine of  the “Tableau économique,” the 
minutes of  the “economical assemblies,” and the vision of  an “eco-
nomical monarchy” were all concerned with politics.53 Reformers from 
all the different economic camps—those devoted to agronomy, to for-
eign commerce, to manufacture, or to the grain trade—agreed that the 
next step was an affair of  state.54
The government was inured to petitions from economic groups 
seeking to promote their interests through official patronage. Typi-
cally, however, these supplicants sought exclusive privileges and other 
concrete advantages geared to their specific enterprises. In the six-
ties the most vocal demands came from broader-based citizen-groups 
seeking not particular permissions and concessions but general 
enabling acts opening new economic frontiers to all comers. Liberty 
was the leitmotif  of  all the petitions: in its broadest and least con-
troversial form, freedom to pursue one’s interests and to profit from 
new skills and methods of  business; in its explicitly political form, as 
it concerned, for example, the Herberts and the Quesnays, freedom 
from the constraints of  a noxious police regime. The agricultural-
ists and the liberals found considerable sympathy in official quar-
ters. The ministry itself  helped to channel the fashionable enthusi-
asm of  the fifties into the nettlesome pressure groups of  the early 
sixties. A liberty lobby, supported by elements within virtually all 
the parlements, the provincial estates, the agricultural societies, the 
chambers of  commerce, the burgeoning economic press (the Journal 
Economique, launched in 1751, set the trend in journalism, to be fol-
lowed by the Journal de Commerce, the Gazette du Commerce, de l’Agriculture, 
et des Finances, the Journal de l’Agriculture, du Commerce, des Arts, et des 
 53 Compare the common roots of  Letrosne’s narration of  the birth of  “economic science” 
and the St. Malo prior-consuls’ call for “a good economic government.” Letrosne, Discours 
sur l’état actuel de la magistrature et sur les causes de sa décadence (Paris, 1764), 72; Supplique des 
prieur-consuls, 1762, C. 3911, A.d. I-et-V.
 54 On the passion for a practical and indeed a political approach to agricultural renewal, see 
the mémoires addressed to Bertin in the early sixties. AN, K 906.
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Finances, and the Ephémérides du Citoyen), and a large body of  land-
owners, merchant-cultivators, and businessmen (négociants in the lead) 
emerged determined to influence royal decisions.
The liberty lobby, perhaps the most remarkable example of  sus-
tained civic insurgency in old-regime politics, merits a separate 
investigation beyond the bounds of  this study. Its activists are famil-
iar to us for what they wrote in their periodicals, brochures, and 
petitions—there is considerable truth in the économiste Letrosne’s 
remark that “it is to the liberty of  the pen that we owe the grant-
ing of  exportation”—and for what they said in their assemblies.55 
But the bulk of  their supporters—the “interests” of  the “produc-
tive nation” which they represented—we know only inferentially 
and indirectly, through notarial records such as leases, marriage 
contracts and after-death inventories, personal account-books and 
commercial registers, the collection logs of fermiers seigneuriaux or gros 
décimateurs, and so on. There is no doubt that the landowners whom 
the physiocrats styled “proprietary class” and the farm operators 
and grain growers who ordinarily disposed of  substantial market-
able surpluses (as well as the merchants, moneychangers, brokers, 
and ship-owners, without direct ties to the land, who specialized in 
grain exchanges) ardently favored the liberal policies which prom-
ised to increase their rents and/or their profits. The “class” of  pro-
prietors cut across all the orders in its recruitment, resided in the 
towns or in the countryside (or both), and drew much of  its wealth 
from its fermages. It is estimated that they comprised no more than 
5 to 8% of  the population but that they owned at least 50% of  the 
land and almost all the rents, métayages, tithes, and seignorial rights.56 
The merchant-cultivators were an extremely diverse group, who 
produced and often stocked grain and depended for their income 
primarily upon the profits they derived from their market dealings 
rather than on fermages. Their number, like that of  the commer-
cial auxiliaries in the towns and ports, has not been satisfactorily 
estimated. More numerous than the “proprietors,” they were still a 
small, albeit powerful, minority of  the nation.
In retrospect, we know that the eighteenth century, especially the 
second half, was the “golden age” of  the proprietor and to a great 
 55 G.-F. Letrosne, “Lettre sur les avantages de la concurrence des vaisseaux étrangers pour la 
voiture de nos grains,” Journal de l’agriculture, du commerce et des finances (July 1765), 47.
 56 E. Labrousse in Labrousse and Braudel, eds., Histoire économique et sociale, II, 473–87.
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extent of  the owner of  grain surpluses as well. Prices—of  rents and 
of  grain, among many other items—began to rise in the thirties and 
continued to mount, despite cyclical reverses, through the whole 
century. Preoccupied with the present and the immediate past, the 
agricultural-commercial elite at mid-century had no clear image of  
a burgeoning favorable trend. On the contrary, they had a gloomy 
memory of  the travails of  their fathers and grandfathers and a bit-
ter personal taste of  painfully low prices during several years in each 
of  the decades of  the century. No platform could have been better 
geared to capture their suffrage than the demands put forth by the 
liberal spokesmen. Prices, incidentally, not only affected the attitude 
of  this mighty socioeconomic elite toward liberalization but toward 
other political questions as well. For example, the sluggishness of  
prices in the early sixties, which reduced their revenues, sharpened 
their opposition to the heavy royal fiscal demands and thus also inten-
sified their support of  the parlements. At the same time, it stimulated 
their appetite for liberty.
The lobby derived its greatest strength from its many institu-
tional bases: the provincial estates, parlements, societies of  agri-
culture, chambers of  commerce, and cultural academies provided 
the corporate and individual cadres for the movement. They gave 
form and direction to the propaganda, harangued the king, and 
besieged the intendants with advice and memoirs.57 They gave the 
lobby a semblance of  organization; the agricultural societies and 
the chambers of  commerce, and perhaps the parlements as well, 
corresponded with one another and coordinated their action.58 
Implanted throughout the realm, the lobby had particular influ-
ence in the west, throughout the south, and in the southeast. Tou-
louse, for example, was the nexus of  one of  the most militant pres-
sure groups: the Estates, the Parlement, the diocesan assemblies, 
and the Chamber of  Commerce joined forces in a common front. 
Similarly, in Brittany, members of  the Estates, the Parlement, and 
 57 In some instances, the intendants themselves seemed to have joined forces with the lobby. 
See IN. of  Brittany to CG, 23 Nov. 1763, C. 1648–49, A.d. I-et-V.; H. Fréville, L’Intendance 
de Bretagne, II, 189–94; IN. of  Rouen to CG, 7 Sept. 1761, C. 103, A.d. S-M.
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the Society of  Agriculture (where Abeille and Montaudouin were 
active) led the liberal campaign, seconded by local notables and admin-
istrators, especially from maritime districts, companies of  international 
traders, bankers and armateurs, and the biggest lay and ecclesiastical 
seigneurs.59 The arguments they used are familiar: a mélange of  Her-
bert and Quesnay contrived both to conceal and to justify an urgent 
appeal in behalf  of  local and regional interests. The prior-consuls of  
St. Malo, like the co-députés of  Vannes and Tréguier and the commer-
cial agents of  Toulouse, deplored the ruin of  agriculture, the burden 
of  idle abundance, the lack of  outlets, the difficulty of  paying taxes 
and meeting other obligations in a climate of  economic stagnation, 
the tyranny and inutility of  police, and the failure to keep pace with 
the English (“our natural and irreconcilable enemies,” according to 
the Malouins, who clung to certain old-fashioned ideas which embar-
rassed more enlightened liberals). They were confident that a full lib-
erty, including freedom to export, would dramatically reverse their 
fortunes.60
The briefs for liberty that reached the king were more elaborate and 
sophisticated. The deputies of  commerce, the lobby’s national agents 
at Versailles, presented a memoir in favor of  exportation meant to 
convince men of  different epistemological persuasions by “the evidence 
of  the principles” as well as by “proofs of  fact.” The highlight of  their 
dissertation was a tendentious historical allegory which purported 
to show that liberty to trade interprovincially and to export abroad 
 59 See Robert Forster, The Nobility of  Toulouse in the Eighteenth Century: A Social and Economic Study 
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was “the primitive and fundamental law of  the French Monarchy” 
with roots deeply embedded in the earliest national past. Prohibitive 
police was a modern, seventeenth-century innovation. despite the 
heroic efforts of  Sully, “the restorer of  France,” to choke it in embryo, 
the police imposter, masquerading in the dress of  tradition and the 
public interest, profited from the disorders of  the times to insinuate 
itself  everywhere with its train of  financial abuses and economic dep-
redations. Although this might reassure conservatives, the important 
point ultimately was not that the police way was a deviation from 
the past but that it was the “principal cause” of  the “decline” and 
“destruction” of  French agriculture and, in addition, the “source of  
monopoly and the cause of  dearths.” The result was disastrous for 
producers and consumers as well as for the governors of  the state 
because agriculture was “the principal source of  wealth” and killing 
dearths were virtually impossible in a regime of  full liberty.61
Not bound by the conventions of  public discourse, a self-styled 
Marseilles businessman-trader bespoke in truculent terms a feeling 
that was doubtless widespread in the grain lobby. It was time for the 
king to make a choice between a “nervous people”—the consum-
ers—which wants to be coddled, and the dynamic elements in society 
which account for the “strength” of  the nation. It is not the job of  
the active and productive groups to be “purveyors” to the masses 
and consequently to suffer infringements on their liberty. The maxim 
“Salus populi suprema lex esto” is “only respectable if  it is salutary to 
the [interest of  the] nation.” “Laisses-nous [sic] faire,” exhorted the 
merchant.62
III
Rumors that the government was moving toward a major reform of  
the grain trade began to circulate widely in the middle of  the Seven 
Years’ War.63 To the partisans of  liberty, the arrêt of  1754 was a source 
of  frustration and dissatisfaction. Officially, the government sustained 
the fiction that, in the words of  one minister, “the freedom of  grain 
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circulation in the interior of  the kingdom is generally established.”64 
But no one at Versailles disputed the existence of  the yawning gap 
between law and fact denounced by traders, publicists, and lobby-
ists. The Controllers-General of  the late fifties repeatedly deplored 
the failure of  officials at all levels to implement and respect the arrêt. 
“I ask you, Monsieur,” wrote Moras to the intendant of  Provence in 
one of  many such instructions dispatched in these years, “to give the 
most positive orders so that in the future there will not exist under 
any pretext any difficulties in the breadth of  your department for 
the free export [i.e., circulation] of  grain in the interior of  the king-
dom.”65 Yet the arrêt itself  was substantively vague and the hortatory 
letters from the ministry addressed none of  the tangled and prickly 
questions which a genuine effort to execute it would have raised. On 
the grounds that their generalities were not “sufficiently abundantly 
supplied,” intendants continued to interfere with circulation; on the 
grounds that “precautions” were necessary, as always, “to prevent 
abuses,” local authorities counteracted the modest dose of  liberty 
accorded by the arrêt. Supporters of  the liberal cause within and out-
side the government became convinced that the arrêt of  1754 was 
neither powerful nor precise enough, legally and politically, to effect 
real changes. They agreed, as the Controller-General Silhouette 
remarked in 1759, that “a new law was necessary.”66
Writer, critic, translator, traveler—in a word, philosophe—Etienne 
de Silhouette came to the ministry amidst giddy expectations for a 
period of  enlightened administration. Though he served for less than 
a year and faced the enormously demanding task of  managing an 
international war, he prepared a remarkable number of  reform proj-
ects, which aroused violent controversy.67 Immediate fiscal problems 
engrossed him above all, yet Silhouette was deeply interested in the 
grain question. Convinced that agricultural development was the key 
to sustained prosperity as well as “the foundation of  our finances” 
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and that conventional regulatory policy stymied agricultural 
growth, this Controller-General resolved to introduce a larger and 
more compelling measure of  freedom into the grain trade than 
the previous legislation had allotted. Since “present circumstances 
do not permit me to do everything that I would desire in favor of  
 agriculture [e.g., to institute exportation in a permanent form],” wrote 
Silhouette, “I will restrict myself  for the time being to  proposing a 
project for a declaration concerning internal commerce.”
Though he fell from power before he could translate it into law, 
Silhouette’s project is of  interest, both for its boldness and for its 
reticence. It contained two important articles, each the product of  
somewhat contradictory preoccupations. The first prohibited “all our 
officers under any pretext whatsoever from stopping the transport of  
grain and flour from one place to another within the same province or 
from one province to any other in our kingdom.” In form and in spirit 
this was a major advance upon the arrêt of  1754; it anticipated one of  
the critical elements in the law which eventually liberated the grain 
trade in 1763. In his commentary, however, Silhouette made it clear 
that he was not hostile, in principle, to all forms of  control. To be sure, 
he sharply reproved the parochialism of  the local police, who did not 
hesitate to compromise “the effect of  a general good” (free circulation) 
in order to satisfy their short-term provisioning needs. Yet it was not 
the idea of  intervention that Silhouette deplored; it was the fact that 
their intervention was ill-conceived or, as he put it, “unenlightened.” 
It was bound to be, by the very nature of  things, for the view from 
the field was inevitably myopic, biased, and uninformed by broader 
concerns or a larger data base. Like Machault and other state-makers, 
Silhouette had a horror of  local pretensions to political autonomy, of  
local administrative initiatives, and of  local idiosyncracies of  all kinds. 
He was a nationalizer: if  there were to be rules, they were to be uni-
form throughout the realm; if  there was to be regulation of  the grain 
trade, it would emanate exclusively from the center, for only the royal 
government was “in a position to know everyone’s needs.” While he 
struck a blow against local police authority, Silhouette reserved the 
right to police the grain trade as he saw necessary.
The second article expressed the Controller-General’s ambivalence 
more starkly. The first part of  it was a portentous innovation, in the 
manner of  the future liberal reforms: it opened the trade to all comers 
and authorized apparently unlimited stocking. In other words, it set 
the stage for the drastic transformation of  the very character of  grain 
128 BREAd, POLITICS ANd POLITICAL ECONOMY
commerce. But, as if  he were alarmed by the implications of  these 
changes, Silhouette recoiled in the second part of  the article from 
the laissez-faire strategy. He required all transactions to occur exclu-
sively upon the public markets. The exigencies of  provisioning still 
had considerable sway over this reformer’s mind; regardless of  the 
needs of  agriculture, Silhouette still wanted a visible, dependable 
supply. Though his record hardly suggests that he lacked daring, the 
Controller-General was unwilling to risk in 1759 what his successor 
Bertin ventured four years later. Like Machault, Silhouette believed 
that a certain kind of  liberty and a certain kind of  police were com-
patible and indeed complementary.68
Silhouette’s project reflected uncertainties about the grain trade 
that were still widely felt. Many of  the intendants favored some form 
of  liberalization of  the regulatory apparatus in order to promote com-
merce and agriculture but a considerable number probably shared 
the circumspection of  the intendant of  Amiens who supported a gen-
erous internal liberty provided the ban on off-market dealings was 
explicitly maintained. “The provisioning of  the public marketplaces 
must at all times be encouraged,” argued this intendant, “because that 
is the surest means of  establishing the tranquility of  the people.”69
Social control considerations were not, however, paramount in 
everyone’s reckoning. Acutely critical of  Silhouette’s project, Feydeau 
de Brou, the intendant of  Rouen, submitted a counter-proposal which 
called for a much stronger and more coherent measure of  liberty. Fey-
deau was not an intransigent liberal militant. He respected Silhouette’s 
prudent approach; on pragmatic grounds, he agreed that it was wise to 
relegate the export question to another time. Yet he believed that the 
Controller-General permitted so many ambiguities to subsist in the 
projected law that the liberty of  1759 would register no more impact 
than had the liberty of  1754. By trying to hedge his bets, Silhouette 
was not giving liberty a chance. There was no need to worry about 
tracking grain and merchants and staging encounters of  supply and 
demand. “Interest alone will always keep the merchants on the surest 
route,” Feydeau maintained, “and for provisioning [one can] depend 
entirely on liberty.” Silhouette’s retention of  the exclusive market rule 
irreparably flawed his project. The obligation to go to authorized, 
 68 Silhouette to IN. of  Rouen, 12 July 1759, C. 103, A.d. S-M.; Silhouette to IN. of  Rouen, 15 
April 1759 and to IN. of  Amiens, 6 April 1759, C. 104, ibid.; Silhouette to IN. of  Alençon, 
9 June 1759, C. 89, A.d. Orne.
 69 IN. to CG, 6 April 1759, C. 105, A.d. S-M.
 THE ORIGINS OF LIBERTY 129
public markets (public markets, Feydeau acidly pointed out, which 
were often “owned” and/or operated for a substantial profit by pri-
vate parties who basked in the “image of  public good” with which 
the law imprinted their enterprise) severely limited the size, range, 
and vigor of  the grain trade. It dulled competition, bloated costs, 
and discouraged the formation of  magazines since merchants who 
could not freely dispose of  their goods would not stock for speculative 
purposes. The market system protected by the law was archaic and 
irrational; markets were insufficient in number, haphazardly located, 
and absurdly programmed into weekly schedules which bore little 
relation to commercial needs. The aim of  the law, continued the 
Rouen intendant, should be to “multiply the places and times” of  
transactions, thereby modernizing market organization and stimulat-
ing commerce.
The mandatory market rule was symptomatic of  a larger problem 
concerning the exercise of  police powers and the relations between the 
rulers and the ruled to which Feydeau called attention. Few  observers 
had such a lucid sense of  the requirements for a successful liberaliza-
tion and of  the difficulties the reform would encounter. Liberating 
grain alone was not enough in Feydeau’s view; at the same time it was 
urgently necessary to free public officials at all levels of  authority from 
the obligation of  managing the grain trade by shackling their hands 
firmly and permanently. One of  the chief  reasons why the arrêt of  
1754 failed was because it made liberty of  circulation “entirely depend 
on us and on our subdelegates whose prejudices can still be deep and 
difficult to vanquish.” By prohibiting the police unequivocally from 
interfering with any aspect of  the grain trade, the government could, 
after a fashion, conquer their prejudices. But behind these “prejudices” 
stood a force of  extraordinary compulsion which suggested that offi-
cials were not wholly free to act as they saw fit. For as long as the police 
were considered “responsible in the eyes of  the people for abundance 
or for dearth,” they could not, without enormous risk and difficulty, 
avert their eyes from the grain trade. Thus Feydeau insisted that the 
law on liberty had to announce loudly and clearly to the people that 
provisioning was no longer a police matter and it had to place the 
police, morally and politically as well as juridically, in a position in 
which they could not be “forced” to take the action demanded by their 
own prejudices or by the people.
Though he should have known better, the intendant of  Rouen 
apparently believed that a stroke of  legislation could effect this 
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 transformation. To make sure that the message got across, Feydeau’s 
proposal specifically forbad the police to demand declarations, con-
fine trade to markets, impede circulation anywhere in the interior, 
bar anyone from the trade, interfere with stocking, fix the price of  
grain or flour or otherwise mediate exchanges between buyers and 
sellers, and visit granaries to inspect and inventory supplies. From a 
strictly practical point of  view, without regard for doctrine, the inten-
dant of  Rouen meant to show Silhouette that liberty and police were 
mutually contradictory and destructive notions. In addition to its 
conceptual defects, the Controller-General’s project was out of  joint 
with the times. For the “public” in Feydeau’s estimation had in recent 
years made striking advances in “enlightenment”; it was now ready 
for a more potent dose of  liberty than Silhouette prescribed. My law 
would be no more difficult to get registered than yours, claimed the 
intendant; your law risks setting back the cause by “rejuvenating and 
fortifying prejudices” which we have already begun to overcome.70
Silhouette suffered disgrace before he had the opportunity to 
implement his project (and before he had a chance to mark grain 
reform with his ill-starred cachet). His successor, Bertin, did not 
reach the ministry on the strength of  a towering reputation. “Two-
bit wine,” his senior colleague in foreign affairs, Choiseul, styled 
him, an appreciation which never became highly controversial in 
Bertin’s time.71 On the whole, historians have been more generous 
in their assessment, praising Bertin for his perspicacity, firmness, 
and administrative skill.72 Whether his nomination to the Contrôle-
Général at a time when the voices of  liberalism were becoming 
increasingly influential represents a happy coincidence or signifies 
Versailles’ sympathy for those reformist tendencies remains sub-
ject to debate.73 Bertin had always been keenly interested in agri-
culture, as a proprietor as well as a public official. While serving as 
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anglais, ou Correspondance secrète entre mylord all’eye et mylord all’ear (London, 1784), I, 100–101.
 72 Guy Caire, “Bertin, Ministre physiocrate,” Revue d’histoire économique et sociale, XXXVIII 
(1960), 257–84; Bourde, Agronomie, II, 1088–1090; Léonce de Lavergne, Economistes, 
446–47. Cf. G. Bussière, “Bertin,” Bulletin de la Société Historique et Archéologique du 
Périgord, XXII (1905), 216–44, 381–418; XXXIII (1906), 72–113, 211–43, 311–31; 
XXXIV (1907), 53–83, 272–314, 373–388, 451–66; XXXV (1908), 274–313, 437–64; 
XXXVI (1909), 133–62, 210–81; and Weulersse, Louis XV, 12.
 73 Bourde insists that Bertin’s appointment marked a clear desire on the part of  the government 
to promote new ideas. Agronomie, II, 1097–99.
Illustration 2. “Foreign” baker supplying the twice-weekly bread market. The Baker’s Cart 
by Jean Michelin (1656). The Metropolitan Museum of  Art, Fletcher Fund, 1927.
Illustration 3. Example of  the record of  grain and flour arrivals, sales, and prices kept 
by the Paris market administration. Archives Nationales.
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intendant at Lyons, he cultivated Gournay, who shared with him his 
radical notions of  political economy. As a protégé of  Madame de 
Pompadour, it was assumed that Bertin continued his education with 
Quesnay and regarded the nascent physiocratic view with favor. At 
the ministry, he drew his closest advisers from liberal, agronomist, 
and économiste circles: Abeille, Baudeau, dangeul, dupont, Morellet, 
daniel Trudaine, Turgot, and the marquis de Turbilly.74
On the other hand, it is worth noting that his carreer was per-
fectly conventional and his ascension more or less predictable. Son 
of  an enterprising provincial parlementaire who owned ironworks 
and ships, he served a classic apprenticeship as lawyer, councillor, and 
President of  the Grand Conseil, master of  requests and intendant 
in Roussillon and Lyons. His views were judged sufficiently ortho-
dox to win him the delicate post of  Lieutenant General of  Police of  
Paris in the year that damiens assaulted the king. Considered one 
of  the most difficult charges in the kingdom, the lieutenance put the 
appointee’s fortitude and talents to the most rigorous test and tended 
to mark him prima facie as a “dur.” It was widely believed that the king 
named him Controller-General for his quality as a “policeman” to 
restore the order disrupted by the “remedies” prescribed by “doctor” 
Silhouette, son-in-law of  a renowned physician. Before Pompadour 
integrated Bertin into her patronage system, he had been the favorite 
of  the Secretary of  State St. Florentin, scion of  one of  the oldest and 
least progressive ministerial dynasties in the kingdom. And, if  he sur-
rounded himself  with liberals and reformers, he named as his official 
propagandist J. N. Moreau, historian of  the “cacouacs” and mordant 
critic of  the philosophes.75
Bertin became Controller-General in late November 1759, an 
extremely difficult time when the government was pressed by urgent 
 74 Bussière, “Bertin,” Bulletin … Périgord, XXV (1908), 274–75 and XXVI (1909), 211–12, 
215; Bourde, Agronomie, II, 1099. According to J. Peuchet, an almost-contemporary student 
of  old regime administration, “Bertin was [a member] of  the économiste sect.…” Mémoires 
tirés des archives de la police de Paris (Paris, 1838), II, 162. On Bertin and the “Chinese” spirit, 
see Charles L. Chassin, ed., Les Elections et les cahiers de Paris en 1789 (Paris, 1889), IV, 122–23.
 75 François Bluche, Les Magistrats du grand conseil au XVIIIe siècle, 1690–1791 (Paris, 1966), 
53; M. Prévost, “Bertin,” in R. d’Amat and M. Prévost, eds., Dictionnaire de biographie 
française (Paris, 1954), VI, 244–45; Bourde, Agronomie, II, 1083; E.J.F. Barbier, Chronique 
de la régence, VII, 207–208 (Nov. 1759); Jacob-Nicolas Moreau, Mes souvenirs, ed. by 
C. Hermelin, I, 78, 80. Cf. Y. durand, ed., Mémoires de J.-J. de Laborde, fermier général et 
banquier de la cour in Annuaire —Bulletin de la Société de l’Histoire de France (1968–69), 158 which 
emphasizes Bertin’s total dependence on Pompadour.
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wartime fiscal needs and censured by the parlements in increasingly 
strident and vitriolic terms for extortionate, wasteful, and illegal prac-
tices. At the cost of  major political concessions, Bertin won approval 
for the bulk of  the emergency measures he proposed. despite his 
preoccupation with finances and the mutinous attitude of  the courts, 
he indicated from the beginning that he would seek a liberalization of  
the grain trade regime “at the right moment.” He shared the assess-
ment of  the intendant of  Rouen that the “enlightened” portion of  
the nation was ready for such a major reform and he was persuaded, 
on the basis of  his analysis of  the economy, that the kingdom needed 
it. Bertin moved with conviction but without precipitation; no doctri-
naire, his determination to promote agricultural prosperity was tem-
pered by a keen sense of  the political and social risks inherent in grain 
reform.76
Memoirs “from everywhere” on the grain question flooded Bertin’s 
offices and the royal council. Their central theme was that agricul-
ture was mired in stagnation as a result of  recurrent gluts, sustained 
low prices, and lack of  outlets and that this stagnation threatened the 
well-being of  the kingdom. “It appears be be generally desired,” the 
Controller-General reported, “that the Government encourage agri-
culture by giving the grain trade a liberty which is capable of  raising 
the price.” In a circular letter soliciting the opinions of  intendants and 
other administrators, Bertin left no doubt that his government planned 
to respond positively to this desire. He invited no criticism of  the prem-
ises upon which the government view rested. The only matter to be 
discussed was how much and what sort of  liberty would be accorded. 
A universal liberty, applicable in all spheres, was from the start out of  
the question. The first taboo enveloped the Paris provisioning system. 
Since “it is essential not to give the least anxiety on an object of  this 
nature,” even if  “abuses” are detected, “for the present” they are to be 
studied rather than remedied. Similarly, consideration of  the freedom 
to export would be postponed “for the present time.” Like Silhouette, 
Bertin envisioned a two-stage reform in which the delicate and com-
plex export issue would not even be raised until the trade had adjusted 
to the new regime. (Liberal stalwarts, of  course, argued that Bertin’s 
prudential segregation of  the export question was self-defeating, for no 
workable adjustment could occur until exporting was allowed.)
 76 Marcel Marion, Histoire financière, I, 209; E. Glasson, Le Parlement de Paris, II, 258–62; Léon 
Biollay, Le Pacte de famine, 95.
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Allowing for these two exceptions, however, Bertin intimated that 
he was ready to go further along the road to liberty than any of  his 
predecessors had dared: to dismantle the entire regulatory apparatus 
as it applied to internal commerce. In order to determine whether the 
administrative corps shared his thinking, he asked them whether they 
favored freeing merchants from all formalities, barring certain “quali-
ties” of  persons from trading, increasing or restricting the number 
of  merchants, allowing stocking, dispensing traders from transacting 
business on the public markets, and sparing grain the imposition of  
all road, river, and bridge tolls ( péages).77
We have not been able to unearth a large enough number of  
replies to Bertin’s questions to venture a global evaluation of  admin-
istrative opinion. But we have a sampling sufficiently rich to suggest 
the range and type of  attitudes encountered. From his intendancy in 
the Limousin, Turgot drafted a long, rambling memoir in which he 
rehearsed the main themes of  the liberal doctrine (citing, doubtless to 
make a point, Gournay rather than Quesnay) instead of  answering 
Bertin’s queries. Though he did not explicitly criticize Bertin’s plan, 
Turgot revealed that he favored a far more comprehensive liberaliza-
tion than the Controller-General envisioned, a “total liberty” includ-
ing freedom to export. He hinted that a reform short of  this might 
not succeed in rescuing agriculture, wresting the grain trade from 
“paltry” hands and passing it on to capitalist entrepreneurs, and sav-
ing France from both the “horrors” of  famine and glut.78
The intendants of  Brittany and Bordeaux seem to have shared 
Turgot’s enthusiasm for a stronger measure.79 The Chamber of  
Commerce of  Marseilles also pledged itself  to press for “a complete 
liberty” permitting unlimited exports, stockage, off-market business, 
and trade by all persons regardless of  quality. Yet, despite their plea to 
“laissez agir,” the Marseillais, worried about the ability of  the police 
 77 Bertin to de la Tour, 1 Aug. 1761 and “Mémoire à consulter sur la liberté du commerce des 
grains,” C. 2420, A.d. B-du-R. Cf. Bertin to INs. of  Brittany (C. 69, A.d. I-et-V.), Alençon (C. 
89, A.d. Orne), Rouen (C. 103, A.d. S-M.). Franche-Comté (C. 496, A.d. doubs), and Caen 
(C. 2619, A.d. Cal.). Originally Bertin envisaged a completely separate declaration dealing 
exclusively with the problem of  tolls and duties on grain in transit. See Bertin to Boisemont, 
4 July 1761, C. 6690, A.d. Nord and Vedier to Premion, 15 July 1761, C. 775, A.d. L-A.
 78 Turgot draft letter in Œuvres, ed. Schelle, II, 122–28.
 79 H. Fréville, L’Intendance de Bretagne (Rennes, 1953), II, 189–94; Boutet to Courteille, 18 June 
1763, C. 1426, A.d. Gir. Cf. the confident assertion of  the intendant of  Hainaut that 
Bertin’s project was really superfluous, given the fact that liberty already reigned in his 
généralité. Boisemont to Bertin, 16 July 1761, C. 6690, A.d. Nord.
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to monitor “the state of  provisioning,” asked the Controller-General 
to require merchants to declare the whereabouts of  their storehouses 
and the destination points of  their shipments.80 Levignen and de 
Gourgues, intendants of  Alençon and Montauban, took positions at 
the opposite extreme from their counterparts in the Limousin, the 
Bordelais and Brittany. Levignen denied that prices were too low and 
felt that exportation should be “entirely prohibited” in order to pro-
tect consumers. de Gourgues cautioned Bertin that “by revoking the 
old laws he was opening the door to still greater abuses.” Both inten-
dants favored retaining the old system of  internal trade for its flex-
ibility, which enabled authorities to relax controls in good times and 
apply them sternly in periods of  stress.81
At the bottom as well as at the top of  royal provincial administration, 
opinion ran the gamut from zealous liberalism to outright hostility to 
serious grain reform. Like the intendants who solicited their views, we 
are particularly interested in the attitudes of  the subdelegates because 
they were in relatively close touch with the day-to-day problems of  
grain trading and provisioning. Seven subdelegates in the generality 
of  Alençon replied to Bertin’s questions. On one side stood the sub-
delegate at Argentan, a self-proclaimed disciple of  Herbert, whom he 
believed had already published “all that could best be said on this mat-
ter.” There was “nothing to fear” in introducing liberty; indeed, only 
liberty could stimulate production and thus strike at “the real cause 
of  dearth.”82 Bourdon of  Lisieux staked out this same terrain, albeit 
 80 Chamber of  Commerce to IN. of  Provence, 26 Sept. 1761, C. 2420, A.d. B-du-R.
 81 Levignen to Bertin, ? Aug. 1761, C. 89, Cd. Orne; de Gourgues to Terray, 16 dec. 1771, 
AN, F11 223. Levignen followed the avis of  his subdelegate from Bernay almost word for 
word. Sd to Levignen, 22 Aug. 1761, C. 89, A.d. Orne.
 de la Corée, the intendant of  Franche-Comté, expressed even stronger reservations in 
a commentary on the draft version of  the liberalizing law which Bertin circulated the 
following spring. He insisted on the urgency of  “reconciling” liberty with “the precautions 
necessary to prevent abuses and especially monopolies.” In his estimation, there was as 
much need “for publicity as for liberty” in the conduct of  the trade. While he endorsed 
interprovincial freedom of  circulation, he favored mandatory declarations and market 
exchanges. To Bertin, 29 April 1762, C. 496, A.d. doubs.
 82 To IN., Aug. 1761, C. 89, A.d. Orne.
 In his extremely thoughtful letter, this subdelegate pointed to two matters which would 
later be of  considerable significance. The first was a remarkably rarefied issue for a 
minor official to join. It concerned the political implications of  the fact that England, 
the nation whose “hundred years of  success” with liberty was supposed to be a powerful 
incentive for the French to adopt their system, had a “republican constitution.” 
The lesson drawn by the subdelegate was not that liberty was therefore ill-suited for 
France, which boasted “a monarchical constitution.” Rather, he suggested, since a 
monarchical constitution accorded far more authority to the central government 
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with considerably less eloquence than his colleague from Argentan.83 
Three other subdelegates answered all of  Bertin’s questions in the lib-
eral sense, yet each official had some reservations about the reform. 
The “total liberty” conceived by the first of  this triumvirate, the 
subdelegate of  Alençon, allowed for full-scale police intervention in 
“critical times,” that is, precisely when the liberals argued that police 
interference was historically and theoretically most pernicious.84 
The other two administrators, in addition to opposing export on the 
grounds that “it would necessarily cause the people to suffer,” also 
challenged some of  the basic liberal ideas. The subdelegate of  Ver-
neuil suggested that the “pretended abundance” which the liberals 
deplore as a burden “does not always have as much reality” as they 
would like us to believe. His colleague from Sées attacked the idea 
that price conditions determined how much land the laboureurs would 
sow in marketable grain; regardless of  yesterday’s or today’s price, 
the laboureurs will always plant “as much as possible” in the “hope of  
a price increase” tomorrow.85
Finally, two subdelegates, preoccupied above all with the needs of  
consumers, advised against the sort of  liberalization which Bertin 
imagined. Afraid that “an entire liberty” would be “dangerous,” the 
first wanted off-market exchanges to be strictly prohibited and grain 
owners obliged to supply the public on a regular basis. There was 
no question in his mind that local grain was to be used for local use 
and that the business of  the grain trade was to serve the consuming 
public. The second official predicted that there would be “troubles 
 than a republican constitution, it would be even easier for France to adopt the liberal system 
and adjust it to its needs than it had been for England. In fine, this was the whole theory of  
enlightened despotism scaled to practice. Far less interesting as political theory, the second 
point raised by the subdelegate had much greater practical political significance. Though 
he sincerely believed in the liberal doctrine, he was haunted by the fear that the new 
system would call into existence huge companies which would force individuals out of  the 
trade and corner the market. Without any fastidious concern for doctrinal coherence, the 
subdelegate simply wanted them banned from the grain trade (along with “excessively rich 
seigneurs”). Such a populist fear coming from a local official sympathetic to liberalization 
should have served as a warning to the government. The specter of  monster companies cast 
a shadow across the whole liberal experience.
 83 To IN., 24 Aug. 1761, ibid.
 84 To IN., 16 Aug. 1761, ibid. This subdelegate, like his colleague at Argentan, also worried 
about the tyranny of  grain trading companies.
 85 To IN., 14 and 17 Aug. 1761, ibid. Cf. the attitude of  the two Provençal procurators who 
also favored liberalization on the one hand but worried about its disequilibrating effects on 
the other. Bonnet and Rostolun to IN., 31 Aug. 1761, C. 2420, A.d. B-du-R.
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and popular riots” if  exportation were ever allowed. Nor was he 
serene about the prospects of  free internal circulation. To check the 
“abuses” inherent in the trade, he recommended the maintenance 
of  most of  the traditional controls, especially the laws of  1567, 1577, 
1699, and 1723 which fixed transactions on the open markets and 
authorized the police to constrain grain owners to furnish supplies.86 
On the whole it is perhaps more remarkable to find two local-level 
officials eagerly committed to the liberal position and three others 
generally favorable to reform than to encounter two partisans of  the 
police system in which they all had been trained. Nevertheless, the 
Controller-General could not have remained insensitive to the fact 
that opinion within the administration was divided and still evolving 
at all levels.
Though Rouen’s Feydeau de Brou unhesitatingly endorsed Bertin’s 
reform plan since it closely approximated the proposal he had made 
to Silhouette, he was nevertheless a bit less sure of  himself  now than 
he had been in 1759. He warned the Controller-General that it 
would require considerable political skill to bring off  the reforms. 
The intendant claimed that he needed time to work on a number of  
the Rouen parlementaires who still nurtured “prejudices” contrary 
to liberty. Nor should the minister entertain the thought of  doing 
without parlementary registration. Without the magistrates’ appro-
bation, Feydeau candidly reminded Bertin, no law could pretend to 
be “permanent” and have a “general bearing.” Moreover, given the 
public confidence enjoyed by the sovereign courts, the people would 
never believe that there was “no contradiction” between liberaliza-
tion and “the general welfare” unless the parlements announced their 
approval.87 This assessment of  parlementary influence was written 
not by a propagandist paid to puff  the robe but by the agent of  royal 
absolutism in the province. Feydau foresaw how deeply the magis-
tracy would be involved in the unfolding story of  liberalization.
Though Bertin felt that “the circumstance is [now] favorable to make 
a decision” when he circulated his memoir in the summer of  1761, 
almost two more years elapsed before the promulgation of  the May law. 
The demands of  war, finances, and related matters may have diverted 
the Controller-General’s attention from the reform project. But it also 
 86 To IN., 2 and 22 Aug. 1761, C. 89, A.d. Orne. The subdelegate-general of  Brittany 
apparently had similar fears for the fate of  consumers. See Fréville, L’Intendance de Bretagne, 
191.
 87 IN. to Bertin, 7 Sept. 1761, C. 103, A.d. S-M.
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appears that Bertin realized that he had underestimated the political 
difficulties which the passage of  the measure entailed. He wanted 
to prepare his case more carefully in the royal council, where there 
were rumblings of  uncertainty, in the administration, in the sovereign 
courts, and in the elusive domain called public opinion. On the one 
hand, he encouraged the liberal lobby and the “economic” press to 
maintain their pressure and he barraged the intendants with reform-
ist propaganda. On the other, he emphasized, in the council, in min-
isterial committees, and in the Bureau of  Commerce, the safeguards 
that the law would contain.
In April 1762 Bertin sent a draft version of  the future May decla-
ration to the intendants, the parlements, the societies of  agriculture, 
and to other public figures and institutions. He introduced it in a 
covering letter far more aggressive in tone than the memoir-question-
naire which had circulated the previous summer. This former Lieu-
tenant General of  Police attacked the police far more sharply than 
he had before, depicting them as inflexible, nervous, intemperate, 
undiscriminating, and blustery rather than supple, stolid, moderate, 
judicious, and discreet. He blamed agricultural stagnation and the 
underdevelopment of  the grain trade squarely upon the police. Nor 
could the police justify their practices on the grounds that they were 
necessary to prevent dearth, for the record indicated that they had 
achieved little success in this domain. “The only means of  encour-
aging agriculture and creating thereby a constant abundance,” con-
cluded Bertin, “was to leave liberty to the internal trade and assure 
the cultivators a price proportionate to their works.”
Yet, despite his conviction that the new liberty and the old police 
could not coexist, the Controller-General was unwilling to venture a 
total liberty as the liberals would have liked; instead, he would avoid 
instituting any change which “could, by its novelty, give rise to some 
untoward revolution.” Thus, Bertin refused to change his mind about 
Paris and about exports; the draft declaration contained articles main-
taining the old rules in the capital and the general prohibition against 
exports save by special license. Paris remained the “noli me tangere of  
the affair,” even at the risk of  limiting the freedom of  a large num-
ber of  traders, because it was simply too dangerous to tamper with 
the city’s provisioning system given the “extent” and the “nature” 
of  its population. Nor could free exportation be envisioned until the 
government assessed the impact of  liberalization upon the domestic 
provisioning trade in order to make certain that grain necessary for 
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subsistence would not escape abroad. Bertin never overcame his deep 
skepticism about the wisdom of  an unlimited authorization to export. 
Later, he vainly opposed the efforts of  his successor to implement this 
policy.88
Bertin’s legislative proposal of  1762 consisted of  a preamble 
explaining the motives that inspired the king to break radically with 
the police tradition and eight articles spelling out the new ground 
rules (and anti-rules) for the conduct of  trade in the interior. The 
first three clauses opened commerce to all comers, abolished the 
registration requirements and the bans on stockage and off-market 
exchanges, guaranteed unimpeded circulation in the interior, pro-
hibited the police from interfering with the trade in any way, and 
dispensed buyers or sellers from paying road, river, or bridge tolls 
on their grain. The next three articles reaffirmed the old prohibitive 
policy on exports and instituted controls to prevent coastwise and 
frontier traders from engaging in fraudulent exportation under the 
cover of  free internal circulation. Codifying the special status of  the 
capital, the seventh article exempted Paris from conforming to any 
of  the changes stipulated in the previous clauses. By declaring void 
all previous legistation and regulations contrary to the new law, the 
eighth and last article formally interred the corpus of  law that per-
petuated the police tradition.
On the whole reactions to Bertin’s proposal must have been reas-
suring, for the declaration which finally appeared a year later in May 
1763 followed the draft law exactly, save for the complete suppression 
of  articles four, five, and six. Though there was a certain amount of  
criticism from those who opposed liberalization, the most vocal objec-
tions appeared to come from the liberal camp. The prior- consuls of  
 88 Bertin circular to INs., P Gs., etc., 13 April 1762, AN, F12 149; Bertin to Levignen, with draft 
of  law, 13 April 1762 and Bertin to Levignen, 25 May 1762, C. 90, A.d. Orne; Biollay, Le 
Pacte de famine, 91–103; Caire, “Bertin,” Revue d’histoire économique et sociale, XXXVIII (1960), 
267; Musart, Réglementation du commerce des grains, 18. Yet Bertin was resolutely opposed to 
issuing “individual licenses,” the common practice before liberalization. If  there was to be a 
liberty to export, it had to be “general.” Bertin to IN. of  La Rochelle, 3 May 1761, C. 189, 
A.d. C-M.
 In early 1763 Bertin had the government publish two measures allowing the uncontrolled 
export of  flour (first farine de minot and then all flour) and grain except for wheat and méteil, 
a hybrid crop of  wheat and rye. The Controller-General willingly made these concessions 
to the liberals because he knew that they would have little bearing upon the provisioning 
situation. In addition, he allowed specific areas burdened with surpluses to export for 
limited periods. See, for example, B 2314, fol. 89, A.d. Isère.
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 89 Prior-Consuls of  St. Malo to Estates of  Brittany (?), ca. summer 1762, C. 3911, A.d. I-et-V. 
Cf. the opinion of  the deputies of  commerce, “Commerce intérieur et extérieur des blés,” 
BN, mss. fr. 11347, fols. 213–16.
 90 The Bretons were especially sensitive to restrictions on coastwise trading, for much of  their 
“internal” grain trade took place by water. Though coastwise trading was not explicitly 
mentioned in the final version of  the May declaration, Bertin assured them that such trade 
was “free” subject to the continued use of  acquits à caution. Bertin to damilly, 3 Aug. 1763, 
C. 774, A.d. L-A.
St. Malo, for example, claimed to be “infinitely surprised” by the 
Controller-General’s draft version:
It is very distressing that the overly tender love of  the Sovereign and of  his ministers 
for the People prevents them from abrogating completely and forever this timorous 
and uncertain police which has almost destroyed our Agriculture.89
In response to charges that he had gone too far, Bertin had only to 
point to overdrawn reproaches such as this to prove that his position 
was essentially moderate.
The issue which excited the ire of  the Malouins as well as of  the 
deputies of  commerce and other liberals was exportation. Perhaps it 
was in part to placate them that the Controller-General dropped arti-
cles four, five, and six from the final version of  the law. By passing over 
the export question in silence the government was likely to provoke 
less discontent among the liberals than by announcing explicitly that 
it had examined and rejected the possibility of  permitting exports. 
The export renunciation formula of  the 1762 draft suggested that no 
change was probable for some time to come whereas the absence of  
any statement of  intention in the May declaration seemed to intimate 
that a decision to extend liberty to exportation could follow in the very 
near future. Surely the liberals also applauded the disappearance of  the 
articles requiring coastwise and frontier traders to obtain passports for 
their shipments and discharge visas upon delivery.90 Had these controls 
survived authorities could have used them to hamper internal trade 
on the pretext of  preventing clandestine exportation. In fact, traders 
appear to have profited from the opportunities for illicit exporting in the 
 fourteen months which elapsed between the May declaration and the 
July Edict. The failure to provide for such controls and to re- dedicate 
the government to a no-export policy reinforced the suspicions of  those 
who felt that Bertin’s ostensibly moderate stand was an illusion.
Bertin, the architect of  the May declaration, had no time to pon-
der the significance of  his success. Another issue surged to the fore-
front, overshadowing the grain reform at the very moment of  its 
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promulgation. In order to deal with the immediate problems of  wind-
ing down the war and meeting pressing civil as well as military obliga-
tions, the Controller-General asked the royal council for a series of  
fiscal measures prolonging the multiple vingtièmes, levying them on the 
basis of  a new assessment of  landed wealth, and imposing, in addi-
tion, a number of  new taxes and tax supplements. Bertin’s proposals 
aroused such furious resistance from the sovereign courts that Louis 
XV felt obliged to dismiss him from office in late November 1763. In 
his stead the king named Laverdy, a member of  the Paris Parlement 
and son of  a celebrated lawyer. Politically obscure and suspected of  
entertaining extravagant Jansenist sympathies, Laverdy had a suf-
ficiently solid judicial reputation to excite genuine hope for a suc-
cessful administration. In large measure, these expectations rested on 
Laverdy’s promise to make peace with the parlements. In return for a 
number of  extraordinary concessions, including a royal invitation to 
the sovereign courts to participate in the elaboration of  fiscal policy, 
the renunciation or dilution of  most of  Bertin’s tax program, and 
effusively conciliatory pronouncements by the king, Laverdy won a 
fiscal accord likely to tide the government through the rest of  the 
decade.91
Within months after he came to power, the new Controller-General 
turned his attention to the grain question. Whereas Bertin’s contacts 
and his career in the field predisposed him to take a special inter-
est in the matter, there was nothing in Laverdy’s parlementary back-
ground to suggest what his attitude would be. Professionally, he was 
best known for being “an indefatigable worker.” His private life was 
hardly less dreary than his public career. Married to the daughter of  a 
wealthy cloth merchant (a “Colbertist” choice!), Laverdy lived simply 
(“bourgeoisement”), frequenting neither the masked balls and gaming 
tables nor the salons. About his ideas we know little more than that his 
distrust of  “philosophy” was firmly rooted. The point is worth remem-
bering, for Laverdy’s conversion to the new political economy would 
soon prove that it was possible to join the Enlightenment without mak-
ing any concession to “philosophy,” or at least not admitting to any.92 
Weeks before she died and deprived the liberal cause of  a powerful ally, 
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Madame de Pompadour hinted at the course the new Controller-
General would take by presenting him with a portrait of  Sully, an 
unmistakable, highly political symbol of  reform. At the same time the 
appropriate verses, flat and fustian, circulated in Paris:
Of  the shrewd and wise Sully 
there remains only the image 
Today this great personage 
is recalled to life in Laverdy.93
The Sullyist position at the beginning of  1764 was best expressed by 
the économiste Letrosne:
The declaration of  25 May 1763 razed these interior barriers erected by timidity, 
maintained for such a long time by habit, so favorable to monopoly, and so dear to the 
eyes of  arbitrary authority. But there still remains to take the most essential step.94
The “essential step” was the “constant and irrevocable grant of  expor-
tation,” the necessary complement to internal liberty without which 
agriculture would not revive, the “common price of  Europe” would 
not be attained, abundance would not become a blessing as well as a 
certainty, and the revenues of  the state and the prosperity of  the citi-
zenry would not grow. Laverdy shared Letrosne’s view of  the urgency 
of  taking this step and he believed, moreover, that the time was ripe to 
do so. Though a canvass of  administrative opinion which he conducted 
in early 1764 revealed that there were still pockets of  dissent, the gen-
eral mood seemed to be favorable to some form of  general authoriza-
tion to export. The May declaration generated a certain momentum 
for reform; it became, according to Laverdy’s predecessor Bertin, who 
felt uncomfortable with it, an irresistible “enthusiasm,” reinforced by 
an excellent harvest in 1763 and superb “appearances” for 1764.95
Laverdy did not, however, take precisely the giant step that 
Letrosne and other liberals demanded: a “total” freedom to export 
without limits. He feared that such a decision would alienate mod-
erate opinion, cause widespread alarm, and precipitate changes 
too brusquely. Though he called upon two of  the leading liberal 
spokesmen in the kingdom, Turgot and dupont, to help draft what 
 93 Bachaumont, Mémoires secrets, II, 44 (13 April 1764).
 94 G.-F. Letrosne, Discours sur l’état actuel de la magistrature et sur les causes de sa décadence (n.p., 1764), 68.
 95 Biollay, Le Pacte de famine, 112.
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became the July 1764 Edict, the Controller-General rejected their 
advice that no conditions be placed on the permission to trade in 
the interior or abroad.96 Instead he insisted that the law contain a 
mechanism for cutting off  exports automatically when the price 
reached thirty livres the Parisian septier. (With equal determination 
he repulsed Bertin’s plea that the price ceiling be set at twenty-
five livres or less.) Any general permission to export was in itself  an 
awesome innovation, Laverdy reasoned, and the liberals themselves 
admitted that thirty livres was well above the “common price of  
Europe” to which they sought to adjust French agriculture. Though 
they rejoiced sincerely in the promulgation of  the July Edict and 
supported Laverdy zealously during his tenure in the ministry, the 
économistes never forgave him for the barrier he raised against abso-
lute liberty in 1764 even as they continued to reproach Bertin for 
his qualmishness in 1763. Years later, well after the first great battle 
over liberalization had been lost, the économistes took their revenge. 
dupont officially purged Laverdy from the roll of  liberal authentic-
ity that he drew up. In favoring the step to exportation, the Con-
troller-General, he wrote, had been “more swept along than con-
vinced.”97 But if  the policy he pursued with unstinting energy and 
stubborn resolution during the four and one half  years following 
the passage of  the July Edict is a fair measure of  his conviction, 
then it is impossible to fault his commitment to the liberal reforms.98
The Controllers-General Bertin and Laverdy played the leading 
roles in the preparation and passage of  the liberalizing measures. But a 
word must be ventured about the position taken by the Foreign Minis-
ter Choiseul who is supposed to have been the preponderant figure in a 
government memorable neither for ministerial coherence nor stability.99 
 96 Œuvres de Turgot, ed. by Schelle, II, 405–406. Cf. J. Nio, Turgot et la liberté du commerce 
(Bordeaux, 1928), 98–99.
 97 dupont to Prince Carl Ludwig, 1773, Carl Friedrichs von Baden Brieflicher Verkehr mit Mirabeau 
und Dupont, ed. by C. Knies (Heidelberg, 1892), II, 136.
 98 On this point I take issue with Weulersse who deplored Laverdy’s lack of  “convictions” and 
“firmness of  character” to which he partially ascribed the failure of  the reforms. Mouvement, 
II, 216.
 99 Lebrun wrote that Choiseul then “reigned” at court. Opinions, rapports, et choix d’écrits politiques 
de C.-F. Lebrun, ed. by A.-C. Lebrun (Paris, 1829), 16. Abbé Georgel claimed that Choiseul 
had “all the powers of  prime minister without having the title.” Mémoire pour servir à l’histoire 
des événements de la fin du dix-huitième siècle (Paris, 1820), I, 96. Cf. ibid., 173. Apparently Choiseul 
did not have close personal or political relations with either Controller-General Bertin or 
his successor Laverdy. See Jacob-Nicolas Moreau, Mes souvenirs, ed. by C. Hermelin (Paris, 
1898–1901), I, 80, 118, 143–144, 185, 216 and II, 53.
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Choiseul’s intelligence and range impressed contemporary observers. 
He had a “prompt, penetrating” mind, according to one acquaintance; 
another esteemed that he was “capable of  rather big ideas” despite an 
air of  frivolity and a pronounced distaste for the details of  governing. 100 
Although he detested doctor Quesnay, his obligations to Madame de 
Pompadour, his patroness, compelled him to treat the économistes sym-
pathetically. The abbé Morellet, a busy philosophe who toiled in their 
camp, characterized Choiseul as “protector of  the liberty of  the grain 
trade,” but noted that he was hostile, more for temperamental than 
ideological reasons, to philosophy in general and physiocracy in par-
ticular.101
Wisps of  evidence from the mid-sixties indicate that he worried 
about provisioning, kept himself  informed on grain trade affairs, and 
intervened on occasion with local and provincial authorities.102 In 
Mémoires attributed to him, composed well after his disgrace, Choiseul 
defined his attitude toward liberalization without, however, divulg-
ing the stand which he had taken in the royal council in the period 
preceding the liberal reforms. While the view he expressed here is 
consistent with our other information about him, his sharply critical 
assessment of  the way the government handled liberalization sug-
gests that he had dissociated himself  from this policy-making, leaving 
it to the controllers-general in whose domain it naturally belonged.
Choiseul saw no reason why merchants should not have an “entire 
liberty” to export grain. Aware of  the fears of  consumers, he argued 
that they must understand that, if  grain were short and dear in France, 
“exportation is null, for one will always prefer to sell at home and save 
on the transport.” But the decision to liberalize should have been based 
“purely” on grounds of  “fact” and “calculation,” or incontrovertible 
data comparing average annual grain production to the number of  
“mouths there are in France which eat bread.” The government in 
the early sixties forsook simplicity and clarity and invited misunder-
standing and disputation by tying its reforms to an elaborate theory. 
100 Abbé de Véri, Journal, ed. by J. de Witte, I, 53; Pierre Besenval, Mémoires de M. le Baron de 
Besenval (Paris, 1805), I, 316–24.
101 Weulersse, Mouvement, I, 116–17; Abbé Morellet, Mémoires de l’abbé Morellet de l’Académie 
Française sur le dix-huitième siècle et sur la révolution (Paris, 1821), I, 186. Cf. J. Nio, Turgot et la 
liberté du commerce (Bordeaux, 1928), 97.
102 Letters to Choiseul, 4, 13 Sept. 1765, AN, F12 150. Galiani claimed to have presented 
his “system” of  grain trade reform to Choiseul (rather than to the Controller-General) in 
1763–64. Galiani to Suard, 15 dec. 1770, Lettres, ed. by Eugène Asse (Paris, 1882), I, 88.
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“On this issue,” charged Choiseul, “metaphysics serves only to mud-
dle the mind and the matter.”
This error in preparation, according to Choiseul, led to another in 
public relations which proved fatal. Through its supporters, the gov-
ernment undertook to expose and justify its position publicly, a “beau-
tiful and honest” but terribly “expensive” gesture which violated a fun-
damental rule of  government: “the administration must neither write 
nor allow to be written anything on affairs which might excite the 
mind of  the peoples.” The official defense provoked a stormy debate 
which in turn produced a “doubt” (Choiseul did not explicitly con-
cede that the “doubt” may have arisen endogenously). “This doubt,” 
he reasoned, “in matters of  the substance of  first necessity, turns 
quite naturally into terror;” and the terror, in this instance, generated 
widespread resistance to the new laws. Choiseul’s critique was a les-
son in the pitfalls of  mixing enlightenment and absolutism in uncer-
tain portions and without regard for the other elements in the recipe. 
“I therefore think,” he concluded, “that, principally on the issue of  
grain as in affairs of  [religious] dogma, one must give only the deci-
sions & conserve, in the sanctuary of  the administration, the motives 
which determine [policy] as well as the means put into effect to pre-
vent and repair the disadvantages of  the law.”103
Whether it was possible in the 1760’s to run government, introduce 
profound changes in administration, and manipulate, dismiss, or dis-
regard public opinion in the chaste manner that Choiseul suggested 
remains open to question. We shall have occasion shortly to take the 
measure of  the foreign minister’s analysis of  the government’s failure 
in managing the grain issue. First we must examine the “motives” 
that “determined” the government of  which Choiseul was a part to 
venture a reform which obviously entailed such great risks.
IV
Why did the government undertake this radical new departure in lib-
eralization in 1763–64? The most obvious answer, widely endorsed by 
contemporaries and which seems to befit a government constrained to 
follow a policy of  opportunistic empiricism, is best described as the the-
sis of  circumstances. Even enemies of  the reform conceded that con-
ditions were strikingly propitious for change. The salient fact was the 
103 duc de Choiseul, Mémoires, ed. by Soulavie, I, 43–45, 50–51.
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price of  grain, product of  three unusually bountiful harvests in succes-
sion. despite its pronounced anxiety over the new measures, the Parisian 
municipality was unable to remember a single below-average harvest in 
the past “ten or twelve years” and noted that the prices have recently 
been “on a very low footing, even at Paris.”104 The average annual price 
of  wheat in France, calculated on the basis of  official reports in Parisian 
septiers, fell from 18.37 livres in 1760 to 15.60 in 1761, 15.48 in 1762, 
and 14.88 in 1763. For the same years the prices reported in Paris were 
17.85 livres, 13.75, 13.80 and 13.05.105 The prices paid by the Hôpital 
Général, which habitually purchased top quality wheat in the provision-
ing zones of  the capital, ranged from 18.25 (January–April) to 22.60 
(May–June) in 1760; 12.50 (November) to 18.20 (February–April) in 
1761; and 13.45 to 14.60 in 1762.106 These figures suggest a clear-cut, 
short-term downward movement. The impression they made on con-
temporaries, not only large grain producers burdened with substantial, 
unremunerative surpluses, but upon administrators, field and center, 
was dramatic. It was generally agreed that prices were abnormally low 
and that there was considerable margin for a socially innocuous and 
economically productive upward turn.
For pessimists, however, the thesis of  circumstances could cut another 
way. Such was the rhythm of  life in a cereals-dominated economy that 
a fortunate spate of  excellent harvests could cause a different sort of  
consternation, for it could be interpreted to mean that a series of  bad 
or mediocre years were in store. Moreover, still other circumstances 
militated against any major political innovation. France had just suf-
fered a humiliating and costly defeat in a war whose demoralizing and 
disorganizing economic and social effects have never received adequate 
attention from historians. At the same time, the parlements violently 
resisted the ministry’s fiscal designs. Michelet and R. R. Palmer both 
used the word “revolutionary” to describe the developing situation.107
104 “Mémoires et avis de Messieurs du Bureau de la Ville” (prior to July 1764), BN, mss. fr. 
14296, fol. 29.
105 Ernest Labrousse, Esquisse, I, 104, 113. Cf. the monthly prices reported in the Journal 
économique from 1756 to 1766 and the “Table du plus beau froment vendu dans les 
marchés de Paris” in Béguillet, Traité des subsistances, 799–800. Béguillet contended that 
the “current price” did not vary dramatically in the course of  the century. The prices 
he reported for the years in question—16 livres 16 sous, 15 1. 18 s., 16 1. 1 s., and 
15 1. 17 1/2 s.—are significantly higher than those published by Labrousse.
106 AAP, 105, liasse 9, nos. 1 and 2.
107 Michelet, Histoire de France, XVI, 124–25; R.R. Palmer, The Age of  the Democratic Revolution, 
(Princeton, 1959), I, 86–99. Cf. H. Martin, The Decline of  the French Monarchy, trans. by 
M.L. Booth (Boston, 1866), 203 and Moreau, Souvenirs, ed. by C. Hermelin, I, 28.
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The failure of  the climate of  post-war uncertainty and political 
volatility to deter reform and the fact that previous ministries, in times 
when low prices converged with domestic and international peace, 
had never dared to envision such reform, suggest that other factors, 
not encompassed in a “circumstantial” explanation, were at work. 
Stagnating prices fashioned one seam in a complex web; they were 
a necessary but not a sufficient condition to motivate liberalization.
Another explanation, which also emerged from contemporary 
comment, a product of  the unwitting complicity of  the économistes 
and their adversaries, can be called the thesis of  conspiracy. Although 
the friends of  Quesnay were by no means entirely satisfied with the 
legislation of  1763–64, they were delighted to acknowledge spiritual 
paternity. They intimated that it would not have been realized with-
out their pressure and they let it be known that dupont and Turgot 
actually collaborated in drafting it.108 Not till late in the decade, in the 
midst of  serious political and social troubles, did their attitude toward 
the achievement become somewhat captious and detached.
Their critics, however, generously insisted on placing credit where it 
was due. In their view the king was not a convert but a captive. They 
played a variation on the venerable theme in the literature of  oblique 
political dissent which exculpated the prince by blaming his coun-
selors. The pernicious “doctrine” of  the économistes, in the words of  
Mably, “infected” the ministry. “A part of  the ministry,” wrote Linguet, 
“[had] become pupil and proselyte of  the flour fanaticism of  which 
I have spoken.” The économistes, “with their unfortunate brochures,” 
charged Mercier in his gay and mordant Tableau, “have struck the peo-
ple with a calamity for which equitable history will not fail to reproach 
them.” They have no right to deny responsibility, he added: “it was 
in their name and following their books that this great commotion 
was given to the grain trade.” In milder tones, Galiani characterized 
them as the “promoters” and “instigators” of  the reform; with their 
swaggering claims of  expertise, their “poise” and “assurance,” they 
“convinced” the government to make the changes. In similar fash-
ion, highly placed royal officials and magistrates traced the reforms 
to the “speculative” writings of  the friends of  Quesnay. Accord-
ing to Béguillet, the économistes “wrested, as it were, from the pater-
nal goodness of  the Sovereign the famous law of  exportation which 
108 Schelle, Dupont, 24; Turgot, Œuvres, ed. by Schelle, II, 48.
Illustration 4. One type of  passport required for the transit of  grain. Private collection.
Illustration 5. Officials supervising the reception and sale of  grain at the Paris ports. 
Grands Moulins de Paris.
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gave such terrible jolts to the State.”109 In almost the same words, the 
économiste Roubaud inverted the formula, claiming that it was not the 
reform which was extorted from a besieged king but the “restrictions” 
annexed to it which were “in a way wrested” from a philosopher-
prince devoted to the principle of  unconditional liberty:
His wish was for complete competition, for the greatest liberty, the general and indefi-
nite liberty. But by a paternal condescension, he wished to leave no anxiety to those who 
might not yet have sufficiently felt the advantages which liberty must procure.110
Based on a consensus of  opinion composed of  partisans and adver-
saries of  the liberal reforms, the conspiratorial thesis, or its polemical 
 counterpart, the thesis of  a True Believer-king, has strong claims to 
credibility. Even if  we did not know that two militants had a direct hand 
in writing the preambles, some of  their key phrases are transparently lib-
eral or physiocratic. Having already printed économiste tracts in his craft 
shop at Versailles, the king could reasonably be expected to publish the 
new laws on the same political economy press. Madame de Pompadour 
energetically promoted the connection between Quesnay and the king. 
Political economy, to be sure, is not bedroom philosophy but there is no 
cause other than an instinctive distrust of  anecdotal history and a cer-
tain lack of  imagination to discount this intimate channel of  influence. 
The économistes themselves viewed her death as a blow to their party.111
When post-Revolutionary defenders of  the old order sought to 
trace the origins of  subversion, they habitually pointed to the stun-
ning triumphs of  the enlightened literati, outsiders and mavericks 
unfamiliar with public affairs and excluded from all the meeting-
houses except the salon, classic refuge for reverie and libertinage. 
But, as we have seen, many of  the most telling critiques of  royal 
109 Béguillet, Traité des subsistances, 797; Abbé de Mably, Du Commerce des grains (1755), in Collection 
complète des æuvres de l’abbé Mably, ed. by Arnoux (Paris, an III), XIII, 298; Linguet, Annales, VI 
(1779), 303; Mercier, Tableau, VI, 228, 232–233; Galiani, Dialogues sur le commerce des bleds, ed. 
by Fausto Nicolini, 88, 133. Cf. Charles desmarest, Le Commerce des grains dans la généralité de 
Rouen à la fin de l’ancien régime (Paris, 1926), 111–12; Marion, Finances, I, 242n; Henri Martin, 
Histoire de France (Paris, 1860), XVI, 232. For a contrary view, argued rather simplistically, 
see René Girard, L’Abbé Terray et la liberté du commerce des grains, 1769–1774 (Paris, 1924), xxiv.
110 Roubaud, Représentations, 39. His italics.
111 Schelle, Dupont, 27–28. For another, more subtle variation on the “conspiracy” theme, this 
one involving Quesnay, La Chalotais, and one of  the king’s lesser mistresses, see below, 
chapter 11.
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policy emanated from within, or nearly within, the public adminis-
tration: from financial, municipal, and royal officials and commis of  
the ministries. If, by the sixties, the highest councils were “infected” 
with liberalism, it was less the product of  infiltration than of  sponta-
neous generation. The government secreted its own reformers, men 
who benefited enormously from the critical methods and insights 
of  the philosophes but who came to their liberalism personally 
and professionally, as a result of  their own participation in public 
administration. The ministries did not have to send their officials 
to the salons for an education; the salons recruited in the bureaus.
Bertin’s government, it was noted, counted more than a half-
dozen liberal or économiste counselors. doubtless some were merely 
quondam consultants or transient hangers-on. Others, however, 
such as Trudaine de Montigny, were solidly entrenched in the royal 
bureaucracy. Highly placed in the Contrôle-Général, Trudaine fils 
enjoyed an extraordinary administrative apprenticeship at the side 
of  his father, “the great Trudaine,” provincial intendant, intendant 
of  finances, master-road-builder, and close collaborator of  Vincent 
Gournay. From the beginning of  his career he had to deal with con-
crete problems of  commercial and industrial organization, agricul-
tural growth, and state regulation of  and investment in the economy. 
He visited ports and mines, studied navigation and engineering, prac-
ticed mathematics, chemistry, agronomy, and natural science. To pre-
pare for reforms which firsthand examination convinced him were 
necessary, he immersed himself  in legal history in order to be able to 
tell his future adversaries: “I know better than you these laws which 
you reproach me with desiring to destroy; and it is because I know 
them that I would like to change them.” A man of  many interests, 
he was sufficiently worldly to earn passing censure for “dissipation” 
and versatile enough to write poetry and translate Lessing as well as 
compose preambles for Controllers-General from Bertin to Turgot.112 
His critics felt he was too intellectual, overly given to “theory”; the 
due de Croy solemnly warned Turgot in the mid-seventies against 
adopting “a system à la Trudaine.”113 Croy specifically referred to 
112 Ernest Chouillier, “Les Trudaine,” Revue de Champagne et de Brie, XIV (1883), 19–23, 131–36, 
208–210; Grandjean de Fouchy, “Eloge de M. de Trudaine,” Histoire de l’Académie Royale 
des Sciences (Paris, 1780 for the year 1777), 70–93; denis diderot, Correspondance, ed. by 
Georges Roth (Paris, 1955–1970) IV, 306; Weulersse, Mouvement, I, 118, 204; Mauguin, 
Etudes historiques sur l’administration de l’agriculture en France (Paris, 1876–77), I, 336.
113 Bachaumont, Mémoires secrets, X, 193 (8 Aug. 1777); duc de Croy, Journal 
inédit du Duc de Croy, 1718–1784, ed. by Vicomte de Grouchy and Paul Cottin 
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Trudaine de Montigny’s grain trade policy which, along with his well-
known sympathy for Quesnay’s group, gave him a reputation as an 
économiste. Trudaine regarded the battle for liberalization as his great-
est challenge; he campaigned vigorously for the reform measures of  
1763–64, believing them to be “the salvation of  the kingdom and of  
mankind.” In the following years his struggle to enforce and preserve 
these reforms against the hostility of  “most” of  the nation inspired by 
“the most absurd and the most popular prejudices” was, in his own 
words, also the “source of  my great troubles.” It compromised his 
health and nearly broke his spirit.114
The conspiratorial thesis, whether it is meant to flaunt or to flay 
physiocracy, is as superficial and misleading as it is engaging. On the 
one side, it begs the perplexing question of  the relationship of  old-
regime politics to lumières or, rather, reduces it to caricatural simplicity. 
On the other, it implicitly posits a factitious dichotomy between ideas 
(the reserve of  thinkers) and administration (the domain of  ministers 
and commis) thereby denying the government any possiblity of  intel-
lectual originality. Both sides exaggerate the malleability and underes-
timate the nerve of  the government. There was indeed a rendez-vous 
between policy and doctrine in the sixties. It was, however, the min-
isters, not the doctrinaires, who set the time, the place and the condi-
tions. Physiocracy, to be sure, made its influence felt in a multitude 
of  ways. But it is worth remembering, with Turgot, that physiocratic 
thinking antedated physiocracy. In a number of  areas, particularly 
tax reform and, to a lesser extent, the regulation of  manufacture, the 
royal government took quasi-économiste positions before the time of  
Quesnay. Nor did the ministries of  the sixties show serious interest in 
the other major economic and political reforms dictated by physio-
cratic doctrine. Politically, the government sought to avoid the extrem-
ist stigma attached to the économistes. For obvious reasons it tried to 
promote the idea that it was above doctrine even as it was above party. 
The government wanted to project a reputation for independence 
 (Paris, 1906–07), III, 139. Trudaine shared with Turgot a remarkably similar background 
and a close friendship. Turgot to dupont, 20 Aug., 1 dec. 1769, Oeuvres, ed. by Schelle, III, 
61, 72 and II, 64–65.
114 Grandjean de Fouchy, “Eloge de Trudaine,” Histoire de l’Académie Royale des Sciences (Paris, 
1780 for the year 1777), 80; Chouillier, “Les Trudaine,” Revue de Champagne et de Brie, XIV 
(1883), 209–210; Trudaine to Sartine, 13 Sept. 1768, Archives Seine-Paris, 3 AZ 10, 
pièce 6; Weulersse, Mouvement, I, 77–78, 119. Trudaine allegedly refused the Controller-
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and sobriety of  the sort which enabled one prominent journalist, who 
had no love for philosophy, to characterize its attitude toward the 
grain question as a “middle position” between opposing camps.115 
Ostensibly the économistes gave the government encouragement and 
confidence, but whether in fact they gave more than they received 
remains an open question. The government provided them with 
extraordinary protection, promoted their journal, found posts for 
their votaries, and probably financed some of  their tracts.116 It used 
the économiste school to serve its own needs: it benefited from the 
impact of  physiocratic propaganda upon certain segments of  public 
opinion without incurring responsibility for their affronts or extrava-
gances. On the question of  agricultural and commercial policy the 
interests of  the government and the aims of  the liberals converged. 
The point of  confluence was a common perception of  the state of  the 
economy and its potential for expansion. This analysis was the fruit 
of  the field experience of  the Bertins and the Trudaines, the reports 
of  subdelegates and intendants, the accounting books of  landown-
ers, and the successes of  other nations such as England. Quesnay’s 
Tableau, like the liberal reforms, resulted from it; the “zig-zag” did not 
produce it. That this view, in addition to reflecting economic realities, 
also stood in conformity to natural law was a kind of  unearned intel-
lectual increment from which the government profited, significantly, 
but incidentally.
Liberalization was above all an economic policy whose goal 
was to increase the wealth and power of  the state by making the 
nation more prosperous and industrious. That does not mean 
that the government was indifferent to the political and the philo-
sophical implications of  liberalism as a doctrine. As a broadly con-
ceived approach to governing and as a political posture, rather 
than as exclusive and irrefragable dogma, the theory of  liberalism 
appealed to the government in a number of  ways. Liberal theory 
argued, first of  all, that the perennial state of  impoverishment of  
the king—which made him vulnerable to political blackmail and 
tempted him to lean too heavily on the tax-paying, overwhelmingly 
rural public—was not simply or even primarily a result of  careless 
and inefficient management, prodigality, and corruption. It had 
more profound causes than generally supposed, connected with the 
115 Année littéraire, I (1770), 290.
116 diderot in Grimm, Correspondance littéraire, ed. by M. Tourneux, VIII, 373 (Nov. 1769); 
Bachaumont, Mémoires secrets, XIX, 171–72 (18 April 1770); Weulersse, Mouvement, I, 209.
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very structure of  the economy and the society and unsusceptible to 
short-run, make-shift resolution. The government found it strangely 
reassuring to learn that a grave and chronic problem had deeper 
roots than expected. This line of  reasoning offered the king a shelter 
from immediate pressure, applied particularly by the parlements, by 
suggesting, on the one hand, that fundamental reforms were the only 
way to remedy the situation—a prospect unlikely to enamor the sov-
ereign courts—and, on the other, that such measures required long, 
painstaking preparations—a claim virtually impossible to refute. It 
challenged royal critics to discuss public policy on an entirely new 
plane. As a pledge of  good faith, the king presented the reform of  
1763–64 as the first thrust in the new departure.
The advantage of  this diversionary approach was that it seemed, 
unlike myriad previous ones, to be part of  a logical, consistent whole. 
In this respect, as the vehicle for a systematic attitude toward prob-
lem-solving, liberal theory found a warm welcome in the ministry, 
especially among the professional public servants surrounding the 
Controller-General and the top officials at the sub-ministerial level. 
These men were disgusted and demoralized by years of  half-hearted 
cosmetic measures, of  equivocation and capitulation, and of  brusque 
changes of  personnel at the highest levels. Liberal theory promised 
to replace a frustrating, sometimes humiliating politics of  expedients 
and ploys with a coherent and enlightened politics built on princi-
ples—principles drawn from nature and sanctioned by (Cartesian) 
insight and (Newtonian) observation. It gave them a stronger case 
and a brighter prospect for sustained policy than they ever had before 
and a fresh enthusiasm for serving the king.
While it buoyed ministerial morale, liberalism, as an officially 
endorsed idea, had a potentially grander purpose. The new political 
economy offered the king a chance to insert his reign into the main-
stream of  the Enlightenment and to reply positively to critical stric-
tures from right to left. It had all the makings of  a counter-ideology, a 
progressive alternative to subversive philosophy and equally danger-
ous parlementarianism. It invited the king to take the offensive and 
reassert the moral leadership which critics charged he had sacrificed 
in favor of  vapid routine, debauchery, and oppression. Although more 
often than not they did a mediocre job in cultivating it, the king and 
his ministers were seriously concerned about their reputation. They 
were jealous of  the popularity of  the parlements and envious of  the 
prestige which accrued to the intellectuals; and they frankly avowed 
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their impotence to muzzle either group. The liberal posture meant an 
opportunity to steal a march on the parlements and gain a foothold 
in the camp of  the philosophes through the informal coalition with 
the économistes.
Physiocracy contributed the rudiments to the liberal royal ideol-
ogy. Stripped of  its most excessive tendencies (including Lemercier 
de la Riviére’s “legal despotism,” which embarrassed dupont and 
other politically-sensitive économistes because it seemed to be naked 
confirmation of  the parlement’s most apocalyptic premonitions) and 
interpreted not according to the letter but following the moderate 
spirit in which Quesnay and Mirabeau construed it (a modulated and 
selective hostility to “privilege,” a disavowal of  certain imprudences 
of  encyclopedism, a respect for rank and ritual, etc.), physiocracy was 
compatible with royal scruples. It met the essential criteria for reason-
in-government without promoting irreligion, immorality or disaffec-
tion. Instead of  history and fundamental law—muddled areas of  
controversy—it called upon the irresistible and impartial arbitration 
of  nature and physical law. Physiocracy in this form rejected the frag-
mentation of  sovereignty and the claims of  the intermediary bod-
ies, but it prescribed limits on kingship and envisioned an alterna-
tive system of  national political participation. Eminently practical, 
it fashioned a politics geared to interest as well as to principles: the 
interests of  the elites in all three Estates whose wealth was predom-
inantly landed and agricultural. A sanitized, palatable, and supple 
ideology, the new political economy placed the king and his govern-
ment unequivocally on the side of  liberty, law, and progress.
Politically, the liberal ideology implied two strategies, two wagers: 
one concerned the king’s relationship with the nation at large while 
the other involved his attitude toward the parlements. Addressed spe-
cifically to the rural world, the liberal reform was an overture for 
support and confidence as well as a program for growth. In the six-
ties the government rediscovered this other France, the kingdom 
of  the majority, preponderant demographically and economically, 
superior quantitatively and, according to liberal evaluation, quali-
tatively too. The reform laws were a frank and contrite avowal of  
the king’s neglect of  the agricultural realm. They seemed to confirm 
the charge, commonly adduced by liberal and parlementary crit-
ics alike, that the government’s only interest in the countryside had 
been in levying heavier and heavier taxes. It was as if  the king real-
ized that he had fallen out of  touch with the nation and sought in a 
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single, dramatic stroke to make amends and to link the fate of  gov-
ernment policy with the destiny of  rural France.
Partisans of  the policy did not hesitate to see it as a rebuke to urban 
haughtiness, the beginning of  the end of  a Parisocentric preoccupa-
tion with luxury, manufactured goods, the court, salons, convulsions, 
rentes, and indolence. during the battle over liberalization, they char-
acterized the opposition as spurious and marginal precisely because 
it seemed to emanate primarily from the cities. Nor did Louis scruple 
to remind the Paris magistrates who protested against the reform that 
he was king of  all the people, not merely patron of  the capital. Rhe-
torically, the liberal laws had a fundamentalist air: a return to first 
principles and to the bond with the bone and sinew of  the nation, 
this “precious” part of  the people. despite économiste claims, however, 
the bone and sinew of  the countryside, buyers for the most part, more 
gravely menaced by high prices than by low, had more in common 
with the urban laboring poor than with the substantial laboureurs, the 
managerial fermiers, and the other comfortable landowners. It was the 
latter rather than the former who clamored for liberty and whose 
dominant socioeconomic position in the countryside (and, for that 
matter, in the cities) made the reform policy an alluring political gam-
ble. Styled as a bounty for the rural nation, liberalization was sure 
to be an immense pork barrel for the privileged and the proprietary 
interests.
The significance of  the liberal posture for royal-parlementary rela-
tions will emerge more clearly in the course of  our discussion of  the 
crisis which erupted after the promulgation of  the laws of  1763–64. 
It is an extremely complex question because it intersects with another 
crisis, one of  a constitutional order, which seethed in the sixties. In 
the constitutional view, the sixties witnessed a great battle between 
the forces of  light and the forces of  darkness. The king, cast almost as 
an underdog, sought to rationalize his administration by reaffirming 
his supreme authority. The parlements are seen as forming a united 
front of  hectoring obstructionism and obscurantism, devoted single-
mindedly to the defense of  privilege in all its manifestations. From the 
perspective of  the liberal reforms, however, the lines and issues of  con-
frontation are less clear-cut. The defense of  royal prerogative was not 
the king’s paramount concern in this matter; his stance was modest 
and placatory rather than imperious. Liberalism was not the uncon-
tested touchstone of  enlightenment; this affair plunged the philosophes 
into profound disaccord. The parlements were bitterly divided within 
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and among themselves and their positions do not fit easily into the 
conventional categories of  motivation and purpose. Liberalization 
wrought strange alliances. La Chalotais, who was hardly a perfect 
king’s man, espoused the royal cause, yet the Brittany Parlement, 
despite its attachment to the Procurator General, changed its mind on 
liberalization in mid-stream. The Parlements of  Toulouse and Greno-
ble, which opposed the government’s fiscal measures in 1763 with such 
violence, remained staunch supporters of  the liberal laws. Though 
stained with the blood of  the Calas, the Toulouse magistrates earned 
the encomiums of  the philosophe-économistes for the ardor with which 
they preached the law of  nature. Rouen categorically renounced the 
new political economy after mid-decade but it joined the liberal Parle-
ments of  Languedoc, dauphiné, and Provence in a proto-Girondin 
uprising in 1768 against the privileged status of  Paris. The Paris court, 
incidentally, also drew provincial ire for its jurisdictional claims in the 
d’Aiguillon affair.117 Whether the union des classes was a convincing 
political hypothesis upon this background is difficult to say.
The liberal ideology had a more subtle bearing on royal-parlemen-
tary rapport. The reform of  1763–64 hinted at ground for a possible 
understanding between king and courts based on a new style of  gover-
nance. Like all laws, these measures were formally the product of  his 
“full power” and “certain science.” But the tone and substance of  the 
texts belied the formula. In part they were an autocritique of  self-suf-
ficient absolutism, absolutism which depended singularly on its own 
sagacity for instruction. By the same token they cast doubt on the reli-
ability of  fundamental law, the congeries of  precedents to which the 
parlements insisted the king must cede. The source of  royal inspiration 
for the reform was natural law—neutral terrain between absolutist 
prerogative and parlementary pretension. The king stood in relation 
to it less as legislator than as executor. Voluntarily, the king assumed 
117 This is a summary statement of  a position I will develop in the course of  the book. The 
major indicators are: La Chalotais, speech of  20 Aug. 1764, cited by dZ [desaubiez], 
Le Bonheur public, 36; Journal économique (Aug. 1768), 352; Mercure historique, CLXV, 281–95; 
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a humble pose. The liberal posture endowed kingship with a new and 
fashionable image. The bloated and blustery prince of  the interven-
tionist administrative monarchy reappeared as the lean and unobtru-
sive king who governs less in order to govern better.
In return for this streamlined model of  rational monarchy the par-
lements would be expected to give up their party spirit. If  both sides 
submitted to it in good faith, natural law would mediate their quar-
rels and neither party would lose face. King and parlements would 
collaborate to make fundamental law and positive law uniformly con-
gruent with natural law. Cooperation would be assured provided the 
parlements agreed with the king’s conception of  natural law.
Theoretically, from this relationship, a set of  rules of  governance 
would emerge. The parlements would be able to deal with a mon-
arch who did not act capriciously or willfully. The king, by mak-
ing his authority hostage to nature’s law, would win immunity from 
political contestation. Over the years the parlements had developed 
a “broad program of  constitutional liberalism.”118 Insistent, however, 
on preserving a world honeycombed with privileges, they fashioned a 
political and legislative liberalism denuded of  any social implications. 
Now the king postulated a radically different version of  liberalism, 
a socioeconomic and executive liberalism surely corrosive of  privi-
lege but steadfastly opposed to sharing political power. In the long 
run, parlementary liberalism more than anything else undermined 
the prestige of  the monarchy and thereby destroyed the court’s own 
raison d’être. At the end of  the sixties, the voice of  royal liberalism 
was stifled by the very grain crisis it helped precipitate. The parle-
ments could not agree upon a common position and the king ulti-
mately recoiled in the face of  grave disorders. With the failure of  the 
coup de nature, the crown resorted to the coup de force. At the end of  the 
decade the king abjured the liberal posture and at the same time dis-
solved the old parlementary system. Curiously, the government did 
not again experiment with political economy until the parlements of  
nostalgia were recalled to life in the mid-seventies.
The circumstantial and conspiratorial/ideological theses, originally 
stated by contemporaries, suggested a number of  ways to account 
for liberalization. Another view, which also surfaced at the time, can 
be called the thesis of  fiscality. Although it ultimately nurtured yet 
another bogey-man theory, the idea of  linking fiscality with the grain 
118 Palmer, Age, I, 99.
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question or with any other object of  royal policy was a perfect com-
monplace. The vast majority of  Frenchmen conceived of  the state 
above all as tax collector. Taxation, perhaps even more than justice, 
was the most salient manifestation of  the presence of  the govern-
ment in the kingdom. Since the state was chronically short of  funds 
and applied all its cunning to augment its resources, it could under-
take virtually no act free of  the taint of  fiscal motive. Suspicion and 
innuendo were rife, not merely because vocal hostility to taxation was 
one of  the few direct political actions within the grasp of  the mass of  
people, but also because administrative organization reinforced the 
notion that all the agencies of  government were in the service of  the 
fisc. Blurred and overlapping institutional perimeters invited distrust. 
In the financial administration, where several concurrent bureaucra-
cies operated, no visible frontier separated public function from pri-
vate enterprise. The intendant’s fiscal responsibilities obscured and 
overshadowed his police and judicial duties. At the highest levels, it 
hardly seemed accidental that the intendants of  finance were the offi-
cials in charge of  the grain and subsistence department and that the 
head of  the bureau of  impositions supervised agrarian reform.
Since grain was the chief  measure of  wealth as well as the predomi-
nant form of  subsistence, the obsession with fiscality often thwarted 
efforts to facilitate distribution on a regional or national scale. Inten-
dants exaggerated or invented reports of  scarcity in order to win 
rebates on taxation. Conditioned to expect fiscal reprisals, lower-level 
officials and cultivators leagued to resist royal and parlementary data-
collecting projects. The sincerity of  the Controller-General seemed 
dubious when he appealed to his subordinates to press the taille levy 
vigorously in order to force grain on depleted markets and spare con-
sumers anguish. Nor did the manner in which the government handled 
grain policy tend to clear the odor of  fiscality. It was widely believed 
that the government sold authorizations to export for limited periods 
to the highest bidders. In times of  emergency, it seemed significant that 
the government turned to the farmers-general, to old style financiers 
like Samuel Bernard and the new magnates of  the private bank like 
Isaac Thellusson to undertake enormous purchases of  foreign grain.
Somewhat mysterious and remote at the olympian heights of  the 
center, the marriage of  fiscality and provisioning was garishly cel-
ebrated at the marketplaces. Consumers chafed at the multitude of  
taxes and duties which encumbered foodstuffs and goods while sellers 
had to pay petty ransoms for permission to dispose of  their goods. A 
 THE ORIGINS OF LIBERTY 157
panoply of  minor officials mediated exchanges in return for obliga-
tory honorariums. Many of  these inspectors and controllers rendered 
important services to the police and the public, but the others, whose 
venal posts were created for purely fiscal reasons, served to discredit 
their colleagues.
A long line of  commentators, beginning in the late sixties and con-
tinuing through the Revolution, ascribed the liberal reforms to fiscal 
or parafiscal motives. The parlements had made fiscal criticism their 
speciality. It was not merely their bête noire; it was the one issue that 
gave them the greatest leverage and sustained their political ambi-
tions. Before the sixties, the courts took the tack that a reduction of  
the taille would provide the surest stimulation to agriculture. Liberal-
ization jarred their unity but did not dull their fiscal consciousness. 
Two distinguished Paris magistrates, the Presidents Lepelletier and 
Hocquart, sitting in the Assembly of  General Police in 1768, warned 
that behind the desire to foster higher prices lay a scheme to increase 
taxes, especially the vingtièmes. Their colleagues at Rouen shared the 
same idea: the wealth to be generated by liberalization would be noth-
ing more “than a pretext to raise taxes.” In its famous remonstrances 
against Turgot’s edicts in 1776, the Paris Parlement recalled the lib-
eral measures of  ‘63–‘64 as acts of  fiscal desperation. Financially 
exhausted, the ministry sought to prepare the ground for new tax 
incursions and simultaneously increase the product of  the old impo-
sitions by pushing up the price of  grain, land, and leases.119 Hinting 
both at fiscal and venal motives, Galiani had the President in his Dia-
logues remark cryptically: “some believe it [liberty] to be a financial 
speculation, others a means of  facilitating the collection of  the tailles 
.…” The philosophe Mably viewed liberalization as a pretext for fis-
cality, nothing more than a “new tax.” An article in the Moniteur in 
the fall of  1789 suggested that the aim of  liberalization, in addition 
to “brigandage,” was to double the production of  the vingtièmes. A 
farmer and correspondent of  several societies of  agriculture writing a 
few years later in a pamphlet on “the means to assure a diminution of  
[the price of] bread and prevent dearths” echoed the same interpreta-
tion. Nor were these admonitions and innuendos simply political red 
herrings. On the morrow of  liberalization, in the Edict of  Novem-
ber 1771 extending the life of  the two vingtièmes and establishing 
119 Recueil, 184, 229; Anonymous, “Mémoire,” (1771), AN, F11 264; remonstrances, Parl. of  
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still other droits, the government itself  justified the increased tax bite 
in terms of  the sustained price rise of  the sixties and the added value 
it gave to land and produce.120
Although it cannot pretend by itself  to account for liberalization, 
the thesis of  fiscality correctly points to one of  the cardinal preoccu-
pations of  the government in the sixties. Repeated failure to restruc-
ture the tax system, extend its base, and rationalize assessment and 
collection finally persuaded the government to change its approach. 
Alarmed and wearied by the rising tenor of  fiscal criticism, much of  
it aimed at the ministry and the crown rather than at the privileged 
elites, the government sought to divert attention away from finances. 
In 1763 it accepted a dubious and jerry-built compromise with the 
parlements, an accord which could only be justified by the govern-
ment’s desire to buy a breathing space no matter what the price. At 
the same time an arrêt du conseil imposed a ban of  silence on the dis-
cussion of  fiscal affairs by prohibiting all publications concerning that 
subject. determined to postpone but not to abandon fiscal reform, 
the government launched its policy of  liberalization, which turned 
the focus on incentives rather than on impositions, on the positive 
question of  wealth rather than the negative matter of  taxes.
There is no doubt, however, that the Controllers-General, like 
doctor Quesnay, envisaged the anticipated expansion of  the GNP 
as a surrogate for and a prelude to fundamental fiscal reform. In the 
short run, the general increase in production and productivity would 
automatically augment tax revenue along existing bases. Later, it was 
imagined, under the tonic influence of  prosperity, a structural reform 
could be more easily effected. Bertin stressed the fiscal component in 
liberalization, reminding intendants that low prices prevented culti-
vators from meeting tax obligations. Laverdy assured the intendant 
of  Tours that “it will not be long before you see in the payment of  
taxes” one of  the first benefits of  liberalization. Four years later, in a 
report to Louis XV, the Controller-General explicitly tied the deci-
sion to free the grain trade to the increasingly “cruel” financial situa-
tion of  the state. Writing in the next decade, a high ministerial official 
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described the desire to “make the king’s revenues more abundant” as 
one of  the chief  “principles which directed the administration from 
1763 through 1768.”121
Among the champions of  liberalization, the deputies of  commerce 
did not blush to raise the fiscal issue as a solid argument in their favor. 
Merely by increasing the kingdom’s resources, they claimed, exporta-
tion would simultaneously reduce the burden on the people and swell 
royal income.122 Other liberals went a step further, linking the suc-
cess of  liberalization with the implementation of  major fiscal reforms 
in the kind of  multi-stage process envisaged by the government. By 
reinvigorating agriculture and restoring prosperity, the Procurator 
General La Chalotais told the Rennes court, liberalization will make 
possible “a plan of  taxation based on true and unique principles,” 
that is, on the physiocratic assumption of  the exclusive productivity 
of  the land.123 For the Parlement of  dauphiné, liberalization marked 
“the most memorable epoch” in the reign of  Louis XV because it was 
both the beginning of  and the precondition to “the regeneration of  
the body politic.” Without the liberty of  the grain trade there was “no 
reform possible.” In its wake, however, the Parlement told the king, 
landed income will be increased, “leading us by degrees to a simpler 
and more equitable plan of  contributions to public expenses and thus 
preparing the total replacement of  the [current] fiscal regime.”124 
These grand ideas were comfortably remote and hypothetical, but 
we are not obliged to discount them merely because they were pro-
nounced by parlementaires. They were not rhetorical devices aimed 
at persuading the ministry to introduce the reforms; the new laws 
were already on the books. They dealt with too controversial and deli-
cate a matter to be interpreted simply as gestures to gratify the gov-
ernment or as spontaneous effusions of  enthusiasm.
From another perspective, this parlementary position could be 
construed as a solemn warning to the government: liberalization is 
121 Bertin to IN. of  Alençon, 13 April 1762, C. 90, A.d. Orne; Laverdy to Lescalopier, July 
1764, C. 94, A.d. I-et-L.; Biollay, Pacte de famine, 109–110; St.-Prest, memoir, Sept. 1773, C. 
1441, A.d. Gir.
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your last best chance for genuine reform. But if  this is so it is less 
significant for the threat, which was already the ministry’s working 
premise, than for the willingness to talk seriously, albeit vaguely, about 
eventual and necessary fiscal reforms. Still, when the intoxication 
with liberal-style reform began to wear thin, the liberals did not shy 
from attempting a sort of  fiscal blackmail as a lever for tightening 
the resolve of  the king to maintain liberalization. Without the con-
tinued permission to export, warned the Estates and the Parlement 
of  Languedoc, the province would not be able to meet the present 
tax schedule or entertain the possibility of  an increment.125 Over-
shadowed by broader economic and political considerations, fiscality 
nonetheless lurked in the atmosphere of  the liberal reform.
The thesis of  fiscality had another side which bore a conspirato-
rial visage and which had serious political significance. In its broad 
outlines, it was not peculiar to the sixties. In this view the king stood 
accused of  speculating in grain. In its mildest form, however, the 
gravity of  the charge was mitigated by ascribing the monarch’s 
motives to fiscality rather than to personal venality. In 1752 the mar-
quis d’Argenson reported the news that the king was manipulating 
the grain trade to force prices up in order to increase his tax revenue. 
A warm partisan of  liberty and lean government, his analysis of  this 
episode is interesting, for it reveals the enormous complexity of  the 
grain/subsistence issue and the tension between fine theory and hard 
social fact. d’Argenson deplored “this bad principle … which has it 
that grain must always be at a certain price to enable the farmer to 
pay his master and the King.” Inverting the “false” and “dangerous” 
physiocratic formula that abundance and low prices mean misery, 
he argued that “the greatest abundance and the cheapest price for 
necessary foods is the best of  principles .…”126 d’Argenson, in this 
instance, censured the king for erroneous policy, not perfidy.
Elsewhere in his Mémoires, however, d’Argenson implicated a num-
ber of  ministers—he skirted the issue of  direct royal responsibility—
in vast schemes to corner the grain market and profit from public 
misery. In the sixties, Leprévost de Beaumont, a lay ecclesiastical offi-
cial, detected similar sinister designs to which he gave the portentous 
name of  Pacte de Famine, or famine plot. The story of  the Pacte will 
be told later; here it is imperative to note that Leprévost specifically 
125 Anon., “Mémoire,” 8 Aug. 1773, AN, F11 265; Weulersse, Mouvement, II, 249.
126 d’Argenson, Mémoires, ed. by Rathery, VII, 285 (27 Aug. 1752).
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linked the alleged Pacte to the liberal reforms of  1763–64. He, too, 
claimed to be a champion of  liberty, an admirer of  Sully, a believer in 
the primacy of  landed-wealth. But he became convinced that liberal-
ization was introduced as an elaborate cover for illicit and shameful 
speculations:
Everything here is thought out and disposed as carefully as possible in order to try to 
conciliate in some fashion the public interest with the renewal of  the clandestine Pacts 
and sub-pacts of  Famine .…127
It was devilishly clever, he acknowledged, to conceal monopoly in the 
very acts devised to extirpate it.
The importance of  Leprévost’s interpretation as a clue to the 
impression “pacte” allegations made on public opinion cannot be 
overestimated. Tales of  odious speculation had circulated for gen-
erations. Self-proclaimed muckrakers, jealous outsiders, and dearth-
syndrome paranoids had, over the years, exposed various plots at all 
levels of  public and private life. What gave credibility to the Pacte and 
enabled Leprévost to crystallize widely-shared suspicions, what trans-
formed it from a fugitive calumny into a political issue that endured 
until the end of  the nineteenth century, was the reform of  the grain 
trade. All the pieces seemed to fit neatly together. If  the king had traf-
ficked in grain in the past, he had done it modestly. Now it was as if  
he transferred his infamous trysting-place from the Parc aux Cerfs to 
the Tuileries gardens. Under the guise of  philosophy and the com-
mon good, he abolished all police controls on circulating grain in 
order to favor the maneuvers of  the cabalists and he devised legisla-
tion meant to veil the export of  the people’s grain which he planned 
either to sell or to store at the nearby isles of  Jersey for resale at a later 
time in France at inflated prices. The specter of  the Pacte prowled the 
streets, demoralized merchants, haunted the parlements, unnerved 
the économistes, and embarrassed and worried the government.
The thesis of  conspiracy coupling liberalization and the Pacte enjoyed 
great vogue during the Revolution. Creuzé-Latouche, addressing the 
Assembly in 1792, described the liberal reform as a vicious deception: 
Louis XV was engaged in the grain monopoly for his own profit; thus he wished first 
of  all to cover his agents with the shield of  the law … then they destroyed this same 
liberty by attributing it exclusively to themselves.128
127 Arsenal, mss. Bastille, 12353.
128 Archives Parlementaires (8 dec. 1792), 679. Cf. Pierre Manuel, La Police dévoilée (Paris, an II), vol. I.
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Buffered from the events by two decades, a liberal like Creuzé could 
argue righteously that liberty never received an honest test during the 
Old Regime. Obviously the earnest liberals of  the sixties, allies of  
the king, could not exploit this thesis in the same way—at least not 
openly. The opposition, however, used it to advantage, not so much 
to besmirch the king as to discredit the principle of  unconditional 
liberty which led ineluctably—witness the Pacte—to heinous crimes 
of  libertinage.
Finally, there was a royal thesis, a self-proclaimed motive for 
reform which Louis XV brandished with particular fervor. Liber-
alization was not introduced merely because it was right, necessary 
and natural. No less instrumental was the fact that it was enormously 
popular. It was not imposed from above; the king depicted the laws 
as a response to an extraordinary demand addressed to him “from 
everywhere.” Although it was the special vocation of  royal sapience 
to lead the people to the truth, in this case Louis cheerfully con-
ceded that he followed the tide of  opinion. In the debates in the royal 
council which preceded the reform it was reported that the dauphin, 
seconded by his father, spoke in behalf  of  the liberty “party” which 
 represented “approximately 12,000,000 Frenchmen.”129 To be sure, 
the gesture of  deference to opinion was a self-protective, political act. 
If  the reform aroused controversy, it would be known in advance that 
it was a program coveted by the nation itself, and for which the nation 
would have to bear responsibility. The government did not scorn this 
occasion to improve its public relations and to present the monarch as 
an enlightened and benevolent prince highly sensitive to the feelings 
of  his people.
But the appeal to opinion was not a nervous demagogic pirouette, 
in the parlementary style, or a hollow boast. It was a sign of  strength 
rather than of  weakness. For the popularity of  the liberal project was 
incontestable. Opponents of  the legislation later openly acknowledged 
that it came about “at the request of  all the Nation,” that the king 
undertook it“… in order to conform, as it were, to the desires of  his 
subjects.”130 Commentators who agreed on nothing else concurred 
that a feisty “enthusiasm” for liberty billowed across the kingdom in 
the early sixties. The government nurtured this sentiment, invited pres-
sure and petition, and took them as incentives and sanctions for action.
129 Grimm, Correspondance littéraire, ed. by Tourneux, VI, 29–30 (July 1764). There are no clues 
to indicate how the dauphin arrived at this figure.
130 Recueil, 113, 161–162.
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Although the ground had been prepared in many ways, liberal-
ization was still a sensational event, for it marked a decisive  rupture 
with one of  the great monarchical traditions. Favorable harvest 
 circumstances and such political issues as the end of  the war, the 
expulsion of  the Jesuits, and the fiscal vendetta helped to mask its 
significance. The government invested great hopes in liberaliza-
tion, both in the short and long runs. A highly influential and vocal 
segment of  public opinion vigorously supported the ministry and 
hoped it would move still further in the direction of  liberalization 
and reform. In 1763–64, everything seemed to augur well for the 
new  policy. The problem now was to implement the legislation— 
everywhere save in Paris—as rapidly and as unobtrusively as pos-
sible. If  the police apparatus could be quickly dismantled and the 
new system firmly entrenched without any serious accidents while the 
mood of  the nation remained calm, then liberalization could begin to 
bear its promised fruits immediately. Whether the mood of  the nation 
would remain calm, however, depended upon forces beyond the con-
trol of  the ministers and the political economists.
Chapter IV
THE RESPONSE TO LIBERALIZATION: 
THEORY AND PRACTICE
The explosion of  joy and gratitude that followed the promulgation 
of  the liberal measures seemed to confirm the royal claims. The May 
Declaration elated the Journal économique. In it the editors rediscovered 
the prince whose proud sobriquet had once been “the well-beloved”: 
they hailed “the august monarch that heaven gave for master to this 
great kingdom” and characterized him as “so justly cherished by all his 
people.” They regarded the declaration as a genuine triumph but they 
esteemed it more for what it portended than for what it actually was 
likely to achieve. It was “a first step,” the “forerunner” of  an “unlim-
ited” freedom which the king would not deny the nation. La Chalotais, 
the Procurator General of  the Rennes Parlement, asked the councillors 
to view the Declaration not “as a simple law of  interior police but as 
a Blessing of  the Monarch,” as one of  those momentous acts which 
provide for “the happiness of  peoples.” More than the measure itself, 
it was the certainty that it “will undoubtedly be followed by a complete 
and general liberty to export” that enraptured the Breton magistrate.1
The eagerly awaited July Edict, despite its limitations, generated 
a wave of  exultation. While the laboureurs shed happy “tears” in the 
fields, the effusions of  the journalists were no less lachrymose: “At 
last we see the dawn of  the beautiful day for agriculture for which 
we have sighed for so long.”2 In the Toulouse area, proprietors, par-
lementaires and local administrators celebrated the victory. “The 
liberty to export our grain … has become an immutable law which 
will render dear the memory of  the prince who issued it and the 
 1 Journal économique (Feb. 1764), 55–57; ibid., (Sept. 1763), 391; Speech of  La Chalotais, 
6 July 1763, C. 1648–49, AD. I-et-V. See the similar remarks in the provincial edition of  the 
Gazette du commerce (16 July 1763), 146.
 2 Journal économique (Nov. 1764), 492.
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citizen-minister who inspired it,” declared a representative of  the 
Toulouse Chamber of  Commerce.3 La Chalotais, whom the Corre-
spondance littéraire considered to be the only magistrate in the king-
dom with “the ideas and the tone of  a statesman,”4 judged the edict 
to be “in conformity with the wish of  the Nation which provoked 
it, with that of  the Estates of  the provinces, with experience which 
is the mistress of  man, with the sentiment of  Henry the Great and 
the illustrious Sully, with the opinion of  all those who examined this 
question in an unprejudiced and disinterested manner.” Henceforth 
there would be no reason to fear either dearths, or “what was almost 
as terrifying,” the superabundance of  harvests.5 Buoyed by its success, 
the liberty lobby continued to ask for an “absolute” and “indefinite” 
liberty throughout the decade of  the sixties. During the next few 
years king and government clung tenaciously to the idea that liberty 
was a truly popular policy despite growing evidence of  an angry and 
widespread reaction.6
This chapter deals with the origin and the nature of  the first stages 
of  the reaction against liberalization. First, I show that, despite the 
lack of  extensive opposition in the early sixties to this radical new 
policy, a number of  individuals and institutions expressed serious res-
ervations about liberalization. This early critique of  liberalism antici-
pated many of  the major arguments which later took shape against 
the reform and the reformers. Second, I consider the relationship 
between liberalization and the great political issues of  the hour which 
the parlements turned stunningly to their advantage. From the very 
beginning, there was some hesitation in several of  the sovereign courts 
about the wisdom of  the reform measures.
The bulk of  the chapter is devoted to the reaction in the field—the 
complaints of  the consumers and of  the police. The people responded 
to the burgeoning subsistence crisis of  the middle sixties in very much 
the same way that earlier generations had reacted to soaring prices, 
scarcity, and fear. It is not so much the kinds of  popular riots and 
 3 Cited by G. Frêche, “Etudes statistiques,” Revue d’histoire économique et sociale, XLIX (1971), 
214.
 4 Correspondance littéraire, ed. by Tourneux, VI, 124 (Nov. 1764).
 5 Speech of  La Chalotais, 20 Aug. 1764, C. 1648–49, A.D. I-et-V. Cf. Dz [Desaubiez], 
Le Bonheur public, 24–49.
 6 Though the liberals stressed its nation-wide popularity, there is some evidence that 
liberalization was not universally celebrated, not even in the beginning. See the remark of  
the intendant of  Champagne who was personally a believer in “total liberty”—at least in 
the beginning. Rouillé to SDs, 4, 24 Aug. 1764, C. 418, A.D. Marne.
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 demonstrations that are striking as their incidence and intensity. 
Equally important and far more singular in my estimation were the 
reactions of  the local authorities—reactions not only to grave sub-
sistence problems but to liberalization. The new departure in grain 
policy, I argue, alienated and crippled the police; I try to explain why. 
The Fronde of  the police as much as the popular riots in the towns and 
marketplaces placed liberalization in jeopardy.
I
In the early sixties there was no organized and powerful force which 
opposed the liberty movement, no vocal anti-lobby. Potential adversar-
ies found no leader around whom to rally; the king, natural candidate 
to raise a defense of  established ways, had deserted with his govern-
ment to the reform side. Nor was there an influential constituted 
body, corps, or company of  national or regional stature prepared to 
marshal resistance; the parlements, the best-equipped institutions for 
such opposition, seemed to be either won over or disarmed by the lib-
erals. There appeared to be little ground for political bickering on an 
issue which united crown and courts in deep embrace. Face to face, 
potential opponents did not discover any glaring differences between 
themselves and the liberals. The latter came from the city and the 
countryside, the north and the south, the government and the salons, 
and from a broad spectrum of  professions. Generally they were men 
of  some substance, a quality which distinguished them from the pop-
ulation at large but not from the sort of  men with whom they would 
debate political economy and public administration.
Unlike the reformers, their potential antagonists had neither a solid 
notion of  precisely what they were to be against nor a clear idea of  
exactly what they were to defend. After all, the reformers took pains to 
show that their projects were fully consonant with national traditions; 
the parlements attested to their legal legitimacy; the savants demon-
strated their scientific pedigrees; and the king vouchsafed that they were 
without risk and in the public interest. These references suggested that 
liberalization could turn out auspiciously. In any case, the limitations 
sagely built into the laws served as collateral against error. It seemed pre-
mature to assail the reform before it actually took effect, in conditions 
which posed no immediate socioeconomic risks, and at a time when 
other matters, especially those of  a fiscal nature, had greater claims 
on public attention. Liberty was not the sort of  issue which anyone 
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relished attacking abstractly, as an evil in itself; nor was police control 
a policy for which men found it easy to apologize in the abstract, as a 
good in itself. Later, a formidable opposition to liberty did arise—well 
after the liberal laws had gone into effect—forged not by the prospect of  
liberty, but by what were perceived to be its measurable results.
The failure to mount an effective resistance, however, did not 
mean that the liberal position went entirely unchallenged in the early 
sixties. A number of  magistrates, bureaucrats, and writers dissented, 
expressing specific reservations about one part or another of  the 
projected liberalization or more diffuse and serious doubts about its 
likely effects, accompanied in some cases by veritable intimations of  
doom. The issue divided the king’s own council; the monarch averted 
a stalemate by openly siding with the ministerial group against a bloc 
of  worried “old wigs” [sic] whose experience in public affairs taught 
them circumspection.7 The father of  the 1763 reform, Bertin, who 
remained in the government after his gentle disgrace from the Con-
trôle-Général toward the end of  1763, tried vainly to play a moderat-
ing role in the preparation of  the second phase. “I did everything in 
my power,” he confessed, to lower the export ceiling in the July Edict 
from 30 to 25 livres but he was overwhelmed by the “enthusiasm” of  
the moment.8
Firmly advocating maintenance of  the traditional system of  export 
by exception, the Bureau of  Commerce, which exercised quasi-
conciliar functions, voiced a theme which all the dissenters shared: 
unchecked exporting was dangerous for it defied a deeply ingrained 
“national prejudice” and it exposed the nation to dearth and hard-
ship.9 The Lieutenant Criminel of  the Châtelet predicted that if  grain 
exports were allowed in 1764 “it would be a fatal thing.” In a kindred 
tone, a correspondent of  the Journal de Commerce et d’Agriculture warned 
of  disaster should the decision to authorize exports coincide with a 
bad harvest. An anonymous memorialist argued that it would be par-
ticularly dangerous to permit exportation in the first years after the 
end of  the Seven Years’ War when the domestic demand, swelled by 
returning soldiers and by renewed orders from the colonies, would 
place unbearable pressure on the supply. For this writer, however, the 
real issue was not the timing but the principle of  the decision. “Physics 
 7 Correspondance littéraire, ed. by Tourneux, VI, 29, 30 (July 1764).
 8 Cited by Biollay, Pacte de famine, 111–12.
 9 Ibid., 108–109. Cf. Afanassiev, Commerce des céréales, 217–18, whose treatment is superficial 
and tendentious.
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is useless without experience,” he lectured the physiocrats; “theory can 
illuminate and perfect practice without ever replacing it.” Experience 
showed that abundance could never be excessive in a nation as large 
as France; so great and incalculable were its needs that it could never 
afford to be without a potential surplus, “a provision of  precaution.”10 
The intendant of  Paris, Bertier de Sauvigny, subscribed to the 
notion that it was the responsibility of  the government to make sure 
that the people were fed. He questioned not only the revision of  
the export rules but the wisdom of  tampering with any of  the old 
police regulations. “Since 1709,” he noted with satisfaction, “we par-
ried every major dearth and the French people never lacked subsis-
tence.” The renunciation of  police control, in Bertier’s mind, would 
jeopardize public order and social harmony and undermine respect 
for authority. Grimm recorded an instructive encounter between 
the intendant and Abeille, civil servant, agronomist, and sometime 
 économiste, in which Bertier expressed his pessimism candidly. The 
 latter “perorated pompously on the dangers of  this liberty.”
‘They [the government] moved very quickly,’ he said. ‘When the riots break out in 
Paris, when my windows and those of  the Lieutenant of  police are broken, it will be 
too late to remedy the evils of  this free and dangerous commerce.’ ‘Set your mind at 
rest,’ Abeille told him, ‘that is precisely what will not happen.’ ‘Once you deny the 
facts,’ replied the intendant, ‘there is no longer any use in arguing.’11
In early 1764 the Parisian municipality submitted a memoir to the gov-
ernment which somehow managed to pass as a cautious endorsement 
of  Laverdy’s liberalizing plans. It is significant because it proposed a 
series of  restrictions whose effect would have been to render the reform 
legislation meaningless and because it attacked the liberal approach 
so stormily. If  agriculture needs the “encouragement” of  exportation, 
the city fathers conceded, there could be no time “more favorable than 
the present.” But they took issue first with the pessimistic liberal assess-
ment of  the state of  agriculture in France and second with the idea that 
liberalization would be the most effective incentive. According to the 
 10 Testard du Lys, Lieutenant Criminel, in Recueil, 139; “Lettre concernant la liberté du 
commerce des grains,” Journal de commerce et d’agriculture (Jan. 1762), 71; “Commerce 
intérieur et extérieur des blés,” BN, mss. fr. 11347, fols. 213–16. Cf. similar strictures in 
Girade, “Cinquiéme mémoire contre la concurrence dans le fret…,” Journal de l’agriculture, 
du commerce, et des finances (June 1766), 167, 170–171.
 11 Bertier de Sauvigny, “Observations sur le commerce des grains,” (prior to May 1763), BN, 
mss. fr. 11347, fol. 229 and passim. Cf. “Questions et réponses,” ibid., fols. 247–48, and 
Correspondance littéraire, ed. by M. Tourneux, VI, 124 (Nov. 1764).
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municipality, the laboureur had “far greater need” of  tax relief, a prescrip-
tion frequently suggested by parlementaires and philosophes alike which 
the government could neither fill nor refute.12 Even if  we grant, the city 
fathers continued, that agriculture must have more outlets, “… it would 
be neither prudent nor wise to accord it an unlimited liberty.” Liberty 
must be “restrained and subject to rules” because “in good public econ-
omy as in private we must assure ourselves of  bread before we think 
about enriching ourselves.” The “people” have a claim on the “grain of  
the kingdom.” When they see it sent abroad, “they enter into fury [and] 
the riots and revolts become difficult to appease.”
This was the heart of  the issue for the municipality and a mea-
sure of  the gulf  between the police and liberal positions. The liber-
als emphasized wealth, profits, production, agriculture, commerce. 
For the elders of  the largest city in France, it was a different ques-
tion, “doubtless the most interesting by the importance of  the objects 
which it embraces and the most delicate by its consequences which it 
is possible to raise in the administration of  a State like France; it is a 
question of  nothing less than the Subsistence of  the People.”13
To make liberalization safe, the city fathers had several recom-
mendations wholly out of  character with the government’s new 
mood. First, freedom to export should only be granted when 
there exists a certifiable surplus. Not surprisingly, the municipality 
evaded the matter of  defining exactly what constituted a surplus 
in this huge, populous, and unevenly rich nation. Nor was it san-
guine about obtaining the vast amount of  detailed information 
on production, consumption, and distribution necessary in order 
to make accurate judgments. To deal with these questions the city 
fathers suggested the creation of  a new, collegial “general bureau” 
of  grain, despite the fact that the Contrôle-Général already 
had an intelligence system of  which it was proud. The proposal 
amounted to a censure of  Laverdy, for it implied that the govern-
ment was technically ill-prepared to undertake liberalization and 
that it was acting more on faith than on hard data. Clearly the 
 12 See, for example, the argument of  Joly de Fleury that a tax reduction would be a greater 
stimulus to growth than a price rise and Grimm’s warning that tax reform was a prerequisite 
for rural prosperity. Koly’s speech to Parl., 25 May 1763, Recueil, 43–44 and Correspondance 
littéraire, ed. by Tourneux, VI, 31 (July 1764).
 13 Registres du Bureau de l’Hôtel de Ville, Feb. 1764, AN, H * 1870, fols. 374–84; Jollivet 
de Vannes, procureur du roi et de la ville, to Saint Florentin (?), 29 Jan. 1764, AN, O1 361; 
“Mémoire et avis de Mrs. du Bureau de Ville” (1764), BN, mss. fr. 14296.
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municipality wanted exports to be authorized only exceptionally, 
under the strictest controls and for limited periods of  time in spe-
cially appointed places as it had always been in the past.
The second recommendation of  the city fathers specifically con-
cerned Paris. The liberals hoped that in the projected phase two 
of  liberalization all the remnants of  the police regime would be 
swept away, especially the Parisian apparatus. The procurator of  
the municipality replied, on the contrary, that liberalization would 
require authorities to “augment the precautions for Paris” because it 
enhanced the vulnerability of  consumers. Lacking a formal organi-
zation of  abundance, Paris lives nervously from “day to day” wholly 
dependent upon commercial avenues of  supply. The “slightest short-
age” and the “least increase of  prices,” argued the procurator, pro-
voke a panic mentality which threatens explosions whose “dangers 
are boundless.” The mere announcement of  a general permission 
to export will send a quiver of  anxiety coursing through the capi-
tal. Merchants and laboureurs who normally supply Paris will find the 
temptation to profit from the new outlets irresistible, the city official 
prophetically noted, and the pattern of  provisioning will be seriously 
disrupted. To forestall these dire consequences it was not enough 
simply to preserve the traditional police of  the capital; it had to be 
strengthened and extended. To make it impossible for suppliers to 
circumvent Paris, exports from the major ports of  Le Havre, Rouen, 
and Nantes should be prohibited, thereby sharply reducing the 
potential for centrifugal traffic on the Seine and Loire. To insulate 
Paris from liberalization, the procurator thus proposed not merely a 
quarantine around the capital but a cordon sanitaire around half  the 
kingdom yoked exclusively to the Paris provisioning system.
Finally, the city fathers reproached the liberals for their doctrinaire 
attachment to “their system,” for their distortion of  history for politi-
cal purposes (apotheosis of  Sully, vilification of  Colbert), and for other 
intellectual defects which became standard themes in the critique of  
liberalism which developed during the next ten years. The munici-
pality made its most astute and original remarks in regard to the use 
of  England as an example to follow. Contrary to the liberal concep-
tion, it contended, English grain policy was neither the only nor the 
best reason for English growth and prosperity. Moreover, England 
was not an appropriate model for France, not only for the usual geo-
physical and commercial reasons but because of  a political distinc-
tion which shaped the temperament and the values of  the citizenry. 
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The municipality sensed that there was an intimate connection 
between the British form of  government and the more or less liberal 
policy vis-à-vis the grain trade. England was a special case for its pecu-
liar constitution engendered a feeling of  participation and “patrio-
tism” which drastically reduced the hiatus between public and private 
interests. Neither political economy nor social ethics operated inde-
pendently of  the political system. French institutions did not promote 
a natural and ineluctable accommodation of  general and personal 
interests; on the contrary, they required explicit and diligent media-
tion. Given the striking differences between the two governments, the 
municipality concluded, there is no reason to puzzle that the liberal-
ism which admirably suited the one would fail egregiously to fit the 
other. The implication was arresting: for liberalism to work in France, 
major political changes would be necessary. It was left for Galiani and 
the anti-économistes at the end of  the decade to transform this argument 
into a precise warning: liberalism was a politically as well as a socially 
subversive program.
Joly de Fleury, Advocate General of  the Paris Parlement and scion 
of  the famous high robe dynasty, pronounced the most resolute and 
sophisticated critique of  the liberal movement in this early period. 
He foreshadowed many of  the arguments favored in the later years 
by the opposition party, which accorded him nearly heroic stature for 
his sibylline insights and his courage in resisting the tide of  opinion.14 
Joly’s status and the circumstances of  his demurrer gave his opinions a 
significance far greater than those of  the intendant, uttered privately 
or within the administration, or those of  the municipality, whose 
resonance was limited. Joly addressed the parlement, a quasi-public 
forum, in behalf  of  the “public ministry” whose voice he embodied. 
As a “king’s man,” with one foot within and one foot outside the par-
lement, his “conclusions” were carefully weighed by the magistrates. 
In July 1763, in defiance of  the royal will, he encouraged the court 
to question the merits of  the first of  the new grain laws. That the 
magistrates endorsed the reform despite the powerful case against 
it made by Joly suggests that liberalism, in one way or another, had 
made deep inroads into the sovereign court.
“It is extremely dangerous,” admonished Joly, “to run experiments 
on such a delicate matter and on one over which opinion, or if  you wish, 
 14 See, for example, the statements of  President Lefebvre and Advocate General Séguier in 
the Assembly of  General Police, Nov. 1764, Recueil, 114, 242.
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the prejudices of  the people, have so much sway.” Naturally the people 
were hypersensitive to a question upon which “their life depends.” For 
over 200 years the old structure of  police, codified in 1567 and 1577 
and renewed in 1699 and 1723, has worked remarkably well. Recently, 
a “new system” arose. It claimed that “these laws are imperfect, … 
that they are contrary to the progress of  agriculture, and that all these 
laws made with the aim of  favoring the consumer have become too 
unfavorable to the cultivator and the dealer.” This “strange system” 
shocked the Advocate General. No doctrine could be more incendiary; 
nothing was more likely to “cast alarm among the people.” Henceforth 
grain was to be denied any privileges or rights of  asylum:
They want to subject the commerce of  a good so necessary to life to the same prin-
ciples to which is subjected that of  things less useful and even superfluous.
Joly did not dispute the contention that the old laws offered special 
protection to the consumers. On the contrary, he assumed that there 
was a fundamental opposition of  interests between consumers and 
producers and he argued that since, in the nature of  things, the strong 
always command the weak, it was the responsibility of  the govern-
ment to favor the have-nots. He rejected, however, the liberal sug-
gestion that the tension between consumers and producers was really 
a contest between city and country. This equation was a false, polit-
ically-motivated device which aimed to polarize feelings and divide 
the nation. In fact, the majority of  the people in rural France were 
consumers like their brethren in the cities:
the artisans, the vintners, the manœuvriers, the poor who inhabit the countryside are not 
less desirous that bread be cheap.
A recipe for social disorganization, Joly de Fleury esteemed, was built 
into the liberal program. First of  all there will be a deadly lag between 
the augmentation of  the price of  grain and the compensatory increase 
in wages during which time the poor will suffer. Even after they begin 
to respond to the upward movement, wages will not rise in propor-
tion to the surge in prices. Employers will either cut back on jobs or 
will profit from the clamor for work by holding wages down. The net 
result will be an increase in misery and social strain and instability, too 
dear a price to pay for whatever advantages agriculture might derive. 
Agriculture, in any case, was not suffering as desperately as the liber-
als liked to imagine. The real “principle of  discouragement” in the 
countryside was onerous taxation, not depressed prices. A reduction 
 THE RESPONSE TO LIBERALIZATION: THEORY AND PRACTICE 173
of  this burden would do more for rural France than an augmentation 
in prices, with far less incidental damage.
Joly heartily approved the goal of  promoting internal circulation; 
this was the purpose, too, he claimed, of  all the old laws. But the 
prospect of  opening the trade to everyone he found “frightening.” He 
feared that the men who controlled the crop (laboureurs) would form 
“monopolies” with men who marshalled “influence and authority” 
(nobles and officers) and those who concentrated capital (financiers). 
Joly was particularly concerned about maintaining the sanctity and 
the centrality of  the marketplace. The psychological role played by 
the market was as important as its purely economic function. Unless 
grain was visible, the people were uneasy.
If  the suppliers cooperated, they could count on police indulgence. 
Joly insisted that it was a calumny and a misconception to depict 
the police as an impassive machine relentless in all seasons. Stringent 
laws remained on the books in case of  emergency; in normal times, 
the police “tempered” the formal rules or neglected to enforce them. 
Occasionally, the Advocate General conceded, an overzealous local 
official violated the tacit convention by executing the letter of  the 
law. Such outbursts of  assiduity, however, were exceptional and the 
victims could easily petition for relief.
To eliminate caprice and make the system more predictable, Joly 
was willing to consider some sort of  formal safeguards or institutional-
ized cues. One possibility would be to insert a clause in the basic police 
legislation making it operative only after prices reached a certain level. 
Joly ventilated this idea casually, without real conviction. “Perhaps,” he 
reflected, “all sides considered, it would be better yet to leave things in 
their present state, to prevent abuses, to contain those who prosecute 
the Declaration of  1723 with too much rigor and no discernment, and 
to live as we have lived.” Closing his case, fittingly, with a citation from 
Delamare and a warning against exportation, the next innovation on the 
horizon, the Advocate General beseeched the king for a new law which 
would contain some of  the features of  the May Declaration (freedom of  
interprovincial circulation, elimination of  duties and tolls which swelled 
the price of  bread, etc.) and many of  the traditional regulations (primacy 
of  market sales, restrictions on the right to enter the grain trade, etc.).15
Although they were primarily concerned with the projected impact 
of  liberalism, these vanguard critics vigorously contested a number 
 15 Joly de Fleury, speech to Parl., 5 July 1763, Recueil, 33–57.
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of  reformist assumptions about the present state of  France. The 
most significant part of  the argument turned on the conditions of  
French agriculture and placed in relief  the tension between politi-
cal and psychological needs on the one side and the perception of  
socioeconomic realities on the other. The liberals argued, often in 
shrill, alarmist tones, that the kingdom faced “imminent ruin” in the 
early sixties. To be sure, agriculture had been mired in “lethargy” for 
a long time. (Keeping their historical options open, the liberals never 
said precisely how long.) But in recent years, it showed evidence of  
a precipitous decline; it had passed beyond the stage of  languor to 
“decadence,” “desolation,” “destruction,” and “profound misery.” 
Signs of  crisis allegedly abounded: massive rural depopulation, strik-
ing diminution of  land under cultivation, technological stagnation, a 
loss of  half  of  the nation’s “real revenue,” and increases in indolence, 
mendicancy, and crime. The smashing defeat in the war, which could 
be seen as a symptom of  decay, further weakened the state and the 
economy. For this baleful situation, the liberals blamed the policy 
that pandered to the cities and the industries. The “restoration” of  
France would begin with the abolition of  the prohibitive regime.16
The critics retorted by accusing the liberals of  cultivating a gratu-
itously despondent mood and painting an excessively bleak picture 
of  the state of  affairs for political reasons. Joly de Fleury, we have 
seen, charged them with “exaggerating” and generally misrepre-
senting the plight of  rural France which, he suggested, had far more 
to do with the structure of  land distribution and fiscality than with 
prices and police. The Paris municipality derided the liberal legend 
of  a golden age when grain moved freely across frontiers, every 
parcel of  arable was under cultivation, and sober peasants paid 
close attention to improvement and growth. On the whole, argued 
 16 “Mémoire joint à l’avis des Députés du Commerce,” “Premier supplément au premier 
mémoire,” and “Deuxième supplément au premier mémoire,” BN, mss. fr. 14295; “Avis des 
députés du commerce sur le libre commerce des grains,” AN, F12 715; Roubaud, Représentations, 
345–46 and Récréations économiques ou lettres de l’auteur des Représentations aux Magistrats à 
M. le chevalier Zanobi, principal interlocuteur des “Dialogues sur le commerce des blés” (Amsterdam and 
Paris, 1770), 105–106; Voltaire, Siècle de Louis XIV, in Oeuvres complètes, ed. by Moland, XIV, 
523; Weulersse, Mouvement, I, 317–32. On the consequences of  the war, which no one faced 
squarely, see the remarks of  the king entered into the minutes of  the Conseil Secret of  the 
Parl., 11 Jan. 1769, AN, X1B 8957; the representations of  the Rouen Parl. (May 1768), in P. 
LeVerdier, ed., Correspondance Miromesnil, V, 210–211n; Voltaire, Précis du siècle de Louis XV, in 
Oeuvres complètes, ed. by Moland, XV, 373–75; remonstrances, 24 June and 9 Aug. 1763, in 
Flammermont, ed., Remontrances du Parlement de Paris, II, 349–50, 360, 362.
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the city government, land is better cultivated today and more of  
it is under cultivation than ever before. Land left untilled is either 
too costly and difficult to reclaim or too remote from roads and 
rivers. The sepulchral air of  the liberal propaganda itself  sowed 
demoralization and invited men, contrary to every social instinct, 
to  welcome bad years.
In July 1763 the Journal économique published a trenchant refutation 
of  the thesis that “France is in decadence and in the old age of  her 
power.” Agriculture had expanded considerably since the death of  
Louis XIV; as evidence of  both increased production and produc-
tivity, the author cited the soaring prices of  leases. He deplored the 
“widespread mania” to denigrate France and contended that eco-
nomically and demographically the kingdom betrayed unmistakable 
signs of  vitality. Several years later, Forbonnais skillfully exposed the 
Quesnayesque vision of  erstwhile agricultural splendor as a fiction 
and attributed liberal moroseness to hypochondria. Galiani disposed 
of  the decadence thesis in similar fashion, arguing that the kingdom 
was “very flourishing” and that the recovery of  marginal lands would 
have little effect upon agriculture.17
By drawing the lines so sharply on the state-of-the-nation issue, 
both sides ensnarled themselves in contradictions and ambiguities. 
The critics, with the parlementaire Joly in the forefront, assailed the 
liberals for contriving a crisis, by hyperbole and distortion, to fur-
ther their political ends. Yet the parlements, especially the Paris court, 
must bear greater responsibility than any other group for propagat-
ing an image of  an exhausted, depleted, and shipwrecked France in 
the years before liberalization. The leitmotif  of  remonstrance after 
remonstrance was “universal ruin,” “prostration,” “discourage-
ment,” coupled with a plea for “renewal” or “liberation” from suf-
fering. The portrait of  misery drawn by the parlements and other 
sovereign courts was strikingly similar to the tableau of  decadence 
drawn by the liberals. It contained rubrics for rural depopulation, 
 17 Joly de Fleury, speech to parl., 5 July 1763, Recueil, 39–40; “Mémoire et avis de Mrs. du 
Bureau de Ville,” BN, mss. fr. 14296; “Réflexions sur l’état actuel du royaume, relativement 
à l’agriculture et à la population,” Journal économique (July 1763), 296–305; J. Hecht, “La Vie 
de Quesnay,” in François Quesnay et la physiocratie, I, 255; Galiani, Dialogues, ed. by Nicolini, 
135, 139, 240. Cf. the retrospective view of  the Paris Parlement, remonstrances, 2–4 March 
1776 in Flammermont, ed., Remontrances du Parlement de Paris, III, 295 and the critique of  
Mirabeau by S.-A.-C. de Saint-Supplix, Le Consolateur (Brussels and Paris, 1763).
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desertion of  land, exhaustion of  resources, discouragement of  agri-
culture, and proliferation of  beggary.18 In other circumstances, Joly 
de Fleury might very well have accepted the liberal crisis analysis, 
provided it was not linked causally with the grain question. Upon 
the background of  parlementary insurgency, Joly’s position seemed 
neither consistent nor convincing.
Although it appeared to serve their interests admirably, the state-
of-the-nation question posed far more serious problems for the 
 liberal camp. While awaiting the felicitous results expected from lib-
eralization, the government had to provide for its immediate finan-
cial needs. If  it adopted an overly pessimistic posture on the state 
of  the nation, it undercut its own demands for more or continued 
supplementary taxation. To counterpoise the gloomy mood which 
it helped inspire, it took pains to sponsor rebuttals to the sensational 
Antifinancier essay which also argued, outside the context of  the grain 
debate, that France was spent.19 Similarly uneasy, the économistes some-
times strained to explain how a depressed and underdeveloped agri-
culture was regularly able to produce “excessive abundances” and 
how it would be able to support France’s immediate entry into the 
“European common market.”20 Towards the end of  the sixties, the 
crisis analysis continued to embarrass them. In the course of  only a 
few years they had called attention to signs of  agricultural advance 
everywhere. A brusque and extensive regeneration, however, implied 
a widespread and effective implementation of  the reform laws which 
the économistes, as we shall see, claimed never came to pass.21
In the sixties, the grain question, along with the defeat in war 
and the chronic fiscal dilemma, offered the occasion for a probing 
appraisal of  the state of  the kingdom. But the issue was never clearly 
or frankly explored. Divergent ideological and political pressures 
within each camp further muddled a debate already marred by the 
 18 See, for example, Flammermont, ed., Remontrances du Parlement de Paris, II, 326–27, 349–50, 
360, 362–63, and Glasson, Parlement de Paris, II, 282, 291.
 19 Marion, Histoire financière, I, 222.
 20 See, for instance, Ephémérides du citoyen (1768), IX, 83.
 21 Turgot to Condorcet, 6 April 1772, Correspondance inédite de Condorcet et de Turgot, 1770–1779, 
ed. by Charles Henry (Paris, 1883), 81; “Observations sur les effets de la liberté du commerce 
des grains, par l’Auteur des Ephémérides du citoyen,” Journal économique (July 1770), 330ff; 
Baudeau, Avis au premier besoin, ler traité, 39 and “Lettres à un Magistrat du Parlement de 
Paris …,” Nouvelles éphémerides économiques (1775), I, 23; G. Weulersse, “Les Physiocrates et la 
question du pain cher au milieu du dix-huitième siècle,” Revue du dix-huitième siècle, I (Jan.-
March 1913), 181 and Louis XV, 70; Turgot, “Septième lettre sur le commerce des grains,” 
2 Dec. 1770, in Oeuvres, ed. by Schelle, III, 341.
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polemical clash between them. The arguments perplexed Frenchmen 
as sensitive as Voltaire, who throughout this period was unable to 
make up his mind about the reform or the reformers. In one place 
he wrote solemnly of  the “profound misery” of  agriculture while in 
another he decried the overwrought despair of  the liberals.22
The debate over the meaning and significance of  “decadence” and 
the proper role of  agriculture led to a decisive break with the belief  in 
abundance that was so deeply ingrained in the national self-image.23 It 
was, however, the men of  tradition, the party of  the police, not the non-
conformist liberals who broke the faith. The liberals remained squarely 
within the abundance persuasion, though they interpreted abundance 
as a simple economic variable rather than as a gauge of  providential 
favor. Some of  them tried to “prove” it, laboriously applying the sta-
tistics of  Vauban and his epigones; most of  them simply accepted it as 
a notorious donnée, confirmed by history and experience.24 On one 
level they relied upon it to build confidence in their program by show-
ing that a kingdom as abundant as France had nothing to lose and 
everything to gain from a policy of  liberalization and exportation. If  
all the arteries of  communication and commerce were opened, there 
would be more than enough grain to go around. With a different pur-
pose in mind, the liberals considered this chronic abundance not as a 
blessing but as a plague. They condemned it as “excessive,”  “onerous,” 
 22 Voltaire, Siècle de Louis XIV in Oeuvres complètes, ed. by Moland, XIV, 523; article “Agriculture” 
cited by Weulersse, Mouvement, I, 222.
 23 For evidence of  the belief  in abundance, see Duhamel du Monceau, Traité de la conservation des 
grains, iv, 6; Herbert, Essai, ed. by Depitre, 40; M. Reneaume, “Sur la manière de conserver 
les grains,” Mémoires de l’Académie des Sciences, 1708, 76; François Aubert, “Réflexions simples 
et pratiques sur le commerce des grains” (1775), BN, mss. n.a. 4433; Anonymous, “Histoire 
de ce qui s’est passé au sujet des bleds en 1725,” Arsenal, Recueil Fevret, mss. 3308; 
A. A. Parmentier, Le Parfait boulanger, 118; Regnaud, “Histoire des événements arrivés en 
 France depuis 1772…,” BN, mss. fr. 13734, p. 180. For the dissenting view, see the 
trenchant “Mémoire sur les bleds” (n.d., ca. 1750) of  Pâris-Duverney, AN, F12 647 
(“Il n’est plus vrai qu’une récolte suffise à la consommation de trois années … on ne peut 
nier que dans les 10 années comprises en 1740 et 1750 [sic], chacune l’une portant l’autre, 
n’ait donné demie récolte.”).
 24 See, for example, “Premier supplément au premier mémoire des Députés de Commerce,” 
BN, mss. fr. 14295, fols. 4–7; Quesnay, articles “Grains” and “Fermier,” Encyclopédie, VII, 813 
and VI, 533; memoir of  the deputies of  commerce of  Toulouse to CG (1762), C. 2908, A.D. 
Hér.; arrêté, Parl. de Dauphiné, 12 July 1768, C. 2420, A.D. B-du-R.; Letter addressed by 
Dauphiné Parl. to Louis XV, 26 April 1769, B. 2314, fol. 107, A.D. Isère; Letrosne, Discours 
sur l’état actuel de la magistrature et sur les causes de sa décadence (Paris, 1764), 60n; Condorcet, Sur la 
liberté de la circulation des subsistances, in Oeuvres, ed. by A.C. O’Connor and M.F. Arago (Paris, 
1847), X, 360–361; Henri Curmond, Le Commerce des grains et l’école physiocratique, 165–66.
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and “pernicious”; it was unsound and unhealthy, for it depressed agri-
culture, made future dearths inevitable, and distributed its largesse 
unevenly across space and time. This abundance Quesnay deplored as 
a condition of  “misery,” for it meant plenty at low prices. For Baudeau 
it was no less destructive in its overall socioeconomic effects than a 
scarcity. In its place the liberals wanted to establish a viable abundance 
of  prosperity linked to profit and expansion, measured not in terms of  
the ratio of  French production to French consumption but according 
to the universal indices of  supply and demand. Thus the liberals were 
able to maintain a reassuring faith in abundance and at the same time 
to expose it as a flawed and vulnerable condition.25
The defenders of  the police in the early sixties took issue with 
the liberals on both aspects of  the question. Challenged to put the 
national belief  in abundance to the test by endorsing the reform laws, 
they backed off  and abjured it. They rejected the idea of  abundance 
with painful reluctance, for unlike the liberals, they thought that 
abundance was unconditionally a good thing. Since they believed 
that the purpose of  agriculture was first of  all to nourish, it struck 
them as paradoxical and sophistical to construe plentiful harvests as 
beacons of  woe and symptoms of  stagnation. The problem was not 
with abundance but with the idea of  it: it was patriotic and comfort-
ing but it was thoroughly misleading. The intendant Bertier came to 
regard the abundance persuasion as a myth that no longer served the 
public interest. “Let us not fool ourselves,” he admonished; the king-
dom simply does not produce the quantity of  grain claimed by the 
mongers of  abundance. Joly and other commentators adopted the 
same tough-minded stance. Neither history nor experience confirms 
the idea of  abundance; on the contrary, they are replete with lessons 
which warn us against complacency.26
In the seventies a growing band of  writers spoke out publicly against 
it. Struck by the recurrent scourges of  dearth and the  unremittingly 
 25 Herbert, Essai, ed. by Depitre, 18; Quesnay, article “Fermier,” Encyclopédie, VI, 534 and 
passim; “Premier supplément au premier mémoire des Députés de Commerce,” BN, mss. fr. 
14295, fol. 61; Baudeau, Avis au premier besoin, ler traité, 33; Journal économique (June 1768), 262.
 26 B. de Sauvigny, “Observations sur le commerce des grains,” BN, mss. fr. 11347, fol. 231; 
Joly de Fleury, speech to Parl., 5 July 1763, Recueil, 39; “Mémoire et avis de Mrs. du Bureau 
de Ville,” BN, mss. fr. 14296, fols. 22–23; Anonymous, “Commerce extérieur,” BN, mss. fr. 
11347, fols. 215, 220–21. Cf. the similar positions of  the intendant of  Hainaut and one of  
his subdelegates. SD of  Avesnes to Taboureau, Oct. 1773 and Taboureau to CG, 4 Aug. 
1774, C. 6690, A.D. Nord.
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precarious nature of  daily life, Galiani, Necker, and Béguillet, three of  
the most vocal antiphysiocrats, cast serious doubts on the abundance 
idea.27 The intendant of  Picardy flatly stated that “…abundant har-
vests do not produce nearly as much as has always been believed.”28 
Simon Linguet heaped scorn on the “tantalus” myth, a nostrum con-
trived by the haves to contain the have-nots: “abundance exists only 
for him who has a share in it.”29 When Turgot, its last great hope, 
acceded to the Controller-Generalship in 1774, liberalism, too, gave 
up the abundance idea. Or rather, Turgot shattered it for them in a 
pithy and momentous sentence in the preamble to the arrêt du conseil 
of  13 September 1774: “Now then, the common year of  production 
cannot be above the habitual consumption.”30
But the abundance persuasion died hard. It invited belief  for it 
seemed to temper the travail of  living. The idea reappeared again 
and again, through the time of  the Revolution and beyond, espoused 
by Pangloss-Pluchistes who believed in a cleverly providential uni-
verse, by political economists whose arithmetic calculations always 
seemed incontrovertible, and by police officials, too, who found it 
less complicated to combat the vices of  men than the inconstancy 
of  nature.
It is important to emphasize how much more difficult it was for 
the early critics of  liberalism at the very beginning of  the sixties to 
break with abundance than it was for their successors a decade later. 
After assailing the liberals for despairing of  the state of  the nation in 
the short run, they themselves posited a proto-malthusian view of  the 
world far more pessimistic in its implications. France was rich and 
fertile but much less fortunate as a rule than the liberals suggested. 
Times of  genuine abundance, that is to say, of  subsistence ease, were 
relatively rare. It was cynical to consider this kind of  abundance a 
“surcharge,” a “burden,” or a sign of  “decadence.” It was a respite, a 
 27 Galiani, Dialogues, ed. by Nicolini, 125–27, 132, 139, 141; J. J. Spengler, French Predecessors 
of  Malthus; A Study in Eighteenth Century Wage and Population Theory (Durham, N.C., 1942), 
332; Béguillet, Traité des subsistances, 357–58, 435, Cf. similar ideas in the article “Disette,” 
Encyclopédie méthodique, Jurisprudence, Police et Municipalités (Paris, 1791), X, 32 and Vernuit, 
“Réflexions d’un citoyen sur les disettes du bled en France …” (ca. an I), AN, F10 215–216.
 28 Reply to inquiry from CG, Oct. 1773, C. 86, A.D. Somme.
 29 Linguet, Annales, VII (Nov. 1779), 205. Cf. ibid., 198–99.
 30 Arrêt du Conseil, 13 Sept. 1774, in BN, Coll. Joly 1111, fol. 36. Writing some years later, Tolosan 
condemned a group of  English agronomist-writers—did he have, inter alia, Arthur Young 
in mind?—for sustaining the misleading abundance persuasion by their “exaggerations” 
regarding the capacity of  French agriculture. Mémoire sur le commerce de la France, 5.
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fleeting moment of  serenity for which the nation should be grateful, 
for every year, regardless of  the preceding one, was a test and a trial.31
II
Why the parlements were not more responsive to the objections 
raised against the liberal legislation in 1763–64 is not easy to explain. 
The fears and reservations of  Joly and the others touched upon issues 
to which the magistracy had always been acutely sensitive. Nor did 
the political climate seem propitious, at least in the beginning, for a 
joint enterprise sponsored by the king and the courts. The exigen-
cies of  war had somewhat tempered parlementary dissidence, but 
the dispute over the Jesuits led to stormy exchanges and Bertin’s fiscal 
edicts inspired a paroxysm of  furious resistance in several provincial 
capitals in 1763.32 Almost at the very moment that the king promul-
gated the first of  the liberal measures in May, he imposed a lit de 
justice upon the Paris court, which replied by denouncing him as an 
inept tyrant.33 If  the government counted on liberalization to mollify 
the parlements or derail their opposition to the fiscal measures, then 
it badly miscalculated, for the sovereign courts adamantly held out 
until the king was ready to capitulate. The parlements most effusively 
sympathetic to liberalization were also the ones which combatted the 
fiscal legislation most violently. Rather than a favor granted by a lov-
ing king to the nation, as the liberal press liked to put it, liberalization 
may very well have been a concession by the magistracy to a defeated 
and humiliated monarch. Conceivably, the Paris Parlement’s tardy 
but crucially important registration of  the May Declaration in 1764 
was part of  a bargain which resulted in the withdrawal of  the most 
obnoxious fiscal measures and the appointment of  the Parisian mag-
istrate Laverdy to the Contrôle-Général. In any case, it should not be 
forgotten that the grain reform became law at a time when the parle-
ments appeared to be, in the words of  a contemporary observer, “the 
master of  public affairs.”34
 31 “Commerce intérieur et extérieur des bleds,” BN, mss. fr. 11347, fols. 213–214; “Mémoire 
et avis de Mrs. du Bureau de Ville,” BN, mss. fr. 14296, fol. 22.
 32 M. Marion, Histoire financière, I, 201–230; Glasson, Parlement de Paris, II, 237–346; Palmer, 
Age, I, 86–99.
 33 Remonstrances, 31 May 1763, in Flammermont, ed., Remontrances du Parlement de Paris, II, 
339ff; E.-J.-F. Barbier, Chronique de la régence, VIII, 73 (May 1763).
 34 Moreau, Souvenirs, ed. by C. Hermelin, I, 128.
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The liberal publicists were especially proud of  their contingent 
of  parlementary allies whose support seemed to be the best riposte 
to the charge that the reformers were dangerous speculators. To 
underscore the ideological nature of  the alliance, the liberal press 
published manifestoes of  doctrinal orthodoxy from parlements and 
parlementaires and editorialized on the community of  views which 
bound together enlightened magistrates, ministers, and économistes. 
Given the robe’s odious reputation for egotism and opportunism, 
historians have always felt embarrassed about treating parlementary 
eloquence in ideological terms. Parlementary ideas are rarely exam-
ined for what they have to say but rather for what they have to hide. 
It is generally assumed that parlementary discourse serves merely to 
rationalize corporate advantage of  one kind or another and thus is 
disingenuous or beside the point. Liberal ideology, however, obviates 
nagging doubts about sincerity by making self-interest a civic virtue 
when properly understood. That is not to suggest that self-seeking 
was the major cause of  parlementary adherence to the new political 
economy; rather, it is to note that material gain was a powerful and 
appropriate motive and that solidarity with the reformers fits the con-
ventional image of  the parlements much more neatly than opposition 
to them.
We do not have the elements to test a model of  economic deter-
minism for explaining parlementary attitudes toward liberalization 
akin to the one developed by Charles Beard.35 Crudely applied on 
a collective and regional level, such a model might help to suggest 
why some of  the parlements—Toulouse is probably the best exam-
ple—ardently espoused liberalization; it would be of  much less use, 
however, in trying to account for the inconstancy, the indifference, 
and the hostility within many of  the others. In neither case could it 
adequately measure the influence of  the different constituencies and 
pressure groups in each jurisdiction.
Emphasis on the desire to profit from higher grain prices, higher 
rents, and economic expansion tends to obscure other areas where par-
lementary and économiste thinking seemed to converge. Both cherished 
the right of  property: characteristically, each group justified its most 
extreme and controversial positions by reference to this supreme author-
ity. Both viewed property as the best guarantee of  personal  liberty and 
 35 I am thinking, of  course, about An Economic Interpretation of  the Constitution of  the United States 
(New York, 1913).
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the source of  social stability. A physiocrat might have composed the 
remonstrance in which the Rouen Parlement defended property as a 
right anterior to all forms of  social and political organization.36
Although they entertained different conceptions of  the rule by law, 
both the parlements and the économistes detested the arbitrary exercise 
of  power in any form. Neither had any affection for the extension of  
the royal bureaucracy, albeit for different reasons. The liberal denun-
ciation of  vexatious, uninformed, and tyrannical local police authori-
ties was redolent of  the parlementary onslaught against similarly nox-
ious fiscal agents.37 The parlements often expressed the same warm 
solicitude for rural France mingled with a suspicion of  the city for 
which the économistes were known.38 Both found the world of  finance, 
traitants, and sly and rapid fortunes repugnant.39 Both feared that the 
present tax system would permanently ruin the economy and they 
joined in deploring government waste and extravagance.
Like the liberals, the parlementaires saw themselves as a party of  
economic reform, focusing specifically on fiscal management. They 
decried prodigality, inefficiency, the endless multiplication and the 
gratuitous duplication of  posts, the failure to keep proper accounts, 
“shadowy” decision-making, “mysterious” forms of  tax collection, 
and abuses in expenditure.40 They called for a general house-cleaning, 
a spirit of  frugality and retrenchment, and a regular “publicity” to 
restore public confidence. All of  these goals were familiar to Quesnay 
and Mirabeau. Both groups, as we have previously shown, impressed 
upon the public the idea that France was teetering on the brink of  
doom. In the early sixties a parlementaire interested in charting out 
common ground with the liberals would discover that they shared 
a belief  in a number of  fundamental principles, a critical attitude 
toward numerous aspects of  administration, and a desire for regen-
eration and renewal. Since the grain reform addressed itself  to these 
issues as well as to the matter of  agricultural profit, many magistrates 
found it hard to resist.
 36 H. Martin, Histoire de France, XVI, 227–28; Michelet, Histoire de France, XV, 123–24.
 37 M. Marion, Histoire financière, I, 215–217. Cf. the explicit analogy between grain and fiscal 
police in the deliberations of  the Estates of  Languedoc, Dec. 1768, C. 2411, A.D. H-G.
 38 Remonstrances, 19 May 1763, in Flammermont, ed., Remontrances du Parlement de Paris, II, 
327.
 39 Remonstrances, 4 Sept. 1759, 20 Jan. 1760, 19 May 1763, ibid., II, 231, 277, 325–26.
 40 Remonstrances, 4 Sept. 1759,20 Jan. 1760, 24 June 1763, 4 Sept. 1763, 1 Dec. 1768, 21 
Jan. 1770, ibid., II, 229–31, 277, 349, 412–13 and III, vii–viii, 75–77.
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The liberal reforms elicited a warm welcome in most of  the sover-
eign courts. The Parlement of  Provence registered the May Declara-
tion as soon as it arrived, at the end of  June, without debate. In the 
next five weeks the magistrates of  Toulouse, Grenoble, Bordeaux, 
Dijon, Lille, and Rennes followed suit. As often happened in the leg-
islative process in the Old Regime—more often than historians who 
read only the remonstrances are aware—one of  the courts made its 
registration conditional upon the inclusion of  an explanatory rider 
concerning its peculiar regional needs and the government accepted 
it without hesitation. In this instance the Bretons, much of  whose 
trade was seaborne, wanted to make it explicitly clear that the free-
dom granted internal circulation in the Declaration also applied to 
coastwise commerce. Not as a condition of  its approbation but as a 
collective wish, the Dauphinais urged Louis XV to extend the new 
liberty to include exports. Although the king “approved the principles 
of  His Parlement,” the government was not yet ready to take this 
second giant step. Pointing to “the fear that so rapid a change might 
impair the provisioning of  the kingdom,” the Controller-General 
Bertin cautioned that before opening the ports and frontiers the min-
istry would wait until “the liberty accorded by the Declaration of  25 
May last” produced a solid base of  “abundance.”41
It is hardly surprising to learn that these same parlements regis-
tered the July Edict with uncommon dispatch the following summer.42 
 41 Parl. of  Provence, 30 June 1763, B. 3676 and B. 3422, fols. 251–253, A.D. B-du-R.; Parl. 
of  Toulouse, 13 July 1763, B. 1953, fol. 235, A.D. H-G.; Bordeaux Parl. registers for 29 July 
1763 and I-B 49, fol. 184 (1 Aug. 1763), A.D. Gir.; Parl. of  Dijon, 2 Aug. 1763, B. 12134, 
fols. 247–48, A.D. C d’O.; Parl. of  Rennes, 4 Aug. 1763, C. 1648–49, A.D. I-et-V.; Bertin to 
Berulle, First President of  Grenoble Parl., 26 April 1769, B. 2314, fols. 88–89, A.D. Isère. 
It is puzzling that in the broadside versions of  the May and July laws which the Rennes 
Parlement had published, the articles regarding the maintenance of  the Paris police regime 
were excluded. Was the omission intentional? If  so, was it because the articles seemed 
irrelevant or because the magistrates desired not to publicize the fact that the capital 
retained its special privileges? This matter, we shall see, had major political and economic 
significance throughout the kingdom. The Rennes examples are the only bowdlerized 
copies of  the liberal laws that I found.
 42 Provence, 2 Aug. 1764, B. 3676, B. 3475, and B. 3433, fols. 688–694, A.D. B-du-R.; 
Bordeaux, 17, 20 Aug. 1764, B. 1470, I B 51, fols. 14–17 and I B 52, fols. 18–20, A.D. 
Gir.; Toulouse, 8 Aug. 1764, B. 1953, fols. 308–310, A.D. H-G. Though they welcomed 
the July Edict enthusiastically as soon as they received it, the magistrates of  Metz delayed 
registration until the end of  November, apparently in order to impose several “conditions” 
regarding the levying of  duties and fees on grain entering, leaving, and passing through 
Lorraine and the Barrois. See the registres secrets, 14 Aug. and 26 Nov. 1764, B. 458 and 
the deliberations of  29 Nov. 1764, B. 38, A.D. Moselle.
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Though liberals everywhere proclaimed that it was a moment to be 
grateful, at least two of  these parlements expressed a feeling widely 
held in the liberal camp: the July law was excellent but it could still be 
improved. To their registration, the Dijon magistrates appended the 
“supplication” that the king “lift as soon as possible the limitations 
placed on the full liberty of  grain exportation… .”43 The Parlement 
at Rennes asked for a revision of  the law to allow for an automatic 
re-opening of  exports in ports where the price had triggered the clos-
ing mechanism once the price fell below the ceiling barrier for three 
consecutive markets; for exports by ships and crews of  any nationality 
in order to maximize profit opportunities and economize on costs; for 
embarkation from any Breton port rather than only the six stipulated 
in the law; and for the suppression of  all duties on imported and 
exported grain.44 These were, it should be emphasized, requests rather 
than demands; their tone was profoundly respectful and patient. 
None of  these proposals was anathema to the government. On the 
contrary, it was very likely that the ministry would adopt them as soon 
as it felt that conditions permitted and it was probably not unhappy to 
have such a plea, emanating, as it liked to believe, “from the nation,” 
on the record. The Parlements of  Dijon, Besançon, and Rennes also 
urged the government to dispel an ambiguity in the May Declara-
tion which enabled many kinds of  octrois and other droits to subsist by 
abolishing all internal duties and fees attached to grain transit in the 
interior—this despite the fact that a number of  magistrates in each 
court owned or farmed some of  them.45
 43 Dijon Parl., 4 Aug. 1764, B. 12134, fols. 455–58, A.D. C d’O. Cf. Pierre de St.-Jacob’s 
description of  the Parlement as “physiocratic” in attitude. Les paysans de la Bourgogne du Nord 
au dernier siècle de l’ancien régime (Paris, 1960), 348, 350.
 44 Parl. of  Rennes, 22 Aug. 1764, C. 1648–49, A.D. I-et-V. In response to complaints that the 
ad valorem duties levied on imports and exports by the July Edict provoked confusion and 
“contestations” because of  the changing value of  the commodities, the government did not 
abolish them as many of  the parlements desired but converted them to fixed amounts per 
hundred-weight. See the letters patent of  7 Nov. 1764 either in C. 2420, A.D. B-du-R. or 
Archives des Affaires Étrangères, France 1361, fols. 335–36.
 45 Parl. of  Rennes, 7 Feb. 1766, C. 1648–49, A.D. I-et-V.; Dijon Parl., 5 May 1764, B. 12134, 
fols. 403–405. Cf. the similar though less militant stand taken by the Bordeaux court. Arrêt 
of  23 Nov. 1763, A.D. Gir.
 As a result of  the sweeping statements of  suppression in the May Declaration, it was 
initially assumed that all internal duties (save market droits) were abolished. Many 
duties, however, were owned by estates, municipalities, and religious and assistance 
institutions which bitterly complained about the loss of  revenue. See, for example, the 
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Yet it is not true, as the Mercure de France later claimed, that all 
of  the parlements registered the liberal reforms with spontaneous 
acclamation.46 There may well have been a considerable amount of  
antagonism within the parlements considered above and those whose 
manuscript “secret councils” were not investigated first-hand.47 There 
was in fact serious hesitation and hostility in Rouen and Paris. Sig-
nificantly, only the May 1763 Declaration on internal liberty caused 
these Parlements to agonize. The Paris court routinely registered 
the July 1764 Edict on exportation and Rouen endorsed it with an 
unwonted exuberance which embarrassed the Controller-General 
Laverdy.48 But after many months of  delay and discussion the May 
Declaration barely squeezed through the Paris Parlement by “two or 
three votes”; the Rouennais subjected it to a year’s “prudent study” 
before they finally assented.49
Both houses regarded the first of  the liberal laws with far more con-
sternation than the second. The May Declaration, in the words of  the 
First President of  the Normandy court, introduced “principles diamet-
rically opposed to those of  the past.”50 This law virtually abolished the 
police of  grain and made the trade a free-for-all. It was not merely a 
prerequisite for exportation; it went far beyond the conditions neces-
sary to allow exports. It determined the character which exportation 
would have and assured that it would generate a pervasive multiplier 
 “Mémoire” of  the Bordeaux city fathers, C. 1426, A.D. Gir. As a result of  intense lobbying, 
the government issued interpretive legislation which “provisionally” exempted from the 
suppression the droits owned by the above-mentioned groups. See the letters patent of  5 
March 1764, Archives des Affaires Etrangères, France 1361, fol. 66; B. 2173, fol. 140, 
A.D. Doubs. Cf. the Flanders Parlement which asked for indemnification of  all toll and fee 
owners in its act registering the May law. Bertin to IN., 16 Sept. 1763, C. 6690, A.D. Nord.
 46 Mercure de France (Aug. 1769), 128.
 47 According to the historian of  the Besançon court, “liberty” was the dominant economic 
notion of  the magistrates. Though he does not deal specifically with liberalization, he shows 
how the province’s peculiar geography caused it to resist obdurately the mandatory market 
law of  April 1723 and to regard the right to export as part of  its “natural liberty.” F. Prost, 
Les remontrances du Parlement de Franche-Comté au 18e siècle (Lyon, 1936), 121–122. Though it 
approved the liberal reforms, events later compelled it, along with several other courts that 
hailed liberalization in the beginning, to reassess its stand.
 48 Rouen, Conseil Secret (1963), 4 May, 9 Aug. 1764, A.D. S-M. Cf. Terray to the Comte de 
Périgord, 25 Nov. 1772, C. 2912, A.D. Hér.
 49 LeVerdier, ed., Correspondance Miromesnil, III, xxxviii; Rouen Parl., Conseil Secret (1763), 
22 March 1763, A.D. S-M.; A. Floquet, Histoire du Parlement de Normandie, VI, 421–23; 
Desmarest, Commerce des grains … Rouen, 116–17; Recueil, 57. Cf. the remarks of  the First 
President of  the Paris Parl., Recueil, 104.
 50 Miromesnil to Laverdy, 10 May 1768, in LeVerdier, ed., Correspondance Miromesnil, V, 183.
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effect throughout society. The May Declaration seemed to be much 
less easily reversible than the July Edict; exportation remained contin-
gent and self-restrictive whereas internal liberty was unconditional and 
unlimited. Although the export question caused a much greater public 
stir, these Parlements viewed it as something of  an anticlimax.
Five years after the fact, at the height of  its semi-public campaign 
against liberalization, the Rouen Parlement claimed that its hesitation 
over the May Declaration had been based on “the fear of  abuses” 
perverting the provisioning trade.51 Nor was the magistrates’ memory 
self-serving, not at least on this point, for the First President of  the 
court, a friend of  the reform, confirmed their self-analysis. But he 
blamed their fears, and thus their resistance, on the magistrates’ lack 
of  sophistication in “economic matters” which left them prey to “the 
old prejudices.” For many months after the Parlement first received 
the legislation the First President toiled vigorously to “combat” their 
retrograde ideas by distributing liberal propaganda and meeting with 
recalcitrant members.52 When they overcame their prejudices and 
finally registered the law, the magistrates did so on the impeccably 
liberal grounds that “dirt-cheap prices” threatened to “ruin” agricul-
ture. Significantly, once they decided to risk the transformation of  the 
grain trade which the May Declaration implied, they immediately asked 
the king for a law permitting exports, for their newly-acquired sophis-
tication in economic matters taught them that such a measure would 
make the May Declaration work more efficiently and strengthen pow-
erfully the incentives which liberalization offered to agriculture.53
In Paris there was enormous pressure from the government, but 
it is not clear what forms it took. If  Joly’s fears could be shown to be 
“groundless,” there was still the more diffuse horror of  brusque change 
of  any kind: inverting the liberal crisis argument, it could be claimed 
that France was “too fatigued to suffer great commotions” precisely 
because she was in “imminent peril.”54 The appointment of  Laverdy 
may have been instrumental in winning some votes. As a gesture of  
parlementary solidarity, certain magistrates may have felt it proper to 
cede to the urgent importunities of  their provincial confreres. Perhaps 
the government also used its classic arsenal of   material and moral 
 51 Lettre et supplication au roi, 29 Oct. 1768, Conseil Secret, A.D. S-M.
 52 Courteille to IN. of  Rouen, 9 Jan. 1764, C. 103, A.D. S-M.
 53 Conseil Secret (1763), 22 March, 13 April 1764, A.D. S-M.
 54 “Observations” (1771), BN, Coll. Joly 1109, fol. 211 and remonstrances, 9 Aug. and 4 Sept. 
1763, in Flammermont, ed., Remontrances du Parlement de Paris, II, 409–411.
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inducements in its quest for support. Presumably the liberals had a 
genuine footing within the parlements, but its size, locus, and influence 
are unknown. The rapporteur of  the May Declaration bespoke the 
gnawing distrust of  many magistrates who acquiesced in its passage:
Let us try it; if, as there is every reason to fear, experience proves the disadvantages of  
this new legislation, we will go back to the old laws.55
The words were prophetic and so was the choice of  the counselor to 
recite them, the abbé Terray, future Controller-General.
III
Men do not give free reign to nature in social life, remarked the 
Chevalier in Galiani’s Dialogues sur le commerce des bleds, unless the 
“sea” is calm and the “wind” is stable: “Sailors never talk of  let-
ting the sails go at the mercy of  the winds except when they see a 
grand tranquility.”56 The sea was not perfectly calm, but the social 
climate of  France was on the whole favorable when the navigators 
of  the ship of  state freed the grain trade and entrusted nature with 
its police. There was, to be sure, considerable political agitation in 
the early sixties, but it did not reach deeply into society; it affected 
the daily lives of  very few Frenchmen. Fundamental law could not 
displace subsistence as the chief  object of  popular concern and the 
marketplace rather than the palace of  justice remained the best 
place to test public feeling. Years of  good harvests and moderate-
to-low prices had produced a situation of  relative quiescence which 
not even the pressure of  war or fiscality could seriously disturb. The 
indifference of  the consuming public to the grain reforms in 1763 
and 1764 did not surprise contemporary observers. “Do you think,” 
asked one, “that when bread is only 2 sols 6 deniers at the market the 
people have something to say?”57 Without general internal peace 
and subsistence ease, liberalization would have been unthinkable.
This tranquility, however, did not endure and, as the circumstances 
changed, the people proved that they had a good deal to say. Already 
in 1764, while the Journal économique warmly welcomed the new era of  
liberal politics and derided “the chimerical fear of  falling into dearth,” 
 55 Recueil, 57. Cf. Anon., “Mémoire” (1771), AN, F11 264.
 56 Galiani, Dialogues, ed. by Nicolini, 224.
 57 Anon., “Mémoire” (1771), AN, F11 264.
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malaise over grain movements and exportation detonated riots in Caen 
and Cherbourg and in Tallard in the Dauphiné.58 These troubles were 
not isolated, idiosyncratic episodes. During the next six years riots and 
émotions erupted throughout the kingdom, especially in the northern 
half  (the south would have its share in the early seventies). Although he 
found them tiresome and redundant, the économiste Dupont conceded 
that they were “perpetual.”59 I have counted over sixty within the juris-
dictions of  the Parlements of  Paris and Rouen between 1765 and 1768; 
elsewhere there are scores of  others to be noted.60 Though the rhythm 
 58 Journal économique (Nov. 1764), 492; Lamoignon to Miromesnil, 24 Dec. 1764, in LeVerdier, 
ed., Correspondance Miromesnil, III, 429; introduction, ibid., V. xiii. “Women of  the little 
people” spearheaded the rising at Caen, intercepting grain and forcing its sale at the market 
below the current. C. 2664, A.D. Cal. According to the municipality of  Cherbourg, the 
mutineers there were “a troop of  canaille” impelled to attack a grain boat from “fear of  a 
future dearth.” Letter of  14 Dec. 1764, C. 2680, A.D. Cal. B. 2315, fols. 116–20, A.D. Isère.
 59 Dupont, Analyse … rapport, 105–106, 108.
 60 1765: Abbeville, Caen, Blois, Orléans, Sablé, Cosne, Cognac, Sancerre, Bléré, Angers, 
Châtellerault, Avoise, Montrésor, and elsewhere in the Touraine and the Orléanais; 
1766: Amiens, Tonnère, St. Dizier, Bourges, Vitry, Sens, Bar-sur-Aube, Beaufort; 1767: 
Coulommiers, Rebais, Tournan-en-Brie, Crécy-en-Brie, St. Denis, La Ferté-Gaucher, 
Montlhéry, Corbeil, Rozoy, Troyes; 1768: Brevant, Joigny, Abbeville, Carentan, Beaufort, 
Bléré, Mamers, La Ferté-Bernard, La Flèche, Pithiviers, Malesherbes, Villaines-le-Jubel, 
Châlons-sur-Marne, Compiègne, Belleville, Montereau, Rozoy, Rouen, Fécamp, Magny, 
Pont-l’évêque, Elbeuf, Darnétal, Maromme, La Bouille, Gournay, Bourgthéroulde.
 Laverdy (?) to Lescalopier, 18 Aug. 1765, AN, F12 150; C. 2664, A.D. Cal.; CG to 
Choiseul, 4 Sept. 1765, F12 150; CG to Cypierre, 13 Sept. 1765, ibid.; CG to Perceval, 
13 Sept. 1765, ibid.; CG to PG, 19 Nov. 1765, BN, Coll. Joly 1131, fol. 5; CG to PG, 4 Dec. 
1765, ibid., fol. 9; Prevost (Angers) to PG, 25 Aug. 1765, ibid., fol. 15; royal procurator at 
Blois to PG, 31 Aug. 1765, ibid., fols. 28–29; CG to PG, 21 Aug. 1765, ibid., fol. 131; fiscal 
procurator at Cosne to PG, 25 Aug. 1765, ibid., fols. 106–107; CG to PG, 13 Sept. 1765, ibid., 
fols. 92–93; CG to IN. of  Touraine, 15, 19, 28 Aug. 1768, C. 94, A.D. I-et-L.; IN. to CG, 
10 Sept. 1768, ibid.; Haberty to IN., 4 Sept. 1765, ibid.; Cypierre to intendant’s secretary, 
9 Sept. 1765, ibid.; Choiseul to IN., 2 Oct. 1765, ibid.; Coll. Joly 1132, passim, especially 
CG to PG, 7 Oct. 1766 and 15 Jan. 1767, fols. 12, 246; SD Masson to IN. of  Champagne, 
9 Sept., 7 Oct. 1766, C. 299, A.D. Aube; IN. of  Touraine to CG, 30 June 1766, C. 96, A.D. 
I-et-L.; Coll. Joly 1133, fols. 9–16, 30, 43ff; Coll. Joly 1134, fols. 128–169, 175–76, 197; ? 
at Coulommiers to PG, 22 Nov. 1767, Coll. Joly 1135, fols. 74–75; Fasquel to PG, 29 Nov. 
1767, ibid., fol. 76; petition of  Sieur Montgolfier, ibid., fols. 80–81; CG to PG, 7 Dec. 1767, 
ibid., fol. 82; reports from Crécy, La-Ferté-Gaucher, Rebais, Coulommiers, and Montlhéry, 
ibid., fols. 130–132, 201, 225, 85–86; Laurent to PG, 19 Oct. 1767, ibid., fol. 152; Nauvin to 
PG, 1 Dec. 1767, ibid., fol. 163; officiers of  Troyes to PG, 2 June 1767, ibid., fols. 175ff; CG to 
PG, 22 June 1767 and 12 July 1767, ibid., fols. 179–181; reports from Abbeville, Beaufort, 
Belleville, Bléré, Châlons-sur-Marne, and Compiègne, Coll. Joly 1140, fols. 7, 36, 57–58, 
61, 95, 170; reports from Montereau and Rozoy-en-Brie, Coll. Joly 1142, fols. 2–6, 84; C. 
1908, A.D. Aube; St. Florentin to B. de Sauvigny, 18 Nov. 1768 and dispatch to same, 4 
Oct. 1768, AN, O1* 410; Hardy’s Journal, 28 March and 5 June 1768, BN, mss. fr. 6680, 
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of  disturbances abated the following year, it rebounded violently in 
1770 and continued to jar many parts of  France through 1775.61 After 
years of  repose, the marketplace became the Saint-Médard of  the six-
ties and seventies.
These risings shared a number of  traits in common. They 
occurred in substantial towns as well as in more modest bourgs and 
hamlets. They struck towns located on or near rivers more frequently 
than those remote from water transportation. Most of  the towns 
were entrepôt markets integrated more or less formally into a larger 
chain of  provisioning serving a metropolitan center or feeding river 
traffic to the coast. For the most part the disturbances were indig-
enously and spontaneously generated, albeit the geographical and 
commercial relations of  the towns sometimes suggested a process of  
contagion and emulation. Panic and rising prices were both causes 
and effects, although in the beginning the former often seemed to 
precede and prime the latter. In normal times there was a relatively 
high tolerance for the physical displacement of  grain and flour. In 
time of  anxiety there was a distortion of  perspective and a new 
threshhold of  alarm became established. Grain movements which 
once passed imperceptibly now aroused resentment and fomented 
resistance. Opposition to what contemporaries called “removals” 
[enlèvements] and “exportation” of  grain (which in this context meant 
nothing more than the transfer of  grain from one community for 
use elsewhere, within the kingdom or abroad) was the form which 
these risings characteristically took. As long as grain seemed to be 
available, it was merely a question of  intercepting it and divert-
ing it to the market, in most cases for relatively orderly distribu-
tion by sale to local consumers. When the grain seemed to disap-
pear from circulation, consumers felt more desperate and helpless. 
Instead of  lying in wait for grain which might never pass by, they 
went after it wherever they believed it to be hidden. In the latter 
 fols. 152 and 165; Gazette à la main par Marin, Lettres Ossolinski, 28 March 1768, BHVP, 
ms. 625, fol. 127; C. 2667, A.D. Cal.; Laverdy to Miromesnil, 27 March 1768, in LeVerdier, 
ed., Correspondance Miromesnil, V, 133–34; Trudaine de Montigny to Miromesnil, 
 13 May 1768, ibid., V, 200; IN. of  Champagne to Bertin, 25 July 1768, C. 413, A.D. Marne; 
CG to IN. of  Touraine, 5 June 1768, C. 94, A.D. I-et-L.; royal procurator of  Bléré to IN., 21 
June 1768, ibid.; Durangouin, lieutenant in maréchaussée, procès-verbal, 27 June, 1 Aug. 1768, 
ibid.; Brissard to IN., 25 July, 7 Aug. 1768, ibid.; SD of  Pithiviers to IN. of  Orléanais, 30 June 
1768 in C. Bloch, Le Commerce des grains dans la généralité d’Orléans d’après la correspondance inédite 
de l’intendant Cypierre (Orléans, 1898), 44.
 61 For a fuller discussion of  the disruption of  the early seventies, see below, chapter twelve.
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case more than in the former, the public demanded that the grain 
price be fixed at a level within general reach.
In all these riots and émotions, women played a strikingly prominent 
role. “Women distinguished themselves the most” in these events, noted 
Dupont dryly.62 They led the assault on merchant storehouses in the fall 
of  1765 at Auray in Brittany. In November 1765 most of  the partici-
pants in a mutiny near Abbeville aimed at preventing the removal of  
grain were women, some of  whom carried knives. During the following 
year, women led similar riots near Amiens and at Tonnerre. In 1767 
a large gathering of  women marched against the laboureurs of  Montl-
héry, women excited the crowd to action against the exporters at Provins, 
and a “seditious” band of  females with rocks hidden under their aprons 
invested the marketplace at La Ferté-Gaucher. A woman detonated an 
anti-export riot at Troyes in June 1767 which mobilized several thousand 
people; according to one report, all sixty persons arrested in the rising 
were women. The “movement” which led to the pillaging of  the grain 
storehouses at Rouen in March 1768, a witness reported, “was caused 
almost uniquely by women.” At St. Brieuc in Brittany, women tried to 
burn the vessels preparing to sail abroad with cargoes of  grain. At Bel-
leville, women formed barricades to obstruct the passage of  grain con-
voys. An “assembly of  women” at Compiègne in the summer of  1768 
did not disband until troops arrived while at Bléré and Châlons authori-
ties reported that the women were the most difficult group to appease. In 
the course of  the next two years women captured grain wagons at Dijon 
and diverted them to the halle, cut the wheels off  the carts at Auxonne 
to halt outbound traffic, thwarted the departure of  a grain ship at Bou-
logne, and caused tumultuous disorder at the markets of  Dammartin, 
Lagny, and St. Germain. At Vitry-le-François a woman sparked a riot by 
assaulting the lieutenant of  police to whom the crowd assigned ultimate 
responsibility for the dearth.63
 62 Dupont, Analyse … Rapport, 105.
 63 IN. of  Brittany to SD Dumener, 16 Sept. 1765, C. 1679 A.D. I-et-V.; IN. of  Amiens to CG, 
20 Nov. 1765, BN, Coll. Joly 1131, fols. 7–8; Jan. 1766, Coll. Joly 1133, fols. 9–16; 12 Nov. 
1766, ibid., fols. 175–176; 4 June 1767, Coll. Joly 1135, fols. 130–131; 6 Oct. 1767, ibid., 
fol. 225; 2 June 1767, Coll. Joly 1136, fols. 175ff; Paillot to PG, 19 June 1767, C. 1908, 
A.D. Aube; Lettres Ossolinski, 28 March 1768, BHVP, ms. 625, fol. 127; 1 June 1768, Coll. 
Joly 1140, fols. 57–58; 10 June 1768, ibid., fol. 170; Hardy’s Journal, 5 June 1768, BN, mss. 
fr. 6680, fol. 165; IN. of  Champagne to Bertin, 25 July 1768, C. 413, A.D. Marne; Armier 
to CG, 18 June 1768, C. 94, A.D. I-et-L.; Bacalan to Langlois, June 1769, AN, F12* 153; 
CG to Amelot, 15 May 1770, ibid., fol. 211; CG to First President, Dijon Parl., 19 May 
1770, ibid., fol. 213; CG to Amelot, 20 May 1770, ibid.; 23 July 1770, BN, Coll. Joly 1149,
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Undaunted by the fear of  violent confrontation, these bands of  
women never hesitated to back their demands with force. But they were 
furies who sought a primitive justice, as they construed it, of  a material 
and distributive sort rather than an exemplary vengeance. They often 
pillaged but just as frequently they offered a price for the merchan-
dise they appropriated. On occasion the women brutalized officials 
and traders, but they were rarely wantonly cruel. It would be absurd 
to characterize their riots as orderly but as a rule they did not pro-
duce more violence than was necessary to achieve the goals which the 
women had announced at the outset, unless there was unusual provo-
cation. What transformed a grain-directed demonstration of  women 
at Troyes in 1767 into a punitive raid on the personal property of  a 
wealthy bourgeoise was the latter’s tender suggestion that “if  they [the 
insurgents] had no bread with which to nourish their children they had 
only to eat them.” The episode at Metz in 1774 in which a group of  
women slaughtered the keeper of  the grain warehouse and threatened 
the intendant Calonne with the same fate was exceptional.64
The generous participation of  women in these riots made 
a deep impression on local authorities. They took it as a sign 
of  the gravity of  the situation; in their minds, it gave the ris-
ings a certain legitimacy. Only very powerful forces of  fear and 
misery could draw women from the hearth to the crossroads 
and marketplaces. Women, remarked Mercier, have become 
noted for their part in Parisian insurrections: “but it is neces-
sary first that the Halles be concerned, otherwise they remain 
 fols. 123–24; CG to Bertier de Sauvigny, 1 Aug. 1770 and CG to La Vrillière (St. Florentin), 
9 Aug. 1770, AN, F12 153; Aug. 1770, BN, Coll. Joly 1150, fols. 33–36; Lettres Ossolinski, 
Oct. 1770, BHVP, ms. 628, fol. 93; 6 Nov. 1770, Coll. Joly 1111, fol. 141; 6 Nov. 1770, Joly 
1153, fol. 25.
 According to a contemporary witness, women took a major part in the Flour War revolts of  
May 1775. “As we all know,” he added, “[women] are more dangerous than men in these 
sort of  crises.” François Métra, Correspondance secrète, politique et littéraire (London, 1787–90; 
reprint Geneva, 1967), I, 321 (3 May 1775). For other subsistence risings in which women 
played a decisive role, see A. P. Usher, The History of  the Grain Trade in France, 1400–1710 
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calm.” In the disturbances provoked by parlementary affairs, “they 
don’t sound a word.” For an official in the Touraine the participa-
tion of  women in a riot in the summer of  1768 was proof  itself  that 
“the people are dying of  hunger.” One woman whom he questioned 
went to five bakeshops without finding any bread. “This will make 
many people thieves despite themselves,” he glumly predicted.65
Moheau, the pioneer demographer and sociologist, was not sur-
prised that “women are more audacious and enterprising than men” 
in popular risings:
different reasons have been given for it; but there is one which is constant and appre-
ciable, it is that they are more wretched.
Moheau was more interested in describing and accounting for their gen-
eral condition—exploitation by convention and discrimination by law 
founded on “a ridiculous and atrocious division of  function”—than in 
pinpointing the factors which mobilized them to collective action.66 Too 
little is known about the social composition of  these groups of  women 
to warrant conjecture about their precise motives. It is not clear if  they 
were predominantly wage-earners themselves, if  they were married or 
single, if  they were housewives and mothers as well as partial providers, 
and if  they participated with the approbation and support of  their hus-
bands, brothers, fathers, and sons. The authorities tended to concede 
that in times of  suffering and hunger, the women had an imperious 
responsibility to fulfill.
In most of  the cases the rioters, men and women, blamed their 
distress first of  all on the merchant: anyone engaged, professionally 
or opportunistically, in the traffic of  grain. The fact that the harvest 
might be patently bad or the supply notoriously short in a given area 
no more justified the maneuvers of  the traders than it made the con-
comitant rise in prices palatable. In the popular etiology of  dearth, 
the naturalistic or supernaturalistic explanation—some form of  divine 
wrath and/or meteorological accident—was never by itself  sufficient. 
Even in the midst of  obvious scarcity, the consumers of  each vil-
lage, bourg, and town stubbornly believed that if  the grain “of  the 
place” were properly used and honestly apportioned, there would be 
enough, albeit barely, for everyone at prices which would be onerous 
but  accessible.
 65 Mercier, Tableau de Paris, XII, 136; Armier to IN., 18 June 1768, C. 94, A.D. I-et-L.
 66 Moheau, Recherches et considérations sur la population de la France (1778), ed. by R. Gonnard, 
Collection des économistes, No. 10 (Paris, 1912), 282–83.
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Dearth was testing time for the merchant when he could not hide 
his true intentions as he passed before the citizenry sitting as an ad 
hoc vigilance committee. It was perfectly reasonable to hold the mer-
chant accountable in the midst of  cherté when the whole community 
stood at his mercy, for in ordinary times he largely escaped scrutiny 
and rarely failed to profit from his relative inconspicuousness. What 
passed for shrewd trading in normal periods became immoral and 
culpable speculation during a moment of  stress. The public accused 
the merchants of  removing or “exporting” grain with regard only to 
their own profit and of  withholding it and exchanging it clandestinely 
in order to drive up prices and sap the will of  the community.
In September 1765 crowds at Auray and Vannes beset traders 
who made substantial purchases for the purpose of  diverting it for 
sale elsewhere. At Bourges toward the end of  the year the populace 
denounced the merchants to the authorities as “jobbers.” In several 
towns in the Brie late in 1767 “the people, imagining that the mer-
chants were cause of  the augmentation of  prices, hurled themselves 
against those who do this trade or whom they suspected of  doing it 
[and] roughed them up very gravely.…” In the summer of  1768 at 
Abbeville the populace seized a grocer rumored to be “a hoarder and 
starver of  the people.” At Beaufort the crowd threatened to admin-
ister summary punishment to a grain merchant who came to pick 
up grain he had purchased on commission. At Bléré the inhabitants 
marched against “several foreign merchants”—strangers to the land, 
men who did not usually deal in the area, aroused passionate hos-
tility—who allegedly siphoned off  supplies before they reached the 
local market. A brawl broke out “between the people and the trad-
ers” at the market of  Mamers, the former forcing the latter to unload 
their horses and empty their sacks. Amidst rumors of  hoarding and 
maneuvers, a crowd at Châlons-sur-Marne besieged the homes of  
several grain traders, breaking windows and “demanding bread in a 
great outcry.” Consumers at St. Dizier, also in Champagne, threat-
ened in 1770 to burn the storehouse of  one of  the town’s biggest 
export merchants if  he did not “abandon [his] grain at the discretion 
of  the people.” At the same moment a “troop of  people” at Reims 
invaded merchant storehouses as well as conventual granaries in 
search of  hoards. Nocturnal transport, like the presence of  strangers, 
seemed prima facie proof  of  wrongdoing. At Montereau, in the spring 
of  1768, the tocsin sounded in response to the news that several mer-
chants were removing stocks under the cover of  dark:
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That caused a sensation among the inhabitants of  the place who assembled in force 
but several shots fired by the conductors of  the convoy forced them to withdraw.67
The rioters ascribed their suffering to the avid, profiteering mer-
chants, but ultimately they held the public authorities responsible 
for the irregular and threatening situation.68 When spontaneous 
and direct pressure upon the traders failed to win tangible, immedi-
ate redress, the insurgents expected the police to intervene. Indeed, 
some of  the émotions seemed to have aimed not so much at hum-
bling the merchants as at making a point to the constabulary and 
providing it with a pretext for action. The grain riot was not always 
or exclusively an act of  desperate frustration; it was a primitive 
political gesture, the only form of  expression available to the bulk 
of  consumers, and its demands were usually modest and straight-
forward: the constant availability of  grain (or bread) at a price 
within the means of  the majority of  the laboring poor. The riot 
involved certain risks, but they were not entirely unpredictable and 
if  they frequently seemed worth taking it was because more often 
than not they resulted in an improvement in the collective lot of  
the village or town. In the most favorable circumstances, the police 
would preempt or dissipate the riot by requisitioning supplies and/
or readjusting the price of  grain as a measure of  general interest 
and social control founded on the vague but widely shared premise 
that private property had public obligations. In the most adverse 
situations, local authorities, almost invariably aided and goaded by 
outside hands, would crush the rising with a smart display of  rigor 
generally followed by a program of  appeasement and containment 
geared primarily to satisfy subsistence needs and only incidentally 
to protect the liberty and property of  the suppliers.
In the sixties the riot often became a medium of  collaboration 
between the police and the people. In some instances the police 
 67 IN. of  Brittany to CG, 17, 20 Sept. 1765 and SD Dubodan to IN., 18 Sept. 1765, C. 1670, 
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in terms of  a still regnant “moral economy.” See “The Moral Economy of  the English Crowd 
in the 18th Century,” Past & Present, 50 (Feb. 1971), 76–136. In this same regard, Martin 
Needler’s “representational” violence category is extremely suggestive. Political Development in 
Latin America: Instability, Violence and Evolutionary Change (New York, 1968), 46–55.
 THE RESPONSE TO LIBERALIZATION: THEORY AND PRACTICE 195
responded rapidly to signals from the people and together they were 
able to avert bloody confrontations. This sort of  joint undertaking 
developed out of  what might be called the “pre-riot.” The pre-riot 
was more than the mere premonition of  a disturbance (though the 
police, as we shall remark, used the putative fear or prospect of  
revolt as a justification for intervention), but less than a full-dress 
upheaval mobilizing large numbers of  people for the performance 
of  violent actions. It was the first stage of  a riot that achieved its 
aims precociously and smothered on its success. Its most commonly 
denounced symptoms were incendiary speeches and seditious 
“bruits,” unusual public gatherings, individual acts of  exemplary 
defiance meant to inspire collective emulation, etc. At this critical 
point the police took dramatic steps designed to reassure the people 
and improve the subsistence situation. Some officials may indeed 
have welcomed the pre-riot—or, as their critics charged, perhaps 
even incited or organized it—for it afforded them a relatively inex-
pensive opportunity to take decisive action under the cover of  emer-
gency authority.
Thus, for example, a pre-riot at Chartres in January 1768 led the 
police to commandeer supplies from millers and mealmen. In the 
“critical circumstance” of  the fall of  1768, which found the market 
of  Brie-Comte-Robert barren, the royal procurator “believed that 
in order to prevent a popular rising he had to order and publish 
that grain would be drawn from the storehouses, which was done, 
and it was observed immediately that the market increased by more 
than thirty muids which not only checked the considerable augmen-
tation of  price which would have taken place but even caused it 
to fall somewhat.” Later that year the authorities at Montargis in 
similar circumstances forced merchants to appear on the market. 
At Bar-sur-Aube in May 1770 the police and the people together 
prevented the removal of  grain earmarked for Besançon. Not long 
afterward in the Bordelais the officers of  Libourne, moved by the 
“desperation” of  the people, visited private granaries in search of  
supplies, enjoined merchants to declare stocks, “and opposed the 
circulation of  grain passing through their city.” Simultaneously at 
Reims, in view of  growing signs of  disorder, the authorities met in 
a “general assembly of  police” which placed a de facto embargo 
on grain outflow, took steps leading to requisition, and organized 
public purchases and charitable distributions. This pre-riot ended 
in an outburst of  joyful relief  and fraternization: “the people and 
the lowest people gathered in a crowd around the police commis-
saires and universally applauded the measures taken by the general 
assembly.”
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Though the anti-dearth measures in all these cases were announced 
in the name of  the police, their striking feature was that they were 
the fruit of  some sort of  common undertaking with consumers. The 
victims of  such action pointedly denounced the league between the 
police and the people. The intendant of  the Orléanais, despite his 
sympathy for frustrated officials and hungry citizens, warned his 
superiors of  the dangers of  tolerating a situation in which the people, 
“upheld by the police,” virtually made subsistence policy.69
The most common type of  complicity between the police and the 
people in the riots of  the sixties and seventies was taxation populaire, or 
collective price-fixing, a fugitive social contract ratified openly in the 
marketplace. In response to popular demands for a just price, often 
backed by violent demonstrations, the authorities declared a fixed 
price at which all grain offered for sale or captured and brought to 
market would be distributed, usually for cash, though credit arrange-
ments were occasionally made. Sometimes the police took the lead in 
assigning the price, mobilizing supplies, and supervising distribution; 
when, in other instances, the people took the initiative, intercepted 
grain, announced a price, and organized the sales, the police inter-
vened merely to confirm faits accomplis. Less frequently, price-fixing 
took the form of  a negotiated transaction in which suppliers, under 
pressure, ceded to consumer demands, tempered by police media-
tion, by lowering their prices significantly in what amounted to a ran-
som paid in the hope of  salvaging their well-being and most of  their 
property.70
In June 1767 a riot erupted at La Ferté-Gaucher, a market-town near 
Provins in the Paris provisioning zone. “The people are persuaded,” 
reported the substitut, that the increase [in the price] of  wheat was 
caused only by the grain merchants, factors, millers, and blatiers. “In this 
occasion,” he continued, “I believed I had to [on the one hand] placate 
the anger of  the people and on the other protect the life of  these unfor-
tunates who are perhaps innocent … and in consequence I forced the 
laboureurs to give wheat for the price I fixed.”71 Next month, not far away 
 69 Ordonnance, 5 Jan. 1768, B. 3958, fol. 47, A.D. E-et-L.; royal procurator to PG, 1 Oct. 
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Champagne, 12 July 1770, C. 414, A.D. Marne.
 70 See, for example, the riots at Bléré and Châlons-sur-Marne in the summer of  1768. Fiscal 
procurator to IN. of  Touraine, 18 June 1768, C. 94, A.D. I-et-L. and IN. of  Champagne to 
Bertin, 25 July 1768, C. 413, A.D. Marne.
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at Crécy-en-Brie, “revolt was ready to break out.” To calm the agita-
tion, the lieutenant general of  police visited the market personally and 
promised to have suppliers deliver grain in priority to the consumers of  
the community at a “reasonable price.”72
On a Sunday night in the late spring at Troyes, following a week in 
which little grain appeared on the market and bread prices rose sub-
stantially, a small crowd intercepted a grain convoy leaving the city for 
Burgundy. Guards protecting the wagons were beaten and the grain 
was placed by collective decision “in depot” in a nearby inn. Their 
ranks quickly swelled by hundreds of  newcomers, the rioters led a 
torch-lit march on the houses of  dealers and of  “bourgeois” known for 
speculation and for maintaining stocks. Though some grain was pil-
laged, witnesses testified that the “largest quantity [was] removed and 
put in storage in the inns to be sold on the market.” Apparently the 
police did not appear on the scene that night. Their critics charged that 
“they hid themselves out of  fear,” but the authorities claimed that they 
were simply overwhelmed by thousands of  “artisans” rendered “furi-
ous” by “the fear of  famine.” The next day, as the rioters continued to 
draw fresh recruits and multiply their expeditions against granaries, 
the mayor and the police officers joined the riot, putting themselves “at 
the head of  the people in order to calm them [and] tolerating despite 
themselves some acts of  violence in order to prevent far greater ones.” 
The police placed the seized grain for sale at almost 50 percent below 
what had been the current price and lowered bread by six deniers the 
pound. The police, not the people, broke down the doors of  the shops 
of  several bakers who refused to yield to the new schedule and led the 
crowd to the storehouses of  several suspected hoarders in order to force 
the sale of  their grain at the fixed price.73
Shortly afterward at Corbeil, an important entrepôt in the Paris hin-
terland, “a crowd of  people” shouting for wheat converged on the market 
where “there was not a single grain” to be found. The problem here was 
more delicate than elsewhere because Corbeil served as the major stor-
age center for king’s grain destined to aliment the Paris Halles. Marching 
to the royal magazines, the crowd threatened to “pillage and remove the 
grain by force.” The royal manager offered to sell them grain at a price 
the rioters deemed too high and of  a quality that they found suspect. 
 72 Ibid., fols. 85–86.
 73 Patris (?) to IN. of  Champagne, 2, 3 June 1767; municipality to IN., 2 June 1767; Paillot to 
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The police authorities intervened, “and the Public having asked to set 
the tax,” they convoked an expert, a local miller “well regarded in this 
city,” to set an honest value. The miller reported what the going price 
had been at nearby markets, found the quality of  the royal grain to be 
significantly inferior, and recommended a price that satisfied the police 
and the public but enraged the manager of  the Corbeil stockhouses.74
According to the royal procurator of  Meaux in the summer of  
1770, the combined effect of  the prolonged dearth and “a vice of  
commerce” which diverted grain from the market was “terrible.” The 
gaping “disproportion” between need and supply was “breaking up 
the households of  workers and country folk,” reducing honest men to 
mendicancy, and threatening to provoke a wave of  crime. Every day 
more and more people milled about the marketplace aimlessly and 
uneasily. One morning in the third week of  July a horde of  hungry 
consumers “made themselves masters of  the sale and of  the price 
of  the grain.” Obviously sympathetic to the crowd, the procurator 
coolly described the posture assumed by the authorities:
Thus despite all the coordinated attention and vigilance of  the police, the maréchaussée 
[the rural gendarmerie] and the subdelegate [of  the intendant], it was necessary, 
while appearing to command, to cede to the populace and engage the grain-sellers to 
give their goods at forced discounts in order to prevent pillage.75
Throughout the Brie “considerable seditions” erupted in which “the 
people forced the laboureurs to sell them grain at a price they set them-
selves.” Failure to placate “this famished people,” noted the fiscal 
procurator of  Faremoutiers, might have produced a “bloody revolt.” 
Several months later, at St. Germain-en-Laye on the other side of  the 
capital, “to put a stop to the tumult,” the police commissaire distrib-
uted flour “at the price which the mutineers demanded.”76
Consumers viewed price-fixing not as a concession but as a right 
which the force of  circumstances periodically authorized them to 
invoke, a concrete disposition of  the right to existence which it was 
the state’s business to guarantee. Doubtless many police officials 
shared this belief  (indeed, many critics of  the police charged that they 
inculcated it, often for unworthy motives). Other officials resorted to 
 74 BN, Coll. Joly 1135, fols. 60–63.
 75 Canelle to PG, 21 July 1770, BN, Coll. Joly 1151, fols. 55–56.
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price-fixing because it was an accepted, traditional emergency mea-
sure which could be practiced exceptionally “without establishing 
precedent” and because it was a relatively simple, rapid, and inex-
pensive vehicle of  social control. It was not, however, a remedy for all 
occasions. To be successful, price-fixing had to be applied relatively 
early in the course of  a disturbance by agents in whom the public 
had confidence. In a number of  cases an angry or suspicious crowd 
spurned tardy offers of  official arbitration or, moved by other sub-
sistence grievances, rejected the set price solution as inadequate or 
irrelevant. Nor was price-fixation of  much use either in a situation 
of  near-absolute grain scarcity or one in which the impoverished and 
the unemployed, with virtually no means to buy, composed the mass 
of  the population at risk. Unless it was accompanied by a willingness 
to mobilize suppliers and pursue them, if  necessary, into their grain 
redoubts, price-fixing could prove to be positively harmful even in the 
short run. Imposed in a heavy-handed manner, it could drive away 
frightened traders and desolate the marketplace. Imperceptibly, fixa-
tion could lead to a policy of  intense local protectionism which could 
seriously disrupt commerce, inconveniencing neighbors, provoking 
retaliatory embargoes and boycotts, and compromising the flow of  
grain toward the metropolitan market.
It would be extravagant to pretend that as a rule the authorities col-
laborated with or capitulated to the crowd. The actions of  authorities 
depended on a congeries of  factors: the season of  the year; the size of  
the market and its location; the experience of  the officials; the nature 
of  their public posts and their private interests; their attitude toward 
liberalization; their relationship with the public; the armed forces at 
their disposal; their assessment of  the significance of  the disturbance, 
the mood of  the insurgents, and the validity of  popular demands; the 
conduct of  the suppliers; the prospects for relief; and the likely reaction 
of  their superiors. In the late sixties the police seem to have resorted to 
price-fixing with remarkable frequency; in some instances they clearly 
relished the opportunity to take the initiative and impose a solution.
Yet it must not be forgotten that there were also cases where the police 
tried energetically to forestall price-fixing, where the consumers wrested 
their price by force rather than by collusion, and where the fixed price 
was the trophy of  a pyrrhic victory which the authorities allowed the 
people to claim only as a balm for their wounds. At Vannes in 1765 the 
police conceded a fixed tariff  to the crowd at the market (possessed by “a 
spirit of  vertigo”) reluctantly and only until they were able to organize 
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an armed repression. Similarly, in the summer of  1768 at Châlons-
sur-Marne and at Bléré in the Touraine, the rioters extorted the price 
by violence and intimidation. Two years later at Rebais, an important 
Brie market, the clamor for price-fixation was muffled as a direct result 
of  the presence of  outside forces interposed by order of  the inten-
dant in conjunction with the Controller-General. Forewarned of  the 
danger of  “movements on the subject of  the rising prices of  grain,” 
Bertier de Sauvigny dispatched a detachment of  troops to the town. 
A former soldier named Rousselot presented a demand that “a price be 
put on the grain.” Asked to identify himself  and explain his behavior,
he replied only with invectives and challenged [the troops] to put him in prison in the hope 
of  being supported by the populace which appeared at the instant to give itself  over to 
murmurs and even to threats; but the officer commanding the troops having arrested him 
and ordered his soldiers to load their arms, this firm stand contained the people.
Ostensibly because he distrusted local justice and wanted “to make a 
more prompt example” of  this crime, the intendant requested a lettre 
de cachet to incarcerate Rousselot in the Parisian prison of  Bicêtre.77
IV
The local police officials in the field did not conceal their uneasiness 
over the deepening subsistence crisis and their misgivings about gov-
ernment policy. Significantly, they did not focus upon harvest failure as 
the primary source of  unrest, although there was considerable empiri-
cal evidence to support such an hypothesis and the allure of  a clinical 
explanation which largely absolved human agencies from responsibil-
ity. Nor did the central government betray any interest on this line of  
analysis, not at least until the end of  the decade, for a public admission 
of  disaster would have been hard to reconcile with its determination to 
pursue liberalization. The immediate causes to which the local police 
ascribed the upheavals of  the sixties were abrupt grain exports and 
removals, bristling resentment against grain traders, prolonged pen-
ury, misery, and high prices. But they also described a general state of  
mind, a pervasive and terrible anxiety—they called it an “agitation” or 
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“fermentation”—and a state of  socioeconomic anarchy, both of  which 
they linked to the new liberal regime.
The dismantling of  the regulatory apparatus worried, baffled, and 
sometimes shocked these administrators. Very few of  them simply 
turned their backs on the new legislation, although it was often tempt-
ing and prudent to claim ignorance. Rather, they confronted it, tried to 
deal with it, and found that it provoked for them a crisis of  conscience 
as well as one of  authority. For it seemed perilous and wrong-headed 
to undermine the public order and well-being by abandoning the 
grain trade to a concourse of  self-interests. Despite its imperfections, 
the old system created for the community a semblance of  solidarity 
and a sense of  accountability and it frequently managed to reduce the 
margin of  unpredictability and temper the consequences of  accidents. 
Now wheat that habitually furnished a given market succumbed to 
strange blandishments. New dealers proliferated in grain commerce, 
brandishing the liberal code as if  it were a special royal patent, thereby 
exacerbating the standard dearth-syndrome fears of  plots and maneu-
vers. Ordinary people, with neither criminal proclivities nor anti-social 
motives, rose up in insurrection. A refrain of  frustration and anomie 
arose from the police, chanted by the intendant as well as the fiscal 
procurator of  the bourg: “our hands are tied”—what should we do?78 
Many of  the disturbances of  the sixties were police as well as popular 
revolts, riots for rather than against an apparently dated version of  
the chose publique. In this sense popular behavior and administrative 
attitude constituted the foundations of  a grassroots movement for the 
recall of  the reform measures of  1763 and 1764.
Though a cynical observer might suggest that they were merely 
contriving pretexts to justify their disobedience, many local authori-
ties appear to have viewed the liberal laws with genuine incredu-
lity. Like the people, the police had certain expectations and beliefs 
about the conduct of  government. There were certain steps which 
they simply could not believe that the government—personified in 
their minds by the king himself—would take. “If, by the declara-
tion of  1763,” the fiscal procurator of  Châtillon-sur-Loire wrote his 
intendant, “the King seems to have given commerce a certain lib-
erty that it did not have heretofore, His intention surely was not to strip 
the police officers of  the right they have to prevent grain from being 
sold anywhere but in the public marketplaces … the sole precaution 
 78 Dronay to PG, 14 Sept. 1766, BN, Coll. Joly 1134, fols. 197–98.
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capable of  procuring abundance in the markets and, consequently 
the just price of  grain.” Similarly, the acting royal procurator at Mon-
targis rejected as “a false interpretation” of  liberalization the claim 
the traders made that the new laws authorized off-market transac-
tions. These were “abuses” which were certainly “contrary to the 
intentions of  His Majesty,” for Louis XV “had no less in view [the 
aim] of  providing for the provisioning of  the markets and the needs 
of  His people” than of  “favoring commerce.” A subdelegate in the 
Hainaut, despite a mass of  contrary evidence, persisted in believing 
that “the intention of  His Majesty was never to alter the general 
police established to procure abundance.…”79
Departing from the same assumptions as his colleagues in the Orléa-
nais, a Beauce procurator composed an interpretive brief  in which he 
contended that the reform laws did not grant as much liberty as every-
one pretended. “The Declaration of  1764 [sic]” he argued, “gives lib-
erty of  commerce, but it does not give that of  buying and of  selling 
grain clandestinely, in the cabarets, on a mere sample.”80 Though in fact 
the liberal laws authorized all these practices, it was inconceivable to 
the procurator that this could be. Groping to make sense of  the events 
which were threatening to engulf  their community, the municipal offi-
cers of  Châlons-sur-Marne wishfully predicted that liberalization could 
not last much longer because it was so violently at odds with the func-
tions of  kingship. “It is still true,” they reassured themselves, “that the 
King is the common father to his subjects and that His heart is revolted 
by the idea that a part of  those who have the good fortune to live under 
His laws be exposed to lacking bread by the impossibility of  meeting the 
price to which grain would be carried by the continuation of  exports.”81
The most common sentiment expressed by the local officials was 
a mixture of  confusion and helplessness. Convinced that there was 
a mistake in the legislation which could be administratively rectified, 
that the central authorities lacked information about the true state of  
affairs, or that, as in the past, exceptions would be readily made to 
accommodate local peculiarities, they besieged the Procurator General 
 79 Cypierre to T. de Montigny, 18 Oct. 1768 and Montargis police register, Oct. 1768 in 
C. Bloch, Correspondance inédite de l’intendant Cypierre, 135–138, 153–155; SD at Valenciennes 
to IN., 22 July 1770, C. 6690, A.D. Nord.
 80 Procurator of  Angerville-la-Gaste to PG (ca. 1770), BN, Coll. Joly 1148, fol. 65. Police 
officials often confused the Declaration of  May 1763 with the Edict of  July 1764. Viewing 
them as parts of  a single measure, they tended to overlook (or disdain) distinctions made 
between internal and external liberty.
 81 Châlons municipality to Laverdy, 29 Dec. 1767, C. 413, A.D. Marne.
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of  the Paris Parlement or their intendants with petitions for clarifica-
tion and precise instructions. In the fall of  1766 the lieutenant general 
of  police at Vitry-le-François painted a gloomy picture of  his town’s 
provisioning situation. A host of  merchants descended upon the mar-
ket, stripping it bare; others prowled the countryside, buying, hoarding, 
and driving prices up. He complained that the Declaration of  1763, 
by introducing freedom of  trade everywhere, crippled him. Within the 
terms of  the law, he could do nothing, but he knew exactly the sort of  
measures the circumstances demanded:
I dare not undertake anything without the authority of  My Superiors; consequently, 
I have the honor of  supplicating Your Grandeur to please authorize me to have a suf-
ficient quantity of  grain brought to the market to be sold to the people.…”
To underline the urgency of  the request—it was as close as a petty 
official could come to threatening the highest authorities—the lieuten-
ant characterized the public mood as combustible: “already underhand 
cabals are forming which menace fire, mutilation of  [grain and flour] 
sacks, and obstruction of  the departure of  grain from this city.”
Four years later the situation had not substantially changed. With-
out effective powers of  police, the city officials could do nothing to 
allay misery or prevent revolt. Faced with an “extremely urgent” 
predicament, the royal procurator, in a laborious letter, asked Joly 
de Fleury for authorization to use old-fashioned constraints, boldly 
hinting that whatever his response the force of  circumstances would 
compel the city fathers to defy the liberal regime:
We will soon be reduced to having no more bread if  you do not have the kindness to 
support the officers of  police. We cannot do otherwise than to interdict the transport 
of  grain; we no longer have any choice. In 1768 the Parlement overturned a Sentence 
of  the lieutenant of  Police of  this city which condemned to a fine several individu-
als who had refused to bring grain to the market. We respect the arrêt without being able 
to understand it. Nevertheless, Monseigneur, we cannot take any other course, we are 
forced to do it in order to avoid some excess of  the people.82
In 1767 the police at Mantes told the Procurator General that they 
no longer knew how to fulfill their functions. Liberalization seriously 
dislocated commercial exchanges in this busy market port. In execu-
tion of  the laws, the police suspended prohibitions on buying, selling, 
and regrating, a throng of  newcomers entered the grain trade, and 
 82 Deballidart to PG, 6 July 1770, BN, Coll. Joly 1152, fol. 175.
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 consumers lost the right to satisfy their needs before the merchants 
entered the market. Persuaded that the cherté and misery of  the times 
were a direct result of  the new system, the Mantes authorities wanted 
to know if  there were any loopholes in the reform laws. Are all “prose-
cutions of  evil-doers forbidden?” they inquired.83 The liberal laws per-
plexed the lieutenant general of  Dreux. Have they changed all the old 
rules and definitions? he wondered. Does the “great liberty” of  1763 
permit the purchase and resale of  grain at the same market, a price-
swelling practice rigorously prohibited according to traditional ways? 
Do I treat men who commit such abuses as “Monopolists”? queried 
the lieutenant.84 Do we understand correctly, asked the municipality of  
Angers, that “according to the current System of  the Council it must 
no longer be a question [for the police] of  taking measures to assure 
the subsistence of  the people?”85
The fiscal procurator of  Tournan in the Brie testified to the success 
of  liberalization from the point of  view of  the suppliers. “Ever since the 
Declaration of  the King which allows freedom of  trade,” he reported, 
“all the merchants, blatiers, and regraters have believed themselves to be 
authorized to no longer follow the regulations of  police.…” In order to 
parry the dearth the procurator argued that it was “of  an indispens-
able necessity” to enforce those rules.86 Although he understood that it 
was a “delicate matter,” the procurator of  another Brie town wanted 
to know in writing whether, in order to maintain public order, he could 
(1) compel merchants and laboureurs to supply the market, (2) visit and 
inspect the storehouses of  dealers, and (3) fix the price of  grain.87 A 
Breton subdelegate warned of  serious disorders unless the police were 
rearmed to combat the “avarice” to which the new laws have given a 
“total freedom.”88 Independently, a bailli and a subdelegate in Cham-
pagne urged the resuscitation of  the 1723 Declaration banning trad-
ing outside the markets; they saw no other way to deal with exorbitant 
prices, hoarding, and popular suffering, all consequences of  liberal-
ization.89 Ganneron, royal  procurator of  Dammartin, a market near 
 83 Chedde to PG, 26 Sept. 1767, BN, Coll. Joly 1146, fols. 143–44.
 84 LG of  Dreux to PG, 9 Jan. 1769, ibid., fols. 104–105.
 85 Mémoire, 1769, C. 96, A.D. I-et-L.
 86 Fiscal procurator of  Tournan to PG, 22 Dec. 1770, BN, Coll. Joly 1155, fol. 18.
 87 Cordenier (Faremoutiers-en-Brie) to PG, 23 July 1770, BN, Coll. Joly 1151, fols. 52–53.
 88 Pravalon of  Lannion to IN., 6 Oct. 1768, C. 1652, A.D. I-et-V.
 89 Lenoir (Arcis-sur-Aube?) to IN., 25 Sept. 1766 and Masson to IN., 9 Sept. 1768, C. 299, 
A.D. Aube.
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Paris, watched helplessly as the suppliers traded privately and irre-
sponsibly, inflated the prices, and created a situation likely to produce 
“famine,” crime, and unspeakable hardships. “Because the Declara-
tion of  the King binds my hands,” he wrote, inviting Joly to untie him, 
“I can do nothing without new orders.”90
The high station of  Cypierre, intendant of  the généralité of  Orléans, 
gave him hardly more freedom of  initiative than the petty provincial 
police. He also found his “hands tied” at the very moment that circum-
stances demanded energetic intervention.91 Cypierre’s case is instruc-
tive, for he was politically and ideologically sympathetic to the liberal 
cause and he had been among the first within the upper reaches of  
public administration to solicit exportation. In principle, he continued 
to favor liberty, but as the chief  officer responsible for public order in his 
province, he could not accept the presumably short-run costs of  transi-
tion from the old regime to the new. He wanted the freedom to temper 
liberty—at least momentarily—with the kinds of  precautions geared to 
reestablish orderly and overt exchanges at the public markets.92
The boldest critics amongst the police spoke out forthrightly in con-
demnation of  the liberal system. The new laws were social, economic, 
and political disasters. Bertinière, substitut at Melun, held them directly 
responsible for the extensive dearth and disorder: “The unhappy cir-
cumstance to which the people find themselves reduced by the brusque 
cherté of  grain… is occasioned neither by the lack of  grain nor of  har-
vests but by the unique cupidity of  evil-intentioned men who on the 
basis of  the general liberty of  this commerce buy at any cost in order 
to hoard.” Since 1763 “the grain markets have been filled with noth-
ing but unknown persons” who scour the countryside cornering har-
vest futures after plundering supplies in the towns. Disdainful of  “this 
pretended liberty,” Bertinière called for a return to the “sage disposi-
tions” of  old which served as a “brake” on self-interest and a barrier 
against dearth.93 Little more than a year after the July Edict a Touraine 
municipality anxiously reported that prices had climbed 50% above 
pre-liberal levels, hoarding was widespread, and the markets deserted 
 90 Ganneron to PG, 18 June 1770, BN, Coll. Joly 1149, fols. 118–19.
 91 Cited by C. Bloch, “Le Commerce des grains dans la généralité d’Orléans,” Etudes sur 
l’histoire économique de la France, 1760–1789 (Paris, 1900), 38. For a fuller discussion of  
Cypierre’s thinking, see below, chapter five.
 92 Ibid., 36–53. Bloch insists on the “contradictions” in Cypierre’s position without, however, 
trying to understand and explain it.
 93 Bertinière to PG, 29 Sept. 1767, BN, Coll. Joly 1136, fols., 124–125.
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as grain  usually bound for the city drained instead to Nantes, appar-
ently for export abroad. As a consequence the city fathers were ready to 
renounce “all the advantage” which the new regime promised.94
“The cherté of  grain seems to me to have its origin in the disposi-
tions of  the edict of  the month of  July 1764,” wrote the subdelegate 
of  Avesnes in the Hainaut. The decisive test for him was that “the 
unlimited liberty accorded by this law has made more malheureux than 
heureux.” The proof  could be heard in “the general protest of  the 
provinces,” which resounded throughout the realm. Though he was 
unmistakably a moderate rather than a hothead, who appreciated the 
need to stimulate a “stagnant” agriculture and who “feared” both the 
“Scylla” and the “Charybdis” of  administrative extremism, this sub-
delegate could not bring himself  to approve the consequences of  liber-
alization. “The frantic license, the avarice, and the cupidity” released 
by the liberal reforms, he contended, “have broken and shattered all 
the links and the chains which should naturally bind one part of  the 
nation to the other, that is to say, the proprietors of  the land, the cul-
tivators, and the country-folk [on the one side] with the businessmen, 
the artisans, the workers [ouvriers], and the inhabitants of  the towns 
and cities [on the other].” Even as it freed grain, the liberal legislation 
enslaved the majority of  Frenchmen: “Three-quarters of  the French 
nation has become within a year tributary to the other quarter.” At 
least five other subdelegates in the Hainaut agreed with his analysis 
and demanded, along with him, that limits be placed on the liberty of  
the trade— limits which would concentrate grain in the markets and 
illuminate the activities of  the traders and owners of  subsistence.95
Among the adversaries of  liberalization at the local police level 
were officials who had been buffeted by the “economic” winds of  the 
sixties despite their distance from ministerial bureaus and philosophi-
cal salons and who had thought seriously about the implications of  
the reforming current. Viewing the decade in retrospect, Deniloy, a 
Picard subdelegate, recalled the optimism which the prospect of  lib-
erty had aroused even among administrators of  his humble rank:
Never had any law marshalled more good wishes than the declaration [sic] of  1764.  
It was supposed to change the face of  agriculture; to procure for us the foreigner’s 
gold by the export of  our grain surplus; to revitalize trade … and to carry abundance 
as far as the huts of  the poor.
 94 Mémoire to CG., Sept. 1765, C. 94, A.D. I-et-L.
 95 “Réflexions sur l’édit du mois de juillet 1764…,” ca. Oct. 1770, C. 6690, A.D. Nord; 
reports of  the SDs of  Valenciennes, Cambrai, St. Amand, etc., ca. Oct. 1773, ibid.
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The results, however, “did not meet expectations.” On the contrary, 
liberalization spelled ruin for “the mass of  people.” Prices had been 
“too low” before 1763–64, but soon afterwards they “broke the dike 
and rose without limits.” The “new riches” produced by the swirling 
grain trade “remained in a small number of  hands.” For the common 
citizens, wages fell, unemployment spread, and “epidemics” followed 
hard upon “the horrors of  dearth.” To deal with this crisis, the police 
had to be given “a new life.” Had we not lost sight of  the essential 
quality of  human nature, Deniloy reflected, we would never have 
succumbed to the allure of  liberty, for “whoever knows the heart of  
man” will agree that “prohibitive laws are necessary.”96
In contrast to his colleague from Picardy, Champassais, a subdelegate 
from the generality of  Alençon, had been acutely skeptical of  the liberal 
panacea from the start. “I never adopted the system” whose principles 
he learned about in “numerous brochures and writings,” he recalled. “I 
foresaw from the very beginning,” Champassais claimed, “the dangerous 
consequences [of  liberalization] that we so unfortunately suffer today.” 
Liberty made the grain trade socially “abusive” by “doubling and tri-
pling” the price and thus causing “desperate misery” amongst the people, 
some of  whom were forced to join the ranks of  beggars or turn to crime 
in order to survive. This official had no doubt that only a swift return to 
the police regime could stem the tide of  social disorganization.97
Deeply shocked by the consequences of  liberalization and the 
apparent indifference of  the government toward them, the royal 
procurator at Meulan confided in Joly de Fleury:
I respect and I submit myself  to its [the council’s] decrees. But as a good citizen I cannot 
keep silent on the effects of  the exportation of  grain abroad [further along in the letter 
he makes it clear that he means “extraordinary removals” regardless of  ultimate des-
tination] which it was believed necessary to permit in order to encourage agriculture. 
But, Monseigneur, if  this good results, we see that there is born in my opinion a real 
evil for the public in general.
After the “very abundant” harvest of  1766, everyone in the area agreed 
that the grain should not sell for more than 12 to 15 livres the septier (Paris 
measure). “Yet,” reported the procurator “instead of  diminishing after 
the harvest as it usually does, it has increased from one market-day to 
another.” Under the new system, only the public stood to lose.98
 96 Deniloy to IN., 2 Feb. 1772, C. 84, A.D. Somme.
 97 Champassais to IN., 12 Oct. 1771, C. 89, A.D. Orne.
 98 Royal procurator at Meulan to PG, 17 Oct. 1766, BN, Coll. Joly 1134, fols. 11–12. Italics mine.
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For fiscal and other reasons local authorities rarely tended to overes-
timate their harvest yields, yet many officials in the sixties (and again in 
the seventies) reported reasonably satisfactory, or even good, crops in the 
midst of  continuing subsistence crises. Nothing seemed to reveal more 
starkly the artificiality and the criminality of  the dearth from which they 
suffered than the apparent co-existence of  soaring prices and substan-
tial supplies.99 A cherished aim of  the physiocrats, cherté-in-abundance, 
was a cruel and unacceptable paradox to the police and the people. It 
was proof  that the shortage was the product of  human evil and bad 
administration rather than unfathomable and intractable hazard. It was 
this paradox that infuriated the people and frequently drove them to 
resist. The police implied, for reasons that were in part self-serving, that 
the people would have been less inclined to violence had they not per-
ceived themselves as victims of  a moral and political wrong and con-
versely more disposed to some form of  sullen resignation had the harvest 
been unequivocally bad and scarcity consequently authentic, inevitable 
and universal. Though subsistence stress blurs everyone’s vision, it is not 
inconceivable, once we learn more about harvests and collective action 
on the local level, that we will find that people rioted more, and more 
violently, in areas where the harvest situation was believed to be reasonably 
good than in places where natural desolation was indisputable.
For certain officials the moral and political failure of  liberaliza-
tion was ultimately more compelling ground for objection than func-
tional arguments bearing on social control and the public interest. In 
one way or another they acknowledged that the people had rights and 
claims vis-à-vis the government and vis-à-vis property-owners and that 
the liberal laws had trampled those rights and ignored those claims. 
From our perspective their stand might seem remarkably audacious 
or aberrant, for we are not accustomed to locating what appear to be 
the harbingers of  sans-culottic ideology or the remnants of  archaic 
communal solidarity in the lowest echelons of  provincial administra-
tion in old-regime backwater France. But to the officials who espoused 
it this position was a commonplace perfectly in harmony with their 
 99 See, for example, the memoir (Dec. 1766) of  the élus généraux of  Burgundy: “The province 
of  Burgundy experiences in a year in which the countryside produced an abundant harvest all 
the hardship of  dearth and is on the brink of  feeling the horror of  famine.” C. 3215, fols. 
622–25, A.D. C d’O. Cf. Masson to IN. of  Champagne, 9 Sept., 7 Oct. 1766, C. 299 and 
Patris to same, 2 June 1767, C. 1908, A.D. Aube; Deniloy to IN. of  Amiens, 2 Feb. 1772, C. 
84, A.D. Somme.
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world. Like many other towns in the late sixties, Chartres suffered from 
excessively high prices, grain penury, and generalized “misery” which the 
municipal officials blamed on the license for “Monopoly” granted by the 
May Declaration. Even as the partisans of  liberty had looked to nature 
for laws capable of  freeing them from the constraints of  the positive laws 
of  traditional monarchy, so the police of  Chartres invoked a higher law 
to justify their dissent. Though the May law explicitly rendered internal 
trade totally free, they argued that there were explicit bonds and obliga-
tions from which no piece of  legislation could free men. Whatever the 
law stipulated, the liberty of  May must “… always remain subject to 
the rules of  justice, subordinated to the rights of  humanity.”100 Abstract and 
threadbare to our eyes, this formula nevertheless comes closest to captur-
ing the outraged mood of  the consumers at the marketplaces. Put into 
practical terms by the Chartres police, it meant that they had the respon-
sibility, and by logical extension the authority, to combat the abuse of  an 
unchecked liberty which led to monopoly and then to misery.
In explaining popular disorders, authorities everywhere dwelled 
on the loathing consumers had to see “the grain naturally destined 
for their subsistence” slip out of  their hands.101 In the thinking of  the 
subdelegate of  Quimper in Brittany, the people had “rights” (des droits) 
over “commodities of  first necessity,” at least in times when “cherté” 
threatens to deprive them of  their subsistence. “I would dare to say,” 
he continued in a language that is clumsy yet unmistakable in mean-
ing, “that whatever the functions which have regulated property might 
be, each individual is in the right to say that what is necessary to make 
up his subsistence cannot be renounced for him by someone else when 
he cannot procure it by dint of  his own work alone.” A perspicacious 
man, the subdelegate was alert to the implications of  this doctrine 
which invested the propertyless with rights and placed limits on the 
rights of  property and the propertied. “These maxims would be dan-
gerous if  they were spread among the people,” he conceded, “but they 
are salutary and sacred in the cabinets of  Princes and of  the persons 
who govern.”102 That is to say, it was not up to the people themselves to 
100 B. 3953, fol. 82 (2 Sept. 1768), A.D. E-et-L. My italics. Cf. the reaction of  the économistes: 
Roubaud, Représentations, 107.
101 Cypierre to T. de Montigny, 1 Sept. 1768, in C. Bloch, Correspondance inédite de l’intendant 
Cypierre, 50. Cf. Masson to IN. of  Champagne, 29 May 1770, C. 299, A.D. Aube.
102 Durun (Quimper) to IN., 11 Feb. 1772, C. 1725, A.D. I-et-V.
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take consciousness of  their rights and lay claim to them. In order to 
preserve the social order, it was the duty of  the police to enforce these 
rights for the people, preemptively and without fanfare. Riots were evi-
dence of  police dereliction, for if  the public administrators performed 
their duties properly, the citizenry would never find it necessary to 
revolt. Though crudely put, this subdelegate’s argument anticipated 
the ideas of  Necker and other exponents of  government intervention 
in provisioning affairs. On the local level, it meant that the police had 
frequently to serve, in the words of  a subdelegate from Champagne, as 
the “representative” of  the people.103
By the end of  1768 the outcry of  “misery” was universal. In the 
frontier areas, observed the duc de Croy, the people suffered more than 
they had in 1709, the memory of  whose agonies served as an index of  
catastrophe for distant generations. “Brittany is abandoned to an all-
embracing calamity and exposed to the torments of  famine,” wrote a 
commission of  the Estates. Lillois compared their hardship to the more 
recent dearth of  1740 and, faced with serious disorder, the city fathers 
made “representations” against the liberal laws which “cannot be exe-
cuted… without occasioning an extreme misery.”104 “How could a man 
who earns 15 or 16 sols a day,” asked Trennin, an official at Versailles, 
“who only three years ago used 12 to furnish bread [for his family] and 
for whom today 24 is necessary, regard his condition tranquilly?” “You 
know, moreover,” continued Trennin,
how much I respect the laws: if  a few words escape from me which seem opposed to what 
the government appears to have thought in 1764, do not accuse me, I beg you, of   temerity. 
103 Gehier (Bar-sur-Aube) to IN., 10 Jan. 1775, C. 299, A.D. Aube.
104 Duc de Croy, Journal, ed. by de Grouchy and Cottin, II, 302; Petition of  Commissaires des 
Etats de Bretagne, 1 Oct. 1768, AN, H 543–45; Pierre Lefèvre, Commerce des grains à Lille, 
53, 184–86. For reports of  growing misery in the Hainaut and in Auvergne, see Taboureau 
to Laverdy, 1 Oct. 1767, C. 6690, A.D. Nord and officers of  the bailliage of  Aurillac to 
Moheau, 26 Aug. 1769, C. 906, A.D. P-de-D.
 One of  the most poignant expressions of  desperation came to the surface in a complaint 
filed with the police by a miller named Jacques Collet from the Parisian suburb of  Antony. 
In late November 1768 he received an anonymous note urging him to place several septiers 
of  maslin in a specially prepared cache along a back road for a family plunged “in misery.” 
The awkward hand and style and the phonetic spelling confirm its authenticity:
 “Monsieur et madame Collet ge sont tras pauvre homme avec nos anfans et nos famme ge 
sont au dessespoire ge sont sant pain … Sis vous voulay nous faire plaisir de nous avance 
chaqun un septies de Metaille ge vous seron bien oblige vous nous tiray de malleur ge 
pouvons pas voir mourire de fain nos anfans sis vous aves cet bonte pour nous ge prirons 
bondieu pour vous ge vous prion nous refusses par ge crain que ge srons pousse a mal fair.” 
AN, Y 18668 (28 Nov. 1768).
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Often laws which are the most advantageous in appearance by the motives which caused 
them to be promulgated, have need of  restrictions, explanations, or modifications.…
Politically adept rather than merely deferential, Trennin understood 
the value of  affecting a moderate tone. Yet the “modifications” and 
“restrictions” he sought were sweeping.
Trennin’s recommendations could have served as a manifesto 
of  the police reaction. He began with an unequivocal statement of  
indictment: “It is, however, to the abuses that this Edict [Trennin, 
like many other officials, assimilated the dispositions of  both reform 
laws to the July Edict] occasioned that one can without lacking the 
respect due to the authority from which it emanated attribute the cherté 
which makes us groan.” By abuses Trennin meant most of  the rights 
with which the reforms had invested traders: the right of  anyone to 
enter the commerce, to deal off  the markets, to stock and speculate, 
to exchange grain without regard for public needs. The liberal laws 
inflamed the “insatiable avidity” of  the dealers who, with “a copy of  
the Edict in hand,” spread disorder wherever they go. Among the 
“precautions” urgently required, argued Trennin, “it is above all nec-
essary not to stifle all the regulations of  police which must be exercised 
on the markets in order to prevent monopoly.” Specifically, he asked 
that “liberty of  trade” be maintained on the condition that all dealers 
register their names, addresses, and location of  storehouses; that mer-
chants be forbidden to buy on their home market, a practice which 
drove up prices and created shortages; that laboureurs be prohibited 
from buying grain in order to resell; that the purchase of  “futures” 
be forbidden; that “in order for exportation not to prejudice the sub-
sistence of  the inhabitants” a careful examination be made of  the 
state of  the preceding harvests and the prospects for the next and no 
decisions be reached before the end of  the winter season; that the gov-
ernment substantially lower the ceiling above which exports would 
automatically halt, for the cut-off  price became in effect the price of  
consumption and the current level of  30 livres the septier was far too 
high. In sum, voicing a demand seconded by scores of  his colleagues 
throughout the kingdom, Trennin wanted the government to restore 
to the local police—the men who had to deal with the subsistence 
problem in the field—all the powers and responsibilities granted to 
them by “the ordinances anterior to 1763.”105
105 Trennin to PG, 26 Oct. 1768, BN, Coll. Joly 1142, fols. 153–164. Cf. the tough demands of  
the Burgundy élus. Petition to IN., 26 Nov. 1770, C. 3363, fols. 73–74, A.D. Cd’O.
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In a limited but significant way, Trennin’s program was imple-
mented from below by a growing number of  officials who passed 
beyond expressions of  bewilderment, admonition, and protest to direct 
action. In addition to price-fixing, the police in places widely scattered 
throughout the realm intervened by intercepting supplies on the road 
or preventing their departure from the town or village, requiring all 
transactions to occur exclusively on the marketplace under public scru-
tiny, imposing provisioning quotas on merchants or requiring them to 
appear regularly at the local market in return for permission to trade 
in the area, compelling dealers to register with authorities, inspect-
ing granaries and private homes suspected of  containing hoards, and 
conducting inventories of  all grain held in storage.106 In a few cases 
the authorities were constrained to act; they had no taste for bullying 
merchants or breaking the law. Delighting in their defiance, in a hand-
ful of  contrasting instances the police staged theatrical entries upon 
the market-stage. The behavior of  some administrators betrayed a 
bitter resentment over the fact that the liberal regime had undercut 
their authority to govern locally, without, however, relieving them of  
the obligation to maintain order.107 Of  the officials who stopped to 
ponder the significance of  their actions, most appear, like Masson of  
Arcis-sur-Aube, to have suffered an enormous emotional strain and to 
have worried about their disobedience even when they were sure that 
what they were doing was necessary and right.108 Yet the vast major-
ity of  interventions were singularly unspectacular and it may very 
well be that the bulk of  the police who undertook them acted unself-
consciously and instinctively, as they always had in times of  stress 
“from time immemorial,” oblivious or indifferent to the new laws, 
like the commissaire of  Nogent-le-Rotrou, the syndic of  Montrésor, 
or the judge of  Pompiez.109 Many of  them simply did not perceive or 
acknowledge a dissonance between their conception of  their responsi-
bilities and their coercive options on the one hand and the dictates of  
106 Cypierre to T. de Montigny, 4 Nov. 1768 in C. Bloch, Correspondance inédite de l’intendant 
Cypierre, 151; Gazette de l’agriculture, du commerce, des arts et des finances (10 July 1770), 518; 
Terray to de la Galaizière, 10 July 1770, AN, F11 153; CG to Turgot and CG to Lieutenant 
of  Police of  Angoulême, 10 April 1770, AN, F12 154; arrêts du Conseil of  12, 19 Aug. 1770, 
AN, F12 6; CG to IN. of  Tours, 9 May 1770 and IN. to officers of  Amboise, 11 May 1770, 
from the personal collection of  the author.
107 Royal procurator to PG, 1 Oct. 1768, BN, Coll. Joly 1146, fols. 28–29.
108 Masson to IN. of  Champagne, 29 May 1770, C. 299, A.D. Aube.
109 B. 2376, A.D. E-et-L.; Haberty to IN. (?), 4 Sept. 1765, C. 94, A.D. I-et-L.; Bouget to IN. 
of  Bordeaux, 28 June 1770, C. 1431, A.D. Gir.
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liberalization on the other. Certainly many of  these officials were sur-
prised the first time they received a reprimand from their superiors or 
notification that one of  their sentences had been quashed by a higher 
jurisdiction.110
Given the niggardliness and the heterogeneity of  the evidence, it is 
immensely difficult to generalize about police resistance. Though we 
have tried to take note of  certain similarities of  attitude and action 
which appear to constitute patterns, it was doubtless true in the sixties 
and seventies, as it was in the good and bad years of  the preceding cen-
tury, that the police of  each place had its own peculiar character, that 
conditions varied widely from place to place depending upon a host 
of  historical, geographical, economic, and sociodemographic variables, 
and that it is virtually impossible retrospectively to “predict” police con-
duct. Allowing for qualitative disparities and erratic and idiosyncratic 
behavior, can one adumbrate a rough chronology and geography of  
resistance? Police opposition to liberalization broke out as early as the 
fall of  1764 and in some places—in the south where the liberal regime 
endured the longest—it erupted as late as 1773–74. North of  the Loire, 
areas close to the main channels of  transportation seem to have experi-
enced police dissidence earlier than the more isolated places; the police 
acted first where the “removals” first disrupted the ordinary train of  
life, rather than in the areas which suffered the earliest crop failures. 
Toward the end of  the decade one can detect a demonstrator or emu-
lation effect, a sort of  contagion of  defiance which induced more and 
more officials to take action. Resistance reached its collective peak in 
1770 on the very eve of  the end of  liberalization, perhaps in anticipa-
tion of  its demise, as the subsistence-economic crisis lurched to a head.
We know for certain that police resistance was astonishingly wide-
spread, and this fact alone gives it great significance. On this point the 
exquisitely tendentious contemporary pamphlet and periodical lit-
erature, which has misled many historians, converges with a convinc-
ing assortment of  more nearly neutral sources.111 It is not yet clear, 
however, that resistance was sharpest where one might have expected 
it, i.e., in areas with the most trying subsistence problems, in places 
110 See, for example, Laverdy to PG, 5 April 1768, BN, Coll. Joly 1142, fols. 56–58 and Petit, 
fiscal procurator of  Rambouillet, to PG, 27 June 1768, ibid., fols. 72–73. Cf. Ricommard, 
Troyes, 292–94.
111 For an example of  the polemical literature, see Gazette de l’agriculture, du commerce, des arts et des 
finances (10 July 1770), 517–519 and (26 Jan. 1771), 59.
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without relevant crisis experience, in river-towns, in metropolitan 
regions, etc. Though it seems true that its incidence was consider-
ably lower, at least till the seventies, in the “liberal” segments of  the 
realm (and if  this is right, it is more likely to turn out to be a cause 
rather than a result of  regional liberalism), there are no pronounced 
differences among the “overpopulated cereal lands of  the north 
and east,” the “bocages of  the west,” and the “specialized” wine, for-
est, coastal, and urban-hinterland areas.112 As a rule, it appears the 
resistance was easier in the smaller towns and villages than in the 
major cities (though the Rouen Parlement protected the municipal 
authorities against pressure from the center) and in the more remote 
rather than the most accessible places (though in both instances this 
may simply reflect the relative facility of  procuring supplies). It is not 
easy to say what difference the attitude and influence of  the major 
representatives of  royal authority might have made. Two critics of  
liberalization, Cypierre, the intendant of  the Orléanais, which lay 
in the shadow of  Versailles (or Fontainebleau, to be more precise), 
and De Gourgues, who managed the far-off  generality of  Montau-
ban, both complained that the police had “their hands tied” by the 
new laws. But whereas in the Montauban area the police apparently 
resigned themselves to their incapacitation, albeit grudgingly, in the 
Orléanais, according to Cypierre himself, they engaged in wholesale 
subversion.113 Surely there were intra- as well as inter-regional pat-
terns of  resistance. Though his claim will require careful testing, the 
intendant of  Brittany’s geography of  local interest may prove to be 
the most promising suggestion to pursue. In his view, those officials 
“who were placed in the commercial cities breathed nothing but lib-
erty [while] those of  the interior spoke only of  prohibitions .…”114 
The revolt of  the consumers and the mutiny of  the police seri-
ously menaced the prospects for liberalization. Determined not to be 
intimidated either by the public or by public authorities, the liberal 
ministry set upon a course of  action which precluded compromise or 
conciliation. The rationale for this policy and some of  its results are 
discussed in the next chapter.
112 These are Goubert’s regional categories in Braudel and Labrousse, eds., Histoire économique 
et sociale, II, 104–118.
113 Cypierre to T. de Montigny, 16 Oct. 1768 in C. Bloch, Correspondance inédite de l’intendant 
Cypierre, 132–133 and De Gourgues to CG, 16 Dec. 1771, AN, F11 223.
114 IN. of  Brittany to CG, June 1774, C. 1653, A.D. I-et-V.
Chapter V
FORCING GRAIN TO BE FREE:  
THE GOVERNMENT HOLDS THE LINE
The government responded to the burgeoning unrest—popular 
revolts and police resistance—with a hard and determined line, 
starkly re-affirming its commitment to liberalization and to high 
prices as an express policy of  state. Laverdy correctly believed that 
traditional attitudes toward subsistence constituted the single greatest 
barrier to change. But, like many self-consciously enlightened minis-
ters and reformers, he neither understood nor sympathized with the 
workings of  popular psychology, nor did he know how to deal with 
it. Diffusing light, to be sure, was no easy matter; since all men were 
not equally equipped to seize the truth, often it was necessary to force 
them to accept it. To re-educate the public, Laverdy saw no alterna-
tive to brutal and relentless reconditioning.
Impetuously, the people believed that their right to subsist took pre-
cedence over all the rights prescribed by natural law as the basis of  
social organization. They assumed that it was the solemn duty of  the 
state to intervene when necessary to guarantee their subsistence without 
regard for so-called natural rights. Such views, in Laverdy’s estimation, 
were erroneous and pernicious; they misconceived the role of  the gov-
ernment and its relation to the citizenry and did violence to the sound-
est principles of  political economy. In a word, they were irrational; the 
Controller-General refused a dialogue with unreason. “The people,” 
he lamented, “hardly used their reason in matters of  subsistence.”1 
Surely the bulk of  police officials who dealt with these problems 
day to day would have found it singularly fatuous to rebuke the peo-
ple for being unreasonable when they were hungry, impoverished, 
 1 CG to Cypierre, 7 Sept. 1768 cited by Bloch, “Le Commerce des grains,” Etudes sur l’histoire 
économique, 43. Cf. the remark of  the liberal First President of  the Parlement of  Provence: 
“The multitude never reasons coolly on the matter of  subsistence.” Draft letter to CG, 8 
July 1768, A.D. B-du-R., C. 2420.
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or simply anxious. It was the job of  the authorities to be reasonable 
about provisioning; for the public, especially in time of  stress, it was 
virtually impossible to avoid subsistence terror. Insofar as popular fears 
were often imaginary—a fact which had little bearing upon the clinical 
state of  fright or its consequences—and popular solutions were illegal 
and myopic, Laverdy would not acknowledge them either as manifesta-
tions of  a legitimate problem or even as authentic symptoms of  a con-
genital psychosomatic disorder.
To combat and discredit this mentality, Laverdy chose to belittle and 
insult it with all the sophistry of  progressive thinking. It consisted of  
nothing more than a crazy quilt of  “prejudices.” “Prejudice” was one 
of  the harshest epithets in the political vocabulary of  the Enlighten-
ment; it acquired added force when accompanied by Laverdy’s favor-
ite metaphors, light and sight. Their prejudices “blinded the people,” 
not only to the “veritable principles of  things,” but also to “their true 
interests.” (A decade later, in similar fashion, Turgot explained popu-
lar resistance to his liberal program on the grounds that the people 
are “too little enlightened on their real interests.”) In letter after letter, 
the Controller-General railed against the “old prejudices which still 
subsist against the liberty of  the grain trade.” He hated “ignorance” 
and “prejudice” en philosophe for the “obstacles … always contrary to 
all sorts of  good [which they] opposed to progress.”2
Though he knew that it had to be done urgently and that it would 
be enormously difficult, Laverdy had no concrete plan for “breaking 
the old chain of  prejudices.” “Surely you feel how important it is,” he 
wrote Lescalopier, intendant of  the Touraine, “to prevent the people 
from giving themselves over to presumptions and prejudices against 
such a useful law [the July Edict].” But what was the intendant to make 
of  the feeble and nebulous ministerial instructions which left the bur-
den squarely on his shoulders: “I invite you,” the letter continued, “to 
neglect nothing in order to make known to them [the people] all the 
advantages [of  liberalization] and to destroy the false interpretations 
which might be applied to it.” Courteille, one of  Laverdy’s assistants, 
hinted to the intendant of  Bordeaux that there was nothing to do 
except insist upon the law until “the people have accustomed them-
selves to it,” until “time and experience prove to them the advantages 
 2 CG to PG, 4 Dec. 1765, BN, Coll. Joly 1131, fol. 9; Laverdy to PG, 23 Oct. 1766, Coll. 
Joly 1109, fols. 145–46; CG to Miromesnil, 31 Dec. 1767, in LeVerdier, ed., Correspondance 
Miromesnil, V, 70; Turgot to IN. of  Alençon, 19 Sept. 1774, C. 89, A.D. Orne.
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which must result from it.” Laverdy’s own instincts were slightly more 
aggressive, though no less hazy. Only a tough, unbending stance would 
produce results. “By stiffening against the prejudices of  the people,” he 
predicted, “they will gradually weaken and we will succeed in accus-
toming them to a bien,” though, he conceded, “they will con tinue to 
misjudge [it] for still some time to come.” Misjudging it, however, 
was one thing, and actively opposing it, quite another. The threat of  
bludgeoning them into submission was the only real incentive the 
 Controller-General offered the people to embrace the liberal program.3
Firmly convinced that liberalization was salutary and necessary, 
Laverdy repulsed the idea that it could be materially responsible for 
the multitude of  riots and disruptions. Rejecting the police analy-
ses which ascribed them to misery, cherté, and removals, he attributed 
the disturbances to the benighted popular mentality. At Abbeville, 
for example, in 1765, Laverdy claimed that grain was abundant and 
prices moderate; the rising, therefore, could only have resulted from 
“the prejudice which exists against the liberty of  the grain trade.” At 
Sens a year later, after another revolt which the police blamed on the 
“export of  grain,” Laverdy argued that “this fermentation was occa-
sioned only by the ancient prejudices which still subsist against the 
liberty of  the grain trade.” In none of  the uprisings was there “any 
motive for fears,” only the “frivolous and illusory pretext” for precipi-
tate action.4 Or, as a liberal journal serenely put it, the riots “are not 
and cannot be the effect of  real need” because in a regime of  liberty, 
“the dearth that the enraged minds fear, or feign to fear, is manifestly 
impossible.”5 Laverdy managed to convince himself  that the aroused 
crowd acted aimlessly, passionately, and whimsically; “blindly,” he 
preferred to say. The irony of  the image escaped him. It was pre-
cisely the question of  visibility which agitated the crowd—the empty 
market, the loaded boat, the camouflaged caravan, the absence of  
 3 CG to Lescalopier, July 1764, C. 94, A.D. I-et-L.; Courteille to IN., 18 July 1764, A.D. Gir., 
C. 1426; CG to PG, 11 Nov. 1765, BN, Coll. Joly 1131, fol. 24. Cf. Diderot on the difficulty 
of  reeducating the people on the subsistence question. Diderot to Necker, 10 June 1775, 
Diderot Correspondance, ed. G. Roth and J. Varloot (Paris, 1968), XIV, 146.
 4 CG to PG, 4 Dec. 1765, BN, Coll. Joly 1113, fol. 9; CG to PG, 7 Oct. 1766, Coll. Joly 1132, 
fol. 12; CG to PG, 13 Sept. 1765, Coll. Joly 1131, fols. 92–93; CG to PG, 23 Oct. 1766, 
Coll. Joly 1109, fols. 145–46; projet de lettres patentes, ibid., fols. 155–58; CG to Miromesnil, 
9 Feb. 1768, LeVerdier, ed., Correspondance Miromesnil, V, 82; CG to Miromesnil, 27 March 
1768, ibid., V, 135.
 5 “Supplément aux Journaux de l’agriculture, du commerce, et des finances,” Sept. 1765, C. 
80, A.D. Somme.
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laboureurs—and its goals were specific rather than diffuse, just as its 
fury was particularistic rather than universal.
Although his contempt for them was sincere, the riots troubled 
the Controller-General deeply. On the one hand, he made a point 
of  deprecating their significance. A riot at Rebais in 1767, part of  
a recurring cycle of  Brie disorders, he styled a “mediocre event” 
unworthy of  attention; the tumultuous uprising at Rouen the follow-
ing year, he reduced to “theft and pillage rather than a sedition.”6 On 
the other, he conceded that the disturbances were “almost universal,” 
and he worried about the “consequences” of  risings in which the 
people “go beyond all the limits and deliver themselves to the most 
extreme disorders.”
Two assumptions, in Laverdy’s view, seemed to have emboldened 
the people. First, that they could riot with “impunity,” an expecta-
tion encouraged by many police authorities—those at Rouen, for 
example—who fail to put down popular movements swiftly and 
mercilessly and who in some instances even seem to sympathize 
with the insurgents. Second, “the persuasion which the populace 
of  the cities ordinarily shares that the fear of  the riots which it 
might excite will force the King to modify the laws which estab-
lished liberty.” Nothing was “more essential,” according to the 
Controller-General, than to “destroy” these aberrant opinions.7
To dispel the idea that consumers could riot without risk, Laverdy 
instructed and exhorted the police after every episode to repress with 
dispatch and pitilessness. Repeatedly, he asked for “a few examples 
of  severity,” which would serve not only to “contain the people,” but 
also to “destroy those prejudices” which motivated them, presum-
ably by revealing the futility of  following their lead. If  the repression 
were to be delayed, the didactic advantages would be lost. “Nothing is 
more important,” Laverdy wrote Joly de Fleury in reference to a riot 
which took place in the fall of  1766, “than to accelerate the proce-
dures instituted against the principal authors … examples in such cir-
cumstances are of  the greatest necessity and when they are deferred, 
they do not produce nearly the same effect.” Moreover, delays 
threatened the “security” of  the grain trade and deterred prospec-
tive dealers from engaging in their speculations. Impatient with “the 
 6 CG to PG, 7 Dec. 1767, BN, Coll. Joly 1135, fol. 82; CG to Miromesnil, 19 March 1768, 
in LeVerdier, ed., Correspondance Miromesnil, V, 138.
 7 CG to PG, 23 Oct. 1766, BN, Coll. Joly 1109, fols. 145–46; CG to PG, 13 Sept. 1765, AN, 
F12* 150.
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slowness of  the official inquiries, the appeals, the forms to which the 
[ordinary] tribunals are subjected,” the Controller-General considered 
resuscitating a draconian repressive law which had been used before to 
bypass local jurisdictions. Finally, he abandoned the plan, apparently as 
a result of  the refusal of  the Procurator General and the First President 
to endorse it, on the grounds that it would tend to frighten rather than 
calm the people and that it discredited the established system of  justice.8
Soft sentences annoyed Laverdy as much as dilatory ones. Even 
as he urged the police to show rigor in the streets and marketplaces, 
so he goaded prosecutors to demand heavy penalties and judges to 
pronounce them. He followed cases eagerly in all their details, made 
his expectations clearly known, and bristled with indignation when 
the results displeased him. In the wake of  a massive riot at Troyes, 
for example, in which the police had failed to deal harshly with the 
insurgents, Laverdy pressed for a stern judicial reckoning. He was 
satisfied to learn that the royal procurator and the rapporteur would 
ask the death penalty for three of  the putative leaders and stringent 
punishment for the others. In anticipation of  such a verdict and a 
hostile popular reaction, extra brigades were sent to reinforce the 
constabulary. To virtually everyone’s surprise, the présidial rendered a 
stunningly mild provisional sentence which could lead to the release 
of  all the prisoners in three months. The Controller-General angrily 
denounced the verdict and demanded an explanation; “the excesses 
to which the people have given themselves in this circumstance,” he 
wrote, “require a much more severe punishment.”9
To disabuse the public of  the other notion which prodded it to 
insurrection—that popular demonstrations would compel the king to 
renounce liberalization—Laverdy asked officials at all levels of  admin-
istration to make it plain that nothing could induce the government 
to waver. Publicize the point, he enjoined them, that the liberal laws 
are “fixed and invariable,” “perpetual and irrevocable.” Even if  the 
people did not understand the laws, they must realize that they cannot 
be changed under any circumstance. On a more sophisticated level, 
 8 CG to PG, 22 June 1767, BN, Coll. Joly 1136, fol. 179; CG to Joly, 12 July 1767, ibid., fol. 
181; CG to bishop of  Angers, 13 Sept. 1765, AN, F12* 150; CG to Dupre de Saint-Maur, 13 
Sept. 1765, ibid.; Dépêche to B. de Sauvigny, 10 April 1768, AN, O1* 410, fols. 219–20; CG to 
PG, 23 Oct. 1766, BN, Coll. Joly 1109, fols. 145–46; PG to CG, 1 Nov. 1766 and anonymous 
comments, ibid., fols. 149, 152–53; projet de lettres patentes and discussion, ibid., fols. 155–61.
 9 CG to IN. of  Champagne, 5 June, 12 July 1768 and Paillot to IN., 13, 28 June 1768, C. 
1908, A.D. Aube.
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Laverdy charged the économiste Dupont to conduct a permanent propa-
ganda campaign in behalf  of  liberalization in the periodical press and 
in pamphlets.10
Disdainful of  indulgence or compromise on the question of  liberty, 
the Controller-General depended upon the local police to execute 
the laws with fidelity, if  not with ardor. Many of  these authorities, 
however, shared with the public the very prejudices which Laverdy 
enjoined them to combat. The failure of  the police to execute the 
liberal policy with resolution elicited angry protests, first from mer-
chants and factors directly aggrieved by their actions and later from 
the économistes and other liberal partisans who accused them of  out-
right sabotage of  the new regime. Doubtless, scores of  cases of  police 
brutality or contrariety went unreported either because the victims 
did not know how to seek redress or preferred not to become entan-
gled in appeals or because the local authorities, often backed by their 
superiors, commanded too much influence to suffer challenge.
Complaints reaching the central government usually involved bla-
tant infringement on the liberty of  dealers to acquire and dispose of  
property in grain. An anonymous letter from Châlons-sur-Marne 
accused local authorities of  obstructing grain removals and “fabricat-
ing” false reports of  merchant treachery and popular unrest to justify 
their conduct.11 Sieur Montgolfier, an enterprising Brie grain and flour 
merchant, who also ran his own mill and furnished Paris with the help 
of  several commissioners, bespoke the irritation and sense of  insecu-
rity of  many traders. During the summer and fall of  1767 at Rebais, 
Coulommiers and nearby markets, mobs pillaged his grain wagons, 
assaulted his agents, and harassed him in his ordinary operations. Nor 
were there any mitigating cicumstances, he emphasized. Like many 
other men who have occasion to call upon the law in defense of  prop-
erty—one thinks of  Turgot in 1775—Montgolfier hinted that he might 
have viewed these crimes more sympathetically, if  they had truly been 
inspired by need. But the prices here are no higher than the prices 
elsewhere (an argument which flattered the merchant’s idea of  equity 
while offering the consumer little consolation), grain “abounded,” and 
“those who interfere with commerce and who are guilty of  theft … 
were not motivated by want of  grain.”
 10 CG to PG, 13 Sept. 1765, AN, F12* 150; CG to IN. Lescalopier, 28 Aug. 1765, ibid.; CG 
to Lescalopier, (?) Sept. 1765, C. 94, A.D. I-et-L.; Oeuvres de Turgot, ed. by Schelle, II, 55 
(introduction).
 11 Letter to CG, 29 Dec. 1767, C. 413, A.D. Marne.
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Against this violence, Montgolfier protested in vain first to the sei-
gnorial judges and then to higher authorities. The royal constabu-
lary, the maréchaussée, remained a “tranquil spectator of  events that it 
should foresee and prevent.” In chorus with Laverdy, the merchant 
warned that the “continued inaction” of  the police served to “autho-
rize” and incite “the perturbers of  commerce.” “A négociant”—Mont-
golfier saw himself  as something more substantial than a common 
dealer—“might very well undertake to seek punishment for a per-
sonal insult or restitution of  a given object,” he contended, “but it is 
impossible for him to struggle against a wild populace.” He pressed 
Joly de Fleury, who forwarded the petition to Laverdy, to recall the 
local police and the maréchaussée “to their duty.” Otherwise, he gave 
notice, he would be forced, “along with several other négociants, to 
abandon his enter prise and his commerce.”12
While the government refused to be blackmailed by popular pro-
tests, it was highly sensitive to this sort of  threat. At about the same 
time, at Corbeil, the manager of  the royal grain magazines assailed the 
local “juges de police” for ceding avidly to “the clamors of  the people” 
for price controls and for nurturing the “untoward prejudices” of  the 
crowd.13 The following year, a Paris grain merchant demanded “jus-
tice” after the substitut at Montereau arbitrarily requisitioned his wheat 
for public sale at a price below the going rate.14 Fearful for his property 
in light of  the irascible mood of  consumers, a merchant who had 
gathered large stocks at Bar-sur-Aube for shipment to Lyons vainly 
sought guarantees from the local police that they would “engage 
them selves to authorize his removals [of  grain] in case the people 
tried to oppose him.”15 Belly, an influential business man from Troyes, 
who introduced several novel marketing techniques in the late sixties, 
angrily denounced the local police for hectoring his agents, infring-
ing upon his freedom to buy and remove grain, and, most seriously, 
after their other tactics failed to intimidate him, “exciting the people 
to riot against him” in the marketplace. While the police charged 
that the people of  the city, “long animated against this dealer,” arose 
spontane ously to defend their interests, Belly sought the “protection” 
which any enterprise “useful to the public” merited.16 Elsewhere in 
 12 Nov. 1767, BN, Coll. Joly 1135, fol. 80.
 13 Mellinet to PG (?), 26 Sept. 1767, ibid., fols. 62–64.
 14 Petitions, March and May 1768, BN, Coll. Joly 1142, fols. 2–3, 12–13.
 15 Masson to IN. of  Champagne, 29 May 1770, C. 299, A.D. Aube.
 16 Belly, “Mémoire historique,” ca. June 1770, C. 1908, A.D. Aube; Terray to IN. 
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Champagne, a leading merchant specializing in military provisioning 
raved against the authorities at Bar-sur-Aube for supporting efforts 
to prevent him from removing his grain from the town.17 In all these 
instances, the central government clearly supported the plaintiffs.
While the merchant complaints were discreet and dispersed, the lib-
eral camp tirelessly and vehemently exposed the perfidy of  the field 
police. “The inferior police,” Roubaud, the économiste, wrote, “required 
to maintain the execution of  the Declaration of  1763 and the Edict 
of  1764, seems to ignore them, & for the sake of  the well-being of  
the people, they aggravate public fears, the cherté, and the dearth, by 
destroying liberty, despite their solemn dispositions.” Every judge and 
officer has “erected himself  into interpreter and arbiter of  the law” 
and every day they “violate” the law, “drawing on the old Regulations 
expressly revoked by the same law.” “One of  the most disastrous effects 
of  the regulations,” noted the liberal Dauphiné Parlement in an Avis to 
the monarch, was “to have habituated the People to hold the Govern-
ment responsible for cherté or dearth.” The police, Roubaud argued, 
intervene in response to popular cues which they themselves incul-
cated, while the people view such official intervention as a model and 
sanction for riot, pillage and popular price-fixing. Turgot deplored the 
tendency of  the police in his own jurisdiction to emulate “the people” 
in their “reasoning” on liberty and the grain question.18
The motives of  the police, according to the liberals, ranged from 
guileless ignorance on one extreme to crass venality on the other. In 
principle, Condorcet believed in the perfectability of  all men, includ-
ing the police, and at least in some cases he was willing to blame their 
“stupid blunders” on their “lack of  knowing what liberty is” rather 
than on bad will. His friend Turgot shared an interest in educating 
them, although he was less optimistic about the prospects. From his 
intendancy in the Limousin, he distributed to local authorities the 
texts of  the reform laws accompanied by a free copy of  the économiste 
Letrosne’s perfervid apology, The Freedom of  the Grain Trade, Always 
Useful and Never Harmful. When he became Controller-General in 
 of  Champagne, 27 June 1770, ibid.; Bertin to IN., 29 July 1770 and SD Paillot to IN., 11 
June 1770, ibid.
 17 Directeurs des Vivres at Besançon to IN. of  Champagne, 11 May 1770, C. 299, A.D. Aube.
 18 Roubaud. Représentations, 39, 80, 93; “Avis du Parlement de Dauphiné ... au Roi,” 26 April 
1769, in Ephémérides du citoyen (1769), VII, 156; Turgot, “Lettre circulaire aux officiers de 
police dans des lieux où il y a des marchés de grains,” 15 Feb. 1766, C. 479, A.D. Haute-
Vienne. See also Journal économique (April 1770), 173.
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1774 and announced his intention to revive the liberal program of  
the sixties, Turgot rightly warned the intendants that “it is princi-
pally the police judges and their subordinate officials who must be 
[re-]educated” and, if  that failed, then, like the people, they must be 
“contained.”19
Nor, in Turgot’s mind, was police ignorance always innocent, for 
these officials were also notoriously “mercenary.” “It is sufficient for 
us to say,” noted the économiste Baudeau, “that several of  the subal-
terns of  the provincial administration have made themselves a little 
Peru from these exclusive privileges.…” This “race of  public blood-
suckers” derived its income from the dues and fees it collected on 
market transactions, from fines and penalties it levied, and from a 
com bination of  graft, fraud, and extortion. Although they were “dec-
orated with the pretext of  assuring provisioning,” wrote an essayist 
in the physiocratic organ, the Ephémérides du Citoyen, the “aim” of  the 
old laws was “primarily fiscal.” The police insisted on market sales 
because the market was the theatre of  their venal operations. Greed, 
rather than a genuine concern for the public good, suggested the 
Dauphiné Parlement, made the police so “jealous of  conserving their 
rights of  inspection.”20
Liberalization menaced the police with the loss of  considerably 
more than their incomes. The new regime displaced them, depriving 
them of  their sense of  purpose and undermining their self-esteem and 
status in the community and beyond. Without rules to enforce, police 
offi cials, noted Condorcet, “might just as well be ordinary individu-
als.” Letrosne and Dupont suggested that the police resented more 
than anything else the idea of  being reduced to supernumeraries. 
They defended their police powers with all the fierce zeal of  men fight-
ing for their professional lives. In their work the police depended as 
much upon moral as upon legal authority; without public confidence 
they could not be effective. Liberty maimed them, noted the abbé de 
 19 Condorcet to Turgot, 1775, in Correspondance Condorcet-Turgot, ed. by Henry, 212; Turgot 
circular, 15 Feb. 1766, in Oeuvres, ed. by Schelle II, 489; Weulersse, Mouvement, I, 119; Turgot, 
“Septième lettre sur le commerce des grains,” 2 Dec. 1770, in Oeuvres, ed. by Schelle, III, 
323. Turgot to IN. of  Alençon, 19 Sept. 1774 and Turgot to PG of  Rouen Parl., 19 Sept. 
1774, C. 89, A.D. Orne.
 20 Baudeau, Avis au premier besoin, 1er traité, 130–31 and 3e traité, 181; “De la liberté du 
commerce des grains,” Ephémérides du citoyen, (1769), I, 55–56, 77; “Avis du Parlement de 
Dauphiné ... au Roi,” 26 April 1769, B. 2314, fol. 98, A.D. Isère. Cf. Desmarest, Rouen, 114 
and Afanassiev, Commerce des céréales, 153.
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Véri; it “snatched from them a cherished part of  their influence on 
the people.”21 “First of  all,” noted Condorcet,
there is nothing to gain in protecting absolute liberty, and never has one made himself  
a reputation by giving the appearance of  doing nothing. In the next place, the goal of  
every honest town officer is the love and the regard of  the people of  his city.
Likening them to the Roman tribunes who “corrupted the Roman 
Republic” through grain distributions, the Provence Parlement decried 
the appetite of  the local police to “distinguish themselves in their home-
districts,” which led them to seek “the esteem of  the People by procur-
ing for them a cheap subsistence.”22 The police courted the favor of  the 
people by “sacrificing” to them the grain traders. The desire “to com-
mend themselves to the public,” claimed Dupont, was one of  the chief  
reasons for the police—not only the subalterns but the magistrates in 
several parlements as well—to subvert the liberal regime.23
All of  their beliefs, Roubaud asserted, conspired to make the 
police reactionary and demagogic. The police mind was shal-
low, narrow, and simplistic; it preferred routine to inquiry, habit 
to analysis. Persuaded that only tradition begets order, the police 
official “finds in nature which he does not consult only disor-
der.” Piously, he believes in the efficacy of  rules and controls; for 
every problem, without studying its causes, he proposes a stan-
dard solution; autonomically, without thinking, he “regulates … 
in order to regulate.” Unschooled in the liberal ethic, he “is con-
vinced that the more the Sovereign governs, the better the people 
are governed.” He conceives of  his jurisdiction in “the image of  
a little State governed by a Despot” and as a result he neither 
understands nor accepts the new role designed for him in the lib-
eral legislation. The new police, the Estates of  Languedoc told the 
king, must be observers and reporters; instead of  “inspecting” and 
“constraining,” they must “watch” and “protect.” When merchants 
like the Sieur Montgolfier seek to purchase, store, and transport their 
 21 Condorcet, Lettre d’un laboureur (1775), in Collection des principaux économistes, ed. by E. Depitre 
and G. de Molinari, XIV, 496; Dupont to Prince Carl Ludwig, 1773, in Correspondance Dupont, 
ed. by Knies, II, 136; Weulersse, Mouvement, II, 505; abbé de Véri, Journal, ed. by de Witte, 
I, 287 (26 May 1775).
 22 Letter to the king, 21 Nov. 1768, B. 3677 and C. 2420, A.D. B-du-R.
 23 Condorcet, Le Monopole et le monopoleur, in Collection des principaux économistes, ed. by E. Depitre 
and G. de Molinari, XIV, 464; Dupont to Prince Carl Ludwig, 1773, in Correspondance 
Dupont, ed. by Knies, II, 141.
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grain, the police must be “invisible.” But when traders are victims of  
popular abuse and assault, the police must rush to their rescue.24
Although the liberals overstated their case against the police, it was 
not entirely wide of  the mark. Many of  the local officials, as we have 
seen, deeply resented liberalization, but not always for the sordid 
or foolish motives that the liberals imputed to them. Doubtless, too, 
most of  the police were guilty of  actions which could reasonably pass 
as parochial, mean, or eccentric. Nor were the économistes, despite the 
increasingly polarized political climate, the only ones to express con-
cern about the police in the late sixties and seventies. The Advocate 
General Joly de Fleury, who criticized the liberal innovations with 
such vigor in 1763, conceded that the “subaltern officers” sometimes 
enforced the laws with excessive and baleful enthusiasm.25 Two distin-
guished presidents of  the Paris Parlement used epithets such as “igno-
rant,” “arbitrary,” and “short-sighted” to characterize the field police 
and Terray, who was accused of  everything except sympathy for the 
liberals, worried about the “abuses” and “zeal” of  these authorities.26 
The government itself  launched the idea—which became a basic 
tenet of  the physiocratic apologia—that the police were responsible 
for the shortcomings of  liberalization and for the crisis of  the sixties. 
In letters patent of  November 1768, the king admitted that
We have not yet succeeded in establishing this salutary liberty as firmly as we would 
have desired; our Declaration of  25 May 1763 has not been executed in its entirety in 
several provinces of  our kingdom, because of  fears which have arisen in the minds of  a 
great part of  our Subjects, & principally of  those who were specifically charged with its execution.27
Laverdy toiled strenuously to bring the police into line. He had no 
patience with authorities who demonstrated laxity in dealing with vio-
lations of  the liberal laws or with disruptions of  public order. Horri-
fied at reports of  police complicity in several uprisings in Brittany in 
1765, he ordered an investigation to determine if  the royal procurator 
involved “is in fact as guilty as he appears to be.” To deal with a vio-
lent grain riot at Troyes, the local police, according to the subdelegate, 
 24 Roubaud, Représentations, 107, 195; “Supplications ... au Roi sur le commerce des grains,” 
Dec. 1768, Ephémérides du citoyen (1769), I, 199–212.
 25 Speech of  5 July 1763, Recueil, 53–54.
 26 Presidents Murard and Lefebvre, ibid., 201, 240; F. Dumas, La Généralité de Tours au dix-
huitième siècle (Paris, 1894), 353.
 27 Letters patent, 10 Nov. 1768, Recueil, 78–79. My italics.
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“found no better expedient for containing the people than approving, 
as it were, their actions.” Vexed to begin with that he had to learn about 
this uprising from the Procurator General rather than through his own 
service, Laverdy unsparingly criticized “the weakness that the mayor 
and the officers of  the bailliage showed.” Appeasement “merely excited 
further disorders”; there was no excuse for not using “the greatest firm-
ness.” Similarly, Laverdy denounced the police at Bourges for having 
“contributed indirectly” to provoking a riot by “welcoming to a certain 
degree the complaints of  the people.” They also broke the law by fixing 
the price of  grain. The Controller-General’s instructions made it plain 
that they no longer had the broad freedom of  action which they had 
heretofore enjoyed. Their new role was “to limit themselves uniquely 
to preventing disorder in the markets.” In the past it was presumed that 
market disorder was caused by the traders; the police of  markets meant 
disciplining the dealers and thereby protecting the people. Liberalism 
inverted this conception, assigning to the police the task of  protecting 
the merchants and disciplining the consumers.28
Developing one of  the Controller-General’s themes, Trudaine 
de Montigny contended that it would be easy to “put a stop to these 
popular fermentations.” What was needed, in addition to “a few 
cavaliers of  the constabulary” who could be excited to repressive 
diligence with cash bonuses for merit, was a large measure of  “firm-
ness,” applied at the first sign of  trouble.29 Too many officials made 
the fatal mistake of  vacillating at the beginning and of  listening to the 
people’s complaints as if  the people were capable of  rational discourse 
and as if  this sort of  dialogue could serve any purpose other than 
 28 CG to de Flesselles, 25 Sept. 1765, AN, F12* 150; CG to PG, 20 June 1766, BN, Coll. 
Joly 1133, fols. 94–95; CG to IN. of  Champagne, 5 June 1767, C. 1908, A.D. Aube. Cf. de 
Montigny to Cypierre, 9 Sept. 1768 in C. Bloch, Correspondance inédite de l’intendant Cypierre, 
66 and the violent grain riot at Tallard in the Dauphiné in May 1764 which mobilized 
“the whole community.” The police “stood in inaction”; they refused to take “the slightest 
measure to control this furor.” This passivity combined with the extraordinary appearance 
of  organization which the riot projected led the militia commander to suggest “a veritable 
plot.” To the ministry’s delight, the First President of  the Grenoble Parlement personally 
intervened to direct the repression. B 2315, fols. 116–20, A.D. Isère.
 29 Trudaine found this firmness lacking at the highest as well as the lowest levels of  field 
administration. See his rebukes to the intendants of  Tours and Champagne for their failure 
to deal more energetically with the spate of  riots in the spring and summer of  1768. To 
DuCluzel, 17 May, 8 July, 13 Dec. 1768, C. 94, A.D. I-et-L, and to Rouillé d’Orfeuil, 28 July 
1768, C. 413, A.D. Marne. For the ideal of  rigorous repression which aroused admiration 
in the ministry, see IN. of  Brittany to SDs, 29 Sept. 1768, C. 1670, A.D. I-et-V.
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encouraging them to resist. “I know,” Trudaine wrote, “that the artisans 
and workers living within a city are little prepared to grasp these great 
principles [of  liberty], that they react only to the rise in the price of  
goods without suspecting any cause for it other than [the actions] of  
those who govern them, whom they still regard as responsible above all 
for procuring them, subsistance.” So, he concluded, there is no point in 
taking them seriously. The “singular” thing is that the authorities toler-
ate these public forums. “Seditious” words mark the beginning of  riots; 
those who utter them, Trudaine instructed, should be “arrested on the 
spot and punished in a manner to serve as examples to the others.” He 
came close to advocating preemptive strikes against the mob-to-be in 
the volatile marketplaces of  the sixties. In this way serious disorders 
would be prevented and the liberty of  the trade would be safeguarded.30
The Controller-General accused local authorities throughout the 
kingdom of  taking a gratuitously alarmist posture on the subsistence 
situation and using the fears which they aroused as a pretext for violating 
the law. “I do not find at all,” he wrote in rebuke of  the Moulins police, 
“that the anxieties of  the Lieutenant of  Police are authorized; I beg you 
to reassure this officer and to please recommend to him to leave the grain 
trade the most complete liberty and to deviate under no pretense from 
the dispositions of  the Declaration of  1763 and the Edict of  1764.” The 
police of  Craon in Anjou earned the same upbraiding for their lack of  
confidence in liberty. Under a smokescreen of  “exaggerated anxieties,” 
Laverdy wrote the municipal officers of  Châlons-sur-Marne, “I see that 
you are giving the contents of  the Declaration of  1763 and the Edict 
of  1764 interpretations contrary to the spirit of  these laws.” Instead of  
trembling in public, he told them, you must set an example for the pub-
lic by showing confidence in the “true principles” of  the reform laws 
and encouraging “speculators” to stock and to export as they see fit. 
Laverdy did not conceal his contempt for officials who lost their nerve. 
The fiscal procurator of  St. Denis who panicked over a minor market 
disturbance showed signs of  cowardice; he was “intimidated,” esteemed 
the Controller-General, by his own self-doubts.31
Although his will never flagged, it is clear that the Controller-General’s 
campaign to discipline the field police was not entirely successful. 
 30 T. de Montigny to Cypierre, 4 Sept. 1768 in C. Bloch, Correspondance inédite de l’intendant 
Cypierre, 53–55.
 31 CG to PG, 5 Oct. 1766, BN, Coll. Joly 1134, fol. 30; CG to IN. DuCluzel, 20 July 1768, 
C. 96, A.D. I-et-L.; CG to municipality of  Châlons, 11 Jan. 1768, C. 413, A.D. Marne; 
CG to PG, 7 Dec. 1767, BN, Coll. Joly 1136, fol. 165.
228 BREAD, POLITICS AND POLITICAL ECONOMy
There is little question that he failed to anticipate both the depth and 
the breadth of  official disaffection. Once the problem became acute, 
Laverdy felt it was politically imperative, in order to safeguard the 
liberal reforms and protect his own position within the ministry, to 
belittle its significance. He underestimated not so much police attach-
ment to habit as the extent to which this attachment was selective and 
derived from a rational and empirical approach to their work. He 
misunderstood not their particularism, but the conditions—structural 
and circumstantial—which made them impotent as well as unwilling 
to abjure that particularism. Laverdy lacked the means and the infor-
mation to deal with this resistance effectively and discreetly. Chronic 
but only spasmodically manifest, often unreported or brought to light 
long after the fact, characteristically sober and oblique rather than 
shrill and defiant, and scattered in scores of  tiny cavities throughout 
the kingdom, each of  which had its own peculiarities, this opposition 
could not be disarmed in a single stroke.
The irony of  liberalization is that to have worked it would have 
required, inter alia, a more powerful central government and a better dis-
ciplined and more extensive royal bureaucracy. It is ironical because the 
theorists of  liberalism hated bureaucracy and the administrative mon-
archy bequeathed by Louis XIV. But to liberate France from too much 
government (or police), they were ready to concede that the central gov-
ernment first had to become stronger (in the physiocratic scheme, the 
king had to act despotically in order to institute his “legal despotism”). 
Centralization, then, was a prerequisite for liberalization and, indeed, for 
all sorts of  reforms desired by the liberals. In order to clear the debris, 
to combat resistance to the new order and nostalgia for the old, the state 
had to be mighty, almost ubiquitous, and pitiless. The liberal state could 
not wither away until it became a truly modern state, that is, until it tri-
umphed completely over particularism, feudalism, and other instances 
of  the dispersion of  power and authority throughout the kingdom. At 
least in its first stages, liberalization demanded a highly authoritarian way 
of  governing. For this task neither the ministry of  Laverdy nor any gov-
ernment until the Revolution was prepared.
After one of  the early episodes of  police disobedience, Laverdy 
vowed to consult the king and council “in the most appropriate meth-
ods” to “restore” the officers to their duty.32 But short of   outright 
 32 CG to de Flesselles, 25 Sept. 1765, AN, F12* 150.
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purges, which would have disrupted public business and spread alarm 
during a time already marked by social turbulence, there were few 
sanctions that the Controller-General, at the summit of  the absolutist 
apparatus, could apply. When it learned of  specific police sentences 
which contra vened the law, the royal council could formally annul 
them, but the time lags seriously attenuated the impact, the interven-
tion did not prevent the police from taking similar action in another 
incident, and the process involved the council in the morass and minu-
tiae of  local affairs which it was neither equipped nor keen to han-
dle.33 Threats and exhortations were commonly rebuffed or dismissed 
while reprimands were on occasion deflected or diluted before they 
reached target. The concurrent hierarchies of  enforcement and the 
multiple levels of  administration made it difficult to isolate responsi-
bility and coordinate action. Fronts of  recalcitrance often coalesced, 
joining in a common posture royal procurator, town fathers, police 
lieutenant or judge, subdelegate, and commander of  the maréchaussée 
brigade—functionaries whose jealousies and rivalries were tradition-
ally among the surest guarantors of  royal control—sometimes backed 
more or less overtly by the intendant and/or the parlement.
The parlements had a major share in the task of  executing the 
law; at the grassroots, the main burden devolved upon the substituts 
of  the Procurator General. Laverdy dealt with the former through 
the intermediary of  the latter, and depended upon him to maintain 
tight control. Highly skeptical of  the wisdom of  liberalization, the 
Paris Procurator did not earnestly use his enormous moral and legal 
authority to second the Controller-General. Cautious in his relations 
with Laverdy, he tended to be vague and evasive in his correspon-
dence with his substituts. He showed little enthusiasm in conveying the 
minister’s fulminations and he took the liberty in certain instances to 
ignore or quash matters which Laverdy deemed important.34 Joly’s 
equivocal stand added to the confusion surrounding the liberal laws. 
It befuddled those officials who habitually relied on his leadership 
and encouraged others who, counting on his protection, interpreted 
his attitude as tacit authorization to follow their own devices. This 
situation makes it easy to understand Trudaine de Montigny’s lament 
 33 See, for example, arrêt du Conseil, 12 Dec. 1766 in Des Essarts, Dictionnaire, I, 22 and CG to 
IN. of  Caen, AN, F12* 153, fols. 48–52.
 34 See, for example, BN, Coll. Joly 1142, fol. 57.
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that “it is difficult to stop these police judges when they believe them-
selves to be especially upheld by the Parlement.”35
Challenged by the crowd of  police from below, Laverdy also had 
to face defections from the elite of  the grand police. Some intendants, 
such as Lebret of  Brittany, Montyon of  Auvergne, and Turgot of  
the Limousin, officially endorsed the ministry’s hard-line by order-
ing local authorities to enforce the liberal legislation faithfully, repress 
popular movements, and protect commerce, or face “severe” punish-
ment for “negligence.” yet not even Lebret could accept Laverdy’s 
contention that the cherté in the first years after liberalization was the 
product of  “a lack of  liberty”; on the contrary, the intendant of  Brit-
tany frankly blamed the dearth and the “uprisings of  the people” 
on “the liberty which has been accorded for the export of  grain.”36 
Rouillé d’Orfeuil, intendant of  Champagne, had serious difficulties 
reconciling his sense of  administrative necessity with the imperatives 
of  liberty.37 Despite the changes in the law of  the land, De la Corée, 
intendant of  Franche-Comté, remained convinced that it was “the 
sacred obligation” of  merchants “to supply grain at a just and moder-
ate price.”38 De Gourgues of  Montauban, La Galaizière of  Lorraine, 
and Taboureau des Réaux of  Hainaut were among the other royal 
commissioners who claimed to have spoken out early and candidly 
against the dangers of  the new system.39
Cypierre of  the Orléanais was one of  the most vigorous critics of  
liberalization within the corps of  intendants. It is worth noting the 
manner as well as the substance of  his dissent. Publicly, he remained a 
faithful servant of  royal policy. “I parade the advantages of   complete 
 35 T. de Montigny to IN. of  Orléans, 25 Oct. 1768 in C. Bloch, Correspondance inédite de l’intendant 
Cypierre, 144.
 36 Lebret to SDs, 29 Sept. 1765 and Lebret draft, 18 Sept. 1765, C. 1670, A.D. I-et-V.; CG to 
IN. of  Bordeaux, 28 Sept. 1766, C.1425, A.D. Gir.; Turgot, “Lettre circulaire aux officiers 
de police dans des lieux où il y a des marchés de grains,” 15 Feb. 1766, C. 479, A.D. Haute-
Vienne; Montyon to Mauriac police, 20 March 1770, C. 907 and to municipality of  Giat, 
10 April 1770, C. 910, A.D. P-de-D.
In parts of  the generalities of  Rouen and Tours and the area around Troyes, the 
intendants lacked either the will or the means to control local police authorities. Dumas, 
Tours, 353; Desmarest, Rouen, 28; Ricommard, Troyes, 292. In Brittany the subdelegates 
appear to have spearheaded the police revolt. Letaconnoux, Le Commerce des grains en Bretagne, 
197.
 37 IN. to Bertin, 25 July 1768, C. 413, A.D. Marne.
 38 De la Corée to CG, Sept. 1770, C. 844, A.D. Doubs.
 39 De Gourgues to Terray, 16 Dec. 1771, AN, F11 223; De la Galaizière to Terray, 30 Dec. 
1771, AN, F11 223; Taboureau to CG, Nov. 1767, C. 6690, A.D. Nord.
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liberty,” he assured the ministry; “I censure all the [police] orders which 
might contradict it.”40 Privately, however, Cypierre bitterly criticized 
the policy, which reduced him to “inaction,” to serving, alongside the 
lesser authorities, as the helpless “Spectators of  the different monopo-
lies.” It was an untenable position for him as well as for the police, for 
it undermined their authority and their credibility. The “victims” of  
monopoly, the people, wrote Cypierre, “see in me the author of  their 
misery because they compare my silence with the firmness that my pre-
decessor M. Barentin showed in similar circumstances, without wishing 
to understand that the law is no longer the same.”41 Cypierre scoffed 
at Laverdy’s contention that the “evil” was in the “mind”—the inten-
dant’s as well as the people’s—rather than in the facts. Monopoly was 
no less real than the misery, unemployment, and disorder one observed 
wherever one looked. Nor could all the philosophy in the world trans-
form the way people felt about subsistence: “the people will never 
calmly stand by as their markets are stripped, as grain wagons cross the 
marketplace with faraway destinations, not as long as they do not have 
bread.”42
There was a “general crisis” in his province, the intendant declared. 
To cope with it, “the police officers must have an authority to act.”43 
Everyday “circumstances force” the local police to take measures for the 
general good which are contrary to the law. This dissonance between 
fact and law generated a kind of  anarchy which confused everyone. 
Cypierre called for a new law, a revision of  liberalization incorporating 
some of  the old controls, which would empower the police to deal with 
 40 Cypierre to T. de Montigny, 16 Oct. 1768 in C. Bloch, Le Commerce des grains dans la généralité 
d’Orléans d’après la correspondance inédite de l’intendant Cypierre (Orléans, 1898), 134. It is clear 
that this attitude of  serenity and discretion was not a pose meant for his superior but a 
professional obligation which the intendant took very seriously. See, for example, Cypierre 
to bishop of  Orléans, 23 Sept. 1768, ibid., 81. This sense of  discretion might help to 
account for the extremely reserved proposal which Cypierre prepared for the Paris General 
Assembly of  Police in Nov. 1768. Mémoire, ibid., 156–159.
 41 Cypierre to T. de Montigny, 1, 7 Sept. 1768 and Cypierre to CG, 24 Sept. 1768, ibid., 51, 62, 
101. Cf. the strikingly similar complaint of  Saint-Priest, intendant of  Languedoc:“... and 
the people, imbued with [the memory of] the power formerly exercised by the intendant in 
this domain [e.g., provisioning], believe that it is simply up to him to prevent the disorder 
by putting a stop to exportation; they push the insolence to the point of  saying [because of  
the intendant’s failure to act as he was supposed to] that he must be in complicity with the 
speculators.” To CG, 3 Sept. 1766, C. 2908, A.D. Hér.
 42 Cypierre to bishop of  Orléans, 23 Sept. 1768, C. Bloch, Correspondance inédite de l’intendant 
Cypierre, 86.
 43 Cypierre to T. de Montigny, 9 Sept. 1768 and to bishop of  Orléans, 9 Oct. 1768, ibid., 
69, 117.
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dearth and commercial abuses.44 He claimed to remain an ardent 
partisan of  liberal reform, but “liberty,” he said, “demands precau-
tions, that is my refrain.”45 By the fall of  1768 Cypierre considered 
the situation so serious that he made it known to the Controller-Gen-
eral that he would no longer answer for public order as long as his 
hands remained tied.46
Cypierre’s stand embodied all those characteristics that the 
 Controller-General found most reprehensible: a skeptical attitude 
toward the new political economy, an attachment to many of  the old 
regulations, an indulgent attitude toward the people, and a sympa-
thy for the predicament of  the police. As the breach between them 
deepened, neither man made a convincing effort to understand the 
position of  the other. How seriously could Cypierre take the surprised 
innocence Laverdy expressed when he wrote: “I do not know why the 
police judges think that I have tied their hands.” What value could 
Laverdy assign to Cypierre’s repeated insistence that “nothing was 
more essential than maintaining the freedom of  trade” and that the lib-
eral laws were “wise” and “salutary”?47 Trudaine de Montigny chided 
the intendant for ceding to “the empty clamors of  a blind populace,” 
to the “cry of  the people,” which he likened to their worn denuncia-
tions of  “pretended sorcerers who caused hailstorms, rains and other 
misfortunes.” In Cypierre’s view, however, it was the ministry which 
was blind for failing to see that while the evocation of  sorcery was a 
matter of  “superstition,” the “present outcry results from need.” He 
regarded Trudaine’s argument that liberty had no sense unless it was 
absolute as a blueprint for disaster. Trudaine viewed his call for mod-
eration as a trap (“The first chains are presented to us,” the Parlement 
of  Provence later wrote, “under the guise of  moderation”).48
Frustrated at his failure to convert Cypierre by gentle persua-
sion, Laverdy exploded in a bristling reprimand delivered in early 
 September 1768:
 44 Cypierre in separate letters to bishop of  Orléans, CG and Sartine, all on 9 Oct. 1768, ibid., 
114, 117, 122.
 45 Cypierre to Sartine, 7 Oct. 1768, ibid., 113. Cf. Cypierre to CG, 7, 10 Sept. 1768, ibid., 57, 
70; St.-Florentin to Cypierre, 27 Sept. 1768, AN, F12* 150; and Cypierre to Terray, 30 Jan. 
1772, AN, F11 223.
 46 Cypierre to St.-Florentin, 2 Sept. 1768 in C. Bloch, Correspondance inédite de Cypierre, 55–56.
 47 CG to Cypierre, 11 Sept. 1768, Cypierre to CG, 15 Aug. 1768, and Cypierre, Mémoire 
(Nov. 1768), ibid., 48–49, 61, 155–159.
 48 T. de Montigny to Cypierre, 1, 4 Sept. and 14 Oct. 1768 and Cypierre to T. de Montigny, 
16 Oct. 1768, ibid., 49, 53, 130, 133; Parl. of  Provence, letter to the King, 10 Nov. 1770, 
B. 3677, A.D. B-du-R.
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I confess to you my great surprise at the letters which you have recently written to  
M. de Montigny and to me. you speak favorably of  the liberty of  the grain trade and 
yet none of  the [other] Intendants has yet lodged such violent complaints against the 
effects of  this liberty.
you want me, Laverdy went on, to “authorize you to annul all spec-
ulative grain operations [arrhements],” but on what grounds? “Am I 
entitled,” asked the Controller-General, “to expect from your admin-
istration and the care which you give to your jurisdiction only hearsay 
and vague terrors which I see supported by no facts?” Why do you think 
His Majesty issued the May Declaration? Precisely, answered Laverdy, 
to quash the old laws which you wish to resuscitate and the “prejudices 
of  the people” which you share. At least have the courage to admit, the 
Controller-General brutally challenged the royal commissioner, that 
you are our enemy in the campaign for liberalization: “… own up that 
very far from favoring the liberty of  commerce, you [really] think that 
it can only be harmful to the State.”49
It is not clear whether Laverdy wanted Cypierre to resign, recant, 
or merely keep quiet. Doubtless the intendant was not surprised to 
learn the following week from his friend the Bishop of  Orléans that 
Laverdy was “biased against you” and that he thought “that your 
head was enraged without reason.”50 Cypierre passionately rejected 
the charges levelled by the minister:
Do you believe, Monseigneur, that it is having the head enraged to [try to] save the 
people and prevent them from going to dangerous extremes, to employ such delicate 
and such discreet means … to bring about a halt to the rise in the price of  bread and 
assure subsistence until the point where the minister, by his superior views and his 
knowledge of  the general state of  subsistence, has the time to attend to our represen-
tations and tranquilize this department?
Cypierre’s conception of  his function clashed sharply with the 
liberal ministry’s view of  the proper relationship between the 
government and the public, though it could fairly stand as the 
administrative credo of  the eighteenth century intendant. “An 
intendant,” he wrote,
administrator of  his province, must be its first patron and guardian angel; my 
heart repeats to me every day my lesson and shows me my duties. Report to the  
 49 CG to Cypierre, 7 Sept. 1768 in C. Bloch, Correspondance inédite de Cypierre, 58–59.
 50 Cypierre to bishop of  Orléans, 19 Sept. 1768, ibid., 81–83.
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ministers, inform them exactly of  the state of  things in the department each time that 
circumstances demand it, confide to them my troubles and my fears when they concern 
the tranquility and the well-being of  the people, obey and execute their orders, that is my 
mission vis-à-vis the ministers. But I have other engagements to fulfill vis-à-vis the people at the same 
time: to inspire them with confidence, the keystone of  administration; use authoritarian 
means only to make it known to the people that it is used always for their advantage, hus-
band the resources of  the people, and make them love the government. That is my profes-
sion of  faith .…51
Cypierre made little effort to avoid a confrontation with the Control-
ler-General; on the contrary, he seems to have decided to provoke one. 
He believed that there were other highly placed officials, in the field 
and at the center, who shared his criticism of  government policy, and 
there are some indications that he tried to organize them into an anti-
Laverdy faction. He courted the favor of  Saint-Florentin, the minister 
of  the royal household, who may indeed have shared some of  his 
reservations about liberalization.52 He broached his plan for a modifi-
cation of  the reform laws with the powerful Paris police chief, Sartine, 
whose “manner of  thinking on this important article of  administra-
tion,” he believed, would lead him “to back my representations.”53 
Through the intervention of  the bishop of  Orléans, who shared his 
views and pressed his case at Versailles, he sought the support of  Cho-
iseul.54 It is probable that Cypierre’s efforts contributed to the decision 
announced by Louis XV at the end of  September to  dismiss Laverdy.
Elated by the disgrace of  the Controller-General, the intendant 
of  the Orléanais interpreted it as a vindication of  his stance and as 
a sign that the policy of  “unlimited liberty” would soon be changed. 
But he badly misread the intentions of  Laverdy’s successor, Maynon 
d’Invau, perhaps because he expected that Maynon, who came from 
an intendancy, would inevitably have experienced difficulties and 
afterthoughts similar to his own. Though Maynon promised him 
that he “would carefully reflect upon the thoughts you have on the 
disadvantages of  this liberty,” the new Controller-General revealed 
himself  to be more inflexible in his liberalism than his predecessor.55
 51 Cypierre to bishop of  Orléans, 23 Sept. 1768, ibid., 83–85.
 52 Cypierre to St.-Florentin, 2 Sept. 1768, ibid., 55. Cf. St.-Florentin to Cypierre, 5 Nov. 1766, 
ibid., 52; Cypierre to T. de Montigny, 7 Sept. 1768, ibid., 64; bishop of  Orléans to Cypierre, 
19 Sept. 1768, ibid., 82.
 53 Cypierre to Sartine, 9 Oct. 1768, ibid., 115.
 54 Cypierre to bishop of  Orléans, 20 Sept. 1768, ibid., 106. Cf. bishop to Cypierre, 19 Sept. 
1768, ibid., 82.
 55 Cypierre to bishop of  Orléans, 9 Oct. 1768, ibid., 118–119; Maynon to Cypierre, 3 Oct. 
1768, ibid., 105.
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As a counterweight to Cypierre’s rebellion, the liberal ministry in 
the mid-sixties could take heart from the loyal support of  the inten-
dant of  Auvergne. His report of  his experience with the reform laws 
was a text-book illustration of  the way liberty was destined to work 
when it was honestly and energetically applied. “The anxieties that 
the People have shown throughout the breadth of  my Generality,” he 
wrote Laverdy in June 1766,
as a result of  the grain cherté, are beginning to diminish. I have endeavored in all the 
letters which I wrote to my Subdelegates and to the officers of  Police to make them 
feel how very dangerous it would be for them to oppose exportation and when several 
of  them departed from the Rules which the Edict of  July 1764 prescribed to them, 
I made them understand how very prejudicial their conduct was to the good of  the 
administration as a result of  the fright which it would inspire in the People.
Just as the liberal theorists contended, the intendant showed that cherté 
was a self-curing problem, for the high prices were attracting merchants 
from surrounding areas to provision the markets of  his province. In a 
reply that was published in the Gazette du Commerce, de l’Agriculture, et des 
Finances, Laverdy congratulated the intendant and took delight in point-
ing to the moral of  the episode: that “… the full and entire execution 
of  the Edict of  July 1764 is the surest means of  preserving the kingdom 
from dearth.”56
Ultimately, dissent from within the corps of  intendants posed a far 
less grave threat to the liberal program than opposition from the other 
claimants to the grand police, the magistrates of  the parlements. Sev-
eral parlements came out openly against liberalization in the late six-
ties. The économistes—and their most influential confrere in the ministry, 
Trudaine de Montigny—accused them of  setting a fatal example by 
attacking and discrediting the law, thereby reinforcing popular preju-
dices and fanning police insubordination. As early as September 1766 
the Parlement of  Bordeaux deliberated on the cherté and listened to 
vocal criticism of  royal policy.57 The Controller-General struggled 
vainly to avert an open rupture with Rouen which posed a threat even 
before the spring riots of  1768 galvanized the Norman opposition.58 
Just as he argued that the people could not see in matters of  political 
 56 Gazette du commerce, de l’agriculture, et des finances (28 June 1766), 417 and (5 July 1766), 437.
 57 (?) to IN., 23 Sept. 1766, C. 1425, A.D. Gir.
 58 CG to Miromesnil, 13 Oct. 1767, in LeVerdier, ed., Correspondance Miromesnil, V, 49. Cf. CG 
to Miromesnil, 8 May 1768, ibid., V, 177–180 and Trudaine de Montigny to Miromesnil, 
16 May 1768, ibid., V, 212–13.
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economy, so Trudaine could not “tire of  deploring the blindness of  the 
Magistrates on an object where it is so easy to demonstrate the truth.”59 
Obdurate and rancorous—a cynic might say doing business as usual—
the Rouen court rankled the government without causing it, solely on 
the basis of  these impertinences, to tremble for the liberal program. It 
was the attitude assumed by the Paris Parlement, as we shall see, which 
proved to be the decisive element in turning the tide.
In good conscience, the Controller-General could insist, time and 
again, that police fears over liberalization were groundless and imagi-
nary, but the incontrovertible fact remained that prices were steadily 
climbing. Compare, for instance, the average annual prices in the fol-
lowing généralités for the years 1763 and 1768 (computed from subdel-
egate reports and converted to the Paris septier):60









A recent reconstruction of  Paris prices based on a four-season aver-








While these prices clearly suggest the direction of  the short-run move-
ment, they obscure the brusque paroxysms and day-to-day fluctuations 
which alarmed and confounded consumers and officials and provoked 
 59 Trudaine de Montigny to Miromesnil, 22 May 1768, ibid., V, 221.
 60 Labrousse, Esquisse, 106–13.
 61 M. Baulant, “Le Prix des grains à Paris de 1431 à 1788,” Annales: économies, sociétés, civilisations, 
23rd year (May-June 1968), 520–40. For the behavior of  prices in segments of  the Parisian 
supply crowns, see J. Dupâquier, M. Lachiver, and J. Meuvret, Mercuriales du pays de France et 
du Vexin français, 1640–1792 (Paris, 1968).
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them to act with little regard for yesterday or tomorrow. In the capital, 
for example, the highest wheat price for the first market of  January 1768 
was 25.75 livres, but in the first week in November the maximum reached 
41 livres.62
Laverdy considered the price rise in two ways, relatively and nor-
matively. In the first mood, he argued, as did many of  the économistes, 
that the short-run perspective distorted impressions, that a more gen-
erous vista across time would show that the price behavior repre-
sented a recovery rather than a prodigious leap forward, and that, 
in any case, the experts in the bureaus of  the Contrôle-Général did 
not feel that it was out of  line with standard economic indicators. In 
the second vein, which he sometimes joined with the first, Laverdy 
embraced the upswing with relish or regretted that it was not more 
pronounced, frankly asserting that such an increase was precisely the 
aim of  his policy. To a fearful lament about “high prices” and their 
sequellae from Rambouillet in November 1767, the Controller-Gen-
eral curtly replied: “25 livres is not at all excessive.”63 Sure of  himself, 
Laverdy similarly disposed of  complaints from Vitry against exorbi-
tant prices: “the prices are still very moderate and well below what 
the interest of  proprietors and cultivators would demand.”64
The new political economy invalidated the old standards of  refer-
ence to which the police unreasonably clung. “The pretension that 
wheat should be worth only 12 to 15 livres the septier,” wrote Laverdy, 
censuring the attitude of  the Meulan procurator, “proves how much he 
who addressed these protests to you is influenced by the ancient preju-
dices; if  his wish were fulfilled, the cultivator would soon be forced 
to abandon his labors.…”65 For generations, the grain price level has 
been artificially depressed, retarding agricultural growth and estab-
lishing a specious relationship between the cost of  grain and of  other 
goods and services, the minister contended. The “principal object” of  
the liberal legislation “was to procure for the price of  grain an aug-
mentation which would excite the emulation of  the cultivators and 
establish a proportion between the value of  this commodity and that 
of  all the other things which are consumed and employed every day.”66
 62 Price table in BN, Coll. Joly 1136.
 63 Petition to PG, 21 Nov. 1767 and CG to PG, 30 Nov. 1767, ibid., fols. 137–40.
 64 CG to PG, 24 Sept. 1766, BN, Coll. Joly 1134, fol. 204.
 65 CG to PG, 8 Nov. 1766, ibid., fol. 15.
 66 CG to PG, 5 Oct. 1766, ibid., fol. 30.
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No areas could escape the price increase. Despite the “sensation” 
that the cherté provoked in the capital, “this progression must occur 
equally in Paris and in the places which surround it.” It would be 
“more dangerous” to curtail the rise because if  Paris prices were 
not “superior” to those in the outlying regions, the capital would be 
unable to attract any supplies at all. Although he scored the fatalism 
of  police officials who tremulously expected at any moment to be 
engulfed in a torrent of  popular unrest, he recognized a direct rela-
tionship between mercuriale and mutiny and he seemed prepared to 
run the sociopolitical risks inherent in liberalization. “The fermenta-
tion which has taken place in several spots,” he told Joly de Fleury, 
“was caused only by the augmentation which occurred on the grain 
prices and which was a necessary result of  the liberty and the chief  
aim of  the dispositions which were taken relative to this subject.”67
From the commercial point of  view, the success of  liberalization 
depended upon the willingness of  urban and rural businessmen to 
take bold risks of  their own. The abandonment of  controls created a 
climate juridically hospitable to the emergence of  a new grain trade, 
but only the prospect of  a sustained higher price level could give mer-
chants the incentives to establish aggressive, large-scale enterprises 
and diffuse the fruits of  liberalization throughout the kingdom. For 
this reason, despite the disorders and the scarcity which neared their 
zenith in 1768, Laverdy felt relieved that a brusque and generalized 
diminution of  prices did not take place. “It would have repelled the 
speculations of  commerce,” he noted, “and perhaps the losses that 
the négociants would have incurred would have deprived us for a long 
time of  the resources that we have reason to expect from commerce 
and that we must conserve with the greatest care.” Every effort must 
be extended to reassure the merchants in this delicate transitional 
stage during which the Controller-General hoped to witness the 
eclipse of  the old style of  timid and half-hearted trade by a new form 
of  expansive entrepreneurship.
“Once this type of  commerce becomes more firmly rooted and the 
négociants are no longer frightened by events and by the memory of  
the old prohibitive laws, the prices will find a level whose variations 
 67 CG to PG, 30 June 1766, ibid., fols. 6–7. Cf. the effusively liberal avowal of  the “inhabitant 
of  the capital, head of  a large family, and thus consumer of  a great deal of  bread,” who 
nevertheless “wishes with all my heart” for a rise in the price of  bread for the sake of  the 
general good of  France. “Lettre à l’auteur de la Gazette du commerce” (14 Jan. 1764), 29.
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will be barely noticeable,” the minister blithely predicted, conceding, 
however, that “we are still distant from this state of  abundance and 
tranquility.” Approximately how far away he did not dare to conjec-
ture, but he never tired of  reminding his correspondents that a single 
step backward, a simple gesture of  imprudence or impatience, would 
slow the pace even further.68 The “level” to which he referred was 
what the économistes called the “right price” (bon prix) which would align 
French prices upon those of  the international market and redress the 
idealized balance between producers and consumers. The attenua-
tion of  variations which he foresaw was what the économistes meant 
by “equalization” of  prices, the process by which local and regional 
disparities would gradually diminish in magnitude and extent and 
prices would tend to become more and more uniform as a national 
market emerged little by little.
Although the économistes did not anticipate that it would be difficult 
to generate a merchant class commensurate with the needs of  liber-
alization, in their post-mortem assessment of  the liberal experience 
they claimed that the grain trade before 1764 had been highly under-
developed and that afterward it enjoyed too little time and too little 
genuine liberty to flourish and fulfill its mission. Grande culture in agri-
culture, grand commerce in the grain trade, such was the rationalizing, 
capitalistic vision of  physiocracy. The new grain traders had to be 
powerful and wealthy men capable of  concentrating large amounts 
of  money, establishing extensive networks of  exchange, and engaging 
in efficient and mammoth wholesale operations.69
Laverdy had a certain amount of  sympathy with the atomized, mid-
dling and blatier-type traffic of  old. Convinced of  the social utility of  
such dispersed, grassroots commerce, he entertained a more merciful 
conception of  competition than the rigorist économistes. In permitting 
the destruction of  the small traders, “one would assure the exclusive 
[l’exclusif] in favor of  the grands, and the exclusive is always the worst 
[of  situations].…”70 yet Laverdy clearly perceived the urgency of  cre-
ating a legion of  big-time professional speculators. Indulgent toward 
the modest merchants, he paid special attention to the négociants, who 
 68 CG to Miromesnil, 9 March 1768, in LeVerdier, ed., Correspondance Miromesnil, V, 110–111.
 69 See, for example, Turgot, “Septième lettre sur le commerce des grains,” in Oeuvres, ed. by 
Schelle, III, 323; Roubaud, Représentations, 19–21,451–52,454; Weulersse, Mouvement, I, 531.
 70 CG to Miromesnil, 8 May 1768, in LeVerdier, ed., Correspondance Miromesnil, V, 180.
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merited the “honor” and “respect” of  the nation. In addition to blan-
dishing them with high prices, he endeavored to give them evidence 
of  “the most striking protection.”71 Above all, this meant facility of  
commerce: freedom from all harassment and intimidation, popular 
or official; perfect security of  property; cooperation from government 
agencies with no strings attached. Materially, it signified the opportu-
nity to earn substantial profits and morally, it promised government 
stewardship of  the grain merchant reputation (publicity to create a 
new image for the citizen-speculator, letters of  commendation from 
the king and council for exemplary achievements, etc.).
Finally, this “protection” suggested a new understanding of  the 
functions and methods of  commerce and a disinfection of  the old 
terms used to describe it. The proliferation of  private grain maga-
zines, a form of  hoarding which the police had always regarded as a 
dangerous abuse, Laverdy viewed with satisfaction as a means of  mak-
ing commerce itself  the best guarantee against scarcity. Secrecy was a 
perfectly legitimate prerogative of  commerce. Off-market exchanges 
were “necessary” for the impulse they gave to grain movement, for 
the regular rhythm of  sales, and for the convenience and morale of  
merchants. The police could never accept the idea that the grain trade 
was a purely commercial adventure; for them the notion of  grain 
“speculations” evoked the syndrome of  avidity which began with dar-
ing clandestine purchases and ended up with monopoly. Laverdy felt 
that “speculations”—any commercial operation involving an invest-
ment, incurring risk, and motivated by a desire for profit rather than 
by a sense of  fear or obligation—were at the very heart of  the grain 
trade, were positively salutary, and merited encouragement rather 
than mistrust or repression.72 Enarrhement, a practice by which future 
 71 Ibid., V, 177–78. For a concrete instance of  the sort of  protection and honor Laverdy 
envisioned, see his letter to the IN. of  Rouen, 12 May 1768 and the latter’s reply, 3 June 
1768, C. 105, A.D. S-M. See also the arrêt du conseil of  30 Oct. 1767 which sought to define, 
encourage, and reward all forms of  large-scale wholesale trade. Recueil général des anciennes 
lois françaises, ed. by Isambert, et al., XXII, 470. Turgot, during his ministry, also promised 
“public marks” of  honor to négociants who served the kingdom brilliantly. Turgot to IN. of  
Caen, 15 June 1775, Oeuvres de Turgot, ed. by Schelle, IV, 494.
 On the stigma attached to grain trading (which “destroys agriculture along with this 
commerce”) and the need to refurbish the image of  the grain merchant, especially the 
négociant, see “Lettre à M. l’abbé Roubaud sur la profession du commerçant en grains,” 
Journal de l ’agriculture, du commerce, des arts et des finances (Dec. 1773), 4–10.
 72 Cf. the depiction of  “Speculators” as public heroes in the Gazette du commerce, de l’agriculture 
et des finances (28 June 1766), 417.
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harvests were cornered in advance, was the sort of  speculation that the 
police strove to eradicate, a classical form of  business cunning explic-
itly and reiteratively prohibited in countless ordinances and sentences. 
Laverdy, however, cautioned against such a narrow-minded and old-
fashioned interpretation. Properly construed, enarrhement, like the other 
opprobrious terms assigned to speculative techniques, cannot mean 
the same thing in a regime of  liberty as it had before. “This word,” he 
wrote, “is equivocal and can comprehend the most legitimate [sort of] 
commerce as well as the most fraudulent.”73
One of  the most compelling demonstrations of  good faith which 
the government could have made would have been to renounce sol-
emnly the practice of  undertaking grain operations itself, directly or 
through intermediaries. The partisans of  liberty argued that the fear 
of  competing with the king, who (in theory) could afford to lose vast 
sums and who was backed by a giant administrative apparatus, dis-
suaded the most adventuresome businessmen from speculating in 
grain. This contract of  restraint Laverdy was not yet prepared to sign. 
In the transitional stages between the police and liberal regimes, he 
was determined to retain all his options. Moreover, he believed that an 
activist but discreet government grain role would facilitate the material 
and psychological process of  conversion from the old to the new way, 
at least insofar as the capital was concerned. Short of  a formal prom-
ise, however, the ministry publicly affirmed its sincere commitment to 
laissez-faire. If  the kingdom was to be provisioned, it would be serviced 
“by way of  commerce.” The government would efface itself  as much 
as possible in order to give “all the freedom” for the trade to thrive.74
Repeatedly put to the test, Laverdy proved himself  innumerable 
times to be a faithful supporter of  liberalization. Indeed, on balance, 
he seems to have erred more often by excesses of  liberal bullheaded-
ness than by want of  devotion to the reforms. The charge, invented 
by contemporaries and reaffirmed by historians, that the Controller-
General, either by duplicity or ineptitude, betrayed the cause cannot be 
 73 CG to Miromesnil, 31 Dec. 1767, in LeVerdier, ed., Correspondance Miromesnil, V, 68; CG 
to Miromesnil, 8 May 1768, ibid., V, 179–80; CG to Miromesnil, 9 March 1768, ibid., V, 
110–111. Cf. the Parlement of  Provence’s rejection of  the old definitions which established 
the “false crimes” of  hoarding, monopoly, etc. Letter to the king, 10 Nov. 1770, B. 3677, 
A.D. B-du-R.
 74 See, for example, Trudaine de Montigny to Miromesnil, 10, 23 Feb. and 8, 16 May 1768, 
in LeVerdier, ed., Correspondance Miromesnil, V, 84, 93, 176, 213; CG to IN. of  Champagne, 
4 Aug. 1768, C. 413, A.D. Marne; CG to IN. of  Touraine, 19 June 1768, C. 94, A.D. I-et-L.
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sustained.75 To be sure, there were inconsistencies in Laverdy’s manage-
ment; given the magnitude and complexity of  the transformation over 
which he presided, it would be astonishing not to discover certain con-
tradictions. Viewed by themselves, some of  Laverdy’s decisions seem 
strangely out of  joint and even suspicious. But they are less interesting 
for the veneer of  credibility which they might lend to the indictment of  
the Controller-General than for what they reveal about the difficulties 
of  executing liberalization.
It is true, for example, that Laverdy occasionally authorized offi-
cials to supply a market by constraint and that he sometimes took it 
upon himself  to compel suppliers to furnish.76 But it must be remem-
bered that these cases were exceptional. They signified emergencies or 
arose from extraordinary conditions in a given time and place. They 
bespoke not an infidelity to principle but a refusal to risk and test the 
principle when the odds were stacked irreversibly against it. Laverdy’s 
zeal for liberalization did not wholly stifle his sense of  comparative 
cost and advantage. He ceded where he felt he had to and where he 
could afford it, in derogation of  the faith, the better to defend the 
policy. Perhaps, in the end, he failed because he did not cede enough.
Laverdy’s handling of  export affairs, which raised embarrassing 
questions about his real intentions, was a product of  the same approach. 
The export question was so murky and complex that it was bound to 
cause embarrassment. Neither the process for the verification of  legally 
excessive prices (i.e., above the ceiling of  30 livres the Paris septier), nor 
the system for the transmission of  signals from the field to the center 
and back to the field was carefully rehearsed. Time and space lags, pre-
cipitate or dilatory action in one place or the other, wild price fluctua-
tions, innocent error, maneuvers of  rival factions—all of  these factors 
could intervene to produce an inopportune or unjustified embargo or 
to postpone a closing urgently and genuinely required. The mecha-
nistic inflexibility of  the law was certain to arouse resentment and 
stir suspicions, for there was no provision for automatic reopening of  
the export points once the price receded.77 Nor was the government 
 75 See, for instance, Weulersse, Mouvement, II, 216; C. Bloch, “Le Commerce des grains,” 
Etudes sur l’histoire économique, 70; Afanassiev, Commerce des céréales, 232–34, passim; J. Nio, 
Turgot et la liberté du commerce (Bordeaux, 1928), 70.
 76 See, for example, CG to PG, 7 Nov. 1767, BN, Coll. Joly 1135, fol. 161; CG to PG, 28 July 1768, 
Coll. Joly 1136, fol. 142; Biollay, Le Pacte de famine, 129; Afanassiev, Commerce des céréales, 232.
 77 In principle, the export cut-off  device in the July Edict was mechanistic and 
inflexible. But we do not know precisely how it went into effect in every instance. In 
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inclined, once a port had been closed, to risk another bad episode or 
create a potentially dangerous precedent by reopening it through a 
special law, a procedure which in any case smacked of  the ignomi-
nous old system of  occasional permissions.
Thus, apart from any willful design, flaws inherent in the system 
could give rise to instances of  ostensible administrative arbitrariness. 
Such appears to have been the case with the closing of  the port of  
Le Havre. According to the embittered merchants of  this city, the 
government invoked the automatic export suspension clause at a time 
when the market price stood a full 25% below the prohibitive ceiling. 
Despite the ministry’s promise to favor large-scale commerce, the Le 
Havre merchants found themselves suddenly “deprived of  the fruits 
of  their speculations.”78
There were other instances when apparently arbitrary measures 
seemed to reflect, not structural faults in the system, but a conscious 
decision made by the Controller-General. This is what appears to 
have been at the origin of  the closing of  the port of  Nantes in early 
November 1766.79 Shocked and angered by this decision, the leaders 
of  the city applied immediately for a reconsideration. They reminded 
Laverdy that they had been among the earliest and most vocal mem-
bers of  the liberal lobby, the Controller-General’s surest base of  polit-
ical support. They called attention to the ideal geographical stituation 
of  Nantes as a grain entrepôt, to their enormous investment in new 
ships (38 grain-carrying vessels constructed directly in response to 
the stimulus of  the July Edict), port improvements and granaries, and 
the obligations which the city’s négociants had contracted in the inter-
national market. Promised that there would “never” be a “return to 
prohibitive laws,” the Nantais now felt deeply betrayed. Even as the 
international business community would “lose confidence” in the 
traders of  the city, so the Nantais hinted that their confidence in the 
Controller-General had been severely jarred. They maintained not 
only that the decision to close exports was economically disastrous, 
 an ambiguous but intriguing letter, Trudaine hinted to the intendant of  Bordeaux that a 
port closing did not occur automatically after 3 consecutive over-ceiling market days, but 
that it remained a fundamentally political decision to be made by the Contrôle-Général. 4 
Sept. 1766, C. 1425, A.D. Gir.
 78 Communications of  8, 12, 15, 19 Dec. 1766, AN, Marine G 81. Cf. Girard, Terray, 
20. yet when Laverdy realized a mistake was made—for example, when as a result of  
a “malentendu” of  the Farmers-General office, export through Dieppe was halted—he 
immediately rectified it. CG to IN. of  Rouen, 7, 22 June 1767, C. 103, A.D. S-M,
 79 CG to the mayor of  Nantes, 2 Nov. 1766, C. 775, A.D. L-A.
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but that it was also wholly unjust. For they claimed that the price rise 
that the government used as a pretext for imposing the embargo was 
the result of  a plot which aimed at nothing less than “overturning the 
laws of  the kingdom” in order to favor the interests of  “monopoly.” 
They characterized the transactions which drove the price above the 
thirty livres per septier barrier as “isolated” and “unrepresentative” and 
they denounced the merchant, Gamier, who made them as a specula-
tor with “evil intentions.”80
Determined to “unmask the maneuvers,” the General Assembly of  
Commerce of  Nantes dispatched a two-man delegation to appeal to the 
Controller-General in person.81 En route to Paris, the deputies visited 
all the major market-towns along the Loire in the hope of  “engaging 
them to join their protests to ours.” To their keen disappointment, how-
ever, they found that virtually all of  the officials they encountered wel-
comed the closing of  Nantes. They met with more sympathy at Orléans 
where they discussed the plight of  their city with one of  the best-known 
defenders of  liberalization, the économiste Letrosne. He offered to write to 
Laverdy in their behalf.
The sojourn of  the deputies in the capital began auspiciously when 
another économiste, Abeille, who had close ties with both the Breton 
liberal lobby and the ministry, arranged a meeting with Trudaine de 
Montigny. Subsequently, however, nothing seemed to go right. The 
deputies expected Trudaine to greet them warmly and volunteer his 
support, but he proved to be extraordinarily evasive. Pretending that 
he had little influence in these matters, Trudaine said that he could 
do no more than urge Laverdy to receive the delegation. D’Aiguillon, 
Brittany’s most illustrious representative then in Paris, flatly refused 
to see them—assuredly for reasons that had little to do with the des-
tiny of  Nantais commerce. The Bureau du Commerce, which had always 
expressed reservations about liberalization, refused to sponsor the 
deputies’ petition. Citing the high price of  grain as more than ample 
justification for the suspension, Courteille, the head of  the grain 
 80 “Mémoire tendant á obtenir la rèvocation de la défense d’exporter des grains du port de 
Nantes pour l’étranger.” C. 774 and Juge-consuls to CG, 20 Nov. 1766, C. 775, ibid.
 Partly out of  vengeance, partly in order to give their remonstrances a documentary base, 
the Nantes police condemned Gamier on 4 December to a 500 livres fine for buying above 
the current price. The royal council quashed the sentence a week later. C. 775, ibid.
 81 Most of  what follows is based upon the report submitted by the two deputies, Kerregan and 
Millet, to the Nantes assembly of  commerce in December 1766. C. 775, ibid.
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department, rejected out of  hand the deputies’ contention that the 
government had been deceived or had acted improperly.
Meanwhile, the deputies set out on their own to uncover clues to 
the plot. Interviews with officials and businessmen convinced them 
that the trail from Garnier, the merchant responsible for breaking 
through the price ceiling at Nantes, led ultimately to Leray de Chau-
mont, a ubiquitous entrepreneur with excellent political connec-
tions with whom we shall become familiar in a later chapter. Deeply 
involved in the financing and organizing of  the royal grain reserve 
for Paris, Leray also served Laverdy as a counselor for grain affairs.
Armed with a letter of  introduction from Montaudouin, himself  a 
Nantes trader and a militant liberal, the Breton deputies did not shrink 
from confronting Leray himself  with their suspicions.82 Leray tried to 
place the closing of  the port of  Nantes in a broader social and eco-
nomic context. Bad harvests everywhere made various “precautions” 
necessary. The situation was becoming critical in large segments of  
the realm. you are partisans of  liberty, Leray told the deputies, but 
remember, “if  800,000 people [in Paris] were to lack bread for six 
hours, everything would blow up.” The government acted at Nantes 
not as the result of  a plot, but in order to prevent one in which all 
the exporting merchants were accomplices. Regardless of  the price, 
Leray argued, the Controller-General has the power to stop exports 
“because the négociants can always find the way to prevent grain from 
rising above the ceiling in order to allow themselves to export all the 
kingdom’s grain.” In fact, Leray contended, the price at Nantes had 
been far above the statutory limit and the Controller-General’s deci-
sion was perfectly regular. As for the rumors which linked him with 
Garnier, Leray pronounced them false. The Nantes deputies made it 
clear that they believed no part of  his story and challenged him, in 
vain, to show them proof  of  his assertions.
Finally, towards the end of  their second week in Paris, Laverdy 
agreed to meet the delegation. He received them with a “severe air” 
and then exploded in a “tirade” against their mission, which he con-
sidered illegal and unwarranted. “I am very much disposed against 
you,” the Controller-General informed them. Alarmed by the stir 
which their private investigation had already caused, he warned them 
against making further insinuations and spreading ideas which could 
have “unfortunate consequences.” “Have you come here to oppose the 
 82 See Montaudouin’s violently anglophobic argument in favor of  the immediate reopening 
of  the port of  Nantes to exports, C. 775, ibid.
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law?” he asked them menacingly. “I shall uphold it in the prohibi-
tive part as in the permissive part.”
Pointing out that “half ” the city of  Paris was against grain exports, 
the Controller-General seemed to be saying, like Leray de Chaumont, 
that there were certain political variables which a minister had to take 
very seriously. Self-proclaimed protector and promoter of  the grain 
trade, Laverdy nevertheless sternly reproached the Nantes merchant 
community for having “pushed up” prices with “an extravagance 
which caused them to mount everywhere prodigiously.” This time 
they have gone too far; while they are worried about their specula-
tions, the Controller-General reminded the deputies, I am worried 
about “the starving of  the kingdom.” He dismissed with contempt 
the delegation’s apocalyptic theory about a plot devised to ruin the 
interests of  Nantes and, along with them, those of  French agriculture 
and, indeed, of  “all humanity.”
Ah, the usual reasons! Everything is always lost, ruined, agriculture, navigation. Well 
then, Messieurs, so you will earn a little less with your 38 [new] ships.
When it did not serve government needs, the special pleading of  the 
liberty lobby was no more compelling and no less tiresome than that 
of  any other interest group courting favor.
Throughout the interview, Laverdy oscillated between moods of  
irascibility and solicitude. After the long rebuke, an unexpectedly san-
guine prediction: the Controller-General felt sure that he would be 
in a position within three months to reopen the port for exports. yet, 
after the balm, another fulmination: you are trouble-makers, he told 
the deputies; you are to leave Paris immediately because “I am afraid 
of  your undertakings [here].” Unable to obtain a full hearing or an 
inquiry, the deputies left for home bitterly disappointed and more 
confident than ever that the ministry was covering up a sordid affair.
The Controller-General officially notified the Nantes municipal-
ity that he would accept no further remonstrances.83 In his letter he 
made no allusion to the political argument which he pressed upon 
the delegation. He claimed to have based his decision strictly on prin-
ciple —on the law. To the Nantais contention that the high price was 
not a valid indicator of  the state of  the market because it character-
ized only a small percentage of  transactions, Laverdy replied that 
 83 CG to Juge-Consuls, 3, 18 Dec. 1766, C. 775, ibid. Cf. Juge-Consuls to CG, 9 Dec. 1766, ibid.
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the  suspension price did not have to be the common price: the sale 
of  “just a few holdings” was sufficient to trigger suspension. yet it 
soon became clear that this principle was not nearly as invariable as 
Laverdy pretended, for less than a year later he rejected the intendant 
of  Hainaut’s plea for export suspension in frontier areas of  that gen-
erality on the grounds that “the quantity of  grain sold above 12 livres 
10 sous the quintal [the ceiling price, i.e., 30 livres the Paris septier] is 
a very small amount in comparison with that which was sold below 
this price.”84 Despite the Controller-General’s optimistic assurance, 
Nantes never recovered the right to export under the provisions of  the 
July Edict. The only real concession which the merchants obtained 
was the permission to export grain already contracted for or loaded 
for departure. On the other hand, despite the dire premonitions of  
the municipality and the merchant association, the port soon began 
to prosper from a trade in grain imports, which grew spectacularly in 
the next few years.
Laverdy’s export management helped in still other ways to arouse 
misunderstanding and mistrust.85 While encouraging the merchant 
community, he tried simultaneously to allay the fears of  the con-
sumers. For example, on several occasions the ministry spread the 
rumor—which it knew to be wholly false—that exportation had been 
officially suspended in the hope that this news would reassure pub-
lic opinion and thus permit exporters, under the cover of  the lull, to 
speculate in tranquility.86 But such deceptions were perilous risks 
 84 CG to Taboureau, 16 Nov. 1767, C. 6690, A.D. Nord.
 85 Though it did not personally inculpate Laverdy, the Dauphiné Parlement retrospectively 
charged that “interested parties” plotted to arrange the closings of  key ports. In fact, though 
they differ in scale and object, the Dauphiné accusations are strikingly redolent in tone and 
even in language of  the famine plot denunciations of  Leprévost de Beaumont. “The law 
[the clause in the July Edict dealing with the export ceiling] has become in guilty hands 
the instrument of  monopoly,” the magistrates contended. “Liberty,” they wrote, “has thus 
served as a pretext to cover a crime ....” If  one did not know that the parlementaires were 
criticizing the limits placed on liberty, which allegedly invited maneuvers and thus further 
 sabotaged liberty, one could easily mistake these remarks for slogans in the campaign 
against liberalization. Specifically, the Dauphiné court charged that a secret agent of  an 
“accredited company” artificially arranged for the closing of  the port of  Nantes, one of  
the major centers of  export-import traffic in the kingdom, thus dealing the renascent grain 
trade a terrible blow. Avis and letter to Louis XV, 26 April 1769, B. 2314, fols. 112–113, 
A.D. Isère. The Dauphiné parlementaires claimed that once Nantes was closed to export, 
the port’s utility as an import entrepôt was also destroyed because the prohibitive climate 
repelled traders. In fact, it seems clear that Nantes’ role as an import center continued to 
grow throughout this period. See D’Agay to CG, 10 May 1770, C. 1718, A.D. I-et-V.
 86 Note by Miromesnil, 10 Feb. 1768, in LeVerdier, ed., Correspondance Miromesnil, V, 83.
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because they had extremely limited short-run returns at best and because 
they were very rarely convincing. Though they were practiced in the ser-
vice of  liberty, they bore the mark of  the prohibitive regime during which 
the government had often secretly arranged with favored négociants to 
undertake exports when circumstances permitted, free from the glare of  
publicity and the goad of  competition. The whole point of  liberalization, 
as Laverdy understood it, was to put an end to ploys, special covenants, 
uncertain speculative prospects, and privileged mandarins.
Laverdy’s handling of  export affairs led to recurrent charges at the 
end of  the sixties that he manipulated port closings either for venal rea-
sons (to facilitate the grain purchases of  a quasi-governmental monop-
oly or a private cabal of  powerful dealers) or as a pretext to prepare for 
a repudiation of  liberalization. Though they were without foundation, 
these imputations impaired the Controller-General’s credibility and 
helped to undermine the liberal reforms. Nothing suggests that he was 
disenchanted with the July Edict for which he had fought so vigorously 
in the royal council or that he used the closure clause and the highly 
charged exportation issue as political instruments to justify his own 
defection from the liberal camp. He was too intimately identified with 
liberalization—especially with exportation—to carry off  a convincing 
separation and he believed too deeply in the worth and destiny of  the 
policy to contemplate such a move. He made errors in judgment and 
he took steps which sorely disappointed his liberal clients. But there is 
no reason to doubt the sincerity of  the remark he made in August 1767 
to his close friend Miromesnil: “My personal sentiment would be to 
render exportation completely [free].”87
The accusation to which Laverdy is most vulnerable concerns nei-
ther his internal police, nor his export policies, but a matter which 
had a bearing upon both: his use of  the king’s grain and his reliance 
upon various forms of  state intervention in the grain trade.88 Doubtless 
these activities clashed with the liberal aims (although it is worth not-
ing that his critics argued not from the fact that they did but, accord-
ing to liberal theory, that they must have). The persistence of  old style 
government buying, selling, stocking, subsidizing, and intriguing seemed 
to these critics to be irrefutable proof  that Laverdy did not take his 
 87 CG to Miromesnil, 5 Aug. 1767, ibid, V, 9. Cf. Laverdy’s sharp condemnation of  the efforts 
of  the Bordeaux Parlement to halt exports without regard to the price mechanism of  the 
July Edict. CG to IN. of  Bordeaux, 1 Oct. 1766, C. 1425, A.D. Gir.
 88 For a discussion of  the use of  the king’s grain in the sixties, see below, chapter eight.
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liberalism seriously. From Laverdy’s point of  view, however, the king’s 
grain and other carefully calculated emergency purchases sponsored by 
the government provided him with the margin of  security and the buffer 
that he needed in order to effect the transition in political terms as well as 
in terms of  political economy. It was not enough to let right principles do 
their work; it was necessary, in certain instances, to smooth the way for 
their triumph with old-fashioned doses of  paternalism. A total abandon-
ment of  official provisioning would have left Laverdy helpless to bargain, 
to bribe, to intimidate, and to parry contingencies such as natural disaster 
or social eruption. In the short run the king’s grain would guarantee the 
success of  liberalization; in the long run, the practice would die of  ina-
nition as it exhausted its usefulness. In the last analysis, Laverdy’s critics 
charged him with having been insufficiently doctrinaire in his prosecu-
tion of  the reforms, a quality of  dubious merit in a high administrator.
The liberal laws of  1763–64 survived longer than their perfervid 
champion, the Controller-General Laverdy. Much to his astonish-
ment, for he believed himself  to be in favor, and to the surprise of  
the people of  Paris, who had enjoyed considerable success over the 
years in forecasting ministerial changes, Laverdy was disgraced at the 
end of  September 1768.89 Now there was never an absolute paucity 
of  reasons or pretexts for the cashiering of  a Controller-General. It is 
no exaggeration to say that virtually everyone had a particular motive 
for desiring the downfall of  one of  the most conspicuous of  ministers. 
The ouster of  a Controller-General was one of  the few acts by which 
the king could please the vast majority of  his subjects in a single ges-
ture, without taking into consideration any of  their specific griev-
ances. In most previous cases, however—with, for example, Orry or 
Machault or Silhouette or Bertin—one could safely ascribe the acts 
of  dismissal to concrete causes or singular incidents. But Laverdy, it 
appears, did not have the satisfaction of  knowing exactly why he was 
displaced. It may be that he was revoked because he failed to improve 
the financial situation, albeit modern appraisals of  his management 
seem extravagantly harsh (“an extreme incompetence”).90 Or he may 
 89 Sept. 1768, Journal et mémoires de Charles Collé, ed. by H. Bonhomme (Paris, 1868), III, 207 
and Alphonse Jobez, La France sous Louis XV, VI, 413.
 90 This is the judgment of  Henri Martin, Histoire de France, XVI, 246. Cf. Coquereau (“aussi 
méprisable par la Bêtise & l’absurdité de son Ministère”), Mémoires concernant ... l’Abbé 
Terrai (London, 1776), 203; Lebrun (Laverdy “messed up everything in a department 
that he did not know, and obtained neither success nor confidence.”), Opinions, rapports 
et choix d’écrits politiques, ed. by A.-C. Lebrun (Paris, 1829), 16–17; M.-F. Pidansat 
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have fallen victim to enmities he aroused among rentiers by his plans 
for amortization, among municipal oligarchs and puissant lords by 
his reform of  local government, or among parlementaires, his former 
colleagues, by his projects to rationalize the collection of  the taille and 
other taxes and by the support he gave their bête noire, D’Aiguillon. 
Finally, there is little doubt that a feud with Choiseul contributed to 
his downfall.91
The fact that he left office at the very end of  September, in the 
midst of  the increasingly strident confrontation on the issue of  the 
liberal reform between the king and the ministry, on the one hand, 
and the Paris Parlement and the other critics of  the new system in 
the magistracy and the upper and lower administration, on the other, 
suggests that his handling of  liberalization may have been one of  the 
keys to his disgrace. Insofar as his stewardship of  affairs was identi-
fied with dearth, soaring prices, and social and administrative disor-
der, Laverdy had become a liability to the liberal cause. His dismissal 
deprived the antiliberals of  an easy target and enabled the king to 
dissociate himself  and the new ministry from Laverdy’s execution of  
the liberal policy, without repudiating the liberal laws. To judge from 
Cypierre’s reaction, it appears that the government reaped some 
short-term political advantage from the replacement of  the Control-
ler-General. But the ouster must not be construed as a retreat from 
liberalization, for the king replaced Laverdy with Maynon d’Invau, a 
maître des requêtes who consummated his apprenticeship as an adminis-
trator-économiste by marrying the sister of  Trudaine de Montigny. The 
latter remained in the ministry to bridge the gap between incoming 
and outgoing Controllers-General.92
Albeit puzzling, the disgrace for Laverdy was mild, accompanied by 
gifts from the king and an invitation to return to the honorable obscu-
rity from which he had emerged only four years before. Laverdy did 
not reappear upon the public stage until 1793, when he became the 
 de Mairobert, Journal historique de la révolution opérée dans la constitution de la monarchie françoise 
(London, 1776), I, 386; and especially Marion, Histoire financière, I, 226–45, followed by 
Michel Antoine, Le Conseil du Roi sous le règne de Louis XV, 221.
 91 Jobez, La France sous Louis XV, VI, 407–13; Henri Martin, Histoire de France, XVI, 246; 
Marion, Histoire f inancière, I, 233–45; Maurice Bordes, La Réforme municipale du contrôleur-général 
Laverdy (Toulouse, 1968), passim; J.-N. Moreau, Mes souvenirs, ed. by C. Hermelin, I, 185.
 92 Bachaumont, Mémoires secrets, XIX, 29 (21 Oct. 1768); Diderot to Sophie Volland, 26 Oct. 
1768, in Correspondance Diderot, ed. by Roth, VIII, 203 (# 507); Morellet, Mémoires, I, 179; 
Léonce de Lavergne, Economistes, 174.
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victim of  the collective memory of  the people, who still connected 
him with the grain question, and of  the personal vengeance of  Lep-
révost de Beaumont, the man whom he had had arrested for propa-
gating rumors of  a “famine pact.” Inspired by Leprévost’s deposition, 
the product of  a quarter-century’s festering reflection in royal prisons 
such as the Bastille, and the discovery of  a pitful of  rotten and ger-
minated grain adjacent to Laverdy’s château, the Revolutionary Tri-
bunal condemned him to death for master-minding “a plot tending 
to deliver the Republic to the horrors of  famine,” a conspiracy which 
began with the efforts to free the grain trade in the sixties.93
The disgrace and execution of  Laverdy takes us far in advance of  
our problem. By 1766, a crisis had declared itself  in the kingdom, 
whether the government wanted to acknowledge it or not—a crisis of  
grain supply, a crisis of  public order and public opinion, and a crisis 
of  authority within the police administration. The government’s hard 
line was based upon the conviction that the subsistence difficulties 
were ephemeral events which would pass once the nation adjusted 
itself  to the liberal regime. The government had never claimed that 
liberalization, in the short run, would make subsistence easier, and 
now it adamantly refused to concede that the reform laws actually 
operated in a way which made it more difficult than ever before for 
consumers to procure supplies. In the next chapter, we shall examine 
the validity of  the government’s contention, with particular reference 
to the state of  foreign and internal grain trade.
 93 H. Wallon, Histoire du tribunal révolutionnaire de Paris (Paris, 1880), II, 96–97, 101; Maurice 
Tourneux, Bibliographie de l’histoire de Paris pendant la révolution française (Paris, 1890–1906), II, 
41–45 and IV, 235; Bulletin du Tribunal criminel révolutionnaire, 99–100 (3 frimaire an II).
Chapter VI
THE REFORMS AND THE GRAIN TRADE
A few short years after the proclamation of  liberalization, the gov-
ernment found itself  faced with a burgeoning subsistence crisis and 
embroiled in a growing debate on the judiciousness of  the reform. 
The reforms were meant to change the way in which the grain trade 
was conducted. The May Declaration radically altered the condi-
tions of  internal commerce and the July Edict opened the frontiers 
to exports. Taken together, these measures were supposed to build a 
stronger, more resilient, and more dependable commercial structure 
at the same time that they generated powerful incentives for agricul-
tural expansion. In this chapter we shall consider the impact of  the 
reforms on domestic and foreign trade and especially on the custom-
ary patterns of  provisioning. In addition, we shall examine the way in 
which partisans and adversaries of  the May and July laws explained 
the relationship between liberalization and dearth.
I
Contemporaries were never able to assess dispassionately the impact of  
liberalization upon the grain trade and the patterns of  provisioning. 
The proliferation of  scarcity, spiraling prices, and disorder polarized 
feelings toward the reform legislation. The parties to the debate were 
more interested in ascribing and denying political and moral respon-
sibility for the crisis than in studying the processes of  cause and effect. 
Resentful of  the dearth that jarred their serenity, the liberals viewed 
it as an accident, ill-timed but banal, which bore no intrinsic rela-
tion to the implementation of  liberalization. On the contrary, they 
claimed that it was a vindictive legacy of  the old police system, for 
were the liberty perfect in its application, dearth by definition would 
be impossible. If  prices were occasionally excessive, it was due to the 
persistence of  the old prohibitions, to the inclemency of  the weather, 
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or to other traditional sources of  fluctuation. The opponents of  lib-
eralization ridiculed the idea that the reforms and the scarcity were 
merely coincidental occurrences. After all, the avowed purpose of  the 
laws was to open new markets for the grain trade and to raise prices. 
The dismantling of  controls led directly to the flight of  grain and the 
vertiginous increase in prices to which, in the eyes of  the police party, 
the popular disturbances furnished eloquent testimony.
In one sense modern scholarship incidentally favors the liberal 
argument, in part because the counter-claim is not readily susceptible 
to quantitative testing, but more importantly because the experience 
of  the sixties fits comfortably the schema of  cyclical and seasonal 
price behavior which characterizes the Old Regime. By analogy with 
similar episodes in other times, the price rise of  the sixties can theo-
retically be explained without recourse to exogenous political factors. 
Bad weather would be the crucial variable. Although a precise geog-
raphy of  differential production, distribution, and demand remains 
to be drafted, it can be plausibly argued that harvest lapses and disas-
ters were sufficiently pronounced and widespread to occasion a con-
ventional scarcity and cherté.1
That is not to say, however, even if  one accepts this clinically neutral 
thesis which by itself  failed to satisfy either party to the quarrel, that the 
harvests can account for all the outbreaks of  dearth, that liberalization 
played no role, or that this dearth as a whole was in fact no different 
from other dearths. The harvest of  1765 does not seem to have been 
unusually short in most places, while opinion on the severity of  the def-
icits between 1766 and 1768 differs from source to source and place to 
place.2 In many cases brusque price augmentations preceded harvest 
 1 Though a number of  methodological problems must be resolved in order to make them 
usable, masses of  harvest reports are awaiting scrutiny in the department C series.
 2 Assessments of  harvest performance varied within the same region or between nearby 
areas. Reports from the Brie around Melun in 1768 indicated a poor crop, while a writer 
from the vicinity of  Meaux claimed the harvest was “very good.” J.M. Desbordes, ed., La 
chronique villageoise de Varreddes (Paris, n.d.), 31. Subdelegations within Picardy differed in 
wheat production in 1769 by as much as 150 percent. The previous year produced similar 
variations. États des Récoltes, C. 81, 82, and 84, A. D. Somme. Calculated in fractions 
and multiples of  “the common year”—a normative and somewhat idiosyncratic concept 
which lends itself  reluctantly either to quantification or comparison—these harvest 
estimates must be used with caution, in conjunction with control data. Clearly certain 
discrepancies in harvest appreciation were voluntary, the product not of  rudimentary 
and parochial accounting techniques but of  political imperatives. Contrast, for example, 
the optimism of  Trudaine de Montigny and the pessimism of  officials in the field. C. 
413, A.D. Marne.
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failures or the intimation of  prospective difficulties. Some places expe-
rienced cherté while they continued to enjoy apparently normal harvests 
and before they became conscious of  trouble elsewhere. In both kinds 
of  examples, the price increases seem to have been related to changes 
in trading practices. For different purposes, économistes and their crit-
ics often pointed to the paradox which suffered (allegedly) abundant 
supplies to coexist with exorbitantly high prices. A critical reading of  
administrative evidence and impressionistic testimonies strongly sug-
gests that the freeing of  the grain trade, if  it did not itself  provoke cherté, 
exacerbated the short-term oscillations and quickened the cyclical and 
long-run movement by overturning market habits, modifying the cus-
tomary flow-patterns of  grain, multiplying the number of  interme-
diaries, reducing the local visible supply, encouraging forestalling and 
regrating, and introducing a whole new dimension of  adventure and 
uncertainty which influenced supply and demand. The last point, con-
cerning the psychological impact of  liberalization, is perhaps the most 
important. For dealers big and small the liberal laws opened a fresh 
vista of  opportunities backed by the assurance of  legal security in spec-
ulation. For consumers and the police, liberalization engendered the 
expectation of  disaster by making security a matter of  private interest. 
Producers and traders assumed a heady attitude of  independence and 
aloofness; police authorities seemed hamstrung and helpless; consum-
ers felt abandoned and betrayed.
The most sensational issue in the debate on the causes of  the dearth 
was the question of  exports. A concrete and theoretically measurable 
phenomenon, it aroused deep feelings and became, to the chagrin of  
the économistes, the symbol and standard of  the entire liberal program. 
For consumers and for many local officials, who had no interest in 
political economy, the existence of  a law authorizing exports explained 
 Finally, it is worth emphasizing the immediate “physical” consequences of  a bad harvest, 
apart from its broader socioeconomic impact. Usually it meant not only a short crop but a 
harvest of  bad quality. low quality grain yielded less flour as well as less good flour than the 
same amount of  a high quality crop. The flour in turn had lower “baker value,” absorbing 
less water, kneading less well, and proofing less successfully than the same quantity of  good 
flour. Thus a short crop usually produced “multiples of  less” through all the stages of  
transformation. And of  course the quality of  the bread made it unappetizing and, in some 
instances—in parts of  Bretagne for example in 1768—“unhealthy.” See SD at lannion 
to IN., 6 Oct. 1768, C. 1652, A.D. I-et-V. Moreover, poor quality grain did not keep well, 
especially at a time before conservation technology was highly developed and diffused. Bad 
grain got worse and worse. In a dearth, since dealers knew that they could dispose of  it 
regardless of  condition, there were few incentives for “repairing” grain or rushing sales.
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everything: shortages, soaring prices, and market dislocation were the 
direct consequences of  the rush to dispose of  grain abroad. From this 
perspective it made no difference that the liberals themselves did not 
expect a huge outflow of  grain or that there were competitive, logis-
tical, and legal limits to the amounts that could be exported. What 
mattered was that since 1764 grain took to the roads and rivers, mer-
chants and laboureurs took to the taverns and granaries, and the gov-
ernment blithely approved practices which it had once prohibited.
Exportation loomed as a mammoth, tentacular pump that vora-
ciously drained the grain from the lifestream of  the kingdom. “This 
big word exportation,” regretted Dupont in retrospect,
repeated perhaps too often by the defenders of  liberty, although they really demanded 
only the right to export, which can exist fully without any effective exportation; this 
big word exportation frightened minds little acquainted with what it is all about.3
The liberals had presented their case with excessive ardor. They made 
exportation the sine qua non of  their program, argued that it must be 
unlimited (blurring, as Dupont complained, the distinction between 
right and fact and seemingly predicting that in reality infinite amounts 
of  grain would quit the kingdom), and insisted, at the risk of  per-
plexing an unsophisticated audience, that exportation was “the surest 
means to prevent scarcity” and “the best precaution against dearth.”4 
Voltaire pungently expressed a sentiment that must have been widely 
felt at the time. Writing in the beginning of  1771 from Ferney where 
“we are dying of  hunger,” he asked his friend if  he knew the journal 
called the Ephémérides du Citoyen: “It claims that we are lacking bread 
only because we have not sold enough grain abroad.”5
 3 “Observations sur les effets de la liberté du commerce des grains … par l’Auteur des 
Ephémérides du citoyen,” Journal économique (July 1770), 332. The fact that many officials 
and consumers characterized all outward bound trade, regardless of  destination, as 
“exportation” did not help the liberal cause. It is easier to understand the domination of  the 
export issue when one realizes, as one liberal commentator mournfully remarked, that “the 
greatest number [of  people] wholly confound interprovincial circulation with exportation 
abroad.” Anon., “Mémoire sur l’exportation des grains,” (Oct. 1768), A 1/3677/, #113, 
Arch. Armée. References to “the liberty of  exportation in the interior” abound in the 
administrative correspondence. See, for instance, SD at Bernay to IN. of  Alençon, 12 Oct. 
1773, C. 89, A.D. Orne and IN. of  Burgundy to SDs, “Mémoire concernant les grains,” 
ca. Oct. 1771, C. 81, A.D. C d’O.
 4 “Premier avis des Députés du Commerce…,” ( Jan. 1764), BN, mss. fr. 14295, fol. 10; 
Anonymous, “Mémoire sur l’exportation des bleds” (ca. 1764) BN, mss. fr. 14296, fols. 15–16.
 5 Voltaire to Chevalier de Rochefort, 9 Feb. 1771, in Voltaire’s Correspondence, ed. by Besterman, 
vol. 78, p. 84 (#15978). Though Voltaire telescoped the liberal growth sequence for the 
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When it came time to take stock of  the crisis, in the late sixties 
and for many years afterwards, the partisans of  liberty tried to focus 
attention on the data rather than on the rhetoric. They emphasized 
the crucial distinction, in the words of  the Dauphiné Parlement, 
between “the act” (“unlimited exportation”) which did not occur 
and “the power to act” (“the unlimited liberty to export”) which 
the law guaranteed and which helped to “perfect” the grain trade 
and Europeanize French prices without draining national supplies. 
Though they warmly acknowledged that exportation produced “pre-
cious” fruits for the kingdom, the magistrates of  Aix insisted that it 
had been nothing more than “a simple metaphysical possibility.” The 
liberals demanded a rigorous accounting of  exactly how much grain 
left France, by which they meant to show that exportation could not 
have been a significant disruptive factor.6 With few exceptions, the 
critics of  liberalization disdained fastidious inventories and concen-
trated their attack on liberal theory and its promised consequences. 
Implicit in their argument was the assumption that exportation had 
unequivocally proved itself  to be a social disaster, regardless of  the 
statistical indications.
The most common reproach formulated was that the government 
should have known how very dangerous it was to risk exportation. The 
objections echoed commissaire Delamare’s classical lesson that “it is 
just to safeguard our own preservation before thinking about that of  
our neighbor” and that exportation must never be permitted unless 
we are absolutely sure that there is a “surplus beyond our subsistence 
needs.”7 Testard du lys, lieutenant Criminel of  the Paris police and a 
vehement adversary of  the new political economy, categorically denied 
that the kingdom contained a surplus beyond need prior to liberaliza-
tion and intimated that France could never safely afford to qualify a res-
idue as disposable. What was left after consumption in the early sixties 
was not a superfluity but merely a “provision of  precaution on which 
depends tranquility.” The social and political value of  this treasure far 
 sake of  burlesque, he did not wholly denature the liberal reasoning process. “Do you want 
France to experience a happy superabundance?” asked the Grenoble magistrates. “We 
must begin,” they answered, “by launching a great export trade; the grain which leaves 
the kingdom will increase the mass of  subsistence in the interior by the encouragement of  
cultivation, of  multiple clearings, and by the amelioration of  all the land.” Parl. to louis 
XV, 26 April 1769, B. 2314, fol. 119, A.D. Isère.
 6 Parl. of  Dauphiné to louis XV, 26 April 1769, B. 2314, fol. 107, A.D. Isère; Parl. of  
Provence to louis XV, 10 Nov. 1770, B. 3677, A.D. B-du-R.
 7 Nicolas Delamare, Traité de la police, II, 726. Cf. E. F. Heckscher, Mercantilism, II, 100.
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outstripped whatever material return it could produce in foreign 
commerce. Testard angrily denounced the idea that this surplus was 
in some sense a “burden” or an “evil.” He made belief  in abundance 
as an unqualified good a test of  civic virtue and hinted that the desire 
for exportation bordered on a sort of  moral treason:
There are few citizens who do not wish for and relish the pleasure of  the abundance of  
grain. To desire, without limits or reserves, the free outflow of  grain is to endanger Society.8
The abbé Galiani indicted the Edict of  July 1764 as one of  the chief  
causes of  the crisis of  the sixties. Founded on erroneous principles 
of  public administration, it was an invitation for social disorganiza-
tion. In principle it made sense to seek outlets for excess production. 
But “the idea alone of  the delicateness” of  the operation required to 
separate the surplus from the necessary was “frightening”:
It is a question so to speak of  removing the epidermis of  the whole of  France without 
touching the skin which is sensitive and which makes one cry, is that possible and isn’t 
it the veritable cause of  the eternal squallings of  the people as soon as one tampers 
a little with the grain trade? … But when the operation is in itself  difficult, delicate, 
scabrous, it is impossible not to do damage.
Given the physical difficulties and commercial risks of  the grain trade, 
the diversities in regional supply and demand, and the primitive means 
of  communication and transportation, this putative surplus was socially 
and politically precious. In practice, Galiani told Diderot, exporting was 
“lunacy.” Given the capricious nature of  the supply and the highly inelas-
tic quality of  the demand, exportation was not the barter of  grain for 
money, but the patently disadvantageous exchange of  grain you now 
have against grain that you will later have to buy back. For Galiani, the 
experience of  the sixties confirmed the admonition of  the grain imprés-
ario and government consultant Pâris Duverney (who was accused of  
profiting from just such insight) that “ordinarily a grand outflow (exporta-
tion) [sic] of  grain when it is cheap is followed by a dearth during which 
one repurchases the same grain very dearly.” In addition to transmitting 
violent shocks through French society, exportation did not even fulfill its 
self-assigned goals. Instead of  stimulating internal circulation, it destroyed 
it by diverting energy and capital from the center to the periphery where 
trade was easier and more remunerative. Instead of  enriching agriculture, 
it sated only the middlemen who skimmed off  most of  the profits and 
 8 Recueil, 136–37.
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quickened the avidity of  the state, which would surely use liberalization 
as a pretext to raise taxes, thereby devouring the rest.9
The future finance minister Necker deplored the innovations of  
the sixties and held exportation largely responsible for the scarcities 
and soaring prices. He derided the liberal effort to belittle the impor-
tance of  real exports:
The more one insists on the smallness of  the exportation occasioned by the Edict of  
1764, the more one exposes the major drawbacks of  liberty, for one proves that the 
outflow of  a very small quantity of  grain is sufficient to cause a prodigious revolution 
in the prices.
The drain of  several hundred thousand septiers could jeopardize the 
lives of  millions of  people in the last months or weeks before a har-
vest. The nation which regularly exports will suffer continued depop-
ulation and consequently a steady erosion of  power, for men rather 
than money were the best indicators of  strength.10
Growth, however, could not be the sole preoccupation of  the judicious 
legislator in Necker’s view. He had to labor to avert social disequilibrium 
and the threat of  conflagration because the interests of  the members of  
society were not identical and would not, as the économistes presumed, 
harmonize spontaneously even when “properly understood.” It was the 
duty of  the legislator to moderate and mediate the “continual shock of  
interests, principles, and opinions” which beset social life. Surplus grain, 
“precious” for him as for Galiani, was one of  the most effective instru-
ments the legislator could use to reconcile divergent interests artificially. 
The surplus served as a balancing agent and the guarantee of  a crude 
form of  social equality without which the laboring poor—the majority 
of  consumers—would be in a perpetual state of  distress. The surplus 
“excites the owners to sell in fear of  being bypassed, tempers their power, 
and weakens their natural empire over the buyers.” The price rise of  the 
sixties, unaccompanied by a compensatory movement of  wages, struck 
the poor like an enormous “capitation”; indeed, it was worse than a capi-
tation, for its limits were not known in advance. In some places in the king-
dom, the price rose 100 percent as a result of  exports. The price of  grain, 
Necker insisted, does not rise in direct proportion to the amount diverted 
 9 Galiani, Dialogues, ed. by Nicolini, 169, 188, 244–53, 262, 282; Galiani, “Mémoire à M. de 
Sartine” (ca. 1770), in Asse, ed., Lettres, I, 411; Diderot to Sophie Volland, 22 Nov. 1768 in 
Correspondance Diderot, ed. by Roth, VIII, 233; Pâris Duverney, “Extrait des divers mémoires 
sur les bleds” (ca. 1750), AN, F12 647.
 10 Necker, Sur la législation et le commerce des grains, 58–64.
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away. The model used for projecting the price increase must contain 
social, political and psychological variables; one must compare the 
amount lacking not to the mass of  grain but to the “surplus necessary 
to temper the power of  the sellers and the alarms of  the consumers.”11
In Necker’s paternalistic vision, for the sake of  equilibrium the 
legislator could “demand some slight sacrifices on the part of  the 
fortunate Citizens.” Even more sharply than Galiani, he rejected the 
idea that property in society was held unconditionally. The owners 
“owed” the people a “social sentiment.” This meant, for example, 
as Delamare had argued, that they could not deprive their fellow 
men of  the food of  “national” grain for profit. Nor was it merely 
a gesture of  altruism in the guise of  a moral debt to be paid under 
threat of  governmental reprisal. If  the owners understood their own 
interests and the fragile albeit venerable conventions that guaranteed 
their rights, they would pay this slight ransom of  self-restraint and, by 
denying themselves the dubious benefits of  exportation, appease the 
consumers. From the legislator’s vantage point, if  the cost of  pro-
moting agriculture through exportation was the eruption of  a “sort 
of  obscure but terrible combat” between haves and have-nots, then it 
was prohibitively expensive.
Moreover, like the Neapolitan philosophe, the Swiss banker not 
only suggested that agriculture did not need the incentive of  exports 
given its huge internal market but wondered as well whether exporta-
tion did not do agriculture more harm than good. In any case, there 
was no reason to believe, despite the assurances of  the liberals, that 
what was good for agriculture was best for the nation. Industry and 
agriculture, for example, were indissolubly linked and interdepen-
dent, “branches of  the same trunk.” Exportation severely penalized 
industry by inflating its costs and undermining its competitiveness. In 
sum, “in a country like France, the prohibition to export grain must 
be the fundamental law,” allowing, however, for sale abroad when the 
prices and circumstances made the risk worthwhile.12
The other adversaries of  liberalization drew similar conclusions from 
the experience of  the sixties. Amplifying a note sounded by both Galiani 
and Necker, a writer of  “Observations on the Grain Trade in France” 
challenged the serene cosmopolitanism of  the économistes. Events 
proved that a fertile and large nation like France was often fleeced of  its 
 11 Ibid., 1, 21, 26, 52, 65–70.
 12 Ibid., 35–49, 86–87, 92–100, 117, 135, 137–50, 175–77, 188–89, 193, 322–24.
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abundance in easy times by other states and left to suffer bad times 
in unfraternal solitude. It was far more important to assure domes-
tic needs than to try to profit from chertés abroad.13 The subsistence 
specialist Béguillet spoke for “the best organized minds” against the 
“rash vehemence” of  the liberals. The satisfaction of  immediate 
needs and the existence of  a surplus were not in themselves suffi-
cient reasons to warrant export. “It has not been realized,” noted this 
advocate of  public granaries, “that in voluntarily depriving ourselves 
of  our surplus … before having placed in reserve a sufficient quantity 
of  grain, we render the life of  the people precarious.” Invoking the 
“genius of  the Grand Colbert,” Béguillet, too, contended that only 
“the certitude of  abundance” and the consumption of  the surplus at 
home at low prices would enable the arts to flourish, manufactures to 
develop, and the population to grow.14
Writing more than a decade after the crisis, Mercier excoriated the 
“law of  exportation,” which wrought death and suffering, “devour-
ing the poor at the door of  the granaries which crumbled under 
[the weight of] the abundance of  grain” destined for sale elsewhere. 
The indifference of  their moral posture rather than the substance of  
their political economy aroused his ire against the économistes. Even as 
Necker protested that men are not “x’s” in algebra, that their “hap-
piness,” which is the goal of  good government, cannot be reduced to 
formulae, so Mercier inveighed against the Tableau mentality and the 
unquantifiable flaw of  liberal social science: “It is not enough to be a 
calculator; one must be a statesman.”15
The économistes continued to believe that only cold “calculations” 
could put an end to the furor over exportation. In 1768 they circu-
lated figures, based on extracts from the registers of  the royal farms, 
purporting to show “that it is not at all exports to which the grain 
dearth in France must be attributed because there remains here 
much more than necessary to nourish all the inhabitants.” Average 
annual exportation in the three years between October 1764 and 
October 1767 was approximately 800,000 septiers. Subtracting annual 
 13 Anonymous, “Observations sur le commerce des grains en France” (ca. 1769), BN, mss. 
fr. 5682, fols. 89–90. Cf. the similar argument and the attack on the intoxication with the 
English example which sustained the enthusiasm for exporting in the anonymous “Mémoire 
sur l’exportation,” Oct. 1760, A 1/3677, Arch. Armée.
 14 Béguillet, article “Abondance,” Supplément à l’Encyclopédie (Amsterdam, 1776–1777), I, 31 
and Traité des subsistances, 802–804.
 15 l.-S. Mercier, L’An 2440. Rêve s’il en fût jamais, I, 145–46; Necker, Sur la législation, 72.
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grain imports, the total should be reduced to 600,000 septiers, which 
represents no more than one-sixtieth of  the annual harvest. Juxtaposed 
to this infinitesimal amount, the fears of  a massive grain drain are 
revealed to be “vain and illusory.” The “misfortunes of  the people” 
and the “clamors of  the ignorant” were thus due to “causes completely 
foreign” to exportation. They resulted from “blockages occasioned by 
the lack of  circulation” and from “obstacles placed in the way of  expor-
tation,” that is to say, from an imperfect and hesitant application of  lib-
eralization. The events of  the sixties merely confirmed the physiocratic 
dogma that “it is impossible that there ever be dearth when there will no 
longer be any obstruction at any time under any pretext.”16
In his energetic defense of  liberalization, the abbé Roubaud 
modified these calculations in a downward direction. In the four 
years 1765 through 1768, an annual average of  no more than 
500,000 septiers left the kingdom (ranging from 600,000 to 700,000 
in 1765 to only 200,000 to 300,000 in 1768) which accounted for 
one-eightieth to one-ninetieth of  the average annual harvest or a 
mere four to five days’ national subsistence. In a word, “exportation 
deprived us of  nothing.”17 Several years later, Choiseul affirmed, on 
the basis of  “first-hand knowledge,” that the exports of  each of  the 
years 1765 and 1766 were at most 1,000,000 septiers (a figure probably 
uncorrected for importation) which amounted to “an imperceptible 
mass against the consumption and the production of  the realm.”18
Writing in October 1768, the deputies of  commerce contested not 
the authenticity but the comprehensiveness of  the statistics drawn from 
the revenue offices of  the royal farms. The farm data indicated a total 
of  about 1,800,000 septiers exported (imports subtracted) between Octo-
ber 1765 and August 1768. “This weak exportation,” explained the 
deputies, “being not at all commensurate with the opinion which they 
formed on the subject, they undertook researches which do not allow 
them to doubt that these figures albeit faithfully extracted … do not 
include nearly the totality of  the exportation.” Of  the 615 export offices, 
494 were not provided for in the extracts. The deputies suggested that 
false declarations and fraud were rampant, especially since the offices 
were hastily organized and manned by agents of  the “last order” whose 
ludicrously low salaries rendered them especially vulnerable to corrup-
tion. In addition, given the existence of  certain traditional privileges of  
 16 Bachaumont, Mémoires secrets, IV, 78–79 (10 Aug. 1768). My italics.
 17 Roubaud, Représentations, 230, 232ff.
 18 Choiseul, Mémoires, I, 53. Cf. Weulersse’s reading, Mouvement, II, 229.
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exemption and the “foreign” status of  several provinces, a significant 
portion of  the kingdom escaped monitoring completely. The deputies 
made no attempt to construct new totals but emphasized repeatedly 
that exportation was “very considerable,” “very extensive,” and “very 
useful to the State.”19
Outside the liberal camp, as within, opinions were divided. Malis-
set, the knowledgeable entrepreneur of  the royal grain reserve, dis-
counted the significance of  actual exportation while his sometime 
associate, the enormously successful négociant leray de Chaumont, 
characterized it as “extraordinary” in degree and regretted that it 
“succored humanity” at the cost of  depleting France.20 Rolland, 
President of  the First Chamber of  the Requêtes du Palais, expressed 
astonishment at the amplitude of  the grain outflow. The lieutenant 
General of  Police Sartine deplored the “sad experience” of  exces-
sive exporting. Pointing to extensive deceptions in trading practices, 
which the official figures did not reflect, lefebvre, one of  the most 
outspoken Presidents of  the Paris Parlement, assailed the liberal claim 
that real exportation had been insignificant.21 Other magistrates, 
however—those who believed that it was a wholesome and beneficial 
policy—suggested that it had been practiced in moderation.22
Evidence from local sources, which must be more fully exploited 
before a convincing picture emerges, shows that there was heavy 
export of  flour and grain from le Havre and Rouen to Spain,  Portugal, 
and Italy between 1764 and 1767 and that the demand for exports 
gave shipbuilding a healthy impulsion.23 Substantial quantities also 
passed through the “southern” Atlantic and Mediterranean ports. 
On the other hand, it is well to remember the technical, geographic, 
and economic limitations on potential exportation. The difficulty and 
expense of  transportation, which hindered internal circulation, obvi-
ously affected prospects for participation in exportation.24 In light of  
the critique of  the deputies and other indicators, the leading scholarly 
 19 “Avis des Députés du Commerce sur la libre circulation des grains,” (Oct. 1768), AN, F12 
715.
 20 BN, mss. fr. 14295 and AN, F11 1193.
 21 Recueil, 130, 189, 234–35.
 22 Ibid., 160, 192–96 (Clément, maître des comptes and Murard, President of  the third Chambre 
des Enquêtes).
 23 Pierre Dardel, Navires et marchandises dans les ports de Rouen et du Havre au dix-huitième siècle (Paris, 
1963), 108, 115–16, and passim and Weulersse, Mouvement, II, 425–26.
 24 labrousse, Esquisse, 124–34.
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authority on the question estimated total exports (to mid-1768) at 1 or 
2 million septiers above the farm bureau figure: 3,828,910 to 4,828,910 
septiers or, allowing for imports, an export balance of  2,795,155 to 
3,795,155 septiers. Even at this revised evaluation, exportation appears 
to have been much less “considerable” than the deputies of  commerce 
imagined, although the fact that they felt so certain is significant for 
our understanding of  government decision-making processes, which 
depended on such expert “avis” as theirs, and of  popular reactions to 
exportation, which were based upon observations little different from 
those of  the deputies. It would be extremely misleading to assess the 
influence of  exportation on the basis of  its volume alone, yet it seems 
clear that total real exports never amounted to much more than one 
million septiers a year or between 1 and 2½% of  annual French grain 
production.25
For Dupont, however, no less than for Necker, small material causes 
could have imposing socioeconomic effects. For Necker the results of 
exportation were wholly baleful while for Dupont they were spectacu-
larly salutary. With customary hyperbole, the économistes claimed that 
exportation (for Dupont it was “the hope of being able to export at 
will,” for he maintained that real exports were “more than null”) trans-
formed agriculture. It made men more laborious, animals more vigor-
ous, and the soil more fertile. It brought thousands of new acres under 
cultivation,26 increased production substantially and in some places 
 25 Weulersse, Mouvement, II, 227 and labrousse, Esquisse, 123. Cf. labrousse and Braudel, eds., 
Histoire économique et sociale, II, 373 where labrousse suggests how the physiocratic design 
anticipated the modern notion of  “marginalism.”
 26 The debate over the impact of  liberalization on land clearing and reclamation has not yet 
been settled, despite pioneering local studies (e.g., G. Debien, En Haut-Poitou: défricheurs au 
travail [Paris, 1952]) and subtle and judicious syntheses (labrousse in Braudel and labrousse, 
eds., Histoire économique et sociale de la France, III, 417–432). The liberals unanimously 
insisted on the major thrust that liberty gave to land clearing. Their critics scoffed at these 
claims; they were disinclined to see progress upon a background of  widespread misery 
and dislocation. In any event, they were more likely to ascribe clearing to the major fiscal 
incentives offered by the government in 1766 than to the grain reforms. Given the highly 
political nature of  the question, it is difficult to take the measure of  contemporary testimony. 
For a number of  reasons, which labrousse reviews, not even the statistical data can be 
used without extreme care. It seems clear that there was a surge of  clearing in the sixties, 
though its total contribution to French agricultural production appears to have been rather 
meagre, “in the hundredths,” as labrousse writes. It is, for example, hard to take seriously 
the Provençal claim that the province, in large part as a result of  the recovery of  arable, 
was now self-sufficient, subsistence-wise. Parl. of  Aix to louis XV, 10 Nov. 1770, B. 3677, 
A.D. B-du-R. Many administrators reported unequivocally that liberalization encouraged 
clearing and contributed ultimately to larger harvests. See, for example, SD to IN. of  
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productivity as well, mercifully saved the families of innumerable cul-
tivators from ruin, spurred capital investment in land, livestock and 
technology, created new jobs, stimulated nuptuality and natality, 
swelled national wealth, and made it easier for everyone to pay taxes 
and other obligations.27
The change was sudden and profound; depressed and languish-
ing in 1763, within a few years agriculture flourished brilliantly. The 
magistrates of  Provence marveled at “this resurrection of  agricul-
ture”; their Dauphiné counterparts called it a “revolution.” The 
 Parlement of  Aix maintained that this should be taken as “the true 
thermometer of  the success of  the new legislation.” “Nothing was 
more striking and immediate than the effect of  this [export] law,” 
observed another advocate of  liberty; “the income of  the cultivator 
increased all of  a sudden, and I saw with my own eyes villages, almost 
deserted and falling in ruins, rebuilt, in the twinkling of  an eye, so to 
speak.…” years later the liberals of  languedoc looked back upon the 
sixties as a golden age of  expansion, wealth, rising land values, and 
optimism.28 The poet of  the “Seasons,” Saint lambert, lyricized
Il fut enfin permis au peuple des hameaux
De Vendre à l’étranger les fruits de leurs travaux.
le Fermier s’enrichit; le Commerce plus libre
Fit couler sur nos champs l’or du Tage et du Tibre.
 Alençon, 25 Oct. 1773, C. 89, A.D. Orne; IN. of  Alençon to CG, 25 Jan 1772, AN, F11 223. 
yet others either reported little clearing because of  the extremely marginal land available 
or acknowledged “much clearing” while questioning its importance in view of  the fact that 
it took place on inferior arable and that it drained capital, fertilizer, and care from proven 
lands, thus decreasing their yield. SD at Bernay to IN. of  Alençon, 12 Oct. 1773, C. 89, 
A.D. Orne and SD at Bar-sur-Aube to IN. of  Champagne, 29 Oct. 1773, C. 299, A.D. 
Aube. Cf. the data on clearings in C. 265 and C. 266, A.D. P-de-D.
 27 “Observations sur les effets de la liberté du commerce des grains … par l’auteur des 
Ephémérides du citoyen,” Journal économique ( July 1770), 330–332; Baudeau, Avis au premier 
besoin, 1er traité, 39; Roubaud, Représentations, 232–67; Baudeau, “lettres et mémoires à un 
Magistrat du Parlement de Paris …,” Nouvelles éphémérides économiques (1775), I, 23; Ephémérides 
du citoyen (1770), V, 24 and VII, 231–33 and VIII, 41–50; Dupont to Prince Carl ludwig, (ca. 
1773), Correspondance Dupont, ed. by Knies, II, 140; Journal économique (April 1769), 176; Turgot 
to Condorcet, 6 April 1772, Correspondance Condorcet-Turgot, ed. by Henry, 81; Weulersse, 
Mouvement, II, 233. Cf. labrousse and Braudel, eds., Histoire économique et sociale, II, 426ff.
 28 Parl. of  Aix to louis XV, 2 Nov. 1768 and 10 Nov. 1770, B. 3677, A.D. B-du-R.; Parl. 
of  Dauphiné to louis XV, April 1769, B. 2314, fol. 109, A.D. Isère; Arrêté of  Dauphiné 
Parl., 12 July 1768, C. 2420, A.D. B-du-R.; Anon., “Réflexions sur les principes des 
parlements…,” France 1375, fol. 294, Arch. AE; deliberation of  the commissaires 
ordinaires, diocèse de Toulouse, 21 Nov. 1779, C. 977, fol. 70, A.D. H-G.
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On paya les impôts sans se croire opprimé; 
Tout fut riche et content; et le Roi fut aimé.29
As always, however, the économistes paid a price for their extravagance. 
On the one hand, they naturally wanted to show that liberalization had 
worked just as they had promised it would since Quesnay drew the first 
“zig-zag.” On the other hand, as the reforms came under increasingly 
sharp attack, their enthusiasm for the dramatic efficacy of  liberaliza-
tion placed them in an awkward position. For instead of  affirming their 
ideological responsibility and resolutely standing their ground on the 
basis of  the positive achievements of  liberalization, they wavered and 
retreated. They began to argue that liberalization was indeed faulty, 
but in its application, not in its aims or in the consequences that it 
would have produced had it been unimpeded. The économistes had 
always argued that the reform laws did not fully meet their theoreti-
cal demands (those of  natural law); now they added that they were 
not genuinely, rigorously, and universally implemented even as they 
were drafted. liberty was restricted, incomplete, and sometimes non- 
existent. That is why dearth and disorder occurred. Dupont’s small 
causes argument presupposed that everyone had the opportunity to 
dispose of  his property in grain as he wished. But in response to their 
critics the économistes increasingly implied that neither this opportunity 
nor the belief  in it really existed in large parts of  the kingdom.
Once self-defense impelled them to modify their view of  liberaliza-
tion, the logic of  consistency suggested that they revise their boast-
ful assessment of  its fruits. Could a liberty so infirm have generated 
a genuine rural renaissance? The abbé Morellet, staunch ally of  the 
économistes, reproved their tendency to exaggeration and regretted the 
damage it did to their case. He admitted that they overstated the effects 
of  exportation upon agriculture; the benfits were neither as “consider-
able” nor as “prompt” as they pretended.30 Their arch-enemy linguet 
exposed the contradictions in physiocratic reasoning, and condemned 
them for impudence and imposture. Deriding the idea of  a brusque 
renewal, he contended even more vigorously than Galiani and Necker 
that liberty had “weakened” French agriculture.31
 29 Cited by Weulersse, Mouvement, I, 549n.
 30 Morellet, Réfutation de l’ouvrage qui a pour titre: “Dialogues sur le commerce des bleds,” 301.
 31 linguet, Réponse aux docteurs modernes (london, and Paris, 1771), partie III, 144, 
152–55 and Du pain et du bled, 174–75. An administrator experienced in grain affairs, 
Bourdon-Desplanches argued that liberalization hurt agriculture by “diverting” 
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II
In the debate over the causes of  the scarcity and the high prices of  
the sixties the exportation issue overshadowed all other questions. 
Remarkably little explicit attention was paid to the matter of  internal 
trade although both parties clearly understood that the problems of  
internal traffic and exportation were inextricably linked and that the 
home marketplaces were the theatres of  subsistence drama and poli-
tics. Obviously the liberty to export would be of  limited significance 
unless internal trade were free and open. The liberals maintained 
that exportation would have a marvelously tonic effect on internal 
circulation, increasing its range and velocity and fanning its goods 
briskly across the kingdom.32
In his reading of  the process, however, Galiani argued that the 
two forms of  commerce were not symbiotic; exportation would 
ruin domestic trade even as it destroyed agriculture. It was a mis-
take to permit exports to become the government’s signal preoccu-
pation: “interior commerce is so preferable, of  such an importance, 
of  such superior utility to the other that there is no comparison to 
make between the two.” Whereas the liberals, partly in an effort 
to show that exports for technical reasons could not be as heavy as 
their critics charged, tended to emphasize the difficulties and risks 
of  export traffic and the special demands of  expertise, capital and 
experience it imposed, Galiani insisted on its facility. Export trade 
would eclipse internal circulation in importance precisely because 
it was “infinitely easier.” Given a choice, serious businessmen 
would no longer bother with domestic provisioning because trans-
port abroad was often simpler, cheaper, and speedier than traffic 
to the center (France, like ancient Rome, would suffer its heartland 
drained of  nourishment), it spared the merchant the petty details 
involved in a diffuse internal network (tedious collection of  accounts 
 attention from the “care of  the land” into feverish speculative endeavors. Projet nouveau sur 
la manière de faire utilement en France le commerce des grains (Brussels, 1785), 12–13. Though it 
is impossible to test Bourdon’s hypothesis rigorously, it is undeniable that many laboureurs, 
farmers and other exploitants invested greater energies in the trade in the late sixties than 
they ever had before.
 32 To clear the historical, institutional, and psychological debris which littered the pathway of  
internal circulation a powerful wind was required, the liberals argued, which could only be 
generated by opening the gates of  fortress France to exports. See Parl. of  Dauphiné to louis 
XV, 26 April 1769, B. 2314, fol. 107 and the remarks of  several Dauphinais subdelegates 
on the stunning new vigor of  the trade in the états des récoltes, 1765, II C. 50, A.D. Isère.
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payable from a multitude of  relatively small buyers, maintenance of  a 
chain of  magazines, etc.), it insulated him against official and officious 
nuisances (“the industry and genius of  men have not yet succeeded in 
establishing Mayors, Echevins, Baillis, and especially Subdelegates on 
the vast plains of  the Ocean”), and it assured greater profits, not only 
from the sale of  huge amounts of  grain, but through other commer-
cial and banking opportunities which would certainly arise.33
On commercial grounds, Galiani’s argument is open to serious 
dispute; more significant are its political implications. Exportation 
diverted the grain trade from its primary mission: the fulfillment 
of  national subsistence needs. Other purposes, such as enhancing 
national wealth, Galiani contended, had to be subordinate and inci-
dental. Moreover, in a country as large and as populous as France, 
with marked regional differences in climate, soil, and nature and qual-
ity of  produce, traffic from one province to another—say from one 
enjoying a surplus to another afflicted with dearth—was a “veritable 
exportation.”34 At least there was no question that it was so regarded 
by the bulk of  consumers who, from their own spatial and psychologi-
cal vantage point, denounced every “removal” as an export irrespec-
tive of  destination.
Ironically, as a result of  popular reactions—not because of  Galiani’s 
“economic” reasoning—the liberal deputies of  commerce esteemed 
that freedom to export had in fact paralyzed internal circulation 
instead of  promoting it: “Cherté having followed Exportation, Expor-
tation engendered inquietude … from which moment any displace-
ment of  grain, albeit destined for interior circulation, appeared as a 
dangerous exportation.” No matter where they set out to go, to the 
frontiers and coasts or to interior markets, merchants were harried and 
their grain was intercepted. In face of  these “prejudices,” grain trade 
became a virtual impossibility by the end of  the sixties.35 The deputies 
by no means conceded that real exports themselves caused the cherté but 
 33 Galiani, Dialogues, ed. by Nicolini, 244–50.
 34 Ibid., 252–54. Cf. note 3 below. The widespread confusion over the precise meaning of  
exportation caused serious misunderstandings. In November 1767, for example, the port of  
Dunkerque was closed to exports because the current price exceeded the legal ceiling during 
three consecutive markets. “This prohibition,” according to the intendant of  Flanders, 
“was misunderstood by the people who confused exports with [internal] circulation.…” 
To enforce their conception of  the export suspension, the people blocked and pillaged 
grain boats and wagons and imposed a virtual embargo on grain removals. Caumartin to 
Taboureau, 7 Nov. 1767, C. 6690, A.D. Nord.
 35 “Avis des Députés du Commerce sur le libre commerce des grains,” AN, F12 715.
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observed that the public “attributed” it to exports. Whether consum-
ers would have thought or acted any differently in a dearth  situation 
unaccompanied by a highly-publicized liberty to export is question-
able. It is worth noting, however, that the deputies, like Galiani, 
deplored its deleterious effect on the ordinary flow of  grain.
For two administrator-magistrates deeply involved in the grain crisis, 
exportation, real or imagined or potential, analyzed hypothetically or 
on the basis of  first-hand experience, was much less significant than it 
seemed either to the liberal deputies or to the antiliberal abbé Galiani. 
To be sure, they agreed that the trade was gravely disorganized, 
but they refused to ascribe this disruption to exportation. The first, 
Moreau, the royal procurator at the Paris Châtelet, who made exten-
sive investigative tours through the kingdom in 1767–68, cautioned 
against the temptation to confuse the issues and draw the wrong con-
clusions. Exportation provided an incentive and an opportunity for 
wrecking the channels of  provisioning, but it was not the real source 
of  the problem. “All the evil,” Moreau contended, “derives from the 
too extensive liberty of  the grain trade.” “I believe,” he added, “that 
exportation in itself  would never have operated the excessive cherté that 
we suffer if  it had not been permitted to buy grain at the home of  the 
laboureur; as a consequence of  this facility, grain is no longer brought to 
the markets.” The Declaration of  1763, rather than the Edict of  
1764, was responsible for the perilous situation of  the nation. It 
invited everyone to become a grain dealer, it authorized sales in the 
granaries and even in the fields, and it wrought chaos by reducing the 
whole subsistence question to a matter of  profit. If  the old regime 
of  regulations had not been abrogated, Moreau suggested, it would 
have continued to channel supplies to the markets where they were 
urgently needed and it would have suppressed practices which tended 
to augment prices. Presumably, then, only grain that was not actually 
required for domestic consumption would have escaped the honey-
comb of  controls and reached the exit points.36
Reflecting on the crisis several years later, the second of  the two offi-
cials, the Parisian Procurator General, concurred. Exportation was at 
best the “secondary cause.” The “first cause” was the “overly absolute 
and too little monitored liberty in the interior commerce.” This license 
made possible “monopolies” and “hoards” without which exports 
 36 Moreau to (?), 2 Oct. 1768, AN, F11 1179.
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could not have had a major effect.37 Exportation preoccupied the 
liberals because it was the issue that galvanized public opinion and 
because it was the one on which they felt most vulnerable. For high-
ranking judicial officials like Moreau and Joly, however, there was 
a more fundamental problem of  which exportation was merely the 
most sensational symptom. The scores of  protests from local authori-
ties and the myriad popular uprisings testified to its crucial impor-
tance. In their estimation the crisis in the grain trade was due above 
all to the eclipse of  the police.
There were less dramatic signs than riot of  what the police termed 
“abuses” in the grain trade which contributed to make grain scarce 
and dear and which diverted it from the well-tread paths it “ordinar-
ily” followed. “Under the pretext that the trade is now free,” accord-
ing to the fiscal procurator of  Rambouillet, “rich Beauce laboureurs” 
purchased grain at the market instead of  bringing it for sale there, 
while the local merchants conducted all their transactions surrepti-
tiously in barns and storehouses. At Vitry-le-François commerce 
became almost completely furtive, moving from the open market to 
the country and leaving officials who were once experts ignorant of  
the true state of  affairs. Throughout Brittany dealers began stripping 
the markets and scouring the countryside in order to prepare hoards 
for export or regrate at the propitious moment. In similar fashion, 
traders, like locusts, devastated parts of  Picardy and Champagne, 
leaving in their wake a trail of  “removals,” which suggested transit 
abroad. When they failed to intercept supplies on the road, merchants 
in Auvergne simply outbid consumers in the public market. Deeply-
rooted habits were rudely jarred. Bidaux, a blatier from Bléré, a town 
near Tours, who used to transfer grain from meagre village markets to 
the larger trading centers with clockwork fidelity, now visited the fer-
miers at home, bought in the granaries, and transacted all his business 
underground. Boureau, an unfortunately-named baker from another 
town in the Touraine, “goes buying from parish to parish, village to vil-
lage which means that the markets are not furnished, almost no grain 
falls to them.” An awareness of  the significance of  the new permissive 
climate and a certain intoxication with the unfolding vistas of  liberty 
stretched down from the international trading companies of  Rouen, 
which anxiously awaited the first toll of  the liberty bell in order to send 
their agents into the interior and their ships abroad, to the petty dealers 
 37 BN, Coll. Joly 1109, fol. 215.
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of  the Brie, who believed that the king would soon enact legislation 
definitively razing the old market-prisons by explicitly authorizing trade 
by sample and exchanges in private granaries. The same climate fired 
the popular imagination in quite another way. The discovery of  a huge 
pit of  charred grain covered with fresh sand containing between 25 and 
50 muids on the road between Meaux and Claye nearly caused a riot. 
The incident struck the people as an example of  the sort of  terrible 
maneuvers that merchants engineered in order to keep the markets 
empty and the prices exorbitant.38
Deserted by suppliers, once flourishing markets were dying of  
asphyxiation. Méry-sur-Seine was almost entirely abandoned. “The 
laboureurs and tradesmen enrich themselves and become very indo-
lent,” wrote the substitut, “while the Bourgeois and the little people 
suffer extraordinarily from the cherté of  grain.” At Etampes trading 
was vigorous but invisible as dealers transacted business over tiny 
sacks instead of  bringing their goods for display and public bargain-
ing. Trading patterns at Arcis-sur-Aube were also violently disrupted, 
but the results were rather different, at least for the commercial 
interest. For instead of  choking the market, liberalization breathed 
new life into it, rationalized its operation, and modernized its role. 
Instead of  convening buyers and sellers once a week, as custom rati-
fied by law had previously decreed, the market “is held every day 
because grain is brought here continually and there are ten buy-
ers at every wagon.” Nor was this the only shock administered to 
Arcis. Before liberalization it had served almost exclusively as an 
entrepôt for the provisioning of  Paris, “but since [1763–64] it has 
shipped a great deal [of  grain] every year by the Canal of  Briare 
[towards the Atlantic or the Mediterranean]; and when Franche-
Comté and the elections of  langres and Chaumont are depleted, 
it supplies them as well.” As a consequence of  these changes a 
once modest commerce had grown to “immense sums,” according 
to a knowledgeable subdelegate. This Cinderella-like transforma-
tion of  Arcis was the liberal dream come true, the proof  that all 
 38 Petit to PG, 21 Nov. 1767, BN, Coll. Joly 1136, fol. 137; Salligny to PG, 24 June 1769, Coll. 
Joly 1144, fols. 111–12; SD report, 4 Sept. 1765 and IN. of  Brittany to CG, draft, 17 Sept. 
1765, C. 1670, A.D. I-et-V.; report to IN. of  Champagne, 29 Dec. 1767, C. 413, A.D. Marne; 
subdelegation of  Amiens, état de récolte, 1768, C. 81, A.D. Somme; IN. of  Auvergne to SD, 
18 Dec. 1766, C. 7506, A.D. P-de-D.; Haberty to IN. (?) of  Tours, 4 Sept. 1765, C. 93, A.D. 
I-et-l.; C. 103, A.D. S-M.; fiscal procurator of  Brie-Comte-Robert to PG, 1 Oct. 1768, BN, 
Coll. Joly 1146, fol. 28; declaration of  Sept. 1766, Arsenal, mss. Bastille 10076.
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things would work out for the best in a laissez-faire world. But if  
liberty and competition brought efficiency and abundance, they 
also promoted cherté. The purpose of  the old, policed market sys-
tem had been to assure abundance while preventing cherté: indeed, 
it was geared specifically to preclude their coexistence. Thus neither 
the local police nor the consumers applauded these changes. On the 
contrary, they regarded them as inimical to the public interest and 
denounced them as the product of  merchant crimes.39
The “authors” of  “maneuvers” and “abuses” varied from place 
to place. In the Brie, according to a report in which Joly de Fleury 
placed considerable confidence, the arch-villain was the cultivator-
turned-merchant, the laboureur-maltôtier who was becoming “as rich as 
the big financiers.” The laboureurs appeared publicly uniquely to buy, 
sold only clandestinely and in great lots, hoarded their stores in mag-
azines hidden in the countryside, and became “masters of  the price” 
wherever they chose to go. “Since 1763,” noted Petit of  Rambouillet, 
“the fermier, too opulent, has become a grain merchant,” hoarding 
supplies and driving up prices. In Champagne, laboureurs sold their 
crops before the harvest, solicited earnest money in return for keep-
ing their grain off  the markets, and hoarded for their own speculative 
accounts.40
Small-time itinerant grain merchants, seeking to expand their 
commercial horizons, were also considered suspect. The police 
arrested Antoine lelièvre, a fifty-two year old veteran grain trader 
from Etampes, as much for his bravado as for his allegedly illicit oper-
ations. He was accused of  assembling a large stock of  grain, in secret 
association with two other dealers, constituted by purchases made in 
the farms and in the markets. Asked by an exempt of  the maréchaussée at 
Arpajon (who, it is true, had no business asking such a question) whether 
he had authorization to buy in the market, he replied in an abusive 
fashion. Reportedly, he expressed delight with the high prices instead 
of  bargaining to resist them and announced with cheerful morbidity 
 39 Bouquigny to PG, 1 April 1769, BN, Coll. Joly 1146, fols. 150–51; Picard to Sartine, 8 Jan. 
1769, AN, y 12618; Paillot (?) to IN. of  Champagne, 23 Oct. 1773, C. 1179, A.D. Aube.
 40 BN, Coll. Joly 1135, fols. 180–185; Petit to PG, 1 Sept. 1770, Coll. Joly 1154, fol. 132; 
Masson to IN. of  Champagne, 9 Sept. 1766, C. 299, A.D. Aube. Cf. the desire of  the 
Hainaut subdelegate to ban “rich persons” in general from the grain trade as a means of  
preventing speculative chertés. Report to IN., ca. Oct. 1773, C. 6690, A.D. Nord.
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that “it would be necessary this winter to have teeth of  gold in order 
to eat bread.”41
Catherine Jourdain of  Poissy, widow of  Claude leclerc, late “grain 
merchant for the provisioning of  Paris and flour merchant for the 
provisioning of  Paris and Saint Germain,” petitioned the Procurator 
General to quash a warrant for the arrest of  her son and business 
associate who had gone into hiding to escape capture. His trouble 
began at Mantes where his buying activities aroused the ire of  other 
customers. “The decision having been made to furnish the people a 
victim,” widow leclerc protested, the police confiscated his grain and 
pursued him although they knew he was “innocent.” She claimed that 
he was made the scapegoat to satisfy the anxieties and the lust of  the 
crowd. He fled not because he was guilty but because “he knew the 
animosity of  the people of  this country [pays] which is always pushed 
to the extremity.” According to his mother, he was a petty dealer, but 
the authorities charged young leclerc with being a “monopolist” and 
a “commissioner for the companies.”42
Sieur Normant of  Montargis, flaunting a permit from the Paris 
municipality, combed the countryside, intercepting grain at the farms 
at “a high price” and thus drying up the neighborhood markets. 
Reports reached the Contrôle-Général that one Simonneau, not 
noted as a major trader, had purchased the extraordinary amount of  
20,000 sacks of  wheat in a single month in the area around Nemours 
and Montereau. “There are in different places,” an anonymous cor-
respondent warned the Procurator General, “merchant stores of  
grain and flour which serve to make famines.”43
Bakers as well as laboureurs and merchants attracted attention 
for unusual trade practices. Officials at Dammartin and Dreux 
complained that bakers were undertaking grain commerce on a 
scale never before witnessed. Paris bakers frequenting Dammartin 
denounced a local baker turned “merchant-blatier” who preempted 
 41 12 Oct. 1768, AN, y 12617. Cf. the wealthy grain merchant with large magazines who 
warned in 1768 that “it will be necessary to have teeth of  silver to eat bread.” BN, Coll. Joly 
1142, fol. 98. Diderot, writing about grain and property rights, cited the “farmer of  Sully” 
who said: “I have grain but damn! you need silver teeth to eat it.” Apologie de l’Abbé Galiani 
(1770), Œuvres politiques, ed. by Paul Vernière (Paris 1963), 121.
 42 BN, Coll. Joly 1111, fol. 137.
 43 Dispatch to Bignon, Prévôt des Marchands, 25 Dec. 1766, AN, O1* 408, fols. 872–73; dispatch 
to B. de Sauvigny, IN. to Paris, 15 May 1770, AN, F12* 153, fol. 217; 25 July 1770, BN, Coll. 
Joly 1109, fol. 178.
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them by buying on samples and then reselling at a higher price on 
the same market. The “populace” of  Gonesse squalled that they were 
unable to purchase grain on their own market “because of  the avid-
ity of  the bakers” who serviced the capital. In the same area a Paris 
baker bought in a single transaction 500 septiers of  wheat which was, 
moreover, three years old and badly worm-eaten. Trudaine de Mon-
tigny suspected the Paris bakers and certain prominent grain mer-
chants of  the same sort of  “maneuvers” and “cabals” which Presi-
dent Mirosmesnil detected at Rouen.44
In October 1768 the Paris police arrested a fifty-three year old 
faubourg Saint Antoine baker named François Gibert for having 
provoked a “popular rising” at the Montereau market by “purchas-
ing with earnest-money the largest portion of  grain [available] at the 
price demanded of  him” and thereby “forcing up the price.” Gibert 
claimed that he bought only fifteen septiers and “acquitted himself  
for the best price he could make.” Challenged by the commandant 
of  the maréchaussée unit to justify his purchases, he displayed a simple 
certificate from the Paris police commissaire lemaire indicating that 
he supplied the Maubert bread market which he tried to pass off  for 
a special permission from the lieutenant General of  Police. Gibert 
denied the imposture, admitting only that he said the lieutenant was 
surely informed of  the role he played in serving the capital’s needs. 
Pressured by the procurator of  Montereau to share his purchases 
with local buyers, Gibert complied. But when he refused to sell below 
the price he had paid, a band of  women assaulted him, upsetting the 
wig which this proud businessman-baker affected in his commercial 
traveling. Gibert insisted on his stature as a major figure in the baking 
industry. It was perfectly legitimate for a baker who “employed three 
journeymen [garçons] as well as his wife and a servant” and who 
converted sixty septiers a week into bread to make large purchases in 
the countryside.45
Certainly Gibert’s activities were no different from the operations of  
ambitious bakers before and after the decade of  the sixties. While the 
dearth drove many bakers deep into the countryside in pursuit of  grain 
 44 Ganneron to PG, 13 June 1769, BN, Coll. Joly 1146, fols. 102–103; lG of  Dreux to PG, 
9 Jan. 1769, ibid., fol. 105; “Mémoire,” 10 May 1768, AN, F11 1174; letter to Trudaine de 
Montigny. 3 Dec. 1767, AN, F11 1174; Miromesnil to CG, 18 March 1768 and Trudaine 
de Montigny to Miromesnil, 22 March 1768, in leVerdier, ed., Correspondance Miromesnil, V, 
120–121, 130.
 45 28 Oct. 1768, AN, y 14095.
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and tempted some to speculate for resale (Gibert emphatically denied 
that he regrated), a great many others, with only marginal means, 
found their usual sources dried up and were only saved from ruin by 
police assistance. One observer maintained that, as a result of  the cherté, 
bakers who usually went to the field for supplies flocked instead to the 
Halles where authorities concentrated large doses of  the king’s grain.46
Although they habitually distrusted the more enterprising bakers, 
the Paris police could not afford to be overly concerned about how 
the bakers procured their supplies as long as they acted discreetly—
Gibert’s sin was that he stirred an uproar—and continued to furnish 
quality bread at the going price. The measurers and porters at the 
Paris Halles and ports assumed as always a large share of  the burden 
of  surveillance of  baker grain and flour dealings. The age-old battle 
between these officers and the bakers persisted, somewhat tempered 
by the desire of  senior officials to avoid any hassles which would 
reduce baker capability to provide bread. The points of  contact (and 
contention) remained the same: the measurers and porters stalked 
incoming grain and flour wagons, challenging the bakers and/or sup-
pliers to prove that their merchandise had been legally purchased and 
the obligatory fees properly paid upon entry. When their goods were 
sequestered and when they received summonses, many of  the bak-
ers protested to higher authorities, appealed in court, or resorted to 
extra-legal gestures of  defiance and evasion. Angry enough to bypass 
the police and take aim at the summit of  the hierarchy, the master 
baker Pharoux remonstrated to the Contrôle-Général against mea-
surer harassment and attempted extortion. Baker Antoine Chevalier 
sent his wife to the hearing over the porters’ seizure of  eleven sacks 
of  bolted flour delivered by his Beaumont miller. By appearing per-
sonally to defend him, she succeeded in avoiding a fine and recover-
ing “by grace” one-half  of  the sale price of  the confiscated goods. 
Not long afterward master baker Boulanger suffered the loss of  12 
sacks for a false declaration of  amount and origin and in addition a 
20 livres fine for failing to answer the summons.47
Victim of  a measurer flour seizure, another master baker appealed 
immediately to Parlement, not in the first instance to contest the mat-
ter of  his guilt (although he conceded nothing), but to win the prompt 
 46 “Mémoire” (ca. 1771), AN, F11 264.
 47 Trudaine de Montigny to Sartine, 10 June 1769, AN, F12* 153; 14 June 1765, AN, y 9632; 
14 Nov. 1766, AN, y 9633.
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release of  the confiscated flour in order to prevent its spoilage and 
to enable him to meet his pressing obligations for “the furnishing 
of  bread.” The high court acknowledged his special role as “baker 
of  Paris”—a status enhanced and a responsibility made heavier by 
scarcity and high prices—despite the unremitting opposition of  the 
measurers. On similar grounds a mealman applied for the deliver-
ance of  a boatload of  flour detained for litigation, citing the demand 
of  the bakers who had “an urgent need to bake” in order to sat-
isfy “their obligation to the public.” Baker Bonhommet launched 
his appeal against the market officers spontaneously in the streets—
opposition to these petty policemen was perhaps the only issue on 
which the bakers could count on public support—almost detonating 
a “popular riot.” Refusing to show his certificate of  purchase and 
physically resisting the seizure of  his fifteen-sack flour wagon, Bon-
hommet forced the porters to call the Guard in order to disperse the 
crowd that had gathered in response to his outcries. In this instance 
the police showed no sympathy for the baker; Sartine approved the 
confiscation and ordered the public sale of  the flour at the Halles.48
The flour trade showed signs of  a new vitality and expansiveness. 
The lingering distinction, already somewhat dim, between miller/
flour dealer and grain merchant became increasingly blurred. lib-
eralization encouraged the millers to dispense with such middlemen 
as the mealman and the grain dealer and to engage speculatively in 
grain and flour traffic. More commonly than before and without exag-
geration, the miller began to style himself  “merchant.” In some cases 
he even dropped the designation miller in favor of  the more impos-
ing “merchant of  grain and flour living at the mill of  X.”49 Merchant 
millers like the Sieur Aubry from the Meaux area or Claude Hallé of  
Belleville or Goriot from Pontoise purchased grain directly from the 
laboureurs, converted it to flour, and sold it through brokers at the Halles 
or directly to Paris bakers, if  they felt bold enough to test the vigilance 
of  the porters and measurers.50 Jacques Pavie’s mill at Bretoncelle in 
Alençon sometimes took on the appearance of  a village grain market. 
Hettard, a Persan miller, only bothered to transform to flour if  the grain 
 48 10 May 1769, AN, X1B 9475; 1 Oct. 1765, AN, Z1H 449; 7 Feb. 1766, Archives Seine-Paris, 
6 AZ 472.
 49 See, for example, the mediator’s report of  4 Nov. 1769, Archives Seine-Paris, D6B6 carton 
6. Cf. the quasi-hysterical fear of  the rise of  the capitalist miller-cheater in “Objections sur 
le commerce des grains” (ca. 1768), C. 2420, A.D. B-du-R.
 50 Mediator’s report, 18 Dec. 1767, Archives Seine-Paris, D6B6 carton 5; Archives Seine-
Paris, D5B6 5367; 17 Dec. 1771, AN y 9474.
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he proffered failed to draw a sufficiently attractive price. lambert, a 
super-miller at Pontoise, allegedly amassed “in different places” 18,000 
sacks of  grain.51
An investigation conducted by the Paris Parlement revealed that in 
1768 an Etampes miller named la Place had amassed a huge stock 
of  grain drawn from the Orleans and Paris provisioning zones where 
he had buying agents. Although he displayed large quantities on the 
market, he sold little because he demanded a price “more dear than 
the current.” When he could not sell he bought, flour as well as grain, 
outbidding needy consumers. He rebuffed the protests of  other mer-
chants, brashly averring that “the trade was today free” and con-
sequently that “he was free at present to make deals as he wished 
and that he feared nothing.” In addition, la Place stood accused of  
removing grain secretly from the market at night, mixing “rotten and 
overheated” grain with good wheat, and of  disposing of  some of  it at 
Montlhéry where he was less well known than at Etampes.52
In order to meet the competition of  the millers, the mealmen 
had to broaden and consolidate their businesses. Many flour dealers 
enlarged the scope of  their grain-purchasing activities, others bat-
tled for control of  the lesser millers who remained artisanal, while 
still others seem to have been spurred to establish their own mills 
and secure greater commercial independence and flexibility.53 liber-
alization and the technological innovations in milling stimulated by 
the liberal reforms reinforced the gradual secular trend towards the 
eclipse of  grain by flour in the trade supplying the capital.54
The police perceived a direct connection between the proliferation 
of  abuses in the grain trade and the infiltration of  new men into the 
business: greedy opportunists, merchants equally lacking in skill and 
probity, men previously excluded from this commerce who exploited 
their wealth and influence unfairly, and above all men who knew 
and cared nothing for the conventions, traditions, and responsibilities 
which were so integral a part of  the trade before liberalization. Open-
ing the trade for the first time to all comers, the May Declaration 
abolished the old eligibility controls and most of  the socioprofessional 
 51 29 Feb. 1772, C. 89, A.D. Orne; Procès-verbal, 28 Oct. 1768, BN, Coll. Joly 1140, fol. 48; 
Coll. Joly 1142, fol. 53.
 52 18 April 1769, AN, X1B 9434.
 53 See, for example, the cases of  Raguidet of  Gouvieux (9 Feb. 1769, Archives Seine-Paris, DC6 
116, fol. 8) and Renard of  Gonesse and Châtelain of  Tillet (20 May 1775, AN, y 11441).
 54 See Malisset’s pertinent “Observations” (Jan. 1765), BN, mss. fr. 14295, fol. 161.
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incompatibilities (nobles, for example, were specifically authorized to 
trade; the Journal économique exhorted them to engage in such useful 
and profitable enterprise).55 According to contemporaries, the result 
was a remarkable multiplication of  new faces in grain and flour com-
merce recruited from every quality and condition. An “infinity” of  
individuals suddenly installed themselves in the trade at Rambouillet, 
in the Brie, in the Beauce, at Orléans, in the Hainaut, at Besançon, 
Troyes, Bar-sur-Aube, Châlons-sur-Marne, Sézanne, Angers, Noirot, 
Amiens; at Vitry gentilshommes and curés participated prominently; 
Etampes boasted a hairdresser and several domestics; “the small-
est fermiers” in the Dauphiné began to gamble; “strangers” in droves 
descended upon the Brittany coast to forage for grain; in the Toulouse 
area, piddling adventurers with a fistful of  change speculated no less 
avidly than the grand proprietors and big farmers who took a much 
keener interest in marketing their own crop and acquiring other pro-
duce than ever before. The sheer increase in numbers of  persons 
engaged in the trade astonished authorities throughout the kingdom. 
In languedoc merchants seemed to “grow by the hundred” while in 
Champagne their storehouses “multiplied as if  by miracle.” A great 
many of  the traders were “unknown persons” and the police had no 
right to inquire into their origins or their intentions.56
Although there was only a faint resemblance between the grain fever 
of  the sixties and the reckless speculation and jolting social disloca-
tion of  the time of  John law, nevertheless the lives of  many men were 
changed in the sixties as they had been in the Regency by the acquisition 
of  rapid fortunes or a brusque shift in function, status, and self-esteem. 
 55 Journal économique (Nov. 1764), 494.
 56 “Mémoire” (1771), BN, Coll. Joly 1111, fol. 143; Petit to PG, 27 June 1768, Coll. Joly 1142, 
fols. 72–73; Coll. Joly 1152, fols. 141–58; Pascaud (?) to Sartine, Sept. 1770, AN H 1669; 
reports of  SDs of  Valenciennes, Quesnay and St. Armand to IN. of  Hainaut, ca. Oct. 1773, 
C. 6690, A.D. Nord; de la Corée to CG, 2 Sept. 1770, C. 844, A.D. Doubs; Municipality of  
Châlons to CG, 29 Dec. 1767, C. 413, A.D. Marne; Masson to IN. of  Champagne, 9 Sept. 
1766 and Gehier to same, 29 Oct. 1773, C. 299, A.D. Aube; Paillot to IN. of  Champagne, 
23 Oct. 1773, C. 1179, A.D. Aube; SD at Dourdan to Cypierre, 24 Sept. 1768 in C. Bloch, 
Correspondance inédite de l’intendant Cypierre, 99; enquête de 1773, C. 86, A.D. Somme; Parl. of  
Dauphiné to louis XV, 26 April 1769, B. 2314, fol. 110, A.D. Isère; Parl. of  Bordeaux, arrêt 
12 May 1773, C. 1439, A.D. Gir.; draft, IN. of  Brittany to CG, 17 Sept. 1765, C. 1670, A.D. 
I-et-V.; de Vandoul (?) to IN. of  languedoc, 21 and 28 April, C. 2914, A.D. Hér.; C. 2909, 
A.D. Hér.; léon Cahen, “le Pacte de famine et les spéculations sur les blés,” Revue historique, 
ClIII (May–June 1926), 37ff.; Weulersse, Louis XV, 172; Georges Jorre, “le Commerce 
des grains et la minoterie à Toulouse,” Revue géographique des Pyrénées, IV (1933), 41, 44; Viala, 
La Question des grains … á Toulouse, 38.
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Urbain Guillot, for example, had been a marginal intermediary in 
a number of  different trades. Now he was a “merchant of  grain for 
the provisioning of  Paris” operating for his own account and residing 
proudly on the rue de la Mortellerie, street of  the Paris grain manda-
rins. Cadet Roux of  Bourg-la-Reine gravitated quite naturally from 
the profession of  wagon-driver to that of  sometime grain and flour 
merchant. later he confessed that he was unequipped to practice the 
commerce for “he never had any knowledge to be able to distinguish 
the good from the bad quality of  the flour.” A Sieur laperde from 
the Bordelais “exercised several professions in which his conduct was 
not without reproach.” In an effort to recoup his losses, “he threw 
himself  headlong into the grain traffic.” Antoine Demolle, a native 
of  Normandy, came to Paris as a servant, left domestic service to 
become a “grain merchant” at the end of  the sixties, and was arrested 
several years later for stealing from his ex-master.57
Another new man drawn into the trade by the lush prospects of  
the new age, Henry Coquelin, son of  a woodworker living in the 
Paris region, had a remarkable appreciation of  the meaning of  liber-
alization and a sense of  the ethos it meant to propagate. Although his 
own commerce was incommensurate with the breadth of  his views—
he bought and sold on a generally modest level in the Mantes area— 
he believed that the reform laws were “founded on the help that the 
Provinces of  the Kingdom could expect from the great freedom of  
circulation and interior commerce of  grain.” He believed that “by 
embracing the grain trade he would fashion for himself  a situation 
enabling him to subsist and that he would be useful to the Society of  
which he is a member.” No doubt he was also interested in making 
money, for in a short time he became known as an artful dealer and at 
the end of  the decade found himself  in jail on suspicion of  hoarding. 
Clinging shrewdly to the letter of  the law, he adamantly denied prac-
ticing any “maneuvers or monopolies contrary to the free circulation 
of  this commerce or prejudicial to the public interest.”58
like Coquelin, but with more capital and entrepreneurial imagina-
tion, Sieur Belly, a contrôleur ordinaire des guerres at Troyes, plunged into the 
grain trade in the sixties. He, too, celebrated his arrival as a great day for 
 57 Mediator’s report, Oct. 1769, Archives Seine-Paris, D6B6 carton 5; mediator’s report, April 
1773, Archives Seine-Paris, D6B6 carton 7; SD to IN. of  Bordeaux, 24 Jan. 1775, C. 1442, 
A.D. Gir.; 22 April 1772, AN, y 10325.
 58 Petition to PG, ca. Oct. 1770, BN, Coll. Joly 1151, fol. 33.
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the public interest. Unabashedly, he contended that the public would 
benefit from his enterprise more or less directly in proportion to his prof-
its and that its success, and thus the extent to which it served the public 
good, hinged upon the liberty he had to manage its affairs. Ambitious 
and innovative, Belly represented precisely the sort of  forward- looking, 
quasi-industrial commerce which the liberal ministry longed to see 
flourish. He set out to change habits. In addition to speculating in grain, 
at considerable financial risk, he experimented with new techniques in 
milling and marketing, introducing a cheaper type of  flour unfamiliar 
to local consumers and bakers and offering it for sale directly to the 
public in retail flour stores of  a kind that had never before existed. It is 
not surprising that his style, which in ordinary times would have startled 
old hands, aroused suspicion and resentment in a period of  dearth and 
insecurity. While Belly claimed to serve the “party of  the poor people” 
by giving them the chance to obtain good quality, inexpensive flour 
without having to run the usual gauntlet of  middlemen, the Troyes 
police denounced him as a hypocrite and a trouble-maker. Far from 
serving the public good, he caused the people to “murmur” by produc-
ing a flour that nobody wanted because it made a bread with a “dusty” 
taste and a dark color, using the flour establishment as a cover for abu-
sive commercial practices, and bilking the community for huge profits. 
For years Belly and the authorities wrangled over the legitimacy as well 
as the utility of  his enterprise. They accused him of  buying indiscrimi-
nately, without regard for the local “usages” and priorities, without 
bargaining for the best possible price, and with the aim of  gaining a 
corner on supplies. Time and again Belly replied in the language of  
liberty: that how he ran his affairs was nobody’s business but his own 
and that according to the law “every citizen has the right ” to buy and 
to sell, or not to sell, as he pleased. To defend himself  Belly had far 
greater resources and more leverage than had poor Henry Coquelin. 
No less a personnage than Bertin offered his protection against the 
local police. Equally obstinate, the authorities continued to harry Bel-
ly’s agents, sully his reputation, and predict that the people would one 
day rise in vengeful fury against him—a self-fulfilling prophecy which 
finally came true, with the help of  the police, in 1770.59
A contemporary observer who aptly called himself  “Fromant” in 
honor of  his expertise credited the liberal climate with exciting the 
 59 C. 1908, A.D. Aube.
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“Capitalists” to enter the trade.60 Dampierre de la Salle probably 
referred to the same men when he remarked that “many idle and glut-
tonous people hurl themselves headlong into this traffic.”61 It was at 
this time that the Necker family realized substantial gains from “for-
tunate speculations on grain.”62 The government’s efforts to bar from 
the trade public officials whose participation might compromise the 
discharge of  official business or scandalize public opinion were not 
successful in some places. A group of  merchants at Soissons accused 
the local police of  dominating the commerce. Two commissaires were 
among the biggest dealers, the wife of  a third was a major broker, and 
the farmer of  the market measuring services also had a hand in these 
operations. The conflict of  interest did not trouble a cavalier of  the 
maréchaussée in the Brie who became a large-scale trader-by-stealth and 
encouraged his colleagues to do the same. Elsewhere “those who had 
the conduct of  royal monies”—financial officiers—allegedly used their 
funds and their strategic position to profit from grain manipulations.63 
The appearance of  a host of  new men in the trade alarmed the 
police and contributed mightily, as we shall see, to Terray’s deci-
sion to restrict the commerce in 1770–71. The wide-open trade 
degenerated into a frenzy of  “cupidity” according to this Control-
ler-General. In the name of  profit and self-interest, dealers com-
mitted crimes against the general interest. Instead of  heightening 
competition and thus supplying grain more efficiently and at lower 
cost, the multiplication of  “hands” in the trade interposed more 
and more middlemen, forced prices higher and higher, and made 
grain less and less visible. Before liberalization, wrote one of  Ter-
ray’s commis, the merchants had been “less opulent and consequently 
more docile and under the hand of  the administration.” From the 
police point of  view, the main problem with the new men was that 
they were faceless. Relieved of  the requirement to register and 
identify themselves formally, the traders were able to escape detec-
tion. The commerce of  a commodity of  first necessity, in Terray’s 
 60 lacombe d’Avignon, Le Mitron de Vaugirard. Dialogues sur le bled, la farine et le pain, 3.
 61 “Observations de Dampierre de la Salle sur un projet de l’abbé Terray,” BN, mss. n.a. 
22777, fol. 259.
 62 Herbert lüthy, La Banque protestante en France de la révocation de l’édit de Nantes à la révolution, 
(Paris, 1959–1961), II, 373–74.
 63 Cugnet to PG and collective petition, 4 Aug. 1768, BN, Coll. Joly 1142, fols. 126–27; fiscal 
procurator of  Brie-Comte-Robert, 10 Feb. 1769, Coll. Joly 1146, fol. 66; “Mémoire,” 8 Aug. 
1773, AN, F11 265; CG to Calonne, 25 Aug. 1770, AN, F12* 155. On the entry of  “les gens revêtus 
de charges,” see also the IN. of  Franche-Comté to Terray, Sept. 1770, C. 844, A.D. Doubs.
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estimation, should always be in “known” hands “continually under 
the eyes of  the people and those of  the administrators.”64
III
One must be cautious, however, with the evidence that suggests this 
phenomenon of  “new faces” and links it to liberalization. It is dis-
persed and fragmentary, albeit copious, and it depends on a mosaic 
of  impressions which, despite their confluence and mutual reinforce-
ment, may themselves be the product of  a shared set of  perceptions 
and assumptions characteristic of  a dearth experience. Chertés in the 
past, which had nothing to do with liberalization, had always called 
forth a host of  transient speculators and modest adventurers seeking 
to profit from the circumstances. The heated atmosphere of  a dearth 
often projected mirages which deluded the least naive and best inten-
tioned observers. Traders in scarcity, like the cherté in the old adage, 
“abound,” that is to say, they swarm from place to place, often far 
beyond their normal range where they are unlikely to be recognized 
or remembered, plundering or succoring. In the sixties merchants 
had the chance to wander more widely and more freely than ever 
before. It is not impossible that the strange faces spotted in a dozen 
different markets belonged to the same man.
There is no doubt that the old pattern of  commerce was seriously 
disrupted and it was tempting then, as it is now when people con-
front a threatening experience, to ascribe it to outsiders, “foreigners,” 
new men. yet not everyone agreed that the personnel of  the trade 
had dramatically changed. In the Dauphiné there may have been no 
significant influx of  new dealers or it may have occurred in the first 
few years after the promulgation of  the reforms, thus enabling the 
apprentice-merchants to appear as old hands by 1771.65 In 1769 the 
 64 Terray, “Mémoire” (Aug. 1773), cited by Weulersse, Louis XV, 179; “Mémoire,” 8 Aug. 
1773, AN, F11 265; leon Cahen, “le Prétendu pacte de famine. Quelques précisions 
nouvelles,” Revue historique, ClXXVI (Sept.–Oct. 1935), 201. In addition to being faceless, 
reported a Hainaut subdelegate, “half  of  these new merchants “barely know how to read 
and write.” SD of  St. Armand to Taboureau, ca. Oct. 1733, C. 6690, A.D. Nord.
 65 IN. Pajot to Terray, 31 Oct. 1771, AN, F11 223. yet the Parlement of  Dauphiné saw 
things somewhat differently, stressing the enormous speculative current generated by 
liberalization. See its letter to the king, 26 April 1769, B. 2314, fol. 110, A.D. Isère. Cf. also 
the arrêt of  23 March 1774 cited by Pierre Rabatel, Le Parlement de Grenoble et les réformes de 
Maupeou (Grenoble, 1912), 147–48.
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deputies of  commerce argued that popular hostilities were so intense 
that “almost no one today dares to devote himself  to the grain trade.” 
It was an ambiguous remark, to be sure, which, if  true, may merely 
mean that the liberalization-nurtured trade had already peaked.66 
Despite the talk about capitalists, the grain entrepreneur leray 
de Chaumont in 1768 called attention to the failure of  the liberal 
reforms to produce or win the allegiance of  powerful négociants capa-
ble of  handling the provisioning of  Paris.67 According to Bacalan, a 
high official on tour in the lille region in 1768, “the grain trade did 
not exist there … the prejudices against this commerce subsist in all 
their force.”68 The économistes, too, lamented the anemic state of  the 
trade at the end of  the decade.69 But the relative paucity of  capital 
concentration and sophisticated organization in the trade does not 
mean that huge fortunes were not made or that important changes 
in the nature of  commercial practice and the nature of  commercial 
opportunity did not occur. It is possible that the trade remained dif-
fuse precisely because it drew so many dealers who thrived on their 
own.
There is a lesson to ponder, too, in the Parlement of  Dauphiné’s 
remark that “two thirds of  the kingdom” was engaged in the grain 
trade—if  by grain trade one means merely the business of  selling 
grain.70 This is of  course a necessary but not usually a sufficient cri-
terion for identifying the trader. Characteristically, grain trading 
implied, inter alia, a certain professional self-consciousness and spe-
cialization rather than a casual flirtation, stocking for speculative 
 66 “Avis des Députés du Commerce sur le libre commerce des grains,” AN, F12 715.
 67 leray to Trudaine de Montigny (?), May 1768, AN, F11 1194.
 68 AN, F12 650.
 69 For example, lemercier de la Rivière, L’lntérêt général de l’état, 8, 401–402 and Weulersse, 
Mouvement, II, 218. Cf. Journal économique (Feb. 1770), 60.
It is a shame that we cannot recall to the witness stand the merchant who lamented the 
extreme underdevelopment of  the grain trade in France in the first days of  liberalization. 
Encouraged to undertake grain speculation by the Declaration of  May 1763, this 
businessman sent “a man of  confidence” to Champagne and lorraine, where grain was 
said to be bountiful and cheap, in order to purchase 2–3,000 septiers for transshipment to 
Provence, where grain was said to be rare and dear. The agent reported that a transaction 
of  this magnitude was virtually impossible to undertake given the fractionalized, inner-
directed, retail nature of  the local grain trade, the paucity of  storage facilities, and the lack 
of  means of  transport. As a result of  the organization of  local markets and the attitudes 
of  the inhabitants, who were not accustomed to wholesale grain removals, the Paris dealer 
concluded that the purchases he envisaged would provoke “panic terrors” and wild price 
increases despite the real abundance of  grain. Gazette du commerce (14 Jan. 1765), 27–28.
 70 Parl. to louis XV, 26 April 1769, B. 2314, fol. 117, A.D. Isère.
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purposes, and buying for resale. In the harried climate of  liberaliza-
tion, such discriminations are not always easy to make. One must be 
on the alert not to take every vendor for a dealer merely because he is 
a stranger flaunting a sack of  grain. Finally, it is important to consider 
the documentation we do not have as well as the evidence available. For 
every new face invented, imagined, or counted twice by overwrought 
or expectant witnesses, there may well have been another who passed 
unremarked because he was adept at secrecy and optimally exploited 
the provisions of  the law which assured him anonymity.
One way to discern more clearly the breadth and authenticity of  
the new commercial activity engendered by the liberal reforms and 
the crisis of  the sixties is to trace the history of  the arrêt du conseil of  23 
December 1770. This law, enveloped in letters patent, required more 
systematically than ever before that all persons desiring to undertake 
commerce in grain or flour, and/or form associations for trade with 
others, declare their names, contracts of  partnership, addresses, and 
location of  magazines with local royal authorities. In theory, one 
should be able to learn, directly and obliquely, a good deal about the 
state of  commerce from the registration lists generated by the law, pro-
vided that the lists have survived and the arrêt was enforced with some 
enthusiasm. The meager yield from searches in over thirty depart-
mental archives warrants little optimism on the first account, though, 
given the procedure indicated by the arrêt, it is quite possible that 
extant lists should be sought elsewhere, viz., in communal depots.
On the second account there is ample margin for uncertainty. The 
arrêt of  23 December 1770 was an enormously important piece of  
legislation which re-introduced a whole series of  police controls in 
addition to the declaration requirement. There are good reasons 
to believe, as I shall attempt to show later, that this law, or rather 
several of  its clauses, were rigorously enforced in a large part of  
the realm, especially in the regions north of  the loire. Nor is this 
surprising; this was the antiliberal law that local authorities avidly 
craved and they were generally highly motivated to apply it. More-
over, to support their efforts, they could count upon the Contrôle-
Général, now lost to the liberals, the bulk of  the parlements, and 
their own consumer-constituents. yet we also know that politi-
cal and commercial conditions varied considerably from place to 
place and that as a result there was no monolithic pattern to which 
all local authorities conformed. In certain areas, where the sources 
of  subsistence troubles seemed to come from outside the com-
munity and where the local dealers had never caused difficulties, 
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the police did not appear to press the matter of  registration.71 In other 
places the police concentrated on the other controls in the arrêt which, 
in their estimation, made registration merely a supplementary refine-
ment; or they were negligent in the conduct of  their administration; 
or they lacked the capacity to cast their nets widely enough to snare 
the host of  small-scale dealers.72 Inevitably, too, there arose jurisdic-
tional quarrels which paid homage to the reticence of  traders who 
wanted to avoid registration. The arrêt enjoined traders to make their 
declarations at the nearest royal jurisdiction. In some towns, however, 
there was more than one royal jurisdiction. The contending authori-
ties clashed over the stewardship of  the registry in the nastiest sort 
of  administrative war promoted by rival clerks ravenous to claim the 
twenty sous to which each declaration entitled them. Traders resident 
in seignorial, ducal bailliage, or similar jurisdictions, remote from the 
citadels of  royal authority, enjoyed a certain immunity, though the 
Procurators General, construing the law loosely, ultimately autho-
rized any police power, in the absence of  royal jurisdiction, to enroll 
grain dealers.73 A subdelegate in the Hainaut complained that regis-
tration before a royal jurisdiction was a perfunctory formality with-
out police function. In its stead he proposed obligatory declarations 
before municipal authorities where merchants would have to con-
front “a contradictor” rather than a mere clerk.74
The weight of  the evidence, allowing for local idiosyncracies, sug-
gests that registration was widely practiced. Such a conclusion, how-
ever, is almost wholly inferential and it says nothing about the quality 
of  enforcement. Obviously the discovery of  declaration lists would 
shed considerable light upon this matter as well as upon the question 
of  the trade itself.
Two such registers, one opened in the capital itself  under the auspices 
of  the lieutenant of  police and the other in Meaux, an important market 
town in the Brie, offer a curious albeit tenuous glimpse of  the state of  
 71 See, for example, “Résultat des observations des officiers de police des différentes villes de 
la province de Champagne sur l’exécution de l’arrêt du 23 Dec. 1770,” bailliage de Vertus, 
C. 417, A.D. Marne.
 72 See, for exemple, Terray to IN. of  Burgundy (?), 22 Nov. 1772, C. 81, A.D. C d’O and SD 
of  Pont Château to IN. of  Brittany (?), 25 Feb. 1772, C. 1725, A.D. I-et-V.
 73 “Résultat des observations des officiers de police …,” Sézanne, Ruhet, and Fismes, C. 417, 
A.D. Marne.
 74 SD of  Avesnes to IN., ca. Oct. 1773, C. 6690, A.D. Nord. Taboureau, the intendant, pressed 
the campaign for registration with great vigor. Taboureau to SDs, 11 Sept. 1772, C. 6689, ibid.
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the trade around Paris.75 It must be borne in mind that registration in 
these cases was far from exhaustive; that the registrants were unequally 
garrulous; that there is no truly reliable control or standard of  refer-
ence against which to measure this data; and that enrollment began 
in early 1771, well after the government undertook its retreat from 
liberalization and several years after the time when liberalization and 
high prices exercised their greatest allure to prospective traders.
The declaration book kept by the Paris police contains approxi-
mately 100 names.76 Forty-seven of  the registrants were based in 
Paris. While only 26 specifically indicated that they were merchants 
“for the provisioning of  Paris,” there is no doubt that all of  them 
aimed primarily at furnishing the capital. Thirty—25 men, 4 married 
women and a widow—dealt exclusively in grain. Seventeen traded 
in both grain and flour. Of  the latter, 6 were millers, at least 4 of  
whom operated windmills. Of  the 2 in the register who appropriated 
the promising title of  négociant, 1 seemed to be an occasional grain 
merchant who dealt on an international scale and kept a warehouse 
at Rouen while the other had no magazines but supplied the Halles 
regularly from as far away as Champagne and Burgundy.
Only 3 others appear to have been very substantial business-
men. Mabille, a grain and flour merchant who had operated a flour 
company under the patronage of  Poussot, the police inspector of  
the Halles in the sixties, maintained 5 magazines on the Oise and 
near Rambouillet. Jean Honoré Aubert, a merchant afflicted with 
chronic financial difficulties, drew supplies from Etampes in the 
south, Meaux in the east, and Pont Sainte-Maxence in the north 
and expanded his commerce to embrace flour as well as grain. 
Miller for the Paris General Hospital and son-in-law of  the highly 
regarded modernizing miller César Buquet, Nicolas Rolland reg-
istered an “act of  society” signed with the marquis de Feuquières, 
lieutenant General of  the province of  Picardy, who promised 
to invest 30,000 livres and the use of  6 mills. Instead of  capital, 
 75 Because it was garbled in organization, a third register, for the bailliage of  Châteauneuf  
in A.D. E-et-l. (B. 4777), yielded very little. Sixty-eight traders enrolled. Most were blatiers, 
shifting grain from market to market in small quantities. Most declared a single storehouse. 
A handful claimed to have “always” been engaged in grain commerce. A few indicated 
that they had recently undertaken the trade. It is extremely difficult to take the measure of  
the experience of  the majority, for they declared ambiguously that they were “continuing” 
to deal in grain without revealing anything about their backgrounds. The register from 
Orléans, surely a gem, must have been destroyed during World War II (C. 83, A.D. loiret). 
There is a fragmentary listing for Graisivaudan in the Dauphiné, C. 48, A.D. Isère.
 76 AN, y 9648. Cf. 8 March 1771, Archives Seine-Paris, D5B6 4910.
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Rolland contributed “only his talent for milling and for the grain and 
flour trade.” Once the business was launched, the parties agreed to 
split profits and losses evenly.
At the other extreme of  scope and structure of  enterprise stood 
the dame laval, wife of  a clerk in the tax farms, who was hardly 
more than a blatière, affiliated with her sister in an extremely humble 
traffic. Three other dealers acknowledged commercial associations, 
2 between grain merchants and colleagues at la Ferté-sous-Jouarre 
and Poilly (Auxerre) and 1 linking a grain and flour trader with a Ver-
sailles miller and grain dealer. At least 3 grain merchants had agents 
regularly buying for them in the country (one of  whom was a cloth 
merchant new to the business) and 2 others served as commissioners 
for merchants based in the provisioning zones.
The 47 Paris-based merchants, operated in all the supply crowns 
tributary to the capital. Only 14 indicated that they did not maintain 
storehouses in the field. Seven reported magazines in 3 or more dif-
ferent locations while the average for the entire group was slightly 
more than 1 per trader. The Brie was the area of  choice; the Beauce, 
the Pays Chartrain, the Hurepoix, the French Vexin, and the Soisson-
nais were also represented. Although they used river transportation at 
least part of  the way, many of  these merchants marketed their goods 
at the Halles rather than at the ports.
The most striking feature of  the group is that almost half  of  its mem-
bers appear to be new men—relatively recent recruits to the trade. 
Of  these 22 newcomers, the professions of  19 are definitely known: 
4 wine merchants, 2 other kinds of  merchants, 2 artisans, 2 innkeep-
ers, 2 clerks, 3 bakers, 3 bourgeois de Paris, and a soldier’s wife. This 
data, like all fleeting references to profession, état, qualité, and condition 
in police and notarial archives, must be used with circumspection. The 
register does not reveal whether they have abandoned their stated pro-
fessions or how long they have been in the provisioning commerce. 
The internal evidence, however, suggests that most of  them have been 
engaged in the grain and flour traffic long enough to establish patterns 
of  buying and selling, a task requiring at the minimum several months 
and in some cases perhaps several years. Although it was fairly com-
mon to dissemble trade and rank for social, economic, and psychologi-
cal purposes, there is no plausible reason for so large a proportion of  
registrants to have falsified their status in this public document.
Ten years earlier it would have been unimaginable for a wig-maker 
or a tinsmith living in the heart of  Paris to petition the police for 
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authorization to engage in the grain trade or to undertake such traf-
fic surreptitiously. In those days the trade was not especially attrac-
tive and the police were not notorious for indulging the ambitions of  
tyros and part-timers. liberalization seems to have accustomed the 
police to accepting new recruits, for even after the reaction to the 
liberal laws set in and Terray moved to put an end to anonymity and 
uncontrolled speculation, the authorities did not attempt to disqual-
ify anyone who came forward to enroll. In 1770–71 candor became 
the mark of  good faith and the quid pro quo for protection; it involved 
no risks for the registrants. The presence of  these 22 newcomers on 
the police list—it is quite likely in addition that some of  the remain-
ing 25 dealers were relatively fresh to the trade—suggests that the 
trade had opened up considerably since 1763–64 and lends credence 
to the sometimes harried reports of  contemporary observers.
The register also contains declarations from 50 merchants residing 
in the provisioning crowns around the capital, especially in the Brie and 
in the St. Denis-Gonesse-Dammartin area. Twenty-six claimed to be 
engaged exclusively in grain traffic. Only 8 of  the 14 millers enrolled 
specifically indicated that they dealt in both grain and flour, but it is 
unlikely that the other 6 rigorously eschewed grain exchanges. Eight 
registrants signed in as merchants of  grain and flour while 2 described 
themselves as simple flour traders. Fifteen of  the 50 brandished the 
title “merchant for the Provisioning of  Paris,” though virtually all of  
them were part of  the Paris nexus. Seven disclosed that they served as 
purchasing agents for Paris-based buyers: 4 for bakers (all of  whom 
were millers; after mid-century Paris bakers rarely employed commis-
sioners who could not themselves convert the grain they bought), 2 
for grain merchants, and 1 for several religious communities. With the 
exception of  the last, all of  them supplied the market as well.
For almost all of  these zone merchants, the Halles rather than the 
ports was the destination point. The vast majority kept storehouses 
(they averaged slightly more than 1 per dealer; at least 5 merchants 
had none while 1 maintained 4) but they were much less widely dis-
persed than those of  their Paris counterparts. Approximately 20 per-
cent of  the zone registrants could not sign their names, a considerably 
larger proportion than among the Parisians. None of  the 50 was asso-
ciated with other merchants in his commerce. Most of  them seem to 
have run modest, family-controlled businesses, limited in geographi-
cal range and socioeconomic ambition. Arnoult of  St. Denis called 
himself  négociant and boasted magazines at St. Denis, Dammartin, 
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and Claye but was hardly the sort of  merchant-baron to whom the 
liberals wanted to entrust the fate of  the cities. More than anyone else 
the millers were the grain and flour moguls of  this group. Dezobry 
of  St. Denis operated 4 different mills; at least 3 other millers each 
controlled 2 establishments. Jean-Claude Colas, a Stains miller better 
known by his sobriquet Valentin, was the creditor of  a host of  Paris 
bakers in the late sixties and early seventies. Seven of  the 14 millers 
were also laboureurs—that is to say, they had structured a vertically 
integrated enterprise in which they sowed and harvested grain and 
sold it, stored it or transformed it into flour.
Strictly speaking, only 7 of  the 50 zone merchants were newcom-
ers to the trade: a mercer, a horse-trader, a baker, 2 tavern-keepers, 
and 2 day-laborers. But it is well to remember that before 1763–64, 
millers and laboureurs were legally prohibited from entering the grain 
trade. Millers were considered artisans whose function it was to con-
vert grain on demand into flour for bakers and private individuals; 
they could not openly buy grain on speculation, sell it, or grind it 
in anticipation of  demand. Laboureurs were supposed to market their 
crop as quickly as possible and return to the tillage of  the soil; they 
could not store grain indefinitely or buy grain clandestinely or on 
the market for purpose of  stockage or resale. In the sense that they 
received legitimation as traders for the first time, millers and laboureurs 
were also new men. Five registrants were merchant-laboureurs (or fermi-
ers or receveurs-fermiers) in addition to the 7 laboureurs who were also mill-
ers. There is no way to determine how many of  the other zone deal-
ers may have begun to deal in grain and flour in the last few years.
The Meaux declaration-book, opened in January 1771, registered 
traders dealing in a remarkably wide area in and around the Brie in all 
the major markets including Coulommiers, Tournan, Rozay, Rebais, 
lagny, la Ferté-sous-Jouarre, la Ferté-Gaucher, Charly, lizy, Dam-
martin, and Provins.77 The listing contains 165 entries, only 2 of  whom 
represent women. In 114 cases we have a fairly clear indication of  the 
amount of  time the merchant has been engaged in grain and/or flour 
commerce. The average for all 114 is 6.9 years with a range of  1 month 
to 48 years. Although this dispersion severely limits the utility of  the 
mean, it is hard to resist noting that 6.9 years would take us back to 
1764, just after the freeing of  internal trade and just before the open-
ing of  the export gates. If  we were able to establish the significance 
 77 Uncatalogued mss., bailliage de Meaux, A.D. Seine-et-Marne.
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of  the figure, it would mean that the “average” Meaux-enrolled mer-
chant was a new man in the trade. If  we use a more prudent approach 
and allow prospective merchants a little more time to react to the lure of  
liberalization or to the commercial opportunities of  the sixties, we find 
that 65% (74) began their grain commerce in 1765 or afterwards and 
thus were new men. If  we take 5 years rather than 6 as the threshold 
for “newness”—a very conservative baseline—then 51% were fresh to 
the trade, a figure comparable to the Parisian pattern. Of  the 114 mer-
chants, a little more than 25% had 10 years of  experience or more in 
the trade; slightly less than 17% had traded for 15 years or more.
Generally the same caveats that qualified the Parisian data must 
be used here. We do not know how many traders operated around 
Meaux and the other areas encompassed in this register before liber-
alization nor how many entered the trade as new men after the prom-
ulgation of  the reforms and left before 1771 in failure, in triumph, or 
in disgust at the reversion to the police system. We have no clear idea 
of  a “normal” turnover rate in the profession. Professional mobility—
upward, downward or lateral—may very well have been greater in 
the grain trade than in lower risk occupations. Nor can we ignore the 
possibility that a small number of  merchants entered the grain trade 
at the very end of  the sixties, not in response to the fever of  liberaliza-
tion, but to the more stable conditions which the revival of  the police 
system presaged. Finally, we cannot say with certainty what percent-
age of  the grain and flour trading community registered. There are 
some indications that it was high but it must be remembered that 
the traders had the option to register where they desired. There was 
probably a good deal of  cross-registering and registering away from 
“home” (in principle, the place which was the center of  the trading 
activities). The failure of  the administration to zone the declaration 
area according to some precise geographical or commercial standard 
blurs the picture of  distribution. All things considered, however, it 
appears virtually certain that in the Meaux region, too, a substantial 
number of  “new” persons decided to undertake the grain or flour 
commerce professionally for the first time in the sixties.
Various observations in the register suggest that many of  the trad-
ers never knew the old regime of  regulation and would find it diffi-
cult to unlearn trading habits which the police, after January 1771 as 
before May 1763, considered “abuses” or “crimes.” At least a half-
dozen registrants casually reported that they ordinarily bought or sold 
on sample, purchased grain before it was harvested, or bought and 
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resold in the same market. Without any sense of  wrong-doing, for 
instance, Pierre Godard and Pierre Desprez, both of  whom began 
to trade in grain in the late sixties, indicated that they bought in 
the farms of  laboureurs and stored their purchases there as well. Nei-
ther revealed whether he intended to abandon these practices. On 
the other hand, Claude Clément the younger, who started trading 
in 1763 and might have had a fleeting first-hand taste of  the old 
system, acknowledged that he used to buy and sell off  the markets 
but promised henceforth “to conform” to the newly restored rules 
which required his presence at the markets.
Of  the 165 merchants enrolled, 45 or 27% appear to exercise or 
to have recently exercised another profession or, in some cases, 2 
other professions. Seventeen were millers of  whom 10 were simple 
grain/flour merchant-millers, 3 were laboureur-grain/flour merchant-
millers, and 4 were baker-grain/flour merchant-millers (of  the lat-
ter, at least 1 seems to have owned considerable amounts of  grain-
producing land and thus spanned the entire provisioning chain from 
seed to loaf  ). In addition to these 4 bakers, 4 others were grain/flour 
merchant-bakers. Seven merchants were also laboureurs not including 
the laboureurs who were also millers. The “other” professions of  the 17 
remaining merchants—38% of  all merchants with more than 1 pro-
fession—were all outside the primary food producing or provision-
ing industry. Ten had occupations that appear to be predominantly 
urban in locus, 4 had professions which seem characteristically rural, 
and 3 fit in a miscellaneous category. Unlike the millers, bakers, and 
laboureurs, it appears that most of  these 17 merchants had to renounce 
their second (or rather their first!) professions—with the exception 
perhaps of  the organist who still could find time to play on Sundays 
or give lessons sporadically and the tavernkeeper whose wife prob-
ably tended the bar and the books. Some of  the millers, laboureurs and 
bakers may have had experience in the grain trade prior to liberaliza-
tion, but these 17 merchants are almost certainly all new men.
In relation to the market and to commercial practice, there were 
three types of  traders enrolled at Meaux. The majority—65%—were 
blatiers, ostensibly small dealers operating locally and with very limited 
means and ambitions among the different markets of  the Brie and 
environs. Only 11% of  the entire contingent were exclusively Parisian 
suppliers, channeling grain or flour from the hinterland to the capi-
tal in large doses and on a regular basis more or less without regard 
for local demand. The remaining traders—24% of  the total—ran a 
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mixed commerce, functioning both as blatiers and as merchants-for-
the-provisioning-of-Paris. It should be noted that in the grain trade, 
as in many other professions where there are supposed to be clear-cut 
gradations of  scope and rank, the nomenclature is not always precise 
or reliable. Alfred Cobban cited the case of  a self-styled Malouin négo-
ciant who was said by his neighbors to have earned his living selling 
fruit in the streets. The works of  Paul Bois, Pierre de Saint Jacob, and 
Pierre Goubert, among others, have taught us how misleading puta-
tively hierarchical nominal typologies of  peasants can be. In this same 
sense it is chastening to note that one Pierre lefebvre, a trader from 
Coulommiers who appears to be engaged in blatier traffic, at the time 
of  his declaration had a stock of  30 muids of  grain (probably wheat), 
an enormous quantity even for a substantial metropolitan-oriented 
dealer let alone a blatier who is supposed to be dealing in a few septiers 
at a time. This case is a useful warning, but in the Meaux context it 
seems to be exceptional. On the whole the blatier traffic in the area 
was indeed quite modest.
The predominance of  blatiers obscures the real magnitude of  the 
Meaux-centered contribution to the supply of  the capital, for a great 
deal of  the grain resold by the blatiers at Meaux and some of  the nearby 
entrepôt markets ended up in the hands of  Paris commissioners. At 
least 7 of  the registered Meaux traders served as  commissioners, or 
factors, for Paris-based merchants (5 of  them for the river-trading 
elite of  the rue de la Mortellerie). Seven others, all millers, bought 
grain in behalf  of  Paris bakers. Twenty-three of  the Meaux mer-
chants who were integrated into the Parisian supply network had 
brokers who managed their business and disposed of  their grain and 
flour in the capital.
Aside from these ties with agents or factors, the vast majority 
of  merchants apparently operated alone. Of  165 merchants, only 
6—less than 4%—were “associated” with others: 4 blatiers, 1 Paris 
merchant, and 1 local-metropolitan dealer. Although it is not sur-
prising that a commerce heavily blatier in organization did not sup-
port more “societies,” it is possible that the police actively discour-
aged the formation of  commercial partnerships or groups which 
reminded them of  the “companies” of  the late sixties and invari-
ably prompted suspicion of  monopoly.
The desire to associate implies a certain amount of  sophistication 
in business and often, but by no means always, a rudimentary educa-
tion. The mass of  the Meaux registrants appear to be literate, though 
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we do not know if  they all kept business records as the law now 
required. Seventeen per cent of  the 165 merchants could not sign their 
names, a figure strikingly similar to the number of  zone-based traders 
in the Paris register who are by this measure presumed unlettered. 
Of  these 28 Meaux merchants, only 1 was a primary Paris supplier; 
25 or 93% were blatier-types.
All of  the merchants except 8 kept or intended to keep grain and/
or flour magazines. The mode for the whole universe was 2, though 
the data on which it is based are not precise. There appears to be 
no necessary relationship between the number of  magazines a trader 
maintained and the magnitude of  his commerce; the dealer with the 
most storehouses in the listing—6—was a blatier-type who bought on a 
small scale throughout the upper Brie and resold at Meaux. Most trad-
ers kept 1 magazine “at home” in a spare room, in the back of  a shop, 
or in a mill and another in or near one of  the market-towns on their 
commercial itinerary. But at least 15 merchants indicated that they 
stocked their merchandise in various inns or cabarets in the town and 
the countryside. There is a certain irony in these innocent declarations 
to the police, for in the days before liberalization the inn had been the 
most notorious hideout for secret, illicit hordes. liberalization legiti-
mized this practice and during the sixties the inns did a bustling and 
open business as grain and flour entrepôts and surrogate marketplaces. 
When the old rules were restored beginning in 1771 the merchant 
could still use the inn, but like the prostitute, only on condition that he 
declared his purpose to the nearby police clerk.
Several registration lists, with scanty information, survive in 
the records of  the intendancies of  Flandre-Artois and Hainaut- 
Cambrésis.78 Of  58 traders enrolled at Maubeuge, almost 20%, an 
unusually high proportion, were associated with other merchants. The 
vast majority had no storehouses outside their own homes. Only 4 
had more than 1 magazine; 4 others claimed they did business with-
out storage facilities. Twenty-two of  the 23 merchants registered at 
Avesnes kept a storehouse at home; only 1 had more than 1 magazine. 
Two traders had associates. Only 1 of  the 23 was a woman—a baker’s 
widow. Eight merchants enrolled at landescq: 2 declared that they had 
associates and 5 asserted that they maintained no storehouses at all.
 78 The lists for Maubeuge, Avesnes, and Valenciennes are in C. 5977, A.D. Nord; the landesq 
register is C. 6690, ibid.; the lille declarations are in C. 3745, ibid.
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The Valenciennes register is the only one of  this group that con-
tains some details on the professional origin of  the merchants. None 
of  the 16 registrants claimed to be a grain merchant by profession. 
Nine exercised professions which had nothing at all to do with the 
grain trade; they were clearly new men. The remaining 7—5 millers, a 
fermier, and a starchmaker—practiced trades more or less closely related 
to grain commerce. yet they, too, qualify as newcomers since all were 
legally excluded from dealing in grain before 1763–64. Though 9 of  the 
16 Valenciennes registrants declared no magazines, it is likely that each 
maintained a storehouse at home.
It is unfortunate that the huge lille declaration list recorded virtu-
ally no socioprofessional data. We know that 32 of  the 225 registrants 
were millers, confirming a trend noted elsewhere. Strikingly few mer-
chants—4—operated with associates. Only 6 of  the 225 were women; 
5 of  these 6 were widows. At least 74% of  the lille group conducted 
business “at home”; apparently they had no stocks elsewhere. Thirty-
eight dealers reported a single magazine located away from home. Only 
7 merchants had more than 1 storehouse away from home. Seven mer-
chants established their granaries in inns or cabarets. As in the other 
northern cities which left declaration lists, the grain trade in the lille 
region was highly fragmented. Most of  the traders were of  the blatier-
type, dealing on a small scale within a strictly local context. Though 
many new men entered the trade, very few appear to have been “capi-
talists” in the sense that their contemporaries used the term.
IV
The emergence of a plethora of so-called “companies” worried 
observers even more than the proliferation of individual new faces in 
the grain and flour trade. It was alarming enough to envision solitary 
hoarders and monopolists lurking about in the grain trade under-
ground and surfacing to commit occasional crimes against society. But, 
then as now, it was far more portentous to encounter organized crime, 
intrigue institutionalized in societies designed specifically to fleece the 
region or country of its vital supplies. In times of stress in the past, the 
French had fallen prey to the obsession with invidious “companies” 
held responsible for a copious array of turpitude, from child-snatch-
ing and blood-letting to currency manipulation and various kinds of 
commercial piracy. The disorder, malaise, and hardship generated in 
the sixties induced people to think in terms of plots and machinations. 
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The particular preoccupation with “companies” resulted in part from 
a confused understanding of the nature of government grain opera-
tions and a memory which recalled previous scandals and revived 
stale but enduring suspicions—the “famine pact” mentality which 
found its apotheosis in the sixties—and in part from the authorization 
to form such commercial associations generously accorded by the lib-
eral laws and utilized by a considerable number of entrepreneurs.
These companies were no more imaginary than the strange new 
traders who scoured the countryside in search of  grain. But a fatal 
combination of  public anxiety, local police suspicion, and, on the part 
of  the agents of  the companies, accidental indiscretion and short-
sighted braggadocio, puffed, distorted, and tainted the image these 
societies projected.79 The failure of  the government to undertake 
a vigorous public relations campaign to clear the air reinforced, as 
we shall see, the fabulous impressions. Pierre Malisset’s operation in 
behalf  of  the king, to which we shall return, became the popular pro-
totype of  the treacherous grain company of  the sixties. But far more 
typical of  the kind of  commercial venture which resulted in associa-
tion was the society founded shortly after the promulgation of  the first 
liberal law by François Jausse, Farmer-General and entrepreneur of  
river transports on the Aisne and Oise, Henry Monginot, écuyer and 
“secretary of  the king,” and Daniel Neser, “investor [intéressé] in the 
affairs of  the king.” Jausse wanted to expand the scope of  his trans-
port activities and place them in the service of  a speculative business 
specialized in the purchase and resale of  grain. “Unable by himself  
to encompass such a vast project,” he turned to Monginot and Neser, 
experienced venture capitalists, who agreed that the moment was 
ripe, economically and juridically, for such an enterprise and prom-
ised to invest in it 50,000 livres apiece. Jausse contracted to provide 
the capital equipment, the expertise, and the managerial direction. In 
the first stages of  the plan the passenger depots along the boat-routes 
would conveniently and unobtrusively double as headquarters for the 
grain commissioners.80
Other companies were less successful than Jausse in avoiding noto-
riety. Reports reached the government that various companies were 
burning over whole districts in pursuit of  grain, driving up prices, 
establishing secret grain caches, forcing honest men who could not 
 79 See the striking remarks of  the philosophe-philanthropist, P. de Chamousset, Œuvres 
complètes (Paris, 1783), II, 291.
 80 30 July 1764, Archives Seine-Paris, D3B6 65.
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compete to abandon the trade, and shipping huge stores out of  the 
country. leclerc, a Poissy flour merchant, purchased and stored grain 
“for the companies.” They offered a wealthy fermier in the Ile-de-
France a splendid price for his grain provided he agreed to hold it till 
after the next year’s harvest. Barat, the fiscal procurator at St. Denis, 
reported that it was generally believed in his area that the “dearth” 
which dried up Gonesse and choked other Paris provisioning markets 
was the work of  “certain companies which undertake exportation.” 
“I do not know if  these companies are authorized and if  exporta-
tion is permitted,” he added, betraying his incredulity (and that of  so 
many other police officials) that the law could in a single stroke license 
both commercial association and exporting, and his perplexity about 
the applicability of  the liberal reform in the Paris area. Barat could 
provide details only about one of  the companies, which operated two 
“powerful” mills at St. Denis and two others at Dugny. Grinding 14 
to 15 muids a day, the mills emptied the countryside of  “incredible” 
quantities of  grain. Nor did the company return any of  the flour it 
produced to the neighborhood. Packed in heavy-duty casks, all the 
local flour was intended for sale abroad.81
The Controller-General laverdy felt that it was perfectly nor-
mal for prices to be rising and for the traditional configuration 
of  the grain and flour trade to be changing. “As for the establish-
ments which have been formed at Saint Denis for the fabrication 
of  flour,” he wrote, “very far from imposing any obstacle on them, 
they must be accorded every protection; it would be desirable for 
these sorts of  establishments to multiply in all the provinces.” Pre-
dictably, laverdy hailed the creation of  such flour factories in the 
Nivernais whence an anonymous remonstrance called his atten-
tion to a “society” which builds mills, hoards grain, and exports 
flour to England while prices skyrocket and the people go without 
bread. Overwrought and lacking vision, the people complained 
“by habit of  the prohibitive laws and the ancient prejudices against 
the liberty of  the grain trade.”82
Trennin of  Versailles, the outspoken police critic of  liberalization, 
denounced the companies born of  the reform legislation in letters to 
Joly de Fleury and Sartine. As a result of  their grain purchases, prices 
increased by six livres in the first year (1765–66) to 25 livres, five more 
 81 BN, Coll. Joly 1111, fol. 137; “Cherté du pain,” AN, T6441–2; Barat to PG, 1 Oct. 1766, 
Coll. Joly 1134, fol. 93.
 82 CG to PG, 17 Oct. 1766, BN, Coll. Joly 1134, fol. 96; CG to PG, 17 Dec. 1766, ibid., fol. 97.
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the next year to 30 livres, and six more livres the following year to the 
current price of  36 livres the septier. The companies not only proved 
that liberalization was socially catastrophic but also illustrated the fal-
lacies of  liberal reasoning. Trennin seized upon an apparent contra-
diction which continued to trouble free enterprise states committed 
to liberty in later times. On the one hand, the liberals argued that 
competition was the only form of  police appropriate for commerce; 
on the other hand, they recently began to complain that the liberty 
accorded by the new laws was insufficient. yet if  the freedom was not 
as “entire” as the liberals desired, in Trennin’s view, it was largely the 
fault of  the very companies spawned by liberalization which choked 
competition and dominated the trade.83
Not sharing laverdy’s faith in progress through liberty, the Procu-
rator General took the news of  the maneuvers of  companies much 
more seriously than the minister. In the margin of  a denunciation 
exposing the wiles of  a miller named Copérieux, he wrote “notice 
which merits attention” and instituted an investigation. The informer 
claimed that in the papers of  Copérieux “would be found information 
and proof  of  Monopoly and would be revealed the names of  a Com-
pany with which he is associated … and would be discovered many 
things for the relief  of  the people.” Sartine’s researches showed that 
Copérieux was innocent and that he was not even involved in active 
grain and flour commerce. Commissioned to mill “by economy” the 
flour for the bread of  the French and Swiss Guard, Copérieux had 
occasion to make sizeable purchases at the Halles which gave rise to 
rumors. Sartine conjectured that the real motive for the denunciation 
was jealousy on the part of  one of  the bakers who previously supplied 
the Guard before Copérieux displaced him.84
At about the same time, the royal procurator at Montlhéry enter-
tained suspicions which made him tremble, for they implicated highly 
placed officials in questionable enterprises. He learned that “a company 
of  grain merchants under the name of  Ballet” maintained an entrepôt 
near the Breton coast “which empties and refills every day” as well as 
magazines in the Brie and elsewhere. An associate of  the company told 
him that “this commerce was known to and protected by Monsieur de 
Sartine and by Monsieur Trudaine de Montigny” and that, although 
it seemed to divert grain from the capital, in fact “it tended only to 
 83 Trennin to PG and Sartine, 26 Oct. 1768, BN, Coll. Joly 1142, fols. 162, 164.
 84 2 March 1769, BN, Coll. Joly 1147, fols. 47–50; Sartine to PG, 8 March and 5 April 1769, 
ibid., fols. 52, 53.
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place abundance in the city.”85 There is little doubt that the company 
unearthed by the wary procurator was a more mature version of  a 
provisioning company founded in 1760 with the encouragement of  
inspector Poussot of  the Halles and known variously under the names 
Mabille; Mabille and Monnerie; Ballet, Mabille and Monnerie associ-
ates; and Ballet, Mabille company. Mabille, “one of  our young people 
who furnish flour for retail,” courted Poussot’s favor by bringing him 
intelligence from the zone markets and ostentatiously conforming to 
all the rules established in the Halles. Poussot hailed the “utility” of  
Mabille’s first company venture, an operation involving the supply and 
storage of  secondary grains. Subsequently, Mabille and his partners 
expanded their affairs, dealing in flour more than in grain and slight-
ing retail in favor of  large-scale wholesale dealings. Shrewdly man-
aged, the company flourished in the mid-sixties and survived until 
1771. While the charge that the company used its Paris provisioning 
reputation as a cover to conceal a substantial export business can be 
neither confirmed nor refuted, it is quite likely that its directors coop-
erated with and enjoyed the support of  highly-placed officials.86
The most startling revelations about “company” maneuvers, aside 
from those associated with leprévost de Beaumont, came from 
a Bavarian farm-manager/agronomist who had come to France 
shortly after the grain trade reform of  1763. In contrast to lepré-
vost, whose hysterical tone and universal theory of  conspiracy under-
mined his credibility from the very beginning, the Sieur Marnville de 
la Roque was remarkably self-possessed and restrained. Although he 
had a monstrous “intrigue” to expose, he treated it simply as a sor-
did business affair without imputing any responsibility to the govern-
ment or dramatizing it into an infernal plot. In 1765 a company of  
agricultural entrepreneurs headed by Billard, caissier général des postes, 
seconded by fifteen or sixteen partners, hired de la Roque to manage 
a huge estate. The company, in magazines near Dammartin, Dugny 
and elsewhere, had “huge heaps of  grain” representing “the harvests 
of  five or six years.” Either poor conservation or natural deteriora-
tion resulted in massive spoilage. The Company disposed of  the most 
infected grain by dumping it in the Seine. It produced thousands 
of  septiers of  flour per month packaged for export. The aim of  the 
 85 Desromont to PG, 10 Feb. 1769, BN, Coll. Joly 1146, fols. 154–55.
 86 10,16 Dec. 1760, Arsenal, mss. Bastille 10141; 11 Dec. 1767, AN, y 12616; 24 May 1771, 
AN, F12 716; 6 May 1766, Archives Seine-Paris, D4B6 29–1530; 8 Nov. 1771, Archives 
Seine-Paris, D2B6 1103.
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company, according to de la Roque, was to generate and sustain 
dearth artificially by cornering supplies, controlling the markets, 
and halting the mills. It maintained permanent agents in some of  
the markets and to the others dispatched skilled operatives such as 
Bar who “traveled day and night in the saddle” in the area around 
Paris. “To color its deception,” the company had one of  its associates, 
Nezet, become a regular supplier for the provisioning of  the Halles in 
flour. De la Roque protested in vain against the strategy and finally 
“quit this job in order not to cooperate in the ruin of  my country for 
the love of  which I had left Germany.”
Since he was angling for a job it cannot be said that the motives for 
de la Roque’s petition were entirely altruistic. Moreover, the petition 
contains a dose of  ill-concealed megalomania: de la Roque claimed 
a fantastic scientific prowess for “the multiplication of  grain,” having 
realized yields of  25 to 1 in Germany, and hinted at a master plan 
which would enable France to export a million septiers a year while 
maintaining the price of  12 livres. yet his disclosures faithfully reflected 
a strain of  contemporary opinion and were not in themselves wholly 
implausible.87 The financier Billard was rumored to be involved in all 
sorts of  speculation including grain maneuvers; traces of  rotten grain 
had allegedly been found in the Seine; Nezet, conceivably, was the 
“investor in the affairs of  the king,” Daniel Neser, whose interests in 
Jausse and Company we have mentioned. The absence of  corrobora-
tive evidence of  any sort suggests that the company was considerably 
less high-powered and oppressive than de la Roque imagined. But 
there is no reason to believe that the company did not energetically 
seek to raise prices—after all, the government itself  favored a higher 
grain price and an activist trading class—or that it did not use a net-
work of  agents and conduct buying and hoarding operations which 
convulsed the grain and flour trade. Whatever real effects these new 
companies of  the sixties had upon supply and demand were in part 
the result of  the fears and expectations they inspired. Preceded and 
shadowed by their stereotyped reputations, these companies commit-
ted depredations which were psychological as well as economic.
 87 18 Dec. 1768, BN, Coll. Joly 1138, fols. 92–93. See also Conseil Secret, Paris Parl., 29 Dec. 1769, 
AN, Xla 8551, fol. 158. Billard’s papers were seized on 16 Dec. 1769. AN, y 11441. In the 
early seventies he was imprisoned and convicted of  malversation and fraudulent bankruptcy. 
Allegedly as a result of  Madame du Barry’s intervention, he escaped the extremely harsh 
sentence which his judges planned to impose. Hardy’s Journal, 3, 12 Feb. 1772, BN, mss. fr. 
6681, fols. 15, 19; Pidansat de Mairobert, Journal historique, II, 373 (13 Feb. 1772).
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Much more evidence must be accumulated on the nature of  the 
grain trade before and during liberalization before one can deter-
mine with any precision how the liberal laws affected provisioning in 
the sixties. There is no doubt that the trade was seriously disrupted 
after the middle of  the decade. We know that during other subsis-
tence crises—in 1725 and in 1739–41, for example—many of  the 
same “abuses” and deviations appeared. There were, however, at 
least three additional factors operating during the experience of  the 
sixties. First, the control apparatus could not respond as it usually did 
once bad times struck. Merchants clearly had more freedom than 
ever before to pursue their interests. The government did not attempt 
to marshal the nation’s resources; it left this business to commerce. 
Second, exportation was not only permitted on a kingdom-wide basis 
but it was maintained well after the dearth began to make itself  felt. 
The opportunity to export, outside one’s own bailiwick or outside 
the kingdom, encouraged the merchants to venture beyond their tra-
ditional avenues of  exchange. In this sense, internal liberty and the 
freedom to export were inextricably linked and their respective effects 
are impossible to unravel. Third, liberalization cued the public and 
the police to expect the worst. It generated fears even beyond those 
that characteristically possessed people’s minds during dearth. If  we 
cannot discern whether the disorganization of  the grain trade was 
the product of  liberalization or of  short crops and their customary 
sequellae, it is in part because contemporaries could not separate the 
two elements.
In principle, Paris was not supposed to suffer, or profit from, the 
changes in the grain trade instigated by the reforms—not at least in 
the short run. In the next two chapters, we shall take stock of  the 
government’s efforts to insulate the capital.
Chapter VII
PARIS
The government felt that it could surmount the crisis provided, above 
all, that the situation in Paris remained under control. As long as it 
did not have to face massive disaffection and disorder in the capital, 
the ministry felt it could win the day in the rest of  France, where 
the mutinies were relatively small and widely scattered and where 
there was still to be found considerable sentiment in favor of  the new 
regime. In this chapter we shall examine the impact of  the crisis upon 
the capital and the way in which the Paris police tried to deal with it. 
In the following chapter, we shall consider the extraordinary efforts 
which the central government made, not without serious reservations 
and contretemps, to spare the capital the most terrible costs of  dearth.
I
The quarantine of  Paris proclaimed by the clauses of  exception in the 
liberal laws proved singularly unsuccessful in preserving the capital 
from fear, dearth, and the disruption of  its provisioning trade. Once 
the rest of  France was liberated, the special guarantees regarding 
Paris provisioning became largely illusory. At the confluence of  her 
great rivers, in the very center of  the realm, the capital simply could 
not be isolated from the rest of  France by fiat. Provisioning was a two-
way affair. It made little sense to stand on the Port of  the Grève or the 
carreau of  the Halles and declare that nothing had changed while at 
the same time telling the rest of  the nation that things would never be 
the same again. The exemption provision created a bizarre disjunc-
ture between the capital and the hinterland, enjoining the police of  
the latter to conform to the very liberal code which it empowered the 
police of  the former to ignore.
 PARIS 301
According to the May and July laws Paris was to continue to pro-
vision itself  as it always had done in the past. The survival of  the 
old way, however, depended upon the preservation of  both the tradi-
tional regulatory apparatus and the familiar trading patterns. Liber-
alization, as we have seen, jarred them both mightily, and the disarray 
of  each encouraged the further breakdown of  the other. The main-
tenance of  the old Paris police system depended primarily upon the 
vigorous support of  the Controller-General, the freedom of  action 
of  the Lieutenant General, and the cooperation, or subjugation, of  
the officials in the provisioning zones. Traditionally the remedies for 
dearth, the disorganization of  supply lines, and the breakdown of  the 
ordinary structure of  controls were massive doses of  police, adminis-
tered by central, Parisian, and hinterland authorities. Now Laverdy’s 
passion was the promotion of  the grain trade. Despite the exemption 
clauses in the laws of  1763–64, he permitted the Paris regulations to 
lapse or interpreted them in such a restrictive way as to make them 
impracticable. By compensating the capital with a copious mass of  
the king’s grain, he felt that Paris could remain an island of  tranquil-
ity in a turbulent sea of  riots, speculation, and hoarding. The local 
police were paralyzed before the crisis made itself  felt. Prohibited 
from enforcing the old regulations and prohibitions, they could nei-
ther guarantee their own supplies nor assure the regular shipment of  
provisions to the capital.
In this situation, the authority of  the Paris police chief  was severely 
curtailed. He could neither regulate the activities of  merchants for 
the provisioning of  Paris in the countryside nor woo them with the 
protection against local competition which he had accorded them in 
the past. Nor was he equipped to intervene on virtually a daily basis 
in the host of  hinterland markets whose own police were forbidden 
to exercise their powers. In the old days the range of  the Lieutenant’s 
jurisdiction used to swell in times of  dearth as new areas fell tributary 
to the capital in its avid search for fresh sources of  supply. Now the 
frontiers of  his authority receded as new frontiers were opened to the 
grain owners and traders; his droit de suite shriveled as they found a 
multitude of  unbarricaded freedom roads leading away from the cap-
ital. The usual sanctions no longer had any sense because the dealers 
had new options which mocked the old constraints. In practice if  not 
in law, as a consequence of  this new mobility, a Parisian destination 
no longer ennobled grain, bestowing upon it privileges and immuni-
ties of  which no common cereal could boast.
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Heretofore the vagueness of  many of  the prescriptions govern-
ing Paris provisioning benefitted the police, for it enabled them to 
pursue a supple, opportunistic policy attuned to the needs of  the 
hour. Now the police became victims of  their own unorthodoxy, 
for it was not clear to anyone precisely what it meant, in scope and 
substance, to enforce the traditional regulations, in the murky lan-
guage of  the exemption clause, “as before.”1 The clause was as nega-
tive in character as it was terse in expression: nothing (“for the time 
being”—a demoralizing threat from the police vantage point) was to 
be “changed or innovated” in the old regulations. It established no 
concrete guidelines to deal with new circumstances, drew no bound-
aries—geographical, administrative, or commercial—, and assumed 
that two diametrically opposed regimes, each by nature dynamic and 
aggressive, could coexist side-by-side without attacking and under-
mining each other.
With their broad, albeit amorphous, mandate and their consider-
able skill, the Parisian police won many individual battles. But armed 
with conventional weapons there was no question of  winning the war. 
As a result of  the inability of  the Parisian police to contain the grain 
trade, the eight (later ten) league de-commercialized zone around the 
capital became open prey to merchants and companies; “foreign” buy-
ers encroached upon the second and third “crowns” of  the Parisian 
reserve; laboureurs stayed home; traders amassed stocks and diverted 
supplies toward domestic outlets free of  police influence on pricing 
and exchange or toward export entrepôts; the markets dried up; and 
all the other activities which the police construed as abuses flowered.
Police confusion and uncertainty, along with the new speculative 
climate induced by liberalization, facilitated changes in the methods 
and structure of  trade in the Paris region. Whether or not they under-
stood the dilemma of  the police or the theoretical tenuousness of  the 
liberty which they could exercise in the Parisian sphere of  influence, 
grain owners and dealers quickly perceived that the authorities were 
unsure of  themselves. The discomfiture of  the police as much as their 
consciousness of  the new rules of  the game emboldened them. Fear of  
entrapment and of  heavy penalties was no longer a powerful deterrent 
to what had once been sinisterly called “maneuvers.” Paris no longer 
cast an intimidating and ubiquitous shadow across their path. Nor was 
 1 See, for exemple, the remarks of  Cypierre, the intendant of  the Orléanais, which included 
part of  the Parisian supply zone, who did not know “the regulations whose execution was 
reserved.…” To Sartine, 7 Oct. 1768 in C. Bloch, Correspondance inédite de l’intendant Cypierre, 112.
 PARIS 303
it merely a matter of  escaping detection, punishment, and regimenta-
tion. For liberty also meant alternatives to the Paris system: new com-
mercial opportunities, new clients and connections, new itineraries. 
The old commercial structure had reflected and in some ways inter-
nalized police priorities and procedures. Once the police require-
ments were annulled, diluted, or blurred, the old structure lost much 
(though by no means all) of  its logic and compulsion. While in some 
places there was no need for readjustment, in others the trade was 
reorganized according to a purely commercial calculus. More or less 
stable relationships linking buyers, sellers, brokers, and commission-
ers in networks crisscrossing the hinterland were abandoned in favor 
of  new arrangements, often ephemeral or shifting in nature. New 
names appeared on business registers which had once been inhospi-
table to strangers. The country traders became less dependent on the 
Paris merchant barons, millers less dependent on the Paris bakers, 
and mealmen less dependent on factors.
The “privilege” of  serving Paris, once a passport into forbidden 
territory and a competitive lever outside the markets, no longer car-
ried the same weight. The aim of  the exemption clause was to assure 
the provisioning of  Paris by preventing all this from happening. yet 
it may have served to hinder the supply of  the capital not only as a 
result of  its impotence to stem the tide of  liberty but also because it 
announced that merchants who continued to frequent the capital, 
unlike traders anywhere else, would still suffer the old servitudes and 
pressures. Save where they believed that it was in their self-interest 
or where the empire of  habit proved irresistible, merchants were 
unlikely to rush to bondage.
The Prévôt des Marchands testified bitterly to the impact of  liber-
alization upon Parisian controls. Before 1763 a substantial number of  
merchants—between 25 and 40—annually applied for commissions 
from the Bureau de Ville to undertake trade for the benefit of  the capi-
tal. “By this means,” noted the Prévôt Bignon, “our ports were always 
furnished in grain.” “But,” he continued, “since the Declaration of  
1763 gave them the same privileges as these commissions without any 
subjection, they were renounced by the majority [of  merchants] or 
the merchants did not renew them, and we have retained but a small 
number and only by showing them the most careful attention.”2 In 
addition, the Parisian police lost their indirect dominion over the host 
of  lesser dealers operating in the supply zone because the exemption 
 2 Nov. 1768, Recueil, 145–46.
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clause did not specifically require them to enroll with local officials and 
respect the Paris rules in order to remain in the grain trade. By way of  
authority there was virtually nothing the police could do to retain their 
fidelity. It is no wonder that the royal procurator of  the city govern-
ment, in anticipation of  the erosion of  control over the lines of  supply, 
had argued strenuously in January 1764 for increasing the “precau-
tions for Paris rather than destroying those which are already estab-
lished in the new regime.”3 Ultimately the Parisian counterpoint in the 
liberal laws revealed itself  to be a hollow promise which served as a sop 
to police anxieties rather than as a basis for a provisioning policy.
Always marked by tensions which reached their peak during short-
ages, supply relations between the capital and the hinterland were fur-
ther strained by liberalization. While Paris drained the supply zones 
with what the consumer population regarded as calculated indiffer-
ence to their needs, local officials found themselves substantially less 
capable than usual of  defending their interests.4 Parisian authorities 
tried to play both sides of  the provisioning game: they piously invoked 
the innovative clauses of  the reform laws when liberty seemed to favor 
the flow of  grain to Paris and they flourished the exemption mandate 
to cover their intervention when liberty appeared to militate against 
their ambitions. The local police, however, were triply disarmed: vis-
à-vis hometown traders, mostly blatiers, laboureurs, and brokers; vis-à-
vis the dealers and commissioners squarely in the Parisian network; 
and vis-à-vis outsiders from still other regions who came in search of  
grain.5 As a result of  the liberal laws, these authorities could no longer 
exercise any police in the grain trade. Legally, they could not oscillate 
from a permissive to a restrictive posture as it pleased them. On the one 
hand, they could not control local traders and protect local supply and 
on the other, without power either to assist or resist Parisian incursions, 
 3 Jollivet to Saint Florentin (?), 29 Jan. 1764, AN, O1 361.
 4 While the capital drained the countryside dry, the Paris police—measurers and 
commissaires—did not even allow country folk who marketed their wares at the Halles 
to fill their empty carts with “Paris grain” for the trip home. Interrogation of  Visbec, 
16 Oct. 1770, AN, X2B 1312; Mediator’s report, 6 Nov. 1771, Archives Seine-Paris, D5B6, 
carton 6.
 5 The capital launched buying expeditions in all parts of  the kingdom without seeking any 
permission, yet Paris took umbrage when outsiders encroached upon its supply reserve. To 
the extent that they were successful in warding off  outsiders—it is my view that “foreigners” 
made serious inroads in the Parisian provisioning region with the blessing of  the central 
government—the Parisian authorities incidentally rendered service to the local police. See 
T. de Montigny to Sartine, 8 Aug. 1765, AN, F12* 150 and CG to B. de Sauvigny, 5 Dec. 
1770, AN, F12* 155, fols. 136–37.
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and thus without any bargaining counters, they stood helpless before 
metropolitan exactions.
Although the protest against excessive liberty and the breakdown 
of  order was the major theme of  discontent in the Paris hinterland 
just as it was elsewhere in the kingdom, local authorities felt that Pari-
sian pressure seriously aggravated their difficulties. They resented the 
cavalier attitude of  the Parisian police and the refusal of  soi-disant 
Paris merchants to demonstrate self-restraint. Shortly after a rau-
cous market disturbance, the fiscal procurator of  Lagny in the Brie 
complained that the unsettled situation was due partly to the huge 
purchases made by millers buying “for the provisioning of  Paris.”6 
His counterpart at Saint Florentin in Champagne deplored the short 
supply and “excessive” price level caused in large measure by the 
operations of  a Paris merchant. “Must we suffer,” he asked, “that 
strangers continue [to make] these removals?”7 The fiscal procurator 
of  Châtillon-sur-Loing submitted a stringent objection against the 
disruptive activities of  a Sieur Lenormant who “claims to be licensed 
and employed for the provisioning of  Paris” and who was draining 
off  the “little grain” which remains in the area. (Two years earlier the 
same trader had aroused similar ill-feeling as a result of  large-scale 
purchases made in the Orléanais.) Since the investigation of  this affair 
was entrusted to the Paris Prévôt des Marchands, who was more than 
ever interested in cultivating a client-relationship with Paris-suppliers, 
the Châtillon procurator had little reason to imagine that relief  would 
be forthcoming. Ironically, there was a strong chance that Lenormant 
cheated Paris even as he plundered the hinterland by failing to deliver 
his grain to the capital.8
even as they defied the law in order to protect themselves against 
the depredations of  liberalization, so the local police took illegal ini-
tiatives in order to ward off  Parisian strikes. The procurator at Mon-
tereau forced a Paris factor to resell twenty-five septiers of  grain which 
he purchased from a local curate for 25 livres the measure on the town 
market at a loss of  3 livres per septier. The Provins police retaliated 
against the Paris merchants by excluding them from the market during 
the prime morning hours. When the police imposed similar constraints 
 6 Gillet to PG, 14 July 1770, BN, Coll. Joly 1150, fols. 39–40.
 7 Billebache to PG, 16 July 1770, BN, Coll. Joly 1152, fol. 10. Cf. similar problems at Troyes 
where the intendant tried to mediate. Jean Ricommard, La Lieutenance générale de police à 
Troyes, 255, 263.
 8 Dispatch to Bignon, 16 March 1769, AN O1* 411, fols. 187–88.
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at Lizy, the Paris buyers struck back by diverting the supply to nearby 
inns where laboureurs flocked with pouches of  samples on which to 
base transactions unencumbered by public or official interference.9 
In some instances the campaigns against liberalization and against 
Paris seemed perfectly coterminous. In these cases Paris was explic-
itly denounced as the destination point of  “removals” or “exports” 
which the people rose up to intercept or the police requisitioned for 
distribution at a fixed “just” price. yet it must be emphasized that the 
local authorities did not confuse the two issues causally even if  they 
appeared to merge in practice. For the officials had lived with Paris in 
the past; all the new and unsettling elements in their situation resulted 
from liberalization which incidentally made their Paris-problem far 
more acute than it had been before. Animosity for the capital did not 
deflect the attention of  the local officials from the liberal laws. Many 
of  them understood that Paris, despite the famous exemption clause, 
was as much a victim of  the reforms as the hinterland.
While hoping for a revision of the new laws and without ceasing to 
rail against Parisian exploitation, a number of officials sought to profit 
from the “special” relationship which they had with the capital by 
shrewdly deriving from it a justification for the resuscitation of their 
traditional police powers. The basic idea was a sort of grain blackmail 
which the authorities responsible for provisioning Paris might very well 
be prepared to pay. Dronay, a police magistrate at Vitry, reminded 
the Procurator General that “the capital of the kingdom during differ-
ent chertés [in the past] drew upon resources in the city of Vitry”, but 
cautioned that the town, “finding itself exhausted,” would not be able 
to “make itself useful” again unless local authorities applied vigorous 
corrective measures.10 Historically, observed the procurator Jarry at 
Bray, this town has been “one of the principal markets on the upper 
Seine for the provisioning of Paris.” To assure this service, the town 
had always required merchants to make themselves known through 
formal registration. “Since the Declaration of the King,” however, 
Jarry explained, “which accords the liberty of the grain trade to all per-
sons the inhabitants of our city … refuse to have themselves received 
as merchants.” As a result, surveillance became impossible and there 
reigned a terrible “confusion” in the market. To facilitate the flow of 
grain to the capital, the local police had to be reaffirmed. “I beg you, 
 9 March and May 1768, BN, Coll. Joly 1142, fols. 12–13, 64–65; Petition from Lizy and CG 
to PG, Aug. 1767, Coll. Joly 1135, fols. 135–141.
 10 Dronay to PG, 14 Sept. 1766, BN, Coll. Joly 1134, fols. 187–98.
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therefore, Monseigneur,” Jarry addressed Joly de Fleury, “to please 
indicate to me if in spite of the declaration of the King I can maintain 
the usage established always and compel those who do a regular grain 
trade for the supply of Paris to have themselves received as has always 
been practiced.…”11
In theory, Jarry could have based his claim on the text of  the liberal 
laws themselves, for they specifically preserved the traditional rules 
governing the supply of  the capital—rules, it could have been argued, 
which would have no substance unless they were applicable through-
out the elastic hinterland where Parisian traders dealt. A local official 
with a talent for loose construction of  the law, who in ordinary times 
would strenuously resist the tutelage of  the capital, might attempt to 
salvage his police powers by placing them under the shelter of  the 
Parisian exemption. Citing the immunity clause in the May Declara-
tion, the fiscal procurator of  Dammartin shared the “hope” with Joly 
that “the halle of  Dammartin located eight leagues from the capital 
is included in the preceding regulations rendered for the provisioning 
of  the city of  Paris.…”12 Petit, fiscal procurator of  Rambouillet, “pre-
sumed” that he could continue to police his merchants and markets 
as always “… since it is said that nothing will be changed or inno-
vated in the Regulations rendered for the Provisioning of  Paris.”13 
The government rejected these interpretations, for it had no inten-
tion of  permitting the “provisioning of  Paris” to become a pretext 
for the perpetuation of  traditional police habits and the constriction 
of  the spread of  liberty.14 Ambiguous in meaning and inspiration, the 
exemption clause was no more an invitation to local authorities to 
evade the liberal reforms than it was a viable program for reconciling 
the peculiar needs of  the capital with the broader requirements of  
national policy.
Paris began to feel the effects of  harvest failure, the disruption of  
the grain and flour trade, and incipient panic toward the end of  1767. 
Throughout the previous year prices had remained well within popu-
lar reach. The four-pound white loaf  sold at 8 sous 6 deniers from easter 
through the summer and only attained 10 sous at Christmas. The price 
dipped slightly during the first half  of  1767, but began increasing steadily 
after the harvest.15 In September the Procurator General warned 
 11 Jarry to PG, 17 Feb. 1770, BN, Coll. Joly 1148, fols. 199–200. My italics.
 12 Noyer to PG, 4 Sept. 1766, BN, Coll. Joly 1133, fol. 149.
 13 Petit to PG, 9 April 1766, BN, Coll. Joly 1134, fols. 85–88.
 14 CG to PG. 29 Sept. 1766, ibid., fol. 29.
 15 See tables 2, 4, 5.
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Laverdy that the price—11 and 12 sous—was “exciting the public” 
to an uproar. The Controller-General confidently replied that it was 
normal for the price to swell fleetingly during the harvest-sowing 
period. “Moreover,” he added, rebuffing Parisian self-regard, “the 
price of  bread is less dear in Paris than in all the rest of  the king-
dom.”16 In December the price rose to 13 sous, provoking the ire of  
the bookdealer Hardy who esteemed that because the harvest had 
“not been bad” the increase could only be due to the “too great 
exportation of  grains outside the kingdom.” As a symptom of  the 
deteriorating situation, Hardy noted an incident that caused a stir in 
popular milieus. The police arrested a woman in the Halles quarter 
for stealing an eight-pound loaf. When asked why she committed the 
theft, she invited the commissaire to come to her home to observe 
her husband and four children languishing “in the last misery.” The 
commissaire returned home with her to discover the father dead, 
 16 PG to CG, 16 Sept. 1767 and CG to PG, 24 Sept. 1767, BN, Coll. Joly 1135, fols. 223–24.
Table 1. Flour and grain arrivals at the Paris ports and halles during 1766 
(in muids and septiers)
Month Wheat & Wheaten Flour Rye Barley
Jan.1766 1,747m.–11s. 33m. 53m.–  1s.
Feb. 1,850    –10 28     –  3 50     –11
March 2,669    –  2 30     –  6 45
April 2,391 34     –  4 48     –  3
May 1,766    –  6 45     –  7 28
June 2,257    –  9 43     –  6 28     –  8
July 2,339    –  8 31     –  4 31     –11
Aug. 1,711    –  5 57     –  1 62     –11
Sept. 1,672 49 80
Oct. 2,262    –  3 49     –  4 49     –  9
Nov. 2,103    –  1 44     –  3 58     –  8
Dec. 2,743    –  9 49     –  7 81
Total 1766 25,515m.–  4s. 495m.–  9s. 618m.–  2s
Cf. Total 1765 22,835m.–11s. 496m.–10s. 596m.–11s.
Source: Gazette du Commerce, de l ’Agriculture et des Finances (6 Jan. 1767), 12.
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hanging from a rope behind the door surrounded by the children in 
a state of  horrified shock. The commissaire released the woman from 
custody and paid for the bread she stole.17
In mid-October, in response to worsening conditions, the govern-
ment had invoked the prerogative, written in its contract with the 
 17 2 and 3 Dec. 1767, BN, mss. fr. 6680, fol. 140.
Table 2. Quantity and price of  flour sold at the Paris halles, 1767–1768
Date Price (livres tournois & sous) Quantity (in sacks 
of  325 pounds)
Minimum Maximum
Jan. 1767 31–  5 41–10 11,745
Feb. 28–  5 45 10,822
March 12,033
Apr. 31–  5 37 11,825
May 29–10 43–15 12,047
June 31 43–10 11,449
July 29–10 48– 5 12,089
Aug.
Sept. 31–  5 59–10 12,082
Oct. 30 57–10 12,842
Nov. 36 57–10 13,683
Dec. 44 58 13,965
Jan. 1768 42 58–10 14,148
Feb. 39 59 13,552
March 37 59 14,001
Apr. 36 58–10 12,047
May 40 58–10 11,886
June 40 60–10 12,786
July 38 62–10 12,319
Aug. 40 64 13,337
Sept. 48 74 12,319
Oct. 45 74 8,104
Source: BN, Collection Joly de Fleury 1139, fol. 129.
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Malisset company which maintained an emergency reserve for the 
capital, transforming the enterprise into an exclusively royal venture. 
Henceforth all the dealings of  the company would be for the account 
of  the king and his government; Malisset would be paid for his labor 
according to the pre-established schedule. Malisset was instructed to 
provide the grain and flour requested by Sartine. In addition, he was 
told to provision certain markets in the countryside around the capi-
tal, “but you will send there only modest quantities and when you find 
these markets to be abundantly supplied and the prices reduced to 24 
and 25 livres the septier measure of  Paris you will cease to ship them 
the king’s grain.” Both Laverdy and Trudaine de Montigny were 
loathe to resort to this expedient. Trudaine feared that the king’s pro-
visions would frighten away the laboureurs and, to be effective, would 
require “sacrifices” on the price which would produce a loss for the 
royal accounts. They agreed to authorize regular Malisset shipments 
to Paris only after repeated, insistent demands by Sartine.18
Seventeen sixty-eight proved to be, in Trudaine’s own words, a 
“critical” time for Paris.19 The winter was bitterly harsh; the duc de 
Croy compared it to the brutal ravages of  1709. At the turn of  the 
year the Seine, littered with huge chunks of  ice, rose dangerously 
high, impeding river transport and threatening bridge residences.20 
The inclement weather, by arresting the mills, generated one of  those 
recurrent flour crises to which pre-industrial europe was so vulnera-
ble, menacing scarcity even when grain was available. The ice, Malis-
set reported, stopped all the mills on the navigable rivers and reduced 
installations on small streams to one-quarter speed. Since windmills 
could never “be counted upon,” he suggested mobilizing the manual 
mills used in the breweries. If  the situation did not improve, Malis-
set proposed drawing upon the reserves of  the religious and hospi-
tal communities and flushing out supplies stocked by Paris bakers by 
checking the records of  the measurers for entries registered at the 
Halles and the barriers during the past two months.21 An emergency 
Assembly of  Notables at Chartres, in the heart of  a major milling cen-
ter, lamented the “absolute impotence” of  the millers to grind grain 
and warned that the people, already “murmuring loudly,” would not 
 18 Courteille to Malisset, 2 Oct. 1767 and etat, 21 Dec. 1767, AN, F11 1194.
 19 Trudaine to Sartine, 13 Sept. 1768, Archives Seine-Paris, 3 AZ 10 1, pièces 6, 7. 
 20 Duc de Croy, Journal, ed. by de Grouchy and Cottin, II, 296; Gazette de France, 18 Jan. 1768, 
no. 6, 23–24.
 21 6 Jan. 1768, AN, F11 1194.
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tolerate a lack of  bread.22 Though the weather gradually became less 
rigorous, the mills faced obstruction again in the spring as a result of  
Table 3. Wheat, flour, and bread prices at Paris halles 1768 (in livres and frac-
tions of  livres)
Date Flour best  
325-pd.sack
Flour white  
min.
Wheat septier  
min. –max.
Bread 4-pd. white  
loaf  min.–max.  
(in sous & deniers)
2 Jan. 58 50 20–25.75 12–13
13 Jan. 58 42 20–26 12–13
3 Feb. 58 42 22–26 12–13
20 Feb. 58 43 19–31 12–13
9 Mar. 59 42 18.25–27.50 12–13
19 Mar. 59 46 23–29 12–13
4 Apr. 58 44 22–30.50 12–13
16 Apr. 58 39 24–31 12–13
7 May 58 44 21–29.75 12–13
18 May 57 46 23–30.50 13
4 June 58.50 43 23–30.75 12–13
22 June 60 44 24.50–30 12–13
2 July 61 40 25–32.50
20 July 62 43 26–33 12s6d–13
6 Aug. 62.50 40 22–34 12s6d 13
17 Aug. 62 40 25.50–34 12s6d 13
3 Sept. 64 50 26–33.50 13
21 Sept. 27.50–36 13s6d–15
1 Oct. 74 50 25–35 14–15
19 Oct. 74 55 24.50–36.50 14–15
5 Nov. 80 48 25–38.10 15s6d 16
12 Nov. 76 27–41 15–16
16 Nov. 76 55 25.50–37.50 15–16
26 Nov. 76 60 25–35 15s6d–16
3 Dec. 74 55 24–32.50 15–16
10 Dec. 72 50 24–30 14–15s6d
17 Dec. 70 58 21–30 14–15
24 Dec. 69 50 27–31.50 13–14s6d
31 Dec. 69 59 20–31.50 13–14s6d
Source: BN, Collection Joly de Fleury 1137.
 22 BN, Coll. Joly 1140, fols. 100–101; police ordonnance, 5 Jan. 1768, B. 3958, fol. 47 and 
police sentence, 2 April 1768, B. 3953, fol. 66, A.D. e-et-L. Cf. similar mill stoppages 
 in lower Normandy: CG to IN. of  Alençon, 19 Jan. 1768, C. 90, A.D. Orne.
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excessively low waters. The summer was morose: cold and rainy, omi-
nous for the harvest and for the poor who could not afford to heat 
their homes.23
Already in January top flour had commanded 10 livres more 
per sack than it had the winter before. In September the flour 
merchant Caron sold his dark flour at 60 livres, an incredibly high 
price that the whitest wheaten meal could not have earned even in 
tolerably bad times.24 In November, the master baker Tupin paid 
77 livres for a white sack, the highest price he had seen in his pro-
fessional life. At that same moment the official cours at the Halles 
posted the best flour at 80 livres. Wheat also reached its cyclical 
zenith in early November, the head bursting over 40 livres at the 
Halles. Miller Philippe Aube found wheat at Congis in the Brie at 
36 livres; in four other zone markets, Gonesse, Pontoise in the Oise 
valley, Magny in the Vexin français, and Meulan in the Seine val-
ley, prices reached 34 livres, 35, 35½ and 37 respectively.25 At Brie-
Comte-Robert, where “the artisan lacks bread” and “a journalier 
finds no work,” wheat had attained 40 livres in late September.26 
yet according to one observer who claimed to have toured the 
zone, the harvest was excellent in the Aube, Seine, Oise, Aisne, 
Marne, and yonne regions as well as in the Beauce, the Orléanais, 
and the Gâtinais.27
As the price of  bread increased in the capital, so did the malaise 
and “murmurings” which bespoke popular fear and misery and acutely 
worried the police. The four-pound white loaf  hovered between 12 and 
13 sous until the fall. In the course of  September, in the shops and mar-
kets, it went from 13 to 15 sous. In early November, it climbed to 16 
sous, almost twice the price considered normal, higher than it had been 
in over a quarter century. It dipped slightly in December but it did not 
fall below 13 sous, still exorbitant, until the summer of  1769.28 Aside 
from occasional eruptions in the bakeries and sporadic brawls at the 
marketplaces, the capital experienced no serious popular disorders.29
 23 Duc de Croy, Journal, ed. by de Grouchy and Cottin, II, 301; 19 Sept. 1768, Lettres Ossolinski, 
BHVP, mss. 627, fol. 167.
 24 Caron, registre D5B6–5217, Archives Seine-Paris.
 25 Miller Aube, registre D5B6-2114, Archives Seine-Paris and see Table 4.
 26 Fiscal procurator to PG, 24 Sept. 1768, BN, Coll. Joly 1146, fol. 27.
 27 Daure, “Mémoire” (ca. 1771), AN, F11 264.
 28 See Table 5. In addition to the sources cited there, for price data see Hardy’s Journal, BN, 
mss. fr. 6680, fols. 151, 183ff.; Lettres Ossolinski, 21 Nov. 1768; BHVP, mss. 627, fol. 190; 
Conseil Secret, Délibération of  20 Oct. 1768, AN, X1A 8545, fol. 462.
 29 See, for example, 12 Sept. 1768, AN, y 12617.
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Table 4. Wheat prices in the provisioning zone, 1767–70 (in livres and frac-
tions of  livres)
Date Gonesse Magny Meulan
1767
Jan. 16–17.75 18.50 18.50–22
Feb. 16.50–18.50 18–21 18.25
Mar. 15–18 18 18.50
Apr. 15–17 18.25 18.25
May 14.50–16.50 18.75 18.25
June 15.50–17.50 20 19.25
July 17–19 21 22.25
Aug. 19–21 23 24
Sept. 20–24.50 24.50 26.50
Oct. 24–28 28 29
Nov. 23.50–28 27 29.50
Dec. 25.50–28 26.50 28
1768
Jan. 24–26 25 26.50
Feb. 24.50–26.50 26.50 27
Mar. 26–28 28 29
Apr. 24.50–26.50 29 29
May 26–28 29 29
June 25.50–27.50 31.50 31
July 29.50–31.50 32.25 33
Aug. 29–31 31 34
Sept. 29–33 32–33.50 33.50
Oct. 29–31 36.50 35
Nov. 32–34 35.50 37
Dec. 26–28 30.50 34
1769
Jan. 29.50–31.50 31 33–34
Feb. 28–30 31 30
Mar. 27.25–29.25 29.75 30
Apr. 27.25–29.25 30.50 30
May 26.50–28.50 30 30
June 26–28 28 27.50
July 24.50–26.50 28.75 30
Aug. 21–23 26.50–28.50 28
Sept. 22.50–26 29–31 31.50
Oct. 22.50–26 28.25–31.50 32
Nov. 20–25 25.50–27.50 26.50
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Table 5. Paris bread prices from baker registers, 1766–69 (4-pound white 
loaf, in sous and deniers)















Date Gonesse Magny Meulan
Dec. 23–25 24.75–26.75 26.50
1770
Jan. 20.50–22.50 22.75–25.25 26
Feb. 19.50–21.50 21.25–23 25
Mar. 20.75–22.75 22.50–24.50 24.50
Apr. 20.25–22.25 23–25 25.50
May 23–25 28–29.50 30
June 26–28 27–29 30
July 30–32 33–35 36
Aug. 32.50–34.50 34.50–36.50 35
Sept. 34–36 34–36 35
Oct. 34.50–38 33–36.50 34.50
Nov. 27–29 25–27.50 29
Dec. 26–28 26.50–28.50 29
Source: J. Dupâquier, et al., Mercuriales du Pays de France et du Vexin François, 196–203.
(Continued )
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July 9s6d; 9; 10 9s6d; 10
Aug. 10 10
Sept. 11; 12 10s6d; 11; 11s6d
Oct. 11s6d; 12; 12s6d 11s6d; 12
Nov. 12s6d 12
Dec. 12s6d; 13 12s6d; 13
1768
Jan. 12s6d; 13 13





July 13 13; 14 13; 13s6d
Aug. 13 13; 14 13; 13s6d
Sept. 13; 13s6d; 14; 15 13; 13s6d; 14; 15 13; 13s6d; 14; 14s6d
Oct. 15 14s6d; 15; 16 14s6d; 15
Nov. 16 15s6d; 16 15s6d; 16
Dec. 16; 15s6d; 15 16; 15s6d; 15 15s6d; 15; 14s6d
1769
Jan. 15 15; 15s6d 14
Feb. 14s6d; 14 14s6d 15
Mar. 14 14s6d; 14 13s6d
Apr. 14; 13s6d 14; 13s6d 14 13
May 13s6d; 13 13s6d; 13 13 13
June 13; 12s6d; 13 12s6d 13
July 13s6d; 13 11s6d; 12; 12s6d 13
Aug. 14; 13s6d 12s6d; 12 13
Sept. 12s6d; 12 12; 11s6d 12
Oct. 12 12; 12s6d 12
Nov. 12 13 12; 11s6d
Dec. 12 11s6d 12; 11s6d
Source: Archives Seine-Paris, D6B6, registres: 4118, 4119, 1003, 84, 2619, 4481, 3009, 3760, 3327.
Table 5. Continued
316 BReAD, POLITICS AND POLITICAL eCONOMy
Table 6. Flour prices 1768–1774 from merchant and baker registers: place 
of  transaction unknown (Paris region) (white flour, 325-pound sack in livres 
tournois and sous)










Oct. 71 73; 75
Nov. 74 75; 77
Dec. 74
Flour Merchant Baker Baker
Jan. 1769 66 68 68–10
Feb. 64 67 67–10
March 62 67
April 60 62
May 59 59 64
June 56 
July 55 56 52
















Sept. 70 70; 72; 76
Oct. 69; 72 71
Nov. 64 64; 60
Dec. 61; 72 62
Baker Baker
Jan. 1771 64 63
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Baker












Jan. 1774 59 
Feb. 59
March 58; 57 
April 57; 56 
May 48
Source: Archives Seine-Paris, registres: D5B6 5217, 5234, 2532, 2169.
Table 7. Flour and grain arrivals at the Paris ports and halles during 1769 
(in muids and septiers) 
Month Wheat & Wheaten Flour Rye Barley
Jan. 1769 3,716m.–  6s. 43m. 109m.–10s.
Feb. 2,993    –  8 67     –  2 121    –  5
March 3,734    –  2 63 84    –11
Apr. 4,258    –11 77     –11 123    –  3
May 3,205 60     –  6 97    –  1
June 4,365    –  5 90     –  8 67    –  8
July 3,579    –11 67     –  1 77    –11
Aug. 3,680    –11 101     –  2 89    –  4
Sept. 4,756    –11 111     –  8 134    –  6
Oct. 4,040    –  4 83     –  9 96    –  9
Nov. 3,320    –  4 74     –  6 98    –10
Dec. 3,456    –  4 91     –  3 138    –  9
Total 1769 45,104m.–  7s. 931m. –  8s. 1,240m.–  3s.
Cf. Total 1768 41,276m.–  9s. 1,251m.–  7s. 1,023m.–  7s.




Authorities were genuinely alarmed, however, by a series of  sub-
versive posters which appeared on the walls of  various quarters 
during a twelvemonth period. Parisians, and other city-dwellers 
during the Old Regime, resorted to placards in times of  trouble 
to express their disaffection.30 The posters varied in style and 
scope from simple scurrilous effusions to primitive political mani-
festoes. Overtly seditious language, whether spoken in a caba-
ret or conveyed by poster, was generally more harshly punished 
than the most portentous works of  philosophical speculation. 
It aroused greater immediate fears precisely because of  its trans-
parent crudity, because it seemed to emerge from the people whose 
irascibility enjoyed less indulgence than the more sophisticated 
spleen of  the elite, and because it appeared more likely to infect 
other people with its bad example. The police regarded the walls 
of  the cities in much the same way that modern governments view 
the air-waves and it strove with the same urgency to safeguard its 
monopoly over their use. 
“you are doubtless not unaware,” Sartine wrote the commissaries 
in the fall of  1768,
that from time to time placards are found posted at the corner of  the streets. It is 
your duty to neglect nothing in seeking to discover the authors in your quarter or 
at least in making in the breadth of  your department exact rounds at the break of  
day in order to take down those that you find and bring them to me immediately.31
At the same moment, in letters patent of  12 November, the king alluded 
to the wave of  placarding and instructed the Paris Parlement to take 
account of  it in its investigations of  alleged grain monopolies.32 Ten 
 30 In 1725, a year of  serious dearth, at least one placard appeared on the walls of  the capital 
implying that the crisis was the result of  a nefarious plot. Arsenal, mss. Bastille 10905. 
Shortly after mid-century Jean Moriceau de la Motte was hanged for sedition, largely 
because of  the offensive posters he was convicted of  having prepared. BN, Coll. Joly 1415, 
fols. 73–86. The Procurator General characterized the unauthorized posting of  bills as 
“a public crime vis-à-vis all persons.” BN, Coll. Joly 2428, fol. 111. See also the resort to 
posters at Caen in 1764 and 1765 and at Vire in 1775 to protest grain removals and high 
prices. C. 2598, C. 2664, and C. 2684, A.D. Cal. In 1778 “incendiary” posters appeared 
on the walls in London. See G. Rudé, “Paris et Londres au 18e siècle: société et conflits de 
classes,” Annales historiques de la révolution française, 45 (Oct.-Dec. 1973), 497.
 31 Sartine to Goupil, 2 Nov. 1768, Arsenal, mss. Bastille, 10277.
 32 Hardy’s Journal, 12 Nov. 1768, BN, mss. fr. 6680, fol. 186.
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months later the Lieutenant General was still exhorting the commis-
saires to tolerate no manifestations of  discontent; anyone “who would 
hold indiscreet discourse” was to be peremptorily jailed.33
The first poster about which we have substantive information 
appeared in late September 1768, although Hardy claimed that oth-
ers had been previously discovered, in Versailles as well as in Paris, 
and “even in the chamber of  the King.”34 A commissaire found 
it on the rue des Noyers where it attracted a throng of  spectators. 
It “warned” the King to “get rid of  Mssrs Choiseul and Laverdy 
who with a troop of  thieves cause Grain to be removed outside the 
Kingdom” or else “30,000 men” would do the job for him “at an 
unexpected moment.” In the opinion of  the commissaire, the poster 
“comes from Gens de Peu de Chose because there is no [proper] spelling 
and the writing does not at all appear to be dissembled.”35 Several 
days later another placard glued with mud to the church of  St. André 
des Arts raised the most serious of  traditional popular urban threats: 
“if  we go on eating dear bread we will put the torch to the four cor-
ners of  Paris.” Commissaire Leblanc described the placard as “very 
badly spelled and written with all sorts of  characters.”36 Nor was this 
the only poster menacing fire and Parisians were uneasy about it. 
Several weeks later, when a fire destroyed a broom factory, a number 
of  observers linked the blaze directly with the promises to burn the 
city contained in the wall messages. During the next two months a 
host of  similar bills appeared on both the right and left banks and in 
the faubourg St. Antoine warning in particular that the houses of  the 
ministers and the Lieutenant General would be the first to go up in 
flames if  the price of  bread did not recede.37
At the end of  October commissaire Roland reported “a large poster 
badly written containing horrors and imprecations against the King.” 
Hardy, who must not have been the only Parisian privy to such infor-
mation, noted its contents in detail. The placard evoked the famine 
plot theme, which had wide currency at the time. It expressed profound 
disenchantment with Louis XV, sharply reproaching him for abdicat-
ing the traditional paternalistic kingship—at about this time the liberal 
 33 Sartine to Goupil, 4 Sept. 1769, Arsenal mss. Bastille 10277.
 34 Hardy’s Journal, 23 Sept. 1768, BN, mss. fr. 6680, fol. 178.
 35 Roland to PG, 21 Sept. 1768, BN, Coll. Joly 1139, fol. 54.
 36 Leblanc to PG, 28 Sept. 1768, ibid., fol. 55. Cf. A. Abbiateci, et al., Crimes et criminalité en 
France sous l’ancien régime (Paris, 1971), 13–32.
 37 Hardy’s Journal, 25 Oct., 27 Oct., 13 Nov. 1768 and 28 Jan. 1769, BN, mss. fr. 6680, fols. 
183, 184, 190, 210.
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Journal économique remarked that Louis’ “handsomest title is that of  
Father of  his people”—and darkly hinting that he had a venal inter-
est in prolonging the suffering of  his subjects. The substance and style 
of  the poster suggest that it did not emanate from “gens de peu de 
chose” or at least not from wholly untutored subversives. According 
to Hardy it said that
Under Henry IV we suffered a cherté of  bread occasioned by the wars but during this 
time we had a King; Under Louis XIV we similarly experienced several other chertés 
of  bread, produced sometimes by the war, sometimes by a real shortage caused by 
the inclemency of  the seasons, but we still had a King; in the present time the cherté of  
bread could be attributed neither to wars nor to a real shortage of  Grain; but we didn’t 
have a King for the King was a Grain Merchant.
The poster concluded by recalling the attempt which Damiens made 
upon the life of  the king in 1757, intimating that such a fate would 
not be unworthy of  the apostate monarch and that men capable of  
assassination were prepared to act. Commissaire Roland found com-
fort in the fact that the crowds gathering to read the placard seemed 
aghast at its insinuations and Hardy reassured himself  that “the spirit 
of  fanaticism and revolt” caused “good citizens to shudder.” But the 
Procurator General, who received news of  it from Sartine, was suf-
ficiently concerned that he immediately notified the Chancellor, the 
Controller-General and the Secretary of  State for Parisian affairs.38 
Posters such as this confirmed the terrible suspicions of  Leprévost de 
Beaumont, the lay church official who was imprisoned as a result of  
his efforts to expose what he called the “pacte de famine.”39
None of  the posters subsequently found took aim at the king in such 
a violent fashion.40 “Abominable and seditious” though they were, they 
assailed the government in general terms and complained of  “public 
misery” and excessively dear bread. Nor did the police apprehend any 
of  the “authors” of  these written crimes. The authorities had a some-
what better chance to punish verbal sedition which usually took place 
in bars and marketplaces and left witnesses. Thus, for example, in the 
countryside, police detained an individual who, “carried away by the 
heat of  wine,” uttered “reprehensible remarks against the person of  
 38 Roland to PG, 31 Oct. 1768, BN, Coll. Joly 1139, fol. 56; Hardy’s Journal, 31 Oct. 1768, BN, 
mss. fr. 6680, fol. 183; Journal économique (Jan. 1769), 3.
 39 J.-C.-G. Leprévost de Beaumont, Dénonciation d’un pacte de famine générale au roi Louis XV .… 
(Paris, n.d.), 28. Cf. his Le Prisonnier d’état (Paris, 1791), 25.
 40 2 Nov. 1768, AN, y 12617; Machurin to Joly, 9 Nov. 1768, BN, Coll. Joly 1139, fol. 57; 9 
Nov. 1768, Hardy’s Journal, BN, mss. fr. 6680, fol. 186.
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the King” in reference to his grain trade policies. The city police 
arrested a former notarial clerk charged with turning a cabaret table 
into a podium for the denunciation of  Choiseul’s inhumanity which 
exposed thousands of  Parisians to death from extreme misery.41
That Paris suffered misery was not a subversive idea invented by 
the popular underground, nor was the wall-poster the only medium 
which dealt with it. In the summer of  1768 the Académie Française 
awarded a prize to an “epître aux Pauvres” which described the dis-
tress of  the poor, “hungry in the midst of  the harvests,” for whom 
bread remains an inaccessible and “forbidden fruit.”42 In September 
the administrators of  the Hôtel-Dieu worried aloud about the “mis-
ery” caused by the dearth, for experience taught them that such epi-
sodes always provoked widespread disease and led to an influx of  sick 
admissions straining the chronically distended capacity of  the estab-
lishment. Seven months later they called attention to “the extraordi-
nary abundance of  sick people who arrive daily at the Hôtel-Dieu as 
a result of  the Misery.”43
The Lieutenant Criminel Testard du Lys took the measure of  
popular adversity in the upsurge of  crime in the late sixties. “Crimes 
multiply,” he said, “not because the human heart is more corrupt 
but because the social faculties are more constricted.” “Verification 
made” of  their cases, Testard concluded that “misery” drove “the 
majority” of  the people filling the prisons to commit crimes.44 The 
Paris Parlement shared his view, noting that the jails “overflow” with 
prisoners in unparalleled numbers, “citizens more wretched than cul-
pable,” victims of  the cherté of  bread.45
The crisis of  the late sixties resulted in a general economic contrac-
tion which caused a serious problem of  unemployment throughout 
the kingdom.46 Inability to find work was one of  the chief  sources of  
popular desperation in the flat country and the city. The Bureau de la 
Ville financed some public works and Sartine stubbornly pressed the 
Controller-General for funds to expand the hiring of  the poor. Obliged 
 41 St.-Florentin to PG, 12 Dec. 1769, BN, Coll. Joly 2075, fol. 38; Henry to Sartine, 18, 22 Nov. 
1768, F. and L. Ravaisson-Mollien, eds., Archives de la Bastille (Paris, 1904), XIX, 422–23.
 42 Hardy’s Journal, 25 Aug. 1768, BN, mss. fr. 6680, fol. 177; Journal encyclopédique, VI (16 Sept. 
1768), 117.
 43 Délibérations du Bureau de l’Hôtel-Dieu, 30 Sept. 1768 and 5 April 1769, AAP, numbers 
137–138.
 44 Nov. 1768, Recueil, 133.
 45 Sept. 1768, in Flammermont, ed., Remontrances du Parlement de Paris, II, 945–8.
 46 See Labrousse, Esquisse, 531ff.
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to turn away many applicants, Sartine was never able to employ more 
than 500 to 1,000 workers a day on the ramparts, hills, and sewerage 
basins.47
Although he tried to stimulate the organization of  charitable 
activities in the parishes, there is some indication that the Lieutenant 
General’s effort was not brilliantly successful. Despite the attempts 
of  the police to direct the people to their parish priests, the suppli-
cants flocked to the commissaires rather than the churches. In the 
fall of  1768 the rumor was current that the commissaires were regis-
tering names for the distribution of  assistance. Besieged by visitors, 
the police assured them “with gentleness and humanity” that they 
had been misinformed.48 On a number of  occasions in the course of  
the year the police may have helped the poor in purchasing bread 
but Sartine pursued no general policy of  subsidies to consumers in 
cash or in bread.49 Although rice, as always, was available for distri-
bution, it does not seem to have won any more favor in the sixties 
than it had in the forties and Sartine did not count upon it to render 
major service.50 On a small scale, private charity contributed to alle-
viate the misery of  the poor. For example, the duc de Penthièvre, 
a prince of  the blood, arranged for the distribution of  cards to the 
“pauvres honteux”—fallen men of  known moral vertebra rather 
than the entrenched poor—enabling them to purchase bread at two 
sous the pound in certain bakeries in the Saint eustache quarter.51
III
Sartine devoted most of  his energies to staving off  the spread of  hard-
ship and tempering its impact by obtaining more supplies of  grain and 
flour and by maintaining tight discipline over the bakers. In September 
 47 Draft memoir, 10 Oct. 1768 and Sartine to CG, 5 Dec. 1768, BN, mss. fr. 6801, fols. 133, 
135; Recueil, 147.
 48 Syndic Chenon to the commissaires, 10 Oct. 1768, AN, y 13728. yet in Sept. 1768 Sartine 
told the commissaires that the king had provided him with “the means” to assist “some 
honest families in a state of  indigence who are not aided by the parish.…” Sartine to 
Mouricault, 26 Sept. 1768, AN, y 12830.
 49 In mentioning the availability of  cheaper bread for the “poor” and the “workers,” it is not 
clear whether Hardy meant that the bread was subsidized or that it was of  inferior quality. 
Journal, 28 Dec. 1768, BN, mss. fr. 6680, fol. 199.
 50 Trudaine to Sartine, 13 Sept. 1768, Archives Seine-Paris, 3 AZ 10 1, piéce 7; Mercure 
historique, CLXV (Oct. 1768), 426–27.
 51 Hardy’s Journal, 23 Nov. 1768, BN, mss. fr. 6680, fol. 190.
324 BReAD, POLITICS AND POLITICAL eCONOMy
he began to call upon the grain stored by the religious communities 
and hospitals. Although he found them unevenly stocked and ill-dis-
posed, he later wrote that their contribution of  several hundred muids, 
intervening at a crucial moment, proved invaluable.52 The shipment 
of  community grain helped create the impression of  abundance at the 
Halles. Psychological warfare was an important instrument in the cam-
paign against dearth. To heighten the panorama of  plenty, the Lieu-
tenant General used other “little ruses of  war.”53 He had dummy sacks 
of  what was meant to appear as grain stacked high in front of  the 
Halles and huge piles of  flour ostentatiously placed near the streets.
Of  much more fundamental importance was the flow of  supplies 
to the capital. In September Sartine submitted a memorandum to the 
royal council that underlined to what extent the rules governing the 
provisioning of  the capital had fallen into desuetude. He “complained 
that the markets of  the environs of  Paris are not sufficiently furnished 
and that the bakers and merchants supplying the capital have much 
trouble finding the grain necessary for this important object.” The 
government responded by specifically instructing the intendants of  
the généralités surrounding Paris, for the first time since 1763, to urge 
(but not require or constrain) the laboureurs to bring to the markets 
“quantities of  grain proportional to their exploitations in conformity 
with the regulations reserved in the edict of  the Month of  July 1764 
for that which concerns the provisioning of  Paris.”54
Though Sartine had reason to be encouraged by the government’s 
action, for it is unlikely that he could have obtained so much as a hear-
ing on this issue a year earlier, its practical effects were extremely lim-
ited. Apart from the strictly legal authority of  the exemption clause in 
the liberal legislation which empowered him to enforce the old police 
code, the Lieutenant General believed that a “reasonable liberty of  the 
grain trade” was “not incompatible” with certain “precautions” such 
 52 23 Sept. 1768, ibid., fol. 178. The community reserve system, embodying an old idea, took 
form after the dearth of  1725–26. For a discussion of  its origin, organization, and destiny, 
see my forthcoming article, “Lean years, Fat years: the ‘Community’ Granary System and 
the Search for Abundance in 18th-Century Paris.”
 53 “Mémoire” (ca. 1771), AN, F11 264. Cf. the similar tactics used at Caen. J. -C. Perrot, cited 
by R. Cobb, “Problèmes de subsistances de l’an II et de l’an III: l’exemple de Honfleur,” in 
Comité des travaux historiques et scientifiques, Actes du 81e Congrès national des Sociétés savantes, Rouen-
Caen, 1956 (Paris, 1956), 303n.
 54 Dispatches to intendants B. de Sauvigny, Cypierre, Lepelletier, 21 Sept. 1768 and to 
Sartine, 24 Sept. 1768, AN, O1 410; Sartine to commissaire Mouricault, 28 Sept. 1768, 
AN, y 12830.
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as the regularization of  the laboureur supply to the capital, which was 
the logical outlet for their production.55 The ministry regarded this 
reasoning as specious and even disingenuous; the only liberty sanc-
tioned by reason was unqualified liberty and the precaution pressed 
by Sartine was a crude Trojan horse cantering to a police beat. If  the 
ministry could not comfortably refuse Sartine’s request for a reaffir-
mation of  Parisian rights, nevertheless it had no intention of  putting 
any teeth into its instructions to the intendants. There was nothing to 
compel the laboureurs to accept the “invitations” issued by the inten-
dants to supply the markets, especially the metropolitan entrepot 
chain.56 As Cypierre of  Orléans told his Secretary of  State, a mobi-
lization of  supply required the promulgation of  a formal ordinance 
calling the grain owners to their duty. The government rejected this 
suggestion out of  hand, regarding it as “dangerous and likely to sow 
anxiety.…”57 While he shared Cypierre’s skepticism about the efficacy 
of  remote moral suasion, Sartine personally wrote to the intendants 
involved, in the hope that he could enlist their aid in resuscitating a 
few of  the most important markets and perhaps also with the idea of  
feeling them out on their attitude toward liberalization for political 
rather than for strictly administrative reasons.
Sartine believed that the city could not become fully secure until 
private commerce resumed its regular service. But in the short run he 
could not have managed to feed the capital and keep it calm without 
the extraordinary aid of  the king’s grain. every day the commissaire 
Machurin of  the Halles department, specialist in grain and flour pro-
visioning, surveyed the market and decided whether extra help was 
necessary.58 Between the end of  September 1767 and the end of  March 
1768, Malisset sent at least 8,652 sacks of  flour to the Halles (approxi-
mately the equivalent of  17,300 septiers wheat) from his magazines at 
St. Charles and Corbeil. Shipments during the winter mill stoppage 
were especially heavy. Slightly more than 75% of  this flour was white, 
 55 Sartine to Cypierre, 25 Sept. 1768 in C. Bloch, Correspondance inédite de l’intendant Cypierre, 94.
 56 Cf. the remark which Turgot made to the intendant Taboureau, 13 June 1775: “Whatever 
polite form one wishes to give it, it is very difficult for the laboureurs not to regard an invitation 
as an order.” C. 6691, A.D. Nord.
 57 Cypierre to St.-Florentin, 23 Sept. 1768 and to T. de Montigny, 27 Sept. 1768 and 
St.-Florentin to Cypierre 24 Sept. 1768, in C. Bloch, Correspondance inédite de l’intendant 
Cypierre, 87, 88, 92, 98.
 58 Goujet to Trudaine de Montigny (?), 10 Feb. 1768, AN, F11 1194 and Albert, compte 
Malisset (1769), AN, F11 1193.
326 BReAD, POLITICS AND POLITICAL eCONOMy
theoretically of  the first grade, and sold to the bakers through ordi-
nary factorage, at an average price of  55.77 livres, somewhat below 
the current. Between April and the end of  November, when the gov-
ernment abruptly and unilaterally cancelled the Malisset contract, 
Corbeil shipped 11,908 sacks to the Halles, 10,766 of  which were 
white and marketed substantially below the current at an average 
price of  56.47 livres. From February to mid-November 1768, the 
Halles received over 30,000 septiers of  presumably first-rank wheat 
from St. Charles which sold at an average of  27.05, markedly below 
the going levels. From Corbeil between mid-June and mid-November 
over 9,000 septiers arrived, registering an average sale price of  26.31 
livres. Thus, within a fourteen-month span, Malisset provided the 
equivalent of  at least 80,000 septiers or approximately 15% of  an aver-
age year’s total Parisian consumption.59
Now the records which preserved these figures are egregiously 
incomplete. Surely they do not encompass all the grain and flour 
emanating from the Malisset operation nor do they indicate the scale 
and rhythm of  shipments made after November by the agents who 
replaced Malisset in the administration of  king’s grain. The Malisset 
invoices suggest the nature of  the government’s relationship as sup-
plier to the provisioning of  Paris, but they do not permit us to mea-
sure the precise extent to which it affected the aggregate supply and 
influenced, psychologically and materially, the mercuriale. Moreover, it 
is certain that in 1768 the government established new connections 
for supply and tapped fresh sources of  domestic and foreign grain 
and flour which benefitted the capital. We shall return presently to 
the question of  the organization and management of  the king’s grain 
and its relation to politics and public opinion.
Despite the steady flow of  king’s grain, Sartine’s relations with the 
government remained somewhat strained. The liberal group in the 
ministry identified him with the police reaction and saw him as an 
enemy of  reform. In fact Sartine was the least tradition-bound of  all 
the lieutenants of  police of  the reign of  Louis XV. He kept an open 
mind on the grain question, consulting on the one side Morellet and 
on the other Galiani—both of  whom were at one time friends of  
Trudaine de Montigny—and seeking advice as well from profession-
als of  the métier like Doumerc who continued to play an expert’s part 
 59 Comptes and etats Malisset, AN, F11 1194.
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in provisioning affairs until the Revolution.60 Sartine’s view of  things 
took him beyond the city of  Paris. He appreciated the need to 
regenerate agriculture, to combat old-fashioned prejudices, and to 
modernize the Delamarist gospel. To be sure, he believed that Paris 
required special consideration in any general reform project, but he 
was a man of  breadth and imagination with a talent for compro-
mise. He could have rendered the ministerial liberals valuable sup-
port had they not contrived to bar him from virtually all top-level 
discussions on the grain issue. As much as this exclusion annoyed 
and embarrassed Sartine, it was of  much less practical consequence 
than the government’s increasing isolation from reality. The inflex-
ibility of  the ministry and its failure to develop a coherent, workable 
Paris policy drove the Lieutenant General into the opposition camp.
Until the very last moment, Laverdy obstinately refused to admit 
that there was anything abnormal or ominous in the Paris provision-
ing situation. He preached time and patience until the fall of  1768 
when, on the eve of  his disgrace, he finally changed the diagnosis and 
declared that it was “indispensable” to commit “all of  the resources 
of  the king” to the supply of  the capital.61 His chief  aide, Trudaine 
de Montigny, who showed increasing signs of  fatigue and sullenness, 
concurred, but only half-heartedly and with important nuances. He 
did not believe that it was most useful or wise to succor Paris directly 
with large, inert masses of  grain whose only imprint would be made 
on consumers’ stomachs. If  the government intervened at all on the 
supply side, it should act according to tactical criteria to maximize its 
impact. The aim should not be to assist the public but to make such 
assistance unnecessary. While Laverdy resigned himself  to a policy 
of  provisioning the capital directly, Trudaine proposed a strategy 
of  rapid thrusts in the supply zone to shake loose hidden grain and 
flour by “disconcerting the measures of  the laboureurs and merchants 
in showing them that we can do without them” in certain markets. 
Thus, for example, in September he proposed diverting 1,200 to 
1,300 sacks of  flour from Paris to the Orléans market to parry the 
“prodigious rise in prices that we suffer in the markets around Paris.” 
“This operation,” he claimed, “if  it succeeds, will procure us more 
repose than could the same [amount of] provision” sent to Paris.
 60 Morellet, Mémoires, I, 185; Galiani to Madame d’epinay, 22 Sept. 1770 and d’epinay to 
Galiani, 1 Nov. 1770, in appendices, Galiani, Dialogues, ed. by Nicolini, 580–81; Colin des 
Murs to Sartine, 8 Jan. 1769, AN, y 12618.
 61 CG to PG, 26 Sept. 1768, BN, Coll. Joly 1140, fol. 190.
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At bottom Trudaine remained fervently hostile to the use of  king’s 
grain, an approach to problem-solving which he believed the new 
political economy irretrievably discredited. “I desire very much for 
the Halles to be as furnished in flour as you desire it,” he assured 
Sartine, “… but I find it hard to believe that the means proposed [the 
king’s grain] can be as useful to that end as the free and entire com-
petition that it would be desirable to establish.” Trudaine knew that 
his stance was highly unpopular with Sartine and his subordinates. 
The attitudes of  the commissaires, who were close to the consumer 
milieus and in a position to influence public opinion, stung deeply. 
They were in large measure responsible, he hinted, for the persistence 
of  antiliberal prejudices and for the contempt and mistrust which the 
people felt for the government. “Where did these men [the commis-
saires] go, then, to acquire their doctrine which they not only allow 
to become accredited among the people but which they fortify them-
selves?” Trudaine angrily demanded of  the Lieutenant General, add-
ing that it was this “which produces the murmurs much more than 
the moderate price increase on the four-pound loaf.” Begging “par-
don for my candor,” he wrote to the man responsible for the behavior 
and reputation of  the commissaires, “it is sad that the magistrates of  
the people in the first city in the world for enlightenment should be 
so destitute of  sense.”
Whatever Paris may think, Trudaine protested, I am making 
“incredible efforts,” “the greatest efforts,” to assure the supply of  
the Halles. “If  it is believed that the thing is badly run as it is,” he 
told Sartine pointedly, “I am more than ready to abandon a depart-
ment that I assure you I did not choose by taste.”62 What the Lieu-
tenant General replied to this passionate outburst is not known. 
Trudaine not only remained in office, but found his authority enhanced 
by the appointment of  his friend Maynon to the Contrôle-Général 
in October 1768. Once he was sure of  a regular supply of  king’s 
grain, Sartine spent more time arguing with the bakers than with the 
ministers.
IV
Beginning in the fall of  1767, Sartine found himself  engaged in a long 
and wearing struggle with the bakers which did not really end until 
 62 Trudaine to Sartine, 13 Sept. 1768, Archives Seine-Paris, 3 AZ 10 1, pièce 6.
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the middle of  the next decade. To be sure, the police and the bak-
ers always lived in a state of  tension or mutual mistrust. But in the 
normal years the latent frictions rarely surfaced on a scale or rhythm 
to warrant concern on either side. As long as the prices remained 
within reasonable bounds, the police generally left the bakers on their 
own. They continued to search for violations in weight, quality, and 
grain or flour trading practices, but they did not often intervene in the 
market or shop nexus which brought buyers and consumers together 
for the exchange of  bread against money (or the promise of  money, 
for sale on credit was widely practiced at all social levels, making the 
bakers in turn dependent on credit offered by their suppliers). The 
steep climb in the price of  grain and flour, however, made the bak-
ers as well as the consumers restive and forced the police to place the 
bakery under strict surveillance and tight control. Sartine asked his 
commissaires and inspectors to report daily on every aspect of  baker 
activity.63 He wanted to know what bakers were saying to each other, 
how they were treating their clients, and how the dearth was affecting 
their commerce. Above all he was concerned to maintain the “ordi-
nary” level of  bread furnishing and to temper the bakers’ desire to 
pass the cost of  the crisis immediately on to the consumers.
From the point of  view of  many bakers, these two goals were mutu-
ally contradictory, for it was unfair and unrealistic to expect the baker 
to continue to provide bread at a loss. Not indifferent to the plight of  
the bakers, Sartine nevertheless insisted on their obedience. Combin-
ing cajolery and intimidation, he made it clear that bakers who coop-
erated would reap long-term benefits while those who resisted would 
pay dearly for their insubordination. While the Lieutenant General 
confidentially instructed his commissaires, dispatched to the markets 
for the purpose of  pressuring the bakers, to effect their missions “in a 
manner so that the public perceived as little as possible”—the police 
always sought to avoid confrontations at the marketplace that could 
ignite the crowd—he threatened the defiant bakers with “public judge-
ments,” which would expose them to popular wrath by announcing 
openly which bakers committed what crimes of  self-interest.64 Bakers 
who failed to conform to the current price or the price proposed by 
 63 Sartine to commissaire Coquelin, 6 Sept. 1768, AN, y 13728. 
 64 Sartine to commissaire Goupil, 22 Nov. and 1 Dec. 1768, AN, y 10277; Sartine to Coquelin, 
28 Feb. 1768, y 13728.
330 BReAD, POLITICS AND POLITICAL eCONOMy
the police were either issued summonses to appear in court or sum-
marily jailed by lettre de cachet or mandate of  the Lieutenant General.65
Sometimes by individual gesture, sometimes by collective petition, 
the bakers pressed tirelessly for permission to raise the price of  bread. 
Sartine tried to hold them off  as long as possible; at the height of  the 
crisis he considered a holding-action of  a week or even of  a single 
market day a substantial victory for public order. By preventing the rise 
in bread price he hoped not only to spare the consumers and facilitate 
the task of  social control, but also to influence the grain price. For he 
knew that grain responded to bread even as bread depended on grain. 
There was little prospect of  “containing” the grain sellers as long as the 
baker-buyers could count on a tariff  pegged to follow the slightest rise 
in the price of  grain.66 The first major encounter between the police 
and the bakers came right after the harvest of  1767. During the sum-
mer the four-pound loaf  had risen by 2 sous. Basing their demand on 
“the cherté of  flour at the Halle and on the little grain which they find 
in the markets of  the environs,” in September the jurés or guild officers 
requested permission to augment again from 11 to 12 sous. Sartine 
rejected their argument on the grounds that the scarcity of  grain was 
a temporary function of  the harvest labors and that flour was in ample 
supply at the Halle.
Although he was firm in his recommendation to hold the line, 
he took pains to avoid alienating the bakers. He wanted them to 
believe that their demands were genuinely negotiable and sub-
ject to frank discussion rather than authoritarian disposal. “The 
juré bakers admitted I was right,” noted Sartine, “and they gave 
me reason to hope that they will not carry the four-pound bread to 
12 sous” at least till the end of  next week. But he realized that this 
self-restraint entailed material “sacrifice” and he felt he could not 
impose the same burden on the forain bakers who commuted from 
the suburbs and hinterland to supply the bread markets twice a 
week because “the bulk” of  them were “men extremely ill at ease, 
unable to suffer the least loss” who would “be forced to quit their 
commerce if  we obliged them to give their bread at a price below 
cost.” Thus he decided not to prevent the forains from asking 12 sous, 
but reassured himself  that if  they succeeded in getting this price, “it 
 65 See, for example, bulletins de sûreté, 27 and 28 July 1768, Arsenal, mss. Bastille, 10123; 22 
Dec. 1768, AN, y 14095; 21 Dec. 1769, AN, y 12618.
 66 For the most lapidary statement of  the idea that “the increased [price of] bread causes the 
price of  wheat to increase,” see Terray to jurats of  Bordeaux, 16 May 1773, C. 1441, A.D. Gir.
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will be the fault of  those who buy, for they could have it cheaper 
by addressing themselves to the bakers of  Paris.”67 This solution was 
hardly satisfactory, for it was bound to cause bitterness among the 
Paris bakers and confusion and resentment among the poorest con-
sumers who habitually formed the clientele of  the forains at the mar-
kets. Sartine’s caveat-emptor stand and his tender manner with the 
bakers suggest that he felt certain that grain and flour prices would 
dip significantly in the near future, thereby relieving everyone.
The next few months convinced Sartine to change his posture. As 
he anticipated, between November and January the price of  grain 
and flour dropped perceptibly. Not only did the bakers refuse to lower 
their price, but on the pretext of  “the slight augmentation” provoked 
by spring grain planting, “they believed themselves authorized to 
announce that they will demand 13 sous 6 deniers for the best four-pound 
loaf  and soon 14 sous.” Sartine denounced the move as “a nuisance on 
their part which I will certainly not suffer.” He was “all the more dis-
content” with the bakers because they “owe me gratitude for not even 
having set the price of  bread and for having used until now indulgence 
in their regard.” The Lieutenant General ordered each commissaire to 
convoke all the bakers in his department to a meeting to inform them 
of  his acute displeasure and to warn them that they risk summonses 
and condemnation if  they exceed the price of  13 sous or merely if  they 
“announce” their intention or desire to increase the price.68
Faced with the threat of  prison or the closing of  their shops, the 
vast majority of  bakers appear to have complied. Despite the pro-
nounced increase in grain and flour prices, bread held fast at 13 sous 
until the end of  August. Here and there, bakers transgressed the ceil-
ing. Many, like Pigeot of  la Courtille, selling on credit to custom-
ers who desperately wanted bread, simply went undetected. Of  the 
handful who were arrested for selling above the current tariff, the 
forain Jean-Baptiste Martin of  Puteaux, attached to the Carouzel 
market, faced the heaviest charges for permitting himself  to speak his 
mind to the commissaire on the price situation and the police control. 
Other violators escaped with a fine in recognition of  the “superior 
quality” of  the bread whose price they inflated.69
 67 Sartine to PG, 18 Sept. 1767, BN, Coll. Joly 1136, fol. 12.
 68 Sartine to commissaire Grimperel, 28 Feb. 1768, AN, y 13396; Sartine to commissaire 
Thierry, 28 Feb. 1768, y 11255; Sartine to Coquelin, 28 Feb. 1768, y 13728.
 69 Archives Seine-Paris, D5B6 3009; bulletin de sûreté, 27 July 1768. Arsenal, mss. Bastille, 
10123; Sartine to PG, 25 June 1768, BN, Coll. Joly 1137, fol. 53.
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Assessing the situation in the first week of  September 1768, Sartine 
acknowledged the legitimacy of  baker grievances but insisted that it 
was wholly inopportune to permit the price of  bread to increase in the 
capital. “I view with distress, Monsieur,” he wrote the commissaires in 
a circular letter whose mood was solicitous partly because it was to be 
read aloud to the bakers, “the position of  the bakers at the price where 
grain and flour is, they cannot do their business with profit, some of  
them must even take losses, which is not Just; I am touched more than 
I can tell you and although they cannot blame their losses on me, I 
nevertheless desire to come to their aid.” each commissaire was to sum-
mon his bakers to a meeting in which he would explain the Lieutenant’s 
warm sentiments while expressly forbidding the bakers to surpass the 
13 sous ceiling (which had now been in effect for over half  a year) at least 
until the end of  the month. “I have reason to hope,” Sartine asserted, 
“that the grain will diminish before this time.” If  the price did not fall, 
he pledged to try to obtain cash compensation from the crown and 
“if  I were not fortunate enough to succeed in this I would not oppose 
a reasonable augmentation [in the price of  bread].” Meanwhile he 
instructed the commissaires to make sure the bakers continued to stock 
their shops “as usual” and treat the public with “kindness.”70
While some bakers promised to obey, a delegation received by 
Sartine the next day made it clear that they could not accept his 
decision.71 Already a large number of  bakers had made their anger 
manifest by raising prices on their own initiative or cutting back 
production. Confronted with a fait accompli, which seemed irrevers-
ible and widespread, the Lieutenant General agreed to grant them 
an augmentation of  half  of  what they desired, from 13 to 13½ sous 
instead of  from 13 to 14. The concession was meant to stem the tide 
of  this incipient mutiny. This time the bakers “kept their word”; at 
the new ceiling “they furnished their places in the principal markets 
abundantly.”72
But for the rest of  the month, while the “people murmur and pro-
test bitterly against the cherté,” the bakers continued to complain about 
the exorbitant price of  grain and flour.73 The upward momentum 
was too powerful for the police to contain. Although the police did 
 70 Sartine to Grimperel, Coquelin, Mouricault, and other commissaires, 6 Sept. 1768, AN, 
y 13396, y 13728 and y 12830.
 71 Grimperel to Sartine, ca. 7 Sept. 1768, AN, y 13396.
 72 Sartine to PG, 8 Sept. 1768, BN, Coll. Joly 1137, fol. 74. 
 73 Sartine to PG, 10, 14, 17 Sept. 1768, ibid., fols. 75–77.
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not officially relax the maximum—the price schedule reported at the 
Halle listed 13 sous as the going price for September—city and forain 
bakers alike raised it to 14½ and 15 sous before the end of  the month. 
In October the price went to 15 sous without any opposition on the 
part of  authorities. There were price variations from breadmarket to 
breadmarket depending upon the afflux of  customers, the personal 
initiative of  the commissaires and inspectors, and the solidity of  the 
bakers’ positions.74 Whether these differentials of  6 deniers or a sou were 
durable or notorious enough to stimulate important shifts in buying 
patterns and the invasion of  new turf  by “strangers” from other quar-
ters is not known. Such a phenomenon of  consumer transhumance, 
in unsettled times, would surely have aroused suspicions and exacer-
bated tensions around the marketstalls and the bakeries.
In the first few days of  November the four-pound loaf  reached its 
crisis apex at 16 and I6½ sous; thereafter Sartine successfully resisted 
any further upward movement. Through the vigorous intervention of  
the commissaires, the police thwarted a spontaneous baker effort to 
push to 17 sous.75 By the middle of  the month, the Lieutenant Gen-
eral imposed a ceiling of  16 sous. For the first time the bakers in the 
markets and shops received printed notices indicating the official tar-
iff.76 Sartine asked to be informed each day of  the “slightest augmen-
tation.” Personally, he reprimanded disobedient bakers and arranged 
for their punishment. By early December the price of  grain and flour 
had “diminished considerably in the Halles and in all the markets of  
the environs of  Paris where our bakers go for supplies.” As a result, 
Sartine expected an immediate reduction of  the four-pound loaf  to 
15 sous 6 deniers. “If  the bakers object that they have suffered losses and 
are entitled to indemnify themselves now that their costs are decreas-
ing”—the usual procedure of  natural compensation—they were to 
be told that the time is not yet ripe, that bread is still far too expensive, 
and that “they must absolutely not envision this at this moment.”77 By 
the middle of  the month bakers who sold above 15 sous risked sum-
monses, heavy fines, and jail.78 Before Christmas the police set the 
 74 12, 15 Oct. 1768, ibid., fols. 85, 86.
 75 Sartine to Goupil, 2 Nov. 1768, Arsenal, mss. Bastille 10277.
 76 Hardy’s Journal, 23 Nov. 1768, BN, mss. fr. 6680, fol. 190.
 77 Sartine to Goupil, 22 Nov. 1768, Arsenal, mss. Bastille, 10277; Sartine to PG, 12, 16 Nov. 
1768, BN, Coll. Joly 1141, fols. 94–95; Collerot Dutilleul (Sartine’s clerk) to Coquelin, 
23 Nov. 1768, AN, y 13728; Sartine to Goupil, 1 Dec. 1768, Arsenal, mss. Bastille, 10277.
 78 Sartine to PG, 21 Dec. 1768, BN, Coll. Joly 1137, fol. 105; Sartine to Coquelin, 
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tax at 14½; although some bakers continued to offer bread at 15 sous, 
others reduced the price to 14 by the first of  the new year. For the 
consumers the worst of  the nightmare seemed to have passed.
even at the height of  the price spiral, violence against the bakers 
was relatively rare, in part because police dispositions (exempts in the 
markets, frequent street patrols) proved effective, but also because of  
the widespread belief  that the bakers, like everyone else, were victims 
rather than authors of  the cherté. Nothing even remotely comparable 
to the massive faubourg Saint Antoine riot of  1725 transpired in the 
late sixties. Although individual acts of  violence were fairly common, 
they rarely escalated into collective demonstrations. At the Saint Paul 
market, for example, on 2 November 1768 a man attempted to bar-
gain with the Widow Tressaux for a four-pound bread. The bakeress 
offered 15 sous 6 deniers which, if  the loaf  was white, was a reason-
able price. The buyer replied “with a furious air,” insulting her and 
swearing that he would have it “for nothing.” A moment later another 
shopper “inveighed against the same woman,” pushed her, punched 
her in the stomach and cursed her. In neither instance did the large 
crowd around the stalls respond to the appeals of  the irate buyers 
for assistance.79
Consumers collaborated with the police in the effort to control the 
bakers by filing complaints against bakers who were dealing unfairly. 
On a Saturday in mid-December Catherine Picot, armed with the 
knowledge that the Lieutenant General of  Police had fixed the price 
of  the best bread at 15 sous, went shopping for a four-pound loaf. Four 
different bakers in her quarter asked 15 sous 6 deniers for their bread. She 
reported this violation to the commissaire Grimperel who issued sum-
monses to the offenders.80 At about the same moment an unemployed 
postillion entered the shop of  the Widow Ferray on the rue de Seine 
to buy a half-pound of  bread for his noon-time meal. He expected 
 13 Dec. 1768, AN, y 13728; Sartine to Thierry, 15 Dec. 1768, AN, y 11255; Hardy’s Journal, 
14 Dec. 1768, BN, mss. fr. 6680, fol. 197.
 According to the abbé Baudeau—if  indeed he is the author of  this journal—the bakers 
reduced prices “very late,” well after they received the orders from the police which themselves 
came “late.” Baudeau also hinted that the bakers had an “infallible means” of  winning price 
increases: bribing the commissaires and the inspectors. The first charges are demonstrably 
false and the second, similar to accusations made in 1725 and 1740, impossible to verify. See 
the “Chronique secrète de Paris sous le règne de Louis XVI,” Revue rétrospective, III (1834), 53.
 79 Sartine to Goupil, 2 Nov. 1768, Arsenal, mss. Bastille 10277.
 80 19, 30 Dec. 1768, AN, y 13396.
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to pay 2 sous but the garçon, son of  the owner, demanded 3 deniers 
more. The postillion, who had placed an écu on the counter, refused 
and asked for his money back. The garçon handed him a loaf, dis-
dainfully offering to “make charity” of  the extra 3 deniers. Affronted, 
the postillion rejected the offer, asserting that he did not take char-
ity. The garçon grabbed the knife used to slice bread and stabbed the 
postillion in the hand. On the complaint of  the wounded buyer, the 
police arrested the son and also arraigned the mother for violating 
the price ceiling.81
V
The pricing system imposed by Sartine was an improvised, circum-
stantial expedient fashioned to meet immediate public needs rather 
than a scientifically-elaborated schedule constructed to anticipate the 
whole range of  conditions that affect supply and demand and the 
costs of  fabrication. It was more like the revolutionary maximums 
than the “rates for the fixation of  the price of  bread” utilized by many 
municipalities in the Old Regime. Sartine’s purpose was to contain 
the upward thrust of  prices in a situation viewed as extraordinary and 
transitory. In ordinary times Paris had no fixed price structure; once 
the crisis passed, the bread price would once again become largely 
a matter of  market determination. From the beginning of  his ten-
ure as Lieutenant, however, Sartine had been passionately interested 
in the nascent science of  provisioning: rationalization of  procedures 
to save money and increase efficiency, technological innovation, 
in production and conservation, and increased productivity in the 
bread industry. Under the twin product of  the crisis and the wave 
of  interest in “economic” innovations, which had helped to prepare 
a climate favorable to liberalization, Sartine continued to sponsor 
experiments—“trials” as they were called in the late sixties—one of  
whose goals was “to succeed as far as possible in regulating the price 
of  bread with respect to the prices of  the production [of  wheat and 
flour] … in such a way so that the public can find the relief  which it 
must expect and at the same time the baker can find in his situation 
a means of  subsisting.”82 
These were the most imaginative, the most thorough and potentially 
 81 13, 15, 20 Dec. 1768, AN, y 13540.
 82 23 Jan. 1769, AN, y 12618. Cf. 8 April 1767, Arsenal, mss. 7458. Sartine also sponsored 
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the most promising trials which had thus far taken place in the Old 
Regime. Before Sartine’s time the police as a rule took little interest in 
the technological side of  the subsistence question, in part because they 
did not see that it would have important policy implications and in part 
because it was taken for granted that production methods, save where 
they raised issues of  public health or artisanal honesty (loyauté ), should 
be left to the men of  the métier: the miller whose lungs were filled with 
flour dust and the baker who put his hands in the dough. Before the 
sixties the police called upon Science (in the institutionalized embodi-
ment of  the Academy of  Science or the Faculty of  Medicine) only 
in extraordinary circumstances, such as during the great quarrel in 
the late seventeenth century over pain mollet, a highly esteemed fancy 
bread made with brewer’s yeast, which certain bakers and a num-
ber of  high police officials believed was “noxious to and unworthy of  
entering the human body.” For purposes of  verifying the legitimacy of  
miller and baker fees and prices, until Sartine’s time the police relied 
upon trials which Delamare had conducted in 1700. The aim of  those 
tests was not to introduce or assay improvements, but merely to reg-
ister the results and costs of  the commonly used methods of  milling 
and baking. even before liberalization, Sartine began to question the 
old standards and the old routines. He tried to establish closer work-
ing connections between the police and the Academy of  Sciences, he 
drew upon expertise in the subsistence métiers themselves, and he prof-
ited from his personal relations with scientists such as Duhamel and 
patrons of  science-in-the-service-of-business such as Pâris-DuVerney 
to favor the cause of  progress in subsistence technology. The subsis-
tence crisis spurred Sartine to accelerate the experimental program.
During the late sixties, under his personal direction, Bricoteau, 
head baker at the Scipion hospital, and Malisset, manager of  the 
royal grain storehouse at Corbeil, undertook countless tests to com-
pare the productivity of  flour ground by “economic” and “gross” 
(traditional) milling methods and the quality and cost of  bread made 
from the different flours. The work done in the sixties led ultimately 
to the creation of  a School for Baking under the tutelage of  Sartine’s 
protégé and successor, Lenoir, which gave the Paris police their own 
scientific academy devoted to research and education in all aspects of  
provisioning technology and policy.
The experiments organized by Sartine focussed on the develop-
ment of  a new or newly-perfected flour manufacturing process appro-
priately called economic milling. It involved multiple stages of  bolting 
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and regrinding which enabled the miller to salvage the rich flour of  
the middlings that had heretofore passed almost completely with the 
bran into flour byproducts not used in bread-making. Though the rea-
sons that this technique had never been widely used before have much 
more to do with the skills, attitudes, and ambitions of  millers and bak-
ers than with public policy, it is interesting to note that the regrinding 
of  middlings had been officially prohibited by police ordinance on the 
grounds that it produced an adulterated and potentially dangerous 
flour. It is fitting, then, at least in a symbolical sense, that economic 
milling came into its own at the very moment that the old police 
regime was discarded. Among other advantages, economic milling 
promised to yield between one-ninth and one-sixth more (good qual-
ity) flour than the grain ground by the customary milling procedure. 
Although it remains to be demonstrated in convincing fashion, I am 
inclined to believe that in the decade after Sartine’s experiments (dur-
ing which time the central government vigorously promoted the dif-
fusion of  the new technique) economic milling was widely adopted in 
the Paris area, that it resulted in a substantial “savings” or increase in 
flour yield from the same quantity of  wheat, and that this advance in 
productivity helped significantly to meet the ever-growing demand for 
bread, which scholars generally suppose to have been met exclusively 
by increases in agricultural production.83
As for Sartine’s immediate effort to establish a universally appli-
cable and acceptable bread price schedule, it failed, or at least the 
implementation of  its results had to be postponed. Although the sub-
sistence crisis induced the police to proceed with the tests and to draft 
reform projects, it was simply not an auspicious moment to attempt to 
introduce major changes in artisanal and commercial practices. In the 
late sixties and early seventies the entire provisioning community was 
mobilized to provide urgently needed supplies for Paris and elsewhere; 
there was neither time nor capital to invest in these innovations. even 
in a less frenetic time it is questionable whether it would have been 
possible to devise and institute a regular price control system in a huge 
city serviced by over a thousand bakers of  various types drawing their 
grain and flour from different places and baking different kinds of  bread 
for a broad range of  customers. Moreover, there were still technical 
flaws to be worked out in the “economic” system. Finally, there was 
 83 “Procès-verbal d’expérience sur 2 septiers de bled,” AN, F11 1194; Sartine to syndics, 
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the impassioned resistance of  the bakers whom Sartine consulted in 
order to learn about their production methods and costs as well as 
their attitudes and whom he invited to witness and comment upon 
the trials.
The bakers detested the idea of  price controls in any form, espe-
cially controls which would implicitly require them to modify their 
commercial and manufacturing habits. After the terrible strain of  a 
subsistence crisis, they looked forward avidly to a return to the wide 
margin of  maneuver they enjoyed in ordinary times. Nor is there any 
doubt that the bakers resented and felt threatened by this intrusion 
of  outside authority into the métier. Armed with new technology and 
irresistible quantitative data, well-funded, and backed by government 
agencies, the innovators pretended to send the retrograde craftsmen 
back to school. The bakers entrenched themselves in one redoubt 
which they still believed to be impregnable, the refuge to which all 
proud artisans bypassed by time cling: the exclusive and unfailing 
talent for producing quality goods. They had no interest in endors-
ing a process which suggested that they could (and, ultimately should 
be required to) produce and sell more bread for less money than ever 
before. The bakers impugned the validity of  Sartine’s tests on a host 
of  technical grounds. But to avoid the appearance of  sacrificing pub-
lic good to their selfish calculations, they sought to discredit the new 
process by showing that it made goods of  a drastically inferior and 
unacceptable quality. In addition to other defects in the system, the 
bread produced by “economic” flour, the bakers claimed, was nutri-
tionally marred, studded with impurities, malodorous, and tinted a 
dark honey color “which the worker despises” and would refuse to 
purchase.84
At the beginning of  the liberal period, the Controller-General had 
also expressed interest in the price control question. He instructed the 
intendants to investigate the relation of  the price of  bread to the price 
of  grain. He claimed to have ordered tests himself  which proved that 
the demands for an upward revision of  price schedules by the bakers 
were unjustified. His liberal scruples did not extend to a desire to protect 
the right of  the bakers to dispose freely of  their property as they saw fit. 
Clearly the social advantages of  dear bread were much more difficult 
to discern than the social benefits of  dear grain. Like the physiocrats, 
the Controller-General did not believe that the former followed 
 84 Procès-verbal beginning in Jan. 1769 and Sartine to Machurin, 7 Feb. 1770, AN, y 12618.
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necessarily from and in proportion to the latter.85 As La Chalotais, the 
sanguine Breton magistrate-philosophe put it, “if  there were a good 
administration of  Police [i.e., revised, parsimonious price schedule], 
it would not be impossible for the price of  grain to rise throughout 
the kingdom while the price of  bread diminished.”86 The liberals 
believed that a rational, i.e., downward, adjustment of  the baker 
index, achieved either by increasing productivity or reducing costs 
and/or profits, could serve to conceal the grain price rise from the 
consuming public.87 Partly in the hope that technical innovations in 
milling and baking, followed by appropriate administrative action, 
would compensate consumers for the permanent rise in the level of  
grain prices (apart from any wage adjustment), the économistes, led by 
Baudeau, became tireless promoters of  subsistence reform.88 While 
they refused to denounce the police of  bakers in the way that they 
excoriated the police of  the grain trade, the liberals nevertheless 
favored a radical liberalization of  the corporate structure of  the bak-
ery. In addition to improved technology and a keener police of  baker 
avarice, Turgot argued that a more rigorous competition among bak-
ers would help modulate the rise in the price of  bread in relation to 
the increase in grain.89
As for the development of  a popular thrift bread—a pain de ménage 
so ardently desired by the économistes and the police—no substan-
tial progress was made under the impetus of  the crisis of  the sixties. 
Individual bakers experimented with various kinds of  dough with-
out marked success. Toward the end of  1767 several bakers in the 
faubourgs and suburbs developed a dearth bread similar to the kinds 
which had appeared in 1709 made of  a mixture of  wheat, rye, and 
barley and selling for 25 or 26 sous the 12 pounds. While it found some 
favor among the country-folk on the periphery of  the city, Parisians 
spurned it when it was brought to the marketplaces. Similarly, the 
following year a Montmartre baker produced a “very good” bread of  
rye to be sold at 2 sous 6 deniers the pound which found few takers.90
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VI
Few bakers had the means to experiment with new bread forms in the 
last years of  the sixties. The piquant aphorism “three dear years will 
raise a baker’s daughter to a portion” did not hold true for the bulk 
of  the baking community.91 Many bakers were caught in the squeeze 
between soaring grain and flour prices and the slower-paced rise in 
the price of  bread. Others, who operated habitually on a slim margin, 
found that they lacked the resources to buy supplies in a highly com-
petitive market. Still others complained of  the rising cost of  goods 
and services, the evaporation of  customary sources of  grain and 
flour, the bitterness of  the weather, and the inability to collect con-
siderable sums of  money due from customers who purchased bread 
on credit. Although there are no serial statistical indicators either in 
the police or consular archives, there is no question that many bakers 
faced bankruptcy and ruin.
Neighbors described baker Charles Desauze of  the faubourg St. 
Antoine as a “very gallant man” victimized by “the present misfor-
tunes.” Inundated by debts and sued by his wife for a property sepa-
ration aimed at saving what little of  her investment in the marriage 
could be salvaged, Desauze ascribed his agony to “circumstances of  
the dearth” as well as to the “bad faith” of  grain and flour merchants 
who exploited the bakers by selling poor quality merchandise which 
produced much less bread than it should have.92 Baker Jean Simon of  
La Nouvelle France complained to the commissaire of  the Halles that 
he had no operating cash at all “due to the cherté of  goods, having earned 
only enough to support his household and this with much difficulty.” 
Simon profited from the goodwill of  the flour broker Widow Delaitre 
who continued to extend credit to him.93 Another factor, Delasalle, 
simply turned away the weak bakers as poor risks.94 From debtors’ 
prison, René Morin of  the rue de Grenelle, whose assets consisted of  24 
livres in veritable rags and 106 livres worth of  baking utensils, declared 
that the “harshness of  the times” compelled him to abandon all his 
 91 On “baker” folklore, see Paul Sébillot, Traditions et superstitions de la boulangerie (Paris, 1891).
 92 16 Dec. 1768, AN, y 13540.
 93 9 Sept. 1768, AN, y 12617.
 94 “etat des boulangers de ce quartier qui demandent du secours,” Sept. 1767, AN, y 13396.
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possessions and sleep “atop his oven.”95 In September 1768 a deputa-
tion of  36 guild “ancients” visited Sartine to “represent to him how 
much they are suffering from the cherté of  bread and that if  things 
continue to remain on the same footing, many of  them will be faced 
with the necessity of  closing shop.”96
Sartine, too, was caught in a bind. On the one hand, he could not 
afford to abandon price controls and, on the other, he could not rea-
sonably expect the poorer bakers to continue in these conditions the 
regular supply which he felt it was imperative to maintain. To avoid 
erosion of  the baker corps, he discreetly offered to provide various 
kinds of  assistance. By means of  subsidies to the bakers, he paid a 
modest ransom for the tax ceiling he fixed on bread and a small com-
pensation for the troubles bakers experienced on their grain and flour 
trade. Through the commissaires, the Lieutenant General distrib-
uted flour and grain in three- or four-sack loads or a cash stipend of  
300 livres. A single bounty, it was hoped, would set the baker back on 
course and enable him thereafter to support himself. “It is not at all 
my intention,” noted Sartine, “to give to the same person two times” 
but exceptions were made in the course of  the year.97
Not every importunate baker qualified for help. The commis-
saires examined each request individually and sought to verify the 
state of  need of  the supplicant. Pierre Amar, master baker of  the 
rue Montorgueuil, reported commissaire Grimperel, is “very poor 
and lacking means, is reduced to baking only a half-sack of  flour a 
day.” Indigent, he and his sickly wife were obliged to sublet their bed-
room and sleep atop the oven in order to pay the rent. The curé of  
St. Sauveur authenticated their story in a written declaration. Amar 
received 300 livres in cash. Like him, the Widow Provendier, “who 
passes for an honest woman,” has little bread for sale in her shop. 
“A little boost will enable her to continue her commerce,” observed 
Grimperel. She received three sacks of  flour. Pierre Tauvin, a newly-
established master who formerly worked in the faubourgs, claimed 
“to be in a very great need, having been ruined by his reception in 
the mastership which he said cost him 1,500 livres and by the misery 
of  the times.” To permit him to furnish his shop and the place he 
had at the Halles market, the police granted him 21 septiers in grain. 
Cut off  by his miller-suppliers at Persan and Versailles, to whom 
 95 15 June 1771, Archives Seine-Paris, D4B6 41–2260.
 96 Hardy’s Journal, 6 Oct. 1768, BN, mss. fr. 6680, fol. 179.
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he owed over 1,800 livres for flour, Guillaume of  the rue aux Ours, 
an “honest chap,” desperately needed the 3 sacks promised by Grim-
perel. Sartine gave 5 sacks and 70 livres to master Labbé who, to 
everyone’s astonishment, received no assistance for his shop and two 
market-stalls from his relative, the grain and flour entrepreneur Mal-
isset. Much less persuasive was the request from Jean Trouillet who 
“had quite a comfortable air” and an arrogant manner that annoyed 
the commissaire. Baker Descosal, a former member of  the Paris 
watch, still wore a sword over his apron and seemed too eccentric to 
be taken seriously. Grimperel endorsed the application of  Sébastien 
Lapareillé, scion of  a huge baker family, who had seven children and 
was “very ill at ease,” but Sartine rejected the request, noting that this 
master “can very well wait.”98
After careful investigation and in consultation with a former and 
a present juré, Grimperel estimated that at least forty bakers in the 
St. Denis quarter alone merited assistance. In most cases the com-
missaire learned of  their need indirectly. Unlike the desperate 
Amars, who went to see Sartine, the majority of  bakers, “despite 
their misery,” still have too much “amour-propre” to step forward. 
A sense of  honor—an alloy of  self-esteem and neighborhood 
reputation—was the pendant to the cupidity for which the baker, 
like the bon bourgeois, was more famous. Although it did not dissuade 
him from cheating the public on weight or defying the price ceiling, 
it inhibited him from soliciting or accepting charity. Grimperel pro-
posed that the police should actively seek out the needy instead of  
waiting for shops to close and bakers to fail. He carefully explained to 
those whom the police assisted that the bounties were “advances” or 
“credits” rather than gifts and that the bakers were expected to repay 
them when they recovered. In return for the advances, the police 
expected their shops to be “exactly”—amply—furnished in bread.99
Several hundred bakers—perhaps as many as 500—benefitted 
from the distributions and, with remarkably few exceptions, fulfilled 
their obligations to continue regular supply.100 The bakers proved less 
cooperative, however, in meeting their promises of  restitution. except 
for the very poor, the subsidized bakers were expected to pay a small 
weekly installment on their advances to enable them to amortize 
 98 etats, Sept. 1768, AN, y 13396; Sartine to Grimperel, 21 Sept. 1768, ibid.
 99 Draft letter, Grimperel to Sartine, mid-Sept. 1768, ibid.
100 Recueil, 13, 132, 268; Roubaud, Représentations, 410–11.
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their debts gradually and to permit the police, who had no special 
budget allotment for this program, to help other bakers. After an ini-
tial access of  assiduity, many of  the bakers began to neglect their pay-
ments. Afraid of  pressure or reprisals from their bolder colleagues, 
those docile bakers who paid begged the commissaires not to reveal 
their names publicly. The police suspected a “cabal” among the bak-
ers to avoid reimbursement, a collective effort on their part to exact 
damages from Sartine for the difficulties he had imposed. To set an 
example, Sartine obtained lettres de cachet in January 1769 resulting in 
the incarceration of  four of  the leaders of  this debtors’ strike. Chas-
tened by a short sojourn in the Grand Châtelet, they agreed to make 
good on their debts. The news of  their experience spread rapidly, 
inducing the other bakers to comply as well.101
Paris escaped neither the effects of  liberalization nor of  the sub-
sistence crisis. From the fall of  1767, the capital’s supply lines were 
mangled and its provisioning was in jeopardy. While Sartine labored 
to repair the channels that linked Paris to the hinterland (without 
any guarantee, moreover, that the hinterland would have grain to dis-
patch) and to keep the bakers in line, the city turned increasingly to 
the central government for direct assistance on the supply side. In the 
next chapter, we deal with the operation of  the king’s grain, at once 
a study in combatting dearth in the traditional style, in managing or 
failing to manage public opinion, and in the practice of  the high and 
low politics of  subsistence. 
101 Dec. 1768, Arsenal, mss. Bastille, 12334.
Chapter VIII
THE ROYAL TRUMP
In considering, across the long run, the increasing success  eighteenth- 
century society enjoyed in escaping or attenuating the effects of  the 
deadly old-style subsistence crises—an incomplete triumph which 
we must be careful not to exaggerate—the role played by govern-
ment in husbanding resources, containing disease, and organizing 
social services is often overlooked. If  Paris was spared a serious “cri-
sis of  mortality” and violent sociopolitical disruptions in the late six-
ties, it was partly due to the efforts the government made—without 
enthusiasm, it must be noted—to keep the city adequately supplied 
in the midst of  a grave and prolonged dearth. To be sure, it can be, 
and in fact was, argued that the methods used by authorities were 
prodigal and inefficient. The king was said to have spent as much 
as 10,000,000 livres in purchasing grain and flour, the bulk of  which 
served the capital.1 But it remains extremely doubtful, given the 
harvest failures, the disorganization of  the grain trade, the primi-
tive state of  communications, and the mood of  consumers, that the 
city could have fared so relatively well without massive governmental 
assistance. In any case, no one, with the exception of  a handful of  
ideologues and  optimists, not even the ministers who fathered the 
radical program of  liberalization, was prepared to court the risks 
that non- intervention implied.
This chapter examines certain aspects of  the king’s grain operation 
in the late sixties. Like the previous interventions of  the government 
on the supply side, it must be seen first of  all as an extraordinary mea-
sure devised to deal with a critical subsistence problem. Throughout 
this discussion, it is imperative to keep in mind that the provisioning 
situation of  the capital was grave and that the grain provided by the 
government, though it could offer nothing more than stop-gap relief, 
 1 “Mémoire” (Aug. 1771), BN, Coll. Joly 1111, fol. 144.
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was desperately needed if  the bakers were to continue to offer bread 
for sale in sufficient quantity. Unlike earlier royal victualing enter-
prises, which did not come into being until after a crisis declared 
itself, the king’s grain operation of  the late sixties was prepared well 
in advance. This point, too, should not be overlooked. On the eve of  
liberalization, for the first time ever, the central government estab-
lished an emergency reserve fund for the capital. Theoretically, the 
government was better equipped than it ever had been to deal with 
potential subsistence difficulties. Liberalization, however, added a 
new variable whose effects the government could not foresee.
The king’s grain system also focuses attention upon administra-
tive practices. It is important to see what the king’s grain was: an arm 
against dearth and for liberty. But it is also revealing to see how it 
worked or how it was supposed to work. Like tax collecting, victualing, 
whether for the army, the hospitals, the colonies, or the great cities, 
was an incredibly difficult task. The more we learn about how it was 
done, the more we shall know about the aims, the composition, and 
the operation of  the old-regime administration, its relations with busi-
ness groups, its appetite for change, etc. Unfortunately, we do not have 
as much information about the details of  the king’s grain undertaking 
of  the sixties as we do about a similar effort on an even greater scale 
conducted in the early 1740’s. Yet enough evidence emerges to suggest 
the way the government conceived of  the enterprise, the approach it 
took in launching it, and the fashion in which it tried to liquidate it. It 
would be useful, in order to take the measure of  this administrative 
experience, to compare it with the provisioning operations which pre-
ceded and followed it, with the étapes and vivrier-munitionnaire operations 
of  the army, with the functioning of  organizations of  abundance in 
Lyons, Marseilles, the Lorraine, Geneva, Rome, and even China.
Nor can we ignore the political implications of  the king’s grain expe-
rience. In many ways they are at the very center of  our preoccupa-
tions. It was, more than anything else, its connection with liberalization 
that distinguished this episode of  royal paternalism and social control 
from previous ones. The king’s grain service, I argue, was the royal 
trump for liberalization: the final resource on which the government 
could draw in its efforts to lead the kingdom to a new manner of  treat-
ing the grain question. A number of  factors, however, threatened to 
blunt the potential effectiveness of  this resource. First of  all, it is clear 
that the government hoped it would never have to be used. At worst, 
from the vantage point of  the mid-sixties, the ministry envisioned 
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occasional forays into the Paris markets to reinforce the supply at stra-
tegic moments. The government was not prepared, materially, psycho-
logically, or politically, for a subsistence problem of  the acuity of  the 
situation which developed in the late sixties, not only in the capital but 
through much of  the rest of  the kingdom as well. second, the ministry 
was itself  divided in opinion. Bits of  evidence suggest that Choiseul 
and saint-Florentin favored the use of  the king’s grain on a substan-
tial scale. Trudaine de Montigny, Laverdy’s closest adviser, made no 
pretense about his hostility to this traditional policy. The Controller-
General himself  hesitated and the operation reflected his uncertainty. 
Third, there is the question of  organization, which we touched upon 
above. To undertake the extremely complex and delicate provisioning 
mission, the government relied upon a peculiar old-regime genre of  
organization located equivocally on the frontier between public and 
private enterprise. The king’s grain operation aroused serious misun-
derstanding and mistrust. Yet it is arguable that any form of  organiza-
tion would have encountered the same sort of  troubles.
The combination of  a highly publicized new departure in national 
grain legislation and the semi-clandestine recourse to “official” grain pur-
chases and sales revived and gave urgency to the old suspicions bequeathed 
by one generation to the next that powerful men at the summit of  author-
ity were speculating for their own purposes on the hunger and misery 
of  the people. The “famine pact” accusations heaped odium on a king 
whose moral reputation was already sullied and vulnerable. Inept at pub-
lic relations in ordinary times, the government proved woefully unable to 
deal with popular credulity and the dearth mentality. On the one hand, 
it did not know how to address public opinion and, on the other, divided 
in its own attitudes, it did not know what posture to present. The revo-
lutionaries of  ‘89 believed in the famine pact and placed it prominently 
on the list of  crimes committed by kings and their henchmen. For many 
nineteenth-century historical commentators, nothing exemplified as well 
as the pact the discredit and the degeneracy into which the old regime 
had fallen. After dealing with the operation of  the king’s grain system, 
we shall examine the so-called legend of  the famine pact, insisting upon 
its relationship to the liberal reforms and upon the terrible irony through 
which royal paternalism lost its credibility.
In this chapter we meet a number of  extraordinary individu-
als whose paths cross in a remarkable way: a grain entrepreneur 
cuckolded by John Paul Jones, an embittered victualer who ended 
up organizing provisioning for the French expeditionary army in 
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revolutionary America, and, at center stage, two men, strangers to 
each other, whose destinies were inextricably intertwined: Malis-
set, the “major-domo” of  the king’s grain, and Leprévost de Beau-
mont, the man who first exposed the famine pact. I pay deference 
to these individuals, especially the last two, not simply because they 
are engaging, but because they illuminate in striking fashion the 
ambience and the problems of  the late sixties. Malisset and Lepré-
vost were both unusually intelligent, self-consciously “enlightened,” 
and acutely aware that they were living in an age of  great ferment 
and innovation. Both favored liberalization, although both became 
instruments of  its downfall and discrediting. In his own way, each 
one had a fascinating career, which tells us, in Malisset’s case, a 
good deal about the transformation of  the subsistence industry 
and about changing patterns of  social and economic mobility, and 
in Leprévost’s case, a good deal about the experience of  politi-
cization and alienation, which many men underwent in the last 
decades of  the eighteenth century. Together, they are the two links 
that tie together the political, psychological, and administrative 
elements in the story of  a subsistence crisis unlike any other in the 
Old Regime.
Finally, the last part of  this chapter deals with the liberal reaction 
to the king’s grain and famine pact experiences and with the attitudes 
of  supporters and opponents of  liberalization to the general ques-
tion of  official victualing. Their commitment to liberalization placed 
the économistes in an intellectually untenable position; like politically 
engaged intellectuals at any given moment, they had to strain to 
remain faithful both to their ideas and to their political allies.
I
The immediate origins of  the king’s grain operations of  the sixties 
are to be found in the ministry of  the Controller-General Mach-
ault (1745–54), one of  the longest and most enterprising in the 
eighteenth century. Partly in response to immediate needs, partly 
as a buffer against future uncertainties, Machault decided just 
after mid-century to set up a grain reserve. Critical of  the care-
less way in which the accounts of  previous royal operations had 
been handled, he assigned Gaudet, senior clerk in the vingtième 
department, the task of  collecting and verifying invoices and gen-
erally of  overseeing the program under the supervision of  the 
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intendant of  finance, Courteille.2 Machault believed that precise 
knowledge of  the grain dealings would enable the ministry to control 
and utilize them more effectively and prevent the long and unseemly 
squabbles between government and contractors, which frequently 
arose during or after the operations, poisoning the atmosphere and 
delaying final settlements.
Ironically, eighteen years later, Gaudet, who had renounced a com-
mission “out of  the desire to please M. de Machault and in the hope 
of  an advancement [in the ministry] which I sought to merit,” found 
himself  involved in a bitter dispute with superiors over the accounts 
for the supply operations he directed in the early fifties.3 In the 1780’s, 
as we shall see, the government was still contesting the claims of  the 
parties who ran the king’s grain in the sixties. Grain bred suspicion, 
not only in the mind of  the crowd, but in the cabinets of  ministers, 
even when they could place their own men in charge of  the busi-
ness. The inquisitions which invariably followed grain affairs demor-
alized experienced middle-echelon managers like Gaudet and made 
respectable entrepreneurs reluctant to serve the government.4
For reasons that apparently had nothing to do with Gaudet’s man-
agement, Machault’s successor, Moreau de séchelles (1754–56), dis-
solved the royal grain fund. Earlier in his career séchelles had directed 
army provisioning, an experience which may have convinced him that 
victualing and stockpiling were uneconomical and politically question-
able undertakings. Under pressure from Courteille, a convinced reserv-
ist who believed in the utility of  “always having a million or 1,500,000 
livres worth of  grain in case of  need” and in reaction to the war with 
England which would deprive France of  a prime source of  imports 
for emergencies, a new ministry in 1757 charged Gaudet once again 
with assembling 40,000 septiers in the Paris region.5 Gaudet had no dif-
ficulty in constituting the stock, but in the course of  the next few years 
there was little call for supplies from either the capital or the outlying 
 2 “Réponse du sieur Gaudet,” Jan. 1769, AN, F11 1192; Almanach royal (1761), 163 and (1763), 
173. For the sort of  business which occupied the grain department, see Courteille to IN. of  
Burgundy, 12 June 1766, C. 77, A.d. C d’O.
 3 Gaudet to (?), 16 Jan. 1769, AN, F11 1192. despite his dispute with the government, Gaudet 
remained in charge of  the vingtième department at least until the ministry of  Turgot. see 
Almanach royal (1774), 200.
 4 Cf. the “Chambre des bleds” of  1709, AN, X2B 1090, and the experience at the local level 
in Bordeaux, Joseph Benzacar, Le Pain à Bordeaux (Bordeaux, 1905), 92–93.
 5 Notes of  a conversation between Courteille and the Avocat Général Joly, 16 June 1757, BN, 
Coll. Joly 1130, fol. 21; AN, F11 1191–1192.
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area. The reserve became a costly and unwieldy insurance policy—
expenses for maintenance alone, not counting granary rental and 
wages for workers, amounted to over 90,000 livres—and the ministry, 
now directed by the Controller-General Bertin, began looking for a 
way to enjoy the benefits of  security while transferring the burden 
of  maintenance to private hands. In 1760 the government commis-
sioned Pierre Malisset, a Paris master baker, to undertake purchase of  
replacement grains for the reserve and in 1762 it named him to take 
charge of  the “régie of  the king’s grain for the provisioning of  Paris.”6
II
The eighteenth century was not accustomed to men like Pierre simon 
Malisset. An Algeresque figure gifted with extraordinary talent and imag-
ination, he had an entrepreneurial and industrial vision of  the future 
uncommon to his time and inconsonant with his place as a guild arti-
san, master baker, and son of  a provincial baker of  no fortune. Installed 
in a modest shop on the rue saint Laurent,7 sweating over the oven, 
serving a clientele he knew by name, and dealing in sous and deniers, he 
became in a short period of  time merchant, miller, subsistence engineer, 
and supplier to masses of  consumers, handling accounts of  hundreds 
of  thousands of  livres and counselling members of  the Academy of  sci-
ence and Controllers-General. Bakers and millers felt threatened by his 
inventions, rivals in commerce resented the advantages which efficient 
methods and good connections afforded him, and the businessmen and 
officials with whom he worked scorned him for his lowly origins. They 
all begrudged his dazzling ascension and lost no opportunity to impugn 
his honor and the authenticity of  his success.
Malisset’s participation in the king’s grain operations won for him a 
dubious celebrity beyond the professional milieu. He signed the con-
tract with Laverdy which Leprévost de Beaumont called the “famine 
pact” and thus became party, so it was claimed, to a horrible crime 
against mankind. What qualified him to undertake this charge was not 
his technical expertise, with which Leprévost was unfamiliar, but his 
“bankrupter’s soul.”8 The Paris Parlement, conducting an investigation 
 6 29 sept. 1760, Arsenal, mss. Bastille 10141; AN, F11 1194 (régie).
 7 16 Feb. 1756, Arsenal, mss. Bastille 10042.
 8 Leprévost, Arsenal, mss. Bastille 12353. Cf. Gustave Bord, Histoire du blé en France. Le Pacte de 
famine, histoire, légende (Paris, 1887), 60 and Maxime du Camp, Paris, ses organes, ses zones et sa 
vie dans la seconde moitié du XIXe siècle (Paris, 1869–1875), II, 29.
350 BREAd, POLITICs ANd POLITICAL ECONOMY
into “monopoly” in the late sixties, interrogated “this former garçon 
baker [who has] become very rich in a very short time.” The lawyer 
and journalist Linguet used his name metaphorically to evoke the 
notion of  monopoly and hoarding. Manuel, the revolutionary muck-
raker, resurrected Leprévost’s charges, characterizing Malisset as the 
“generalissimo” of  the famine plot.9
Malisset first set up shop in 1748. From the beginning, he con-
ducted experiments in bread-making and in the production of  flour 
meant to improve quality and increase yield. More than any other 
individual, he was responsible for the early development and diffusion 
of  economic milling, a technique which promised enormous benefits 
to the public.10 despite considerable opposition, he stubbornly per-
sisted in his efforts to persuade the directors of  public assistance insti-
tutions to adopt the new methods and drastically modify their flour 
and bread-making procedures. After initial, hard-won triumphs at 
the General Hospital, the Controller-General Bertin offered govern-
mental patronage and launched a program to promote the technique 
throughout the kingdom. In 1761, signing himself  simply “baker at 
Paris,” Malisset wrote the first widely disseminated piece on the new 
method for the Journal économique, the appropriate organ for Malisset’s 
brand of  micropolitical economy.11
He also assisted doctor Malouin, a well-known physician and 
chemist, in the preparation of  his volume on baking and milling for 
the encyclopedic series on the arts and crafts sponsored by the Acad-
emy. The scientist Parmentier and the lawyer-scholar Béguillet, two 
of  the most prolific writers on subsistence questions in the eighteenth 
century, drew heavily on Malisset’s experience.
Economic milling, as Malisset construed it, postulated a whole new 
approach to the bread industry, not merely a technical modification 
 9 23 Nov. 1768, BN, mss. fr. 6680; Linguet, Du Pain et du bled, 59; Manuel, Police dévoilée, I, 371.
 10 Béguillet, Traité des subsistances, part II, 6; Béguillet, Discours sur la mouture économique (1775), 
184–85; Béguillet (?), “Mémoire sur les avantages de la mouture par économie,” Arsenal, 
mss. 2891, fol. 209; “Mémoire sur l’expérience des bleds” (ca. 1764), BN, mss. fr. 14296, 
fol. 19; C. 9780, A.d. Nord. For Malisset’s contemporary reputation, see also Baudeau, 
Avis au premier besoin, 2e traité, 28 and P.-J. Malouin, Description et détails des arts du meunier, du 
vermicellier et du boulanger, ed. by J.-E. Bertrand, 50. For a modern view, see Mauguin, Etudes 
historiques sur l’administration de l’agriculture en France, I, 332 and Alfred des Cilleuls, “Rapport 
sur l’étude de M. Camille Bloch, ‘Création par Malisset d’un moulin économique à 
Châtillon-surLoing en 1776,’” Bulletin du Comité des Travaux Historiques et Scientifiques, section 
des sciences Economiques et sociales (1899), 10–11.
 11 Journal économique (Aug. 1761), 363–64.
 THE ROYAL TRUMP 351
of  the grinding and sifting process. He wanted to introduce thrift, effi-
ciency, and the rational use of  resources at every stage of  production: 
from seed to loaf. deeply interested in techniques of  grain and flour 
conservation which would eliminate waste, protect consumers from 
disease, enhance bread quality, and make the trade more profitable at 
all levels, Malisset conducted experiments under the sponsorship of  
Pâris-duVerney, intendant of  the Royal Military school and an old 
hand in provisioning affairs. Malisset worked directly with the emi-
nent savant duhamel du Monceau, whose étuves, or drying ovens, he 
installed in several magazines. He proposed important modifications 
in the drying process and developed tests to prove the unquestionable 
superiority of  grain subjected to treatment.12 The Paris municipality 
engaged him to conduct experiments on the river to develop the best 
methods for covering and conserving grain shipped by boat.13 He 
directed numerous trials commissioned by the Paris police to deter-
mine more effective ways to prepare bread.
At Corbeil, the center of  his operations in the sixties, he established 
a complex of  six economic mills which were the wonder of  the whole 
region. There he installed drying chambers, harnessed the energy of  
the water-mills to power a pulley-elevator system capable of  lifting grain 
to seventh-floor granaries, experimented with new baking ovens in the 
shape of  a parallelogram, and developed molds for baking a form of  
bread which many Parisians still prefer today (“une baguette moulée, 
pas trop cuite, s.v.p.”).14 Years before the founding of  a public bakery 
school by Parmentier and Cadet de Vaux, Malisset fixed as his “aim” 
at Corbeil “to assemble everything that concerns the preservation and 
manufacture of  flour and bread, to present models of  each machine 
and tool suitable for these operations, to train students without neglect-
ing the part for bookkeeping which is so essential in a big business.”15
Big business was Malisset’s dream; he considered the traditional 
artisanal style an anachronism. He had a revolutionary vision in which 
 12 AN, 127 AP 6 (duhamel du Monceau); Pâris-duVerney to duhamel, 3 May 1762, cited by 
Béguillet, Traité des subsistances, 775–78n; Bourde, Agronomie, II, 940–41; Gazette du commerce, 
de l’agriculture et des finances (29 July 1776), 507.
 13 14 Oct. 1762, AN, K 1026.
 14 Béguillet, Traité des subsistances, 520; Malouin, Description (ed. 1761), 243, 252; “Mémoire” 
(n.d.), AN, F11 264. similar installations, with mechanical elevators, aerating machines, 
and more efficient grinding apparatus, apparently existed in England and were familiar to 
specialists in France. see société d’Agriculture de Rouen, “Mémoire sur le commerce des 
bleds et des farines,” ca. 1763, AN, H 1507.
 15 “Mémoire justificatif  par le sr Malisset,” 8 Feb. 1771, AN, F11 1173.
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technology rather than politics was to be the corrosive of  the old 
socioeconomic order. The air at Corbeil today is still thick with flour 
dust produced by milling factories working for Paris of  the sort which 
Malisset anticipated 200 years ago. In the 1760’s he saw millers as 
“fabriquans” and grain merchants as “négociants.”16 Even while he 
was employed in the royal service, he prepared to seize the opportuni-
ties which liberalization offered the industrial-scale flour trade by cre-
ating workshops to construct and repair barrels and packaging mate-
rial for the transport of  flour to the colonies and to foreign countries.17
As a result of  his innovative spirit and driving energy, Malis-
set became an adviser to the government. Bertin called upon Mal-
isset for consultation on general questions concerning agricul-
ture—Bertin’s specialty—as well as concrete matters pertaining 
to milling.18 Malisset enjoyed a long and fruitful collaboration with 
the police experts in subsistence, Machurin and Poussot, respec-
tively commissaire and inspector in the Halles department. Pous-
sot described him as “one of  the men most informed about trade 
in grain from its birth until it is converted into bread; there is no 
matter on this commerce, good or bad, that he does not know.”19 
The police hoped, through a series of  physical improvements and 
structural reforms, to regenerate the Halles and make it the para-
mount and perhaps even the exclusive center for grain and flour traf-
fic serving the capital. With Malisset’s technical assistance, the police 
planned to compose a detailed, rigorously exact treatise for “min-
isters and magistrates” on the problems of  provisioning, in effect a 
much needed revision of  parts of  delamare’s Traité.20
Business was the center of  Malisset’s life. Childless, he and his wife 
devoted themselves completely to their affairs. Madame, whom he 
described as “assiduous and intelligent … [and] extremely thrifty”—
the sort of  bourgeoise whom Chardin liked to paint—assumed a large 
share of  the burdens of  day to day management, freeing her husband 
for other pursuits. They lived frugally; without taste for ostentation 
and with no dowries to build, they invested all their earnings in their 
commerce.21 There is no evidence, as Malisset’s enemies hinted, that 
 16 Malisset, “Observations,” (Jan. 1765), BN, mss. fr. 14295, fol. 164.
 17 AN, F11 1193.
 18 Béguillet, Traité des subsistances, 87–90n.
 19 22 March 1760, Arsenal, mss. Bastille 10141.
 20 7 April, 2 Oct. 1760, ibid.
 21 “Mémoire justificatif  par le sr Malisset,” AN, F11 1173.
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he lived a life of  debauchery and dissipation. A curious episode in the 
fifties does not gainsay his puritanical self-portrait but suggests none-
theless that he was vulnerable to certain worldly vices. On a grain 
buying expedition in the Oise Valley, he met three “cavaliers” who 
invited him to join a card game called “the triumph of  France.” Mal-
isset won handily and refused to continue, claiming that he played too 
well and would merely be “stealing” their money. Finally he ceded, 
lost 36 louis, a tidy sum, and later discovered that one of  the players 
had emptied his saddle bags of  their contents and filled them with 
hay while he was at the gaming table.22
Nor did Malisset have an untarnished police record. On at least one 
occasion, also in the fifties before he achieved notoriety, the police, at 
the request of  the guild jurés, seized 14 septiers of  flour seconds and a 
wagon drawn by three horses belonging to Malisset, on the grounds 
that the corporate statutes prohibited bakers from trading in flour. 
Malisset insisted that the flour was to be used for dusting his bread 
and feeding animals.23 It is quite likely, however, that he purchased 
seconds specifically for purposes of  regrinding and converting into 
bread-flour according to the principles of  economic milling that he 
would later make famous.
Although it is easy to account for his sinister contemporary repu-
tation on other grounds, it is possible that he owed a portion of  the 
stigma assigned to him to his older brother with whom he was often 
confused by contemporaries and historians. Antoine-Charles Malisset, 
who signed his name almost precisely like Pierre-simon, was a forain 
baker singularly unsuccessful in his business. His wife, the widow of  
a Paris master baker who brought him a considerable dowry includ-
ing a house in the faubourg st. Antoine, sued him for separation of  
property in 1759. Witnesses who knew him well described him as 
“negligent in his affairs,” “deranged in behavior,” irresponsible, and 
heavily indebted to a host of  merchants. Pierre came to his brother’s 
rescue, employing him first as a warehouseman, then as a “mealman 
and miller” for the General Hospital, and finally as a salesman and 
promoter of  Malisset grain and flour in the provinces.24 An even more 
 22 20 dec. 1755, Arsenal, mss. Bastille 10041.
 23 2 June 1757, AN, Y 12605.
 24 23 Aug. 1759, AN, Y 15060; Minutier Central, XXVIII, 290 (13 Feb. 1745); Minutier 
Central, VII, 349 (15 March 1764); Minutier Central, LXXXV, 583 (23 Nov. 1764).
 Arpin noted that there were two Malissets, the older a specialist in milling and the 
younger an expert in baking. I have found no evidence to support this claim. Marcel 
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serious blow to family honor and solidarity came from his nephew 
Jean-Baptiste (the son of  Antoine-Charles?) who became his first clerk 
and heir apparent in the late sixties. Jean-Baptiste betrayed Malisset 
by joining his rival, enemy, and successor in the management of  the 
king’s grain, doumerc, who allegedly encouraged the nephew’s frivol-
ities and alienated him “from the fidelity he owed his uncle in order to 
draw from him the secrets of  the commerce of  sieur Malisset.” Later, 
on his own, Jean-Baptiste became “négociant” in grain and a flour 
merchant, barely surviving until he filed for bankruptcy in 1779.25
Impressed with Malisset’s credentials, in the fall of  1760 Gaudet 
asked him to begin to purchase grain for the king’s account. If  the 
arrangement proved satisfactory, Gaudet intended to tranfer the 
entire operation to private, or rather, semi-private hands. Malisset 
expressed serious reservations about the proposition, not merely to 
enhance his bargaining power, but because he knew that there were 
grave risks involved in such a collaboration. Firstly, he was concerned 
because Gaudet’s affairs “did not pass for being clear,” a circuitous 
way of  suggesting that Gaudet was already under suspicion for mis-
management, a charge Malisset himself  would later face. secondly, 
long before Leprévost de Beaumont ever imagined a famine pact, 
Malisset fully understood that the administration of  the king’s grain 
had never been a wholesome and unblemished enterprise. In studying 
the government’s role as a supplier in the Old Regime, it is extremely 
important to keep this insight in mind. “In these sorts of  purchases 
and maintenance of  grain,” he noted, “many things occur which are 
against the interests of  the King and consequently of  the state.” If  the 
Lieutenant General of  Police insisted, he would undertake the mis-
sion, but he wanted it known from the beginning that he was entering 
a sort of  Augean stable.
Poussot assured him that sartine and the intendant Bertier, another 
of  Malisset’s patrons, would follow his activities closely and protect 
 Arpin, Historique de la meunerie et de la boulangerie, depuis les temps préhistoriques jusqu’à l’année 1914 (Paris, 
1948), I, 118–19. Lefèvre wrote about a Malisset père and a Malisset fils. It is almost certain that 
he mistook Malisset’s older brother for his father. P. Lefèvre, Le Commerce des grains à Lille, 88n.
An Antoine-Charles Malisset, “associated baker at Choisy-le-Roy,” husband of  Louise 
Brive (not the woman from whom our Antoine-Charles separated in 1759) appears in the 
records in 1781 ceding his property to creditors. 31 March 1781, Archives seine-Paris, dC 
6 24, fol. 12.
 25 Archives seine-Paris, d4B6-53-3245, d5B6 531, dC 6 21, fol. 150, d4B6-80-5338; 
“Mémoire justificatif  par le sr Malisset,” AN, F11 1173.
 THE ROYAL TRUMP 355
him. The reformist police inspector was elated by Malisset’s accep-
tance, for it would mark a new era, he felt, in the management of  
the king’s grain. With Malisset there would be no corruption and no 
waste; none of  the royal stock would henceforth be thrown in the river, 
as the public often suspected and as Poussot attested had occurred in 
the past. Given the “infallible precautions” he would take, his pur-
chases would be discreet and without effect upon the normal flow of  
grain to the capital and his sales would be prompt and strategically 
distributed.26
As a gesture of  good faith and as a reward for his willingness to 
cooperate in the king’s grain, in November the royal council granted 
Malisset a nine-year concession for furnishing all the prisons of  Paris 
with bread. Prison supply had long been a source of  concern to the 
government. Prisoners rioted a half  dozen times in the course of  the 
century over bad quality bread. Authorities conceded that the bread 
was often “badly manufactured” by bakers “of  poor economy” who 
tried to squeeze a substantial profit from the six-month contracts they 
habitually signed. Malisset promised a bread of  at least “one-third” 
better quality at a lower price than previously offered.27 The opportu-
nity to implement his economic milling and baking technique on an 
institutional or quasi-industrial scale pleased Malisset enormously. It 
would facilitate his role in the king’s grain operations, for the prison 
concession required him to maintain at all times a full year’s advance 
supply of  grain or flour. Already operating one economic mill on his 
own, the contract prompted him to establish a second one. In the 
light of  similar charges which later arose, it is interesting to note that 
his prison bread drew criticism from a jailhouse concierge for poor 
quality. such an opinion deserved no credit, contended Poussot, “for 
everyone agrees that it [the bread] is pretty and good.”28
The exact nature and scope of  Malisset’s initial activities in the 
king’s grain is not known. They must have gratified the ministry, 
for beginning in 1762 Malisset undertook full responsibility for the 
“régie of  the king’s grain for the provisioning of  Paris.” He inherited 
from Gaudet a part of  the 40,000 septiers fund he was supposed to 
maintain. He had complete freedom to make purchases where he 
chose as long as he constantly kept the fund at par, but he could only 
 26 29 sept. 1760, Arsenal, mss. Bastille 10141, fol. 380.
 27 Arrêt du Conseil, 14 Nov. 1760; 23 sept. 1760, Arsenal, mss. Bastille, 10141, fols. 377–78.
 28 10 dec. 1760 and 3 Jan. 1761, ibid., fols. 419, 425.
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dispose of  grain as the  government ordered. Between december of  
1762 and december of  1764 he bought or replenished 40,424 septiers 
worth 579,107 livres at time of  purchase. From the beginning of  1763 
to August 1765 he sold 34,307 septiers. The General Hospital was the 
largest single buyer. The capital, still amply supplied by the ordinary 
channels of  provisioning, drew less than 8,000 septiers in king’s grain. 
Malisset stored his grain in sixteen different magazines, most of  
which were located in the Brie, a prime theatre for buying. The cost 
of  maintaining the stock was 107,164 livres, the bulk of  it in ware-
house rentals and wages for day-laborers and supervisory person-
nel. The expenses involved in purchase—transport, loading, duties, 
etc.—amounted to over 24,000 livres. For his labors, Malisset received 
a commission, based on sales volume and price, of  51,530 livres, The 
royal accountant for the king’s grain, Mirlavaud, one-time clerk to 
the famous financier Bouret who aided Machault in grain purchases, 
provisionally approved Malisset’s calculations on the very day they 
were submitted. In addition to buying and selling grain, Malisset also 
manufactured government flour for shipment to the colonies.29
Malisset’s arrangement with the government does not seem to 
have prohibited him from undertaking grain trade in his name. It is 
known, for example, that he sold grain to the hospitals on his own.30 
How carefully he separated, physically and financially, his personal 
dealings from those in the king’s name cannot be determined.
III
In August 1765, Malisset signed the contract with the Controller-
General Laverdy, which later put Leprévost de Beaumont on the 
scent of  the famine pact. This contract significantly altered the way 
 29 Comptes and états, AN F11 1194; André Cochut, “Le Pain à Paris,” Revue des deux mondes, 
XLVI (15 Aug. 1863), 989; Courteille to La Michodière, 25 Jan. 1764, C. 103, A.d. s-M.
 30 AAP, 105, liasse 9, #2. Malisset may also have been involved in purchases made by order 
of  sartine in 1763. Ibid., new series 47 (scipion accounts). He was also “the munitionnaire 
charged with the supply of  bread for the troops of  the camp of  Compiègne,” according to 
the Journal encyclopédique, XVIII (1 Aug. 1764), 131. Malisset’s brother Antoine had a share 
in the enterprise for the supply of  bread to the hospitals of  the royal army in Germany in 
the early sixties—a concession he probably obtained through Malisset’s influence. 2 April 
1769, AN, Y 9086 (I owe this reference to the graciousness of  Professor s. Chassagne, 
currently at the C.N.R.s.). Finally, Malisset organized his own flour exporting venture. see 
“Observations sur le commerce de bled et de farine,” ca. sept. 1765, C. 9780, A.d. Nord.
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in which the government administered the king’s grain.31 In the fifties 
and early sixties, the king’s grain had been a royal operation managed 
by crown officials with the participation of  outside agents working 
exclusively for the king’s account. With the signing of  the new agree-
ment, the government diluted its responsibility for the administration 
of  the operation; it lost its quality of  régie, or more precisely, was to 
become a régie only under certain conditions. Malisset acknowledged 
receipt of  40,000 septiers of  “first quality” wheat, which he promised 
to maintain at all times at the disposition of  the government. As long 
as the price remained below 21 livres at the Paris market he could, 
however, dispose of  up to one-third of  the stock as he wished pro-
vided he replaced it within four months. Once the price attained 21 
livres the fund was supposed to be “entire”, but Malisset still had some 
latitude for his own dealings, for he had another margin of  two weeks 
to “complete” the stock once the price climbed to 25 livres. At that 
moment, the grain kept by Malisset formally became the king’s grain. 
Malisset could no longer sell for his own purposes; all purchases and 
sales were to be made for the king’s account and all sums received 
were to be deposited with Mirlavaud’s royal grain treasury.
The contract carefully safeguarded royal interests; it was hardly a 
windfall for Malisset. He assumed all expenses for magazines, mills, 
transport, labor, and equipment, in return for which he was to receive 
an annual indemnity of  24,000 livres and a 2% commission on the 
current value of  all grain bought and sold for the king’s account.32 In 
addition to a number of  material benefits, such as exemption from the 
taille, the contract afforded Malisset one enormous moral advantage 
which he cleverly commercialized. Article eleven stipulated that “all 
the operations relative to the maintenance and provisioning of  the 
magazines of  the king will be made in the name of  His Majesty and 
I will be accorded every protection in this respect.” This provision 
enabled Malisset to invoke royal patronage as a lever in all his dealings. 
Even when he was not acting specifically in behalf  of  the government, 
he could use this license to facilitate his business, to win the favor of  
clients, and to preempt rivals who could not sport a royal imprimatur. 
 31 Malisset Contract, AN, F11 1194.
 32 Courteille supported Malisset’s request for a 30,000 livres indemnity, arguing that it was 
“much less considerable” than what the government had paid in the past for such services. 
Mémoire (1765), AN, F11 1194. Note, too, that Malisset promised to provide 170 pounds of  
flour for every septier of  wheat, at least ten pounds more than commonly offered.
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Malisset’s liberal use of  the royal name was partly responsible for the 
astonishing proliferation of  rumors concerning the operations of  a 
royal “monopoly” or royal “companies” in the late sixties.
In his policy of  liberalization, the king’s grain served as Laverdy’s 
royal trump card. The availability of  a reserve for the capital, he 
believed, would free him to implement the liberal reforms throughout 
the rest of  the kingdom. If  the Paris supply lines became threatened, 
he could draw upon the king’s grain “without,” in the words of  one 
of  Malisset’s associates, “at all altering the liberty of  commerce.”33 
This was, in any case, the intention and the rationalization. Whether 
indeed Laverdy genuinely believed that the Company, when called 
upon to act in a difficult moment, could avoid “altering” the liberty 
of  commerce for many buyers and sellers is an open question. The 
Controller-General conceived of  the grain fund as a tactical pis aller, 
not as a proper granary of  abundance charged with responsibility 
for provisioning the city at all times. There is no doubt that Laverdy 
felt uneasy about resorting to interventionist practices in virtually the 
same instant that his ministry formally broke with that traditional 
style of  administration. Nor was he unaware that certain observers 
would point to the Company as evidence of  his hypocritical or luke-
warm commitment to liberty. Yet he viewed the king’s grain arrange-
ment, at least at the start, as a crucial form of  insurance and as an 
integral part of  the plan to contain Paris for the sake of  liberalization.
Why Laverdy chose to reorganize the reserve system along the lines 
of  the new Malisset contract remains a puzzling question. In other 
arrangements for institutional provisioning—the army, for example—
he prided himself  on substituting a régie-like operation for the traditional 
“companies” in order to obtain “economy” and order.34 In the Mal-
isset deal, the government farmed out the management and, despite 
rigorous checks, inevitably weakened its control. In part, the decision 
seems to have been motivated by growing dissatisfaction with the old 
management under Gaudet. The government had never desired nor 
been equipped to go into the grain business. Gaudet had little difficulty 
mobilizing the reserve, but during relatively long intervals of  quiescence 
he could maintain it only at great cost and with considerable waste. 
 33 Mémoire to Trudaine, May 1768, AN, F11 1193. Malisset himself  understood the primacy 
of  liberalization in the Controller-General’s mind. “Observations” (Jan. 1765), BN, mss. fr. 
14295, fols. 153–54.
 34 Laverdy to Miromesnil, 24 April 1768, in LeVerdier, ed., Correspondance Miromesnil, V, 157.
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He could not sell and renew with the ease and mastery of  a merchant. 
Malisset was a skilled expert with a formidable background in the métier 
and a fetish for economy; given the incentives for private initiative in the 
contract, it could be expected that he would manage the reserve with 
greater success. Financially, the arrangement had allure for a govern-
ment facing chronic deficits. Malisset provided all the capital for con-
struction and upkeep and he paid all current expenses; the government 
simply deposited in his hands the initial grain fund.
Finally, there seems to have been a political dimension to Laverdy’s 
reckoning. Implicit in the doctrine of  liberalization was the idea that 
once all obstacles and vexations were removed, an uninhibited free trade 
would assume all the burdens of  supply in good times and bad. The 
government would not only cease to be a policeman, but it would also 
renounce any entrepreneurial role in the economy. For the moment an 
exception in favor of  Paris had to be tolerated. As a first step in the new 
direction, however, Laverdy thought it was important to break away 
from the old style system in which the government itself  operated the 
king’s grain. divesting itself  of  its managerial and financial interest in 
the business, the government would give the grain operation an aspect 
less harshly in contradiction with its liberalizing policies. Whether the 
resort to a quasi-private company dressed in royal livery was the best 
way for the government to divorce itself  from the association was a 
question warmly debated within the ministry and in liberal circles.
Although Malisset had full technical control of  the operation, he 
was not the only party to the “submission” of  August 1765. While “the 
experience and fidelity of  sieur Malisset left no fear as regards him,” 
wrote Courteille, the intendant who struggled until his death in 1767 
with Trudaine de Montigny for control of  the grain department in the 
ministry, “several inconveniences which it is prudent to prevent gave 
reason to fear that in the moment of  need, the totality of  the provi-
sion might not be constituted and that the time required for replace-
ment might delay the help that the circumstances might require instan-
taneously; in consequence, it was judged necessary to ask Malisset for 
backers.”35 In a word, the government knew that Malisset could convert 
grain and prepare bread, but he was, after all, merely a master baker 
recently risen and he had neither the rank nor presumably the wealth to 
guarantee that he would be in a position to fulfill all his obligations. The 
convention sought by the government was customary practice in both 
 35 Courteille, 11 sept. 1765, AN, F11 1194.
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business and what passed for public affairs in the Old Regime. It wanted 
men of  impeccable credentials and substance to pledge their honor and 
property along with Malisset in this important venture.
Nor is it likely that Malisset had the opportunity to choose his guar-
antors and partners. With his consent, the ministry proposed three men 
who had important positions and connections: Jacques-donatien Leray 
de Chaumont, honorary grand master of  the Eaux et Forêts of  France 
at Blois; his friend Bernard Perruchot, director of  the hospital services 
of  the royal armies, a position which probably gave him some experi-
ence in provisioning; and Pierre Rousseau, another friend and business 
associate of  Leray, who had a long career in the finances, most recently 
as receiver-general of  the domaines in the Orléanais. (Endogamy was 
not the rule in either the financial or victualing milieu, but in both those 
places, as in the mafia, it facilitated connections: Rousseau married the 
sister-in-law of  Brochet de saint-Prest whom we shall meet as manager 
of  Controller-General Terray’s grain department in the seventies.)
In a separate contract, the three guarantors joined Malisset in the 
formation of  a “society” for the conduct of  the grain and flour busi-
ness. Each man held four shares for which he paid 10,000 livres apiece, 
forming an investment pool of  160,000 to launch operations. “To 
excite his zeal,” the guarantors bestowed a gift of  two extra shares 
upon Malisset. Malisset retained a large autonomy in day-to-day 
management, but the associates agreed to appoint a treasurer quar-
tered in offices in Paris, institute a regular accounting and reporting 
system, and hold a weekly meeting of  the shareholders.36
Leray de Chaumont was the dominant figure in the triumvirate of  
backers. In the opinion of  Courteille, Leray “can by his fortune and 
by the range of  his commerce render to the state the most essential 
services in the times of  crisis.”37 son of  a prosperous Nantes bour-
geois who became a city councillor and chevalier of  the order of  
st. Michel, Leray made the first of  his many fortunes in maritime 
 36 J.-C. Colfavru, “La Question des subsistances,” La Révolution française, V (July–dec. 1883), 
219–26; L. Cahen, “Le Prétendu pacte de famine,” Revue historique, CLXXXVI (sept.–Oct. 
1935), 180–81. On Rousseau, see Jean-Nicolas dufort, comte de Cheverney, Mémoires sur les 
règnes de Louis XV et de Louis XVI et sur la révolution, ed. by Robert de Crèvecœur (Paris, 1886), 
I, 331, 345, 399–400 and II, 23, 145, 371. There is also a brief  reference to Rousseau, who 
acquired an important financial post in Paris toward the end of  his career, in J.F. Bosher, 
French Finances 1770–1795, From Business to Bureaucracy (Cambridge, 1970), 339. Without 
adducing any evidence to back his claim, E. Lavaquery wrote that Necker invested in the 
Malisset operation. Necker, fourrier de la Révolution (Paris, 1933), 29.
 37 Courteille, 11 sept. 1765, AN, F11 1194.
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trade and invested part of  it in the purchase of  vast manors, includ-
ing the estate of  Chaumont-sur-Loire, which dated from 980 and 
once belonged to Catherine de Medici. One of  his neighbors was 
Choiseul, who regarded him highly and brought him in touch with 
other members of  the ministry.38
Like Malisset, Leray was an innovator, an experimenter, and a 
gambler, but on a far greater scale. According to a friend, Leray “was 
mixed up in every possible commercial enterprise.”39 Within several 
years after the liberalization of  the grain trade and the development 
of  economic milling, he established a plant at Blois for the manufac-
ture of  economically-ground flour for exportation to the colonies.40 
He was a correspondent and admirer of  duhamel du Monceau 
whose works on grain conservation had direct bearing upon his com-
merce. He experimented with various methods of  drying and fortify-
ing grain and developed a simple and relatively inexpensive system 
of  étuves modeled after Chinese grain saunas.41 He participated with 
and advised sartine on the milling and baking experiments which 
the police chief  sponsored. Later, when Leray became intendant of  
the Invalides, he encouraged Parmentier in his researches and hired 
Brocq, a noted experimental baker who later became technical direc-
tor of  the school of  Baking.42
For Leray, however, subsistence was only a sideline. He established 
glass and pottery factories and supported several prominent artists, 
including Nini, the celebrated medallionist.43 He was a grand specu-
lator, involved before and after the sixties in every sort of  overseas 
traffic. A member of  the “reform party,” which rebelled against the 
 38 For Leray’s background, see J. de Broglie, Histoire du Château de Chaumont (Paris, 1944), 181–
83 and passim.
 39 dufort-Cheverney, Mémoires, ed. by Crèvecœur, I, 345. For his comments on Leray’s later 
career, see ibid., I, 174–75.
 40 Béguillet, Traité des subsistances, 91. Béguillet thought highly of  Leray, hailed his great services 
for provisioning in 1768, but criticized his application of  economic milling. Ibid., 669n, 113.
 41 C. Bucquet, Observations intéressantes et amusantes du Sieur César Bucquet, ancien meunier de l’hôpital 
général, à MM. Parmentier et Cadet ... (Paris, 1783), 130n; Leray to duhamel, (n.d.), AN, 127 
AP 6 (duhamel du Monceau).
 42 4 May 1769, AN, Y 12618; 22 Jan. 1771, Archives seine-Paris, d5B6 2169, AN, F11 1230; 
deliberations of  Bureau of  the General Hospital, 15 Jan. 1787, AAP, new series 47; 
A. A. Parmentier, Manière de faire le pain de pommes de terre sans mélange de farine (Paris, 1779), 23.
One wonders whether it was his expertise in grain trade and commercial affairs which 
enabled the economist Forbonnais to win the hand of  Leray’s daughter. see Claude Lopez, 
Mon cher papa, Franklin and the Ladies of  Paris, (New Haven, 1966), 323–24.
 43 Broglie, Château, 181–82.
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directors of  the mismanaged Indies Company in 1764, he helped 
form a giant India-consortium in the seventies that included the 
nephew of  John Law and a number of  prominent international bank-
ers.44 He borrowed heavily and was also the source of  huge loans for 
needy financiers.45 According to an American correspondent writing 
in the eighties from “New Haven dans la Nouvelle Yorck,” Leray was 
among “the first and true authors of  our glory and of  our liberty.”46 
Leray became the intimate friend and counselor of  Benjamin Frank-
lin, who used his splendid Passy hotel as an American business and 
propaganda office and salon.47 Leray served as intermediary between 
Franklin and the French foreign ministry, won the favor of  sartine 
who was navy minister in the mid-seventies, helped Franklin procure 
desperately needed supplies and ships for the American revolutionar-
ies, and personally fitted out several of  the vessels with which John 
Paul Jones made his mark.
A man immersed in such extensive, complex, and delicate dealings 
was bound to inspire strong feelings among his associates. Franklin 
regarded him as “the only Person here whom I could rely on for 
Counsel”, but also noted that “his embarrassments have made him 
say and do things inconsistent with his character.…”48 John Paul Jones, 
who allegedly seduced Leray’s wife, called him a “harebrained man” 
and accused him of  “base conduct.”49 The Mémoires Secrets cited his 
“very equivocal reputation” while the “English spy” described him 
as “an ardent, industrious, and greedy man, who would grasp, if  he 
could, the commerce of  the 13 united colonies for himself  alone.”50 
 44 Lüthy, Banque, II, 384, 452–53, 455–56.
 45 see, for example, Bosher, French Finances, 106n.
 46 Bachaumont, Mémoires secrets, XXIX, 136 (25 July 1785).
 47 Lopez, “Benjamin Franklin, Lafayette, and the Lafayette,” Proceedings of  the American 
Philosophical Society, 108 (1964), no. 3, 185–87 and Mon cher papa, 123–29. On Leray’s role as 
an intermediary between France and America during the revolutionary war, see Lafayette 
to Leray, 16 April 1779, typescript translation from Louis Gottschalk collection (courtesy of  
a private collector). On Leray’s American connections, also see Beaumarchais to Vergennes, 
21 sept. 1776 and 3 April 1777, in Beaumarchais Correspondance, ed. by B.N. Morton (Paris, 
1969–72), II, 254 and III, 83.
 48 Cited by Lopez, “Benjamin Franklin, Lafayette and the Lafayette” Proceedings of  the American 
Philosophical Society, 108 (1964), no. 3, 188 and Lincoln Lorenz, John Paul Jones: Fighter for 
Freedom and Glory (Annapolis, 1943), 464. Cf. Franklin’s description of  Leray as “the first in 
France who gave us credit” in Lopez, Mon cher papa, 324–25.
 49 s. E. Morison, John Paul Jones: A Sailor’s Biography (Boston, 1959), 123, 185; Lorenz, John Paul 
Jones, 456–57.
 50 Bachaumont, Mémoires secrets, XXX, 249 (28 May 1775); A.O. Aldridge, Franklin and his 
French Contemporaries (New York, 1957), 62. Cf. the stinging assessment ascribed to Baudeau, 
“Chronique secrète,” Revue rétrospective, III (1834), 90–91.
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Necker saved him from financial failure in 1780, but Leray had to 
struggle throughout the decade to keep his affairs in order. Necker’s 
daughter, Madame de staël, helped finance the efforts of  Leray’s 
son, who fought in the War of  Independence and married an Ameri-
can, to colonize the Ohio Valley.51 Leray is said to have become the 
confidant of  the duc de Chartes and an active Mason.52 An enlight-
ened and paternalistic seigneur, he managed to obtain certificates of  
civism through all the vicissitudes of  the Revolution. Astonishingly 
versatile, thoroughly familiar with every phase of  the enterprises he 
launched, devoted to science, art, and lively conversation, willing to 
take enormous risks but shrewd enough to invest in land as well as 
commerce and the bank, officeholder and courtier, philanthropist 
and robber-baron, Leray was a striking representative of  that breed 
of  dynamic businessmen-nobles who rose to prominence in the old-
regime equivalent of  the industrial-military complex.
Except for the impression made upon the popular imagination—
a gauge that is difficult to read—there is little trace of  the activities 
of  the Malisset company in the first two years after the signing of  
the contracts. It seems probable that the company took maximum 
advantage of  the opportunities afforded by the contract to engage 
in the grain trade, but there is no evidence indicating the magnitude 
of  the operations, the origin and purposes of  the buyers, the amount 
which entered export traffic, or the sources from which replacements 
were drawn.
The base of  the Malisset company was at Corbeil, a town watered 
by the seine with a centuries-old milling tradition. The king and 
the Paris hospitals were among the most noteworthy old-time mill-
owners.53 Corbeil was an ideal entrepôt because its grain- and flour-
laden boats could reach the capital in four or five hours and there 
were seven rivers traversing rich wheat-lands from which one could 
reach the door of  Malisset’s magazine without changing boats or 
using horses. If  the weather impeded river navigation, supplies 
could take the paved road which led from the gate of  the company’s 
 5l Lescure, ed., Correspondance secrète inédite sur Louis XVI, Marie-Antoinette, la cour et la ville de 1777 
à 1792.... (Paris, 1866), I, 324–25; Broglie, Château, 203–205; Lopez, Mon cher papa, 135, 
322, 324–25; Robert de Crèvecœur, Saint John de Crèvecœur, sa vie et ses ouvrages (Paris, 1883), 
187–88.
 52 B. Fay, Louis XVI or the End of  a World (London, 1968), 318; Valentine Thomson, Knights of  
the Seas. The Adventurous Life of  John Paul Jones (New York, 1939), 220.
 53 Abbé Lebeuf, Histoire de la ville et de tout le diocèse de Paris, ed. by Augier and Bournon (Paris, 
1883–1893), IV, 312; Y. Bézard. La Vie rurale dans le sud de la région parisienne de 1450 à 1560 
(Paris, 1929), 172; J.-A. Le Paire, Histoire de la ville de Corbeil (Lagny, 1902), II, 33, 56.
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 installations to Paris. The tributary tapped to power the six mills 
rarely froze or dried up. Malisset boasted that the country was “very 
salubrious” with “good air” congenial to the conservation of  grain 
and flour.54
Visiting the area in 1771, the duc de Croy expressed admiration 
for the design of  the mills, for the soaring seven-story warehouse 
which loomed like a skyscraper against the flat horizon, and for the 
mechanized system of  cleaning and aerating the grain and loading 
and mounting the sacks.55 The mills were engineered with great care 
to enhance their productivity and durability.56 The central magazine 
cost over a quarter of  a million livres to build, had a capacity of  70,000 
septiers and was equipped with a “laboratory”; the automatic elevators, 
sieves, and fans, Malisset claimed, were especially invented to meet his 
needs. The company utilized thirteen other magazines, including the 
st. Charles religious house in a Paris faubourg and a storehouse near 
Nogent rented out by the abbé Terray who lurks about the periphery 
of  the provisioning business throughout the sixties. For buying and 
selling, Malisset, his brother, and a few trusted aides toured through-
out the countryside and relied heavily upon a dozen experienced 
commissioners widely dispersed to the north and west of  the capi-
tal who, Malisset said, “have the best reputation and who are in a 
position to answer for the funds which might be advanced to them.” 
Although Malisset insisted that he enjoyed “the greatest credit and 
the greatest consideration [everywhere], even abroad,” it is likely that 
he depended upon the contacts of  his guarantors for deals that took 
the company far afield.57
In the fall of  1767, as we have seen, the government “royalized” 
the company and Malisset once again became a mere agent of  the 
ministry. Officials treated Malisset like a minor functionary, not like 
a farmer of  royal interests or a future merchant-prince. Courteille 
barked instructions to Malisset peppered with admonitions rather 
 54 Malisset, Evaluation (Aug. 1768), AN, F11 1194; Lenoir, “Essai,” published by R. darnton, 
“Le Lieutenant de police J.P. Lenoir, la guerre des farines et 1’approvisionnement de Paris à 
la veille de la Rèvolution,” Revue d’histoire moderne et contemporaine, XVI (Oct.–dec. 1969), 619.
 55 duc de Croy, Journal, ed. by de Grouchy and P. Cottin, II, 504 (May 1771).
 56 The national survey of  grain mills conducted in the year ten revealed the Corbeil mills to 
be among the most productive in France with an output of  75 septiers a day. AN, F20 294.
 57 AN, F11 1193–1194; Béguillet, Traité des subsistances, 522; Encyclopédie méthodique, Jurisprudence, 
Police et Municipalités (Paris, 1791), X, 35; CG to PG, 7 Nov. 1767, BN, Coll. Joly 1135, 
fol. 161.
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than encouragements. Allowing him little room for maneuver, the 
intendant of  finance elaborated a detailed procedure by which Mal-
isset would have to justify his accounts and remit funds every satur-
day.58 Upon Courteille’s death in November, Trudaine de Montigny 
took over the correspondence and allegedly found reasons to be dis-
content with Malisset. He rebuked him for tardiness in submitting 
accounts, questioned his choice of  milling techniques, and rejected a 
plan to accelerate the service of  the Halles by mixing different sorts 
of  flour.59 Malisset defended himself  politely but did not at this time 
make an issue of  any of  the charges, which seemed to be the standard 
fare served up to royal contractors to keep them on their toes.
Every week until November 1768 Malisset shipped large amounts 
of  wheat and flour to Paris and lesser quantities to markets through-
out the zone. In addition to the six mills at Corbeil, Malisset con-
trolled four others at Robinson and Essonne and utilized the services 
of  a score of  mills at st. denis, Charenton, Nogent, and elsewhere.60 
The government did not fix the price of  the grain and flour. In Paris 
it offered them slightly below the current in order to encourage a 
downturn and in the zone markets it rarely permitted them to be 
sold below the “average” going price. As in previous dearths, this 
cautious price policy was motivated by a desire, on the one hand, to 
alleviate distress and prevent disorder and, on the other, to normalize 
trade relations as quickly as possible and to minimize royal losses in 
the distribution of  supplies. It would be “dangerous” to set prices too 
low, warned the guarantor Rousseau, for that would “drive away” the 
laboureurs and merchants.61 This last concern was of  special impor-
tance in the liberal sixties, for unlike earlier times the government 
refused to accelerate the normalization of  trade “by way of  author-
ity.” sartine could not, as did the police lieutenants Hérault in 1725 
and Marville in 1740, constrain the laboureurs and merchants who had 
grain to come into the open and furnish the markets.
It is not known with certainty how much grain and flour the  Malisset 
company placed upon the market. One invoice, which inspires little 
confidence but perhaps fairly suggests the general order of  magnitude, 
indicates that sales in the year 1768 accumulated 2,156,191 livres in 
 58 see, for example, Courteille to Malisset, 17 Oct. 1767, AN, F11 1194.
 59 Trudaine de Montigny to Malisset, 8 dec. 1767, ibid.; Malisset to Trudaine, 10 dec. 1767, 
ibid.; Trudaine to (?), 11 Feb. 1768, ibid.
 60 Malisset to Courteille (?), 20 Oct. 1767, ibid.
 61 Rousseau to Trudaine, 23 June 1768, ibid.
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Mirlavaud’s treasury.62 This amount would represent approximately 
180,000 septiers worth of  grain. Yet another estimate, made by an 
observer who claimed to be close to the scene, placed the level of  king’s 
grain used in Paris and the provinces at 300,000 septiers, an extraordi-
nary figure albeit not inconceivable if  it embraced conduits other than 
the Malisset company.63
At the very moment that Malisset was engrossed in provisioning the 
capital, dissatisfaction with his management reached a peak within 
the ministry and among his associates. Malisset became the protago-
nist in precisely the sort of  drama which he knew had occurred in 
the king’s grain operations before and which had made him reticent 
about accepting the government’s overtures in 1760. On November 
1, 1768 the government formally annulled the Malisset contract. The 
events and maneuvers surrounding the cancellation are extremely 
difficult to disentangle and reconstruct. Courteille had been brusque 
with Malisset, but he was a firm believer in a permanent king’s grain 
fund and one of  the few men close to the Controller-General who 
was nostalgic for the days before liberalization. After his death the 
grain department reverted wholly to Trudaine fils who had no sym-
pathy for an institutional reserve of  any kind.64 Late in 1767 Trudaine 
became convinced, presumably upon the basis of  an examination of  
the accounts—he never enumerated the charges—that there was 
“prejudice for the king” in the way Malisset handled his responsibili-
ties.65 Trudaine consulted with Laverdy and probably also with Choi-
seul and Leray de Chaumont who was already beginning to estrange 
himself  from Malisset and the other guarantors. They agreed to invite 
Brillon duperron, an administrator of  the General Hospital with spe-
cial responsibilities for food supply who had worked with sartine and 
Malisset in the testing of  economic milling, to conduct a discreet but 
comprehensive investigation.
In January 1768, well before the duperron report was completed, 
the Controller-General took the first step toward repudiating Malis-
set by awarding Leray, under the name Trezel, a secret contract for 
the supply of  replacement grain for the king’s Paris fund as well as for 
 62 “Borderau général” (March 1769), ibid.
 63 “Mémoire” (1771), AN, F11 264.
 64 For the announcement of  Trudaine de Montigny’s appointment to head the grain 
department, see CG to INs. of  Burgundy and Champagne, 20 Nov. 1767, C. 78. A.d. 
C d’O. and C. 379, A.d. Marne.
 65 “Mémoire” (July 1768), AN, F11 1193.
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the provisioning of  the provinces in need of  assistance.66 The Malisset 
contract had reserved for the king the right to choose whomever he 
desired to replace the stocks used to provision the capital, but it had 
seemed highly unlikely that the king would not entrust the task to the 
company in charge of  maintaining the reserve. The deal with Leray 
deprived Malisset and the other guarantors of  the opprtunity to earn 
the 2% commission paid on replacement purchases, thus striking a 
harsh blow at their sources of  revenue and future prospects.
Nor did Laverdy stop with the Trezel-Leray order. Indications 
are that the Controller-General was sufficiently worried to launch 
a European-wide search for stocks of  grain available for immedi-
ate purchase. At danzig, for example, he placed an order for 50,000 
septiers.67 The liberal friends of  the Controller-General felt that such 
purchases were extravagant and needless; it was enough to pay boun-
ties on imports effected by private hands. The critics of  liberaliza-
tion, however, lamented that he had waited so long before taking this 
emergency action.
IV
What troubled Laverdy most about the Malisset company was not 
the suspicion that it was mulcting the king, but the fear that it was 
undermining confidence in the sovereign and his government and 
 discrediting the policy of  liberalization. Throughout 1768, the air was 
thick with the sort of  rumor which had once besmirched the duc de 
Bourbon and Madame de Prie, samuel Bernard, dodun, the Pâris 
brothers, the Indies Company, Cardinal Fleury, and the Orry  brothers. 
 66 AN, F11 1173, F11 1193–1194. By the end of  the decade, Leray de Chaumont appeared 
to contemporary observers as the dominant figure in the provisioning business. The 
parlementaire Baudouin went so far as to describe Corbeil as Leray’s own establishment. 
Baudouin to Galiani, 23 Mar. 1770, in Galiani, Dialogues sur le commerce des bleds, ed. 
F. Nicolini, 570 (appendix 10).
 67 “Mémoire particulier,” AN, K 908. Cf. correspondance consulaire (8 June 1768), AN, AE 
B I 480. An anonymous memorialist writing in the early 1770s claimed that danzig alone 
supplied 120,000 septiers in the late sixties and that Hamburg, Lübeck, and several dutch 
ports also provided substantial shipments. “Réflexions sur les principes des parlements de 
Paris et de Rouen par rapport au commerce de bleds.” Arch. AE, France 1375, fol. 301. Yet 
England, habitually a major source of  imports, herself  suffered from dearth in 1768. Gazette 
du commerce, de l’agriculture et des finances (5 Jan. 1768), 11. Earlier in the sixties, disastrously 
short crops plagued both southern and northern Europe. Ibid., (4 Jan. 1766), 2 and (16 
sept. 1766), 647.
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The charges were hauntingly familiar: for sordid, venal reasons, the 
ministers nourished the dearth, mounted horrible maneuvers to 
deprive people of  bread, and extracted huge profits from grain secretly 
and illicitly bought, stocked and resold. This time, unlike in 1725 when 
he was judged too young and captive to know better, Louis XV was 
explicitly said to be a part of  the “manège.”
The source of  these rumors was not merely Porcherons guinguettes and 
Parisian wallposters.68 Laboureurs, farmers, and local officials complained 
about allegedly “authorized companies” plundering the countryside; the 
Estates of  Languedoc warned against the spoliations of  “an Accredited 
Company”;69 Cypierre, the intendant of  the Orléanais, where Leray’s 
brother-in-law, among others, operated what one witness called the “grain 
shuttle,” blamed hoarding, off-market manipulations, and interceptions 
on a “single Company” which seemed to have a plan and an organiza-
tion;70 Leprévost de Beaumont, into whose hands fell some of  the docu-
ments concerning the grain department of  the Contrôle-Général and 
the Malisset company, began propagating his cry of  indignation; and the 
Rouen Parlement, with which Leprévost may have been in touch, dif-
fused a number of  accusatory queries in which it suggested that the king 
and the ministry were behind the misery of  the times.
Beginning with the harvest of  1768, Cypierre bombarded the min-
istry with protests against the speculations of  a company. First he called 
it a “private Company”, but he soon became persuaded that it was a 
“privileged Company” abusively operating behind a shield of  govern-
ment authority. Its agents appeared throughout the Beauce, the Perche, 
and the Gâtinais, buying secretly, even before the crop was taken, and 
constituting hoards. Increasingly, Cypierre came to believe that the 
Company was itself  largely responsible for the cherté, at least in his ter-
ritory. “The price rise, Monsieur, has other causes than the [natural] 
exhaustion of  the old grain,” he informed Trudaine de Montigny; “I 
repeat, it is [the result of] the maneuvers of  this Company which has 
 68 Turgot contended that “the outcry of  Parisians against the pretended monopolies” was 
“excited by” the outcry “raised in the provinces on the occasion of  the purchases ordered 
for the provisioning of  Paris.” “Lettres sur le commerce des grains,” 30 Oct. 1770, in Œuvres, 
ed. by schelle, III, 271. That is to say, Parisians believed that they were being starved by the 
very companies which were starving the provincials in order to feed the inhabitants of  the 
capital. Turgot claimed that the rumors traveled from the countryside to Paris “from mouth 
to mouth.”
 69 deliberation, dec. 1768, C. 2411, A.d. H-G.
 70 “Première question,” BN, Coll. Joly 1111, fols. 154–55; C. Bloch, “Le commerce des 
grains,” Études sur l’histoire économique, 32–33.
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made itself  master [of  the supply] .…” What scandalized and frustrated 
the intendant was that the law—specifically, the liberal laws—prohib-
ited him from taking any action. “These purchases,” he complained to 
sartine, “were made by agents whom we could not question without 
appearing to infringe upon the liberty of  trade.” The ministry scoffed at 
Cypierre’s “vague allegations.” They were the product of  an overheated 
imagination or the residue of  old-style prejudices; after all, the intendant 
himself  confessed that he learned of  the Company “only by the outcry 
of  the People” transmitted by his subdelegates. The government itself  
could not have invented a better excuse for treating Cypierre’s reports 
with derision.71
Meanwhile the magistrates of  Rouen picked up the trail of  the 
Company and pursued it with their usual enthusiasm. In April a 
member of  a subcommittee named by the Parlement to investigate 
the causes of  the cherté claimed to have discovered that “there was 
in Paris a society which, under pretext of  the provisioning of  the 
capital, has become master of  this [grain] commerce in the whole 
kingdom.” The design of  the society was to “starve out” whole prov-
inces, such as Normandy, Picardy, and Flanders, by buying up all the 
grain in the markets and granaries and shipping it abroad to store 
(even as their counterparts in earlier times had cached their grain in 
the isles of  Guernsey and Jersey proximate to the coast of  France), 
and then reimporting the same grain for a bountiful profit after the 
prices had skyrocketed. The parlementaire declared that “it would 
be easy to have proofs of  all these facts” and that, accordingly, it was 
urgent “to supplicate the King to destroy the company of  Paris and 
to prohibit all societies for the commerce of  grain.” In an effort to 
counteract the impression this report made upon the subcommittee, 
the First President Miromesnil vigorously denied that the govern-
ment “had any part in the grain trade except perhaps to encourage 
it.” He conceded that a Paris company might in fact exist, but if  it 
did it held no “exclusive privilege” for buying and selling and “it 
could not do any damage to the rest of  the kingdom.”72
Laverdy expressed contempt for the rumors, which implicated 
himself, Choiseul, and Trudaine de Montigny in a grain trade plot. 
 71 Cypierre to T. de Montigny, 1,7, 11 sept. 1768 in C. Bloch, Correspondance inédite de l’intendant 
Cypierre, 50, 63, 73–75; Cypierre to CG, 10 sept. 1768, ibid., 70; Cypierre to sartine, 
27 sept. 1768, ibid., 97.
 72 Miromesnil to Laverdy, 30 April 1768 (two letters), in LeVerdier, ed., Correspondance 
Miromesnil, V, 163–69.
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He took the trouble, however, to rebut the charges, without specifi-
cally mentioning the Malisset company. “As for the foul remarks con-
cerning the monopoly of  the government,” he wrote, “I know that to 
my regret it was necessary to draw 2,400,000 from the royal treasury, 
and, in stimulating commerce to act, squeeze from that the stuff  for a 
grain operation of  6,000,000 in order to meet our needs; and I would 
gladly be whipped in the public square of  Rouen if  I have gotten an 
écu out of  it to this day.” “In any event,” he added, “I am neither so 
dumb nor so absurd as to place my money in such a job.” Accord-
ing to the Controller-General, Trudaine had succeeded marvelously 
in exciting commerce and, through a combination of  private enter-
prise and royal purchases, the seine was covered with ships bringing 
succor to Paris and the surrounding provinces. Choiseul assisted the 
Controller-General by agreeing to lend civil authorities grain from 
military reserves and to absorb any foreign grain which the govern-
ment felt it could not use, thus sparing it the costly burden of  dispos-
ing of  residues after the passing of  the emergency.
Laverdy encouraged Miromesnil to share these details with the 
parlementaires: tell them about our “crimes”—we have nothing to 
be ashamed of.73 shortly after the Rouennais launched their inquiry, 
their Parisian confreres threatened to come to the charge. Laverdy 
claimed to welcome their intrusion because it would help clear the 
air. “Now comes the Parlement of  Paris,” he noted,
which undertakes researches, I am gratified, for if  it discovers maneuvers on the part 
of  the government or someone dependent upon it, I will give it a merle blanc.74
The Parlement of  Paris backed off, probably because it came to real-
ize that it was not in its interest to unmask an operation devoted to the 
provisioning of  the capital. But the Rouen court continued to press its 
case even after Laverdy’s disgrace. The efforts made by the ministry 
to quash its investigation merely tended to reinforce its sense of  a plot 
even as the royal orders to suspend judicial procedures instituted in 
the summer of  1768 against alleged monopolists had confirmed its 
suspicions that the government was trying to cover-up wrongdoing in 
which it was involved. Like Cypierre, the Rouen magistrates reached 
the conclusion that it was no accident that liberalization tied their 
hands at the same time it afforded immunity and  encouragement to a 
 73 Laverdy to Miromesnil, 24 April 1768, ibid., V, 156–57.
 74 Laverdy to Miromesnil, 19 April 1768, ibid., V, 151.
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band of  mighty speculators. In October, in the course of  two weeks, 
the Parlement sent two extraordinarily virulent “letters and supplica-
tions” to Louis XV which were illegally published and disseminated. 
Bluntly condemning the “badly-managed administration” for caus-
ing the dearth, the first letter nevertheless mitigated the king’s own 
responsibility by placing the blame with his advisers who “deceived” 
him with their “badly-wrought systems.”75 But the second letter virtu-
ally accused the king of  complicity in a “criminal” grain monopoly 
operating “in the shadow of  a law [ostensibly] devised to prevent it.”76 
Enormous amounts of  grain, wrote the Parlement, have been pur-
chased “for the same account” in many markets. No “private enter-
prise” could handle such “immense” transactions:
There is only one Company whose members are powerful in credit which could be 
capable of  such an undertaking … Here we have recognized the imprint of  power and the 
trace of  authority.
Inured to personal calumnies, Laverdy worried about charges such as 
these because they took such striking proportions and because they 
were clearly linked to the liberalization policy.77 The liberal reforms 
were said to be a cunning pretext for the maneuvers of  the government 
monopoly, which used the export authorization in order to store grain 
in foreign caches for re-entry into France once prices rose enough to 
assure a grandly usurious profit and the freedom from police control 
in order to strip the countryside bare and weaken the nation for the 
kill. The operations of  the company and the ministry’s refusal to allow 
police authorities to act seemed to be conclusive proof  that the reform 
and the dearth were not simply coincidences.
How much of  this climate of  accusation he ascribed to Malisset’s 
doing and how much of  it he understood to be the product of  a 
deeply-seated paranoia or the propaganda of  the enemies of  the min-
istry is difficult to say. Clearly he felt that Malisset had shown poor 
judgment in everywhere brandishing the king’s name. In  skillfully 
handled operations for the royal account, “the hand of  the King 
 75 Letter of  15 Oct. 1768, Conseil Secret 1767–68, A.d. s-M.
 76 Letter of  29 Oct. 1768, ibid. Cf. the severe and horrified reaction of  a contemporary 
observer to the Parlement’s hint that the King was an “accomplice” in a “crime” against the 
nation. (Anonymous), “Réflexions sur les principes des parlements de Paris et de Rouen,” 
Arch. AE, France 1375, fols. 293–304. In a remonstrance drafted in January 1769, the 
Rouen court piously disclaimed any intention of  implicating the king (“God forbid”). 
Remonstrances, 25 Jan. 1769, Registre st. Martin, A.d. s-M.
 77 see, for example, the anonymous letter to Joly de Fleury, 4 Oct. 1768, BN, Coll. Joly 1139, 
fol. 84.
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would be less easily discovered.”78 By incarcerating Leprévost, tearing 
down placards, and reprimanding parlements, he could not halt the 
insinuations. Nor could he effectively combat the charges by dismiss-
ing Malisset. But the latter gesture, symbolic and perfunctory as it 
was, might at least reassure the sensible, highly-placed men who had 
begun to share the popular fears and suspicions. In september he 
told the intendant Cypierre in an evasive but placatory letter, which 
was probably a circular meant for other officials as well:
It has spread among the People and even among the most enlightened persons79 that 
different companies, several of  which even protected by the government, had a part 
in this price rise through large purchases indiscreetly made. This fact, hardly likely 
in itself  given the high price of  goods and the little evidence that there is that they 
will remain at such a disproportionate price, has however become so generalized that 
I believed it necessary to ask you to verify if  in fact indiscreet purchases have taken 
place in your généralité, while assuring you that the King has authorized no Company 
for this badly conceived commerce.
That Laverdy sanctioned such “verifications” suggests how very anx-
ious he was about the rumors and about the willingness of  highly 
placed persons to believe them, for “verifications” smacked of  the 
old police style and doubtless could be used as a pretext to interfere 
with the liberty of  commerce. Moreover, immediately after denying 
that the king “authorized” any company to engage in this “badly con-
ceived” trade, Laverdy casually announced the decision to terminate 
the arrangement with a company called Malisset whose object had 
been to assist in the provisioning of  Paris. Anyone who claimed to be 
buying for this or for any other company was engaging in deceit and 
merited severe punishment.80 Apparently, Laverdy had confidence 
that Leray, functioning through the straw man Trezel, would buy his 
grain without fanfare.
In a tone blending triumph and irony, Cypierre reminded the Con-
troller-General that he, the intendant, had never doubted for an instant 
the existence of  a Company whose “indiscreet and multiple purchases 
 78 “Mémoire” (ca. dec. 1767), AN, F11 1194. Compare the widespread perception of  Malisset-
as-villain with Galiani’s perspicacious assessment of  him as a sort of  anti-monopoly 
warrior. Galiani to Tanucci, 21 sept. 1767, in Galiani, Dialogues sur le commerce des bleds, ed. 
F. Nicolini, 324 (appendix 4).
 79 Cf.: “... those who make the most rumor are the persons above the people whose fear causes 
them to speak indiscreetly in front of  their valets.” Miromesnil to Laverdy, 21 March 1768, 
in LeVerdier, ed., Correspondance Miromesnil, V, 129.
 80 Laverdy to Cypierre, 26 sept. 1768, cited by C. Bloch, “Le Commerce des grains,” Etudes 
sur l’histoire économique, 46–47.
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caused grain prices to rise rapidly.” The Company, which Cypierre 
had repeatedly denounced, whose reality the ministry had reiteratively 
denied, “is perhaps,” noted the intendant, “the very one formed under 
the name of  Malisset … whose dissolution you have just announced 
to me, Monsieur.” Cypierre relished his revenge: “this Company,” he 
suggested to his superior, “has perhaps exceeded the object for which 
it was established .…” Laverdy suffered disgrace before he could reply, 
but his assistant, Trudaine de Montigny, conceded virtually nothing to 
the intendant of  the Orléanais. While he savagely criticized Malisset’s 
management of  the government grain operations within the confines of  
the ministry, Trudaine unblushingly assured Cypierre that the Company 
had made no purchases in over a year and that “it never did anything 
which could give rise to the suspicion” of  illicit speculations.81
Malisset was a victim rather than a cause of  the pacte-type rumors, 
which covered the land even as he was a scapegoat for Laverdy’s 
embarrassment. The name Malisset, however, did not become 
opprobrious only because it was said to represent the monstrous royal 
monopoly. The quality of  his grain and flour inspired criticism repeat-
edly, arousing suspicion and resentment, which the public passed on 
to the king and government and interpreted as another manifestation 
of  the plot against the general interest. To be sure, it followed from 
the belief  in the king-as-speculator that the king’s grain would be 
rotten: indifferent to the well-being of  his subjects and to the conven-
tions of  honest trade, the king would be sure to market only the least 
valuable and most volatile grain, which could no longer bear storage. 
Nor was this suspicion about the quality of  royal grain unfounded; 
like the elements of  most paranoia, it drew its first breath of  life from 
an unmistakable perception of  reality. In 1709, 1725, 1740, and 
1752 portions of  the grain sold in the king’s name had been con-
taminated.82 Much of  it was foreign grain which arrived “fatigued,” 
received inadequate conditioning, and was stocked in exiguous, fetid, 
makeshift warehouses which further aggravated its condition. Nor 
was domestic grain, harvested during inclement times, amenable to 
easy conservation. The demands of  the buyers, who had clienteles to 
protect, remained rigorous even in periods of  crisis.
 81 Cypierre to CG, 24 sept. 1768 in C. Bloch, Correspondance inédite de l’intendant Cypierre, 102; 
Cypierre to bishop of  Orléans, 20 sept. 1768, ibid., 106; T. de Montigny to Cypierre, 
14 Oct. 1768, ibid., 131.
 82 On the chronic mistrust of  king’s grain, see Bertin to IN. of  Burgundy, 17 sept. 1760, 
C. 80, A.d. C d’O.; “Mémoire sur la manière de faire des provisions de bled pour prévenir 
la famine” (1736), Arch. AE, France 1304, fol. 161.
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Not all of  the complaints against bad quality in the late sixties struck 
at Malisset. sellers, especially the transient ones who had no interest 
in pleasing their customers, sought to profit from the shortage and 
the press of  buyers by disposing of  poor-grade merchandise. A Paris 
baker protested against mealmen who foisted bad flour on bakers 
like himself  who were desperate to find supplies. “All the merchants,” 
reported the lieutenant general of  Provins, “unanimously complain 
that since the onset of  the grain cherté the laboureurs do not take the 
trouble to clean it with as much exactitude as when it is at a lower 
price.” A faubourg st. Antoine baker tried to avenge himself  against 
the suppliers and turn a trick by substituting dark for white flour in a 
sack he bought at the Halles and filing a claim against the flour mer-
chant for fraudulently selling him inferior goods. The flour broker’s 
aide, whom he tried to bribe, exposed his perfidy and reported him 
to the police.83 King’s grain not emanating from Malisset provoked 
public anger. Leray de Chaumont’s agents sent grain to Orléans under 
the name of  the “Royal Company” which proved to be “absolutely 
spoiled.” The grain specialist doumerc, who worked at this time for 
Leray, had a large cache of  grain at Pontoise which “smelled of  blem-
ish.” Royal grain sent to Angers had a bad odor and an offensive taste. 
Fifteen hundred sacks of  wheat which the négociant Prémord imported 
on order of  Trudaine arrived “overheated and damaged.” The flour 
that the government commissioned from Bordeaux for Paris was 
“abominable.”84
Malisset, however, was especially vulnerable because he was a 
regular supplier, close at hand, and a known experimenter with flour 
manufacture and mixture. Predictably, Leprévost de Beaumont 
charged that his flour, adulterated with beanmeal, “was crawling 
with worms” and his grain “exhaled infection.” Later, when the 
government wanted to convince itself  that Malisset was a sharpster, 
it gave some credence to these charges by formally accusing him of  
“negligence” in the preparation of  flour and infidelity in failing to 
replace the king’s grain with first quality wheat. several times in the 
course of  1768 Trudaine forbade Malisset to market mixed flour 
under the king’s name for fear that it was not of   unquestionable 
 83 16 dec. 1768, AN, Y 13540; Colin des Murs to sartine, 8 Jan. 1769, AN, Y 12618; 30 June 
1767, AN, Y 12613.
 84 “Première question,” BN, Coll. Joly 1111, fols. 156–57; Forest to Joly de Fleury (?), Coll. 
Joly 1140, fols. 47–49; petition of  bakers of  Angers, 28 July 1770, Coll. Joly 1148, fols. 
61–63; Archives seine-Paris, d5B6 284; (?) to PG, ca. Feb. 1769, BN, Coll. Joly 1147, fol. 45.
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goodness. Municipal authorities at Lille virtually banned Malis-
set from the market as a result of  several large-scale transactions 
which raised questions about the soundness of  his grain and flour. 
Encamped in his citadel of  abundance, Malisset became an object 
of  hatred to the townsmen of  Corbeil. The local police accused 
him of  hoarding all the best wheat in the region and marketing 
only grain of  inferior quality. In a consumer riot which they joined, 
the police fixed the grain they seized from him at a penalty price 
because it contained worms and smelled of  the boat.85
In February 1768 Malisset sold a huge quantity of  Breton grain 
to the Paris bakers which was filled with stones and dirt. “The bak-
ers who purchased it,” noted sartine, “complain that the public does 
not want the bread which comes from it.” He warned that it was 
dangerous to permit bread of  such poor quality to be sold, for the 
public was in a nasty humor and likely to react with violence if  inci-
dents such as this recurred. Trudaine de Montigny ordered Malisset 
to take back the remaining wheat and indemnify the three dozen 
bakers involved.86
One of  Malisset’s most ferocious critics went so far as to blame him 
for “this sad idea which circulates that one wishes to poison the poor 
people.”87 There is no evidence that Parisians seriously entertained 
such fears but dreadful rumors reached the capital that rural popu-
lations in outlying areas were mortally striken from eating Malisset-
brand bread. duperron, the government’s inspector, and one of  his 
agents, investigated the charges. “It is quite difficult,” the agent cau-
tiously wrote, “to ascertain if  they have some foundation or if  they 
have for basis envy and jealousy or rather the bad mood which the 
bread cherté engenders.” In his initial inquiry he could find no one who 
was made ill by “bad flour.” It is true that Malisset mixes barley in his 
flour (not, however, in the flour destined for Paris), “but does he add 
other kinds of  grain or bad wheat [?] — that remains to be proven.”
The investigators visited three villages in the general area of  Corbeil. 
Lisse and Villabbé were in the past “frequently” subject to “epidemics” 
and “pestilential” maladies. In the summer of  1763 the villagers suffered 
a “great number” of  illnesses which they ascribed to poor bread made 
 85 Arsenal, mss. Bastille 12353; Albert’s analysis, AN, F11 1173; AN, F11 1194; P. Lefèvre, 
Le Commerce des grains ... Lille, 88n.
 86 sartine to Trudaine de Montigny, 9 March 1768 and état-général st. Charles (Feb.-Nov. 
1768), AN, F11 1194. Cf. the Controller-General’s rebuttal of  a “bad quality” complaint 
from Brie-Comte-Robert, 21 Nov. 1768, BN, Coll. Joly 1146, fol. 64.
 87 daure, “Mémoire,” (ca. 1771), AN, F11 264.
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from Malisset flour. “But,” said the report, “those who have reflected on 
these relations might think quite differently.” With few exceptions, all of  
those who died were chronically miserable, “poor people lacking every-
thing necessary to live, even bread, given the cherté of  grain.” The grain 
sold to these people by Malisset—“announced,” it is significant to note, 
“under the name of  the King’s Grain”—“without being of  the first 
quality,” nevertheless made good bread. Others who ate it elsewhere 
suffered no untoward effects. In addition, Malisset sold four qualities of  
flour. The “firsts” went exclusively to Paris. The villagers could afford 
to buy only the thirds and fourths and thus ate a bread “browner and 
of  much less quality” than the Parisians, yet without noxious content.
duperron found the same thing at Limeil, a village he knew inti-
mately because he maintained a country home there. The Malisset-
made bread was “extremely dark” and somewhat bitter “but it did 
no damage to anyone, and I have seen with my own eyes,” duperron 
wrote, “numerous families who have subsisted on nothing else for 
the last six months and who are in excellent health.” Everywhere the 
imperfect bread “excited murmurs” but everywhere the poor con-
sumers who had no choice continued to eat it.88
duperron cleared Malisset of  the most horrible of  the accusations, 
but he could not purge the stigma attached to the Malisset name. Heir 
to the dubious reputation which the king’s grain always bore, Malisset 
bequeathed it to his successors in a slightly shabbier condition. The 
duc de Croy, who praised the Corbeil installation generously, reported 
in 1771 that it produced mixed and repaired grain of  “bad quality 
about which the people murmured a great deal.” Lenoir, Paris police 
chief  in the mid-seventies, noted that “murmurs” against the “rotten” 
flours of  Corbeil were widespread. When a fire erupted at the ware-
house in October 1775 the people refused to help extinguish it. The 
revolutionaries of  ’89 condemned the Leleu brothers, the last Corbeil 
victualers of  the Old Regime, for the same alleged frauds.89
That Malisset, who devoted so much of  his professional life to 
improving the quality of  wheat-flour and bread, should stand accused 
of  carelessness, adulteration, and deceit is particularly ironical but 
not surprising. Although his science, in theory and practice, was far in 
advance of  his times, he was unable to assure the proper conservation 
 88 July-sept. 1768, BN, Coll. Joly 1140, fols. 180–90.
 89 duc de Croy, Journal, ed. by de Grouchy and Cottin, II, 504; Lenoir papers, Bibliothèque 
Municipale d’Orléans, mss. 1421; Hardy’s Journal, 21 Oct. 1775, BN, mss. fr. 6681.
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of  his goods. His technique was imperfect, the cost of  global applica-
tion was prohibitive, and the crisis conditions in which he operated 
were not conducive to painstaking labor and inspection. dealing on 
a wide scale and at a frantic pace, dependent in part on millers for 
whose expertise he could not vouch and on day-workers in fifteen dif-
ferent magazines, he was not fully in control of  the business. The pub-
lic was not yet accustomed to the flour produced by economic milling 
or to the dearth-mixtures, which Malisset improvised, nor were the 
bakers comfortable with much of  the grain that he had to bring in 
from far away sources. doubtless, too, Malisset also confounded the 
economy of  his own business with the “economy,” which he always 
claimed to seek for the consumer. He had to replenish the stock of  
king’s grain, depleted by at least a third on the eve of  the royalization 
of  the company, in highly adverse circumstances. Like all buyers in a 
cherté, Malisset looked for the cheapest possible buy even when it did 
not fully meet the “first quality” standard established by his contract.
still, the tableau must not be overdrawn. In a dearth people expected 
to be force-fed bad quality food. “They cried out against rotten grain,” 
commented an observer, “even as they cried out against [fantom] 
monopolists.”90 There is only a small grain of  truth in the self-serving 
memory cultivated by the revolutionaries that the Parisians in the late 
sixties had been nourished on “stinking wheat.”91 In relative terms, the 
Parisians, as always—at least until the second World War when the 
countryside had its revenge—fared reasonably well. sensibly, Malis-
set sent them most of  his finest goods; save for accidents, he reserved 
his trimming for the provinces. The most beautiful flour at the Halles, 
diderot wrote sophie Volland in November, is that “called Malicet 
[sic], from the name of  he who furnishes it.”92
V
Even before the ministry decided to abandon the company in 1768, 
the guarantors, evincing growing dissatisfaction with Malisset and 
with the terms of  their obligations to the government, petitioned 
for a cancellation of  the contract. On the one hand, they claimed 
 90 Anonymous, “Mémoire” (Nov. 1768), Arsenal, mss. Bastille, 12353.
 91 R. Le Bon, “Observations sur les subsistances et les moyens d’y remédier à partir de 1770 
jusqu’à 1789,” AN, F10 226.
 92 diderot to sophie Volland, 15 Nov. 1768, in Correspondance Diderot, ed. by Roth, VIII, 222.
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“great losses,” which they blamed on Malisset as a consequence of  
the inopportune deals he “made us” engage in with “faithless corre-
spondents,” the bad quality of  the merchandise which he procured, 
and other reverses attributable to his managerial shortcomings. On 
the other hand, in a much more convincing argument which inci-
dentally flattered Malisset’s stewardship, they ascribed their setbacks 
to the cruel circumstances of  the time and to the onerous terms of  
the contract. At the time of  the signing one could still purchase first 
quality wheat at 14 livres the septier. Three years later, as a result of  an 
“almost universal dearth” and an “extraordinary” exportation which 
exhausted national stocks, the price had doubled. “disconcerted,” 
they nevertheless managed to discharge their obligations “exactly and 
even beyond.” They marshalled 3 to 4,000 septiers more grain than 
required and, in addition to supplying the Halles and the zone mar-
kets with king’s grain, provided large amounts of  flour for the anxious 
consumers as well.
“But,” the guarantors noted, “if  they fulfilled this important goal, 
they did it at their own expense.…” They had to replenish their stocks 
in the midst of  the crisis at prices much higher than those at which 
they previously sold their grain. This “radically unwonted” clause 
which required them to replace grain at the current price and pro-
hibited them, once the company was royalized, from continuing their 
own speculations, meant that they could not go on without “ruin-
ing themselves.” The 2% commission on the sale of  the king’s grain 
and the annual subsidy of  24,000 livres did not remotely cover their 
expenses. And, given the policy of  liberalization, they contended, it 
was very unlikely that the price of  wheat will drop below the level 
permitting them to use the stocks for their own commercial purposes. 
In the present arrangement the “King alone” profited. He had reason 
to be pleased, for according to the guarantors this was the first time in 
the history of  the king’s grain that the administrators of  the reserve 
provided precisely the amount of  grain demanded and spared the 
treasury “immense” outlays.93
The guarantors wanted to annul the old contract without, how-
ever, losing the opportunity to “repair” their losses. Malisset, who was 
deeply in debt to them and to others for advances, agreed to step 
aside and transfer the Corbeil establishment, in return for proper 
 93 Leray de Chaumont and Perruchot to Trudaine de Montigny, 10 May, 17 Aug. 1768 and 
Trudaine to MM. les intéressés en `la régie des grains, 24 Oct. 1768, AN, F11 1193.
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 indemnities, to a new company. For reasons that remain obscure, 
Leray and Perruchot joined forces, to the exclusion of  Rousseau, and 
proposed a “new contract” in mid-August which they implored Tru-
daine fils to “put under the eyes of  the Controller-General” as quickly 
as possible.
It was a provisioner’s dream, containing virtually ironclad guaran-
tees against losses, requiring little capital investment, and involving 
slight risk. The demands made by the new group vividly underline 
the enormous advantages accorded the government by the Malisset 
submission. The king would purchase the Corbeil establishment for 
700,000 livres (not including boats, horses, carts, and sacks, which he 
would acquire separately) and place it at the disposition of  the con-
tractors; remit to them a fund of  40,000 septiers of  wheat; pay them 
an annual indemnity of  40,000 livres (16,000 more than granted Mal-
isset) and an additional 1,000 livres for every extra thousand septiers 
stored; indemnify them fully for losses suffered by riot, fire or other 
disaster; place a swiss guard at the door underneath a sign reading 
“Royal Magazine and Manufactury of  Grain and Flour”; and permit 
them to conduct business “in the name of  His Majesty” and under 
the protection of  commandants, intendants, and local magistrates. 
Unlike Malisset, the contractors would have “complete liberty” to 
engage in grain and flour trade, inside the kingdom and abroad, in all 
times regardless of  prices “as they will see fit and without restriction 
of  any sort.” Upon notification the company would have a month’s 
time to complete its stock. If  they were found short they would simply 
pay a cash penalty equivalent to the current price of  the amount of  
grain that was missing. The company would be prepared at all times 
to deliver up to 1,000 septiers of  wheat or 500 sacks of  flour (at 160 
pounds of  flour to the septier, or ten pounds less than Malisset had 
offered) for which they would receive a fee of  4 livres per sack of  flour 
and 2 sous per septier of  wheat. The contract would run for twelve years 
and could not be cancelled without proof  of  malversation or infidelity.
Aware of  its liberalizing ambitions, Leray and Perruchot warned the 
government against succumbing to the lingering temptation to aban-
don the provisioning of  Paris wholly to private commerce. Liberty has 
failed to create a corps of  rich and well-connected négociants capable 
of  nourishing Paris and maintaining stores. Abundance at the Halles, 
they argued, “can only be physically guaranteed by the vigilance of  
the government and by means of  a bountiful magazine always ready 
to be opened for the needs of  the public.” Properly managed, they 
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hastened to reassure the liberals of  the ministry, such an operation 
would not undermine “the spirit and the liberty of  the trade.”94
The government flatly refused these propositions. The new con-
tract excised everything which pleased the government in the old rela-
tionship, magnified all of  its dubious characteristics, and imposed, in 
addition, a charter of  privileges and prerequisites which would cost 
the government money, and deprive it of  control. In principle, the 
ministry was more favorably disposed to an idea secretly submitted 
by the third guarantor, Rousseau, who had been squeezed out of  the 
affair along with Malisset by his former partners. Rousseau under-
stood Laverdy’s sensitivity to the impact of  the Malisset venture on 
public opinion and the sh́adow it cast over the liberalization policy. 
Without explaining how it would work or why it should be expected 
to prove any more successful than previous undertakings, he recom-
mended a return to the régie whose chief  merit would somehow be to 
protect the government against public suspicion.95
By early september Laverdy had decided upon a course of  action. 
Until the end of  the dearth he would continue to purchase king’s grain 
through the agency of  men such as Leray, but he would no longer 
support an institutionalized company or régie. Just at the moment that 
prices reached their zenith, the Controller-General felt the need for a 
new beginning. He wanted to clean his hands entirely of  the Corbeil 
affair. Judging the installations there to be “of  no utility whatsoever” to 
the government, he offered them to the General Hospital, which had 
planned for many years to build a storehouse and mills in the area.96 
It was, however, too late for Laverdy to make a fresh start. A few 
weeks later the King dismissed him. Reviled by the people and several 
of  the parlements, challenged by some of  his own intendants, and 
too intimately identified with hard times, he was sacrificed to pub-
lic opinion much in the same way that he repudiated Malisset. His 
successor, Maynon d’Invau, had an impressive liberal background; 
his appointment presaged no change in political orientation. On the 
contrary, the king detemined to breathe fresh vigor into the liberaliza-
tion policy and to gird against the forthcoming onslaught of  the Paris 
Parlement. 
Maynon, according to the économiste dupont, broke decisively 
with the king’s grain tradition. This thesis served dupont well, for 
 94 “Nouveau Traité,” May 1768, ibid.
 95 Rousseau to Trudaine de Montigny (?), 11 May 1768, ibid.
 96 Laverdy to duperron (?), 6 sept. 1768, AN, F11 1194. Cf. M.B.d. *** [probably Brillon 
duperron], Observations sur la mouture d’après l’hôpital général (Paris, 1768), 2.
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it enabled him to depict the abbé Terray as a dark reactionary who 
“reestablished” the royal grain operation when he replaced the right-
thinking Maynon at the end of  1769. In fact, no such brusque rupture 
in governmental position occurred. Laverdy suppressed the company 
without ending the system. Maynon “resolved,” as Baudeau pru-
dently put it, to stop large-scale provisioning for the account of  the 
king.97 Given the pressing demands of  the capital and the momentum 
of  the grain operations already under way, however, he was unable to 
realize this aim.
One of  his subsistence advisers was daure, a man with consider-
able experience in grain affairs and strong convictions about gov-
ernment policy. Rudely treated by men he thought to be his friends, 
daure wrote in bitter retrospect about his experience in the corri-
dors of  the ministry. since he is the major source for information 
about official attitudes in 1768–69, his testimony must be treated 
with caution. daure detested Malisset, characterizing him as a venal 
and “dangerous” schemer responsible for keeping prices high and 
fomenting popular discontent. daure also distrusted Leray de Chau-
mont whom he suspected of  desiring to control the grain trade of  the 
entire kingdom. On the basis of  extensive visits to the provisioning 
zones and sober reflection, daure “believed very positively that if  
one had the strength and the courage to leave [laisser faire] the [grain] 
trade alone everything would return to a natural state which would 
content all reasonable persons, and that if  on the contrary one wishes 
to provision Paris like a city in war, one must count on spending an 
immense sum of  money and experience always the greatest anxieties 
and the greatest alarms.” A survey of  the harvest of  1769 convinced 
him that it was “the decisive moment to trancher au vif.” “I will submit 
to be jailed for ten years in the Bastille,” he averred, “if  grain by 
its own mass does not diminish [in price] by the first of  October.” 
According to daure, the Controller-General “definitely vowed to 
depend on commerce” and to maintain only a token reserve for dire 
emergencies.
Not surprisingly, there coursed victualer’s blood in the veins of  
this passionately liberal functionary. daure proposed to organize 
this emergency grain fund, which would be concealed behind a 
contract for the supply of  bread to the French and swiss guards. 
 97 dupont to Prince Carl Ludwig, (n.d., ca. 1773), in Correspondance Dupont, ed. by Knies, 
II, 142; Baudeau, “second mémoire à un Magistrat du Parlement de Paris ...,” Nouvelles 
éphémérides économiques (1775), I, 42.
382 BREAd, POLITICs ANd POLITICAL ECONOMY
The  government apparently accepted the conditions he posed for 
undertaking this mission: that the contract be absolutely secret, that 
he be considered a consultant rather than an entrepreneur in the style 
of  Malisset, that Malisset be banned from any participation in grain 
affairs, and that he, daure, suffer no competition in his service to the 
crown.98
despite his good will, however, Maynon lacked the energy and the 
influence to keep his word. He had underestimated the complexity 
and difficulty of  stopping the giant “machine” (Maynon’s word) of  
royal provisioning. More of  the king’s grain remained in stock and 
more operations were underway than he had imagined and there 
were more vested interests to dislodge than he was able to count. Cho-
iseul allegedly pressed the King to continue the provisioning opera-
tions. Leray supplied Paris and environs with at least 70,000 septiers 
in 1769. J.-B. Prémord, an armateur-négociant from Honfleur with a 
background similar to Leray’s, imported large amounts of  grain from 
Holland “for the account of  the king.” some of  Malisset’s old cor-
respondents continued to supply for the king’s account and Malisset 
himself  furnished the Halles and other markets with grain and flour 
in his own name. With some embarrassment and confusion the gov-
ernment continued to use Corbeil as an entrepôt, under the direction 
(in régie form) of  Malisset’s former subordinates.99
VI
surrounded by a mass of  hungry rivals who undercut his commercial 
dealings and destroyed his morale, daure felt himself  betrayed. At 
the end of  the year his erstwhile protector left the Contrôle-Général. 
Maynon’s successor, Terray, daure noted scornfully, believes that “a 
king must hold the price of  this good [grain] in his hand and charge 
himself  with feeding his people.” Terray, as we shall see, made exten-
sive use of  the king’s grain in combatting scarcity and high prices 
throughout the kingdom. Under Terray, the ministry forced a revi-
sion of  daure’s contract and refused to honor the promises which 
Maynon’s government allegedly made. They never reconciled their 
 98 daure, “Mémoire,” (1771), AN, F11 264 and “Mémoire particulier” (ca. 1775), AN, 
K 908. Léon Cahen incorrectly attributed these essays to doumerc and as a result made 
serious errors of  comprehension and interpretation. “Le Prétendu pacte de famine,” Revue 
historique, CLXXVI (sept.-Oct. 1935), 173–214.
 99 daure’s “Mémoire,” AN, F11 264 and K 908; états and comptes, AN, F11 1193 and F11 
1173; Archives seine-Paris, d4B6–43–2391 and d5B6 284 and 298.
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differences and soon daure stood accused, as Malisset had been, 
of  misconduct and ineptitude. According to the three bakers who 
worked for him, daure did not manage the flour and bread-making 
company with skill and economy. One of  the bakers was completely 
ruined in the deal, another filed for business failure, and a third fled 
the capital. daure blamed his troubles on the ministry and, once 
again like Malisset, quarreled with the government over the settle-
ment of  accounts until the Revolution. His campaign for rehabilita-
tion was interrupted only by a short sojourn he made to America 
where he organized military provisioning, serving Rochambeau with 
the same zeal and versatility with which Leray de Chaumont served 
Franklin.100
Uncommonly resilient, Malisset did not disappear from the pro-
visioning arena upon the abrogation of  his contract and the liquida-
tion of  his company. Public provisioning in the Old Regime was a 
decentralized, fragmented, and competitive affair. despite his repu-
diation by the Contrôle-Général, other officials on various levels of  
responsibility sought Malisset’s services. The intendant of  Paris, one 
of  his original sponsors in the early sixties, contracted for his supplies 
as did the intendant of  Auvergne. Malisset furnished grain and flour 
to “several small cities,” to the depot of  the Poor in the Bourbonnais, 
and to other public assistance facilities called depots of  Mendicancy, 
and he continued his regular provision of  bread for the Paris pris-
ons. Nor did the ministry sever its ties with him completely, for it still 
needed his Corbeil apparatus and it asked him to collaborate with the 
new régisseur in the storage and conversion of  grain to flour.101
In January of  1771, Malisset sent the Terray government a blueprint 
for another full-blown Paris grain fund of  40,000 septiers under his direc-
tion. He had learned his lessons well. To be sure, he called attention to 
his experience in the métier, to his extensive network of  “the most solid 
100 daure, “Mémoire,” AN, F11 264 and AN, K 908; daure to st.-Florentin (?), 20 June 
1775, AN, O1 361; Bourgade to Joly de Fleury, 14 March 1782 and daure to Montaran, 
25 May 1768, AN, F12 1299a. In 1775 Turgot ordered the grain treasury to pay daure 
50,000 livres. Œuvres de Turgot, ed. by schelle, IV, 197. According to my calculations, this was 
approximately the sum which daure claimed in the early seventies. Given his protracted 
quarrel with the government, it appears that either daure never received this payment in 
full or that he revised his demands for reimbursement.
101 “Mémoire justificatif  pour le sr Malisset,” AN, F11 1173; AN, F11 1193; Malisset to Bertier 
de sauvigny, 27 May 1771 and Malisset to Rives (one of  Bertier’s agents), 21 June 1771, 
AN, 80 AP 19 (Bertier de sauvigny family papers to which the descendents of  the grands 
commis kindly granted me access). Malisset to Monthyon, 6, 9, 14, 18, 21 June 1770, C. 915, 
C. 917 and C. 918, A.d. P-de-d.
384 BREAd, POLITICs ANd POLITICAL ECONOMY
and intelligent” correspondents who know how to keep books, and to 
his willingness to forego all advances and to settle for a 2% commis-
sion on all operations without further compensation. But the leitmotif  
of  the project, which seems so ironical in retrospect, was his emphatic 
assurance that he would perform the task “without producing any sen-
sation.” His normal commercial dealings on the Paris ports and Halles 
and in the countryside “will serve as a cover for buying without giving 
rise to any suspicion that his purchases might involve the King.”102 Mal-
isset’s pitch failed to arouse enthusiasm in the Terray ministry.
As “miller,” “flour merchant,” “négociant,” and “grain merchant for 
the provisioning of  Paris,” he expanded his private operations which 
he always maintained were in the public interest. He invested in the 
construction of  new mills, established business connections in the 
midi and the southwest, and found it relatively easy to borrow sub-
stantial sums of  money despite his huge debts. He retained enough 
moral credit, too, to continue serving as a public commercial mediator 
in the Consular Courts as he had before his ordeal.103 The one-time 
journeyman baker proudly and legitimately styled himself  “bourgeois 
de Paris” when he penetrated the realm of  high finance to enter into 
a partnership with the swiss banker Ferdinand Grand, later one of  
the founders of  the Caisse d’Escompte, for the importation of  foreign 
grain. Grand, a creditor of  Leray de Chaumont, functioned as chief  
banker for Benjamin Franklin and the American Congress in France.104 
With audacity, a sense of  destiny, and visions of  samuel Bernard and 
the Pâris brothers dancing in his head, Malisset petitioned the king not 
long after his disgrace to reward him for his achievements with a pen-
sion and a promotion in rank:
The sieur Malisset asks that for proof  of  satisfaction with the services that he ren-
dered to His Majesty, & for recompense of  his works which were useful to the public 
and to the hospitals, the King please accord him the cordon of  saint Michel, or letters 
of  Nobility; having need of  some mark of  distinction to triumph over the Jealousy 
which has persecuted him in all times and to live with some felicity in the estate to 
which he shall retire.105
102 “Mémoire,” 26 Jan. 1771, AN, F11 1194.
103 Archives seine-Paris, d4B6–36–1958, d4B6–42–2307, d2B6 1104 (16 dec. 1771), d2B6 
1107 (2 March 1772), d5B6 2532, d4B6–64–4161; Malisset to sartine, 21 Feb. 1771, AN, 
F11 1193; 7 July 1767, Archives seine-Paris, d6B6 article 5 and 23 July 1773, Archives 
seine-Paris, d6B6 article 6.
104 Minutier Central, XIII, 391 (11 May 1776); Lüthy, Banque, II, 451–54, 613.
105 Petition, 9 April 1771, AN, F11 294–295.
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Throughout this third phase of  his career, Malisset remained a highly 
controversial figure. daure charged that the post-company Malisset was 
just like the old one, buying and selling to prolong rather than com-
bat the dearth. In september 1770 Hardy recorded that Malisset was 
hoarding oats, depleting the ports, and causing the price to double. He 
clashed with the grain measurers over fees which they claimed were 
due.106 doumerc, Leray’s former aide, who directed Terray’s provi-
sioning operations, accused Malisset of  stealing the king’s flour in the 
magazine they shared at Corbeil. Malisset indignantly rebuffed dou-
merc’s “atrocious” imputations. Precisely to avert any confusion, he had 
installed steel bars and separators to seal windows and to close off  com-
municating doors between the rooms containing royal flour and those 
harboring his own goods. In a lengthy, semi-autobiographical memoir, 
Malisset presented himself  as a man of  unwavering virtue and suggested 
that doumerc and his clerk dure invented these absurd “calumnies” to 
mask their own “malversations.” dure, he said, lost his last job on sus-
picion of  speculation and spent much of  his time in “dissipation.” As 
for doumerc, although there were many instances of  his misconduct 
that could be cited, Malisset refused to stoop to the name-calling level 
of  his adversary, adding that “he will not mention the observations that 
he could make on the habits of  this director [one of  doumerc’s titles 
was “director of  grain coming from abroad”] with a woman of  ill-
repute.”107 In 1770 Malisset’s charges had no credibility. But the situa-
tion was different several years later when it became doumerc’s turn to 
fall into disgrace, allegedly for misappropriating government funds and 
conducting official business in a dishonest fashion.
In 1772 another ugly affair arose concerning the quality of  Malis-
set’s merchandise.108 He had sold a Lyon client 600 sacks of  reput-
edly “first quality, fresh and well-made” flour through an intermedi-
ary who had no experience in the trade. When the client withheld 
payment of  more than half  the sale price, Malisset sued him before 
the Juges-Consuls. The Lyonnais angrily complained that the condi-
tions of  the contract had not been fulfilled since the flour contained 
“everything most defective in quality as well as in bad taste, to the 
106 daure, “Mémoire,” (1771), AN, F11 264; 15 sept. 1770, Hardy’s Journal, BN, mss. fr. 6680; 
AN, F11 264; 7 March 1770, AN, H * 1873, fol. 497.
107 “Mémoire justificatif  pour le sr Malisset,” AN, F11 1173. A Malisset appeared as creditor 
in the statement of  business failure which dure filed in 1772. Archives seine-Paris, d4B6–
50–3037.
108 28 April 1773, Archives seine-Paris, d6B6 carton 7.
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point that after having delivered it to different bakers … they made 
of  it such a bad bread … that he was obliged to take it back.” The 
referee, a Paris négociant, assigned by the court to try to settle the case 
amicably, esteemed that the flour in question, made from “very bad” 
Picardy wheat harvested in rainy conditions, “could not be compared 
with that of  the third quality.” He found Malisset guilty of  “abusing 
the confidence” of  the buying agent and reproached him for failing to 
present the issue honestly. Malisset’s deal with the banker Grand also 
ended in controversy—the parties could agree neither on the interest 
each had in the enterprise nor on the amount which the sales pro-
duced—but they were able to reach an out-of-court convention by 
which Malisset promised to pay his associate 15,000 livres.109
The most significant and protracted dispute involving Malis-
set concerned the settlement of  accounts of  the contract with the 
Laverdy government. While Leray remained aloof, Malisset and the 
other two guarantors were angered by the ministry’s refusal to grant 
them any consideration at the time of  cancellation. Although their 
claims that they were “ruined” by the enterprise were grossly puffed, 
there can be no question that they lost considerable sums of  money in 
1767–68. On several occasions the three demanded reimbursement 
for money they advanced after the company had become royalized, 
and for indemnities to compensate them for the remaining nine years 
of  the contract, despite the fact that they had all concurred in solic-
iting cancellation. Perruchot even dared to withhold sums deriving 
from the sale of  the king’s grain, which he was supposed to remit 
immediately to Mirlavaud. Trudaine sternly rebuked him, telling him 
that it “is against all rules for you to keep the funds of  the King in your 
hands to fulfill your pretensions” and flatly asserting that “the King 
owes you nothing.”110
In fact, after a critical inspection of  the accounts the following year, 
Albert, the intendant trained by Trudaine to take over the grain depart-
ment, concluded that Malisset and the guarantors owed the govern-
ment over 300,000 livres. His report was a visa, or a chambre de justice in 
miniature. He clearly began with the conviction that the government 
had been cheated and he expressed contempt for Malisset’s claims and 
explanations at every juncture. The examination was mercilessly exact-
ing and sometimes quite strained, covering hundreds of  items rang-
ing from the purchase of  grain to the repair of  damaged sacks. Albert 
109 Minutier Central, XIII, 391, 11 May 1776.
110 Mémoire, March, 1791, AN, F11 1193; Malisset, Rousseau and Perruchot to Trudaine de 
Montigny, 19 Jan. 1769 and Trudaine to Perruchot, Nov. 1768, ibid.
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 contended that the company did not replenish the stock of  40,000 sep-
tiers in the time specified by the contract and that Malisset “fraudu-
lently” supplied replacement grain of  light weight and “bad quality” 
even though the government’s grain expert duperron suggested that 
given the harvest conditions the grain “could have been of  an inferior 
quality without any fraud on his part.” Albert accused Malisset of  sys-
tematically falsifying the weight of  grain and flour sold, of  rendering 
much less flour per septier than promised, of  inflating the amount lost 
due to natural waste (again, despite the opinion of  duperron), of  pass-
ing on to the king expenses for which the company alone was responsi-
ble, and of  exaggerating costs legitimately attributable to the king. The 
intendant categorically denied all the company’s requests for compen-
sation for unanticipated expenses or unusual circumstances and refused 
its claim for a 2% commission on the replacement grains purchased by 
Leray under the name of  Trezel.
Malisset, Perruchot, and Rousseau rightly protested that Albert’s 
accounting was excessively severe. His rectifications were often arbi-
trary and abstract and on the whole his stance was no less one-sided 
and self-protective than that of  the company. The dispute dragged 
on for years, during which time the government does not seem to 
have pressed its case vigorously. In the 1780’s Montaran, the new 
chief  of  the grain department, reviewed the contest step by step. 
Although he reduced the government claim substantially, he gen-
erally found in favor of  Albert. The heirs of  Perruchot and Rous-
seau, on whose estates the government had placed liens, proposed 
a quid pro quo for the termination of  the affair. If  the government 
abandoned its quest for restitution, the company would renounce 
its demands for indemnities. despite the intercession of  sartine and 
other men of  influence in favor of  Malisset and the guarantors, 
Calonne refused to drop the case and appointed another in a series 
of  extraordinary commissions of  the royal council to study the affair. 
This panel also examined the accounts of  Leray de Chaumont and 
“other commissioners charged with the provisioning of  grain for the 
account of  His Majesty.” As late as 1791 the case remained unre-
solved and litigation for recovery may very well have resumed after 
the Revolution.111
Corbeil, Malisset’s only durable monument, passed into royal 
hands, after considerable bickering, in early 1772. Plunged into debt 
and deprived of  the contract at the end of  1768, Malisset had agreed 
111 AN, F11 1193; AN, F11 1173; AN, V7 273.
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to offer the establishment to the General Hospital. He estimated its 
worth to be 850,000 livres, including a quarter of  a million each for 
the central warehouse and the six mill-installations and 200,000 “for 
the water” which drives the machinery. He fixed its potential annual 
income at 48,422 livres, encompassing revenue from grain storage, 
milling, and the rental of  houses, boats, and a small vineyard. He 
was willing to let the Hospital acquire the establishment for a mere 
500,000 livres, 200,000 in cash (which would cover a large portion of  
his debts), and 300,000 in “exchanges” for houses in Paris and/or 
farms in the countryside (which would mark the beginning of  a new 
patrimony). Among the special “advantages” in the bargain, aside 
from the superb location, capacious quarters and modern machin-
ery, Malisset offered to cede his network of  correspondents much as 
a baker sold his “clients” [pratiques] and to refrain from competing 
against the Hospital for grain purchases in those areas.
The Hospital deal fell through, apparently because the govern-
ment decided that it still needed Corbeil. By an arrêt du conseil of  Janu-
ary 1769, the ministry offered to lease the Corbeil mills from Malisset 
for 12,000 livres a year and grant him a ten year loan of  260,000 livres 
to be paid directly to his creditors. Malisset accepted the terms but, 
for reasons that are obscure, the government fulfilled only a part of  
its obligations. It paid no rent to Malisset and advanced only 115,000 
livres of  the loan (the bulk of  which Leray received), which it tried to 
recover from Malisset in 1791. In February 1771, Malisset offered to 
sell the entire Corbeil establishment to the King for 590,000 livres plus 
a pension for himself  and a “part” in some royal operation to indem-
nify a sieur demontvallier who had purchased a quarter interest in 
Malisset’s business. In April he reduced the price to 500,000 livres. 
The government approved this arrangement and became proprietor 
of  the establishment.112
First under doumerc and then, in the late seventies and eighties, 
under the Leleu brothers, Corbeil remained a major entrepôt and the 
sole reserve for the capital. At the end of  1790, a committee appointed 
112 Evaluation (Aug. 1768), état (20 April 1769), mémoires (July 1769), arrêt du Conseil 
(Jan. 1769), and Malisset to CG, 20 Feb. 1771, AN, F11 1193–1194; “Offre du sr Malisset,” 
9 April 1771 and “Mémoire sur l’établissement de Corbeil” (1790), AN, F11 294–295. 
Like many innovative undertakings in the Old Regime, the ultra-modern Corbeil milling 
establishment was still burdened with the weight of  the past. As soon as the sale of  Corbeil 
to the government became official, the Order of  Malta rushed to levy its sacrosanct claim 
to lods et ventes. Boscheron to st.-Prest, 6 Mar. 1772, AN, F11 1193.
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by the Paris municipality urged the city to acquire the Corbeil instal-
lation. The provisioning of  such a great city must not be “delivered 
to chance,” they warned; “an almost physical certitude is necessary” 
and Corbeil could help provide this security. The matter was urgent, 
for a number of  “companies of  speculators” coveted the establish-
ment for their own purposes. The committee assessed the value at 
162,450 livres, substantially lower than the most niggardly estimates 
made twenty years earlier. Through various arrangements, Corbeil 
remained under government control. Well into the nineteenth cen-
tury, it continued to serve Paris as a reserve center and a laboratory 
for testing the merits of  different types of  grain and flour.113
With the transfer of  Corbeil, Malisset finally terminated his active 
role as an “intéressé dans les affaires du Roy,” an intentionally vague 
and portentous title which covered a vast range of  activities in the 
borderland between the public and private sectors of  the Old Regime. 
Malisset emerged from his experience in provisioning with enough 
funds or enough credit to become a gentleman-farmer: he purchased 
four domaines and operated the duché de Châtillon-sur-Loing, leased 
from the duc de Luxembourg. But he did not find serenity in retire-
ment. To build this new empire, he had to borrow heavily; in addi-
tion, while he insisted with a certain haughtiness that he “no longer 
engaged in trade of  any kind,” he still owed money to some of  his for-
mer business relations. Unable to pay his creditors and either unable 
or unwilling to liquidate his properties, in March 1781 he filed for fail-
ure with the Consular Court. His debts amounted to over 71,000 livres; 
the banker Grand spearheaded the organization of  creditors which 
pressed for recovery. He had substantial assets, including 98,000 livres 
in domain land, a 24,000 livres house in Paris, and over 16,000 livres in 
rentes. Nevertheless, he was judged insolvent. According to a govern-
ment report, he suffered from madness in his declining years.114
VII
His was not the most famous case of  purported insanity linked to the 
history of  the king’s grain in the late sixties. Leprévost de Beaumont, 
113 AN, F12* 1, fols. 11, 32, 161–62, 203, 338; Mémoire, 22 Feb. 1791, AN, F11 294–295; 
Nov. 1790 and May 1791, AAP, #105, liasse 10; AN, F11 1359.
114 Archives seine-Paris; d4B6–80–5338; “subsistance, 1765–68” (Feb. 1788), AN, F11 1173; 
decision of  M. delessart, 8 April 1791, published by Bord, Histoire du blé, 228.
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who denounced the “pact of  famine” in 1768, was described by sar-
tine as a “dangerous maniac,” treated during 21 years of  captivity in 
the Bastille, Vincennes, Bicêtre, and Charenton as a demented sub-
versive, and characterized by modern historians as either a pathetic 
or a rascally madman.
In a mawkish novel written in the first half  of  the nineteenth cen-
tury by Elie Berthet, whose chief  fault was his prolificacy, Malisset and 
Leprévost crossed paths.115 The “hero of  this story,” Leprévost, was 
an intensely earnest and compassionate young man “of  noble visage, 
smooth, full of  character and expression,” dressed in the simple black 
of  a layman attached to the ecclesiastical bureaucracy. The villain, “so 
bloated with fat and importance, was named Pierre Malisset: he was 
a former baker, who, after having become bankrupt, had acquired 
a fatal celebrity in the grain markets, where he purchased immense 
quantities of  grain for the king’s account.” This “big financier” had a 
“proud and disdainful air” with “one of  those fresh, round, flowered 
faces made to reflect a wholly material beatitude.” Richly garbed, he 
wore an elegant wig and diamonds sparkled on his fingers. He lived in 
a sumptuous house filled with masterpieces of  woodwork and sculp-
ture and attended by an army of  servants. There he often received 
his fellow-financiers, to whom he once proposed the toast: “to the 
health of  the people of  Paris, this good people whom we nourish so 
badly and who nourish us so well.” This wretched people, suffering 
the “horrors of  dearth,” suspected that Malisset’s operations, made 
under the name of  the king’s grain, were really part of  “a vast system 
of  hoarding” authorized by a “secret deal” between the financiers on 
the one side and the ministers and the court on the other.
To learn more of  the plot, the philantropic Leprévost tried to infil-
trate the Malisset organization. “He wants to rip the mask from the 
grain hoarders,” sobbed his wife Angèle, who begged her husband to 
abandon the dangerous plan, “denounce the famine pact in Parlement, 
and present to the judges documented proof  of  an execrable conven-
tion.” “That is to say,” commented his aged father, “to attack the gov-
ernment of  the king head-on: and, if  he does not succeed, or even if  he 
succeeds, to fall into the cells of  the Bastille, which will enclose him like 
a tomb.” Leprévost passionately rebuffed these objections: “My father, 
there is something still more powerful than the voice of  the family, it is 
115 Elie Berthet, Le Pacte de famine (Paris, 1857). Cf. Berthet’s play, written in collaboration with 
P. Foucher, Le Pacte de famine (Paris, 1857).
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the voice of  a people which is suffering and hungry, this voice calls me, 
I must obey it.”
The denouement was cruel and predictable. One of  sartine’s spies 
exposed Leprévost; the police, accompanied by Malisset, whose face 
radiated an “infernal joy,” arrested him and tossed him in jail where 
he languished until the 14th of  July 1789 when the good people of  
Paris, led by Leprévost’s own son, liberated him.116 He survived his 
release only a week but he passed away in peace with the knowledge 
that a new day had come: 
Adieu, my friends; I am able to die. The people will have bread.
Berthet’s treacly fiction embodies what historians have come to call 
the legend of  the famine pact. The legend itself  is a curious historical 
reality which survived in scholarly and imaginative literature until the 
end of  the nineteenth century and still occasionally surfaces today.117 
Leprévost invented the highly charged phrase and elaborated the leg-
end, which the revolutionaries of  ’89 consecrated in the form that 
we know it. son of  a procurator of  the bailliage of  Beaumont, he 
was secretary to the abbé de Broglie, general agent of  the clergy of  
France.118 sustained by a modest salary and bits and pieces of  land 
and rentes, his expenses appear to have exceeded his income. In July 
1768 he fortuitously came across a file of  papers concerning the Mal-
isset company and its relations with the government. Convinced that 
he had found the trace of  “an infernal pact of  a monstrous league” 
whose goal it was “to establish famine methodically” in order to reap 
enormous profits, he felt that it was his obligation to denounce the 
plot and to force a purge of  the malefactors from the seats of  power.
The police arrested Leprévost in November 1768 at approxi-
mately the same moment that bread prices reached their crisis apex 
116 The real Leprévost in fact was freed more appropriately on the 5th of  October, the day the 
crowd marched to Versailles to retrieve the Baker-King. Leprévost, Dénonciation, pétition et 
rogation (Paris, 1791), 7.
117 see, for example, P. s. Laurentie, Histoire de France (Paris, 1845), VIII, 266; G. de Molinari, article 
“Céréales,” in Coquelin and Guillaumin, eds., Dictionnaire de l’économie politique (Paris, 1873), I, 
305; Cochut, “Le Pain à Paris,” Revue des deux mondes, LXVI (Aug.-sept. 1863), 986–89; Mauguin, 
Etudes historiques sur l’administration de l’agriculture, I, 326–330, 340–41; Maxime du Camp, Paris, II, 
29, 32; Colfavru, “Question des subsistances,” La Révolution française, V (July-dec. 1883), 507–
508; F. Rocquain, “Le Parti des philosophes,” Séances et Travaux de l’Académie des Sciences Morales et 
Politiques, XIV (1880), 102–46; Eugène Bonnemère, Histoire des paysans (Paris, 1846), II, 160–61; 
and most recently Gérard Walter, Histoire des paysans de France (Paris, 1963), 308.
118 Arsenal, mss. Bastille 12353. Cf. Jobez who claimed that Leprévost was a relative of  the 
former Lieutenant General of  Police of  Paris Hérault. Louis XV, VI, 401–403.
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and that the Paris Parlement subpoenaed Malisset. The interception 
of  a packet of  documents and charges, addressed by Leprévost to the 
Rouen Parlement, led to his apprehension.119 sartine at first seems to 
have treated him sympathetically, to have tried to win his confidence, 
and perhaps disabuse him of  his illusions by explaining in detail the 
nature of  the king’s grain system. Not even the prospect of  freedom 
could induce Leprévost to repudiate his charges. “How could one 
act against one’s conscience,” he asked, “when it is a question of  the 
fatherland, of  the cause of  the people, and of  that of  our monarch?” 
Morally bound to the heroic course, he later justified his persistence 
on legal grounds as well, citing an obscure law of  1477 that required 
citizens to expose plots against the government.120
According to Leprévost, the “blackguard” Laverdy was the engineer 
of  the conspiracy on the government’s side, assisted by the intendants 
of  finance, tyrannical sartine (“the most refined knave of  his time”), 
a large contingent from the Paris Parlement, and a host of  “pirates,” 
“vultures,” “privileged vampires,” “millionaires,” and “monopolists.” 
Using liberalization as a device to suppress controls without arousing 
suspicion and the permission to export as a pretext to secrete vast quan-
tities of  grain abroad, the conspirators stripped the kingdom bare of  
subsistence, beginning first around Paris and gradually spreading their 
net across the rest of  the nation. The proof  of  the crimes was to be 
found in the correspondence between officials and financiers and in 
the contracts they signed. There were other “strong indications” of  
the cabal plain for everyone to read in the unnatural course of  events: 
“the general outcry, the scarcity of  goods in the markets, the precipitate 
removals and concealments, the nocturnal transports by land and sea, 
the continual cherté even in a time of  Abundance, the sharp lowering and 
raising of  the price against the usual order,” in a word the same set 
of  factors which aroused suspicion among local officials and provoked 
119 It is an interesting reflection on Leprévost’s perception of  the political divisions at the 
summit of  power to note that he also sent, or intended to send, a denunciation of  the 
famine pact to the Prince de Conti.
120 Arsenal, mss. Bastille 12353; Leprévost, Le Prisonnier d’état, 22–23, 52, 86; Leprévost, 
Dénonciation d’un pacte de famine générale au roi Louis XV (Paris, n.d.), 35. Preferring duty to 
liberty, Leprévost claimed he also lost the love of  his life, “a very beautiful, rich girl” whom 
“he was about to marry.” Leprévost, Dénonciation et pétition aux représentants de l’Assemblée de 
la seconde Législature (Paris, 1791), 4. For the official view of  Leprévost as a “dangerous” 
and “totally deranged” man, see sartine to Jumillac, 17 Nov. 1768 and Florentin to 
Rougement, 1 sept. 1770, F. and L. Ravaisson-Mollien, eds., Archives de la Bastille, XIX, 
410, 411.
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consumer riots. Nor was the Laverdien pact the first of  its kind. Lepré-
vost traced the conspiracy back at least as far as Orry. From prison he 
averred that it was continued by Laverdy’s successors.
Leprévost vacillated in his attitude toward the king. sometimes 
he depicted the king as an innocent victim of  “lèse-majesté and lèse-
humanité”: “they took special care to hide from the King Louis XV 
the exercise of  the monopoly of  grain and all the magazines during his 
whole reign so that he neither knew nor suspected anything even in the 
time of  the most rigorous chertés in the years 1752, 1767 and 1768 though 
everything was done in his name and at the expense of  his finances.” But 
at other times he suggested, like the Rouen Parlement, that the operation 
was too vast and important for the king to remain unaware and unin-
volved and he referred bitterly to “our monarch, merchant of  grain.” 
He took refuge, too, like others who had suspected royal complicity in 
grain speculations in the course of  the century but could not bring them-
selves to believe that the aim was personal aggrandizement, in a middle 
position which made the king a party to a sort of  physiocratic-fiscal plot 
through which his associates concealed from him their true motives:
The King knows of  the Contract. He has been made to believe that it was the only 
means to bring back into France all the money which has left his Kingdom, to give 
back to the laboureurs the capacity to extend the cultivation of  their lands with their 
personal fortunes, to force up the price of  land in favor of  the proprietors, and to 
succeed in amortizing the debts of  the state little by little since no other financial 
operation revealed the possibility of  doing it.121
during his long incarceration Leprévost remained defiant. He 
complained bitterly of  the cruel treatment accorded him (1,631 days 
in solitary and a diet composed of  “the bread of  suffering and the 
water of  anguish”), yet he rejected numerous offers of  accommoda-
tion on the grounds that they compromised his integrity.122 He con-
tinued to fashion denunciations, which he cast to the wind over the 
prison walls in the hope that they would reach and arouse men of  
good will. He shared his discoveries with fellow prisoners, including 
121 Ibid. Cf. Leprévost, Dénonciation d’un pacte de famine générale, 17, 24, 40 and Regnaud, “Histoire 
des événements arrivés en France ...,” BN, mss. fr. 13733, fols. 26–27.
122 see, for example, Leprévost to Lenoir (?), 23 May 1778, Archives seine-Paris, 4AZ 68, a 
frenzied but moving cry for justice and liberty. For Leprévost’s perception of  the treatment 
he received in the various prisons he inhabited, see A. Arnould, et al., Histoire de la Bastille 
(Paris, 1844), VI, 85–106 and Alboize du Pujol and Auguste Macquet, Le Donjon de Vincennes 
(Paris, 1844), II, 135–56.
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one de sades, until he was placed in solitary confinement. He wrote 
incessantly and, although most of  the essays are quite coherent, they 
show signs of  the strain of  isolation and of  a febrile and agitated 
imagination. The rhythm and tone of  his rhetoric sometimes became 
frenzied, he drew increasingly upon apocalyptic religious imagery, 
and he indulged in escapist fantasies and role-playing. Released in 
1789, Leprévost became something of  a celebrity, living proof  of  the 
perfidy and inhumanity of  the Old Regime. His revelations seemed 
particularly relevant at a time when the people once again lacked 
bread, and when the intendant of  Paris, Bertier de sauvigny (once a 
patron of  Malisset!) and his father-in-law Foulon were massacred by 
vengeful mobs who accused them of  conspiring to starve the people.123 
No one was surprised to learn in 1789 that the counterrevolutionary 
conspiracy to starve the nation had deep roots in the prerevolution-
ary past. Manuel hailed his patriotism in the Police Unmasked and the 
Moniteur, and the Révolutions de Paris told his story in stilted detail.124
On the whole, Leprévost remained faithful to his original scenario, 
making certain adjustments to accommodate the revolutionary vocab-
ulary (he now called the pact crime “nationicide”), extending the 
scope of  the plot a bit to encompass all the parlements except Rouen 
and Grenoble and some members of  the upper clergy whom he had 
served in the old days, and abandoning any serious effort to salvage 
the honor of  the king. It is difficult to imagine what an extraordinary 
experience it must have been for him to witness his own resurrection, 
vindication, and apotheosis in terms which he had obscurely foreseen 
in his prison lucubrations.125 Understandably, prison had nurtured an 
appetite for vengeance. He testified at the trial that sent Laverdy to 
the guillotine and he pursued in the courts several of  the ministers 
and officials responsible for his oppression.126 He became a nuisance 
as well as a fury, harassing the assembly with requests for indemnities 
123 In his “revolutionary” writing, Leprévost explicitly connected, in linear fashion, the “pact” 
of  Bertier, Foulon and their associates with the earlier conspiracies of  Laverdy, sartine, etc. 
Le Prisonnier d’état, iii.
124 Manuel, Police dévoilée, I 370–71, 375–80; Révolutions de Paris, successive numbers beginning 
with #31 (6–13 Feb. 1790) and concluding with #52 (3–10 July 1790). Cf. Buchez and 
Roux, Histoire de l’Assemblée Constituante, II, 74, 76–78.
125 Leprévost himself  reminded his readers that they were “in front of  a ghost [returned] from 
another world....” Dénonciation et pétition, 1.
126 On his obsessive demand for vengeance, especially against Laverdy, see Le Prisonnier d’état, 
passim, and Dénonciation, pétition et rogation, 8 and Dénonciation et pétition, 7.
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and recognition, consolation more substantial than the knowledge 
that the people will at last have bread.
The terrible famine conspiracy, in the extravagant, all-embracing 
form in which Leprévost presented it, may have been the creation 
of  a spirit touched with madness. But it is well to remember that 
unless such folly was an epidemic disease, it required no madness to 
imagine, in less exalted cast, a plot of  officials and entrepreneurs con-
trived to profit from public misery. Viewed in retrospect, the vision is 
almost trite. What is striking about its reemergence in the sixties is not 
so much Leprévost’s muckraking—which, after all, had no influence 
until the Revolution when it had to compete for attention with a host 
of  other plots hatched on the left and on the right—but the fact that 
it was so widely ventilated on so many levels and that in most cases it 
specifically connected the conspiracy with the broad policy of  reform 
undertaken by the government of  Louis XV.
France bristled with talk of  speculative conspiracies in the late six-
ties, as it had in 1725 and 1740. But in the late sixties the talk did 
not focus on an allegedly depraved minister like the duc de Bourbon, 
on an ambitious royal mistress like Madame de Prie (although Pom-
padour did not suffer for lack of  abuse), on corrupt hangers-on like 
Orry’s brother, on preeminent court bankers like Bernard and the 
Pâris brothers, on a grand commercial monopoly like the Company 
of  the Indies, or upon a particularly rapacious Controller-General 
like the abbé Terray (at least not till later). Although there are many 
important similarities in the plot conceptions of  the sixties and those 
of  earlier periods, the indictment of  the sixties fixed not so much upon 
individuals as upon institutions and policies. The “mark of  author-
ity,” as the Rouen Parlement said, was everywhere apparent. Even 
if  the government did not itself  direct every maneuver, it tolerated, 
or rather forced local authorities to tolerate, maneuvers which in the 
past had been strictly forbidden. Leprévost himself  had copies of  let-
ters from local police complaining against removals of  grain made 
in the name of  the king and reports of  sartine’s own agents calling 
attention to suspected maneuvers.127 The accusations current in the 
sixties suggested the idea that the government prepared the condi-
tions which made a crisis likely and for reasons of  its own—fiscal, 
venal, economic—made every effort to turn the crisis to advantage.
127 Arsenal, mss. Bastille 12353.
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These charges, of  course, are no less fabulous than the earlier ones. 
It is worth asking, however, whether they do not betray a significantly 
different political perspective. To be sure, it would be unwise to strain 
the point. Not enough is known about the “pact-type” mentality to 
warrant hasty inferences. But if  one contends that it was a sort of  
recurring Weltanschauung characteristic of  stressful episodes of  scarcity 
and cherté, one is presuming not only a certain collective psychology 
(or collective psychopathology) but also a number of  conscious or 
semiconscious political choices. For one must explain why the men-
tality took the peculiar shape that it did. While events and memories 
may condition people to think about their situation in conspiratorial 
terms, they must still decide, from a relatively wide range of  options, 
who or what to hold responsible. Traditionally, the king and the peo-
ple had a special, symbiotic relationship. The father of  the people 
expected his subjects to obey. The people expected the monarch to 
look out for their welfare. When a dearth came, the people some-
times blamed the king. But there is a considerable difference between 
reproaching a ruler for his lack of  foresight and accusing him of  bra-
zenly disregarding and exploiting public misery. some sort of  politi-
cal consciousness bridges the distance between these two postures.
Activated by the crisis, this political consciousness is the cumulative 
product of  the everyday experiences and perceptions of  individuals. 
The Great Fear of  1789 grew out of  a plot mentality triggered by a com-
plex of  well-known causes. To explain why it resulted in the burning of  
some châteaux and not of  others, one must consider political variables. 
I have suggested that the “pact mentality” acquired its special stamp in 
the sixties as the result of  a widely shared political sentiment. A segment 
of  the population, persuaded that there was a causal relationship—a 
deliberately-engineered connection—between the policy of  liberaliza-
tion and the grain crisis, lost confidence in the government. so profound 
was their disenchantment that they were prepared to believe that the 
government and perhaps the king as well, had turned against the nation. 
Nor was this the only element which could have contributed to political 
alienation. There were other factors that had nothing to do with the 
dearth or plot mentality which informed political consciousness. Lepré-
vost’s conceptualization of  the famine pact, for example, clearly fits into 
a larger view of  the politics of  the Old Regime.
Like the marquis d’Argenson, whose idiosyncratic political ideas 
predisposed him to expect to find evidence of  government malfeasance 
in the dearths of  the forties and fifties, Leprévost came to the famine 
pact with serious reservations about the way in which the  government 
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of  Louis XV managed the affairs of  state and society.128 Morally and 
materially, he argued, France was in a state of  ruin. Everywhere there 
were signs that the people no longer believed in the government. The 
people have been infinitely patient, but the day of  reckoning, Lepré-
vost warned, was not far off:
For some time the evils have been increasing, the complaints have been registered 
again and again, confidence has been evaporating, desolation has been growing, mur-
murs follow, succeeded by discouragement, the people become indignant, and the 
keen and constant love which they have always had for Your Majesty is ready today to 
pass to hatred; there remains only to dread the Universal Rising of  the Kingdom in 
the train of  the local revolts which have already erupted.
The government has only itself  to blame, Leprévost contended. struc-
turally, it was corrupt and defective and its policies perpetuated old 
abuses and created new problems. The people felt betrayed because 
the government repeatedly broke its “most sacred engagements.”
Fiscality furnished the most egregious example. The government 
admitted that taxes were oppressively heavy but, despite its solemn 
promises, the double vingtième and the supplementary “sols pour livre” 
were not abolished and the taille was increased. Fraud, theft, and tyr-
anny were rampant in the fiscal system and they spread from there 
to other domains. Leprévost hated the “maltôtiers” in finance, in the 
farms, and in other semi-official enterprises who “purchased the right 
to plunder.” He shared the desire of  certain reformers and officials to 
see the General Farms converted into régies and the receveurs prohib-
ited from using “the people’s money” for private purposes. It was no 
accident that to describe the mechanism of  the famine pact he used 
the vocabulary of  fiscality: farms, leases, croupiers.
Like the parlements, Leprévost accused the government of  promot-
ing or failing to correct “alterations of  the fundamental constitutions 
of  the kingdom.” He viewed the parlements as “permanent councils” 
which the king must depend upon and trust. But he did not hesitate to 
denounce the “odious and shameful venality of  offices” and the failure 
of  the courts to provide free and easily accessible justice to everyone. 
Like Necker, Leprévost viewed “general administration” as a “true sci-
ence”—an “encyclopedia,” he said, in a revealing metaphor—which 
must be carefully studied. The king, however, treated it casually, like a 
royal domain, or frivolously, like a game. Without careful consideration, 
128 For d’Argenson’s “pact” charges, see his Mémoires, ed. by Rathery, 5, 8 Nov. 1740, III, 213, 219, 223.
The analysis of  Leprévost below is based upon letters, essays, outlines and mss. fragments 
in Arsenal, mss. Bastille 12353.
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he appointed ministers who were not qualified. As a consequence, there 
were “frequent revolutions” in the government, “instability in its prin-
ciples,” and confusion and consternation on the part of  the citizenry, 
which did not know what to expect.
In this age of  vulgar materialism, where “everything is reduced to 
finance,” where luxury and misery coexisted in scandalous counter-
point, not even the church escaped unscathed. Leprévost, who had a 
professional knowledge of  ecclesiastical affairs, criticized the pomp and 
prodigality of  the upper clergy, the general avarice of  clerics at all lev-
els, and such abuses as the plurality of  benefices, nonresidence of  prel-
ates, and inequalities of  ecclesiastical jurisdictions. Although he had 
little to say about the second estate, he did censure nobles for clinging 
to privileges and dues which retarded the development of  commerce, 
agriculture, and industry.
The fruit of  mismanagement and corruption was universal decay 
and suffering. The cities teemed with beggars, the countryside was 
“almost deserted,” commerce was rife with bankruptcies, old industry 
languished, and new manufactures were stillborn. dishonor abroad 
matched disorder at home. Humiliating defeat in war cost the king-
dom its colonies and its “glory.” “Never,” insisted Leprévost, “yes, 
never, was misery in France more crushing and more general than 
during the peace [that followed] and after successive and abundant 
harvests.” The artificial dearth caused by excessive exportation and 
“the criminal monopoly” produced a general economic crisis, accord-
ing to Leprévost’s analysis, which was not at all far-fetched. The prices 
of  other necessities and of  rents and land followed the soaring course 
of  the price of  grain while wages lagged far behind. The ranks of  the 
jobless swelled as employers cut back their operations. “Twenty suc-
cessive years of  foreign warfare,” he contended, “make less ravage in 
the kingdom than bread cherté during two years.”
On the issue of  the grain trade, Leprévost did not take a nar-
rowly traditionalist stance. There was a tension in his mind between 
an ardently physiocratic inclination to liberate commerce from all 
 servitudes and a delamarist fear that the consumer would suffer 
unbearably under such a system.129 He favored an unlimited internal 
liberty for the grain trade except in times of  shortage, but demanded 
that exportation, which served only to enrich millionaires, be closely 
 controlled.
129 see his sympathic remarks about the physiocrats in Dénonciation d’un pacte de famine générale, 27.
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There is nothing arresting or original in Leprévost’s indictment of  
the Old Regime. He was one of  the growing circle of  men of  disparate 
backgrounds and interests who wanted to change things. He read the 
philosophes, he was interested in the Jansenist attack on the church, he 
knew all the economists from Melon through Mirabeau, and he drew 
heavily on the spirit and substance of  the parlementary opposition to the 
crown and the government. He saw himself  as a philosophe, not the sort 
given to poetry and abstractions but to practical, urgent matters of  state. 
The police chief  Lenoir, his arch-enemy (“the black ogre”), called him 
“a dangerous writer seeking to arouse [men’s] minds through seditious 
works … an homme à projets.…”130 While in prison, Leprévost claimed to 
have written a twenty volume manuscript called “L’Art de régner,” of  
which only a bare outline survives today.131 He believed that he had syn-
thesized the “scientific” principles upon which good government should 
be based. As time passed, he learned with satisfaction of  changes tak-
ing place in the administration, changes very similar to those which he 
himself  recommended in his writings. He characterized the sweeping 
reforms of  the financial system and the army in the seventies and eight-
ies as “coups d’état” for which, in some sense, he believed he deserved 
credit. In the year VIII, when he was 75 years old, “seeing the fatherland 
in the most imminent danger,” he published a long critique of  the leg-
islative and constitutional record of  the Revolution from its inception. 
He proposed “forty fundamental columns” on which a nation could be 
solidly built, of  which financial order was the most important. despair-
ing of  a solution on the part of  the inept directory, he was prepared to 
place his confidence, at least provisionally, in a “hero” on horseback.132
While there is still a great leap between Leprévost’s vigorous criti-
cism of  the government and his manic formulation of  the famine 
pact, his overall posture suggests that the denunciation of  the plot 
was not merely a wild-eyed aberration, but a manifestation, albeit 
grotesquely distorted, of  a political attitude. He convinced himself  
that a government as corrupt and as indifferent to the public good 
as the one he described was capable of  the most diabolical actions. 
Political alienation is a powerful prism. Present-day Americans who 
130 Lenoir papers, Bibliothèque Municipale d’Orléans, mss. 1422.
131 He claimed that the manuscript was confiscated by the police when he was transferred 
from Vincennes to Charenton in 1784. Le Prisonnier d’état, 123–24. during the Revolution 
he referred to himself  as the author of  “L’art de régner,” as if  it were, along with the Spirit 
of  the Laws, a standard text of  political science. Ibid., 102.
132 Leprévost, Aspect de la France (Paris, year VIII).
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have heard men of  goodwill impute the Kennedy assassination to a 
conspiracy of  highly-placed government or military officials and a 
handful of  rightist millionaires know what it can do. For that mat-
ter, future Americans, looking back to the Watergate Administration, 
may well perceive the Russian-American wheat deal of  1972–73 as a 
sophisticated version of  a pacte de famine.
VIII
The pact phenomenon placed the liberals in an embarrassing and 
delicate position. Had it occurred at a different time, before the gov-
ernment instituted the grain reforms, the liberals could have prof-
ited from the impact on public opinion, for it underscored one of  
the lessons that they never tired of  preaching: that the government 
had no business interfering in subsistence matters at any time. But 
in the sixties the liberals were the servants, not the adversaries, of  
the party in power. Politically, they had invested all their hopes in 
the government’s liberalization policy. For the sake of  solidarity, they 
had modulated their demands and tempered their criticisms of  the 
government and they tacitly accepted, as part of  the global strategy, 
the recourse to the king’s grain, Laverdy’s royal trump. so long as the 
government maintained its commitment to liberalization, they could 
not afford to question its wisdom or good intentions. The outburst of  
rumors and suspicions did not startle the liberals—in the fifties Her-
bert and others had warned that the king’s grain invariably provoked 
popular “insults” and “murmurs” which turned the people against 
the government—so much as it exasperated them.133 For it discred-
ited the government with which they were closely associated and it 
jeopardized the fate of  the program they had labored so devotedly 
to realize.
With deep ambivalence—they could never excuse the ministry for 
its weakness and stupidity—the liberals came to the defense of  the 
government and provided the only serious public refutation of  the 
charges of  Leprévost, the Rouen Parlement, and others. The idea that 
the ministry was part of  a plot against the people’s subsistence, the 
abbé Roubaud argued at the end of  the sixties, was absurd, naive, 
and illogical. There was indeed a Malisset company—he called it by 
name—which functioned “by order of  the Government and under 
133 Herbert, Essai, ed. by depitre, 55. Cf. ibid., 20 and Journal économique (May 1754), 72–73.
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the inspection of  the Ministry.” Like many previous ventures simi-
larly organized following the precepts of  “the old system,” its pur-
pose was to provide “for the provisioning of  the capital, large cities, 
and provinces which might have need of  assistance.” The Malisset 
operation, however, Roubaud emphasized, was a temporary measure 
meant to last “until commerce was sufficiently free and extensive to 
spare the administration this care.” “This is,” he wrote, “the single and 
only enterprise that conjectures have been able to transform into odi-
ous and shocking monopoly.” What sort of  monopoly, he asked, sells 
regularly at a loss and conducts its business soberly to avoid “stifling 
the competition” and “ruining” the merchants? Malisset did not even 
engage in trade, properly speaking; rather he “rendered a service” 
to the nation. It was a sad irony (attributable to longstanding “preju-
dices” and to the panic fears peculiar to dearths), Roubaud concluded, 
that the very people who implored the king for food were the ones who 
rushed to denounce the activities of  the government in their behalf.134
In an essay published toward the end of  1768, the abbé Baudeau 
joined Roubaud in a warm defense of  the integrity and the ideological 
commitment of  the ministry to liberty and a straightforward explana-
tion of  the king’s grain operation as an emergency service which the 
government construed as a “necessary evil.”135 While liberalization was 
still in force, Baudeau regarded “pact” imputations and criticism of  
government victualing as direct attacks on the liberal reforms. Yet his 
tone changed considerably by the time he treated the question again 
in the seventies, well after the government had abjured liberalism. He 
was now free to deal with the matter without any political constraints. 
“In recent times,” Baudeau noted, “the public has been persuaded 
that there was exercised in the kingdom a general monopoly on grain 
and flour: the public was right.” It erred, however, in its conception of  
“the nature and the characteristics” of  the monopoly:
It was imagined that the company of  commissioners of  the King ran a trade for profit, 
buying grain cheaply, & reselling them more dearly. In truth, this company was doing 
quite the contrary: it bought more dearly, & sold more cheaply … so that its general com-
merce was conducted at a loss, but a very great loss for the royal treasury, that is to say 
for the Nation which filled it.
134 Roubaud, Représentations, 126–32.
135 Baudeau, Avis aux honnêtes gens qui veulent bien faire (Paris, 1768), 64–80 and passim. The Rouen 
Parlement pointed to the revelations in the Avis as a vindicaton of  their contention that 
“this famous and protected company” existed and as further evidence that the government 
had lied in its replies to the Parlement’s charges. Remonstrance, 25 Jan. 1769, Registre st. 
Martin, A.d. s-M.
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The company was not exclusively devoted to the public interest, what-
ever the intentions of  the government, nor did it have any scruples 
about crushing competition. The “natural goal” of  the agents was 
to become “the only dealers in grain and flour in all the kingdom.” 
“Open warfare” broke out between the company and the ordinary 
merchants who could not successfully rival an enterprise protected 
and subsidized by the government.
Baudeau disabused the public of  its suspicions in a singularly curious 
way. He said that it was absurd to imagine a plot against the people, yet 
he described a system of  provisioning whose effect was clearly contrary 
to the public interest, viewed from the perspective of  simple consumer 
or physiocratic prophet. In the same reassuring, clinical tone, Roubaud 
wrote that it “had an interest in allowing or even causing local dearths 
to arise in order to prove its utility.” “so as not to accuse anyone,” he 
added mysteriously, “let us not insist on these last points.” Roubaud 
had punctured the pact/plot idea in order to rescue the government’s 
reputation and program; Baudeau refuted it in order to discredit the 
ministry and its policy on the solid grounds of  political economy rather 
than to exonerate the ministry as a victim of  the fantasies of  a gull-
ible and insecure public. Baudeau hated the notion of  a provision-
ing company because he believed that it was wholly incompatible with 
a genuine liberalization and he detested the agents of  the company 
(“they are my known enemies”) because he saw them as the most vocal 
antiliberal, pro-police lobby within the government.136
Along with many others, liberals and nonliberals alike, Baudeau 
felt that any sort of  governmental provisioning, even if  it were done, 
as Turgot once said, “by angels,” was misconceived, generally deleteri-
ous, and doomed to failure. The experience of  the late sixties reinforced 
their belief  that all such activities ought to be stopped for reasons that 
were political as well as doctrinal. The famine pact episode underscored 
the enormous difficulty of  calculating public opinion in the practice 
of  public administration. The king’s grain, alleged the Provence Par-
lement, spread “terror” rather than comfort throughout the realm; the 
whole pact syndrome could have been averted had Louis XV not turned 
against his “own principles” in order to satisfy a lingering and misguided 
paternalistic scruple.137 The économiste-bureaucrat dupont took it as a sort 
of  behavioral law that government grain operations provoke “anxieties” 
136 Baudeau, “Lettres ... à un Magistrat du Parlement de Paris ...,” Nouvelles éphémérides 
économiques, I (1775), 1–23.
137 Letter to Louis XV, 10 Nov. 1770, B. 3677, A.d. B-du-R.
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and “expose the Ministry to unjust suspicions.” Like Turgot, he argued 
that whatever the design of  the government, the people “never see in it 
anything but crime and monopoly.”138 Turgot’s friend Véri discerned the 
same kind of  plot reflex and thought it might have a salutary effect if  it 
taught administrators a lesson: “Anything which might deter them from 
directing the grain [operations] will seem to me so great a good that I 
cannot be troubled by the false imputations made to them.”139
Whereas the liberals claimed that the people were too blind to appre-
ciate the true defects in royal victualing systems, partisans of  government 
intervention maintained that they were too blind to understand its true 
benefits. Necker deplored the popular tendency to attribute government 
“beneficence” to “interested views.” Acutely sensitive to public opinion, 
he felt that the political cost of  extensive government provisioning was 
prohibitive: “thus the constant intervention of  the Government in the 
grain trade is contrary to the good of  the state; it is especially destruc-
tive of  that precious opinion, of  that tender confidence which must bind 
the People to its sovereign.” On the other hand, in a time of  need, the 
government should not hesitate to come to the aid of  the people regard-
less of  what the people thought. Nonintervention cannot be a fixed rule, 
Necker lectured the économistes and especially his rival Turgot, “for in 
political economy and in administration, there is nothing absolute.”140
Critics assailed government grain operations such as those of  the 
sixties on very much the same grounds as they had attacked the “Jose-
phist” idea of  prophylaxis in any form. Economistes, encyclopedists, and 
parlementaires agreed that government-sponsored enterprises were 
exorbitantly expensive. With nothing to lose and sometimes a great 
deal to gain from inflating prices, government agents bought at any 
price, transported without genuine concern for economy, and con-
served with indifference, thus losing considerable amounts of  grain 
and flour or marketing poor quality goods. In addition to absorbing 
all the losses, the government in some cases had to pay substantial 
initial advances. Turgot’s axiom, that only self-interest could guaran-
tee efficiency and fidelity, was widely shared.141 despite government 
instructions, agents and commissioners were likely to commit abuses. 
138 dupont, Analyse ... rapport, 96, 106. Cf. Turgot, “septième lettre sur le commerce des 
grains,” 2 dec. 1770, in Œuvres, ed. by schelle, III, 323–24.
139 Abbé de Véri, Journal, ed. by J. de Witte, I, 150.
140 Necker, Sur la législation, 285–96.
141 Turgot, “septième lettre sur le commerce des grains,” 2 dec. 1770, in Œuvres, ed. by 
schelle, III, 325–29.
404 BREAd, POLITICs ANd POLITICAL ECONOMY
They had no reason to want prices to decrease, remarked a committee 
of  the Paris Enquêtes; they were easily tempted to engage in “culpable 
maneuvers,” Turgot warned; they might themselves become “monop-
olists,” cautioned Clément of  the Paris Chambre des Comptes.142
The most serious charge made against government operations was 
that they ruined commerce. The marquis d’Argenson vividly described 
how the specter of  government intervention, competition, and con-
straint paralyzed and demoralized the merchant community.143 Writ-
ing from Rome in the midst of  the “famine” of  1764, the abbé Coyer 
argued that the grain-dealing business of  the administration furnished 
the “infallible means to disgust the laboureur, ruin agriculture, and 
bring on [future] dearths.”144 The Languedoc Parlement complained 
to the king in the sixties that his goodwill undertaking served only to 
“intimidate” proprietors of  grain and “discourage” traders.145 “We 
have never had a grain commerce in full activity,” dupont contended, 
“because we are accustomed to seeing the Government mix in.…”146
Every time the government intervened in the course of  the cen-
tury, merchants protested bitterly against the unfair competition. 
How many of  them actually fulfilled their threats to abandon the 
profession, we do not know. The critics of  official provisioning liked 
to believe that the tale of  the Etampes flour merchant at the end of  
the sixties was typical:
I have two mills, when the public does not occupy them I make flour for my own 
account which I reserve for the moments when the Halles of  Paris are not well fur-
nished [when the price was high], this commerce always brought me a profit; but for 
some time I have ceased this commerce because the Government made individual 
deals with several of  my confreres to provision the Paris Halles, they were given such 
a great advantage that 1 would have ruined myself  if  I had wanted to compete with 
them. do you know what happened? These messieurs came to me, put me to work for 
them, had me doing everything which I had so simply done before and surely much 
142 “Mémoire,” Aug. 1771, BN, Coll. Joly 1111, fol. 139; Turgot, “septième lettre sur le 
commerce des grains,” in Œuvres, ed. by schelle, III, 324–25 and arrêt du conseil, 13 sept. 
1774 in des Essarts, Dictionnaire, I, 24; Recueil, 176. Cf. Roubaud, Représentations, 165–66; 
dupont to Prince Carl Ludwig (1773), in Correspondance Dupont, ed. by Knies, II, 147; article 
“disette,” Encyclopédie méthodique, Jurisprudence, Police et Municipalités, X, 35.
143 d’Argenson, Mémoires et journal inédit du marquis d’Argenson, ed. by d’Argenson, V, 361–72.
141 Abbé Coyer, Voyage d’ltalie et de Hollande (Paris, 1775), 204.
145 Letter from Languedoc to king, published in the Ephémérides du citoyen in early 1767 cited by 
Weulersse, Mouvement, II, 617. Cf. Journal économique (April 1769), 178.
146 dupont, Analyse ... rapport, 162.
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more cheaply than they, so it is the Government which lost and it is in the end the 
people who will pay.147
Implicit in the argument that government commerce crushes pri-
vate trade is the notion that the latter is infinitely better at performing 
the services undertaken by the former. Turgot made the case bril-
liantly, first in his Letters on the Grain Trade and then in the preamble 
to the arrêt du Conseil of  13 september 1774, one of  the most scath-
ing critiques of  government published in the eighteenth century and 
one of  the many examples of  the Old Regime doing itself  in. Pri-
vate commerce, with its network of  correspondents, its superb intel-
ligence system, and its frugal habits, Turgot argued, was the “surest, 
quickest and least expensive” means to meet the needs of  the people. 
Merchants knew their business better than anyone else, they did not 
need a special cue to begin their operations, and they were highly 
motivated to perform well. Compared with the king’s men, Turgot’s 
merchants were of  heroic stature, not because they wanted to be, but 
because the forces of  nature and the economy made them so: “Their 
vigilance, excited by [self-] interest, prevents waste and losses, their 
rivalry makes any monopoly impossible and the continual need which 
they have to realize a prompt return on their investments in order to 
maintain their commerce, engages them to be content with moderate 
profits.” If  the “avidity” of  the merchant is not “repressed by com-
petition” or if  he does not satisfy the demand, the error is not in the 
model but in the environment (police constraints or government inter-
vention on the supply side) or in the person (unusual ineptitude or 
knavery). For Turgot, the best and only way to assure subsistence was 
to maintain rigorously the “legitimate rights of  property and liberty.”
The striking failure of  the governments of  the last century to resolve 
the subsistence imbroglio by following the principles of  the old system 
was more than sufficient reason to abandon that system. It inspired a 
fatal “illusion” that the government, through its grain operations, could 
not only succor the people in emergencies, but control the entire dis-
tribution process. The government deluded itself  and the people if  it 
believed that it could prevent dearths. Let us face reality, Turgot urged: 
the product of  an ordinary harvest was less, not more, than enough; 
shortages were frequent; price rises were “inevitable”; and cherté was 
the “unique possible remedy for scarcity.” Government grain opera-
tions were short-run balms which did not deal with the fundamental 
147 “Cherté du pain,” AN, T 6441–2.
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 problems. They were bound to fail and to exacerbate the fears they 
were meant to allay. In the midst of  victualing operations, the adminis-
trators themselves took alarm and unleashed a sort of  “terror” which, 
as Turgot described it, resembled Jacobinism more nearly than dela-
marism. Commerce, “vexed, outraged, denounced to the hatred of  the 
people,” virtually ceased; popular clamors became more boisterous; 
prices continued to soar. The government, concluded Turgot, “cannot, 
then, reserve to itself  the transport and storage of  grain without com-
promising the subsistence and the tranquility of  the peoples.”148
Turgot gave substance to his thesis in the third article of  the arrêt 
of  1774 by having the king solemnly renounce any future purchases 
of  grain and flour for his account. The major purpose of  this self-
righteous declaration of  purity was to give commerce this final reas-
surance and encouragement absent in the liberal laws of  1763–64. Its 
effect was to confirm the age-old suspicion that there was something 
profoundly rotten not only in the quality, but also in the administra-
tion of  the king’s grain. Turgot’s attack on the government provision-
ing operations was an admission of  guilt; in a very limited but signifi-
cant way, it was a public vindication of  the mission of  Leprévost de 
Beaumont.
To the extent that it provided urgently needed supplies at a critical 
moment, it would be a mistake to view the king’s grain experience 
as a debacle for the government. Yet there is no doubt that Malisset, 
despite himself, and Leprévost, as a symptom for a deeper predica-
ment than he himself  represented, each helped to undermine the posi-
tion of  the liberal ministry. It was the intervention of  the Parlement 
of  Paris, however, upon a background of  ongoing subsistence crisis, 
which forced the issues to a head. Although the king’s grain contrib-
uted substantially to improve the subsistence situation in the capital, it 
did not succeed, as the government had hoped it would, in preserving 
the goodwill or at least the neutrality of  the authorities responsible for 
the police of  Paris. Indeed, by the beginning of  1768, it was no longer 
merely a question of  the short-run fate of  the capital. Increasingly, 
it seemed impossible to separate the problem of  Paris from the gen-
eral dilemma which confronted the kingdom as a whole.  Increasingly, 
148 see especially the “septième lettre sur le commerce des grains,” 2 dec. 1770, in Œuvres, 
ed. by schelle, III, 323ff. For the arrêt, see BN, Coll. Joly 1111, fol. 39; Journal historique et 
politique des différentes cours (Oct. 10, 1774); and des Essarts, Dictionnaire, I, 24. For similar 
views expressed by a prelate-économiste and former classmate of  Turgot, see E. Lavaquéry, 
Le Cardinal de Boisgelin (Paris, 1920), I, 126.
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 attention focused on the meaning and the wisdom of  the liberal reform 
and its social and political implications. The next chapter treats the 
evolution of  the Paris Parlement’s attitude from the onset of  the cri-
sis until the end of  1768 when it declared its opposition overtly and 
joined the campaign to quash liberalization in which its sister-court at 
Rouen had already taken the lead.
Chapter IX
THE GOVERNMENT, THE PARLEMENTS, 
AND THE BATTLE OVER LIBERTY: I
In the modern scholarly view of  the sixties, which has brought con-
siderable order and sophistication to the study of  eighteenth-century 
France, the dominant motif  is constitutional, the lingering crisis is the 
Brittany affair, and the denouement is the stunning coup engineered 
by Maupeou. I have viewed the decade from a different vantage 
point. I have suggested that another issue preoccupied Frenchmen in 
the sixties and in many ways cut more deeply and touched more peo-
ple than the well-known political confrontation. I have focused upon 
a social and political crisis concerning subsistence, which set the stage 
for the outburst of  absolutism in 1770–71 by producing widespread 
economic disruption and recession.
From this perspective, the main themes of  parlementary action 
eddy against the prevailing current. What is striking are not the claims 
of  parlementary union and indivisibility, but the deep divisions among 
the sovereign courts; not the political pretensions of  the parlements, 
but their vitally important administrative and regulatory responsibili-
ties; not the obscurantist attitudes and obstructionist tactics for which 
they are famous, but their critique of  government mismanagement and 
royal abuse, which had much in common with what we convention-
ally call “enlightened”; not their adamantine hostility to change and 
their persecution of  truth, but their inability to decide amongst them-
selves what changes were best and what opinions were true; not their 
egotistical defense of  privilege, but their discussion of  the nature of  la 
chose publique; not their desire to curtail royal authority, but their debate 
on the responsibilities of  kingship. The parlements of  the grain crisis 
were the same parlements which thwarted Bertin’s intelligent reforms, 
burned LaBarre, and mercilessly harassed the king. But the view of  
France from the marketplace differed sharply from the scene perceived 
from La Chalotais’ prison or the fauteuil in which Louis presided over 
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lits de justice, even as it differed from vantage points in Rouen, Toulouse, 
Grenoble, and Paris. The issues raised by the grain crisis differed from 
the problems posed by the constitutional quarrel and elicited different 
responses from parlements for whom politics was a very complex and 
subtle business. The constitutional question, as important as it was, 
must not obscure the existence of  other matters of  urgent public con-
cern and other dimensions of  parlementary behavior.
Chapters IX and X are concerned with the relations between 
the government and the parlements, especially the Parlement of  
Paris which became the most prominent adversary of  liberalization 
in 1768. In the past, the Paris court had never seriously quarreled 
with the king on subsistence affairs. With some hesitation, this Par-
lement had approved the liberal reforms of  1763–64. It resolved, on 
the motion of  the grand chambrier abbé Terray, to give liberalization a 
proper trial. For almost four years, the Parlement remained silent as 
the new policy took root. Chapter IX treats the reaction of  the court 
to the deepening subsistence difficulties in its ressort and the reawak-
ening of  its interest in liberalization. It traces the growing hostility 
between the Parlement and the ministry and the hardening of  posi-
tions on both sides. The Parlement understood the motivation for the 
new departure in grain policy and many of  its members sympathized 
with its goals. But the experience of  the sixties convinced the majority 
of  its members that liberalization opened the gates to perils which far 
outweighed the advantages it could deliver.
This issue became, in the Parlement’s view, not only a matter of  a 
subsistence crisis, but also a crisis in the nature of  kingship. Through 
its own offices and by means of  an extraordinary representative 
assembly, the Parlement reaffirmed the traditional values of  police 
and the “well-policed state.”
Among the sovereign courts, the Paris Parlement did not stand alone 
in the struggle against liberalization. Several other courts shared its 
alarm about the consequences of  the reforms. Yet it would be wrong 
to imagine that their common opposition rested on a self-conscious 
community of  interest. Sympathy for Paris was not, as Chapter X 
suggests, at the base of  the loose antiliberal coalition.
The bulk of  Chapter X concerns the liberal effort to mount a coun-
ter-offensive. Locked in battle with the most powerful Parlement, the 
government turned to the nation for support against Paris. Three parle-
ments hastened to the defense of  the new grain regime and the liberal 
style of  kingship, giving the lie to the claim of  the Parisian court that it 
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spoke for the people of  France. The économistes publicized the views of  
the liberal courts and mounted a campaign of  their own to prove that 
liberalization was a salutary undertaking. Strengthened by this support, 
it was not until the very end of  1769 that the government betrayed any 
hint of  weakening resolve.
I
While the Brittany affair dragged on, the attention of  the Paris Par-
lement turned increasingly to the subsistence problem. It observed 
with growing inquietude the proliferation of  disorder in its ressort. 
Through the Procurator General, the Parlement received first-hand 
reports of  the effects of  the dearth and the remonstrances and lam-
entations of  the local authorities. Jurisdictionally, the problem directly 
concerned the sovereign court in the exercise of  its grande police. The 
Parlement did not leap rashly into the affair as it often did with mat-
ters which it could exploit to political advantage. It regarded the situa-
tion as extremely delicate and it showed uncharacteristic forbearance 
in its approach and restraint in its language. In December 1767, the 
Parlement appealed to the king to “take measures to facilitate the sub-
sistence of  the poor People” who suffered most from the “excessive 
cherté.” It neither raised general questions of  royal policy nor attacked 
liberalization, perhaps partly to avoid a falling out with several of  the 
other sovereign courts, which remained passionately committed to the 
liberal reforms, but primarily because it saw the issue at this stage in 
limited terms as one of  reestablishing public tranquility.
The king rebuffed this overture and another which the court made 
the following April: “I love my Peoples; I have no need of  being 
excited to assist and relieve them; the efficacious measures that I have 
taken have assured their subsistence: they can be upset only by ill-
considered démarches [like yours].” The government, even more 
than the Parlement, wanted to avert a debate on principles and policy. 
The king treated the cherté as a commonplace accident: bad weather 
produced a bad harvest, which caused a major price rise “that no 
attention could prevent.”
The Parlement responded with an initiative that bypassed the mon-
arch and threatened to provoke the “éclat” which above all he wanted to 
avoid. The court instructed the Procurator General to ask all the substituts 
to send memoirs on prices, the grain trade and the overall state of  local 
affairs. By this measure, the litany of  misery and protests would formally 
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enter the record and become subject to deliberation. The king viewed 
this action as the first step in going to the country to mobilize opinion for 
an assault on liberalization. The ministry would not let the Parlement 
use the cherté as a stalking horse; Louis XV brought the issue into the 
open. Under no circumstances would he compromise “the  principles 
which form the basis” of  the May Declaration and the July Edict. “I 
want to maintain the execution of  these two laws,” the monarch told 
the court, and “my Parlement must penetrate itself  more and more 
with their utility and consequently support my views in having them 
exactly observed.” He ordered the court to send the government copies 
of  the country poll and he prohibited it from taking any action before it 
made known its intentions. The Parlement made no reply; it appointed 
a watchdog committee and awaited the results of  the new harvest and 
the distribution of  the king’s grain.1
In the fall the crisis deepened; in October, the price of  bread 
in Paris reached 15 sous. To appease public opinion as well as an 
expanding current of  opposition in official quarters, Louis dismissed 
Laverdy, even as he had appointed him five years earlier to placate 
the parlements. At the same time the First President Maupeou, who 
had a reputation for devotion to the king and had served fruitlessly as 
mediator between crown and parlement in the discussion of  the cherté, 
succeeded his father as chancellor.2 His appointment was viewed as 
a mark of  the king’s determination to deal more forcefully with the 
court. Earlier in the year, the king had resuscitated the Grand Con-
seil, rival and bete noire of  the parlements, which vehemently pro-
tested the decision.3 This peremptory measure followed hard upon 
yet another squabble over the extension of  the second twentieth tax.4 
 1 Parl. of  Paris, Conseil Secret, 28 March, 18 April, 4 May 1768, AN X1B 8955; Recueil, 65–70.
The Gens du Roy instructed the substituts to “avoid confounding the rumor of  the people 
with the truth of  the facts” and to conduct their investigation with “prudence & discretion” 
so as not to “interrupt the provisioning of  the markets or cause any alarm.” Conseil Secret, 
3 May 1768, AN, X1B 8955 and BN, Coll. Joly 1139, fols. 7, 11, 15; PG to royal procurator 
of  Aurillac, 19 April 1768, C. 7506, A.D. P-de-D.
 2 Flammermont, ed., Remontrances du Parlement de Paris, III, i–iv. D’Aligre succeeded Maupeou 
as First President.
 3 Glasson, Parlement de Paris, II, 222–35, 335–37; Le Nouvelliste suisse ( June 1768), 139 and 
( July 1768), 162–166; Bertin to Miromesnil, March 1768. in LeVerdier, ed., Correspondance 
Miromesnil, V, 109; Bertin to Mssrs. du Parlement, 10 Aug. 1768, Conseil for 1767 (entry 
16 Aug. 1768), A.D. S-M.; Choiseul to Parl. of  Dauphiné, n.d. and St.-Florentin to Parl. of  
Dijon, n.d., Arch. AE, France 1366, fols. 110 and passim.
 4 Remonstrances, 21 Aug. 1767, Conseil 1767, A.D. S-M.; Remonstrances, 5 June 1767, 
Flammermont, ed., Remontrances du Parlement de Paris, II, 809ff. Nor did the liberal parlements 
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The climate was not conducive to conciliation, though Maupeou 
made a few symbolic gestures meant to relieve the tension.
On October 15 in the Chambre des Vacations, a councillor captured 
the predominant mood when he pronounced the past year’s low-
key appeals to the king a failure and demanded urgently a full scale 
debate on the mounting cherté.5 The government frantically tried to 
have the deliberation, set by the Chambre for the 20th, quashed or 
postponed. Maupeou pressed the presidents who were in Paris and 
the Gens du Roi to lobby among the magistrates for a delay. “Any 
action,” he warned, “can only worsen the situation.” He won the 
support of  Sartine, whose voice concerning conditions in Paris would 
have influence with the Chambre. The Lieutenant General agreed to 
tell the councillors that “precautions” have been taken and needed 
time—at least until after the return of  the whole court following St. 
Martin’s—to take effect.
Speaking for the ministry, St. Florentin, the Secretary of  State 
for Paris, wrote that we applied ourselves “incessantly to procure a 
diminution on the price of  grain.” If, “despite all the efforts,” it has 
not come as rapidly as hoped, he argued, it is “because the causes of  
the cherté are physical and do not depend on the will of  those who govern.” 
This confession of  quasi-impotence followed logically from the lib-
eral line of  the government. Before liberalization, the government 
had rarely shown much humility vis-à-vis a subsistence crisis. Seldom 
in the past had it been willing to admit that a crisis was natural and 
in some fashion ineluctable, rather than the consequence of  human 
error or malevolence. The age of  liberalization was a time of  can-
dor; the government, like any other mortal, could only operate within 
the limits of  the possible. Although the facts clearly belied his seren-
ity, the Secretary of  State insisted that “the spirit of  the people is 
tranquil” and that parlementary action “could only serve to make [it] 
anxious.” After working on the magistrates informally for four days, 
Maupeou hoped that they would cede to the suggestion of  the Gens 
du Roi when they were called to render conclusions at the delibera-
tion of  the 20th. Kept waiting for two hours, the Procurator General 
 graciously spare the king on this issue. In a violent tone, the Grenoble court charged the king 
with lying to the people, violating the constitution, mismanaging finances, and ignoring the 
“cries of  misery and of  indigence.” At roughly the same moment, in an entirely different 
humor, the Dauphinais reported the beginnings of  a delicious prosperity, which they had 
not tasted before, consequent upon the introduction of  liberty and the promise of  more to 
come. 21 April, 31 Aug. 1769, B. 2314, fols. 77–87, 123–39, A.D. Isère.
 5 15 Oct. 1768, AN, X1A 8545, fol. 457.
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Joly and the Advocate General Séguier, both of  whom sympathized 
with the magistrates despite their formal expression of  loyalty to the 
chancellor, did not even have a chance to address the Chambre when 
they were finally invited to enter.6
The Chambre presented them with a fait accompli, an arrêt of  remon-
strance which challenged the entire liberal program. “If  obedience 
and respect have for a long time kept [us] in silence” and limited us to 
employing the “private offices” of  the First President, the Parlement 
declared, this same fidelity now imposes upon us the obligation to reveal 
to the king “some important truths” on the state of  the nation. To give 
the new legislation a fair trial and “to allow the promised benefits the 
time to develop,” the nation “endured this long and grievous ordeal.” 
Liberty promised wealth and ease, but it wrought misery, which forced 
mothers to “deplore their fecundity.” It caused hunger, which pro-
voked “peaceful and domiciled citizens”—not the gens sans aveu or the 
rootless rabble, but “citizens whose hearts were naturally faithful and 
 submissive”—into rebellion. For his obliviousness to these “calamities,” 
the Parlement generously afforded the king an excuse. Isolated from 
reality at Fontainebleau, where bread was fixed at a price below the 
market value and spared incriminating details by his ministers, Louis 
could not have been aware of  the full gravity of  the situation.
Now, said the Parlement, it was time for him to demand “an 
accounting of  the new system of  legislation introduced a few years 
ago on the commerce of  grain.” He must “compare” the disposi-
tions of  these laws “with the events that followed” and ask himself  “if  
these chertés of  bread, these public alarms, these popular riots do not 
have their hidden principle in some defect of  the new system.” Louis 
must examine “whether an indefinite liberty cannot degenerate into 
the license of  monopoly” which “until now only the inspection of  
an attentive police was capable of  averting.” Finally, concluded the 
Chambre, the king must decide whether it would be prudent to “pro-
long” this system any further.7
“Here we are preoccupied with the cherté of  grain,” wrote a Parisian 
to his provincial correspondent,” and it could happen that we end up by 
 6 St. Florentin to PG, 16, 20 Oct. 1768, AN, O1 410 and BN, Coll. Joly 1139, fol. 98; 
Maupeou to PG, 15, 16 Oct. 1768, BN, Coll. Joly 1139, fols. 88–89, 96–97; drafts, PG to 
Maupeou, 15, 20, 24 Oct. 1768, BN, Coll. Joly 1139, fols. 89, 115–120.
 7 Conseil Secret, 20 Oct. 1768, AN X1A 8545, fols. 460ff.; Hardy’s Journal, BN, mss. fr. 6680, 
fol. 180.
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[seeing] the export law suspended.”8 This prediction was premature, but 
the Parlement’s bristling remonstrance was not the only sign of  govern-
ment vulnerability. From the time of  the grain and bread riots, which 
erupted throughout Normandy in the spring and summer of  1768, the 
Rouen Parlement, which had demanded freedom to export with such 
passion in 1763–64, began to question the virtues of  liberalization. The 
violent uprising in Rouen in March was the catalyst in the court’s volte-
face; it was as if  the mutinous citizenry released the magistrates from 
their commitment to the reform laws. For Laverdy, it was another exam-
ple of, on the one side, “the weakness of  different police officials” and, 
on the other, “a blinded people ruining its future subsistence by pillaging 
and destroying the only thing which can guarantee it [i.e., free trade in 
private hands].” Hours after the revolt broke out, without any need for 
a prod from Versailles, the Parlement pledged a swift and terrible repres-
sion. But as the rioting intensified in the city and spread throughout the 
region, the magistrates seemed to lose their taste for punishment and 
shift their focus of  interest from effects to causes. Even as they inter-
rogated suspects arrested by the watch, they listened to reports on “the 
general state of  misery” and discussed ways to alleviate it.9
The Rouen Parlement chose to make an example, not of  the riot-
ers, but of  the dearth and the circumstances that sustained it. As 
calm returned, the punitive measures taken by the court proved to 
be much less severe than anyone expected. Its action was meant as 
a sign that the Parlement did not wish to lay blame on the public for 
“excesses” which it was driven to commit and as a defiant snub of  
the  Controller-General’s express desire for a stern reckoning. While 
Laverdy dispatched troops to guarantee the maintenance of  order, 
the magistrates issued an arrêt, which implicitly held government pol-
icy responsible for the disorders. It revived a number of  the most 
important grain trade controls which the liberal laws had abolished 
including the prohibition against speculative buying and hoarding 
and the obligation to furnish the marketplaces regularly. In addi-
tion, the court promised to appeal to Louis XV “to procure the most 
prompt and efficient assistance” for the people and to petition the 
royal council to lower the export cut-off  mark from 30 livres to 21 livres 
12 sous the septier (Paris measure).10 
 8 Lettres Ossolinski, 24 Oct. 1768, BHVP, mss. 627, fol. 184.
 9 Rouen Parl., Conseil Secret (1767–1768), 23 March—15 April 1768, A.D. S-M.; Laverdy to 
Miromesnil, 23 March 1768 and Laverdy to de Crosne, 10 April 1768, C. 107, ibid.
 10 Rouen Parl., Conseil Secret (1767–1768), 23 March—15 April 1768, A.D. S-M.; Maupeou to 
Miromesnil, 23 March 1768, C. 107, ibid.; Laverdy to Miromesnil, 27 March and 
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Appalled by the “bad conduct” of  the Rouen magistrates, the gov-
ernment labored to minimize the impact of  their defection. Though 
the royal council could have annulled the Rouen arrêt in a stroke, 
Laverdy calculated that such an authoritarian gesture would drive the 
Rouennais more irretrievably into opposition and focus national atten-
tion and debate on the issue at a very inopportune time— precisely 
the results he wanted to avoid. On the other hand, he felt that to 
countenance such a flagrant violation of  the laws of  1763–64 would 
undermine the entire reform enterprise. All spring he worked strenu-
ously to induce the magistrates to withdraw voluntarily the reaction-
ary arrêt. The Parlement refused, however, to abjure its “errors” and 
confess to having “been carried away by its own zeal.” In a deliber-
ately circuitous manner, the royal council finally promulgated an arrêt 
which ordered the exact execution of  the May and July laws in the 
Normandy jurisdiction, without explicitly quashing the Parlement’s 
arrêt. The intendant of  Rouen cautioned the ministry against having 
this legislation cried and posted for fear of  arousing the ire of  the 
people of  the province, who remained convinced that liberalization 
was the cause of  the ongoing dearth.11
The Rouen Parlement clearly indicated that it was not inter-
ested in devices for saving face or maintaining convenient fictions. 
Even before it received the royal arrêt, it sent the king a long remon-
strance-sermon depicting widespread misery due to soaring prices 
and massive unemployment. Pointedly, it reminded him that “the 
most powerful tie of  obedience and affection of  the subjects is the 
attention the prince pays to their needs.…” In June, the Parlement 
invited Louis XV to retract the letters patent which contained the 
royal arrêt reaffirming the liberal legislation. Later that summer, 
in new remonstrances, it developed, with increasing intensity, its 
objections to the liberal regime. Rejecting the ministry’s argument 
that the subsistence difficulties were due to “accidents” of  weather 
and commerce, the Parlement urged the government to deal with 
its “true causes,” first of  all by placing tighter limits on exports. The 
tone of  the ministry’s response in late September suggests that it 
had abandoned hope of  recapturing the support of  the Rouennais. 
 4 April 1768, in LeVerdier, ed., Correspondance Miromesnil, V, 135, 142–44; Floquet, Parlement 
de Normandie, VI. 424–25.
 11 LeVerdier, ed. Correspondance Miromesnil, V, xxvi–xxx (intro).; Bertin to Miromesnil, 18 April 
1768, ibid., V, 149–50; Miromesnil to Bertin, 21 April 1768, ibid., V, 152–55; Arrêt du Conseil, 
20 June 1768, C. 103, A.D. S-M.; T. de Montigny to La Michodière, 1 July 1768 and La 
Michodière to Montigny, 3 July 1768, C. 103, ibid.
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Victim of  “a residue of  anxiety and prejudice” from earlier days, 
the Rouen court had lost touch with its own time. Citing the vocal 
demands of  other parlements in the kingdom for the elimination 
of  all restrictions on exportation as evidence of  the prevalent state 
of  French opinion, the government pledged that it would take no 
backward steps along the path to total liberty.12
These expressions of  mutual hostility led inexorably to open warfare. 
The Rouen Parlement attacked fiercely in October with two “letter-
supplications” addressed to Louis XV, which were illicitly printed and 
circulated. The sensation these letters provoked as a result of  their inti-
mation that the government was involved in a grain speculation con-
spiracy obscured the fact that they were also a detailed indictment of  the 
liberal laws and no longer a demand for certain modifications, but for a 
full-scale revision. As a result of  irresponsible leadership and of  laws that 
were both ill-conceived and subject to easy abuse, the nation now faced 
“terrible dangers”—a social and economic “calamity” which deprived 
people of  work at the very moment that it drove prices far beyond reach. 
Although more than once we called attention to our needs, “we were 
answered only by vague expressions of  efforts and of  hopes.” Perhaps, 
suggested the Rouen magistrates, you do not believe us: 
The Courtier swimming in delights cannot imagine the horrors of  indigence, then let 
him descend into the details! let him visit the countryside; let him traverse our cities, 
depots of  human misery! His delicacy will tremble at the spectacles which will present 
themselves from everywhere to his eyes.
The “theory” of  liberalization, the Rouen Parlement contended, “has 
been contradicted by the practice.” As a stimulus for agriculture, the 
bon prix program seemed “on the outside extremely seductive.” Had 
it only produced “a moderate augmentation” it might still be worthy 
of  our suffrage. But the fact that it “plunged an entire people into the 
most horrible misery and upset the whole commercial economy” is 
incontrovertible proof  of  its failure and the best reply to those who 
“obstinately continue to solicit a total liberty.” Yet the Rouen magis-
trates had no desire to appear as enemies of  liberty, of  a “true liberty.” 
But a genuine liberty, they insisted, by definition, could never have 
produced such disastrous results. These very results demonstrated that 
the liberty of  May and July was a deformation, “an illusory liberty.” 
 12 Remonstrances of  5 May and 19 Aug. 1768, Conseil Secret (1767–68), A.D. S.-M.; Bertin to 
Parl., 20 Sept. 1768, inserted in Conseil Secret, 10 Oct. 1768, ibid.
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Instead of  promoting “competition” and “the division” of  the trade 
in many hands, the laws encouraged monopoly: the concentration of  
the supply in the hands of  a “powerful” few with enormous credit, 
the hoarding of  stocks, and the manipulation of  prices for the sake 
of  inflating profits at public expense. This, the Parlement concluded, 
was “the principal and most important cause” of  the present crisis. 
The facility accorded exportation merely aggravated the evil effects 
of  monopoly; the curtailment of  exports would not by itself  solve the 
problem. To save the nation from doom, the government had to rush 
to the aid of  the people and renounce the theory and practice of  lib-
eralization.13
By the end of  October 1768, the government found it increasingly 
difficult to pretend that there was no really serious opposition to the 
liberal reforms. Despite considerable differences in their style and 
 emphasis and in their appreciation of  the motives of  the king and his 
ministers, the Parlements of  Paris and Rouen shared the view that lib-
eralization had produced monopoly and misery and that it could not 
safely be allowed to endure. The outrageously disrespectful and pro-
vocative letters from Rouen merited severe punishment, but the min-
istry refused to satisfy the magistrates’ appetite for a public brawl and 
a cause célèbre which they would use to discredit liberalization. Instead, a 
secretary of  state sent them two wishy-washy rebukes that they treated 
with a mocking disdain, which barely concealed their deep disap-
pointment.14 Louis XV addressed himself  personally to the Parisian 
remonstrances, but he had nothing new to say. “I have taken the most 
efficacious means,” the king reiterated, “to fix abundance in the mar-
kets and to stop, insofar as it is possible, a cherté occasioned above all by the 
circumstance of  the season, heightened by the fear of  the Public.” The 
Paris Parlement, he added, must make it a duty to “second” my views 
by “dissipating the anxieties,” that is to say, by taking no further action.15
A week later the council issued an arrêt which could be read either 
as an expression of  weakness or of  determination. The king was not, 
after all, unaware of  what was happening in the nation. He publicly 
acknowledged that “in several provinces” the price of  grain had risen 
considerably faster and higher than wages and thus made it difficult 
 13 Lettres-Suppliques, 15 and 29 Oct. 1768, Conseil Secret (1767–68), ibid.
 14 See the references to these letters in Lettres-Suppliques, 29 Oct. 1768, Conseil Secret (1767–68) 
and remonstrances, 25 Jan. 1769, Registre St. Martin, ibid.
 15 BN, Coll. Joly 1139, fol. 116; Hardy’s Journal, 23 Oct. 1768, BN, mss. fr. 6680, fol. 182. 
My italics.
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for the people to subsist. But having examined the problem carefully, 
the council concluded that “the most appropriate means to remedy 
the evil” was to reaffirm the liberal program,
to recall the dispositions of  the Declaration of  25 May 1763, whose effect must be 
to establish throughout his [the king’s] realm a free circulation, by which means there 
occurs, uniquely by the ordinary operations of  a free commerce, transfer [of  grain] from 
the most abundant provinces to those which experienced misfortune in their harvests.
The government added one new dimension to the standard pre-
scription. To assure a more rapid relief  and to promote the competi-
tion which alone can force down prices, the government decided to 
offer bounties to importers of  all nationalities.16
On November 10, the eve of  the opening of  the new parlementary 
year, the royal council finally took the offensive with the publication of  
artfully designed letters patent. Their aim was to fix clearly the respon-
sibility for the ostensible shortcomings of  liberalization and to dispel 
the persistent and injurious rumors that the government was cod-
dling monopolists. Through the voice of  Louis XV, the ministry again 
explained that it had abolished the old legislation which fettered the 
grain trade because it was inimical to the interests of  cultivators and 
consumers alike. Convinced that it was the “surest means” to satisfy 
everyone’s needs, we embarked on a program “to establish the most 
absolute and complete liberty and competition.” If  problems arose, it 
was not, as several parlements contended, because of  too much liberty, 
but because there was too little. “We have not yet succeeded in imple-
menting this salutary liberty as fully as we would have desired,” the 
king confessed. The government imputed this failure directly to the 
local police, abetted by the people who knew no better: “our Declara-
tion of  25 May 1763 has not been executed in its entirety in several 
provinces … as a result of  the fears which swelled in the mind of  a 
large part of  our Subjects and principally of  those who were specifi-
cally charged with its execution.” Had the law not been subverted, the 
letters suggested, commerce would have been strong enough by itself  
to deal with the predicament caused—it could not be emphasized too 
much—by the series of  unfortunate harvests. The remedy to our prob-
lems, then, is not the repudiation or dilution of  the liberal theory but 
 16 BN, Coll. Joly 1139, fols. 125–26; Hardy’s Journal, 5 Nov. 1768, BN, mss. fr. 6680, fol. 185; 
arrêt of  31 Oct. 1768, Gazette de France (7 Nov. 1768), 368; C. 848, A.D. Nord.
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its universal application, to which end the government renewed its 
unswerving commitment.
I have been troubled to learn, the king went on to say in a frank 
allusion to the proliferation of  famine-plot rumors, that the notion 
has “spread among our People that several rich & powerful individu-
als have formed the plan to turn the general calamity to their profit” 
by hoarding massively. The government considered these rumors 
to be nonsense; beyond their source, which should have been suf-
ficient to discredit them, it was clear that such vast maneuvers were 
logistically, commercially, and financially inconceivable. But these 
“vague” and “uncertain” reports persisted, and now they worried 
Maynon as they had Laverdy. The danger was that alarm would 
continue to spread, alienating public opinion and creating pretexts 
for precipitate, authoritarian action by parlements or by the local 
administration.
By not taking any action at all, the ministry realized, it was giving 
credence to the idea that the government was somehow involved in 
one or many plots. By taking the initiative, the government calculated 
that it could appease public opinion, upstage the parlements, and at 
the same time keep the local authorities in check. Thus, after having 
dismissed Laverdy, the object of  many suspicions, and dissolved the 
Malisset contract, by these letters patent the king ordered the parle-
ments to investigate the reports of  “companies” and “monopolies” 
(which the government knew to be false), to denounce any “enter-
prises which might tend to the prejudice of  our Subjects” (the minis-
try expected none to be found, or in any event none with ties to the 
government), and, most important of  all, from the ministry’s perspec-
tive, to put a stop to the spreading of  rumors (including posting of  
placards), to expose those who (like Leprévost de Beaumont) “wick-
edly” propagated rumors in order to “excite disorders,” and to “con-
vince all our Subjects of  the falsity of  these rumors.”
Nor could the investigation be used as a pretext for a reversion to old 
police techniques. On the contrary, the letters not only prohibited the 
parlements from “violating in any fashion” the May Declaration, but 
enjoined them to suggest the means by which this law could be rigor-
ously and uniformly implemented. In order to prevent a resurgence of  
local police activity under the aegis of  the parlements, the letters explic-
itly forbad them to “make or renew any prohibitive regulations.” Given 
“the pernicious effects for the liberty of  circulation and the operations 
of  a legitimate commerce which might result from the indiscreet zeal 
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of  some subordinate officials,” the government authorized only the 
sovereign courts to conduct the inquiry.17
The government’s new tactics momentarily threw the parlements 
off  balance. How could they reject, in full public view, the ministry’s 
ostensibly hard-line stand against abuses in the grain trade after they 
had campaigned so vigorously to expose these abuses and to force the 
government to take action? Would not such a refractory posture sug-
gest that their opposition to the liberal program had been motivated 
by political considerations rather than a genuine concern for the fate 
of  the reforms and the state of  the kingdom?18 Yet the parlements 
could not bring themselves to endorse the letters patent, not merely 
because they viewed them as a cynical political trap, but because the 
letters presented the issues in what the magistrates regarded as a per-
verse and misleading manner. Both parlements refused to register the 
letters on very similar grounds, though the remonstrances of  Rouen 
were at once more sharply worded and wider-ranging.
The remonstrances of  both courts criticized the government for 
underestimating—wilfully—the gravity of  the economic and social 
situation in large segments of  the realm.19 They assailed the letters 
patent for lumping together the phenomena of  monopoly and of  
rumor, implying that the former was largely the creation of  the latter, 
and treating them both as products of  the same aberrant mentality. 
The Parisian magistrates conceded that the rumors were dangerous 
and they agreed to look into them, but their Rouen counterparts, con-
vinced that the indictment of  rumor-mongering was aimed largely at 
them, denounced the whole enterprise as a worthless, diversionary 
ploy. For both parlements, monopoly, “this destructive scourge,” was 
the really urgent affair. Monopoly, the parlements lectured the king, 
was a very real menace, an enemy of  the throne as well as of  the peo-
ple. Operating everywhere, at every level and stage, monopoly struck 
rapidly and decisively and then concealed itself  in the “shadow of  
mystery” (Paris) or “under the veil of  the law” (Rouen). For the Pari-
sians, monopoly was a treacherous and elusive force, fragmented and 
 17 Recueil, 77–83; Hardy’s Journal, 12 Nov. 1768, BN, mss. ft. 6680, fol. 186; St. Florentin to 
PG, Nov. 1768 and PG to Maupeou, 18 Nov. 1768, BN, Coll. Joly 1139, fols. 100–104; 
Le Nouvelliste suisse (Nov. 1768), 259–61.
 18 This was the line promoted by the anonymous author of  “Réflexions sur les principes des 
Parlements de Paris et de Rouen.” Arch. AE, France 1375, fols. 293–304.
 19 The Paris representations are in Recueil, 84–91; the Rouen remonstrances are in Registre 
St. Martin, 25 Jan. 1769, A.D. S-M.
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dispersed in time and space, which would be difficult to uncover and 
neutralize. The Rouennais had a more immediate and nearly anthro-
pomorphic conception of  monopoly: it operated brazenly before 
their eyes and they suspected that it was the expression of  organized, 
coordinated criminal designs rather than merely the results of  autono-
mous, local abuses. While the Paris magistrates welcomed the oppor-
tunity to launch an investigation, the Rouen magistrates claimed that 
they already had the “proofs” in hand and that they needed, not the 
condescending and gratuitous grant of  authority of  these letters pat-
ent to prosecute common crimes (“We are no longer in the infancy of  
the Monarchy; our Criminal Code has long been composed…”), but 
the government’s solemn assurance that it would not interfere with the 
ordinary judicial process in the Rouen jurisdiction.
Both Parlements scored the letters patent for “debasing” the local 
police and disqualifying them from participation in local affairs that 
directly concerned them. Now it is true that the parlements had rarely 
shown high regard for the authorities in the field. The magistrates 
scorned their ignorance and pettiness and derided their pretensions. 
Nevertheless, the sovereign courts depended upon them to maintain 
order, enforce the law, implement arrêts de règlement and parlementary 
sentences, and provide information on the turn of  events. The revolt 
of  the local police against liberalization made a powerful impression 
on the magistrates; a large majority of  them favored a strengthening 
of  local authority to deal with subsistence problems. Liberalization had 
already severely limited the powers of  the local police; now, to protect 
liberalization, the government wanted to bind them in tighter manacles 
and stronger muzzles. The Parlement of  Paris resolved not to permit 
the ministry to “tie the hands” and “shut the mouths” of  the officials. 
Such action would serve only to prolong the dearth and “assure impu-
nity” to the monopolists who could only be ferreted out from below by 
officials with “local knowledge” who stalked the movement of  grain. 
The constraints which the letters patent placed on the police suggested 
to the Parisians that the government did not seriously mean to uncover 
monopolistic maneuvers. The Rouennais warned that, by dishonoring 
the local police in the public eye, in order to destroy their moral author-
ity at the same time that it circumscribed their legal authority, the gov-
ernment was laying waste to the very foundations of  law and order.
While the Parisian remonstrances dealt exclusively with the 
issues raised in the letters of  10 November, the Rouen Parlement 
moved beyond them to discuss the “theory” on which they were 
based. “The system called economic,” the Rouennais charged, was 
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another version of  “the republic of  Plato, an imaginary speculation.” 
It was flawed in its assumptions about human nature, social orga-
nization, and public administration. Obsessed by their concept of  
the perfect “evidence” and infallibility of  natural law, the écono-
mistes have forgotten the nature of  man: “the passions will always 
resist this evidence.” Private interest, the motive force on which 
the économistes built their system, the Rouen Parlement argued, 
will “perpetually violate” the natural order which it is supposed to 
guarantee. To establish “self-interest, this violent passion,” as “the 
general law” would be “to cast us into the pure state of  nature.” It 
is because experience has taught us the danger of  unleashing the 
passions in society under the name of  “total liberty” that our laws 
must perforce be “restrictions on liberty.” Grain liberty conjured 
for the Rouennais an apocalyptical vision whose horrors went 
beyond famines and riots to social and political disintegration, the 
logical consequence of  unchecked liberty:
Suppress all the Regulations, leaving only an unlimited liberty [!] the balance-spring 
of  society will be destroyed; the Peoples will be [indiscriminately] blended; the Sov-
ereign will be nothing more than a magnate distinguished by some sort of  mark but 
without any power to be useful; thus, this system which appears to lay the foundation 
for everything tends in fact to shake and destroy everything.
“Unlimited liberty” is not only “contrary to the happiness of  your sub-
jects,” the Parlement informed the king, but it is also “an Alteration of  
the French Constitution.”
Given their past record and style of  opposition, it seems hardly sur-
prising that the Rouennais would end on a constitutional note. After 
all, they fought virtually every other issue on constitutional grounds, 
for it flattered their self-regard and gave their obstructionism a certain 
luster of  coherence and legitimacy. Yet the argument over grain did not 
conform to the usual criteria for constitutional bickering.20 The Rouen-
nais were not trying to place limits on royal power and enhance their 
own authority in the usual way. The Parlement did not pretend that 
the king had done something illegal according to its interpretation of  
fundamental law, the cumulative wisdom which formed the base of  
its constitutionalism. The grain question ran deeper than fundamental 
law; it raised questions not so much about the legal constitution of  the 
 20 Cf. the Rouen remonstrances of  26 Feb. 1771, which suggest the extent to which the 
critique of  liberalism eddied against the main currents of  eighteenth century parlementary 
political theory: “Every law which guarantees property is fundamental law, anything which 
violates it attacks the constitution of  your state.”
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 monarchy—the habitual preoccupation of  remonstrances—as about 
the very nature of  the social and political structure. Instead of  swag-
gering, the magistrates trembled with fear, even as they admonished. 
Unlimited liberty, they maintained, was not merely contrary to the 
French Constitution; it was incompatible with “a monarchical consti-
tution” of  any type. In retrospect, the warnings of  the Rouen court 
against the liberal ethic seem much less hysterical and hyperbolic than 
they must have appeared in the narrow context of  the letters patent of  
November tenth. But even in their own time, as we shall see, they were 
beginning to gather a worried audience in many quarters.
The Rouen remonstrances, rewritten several times in committee, 
did not reach the king until several months after the promulgation 
of  the letters patent. By that time, the court had already launched 
the policy it would pursue for the next two years: a refusal to enforce 
the liberal laws in its jurisdiction, combined with a discreet effort to 
assist local authorities who wished to reestablish police controls. This 
shift from conventional to a sort of  guerilla warfare was based on the 
pragmatic calculation that, while the government would surely reject 
the proposals to jettison the reforms, it would almost certainly not 
engage in a costly, raucous campaign to force liberalization down the 
throats of  the Rouennais. The Normandy Parlement correctly sup-
posed that the ministry, in order to devote its energy to enforcing the 
liberal program in less hostile regions, would tolerate a large measure 
of  de facto defiance of  the law of  the land. With a view toward recon-
quering the province when more favorable circumstances developed, 
the government tried to hold some ground in Normandy by continu-
ing to encourage the merchant community, relying on the influence 
of  the intendant, and repairing damages caused by local authorities 
through direct action of  the royal council.
At the very center of  things, the Paris Parlement could not turn 
its back on the government with the ease of  the Rouennais. It 
had no confidence that a strategy of  sabotage could work and it 
feared the confusion and disorder that it would produce, if  in fact 
it could be implemented on the massive scale of  the Paris jurisdic-
tion. Moreover, such an approach begged the fundamental ques-
tions concerning liberalization and the grave social and economic 
disorganization which accompanied it. Unlike their Rouen col-
leagues, the Parisian magistrates responded succinctly and rapidly 
to the letters patent of  November tenth and asked Louis XV to 
reply immediately to their objections. While waiting, later in the 
month, in a move meant to underscore its determination to unmask 
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monopoly, the Parlement convoked and interrogated late into the 
night the baker-entrepreneur Malisset of  Paris and Corbeil and a 
Vaugirard baker named Sauvageot, both “suspected of  having a 
part in the monopoly.” If  the news of  this investigation reached 
Leprévost de Beaumont in the prison cell which he had occupied 
now for only a little more than a week, he must have had a tremor 
of  excitement. But it led to nothing; the Parlement accepted Mal-
isset’s written commission as agent for the king’s grain without 
probing further and released him immediately. Sauvageot, on the 
other hand, a pitiful figure who had had the imprudence to make 
a wager with a laboureur that prices would continue to rise, was 
tossed in prison. The same day the king formally retracted the 
disputed letters patent and the Parlement sought yet another dra-
matic way to fortify its case.21
II
At the end of  November, for the first time in 76 years, the Parlement 
decided abruptly to convene “all the estates of  Paris” to an “Assembly of  
General Police” (or “General Assembly of  Police” as some of  the texts 
call it).22 Previously convoked only in times of  “extraordinary calamity,” 
the function of  the gathering was to assess the causes of  and seek rem-
edies for the crisis. Delamare traced the custom of  holding assemblies 
as far back as the fourteenth century. They met at least six times in the 
sixteenth century and eight times in the seventeenth. Usually subsistence 
problems filled the agenda, though several assemblies dealt with the 
plague, the floating population, and other issues of  public order.23 The 
Parlement boasted that these meetings had often succeeded in  uncovering 
 21 Draft, PG to Maupeou, 23, 24 Nov. 1768, BN, Coll. Joly 1138, fols. 115, 117; Hardy’s 
Journal, 23, 25 Nov. 1768, BN, mss. fr. 6680, fols. 190–92; Lettres Ossolinski, 28 Nov. 1768, 
BHVP, mss. 627, fol. 193; Journal encyclopédique (Dec. 1 1768). The Rouen Parlement also 
pressed its investigation of  monopoly despite the government’s efforts to impede it. See, for 
example, Registre St. Martin, 8 Oct. 1769, A.D. S-M.
 22 Arrêt of  25 Nov. 1768, Recueil, 92–93; Moreau, procurator at the Châtelet, AN, H* 1873, 
fol. 161; Lettres Ossolinski, 5 Dec. 1768, BHVP, mss. 627, fol. 194.
 23 Recueil, 94–99; AN, H* 1873; Hardy’s Journal, 28 Nov. 1768, BN, mss. 6680, fol. 192; 
Delamare, Traité de la police, II. 764, 867; BN, mss. fr. 21639 (Delamare), fol. 342; BN, mss. fr. 
21640 (Delamare), fol. 21; BN, mss. fr. 21641 (Delamare), fols. 123–32; ordonnance of  1619, 
Archives Seine-Paris, mss. 6 AZ 133/2; article “Châtelet,” in Diderot, et al., Encyclopédie, II, 
246; G. de Molinari, “Céréales,” in Coquelin and Guillaumin, eds., Dictionnaire de l’économie 
politique, I, 303, 305; Alfred Franklin, La Vie privée d’autrefois: L’Hygiène (Paris, 1890), 93; 
Jacques Saint-Germain, La Reynie, 267; P. Bondois, “La Disette de 1662,” Revue d’histoire 
économique et sociale, XII (1924), 53–118; Louis Thuillat, La Reynie, premier Lieutenant Général, 88.
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“maneuvers” and generating recovery “with a surprising rapidity.”24 The 
bookseller Hardy noted in his journal that immediately after such an 
assembly in 1676—for which meeting, curiously, there is no documen-
tary record—the price of  wheat fell from 44 to 20 livres the septier.25
None of  the assemblies seems to have achieved as much as either 
the magistrates or Hardy pretended. Of  the most recent consulta-
tions, the one in 1662 failed to arrest the crisis and the one in 1692 
merely flattered the reigning wisdom. The Parlement in 1768 did 
not count upon the Assembly to produce the sort of  miracle which 
the public expected from the procession of  the reliquary of  Saint 
Genevieve, another traditional disaster measure. Clearly, the motive 
of  the parlementaires who engineered the convocation was to embar-
rass the government and broaden the basis of  criticism of  royal pol-
icy. They wanted to demonstrate that the question at hand was not 
merely another phase in the interminable struggle between king and 
sovereign court, but a bipartisan issue, political to be sure, but not of  
the same order of  politics, say, as the contemporary d’Aiguillon affair 
or a fiscal confrontation.
The Assembly did not, however, serve as an inert cipher for a mono-
lithic opposition. There was no disciplined, rehearsed anti-orthodoxy 
that performed according to cue. The debates revealed a prodigious 
diversity of  opinion; they are of  interest precisely because they permit 
us to follow the lines of  argument as we might in the minutes of  a rep-
resentative assembly, rather than simply take note of  an impersonal 
institutional verdict, which conceals differences and creates a misleading 
impression of  uniformity. At the end of  the discussion, however, when it 
became a choice between granting liberty the totally free reign which its 
proponents claimed it required to be effective or petitioning the crown 
for a far-reaching revision of  the liberal legislation, a large majority of  
the delegates found themselves in accord. Their agreement embodied a 
rebuke to the king and a refutation of  the new political economy.
Meeting for only a day, the Assembly brought together on Monday, 
28 November, almost 200 representatives of  “all the companies and 
diverse orders of  citizens” including deputies from the different cham-
bers of  the Paris Parlement, the Chambre des Comptes, the Cour des 
The Procurator General Joly de Fleury consulted Delamare and prepared a complete 
reconstruction of  the Assembly of  1692 which served as model. BN, Coll. Joly 1138, fols. 1–18 
and Joly 1139, fol. 131.
 24 Recueil, 92–93.
 25 Hardy’s Journal, 25 Nov. 1769, BN, mss. fr. 6680, fol. 192.
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Aides, the Bureau des Finances, the Châtelet, the Hôtel de Ville, the 
six great guilds, the major religious communities and hospitals, and 
a number of  “notables,” four of  whom were singularly equipped to 
proffer technical advice: the academician-agronomists Duhamel du 
Monceau and Fougeroux, the chief  of  the grain measurers, and a 
leading financier.26 The Parlement had voted to call the Assembly on 
Friday afternoon, 25 November. The Procurator General issued most 
of  the invitations on Sunday, the day before the meeting; some of  the 
delegates did not learn that they were to take part until early Monday 
morning.27 It is likely that the Parlement acted so brusquely in order 
to preclude governmental pressure and avoid charges of  sensational-
ism. The government apparently did not learn of  the court’s inten-
tion until after passage of  the arrêt.28 Maupeou expressed concern 
about the authority that such a body could exercise; Joly assured him 
that it could not render arrêts or arrêtés but only “plans of  conduct” 
and “plans of  démarche.”29 Only the commonly felt urgency of  the 
situation can explain the relative facility with which the Parlement got 
the highly status-conscious, proudly independent companies to meet 
under its aegis on such short notice. Nor were they able completely to 
avert squabbles over such matters—not mere formalities for the par-
ties involved—as precedence and procedure.30
The First President D’Aligre, known for his extraordinary wealth 
and his ability to get on with the magistrates despite his devotion to 
 26 There is unfortunately no information regarding the process of  selection of  the deputies. 
In view of  the persistence of  a liberal element within the Paris Parlement, it would be 
particulary interesting to know how that body chose its delegates. See the address of  the 
First President, Recueil, 104.
The physiocratic president of  the Rouen Parlement, Bigot de Sainte-Croix, criticized 
the presence in the Assembly “d’un grand nombre d’ecclésiastiques et de religieux auxquels 
leur état semble interdire toutes spéculations politiques.” Cited by Jean Egret, Le Parlement 
de Dauphiné, I, 185.
Galiani, who began to compose his Dialogues at the time of  the Assembly and who 
may very well have used its procès-verbaux as a reference work, had the Chevalier remark: 
“Assemblez quelques Magistrats, quelques intendants, hommes de vertu et de génie… 
Priez-les de composer un nouveau code de police des bleds.” Dialogues, ed. by Nicolini, 292.
 27 BN, Coll. Joly 1138, fols. 43–51; extraordinary Sunday deliberation of  the Bureau of  the 
Hôtel-Dieu, 27 Nov. 1768, AAP, Hôtel-Dieu, #137; Deliberations of  the Bureau of  the 
Hôtel de Ville, AN, H* 1873, fols. 70ff.
 28 Draft, PG to Saint-Florentin and Maupeou, 25 Nov. 1768, BN, Coll. Joly 1138. fol. 118. Cf. 
Roubaud, Représentations, 283.
 29 PG to Maupeou, 26 Nov. 1768, BN, Coll. Joly 1138, fol. 133.
 30 Recueil, 99–101, 155–57, 247; AN, H*1873, fols. 70ff; Deliberation of  the Bureau, 7 Dec. 
1768, AAP, Hôtel-Dieu, #137.
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the government, opened the assembly with an address which betrayed 
strained loyalties, but nevertheless put the issue in clear terms.31 “We 
have lived under two very different and very contrary jurisprudences,” 
he said. In the old system “everything was anticipated,” monopoly 
was “severely prohibited,” and each local police official had “the most 
ample power to do everything which he believed useful for the provi-
sioning of  the markets of  the areas of  his territory.” The liberal laws 
changed everything and for the first two years there were “no regrets.” 
Prices rose with “just moderation,” helping cultivators without harm-
ing consumers. Then we suffered bad weather, bad harvests, and wide-
spread social disorder. Now grain is “dear and far beyond the faculties 
of  the people.” Yet D’Aligre refused to draw any explicit causal links 
between liberalization and the grave problems of  the hour: that was for 
the assembly to decide. Although the “bitter pleas” of  the people could 
not be ignored, D’Aligre reminded the delegates that the nation was 
divided on the issue: certain parts of  the kingdom still favored the new 
system, “numerous writings” have appeared for and against, and within 
the Parlement of  Paris itself  voices have differed sharply.
Significant differences in tone and attitude emerged at the 
Assembly. A number of  deputies openly despaired of  the prospects 
of  redressing the supply situation and restoring public order in the 
near future. Another group, nervous about the impact which the 
meeting would have upon public opinion and anxious to avoid 
debating in a crisis atmosphere, deprecated the gravity of  the situ-
ation. “The misfortune is not as great as we feared,” noted the 
President Lepelletier, who was not in the least sympathetic with 
liberalization.32 Still others denounced this posture of  restraint as 
a liberal trick to make everyone forget how bad things really are. 
Hocquart of  the Requêtes believed it “indispensable to state by an 
Article that the whole Assembly unanimously thinks that grain 
was too dear, that this proposition simple in itself  still seemed to 
be doubtful in the minds of  the authors of  the new system of  the 
 31 Henri Carré, La Fin des parlements, 1788–1790 (Paris, 1912), 2, 9–11, 47 for D’Aligre’s 
background and Recueil, 102–110 for his speech.
 32 Recueil, 223 (Lepelletier), 192–204 (Murard), 132–33 (Sartine), 157 (Levasseur d’Hérouville); 
AN, H* 1873, fols. 100–103 (Moreau). For Lepelletier’s background, see François Bluche, 
L’Origine des magistrats du parlement de Paris au 18e siècle in Mémoires de la Fédération des Sociétés 
Historiques et Archéologiques de Paris et de l’Ile de France, V–VI (1956 for 1953–54), 273. On Murard, 
see J. Flammermont, Le Chancelier Maupeou et les parlements, 2nd. ed. (Paris, 1885), xvi.
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unlimited liberty of  the grain trade.”33 There was something tragi-
comic in a request for a formal declaration of  unequivocal cherté at 
a time when bread had passed four sous in the capital and reached 
even higher elsewhere, yet it bespeaks the conviction of  these mag-
istrates that the liberal ideology still had powerful influence.
Testard du Lys, the Lieutenant Criminel, underlined the “urgency” 
of  popular needs and flatly blamed liberalization for producing the 
hunger and misery, which were driving increasingly large numbers 
of  innocent people to commit crimes. His colleague Moreau, the 
Châtelet’s procurator, who was not a partisan of  the liberal reforms, 
nevertheless briskly rebutted Testard’s contention. “There were 
never fewer major crimes,” he claimed, and those who invoke high 
prices and suffering as an excuse seek “a pretext for slothfulness or 
libertinage.”34
 33 Recueil, 183. On Hocquart, see Bluche, L’Origine des magistrats, 214. Michau de Montblin, 
an influential young counselor in the First Enquêtes and the son of  a maître des requêtes and 
intendant of  commerce, took a similar, uncompromising position. Recueil, 189. On his family, 
see Bluche, L’Origine des magistrats, 313. Turgot acknowledged Montblin’s growing prominence 
in the parlement but expressed contempt for his subsistence politics. Turgot to Dupont, 4 
Jan. 1769, in Œuvres, ed. by Schelle, III, 53. It is interesting to note that Montblin and the 
liberal parlementaire Chavannes, who were bitterly divided on the grain issue, fought side by 
side against the Maupeou purge and suffered particularly harsh exiles. See Flammermont, 
Maupeou, 81, 220–21 and Pidansat de Mairobert, Journal historique, III, 237 (23 Aug. 1772).
 34 Recueil, 133–41; AN, H* 1873, fol. 102: remonstrances of  19 Aug. and 4 Sept. 1768, in 
Flammermont, ed., Remontrances du Parlement de Paris, II, 944–48. Cf. similar sentiments in 
the representations of  22 March 1769, ibid., III, 32.
The philosophes debated the question of  crime specifically in its relation to misery. 
Mercier insisted on the need “to make a distinction” between theft motivated by hunger 
on the one hand and avarice or libertinage on the other. Tableau de Paris, XI, 311. Cf. ibid., 
VI, 232 and Mercier’s L’An 2440, I, 143n. Yet the économiste Condorcet insisted that “need 
does not give them [the people] any more [than other motives] the right to steal grain and 
money.” Lettre d’un laboureur de Picardie à M. N. auteur prohibitif  à Paris (1775), in E. Daire and 
G. de Molinari, eds., Collection des principaux économistes, XIV, 487. See also the exchange 
between D’Alembert and Frederick and the views of  Brissot cited by A. Lichtenberger, Le 
Socialisme au XVIIIe siècle (Paris, 1895), 259–260, 414.
We need a serious study of  criminality and criminology, based in part on the Y and X series 
at the Archives Nationales. The team study directed by F. Billacois is a step in that direction. 
See A. Abbiateci, et al., Crimes et criminalité en France sous l’ancien régime, 17e–18e siècles, Cahier des 
Annales, #33 (Paris, 1971). Albeit suggestive, Arlette Farge’s Le Vol d’aliments à Paris au 18e siècle 
(Paris, 1974) rests on a precarious source base and a simplistic conceptual foundation. There are 
many stimulating notions in Yves Castan’s Honnêteté et relations sociales en Languedoc (Paris, 1974). 
The discussion has been recently enriched by the publication of  a special number of  the Revue 
d’histoire moderne et contemporaine, XXI ( July-Sept. 1974) devoted to “marginality and criminality.”
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These and still other points of  contention proved that the deputies 
did not all see things in the same manner and enabled the économiste 
Roubaud to remark, with ironic satisfaction, that they could not even 
agree whether the widely proclaimed dearth was a dearth after all.35
The crucial question before the Assembly concerned the merits and 
defects of  the liberal laws. It was believed that an emergency assembly 
meeting under the standard of  “police” and dominated by men from 
institutions of  a regulatory character and tradition would take a stand 
violently opposed to exportation, the issue on which so much public 
attention had been focused.36 As expected, a number of  deputies main-
tained that the liberals had exaggerated the decadent state of  agricul-
ture and belittled the real magnitude of  exports, that exportation was 
one of  the chief  causes of  the cherté, and that it was perverse and 
wasteful for the government to encourage the export of  wheat needed 
by the nation while it paid bounties on imports of  foreign grain.37 But 
an influential bloc of  deputies claimed to understand and sympathize 
with the July Edict and a far larger group criticized it constructively and 
with moderation. Although they felt that exports were presently inop-
portune or even dangerous and that the cut-off  ceiling should have 
been lower (Sartine proposed 24 livres instead of  30, an idea which 
Miromesnil, Laverdy’s friend, had proposed a year before), they agreed 
that exportation was “absolutely essential” for the reinvigoration of  a 
Modern criminologists have been impressed by the relationship which Testard suggested. 
See Y.M. Bercé, “Aspects de la criminalité au XVIIe siècle,” Revue historique, 92nd year, CCXXIX 
(Jan.–March 1968), 35.
R. Cobb has written about the confluence of  crime and dearth during the Revolution. 
The Police and the People, 271. See also the case of  the citizen of  Saumur, sentenced to death 
for theft but pardoned when “il fut reconnu qu’il avait volé pour manger” (1700). André 
Alem, Le Marquis d’Argenson et l’économie politique (Paris, 1900), 59n.
 35 Roubaud, Représentations, 408–09. In fact, virtually no one doubted that there was a dearth 
situation. The question they pondered was whether the dearth was “real” or “artificial.” 
See, for example, Recueil, 116, 162. For the significance of  these distinctions, see above, 
chapter two. The deputies who emphasized the importance of  exports tended to argue that 
the dearth was indeed real as a result of  this drainage. The deputies who focused on the 
disruption of  internal trade were more inclined to see the dearth as “artificial.” Their point 
was to highlight an ominously paradoxical situation in which high prices subsisted despite 
the availability of  relatively ample supplies.
 36 Lettres Ossolinski, 5 Dec. 1768, BHVP, mss. 627, fol. 194.
 37 Recueil, 39–40, 136–37, 140, 189, 219–23, 230–31, 233–35; AN, H*1873, fol. 108. Galiani, 
Chamousset, and later Malthus warned against the “imbecility” of  those who count on 
compensating exports with imports. Galiani’s phrase, in a letter to Madame D’Epinay, 
1 Sept. 1770, in Asse, ed., Lettres, I, 131; Chamousset, Œuvres, II, 282; Malthus, On Population, 
ed. by G. Himmelfarb (New York, 1960), 421.
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“lethargic” agriculture.38 In the end, to be sure, the assembly decided 
“almost unanimously,” in the words of  one observer, that continued 
exporting was contrary to “the interests of  the people,” but it would be 
misleading to ignore the ambivalence of  many deputies.39
It is equally important, however, to remember that the bulk of  the 
deputies did not regard exportation, despite its salience in the public 
mind, as the most delicate and decisive issue. In the last analysis, whatever 
its magnitude and psychological impact, exportation was a “secondary 
cause” of  the troubles, as a magistrate later remarked.40 The Parlement 
of  Paris had acted on this premise from the very beginning; it agonized 
over the May Declaration, but once it agreed to concede internal liberty, 
it readily approved the July Edict. On this point the deputies agreed 
with the ministry’s position, for the letters patent of  early November 
clearly argued that May, not July, cut to the heart of  the quarrel. Presi-
dent Murard of  the Enquêtes spoke for a large portion of  the assembly 
when he said that monopoly was “infinitely more dangerous” than free 
exporting.41 The fundamental questions raised by the May Declaration, 
as the assembly saw it, were the nature of  the grain trade, the meaning 
of  liberty, and the responsibilities of  the governors to the governed.
The permissive conception of  the grain trade aroused little sup-
port from the majority of  delegates. A handful, led by the leading 
liberal in the Paris Parlement, the grand’chambrier Chavannes, argued 
for a totally untrammelled freedom for merchants to operate “as it 
will please them,” viewed stockpiling, off-market transactions, and 
secrecy as absolutely necessary for the proper functioning of  com-
merce, and defended the right of  the merchants to a “very consid-
erable profit” for their services.42 But most of  the deputies believed 
that grain, as an article of  vital necessity, had to be treated differently 
from all other goods in commerce. “Obstruction is the destruction of  
trade,” Lebegue, a secretary of  the king, readily admitted. “But,” he 
 38 Recueil, 130–31,148–49,154,192–97; Miromesnil to CG, 21 Dec. 1767 in LeVerdier, ed., 
Correspondance Miromesnil, V, 67.
 39 Desaubiez, Le Bonheur public, 66.
 40 BN, Coll. Joly 1109, fol. 215. The magistrates of  the Provence Parlement observed that it 
was not against exports, but “against the free circulation [of  grain] that the principal effort 
is directed.” Letter to king, 21 Nov. 1768, B. 3677, A.D. B-du-R. Cf. also Moreau’s letter of  
2 Oct. 1768, AN, F11 1179.
 41 Recueil, 192–204.
 42 Ibid., 166–172, 192–204, 206–212. The Ephémérides du citoyen later hailed Chavannes’ speech 
and Baudeau praised his “enlightenment,” “probity,” and “patriotism.” Ephémérides (1769), 
II, 122–25; Nouvelles éphémérides (1775), I, 115–124. The liberal press published parts of  
Chavannes’ speech; manuscript copies also circulated in liberal milieu. C. 2420, A.D. B-du-R.
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went on to say, “when it is a question of  grain, primary matter of  the 
food of  men, one will not think that liberty is obstructed when it is 
subjected to laws which oppose avidity and illicit gains.”43 “What will 
the merchant regard as a sufficient profit?” asked President Lefebvre, 
one of  the leading figures of  the Parlement. It is in the nature of  
commerce, he answered, to seek greater and greater profits. Without 
police controls “all the speculations of  the merchant tend to produce 
cherté, to sustain it, & to increase it.”44 All of  these speakers rejected the 
liberal-utilitarian notion of  a happy convergence of  private and pub-
lic interest.45 Unchecked self-interest betrays the public good, accord-
ing to the Advocate General Séguier, and “sacrifices everything to the 
inordinate desire to make a fortune and rapidly amass riches.” The 
lesson was clear: the government must not, in Lepelletier’s words, 
“abandon the consumer, who could not do without bread, to the law 
that the cupidity of  the merchant would impose upon him.”46
Liberty, in Séguier’s traditional police view, authorized a man to 
work for his happiness only in ways which did not “trouble” that of  
other men. What we see now, another parlementaire contended, is “a 
liberty unfortunately degenerated into license.”47 This of  course was 
the great fear of  the police, what they had always predicted would hap-
pen were liberty unleashed. The rest of  the causal chain was simple to 
follow: license engendered monopolies, which plunged the nation into 
crisis. On the basis of  “personal” observations in the Beauce during 
the past three years, a maître des comptes affirmed that the present “dis-
order” had no other cause than “monopolies and evil maneuvers,” 
none of  which could have occurred had not the reform legislation 
“tied the hands” of  the local police.48 Lefebvre used the same image, 
a staple in the protest refrain from the local officials and one of  the 
keys to understanding the problem of  liberalization: “the police, the 
administration itself, have their hands tied.” We find ourselves, Lefe-
bvre went on, in an absurd situation in which “the merchant can do 
 43 Recueil, 151.
 44 Ibid., 237, 239. On Lefebvre, see Bluche, L’Origine des magistrats, 261.
 45 Cf. Grimm’s Correspondance littéraire, ed. by Toumeux, X, 516–17 (Dec. 1774): “… the 
experience of  every day and the history of  all times, doesn’t it prove that private interest 
and the public interest have almost always a very different course… and that the greatest 
art of  the legislator is to force them to come together or to support each other.”
 46 Recueil, 115.
 47 Ibid., 190–91 (Hocquart).
 48 Ibid., 248.
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anything to the people & neither the Judge nor even the Sovereign can do 
anything to the merchant to whom the law has given immunity.”49 
Even Sartine, who was closer to Chavannes than to the parlementary 
presidents on many issues, defined the grain trade, as the police always 
had, in terms of  a public service, as “a tribute that society is empow-
ered to demand.”50
It followed that the state’s highest interest was to assure the subsis-
tence of  the people. It was “infinitely more important for the State,” 
Lepelletier maintained, to “give an entire people the means to feed 
itself ” than “to enrich a few individuals.”51 On other issues—fiscality is 
the most prominent—when it became a question of  choosing between 
the interest of  the many and that of  the few, magistrates like Lepelletier 
were less avidly self-denying. Moreover, Lepelletier and many of  the 
other deputies were landowners who stood to profit from the bon prix 
which liberalization sought to produce. What caused them to demur on 
liberalization was neither a paroxysm of  altruism or statesmanship on 
the one hand, nor a wile of  demagogy on the other, though their ene-
mies accused them of  the latter and their friends congratulated them 
for the former. Rather, it was a sense of  fear or alarm, more sophisti-
cated and less visceral than the sensation experienced by the people, 
but not unlike it. “In these moments of  crisis,” the économiste Dupont 
scornfully noted, “… the Magistrates … become people themselves.”52 
“Everyone is people” said Joly de Fleury, “when they lack bread.”53
Now the deputies did not lack bread, but they were frightened by the 
effects of  scarce and dear bread upon the social order. For the state and 
the estates to survive, they had to pay a certain price for social peace. 
“Our predecessors,” Séguier asserted, were always prepared to pay this 
price: “all their policy on this matter was to give to the most consider-
able portion of  the state, to the People, bread at the lowest possible 
price.”54 Like Necker and the other theorists of  social equilibrium in a 
society rent with inequality, Séguier saw it as part of  the tacit bargain 
by which the rulers assumed responsibility and the ruled submitted. 
A policy of  government which ignored this responsibility and made 
turbulence endemic, he suggested, would undermine the  political and 
 49 Ibid., 238–39.
 50 Ibid., 130–31.
 51 Ibid., 226.
 52 Dupont to Prince Carl Ludwig, 1773, in Knies, ed., Dupont Correspondence, II, 146.
 53 Speech of  5 July 1763, Recueil, 48. 
 54 Ibid., 112.
 THE BATTLE OVER LIBERTY: I 433
social structure. Few of  the deputies could listen with equanimity to 
maître des comptes Clement’s analysis—strikingly like Necker’s reaction 
to Turgot in the next decade—of  “this combat” between rich and poor 
for wealth on the one side and subsistence on the other.55
Lepelletier understood that the purpose of  the liberal program was 
not merely to “enrich a few individuals.” He knew that it aimed at 
economic growth and agricultural renewal. To achieve this end, the 
liberals wanted to raise prices. They not only “fulfilled their goal,” he 
argued, “but they overshot it.” Give “him who cultivates grain & him 
who sells it the liberty to draw a profit,” he allowed, “up to the point 
which will not reduce to famine or indigence those who must nourish 
themselves on it.” On balance, the social trade-off  realized by liberal-
ization was disastrous. “The people cannot live at the price to which 
bread has risen,” Lepelletier told the assembly.56 Not even good citi-
zens could be expected to forbear infinitely. Clement frankly accepted 
the prospect that many of  the poor would perish in their struggle “to 
wring” wages commensurate with the price rise from their employ-
ers. In the end, by the “commiseration of  the proprietors”—that is, 
as a result of  their fear of  insurrection and turmoil—the workers will 
win the new subsistence minimum.57 The Malthusian prospect, with 
its peril to the social order, horrified the other deputies. Nor were 
they optimistic about a short-run accommodation between workers 
and employers, in the countryside (where the économistes wrongly pre-
dicted these pressures would not exist) as well as the cities. Lepelletier 
and Montblin of  the Enquêtes foresaw more and more unemployment 
and a widening of  the fatal wage lag. Experience, they declared, has 
revealed the speciousness of  the physiocratic assurances to the people 
and underlined the urgency of  returning to the “judicious spirit of  
the old police.”58
 55 Ibid., 161–64.
 56 Ibid., 226, 228.
 57 Ibid., 161–64.
 58 Ibid., 183, 228. Like Joly in 1763 and Necker in 1775, the critics of  the physiocratic wage 
theory rejected the suggestion that only urban workers—not the rural laboring force—
would suffer from a price-wage lag. See ibid., 37; remonstrances of  Rouen Parl., 25 Jan. 
1769, Registre St. Martin, A.D. S-M.; and Necker, Sur la législation des grains, 179–180. Cf. 
J.-B. Briatte’s blistering refutation of  the économistes’ “horribly cruel assertion” that wages 
kept pace with commodity prices. Offrande à l’humanité (Amsterdam, 1780), 159–60.
The failure of  wages to keep pace with prices was one of  the major items of  criticism 
from field administration. Even where bread was in relatively plentiful supply, the loaf  “cost 
more than the day [of  labor].” This, said an intendant, was the “crisis of  the people.” The 
“number and the competition of  unemployed hands diminishes the price of  the day,” even as 
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A revival of  the old police spirit, these critics of  liberalization 
insisted, did not mean a return to the dark ages. They refused to be 
constrained by the liberal formulation of  the question which allowed, 
as a matter of  principle, no middle ground. “It has been presented in 
this manner in several writings by the Authors of  the new system,” 
said Lepelletier, “because the idea of  liberty, always being agreeable, 
& that of  prohibitions always being repugnant, they believed that 
many persons, without examining further, would decide for that which 
one covered with the name of  liberty.” (The parlements, of  course, 
to capitalize upon the fashion of  the age, had used the same ploy 
countless times on other issues.) Lepelletier spoke for what he called 
“a legitimate, honest, moderate liberty,” between what he admitted 
had sometimes been “excessive prohibitions,” on the one hand, and 
“an absolute license, exempt from all rules, shielded from all inspec-
tion,” on the other.59 Pursuing the same theme, Séguier claimed that 
a return to the old laws did not mean strict adherence to legislation, 
such as the 1723 Declaration on mandatory market exchanges, which 
everyone considered overdrawn.
In anticipation of  some of  the severest antiphysiocratic criticism of  
the seventies, Séguier emphasized the contrast between his relativism 
and the absolutism of  the économistes. He did not find it strange that the 
leading voices in “several provinces” praised liberalization. He accepted 
the thesis that “the most entire liberty” was a “genuine good” in the 
seaports and especially in the Mediterranean provinces, but, he insisted, 
“what is good in one place becomes harmful or dangerous in another.” 
 grain prices continued to rise or remain high. Cypierre to bishop of  Orléans, 23 Sept. 1768 
and to CG, 9 Oct. 1768 in C. Bloch, Correspondance inédite de l’intendant Cypierre, 85–86, 123; 
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Mondidier and état des Pertes, Ponthoile, ibid.; IN. of  Lorraine to CG, 30 Dec. 1771, 
AN, F11 223; Anon., “Mémoire sur l’exportation des grains,” Oct. 1768, Arch. Armée, 
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Liberty worked well in England, but its success there was of  no rel-
evance for France because the two nations were not at all comparable 
in character, laws, and physiognomy. Similarly, the Advocate General 
reasoned, it would be a “dangerous evil” to impose this complete 
liberty upon Paris, whose geographical position and needs differed so 
markedly from those of  the maritime provinces.60 Séguier followed 
Lefebvre’s premise—widely and instinctively shared by a great many 
Frenchmen— that provisioning questions were “in the moral order” 
where they depended on changing circumstances, rather than in the 
natural or “physical” order of  the physiocrats, where they depended 
on fixed, universal relationships. As a result, it made sense to think of  
such matters as liberty in relative terms, in terms of  good and bad in 
relation to time, place, and dose.61
The spokesmen of  the movement against liberalization assailed 
the mainsprings of  its ideology as well as its policies. Corrosive philo-
sophical speculations produced abusive grain speculations. The new 
political economy was not merely erroneous; venturing into the realm 
of  everyday material life, it became a public menace. For President 
Lefebvre, the liberty of  the économistes was atavistic and antisocial. It 
implied a chaotic state of  nature in which strife replaced structure 
and private interests crushed the public good. Just as the king, in the 
famous castigation of  the Paris Parlement known as the séance de flagel-
lation, depicted himself  as a bulwark against “all new systems and all 
these expressions invented to accredit the most false and dangerous 
idea,” so Lefebvre saw it as “the most urgent duty” of  the magistrates 
to “defend the State against novelties,” which threatened “the conser-
vation of  the inhabitants of  France.”62
President Lepelletier frankly characterized the économistes as enemies 
of  the public good. The liberal ideologues, he charged, preached the 
seditious and “inhuman” dogma of  constant cherté, equating the bon 
prix with an “excessive” price beyond the reach of  the people. He inti-
mated that publicists who promoted such a program of  exploitation 
 60 Ibid., 114–16, 123, 225. Cf. the similarities between the arguments of  Séguier and Galiani: 
Galiani to Suard, 7 Sept. 1770 in Asse, ed., Lettres, I, 140 and Dialogues, ed. by Nicolini, 13.
 61 Recueil, 243.
 62 Recueil, 241–42; 3 March 1766, in Flammermont, ed., Remontrances du Parlement de Paris, II, 
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and extravagant profits probably had a venal interest in it.63 Lepelletier 
denounced them for the same kind of  crime for which the king dissolved 
the parlements two years later. In the preamble of  the famous Mau-
peou edict, Louis XV condemned their “esprit de système, as uncertain 
in its principles as it is bold in its undertakings” and the “new ideas … 
capable of  troubling the public order.” The economic liberalism and 
the pretensions of  the économistes were as abhorrent to the leaders of  the 
Paris Parlement as the constitutional liberalism and pretensions of  the 
parlements were to the monarch. “A crowd of  writers without mission 
& without power to express the public wish,” said Lepelletier, “had pre-
tended to be its organs in extolling the wildest systems on this subject 
[of  subsistence].” Henceforth, however, he declared, the économistes 
“will no longer be able to present, as the public desire, false & danger-
ous views, against which, on this day, has risen the general wish of  the 
citizens of  all the orders.”64
If  the assembly had been convened, however, simply to excoriate 
another dangerous intellectual “system,” it would have been a com-
monplace affair, like the numerous judicial, ecclesiastical, and univer-
sity assemblies which periodically banned and burned books. With-
out overlooking their significance, it must be emphasized that the 
assembly was only incidentally concerned about the peril of  ideas. 
This was not an airy debate about political and economic theory. The 
“system” in question, or at least significant parts of  it, had been made 
the law of  the land. It was defended not only by professional col-
porteurs of  ideas but by ministers and royal councillors. The debate 
in the assembly turned on concrete matters of  policy and practical 
details of  administration. The deputies addressed themselves not to 
vague potential threats to the public order but to the sources of  dam-
age already done and likely to be done in the immediate future. At 
the end of  the day, when the deputies were asked to formulate a set 
of  collective recommendations, which would ultimately be presented 
to the king, it was this pressing question of  police, not theory, which 
was uppermost in their minds.
 63 Cf. the Intendant Cypierre’s remark on the économiste Letrosne “… who is known to be 
engaged in grain commerce, and so hated, not to say scorned, in this city [Orléans] that the 
people, seeing him return from Paris at the moment when grain went up in price, cited him 
in the middle of  the market as the principal author of  their misery.” To T. de Montigny, 
7 Sept. 1768 in C. Bloch, Correspondance inédite de l’intendant Cypierre, 63.
 64 Recueil, 224–25; Edict of  Dec. 1770, cited by Flammermont, Maupeou, 116. Cf. Galiani 
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Despite their disagreements on the meaning of  liberty, the success of  
the old prohibitions, the necessity of  reform, the rights of  commerce, 
and the claims of  agriculture upon the nation, the majority of  depu-
ties obviously felt that liberalization had wrought infinitely more harm 
than good and that the government was set upon a disaster course. 
The government’s intransigent program for the rigorous application 
of  the liberal laws as they were originally conceived, presented to the 
assembly by Chavannes, won no support. A single deputy voted for 
an equivocal, unwieldy compromise devised by Murard and Clément 
to salvage the core of  liberalization, while meeting some of  the major 
objections of  its critics.65 In the final roll call of  the session, the depu-
ties gave “almost unanimous support” to a tough proposal sponsored 
by Lepelletier which clearly called for a repudiation of  the liberal sys-
tem.66 His projected arrêt would beseech the king to issue new legisla-
tion “modifying” the laws of  1763–64 by “renewing the dispositions 
of  the old ordinances which for such a long time assured to the citizens 
a subsistence in proportion to their faculties and to the State a happy 
tranquility.” Specifically, it asked for obligatory declarations of  name, 
address, stocks, and destinations by the merchants, for the restriction of  
all transactions to the public marketplace, for a buying schedule which 
would favor consumers and bakers over traders, for police authority to 
constrain merchants and owners of  grain to provision markets “in case 
of  necessity,” and for a complete suspension of  all exports for at least 
a year—in a word, a return to “the spirit of  the old police.” Drafted as 
a political program of  action, the recommendations of  the assembly 
allowed for no nuances. Séguier had characterized the triumph of  lib-
erty as a “revolution” in politics and in ideas. The final report of  the 
Assembly of  General Police was forthrightly counter-revolutionary.
III
Virtually to the letter, the Paris Parlement embodied the assembly’s 
project in an arrêt on December 2, which it hoped would make a 
special impression on the monarch. If  “tears” and “lamentations” 
did not reach the crown, the magistrates wrote, surely the king 
would hear the “voice of  the people” expressed by the recent assem-
bly, which had drawn together “the Noble and the Commoner, the 
 65 Recueil, 166–76, 202–210.
 66 Ibid., 229–33, 251; Hardy’s Journal, 28 Nov. l768, BN, mss. fr. 6680, fols. 192–193.
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 Bourgeois and the Merchant, the Poor and the Rich, the Proprietor 
of  real estate and the businessman, the Private Person and the Public 
Man, the Ministers of  Religion and those of  Justice.” And the “voice 
of  the people,” the Parlement reminded God’s viceroy, “… in this 
matter more than any other, is the voice of  God, that is, the expres-
sion of  the truth itself.” (“Who is this people whose voice is the voice 
of  God?” asked Roubaud, sometime cleric and full-time économiste, “is 
it the people of  the cities or the people of  the countryside, the people 
of  the capital or the people of  the provinces, an educated people or 
an ignorant people?”) The chastening idea that the Parlement was 
trying to convey through the vox populi invocation was as much politi-
cal as it was moral. It meant not that the people’s instinct was wiser or 
holier than the king’s, but that it was in this affair irresistible.
The Parlement claimed that there was overwhelming evidence, not 
the neo-Cartesian variety favored by the économistes, but the kind mea-
sured in terms of  prices and disorders, that liberalization had worked 
a disaster. It was unimaginable that the king would knowingly per-
petuate “a system so harsh” to the poor who could not procure bread 
“enough for their subsistence” at the current levels. Though flawed by 
“some excessive prohibitions,” the old legislation “contained nothing 
that was not prudent and equitable” for the cultivators and the con-
sumers. The new system had turned “the balance” drastically against 
the latter, “authorizing a license without limits,” assuring “impunity 
to all sorts of  frauds [and] to the most odious maneuvers,” favoring 
the greedy grain barons over the small traders who used to swarm 
in the markets, and “exposing the people … to perish of  hunger.” 
Liberty was “legitimate,” contended the Parlement, to the extent 
that it was “compatible with the public interest”; it lost legitimacy 
the moment it clearly began to ravage that interest. By instituting the 
new system, the king showed that he misconceived the public interest. 
By maintaining it, Louis placed the kingdom in jeopardy and failed in 
his primary responsibility to his subjects: to make it possible for them 
to find bread sufficient to meet their needs and commensurate with 
their means. Ultimately, the question concerned the legitimacy of  the 
king as much as that of  his liberal policy. Would the monarch who 
had, in a sense, desacralized bread by abandoning the stewardship of  
subsistence recognize the voice of  God?67
 67 Recueil, 252–54, 260; Conseil Secret, 13 Dec. 1768, AN, Xlb 8957; Roubaud, Représentations aux 
magistrats, 385–86. On the tradition of  invoking the Vox populi, see George Boas’ Vox 
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The king rejected the assembly’s recommendations in a mild and 
evasive reply, which Turgot considered “weak and without dignity.” The 
government attributed the cherté, as it had before, to bad harvests and 
“the anxieties of  weak and prejudiced spirits,” but for the first time it 
also blamed the problem on the maneuvers of  “interested persons” and 
on the “prosperity” of  laboureurs who had profited from the price rise and 
were now in no hurry to supply the markets. The government envisaged 
no changes in policy to combat the cherté. It would continue to provide 
king’s grain and it would enforce the liberal legislation. Louis chided 
the Paris Parlement for pretending to speak for the whole nation. He 
boasted that he had allies among its own sister courts, several of  which 
construed the public interest differently from the Parisians. “All my Sub-
jects are equally dear to my heart,” averred the king—a claim which the 
Rouen magistrates had bitterly contested several months earlier.68
The Parlement planned to express its unhappiness in “iterative 
remonstrances” after the Christmas recess. Meanwhile another of  the 
periodic clashes over finances strained relations further between the 
crown and the sovereign court. In a strongly worded remonstrance 
attributed to the abbé Terray, copies of  which were “allowed to leak 
out” to the public, the Parlement painted a “sad tableau of  the mis-
fortunes of  France and of  the disorder of  her finances” and protested 
against the extension of  the second vingtième and certain indirect taxes 
and the issue of  a new loan. In early January 1769, the king forced 
registration in a lit de justice and contemptuously rebuffed the worn 
and deficient remedies which Terray proposed, some of  which he 
would bring with him to the Contrôle-Général a year later.69 The 
conduct of  another future member of  the triumvirate, D’Aiguillon, 
whose ministerial destiny was no more likely than Terray’s at the end 
of  1768, was also the subject of  parlementary remonstrances.70
 Populi. Essays in the History of  an Idea (Baltimore, 1969). See also Rousseau’s remark: “often 
injustice and fraud find protectors; they never have the public on their side; in this way the 
voice of  the people is the voice of  God.” C.E. Vaughan, ed., Political Writings of  Rousseau 
(Cambridge, 1915), II, 256.
 68 Conseil Secret, 19 Dec. 1768, 17 Jan. 1769, AN, X1b 8957; AN, O1 pièce 349; Recueil, 261–62; 
Lettres Ossolinski, 26 Dec. 1768, BHVP, mss. 627, fol. 202; Hardy’s Journal, 13, 19 Dec. 
1768, BN, mss. fr. 6680, fols. 196–97; Turgot to Dupont, 4 Jan. 1769, in Turgot, Œuvres, ed. 
by Schelle, III, 53.
 69 Conseil Secret, 20–21 Dec. 1768 and 11 Jan. 1769, AN, X1b 8957; Le Nouvelliste suisse 
(Jan. 1769), 25–28; Bachaumont, Mémoires secrets, ed. by P.-L. Jacob (Paris, 1883), 330 (14 
Jan. 1769); Mercure historique (Jan. 1769), CLXVI, 55–57. Cf. the similar complaints drawn 
up by the Parl. of  Metz, 27 Feb. 1769, B. 467 (registre secret) and the remonstrances 
prepared by Malesherbes in Le Nouvelliste suisse (Feb. 1769), 41–43.
 70 Lettres Ossolinski, Dec. 1768, BHVP, mss. 627, fol. 196.
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On Friday, 20 January, after preparing another remonstrance ask-
ing the king to revise the liberal laws, the Parlement passed a spec-
tacularly defiant arrêt in which it took it upon itself  to legislate the 
revisions which it had vainly urged the king to make.71 After a sarcas-
tic preface (“in order to conform to the known intentions of  the said 
Seigneur King …”), the arrêt ordered all those who wished “to make 
use of  the liberty” to enter the grain trade—the irony was either 
unconscious or heavy-handed—to file the very sort of  declaration 
with the local police from which the May Law explicitly dispensed 
them. In addition, the arrêt enjoined the Procurator General to open 
a formal investigation into grain trade maneuvers in the hinterland 
of  the jurisdiction. The Parlement voted to publish the arrêt that very 
day and post it that night so that Parisians could see it before, as 
expected, the royal council quashed it. The aim of  the magistrates 
was to dramatize the stalemate between king and court and to enlist 
the full weight of  public opinion against the government, implicitly 
depicted as the villain, the defender of  cherté.
Eighteen months earlier, the Parlement had launched its campaign 
for a reassessment of  liberalization in a low-key, unpublicized man-
ner precisely because it understood the grave danger of  stirring the 
apprehensions of  people who were already uneasy and volatile in 
mood. Indeed, throughout the political wars of  the Old Regime, it 
was tacitly agreed to suspend public hostilities during such general 
emergencies as dearths when they were likely to enhance anxiet-
ies and contribute to disorder. After repeated failures to influence 
the king through diplomatic channels, the Parlement turned to the 
Assembly of  Police as a safe surrogate for public opinion and as a 
warning to the government that it was prepared to escalate its attack. 
Still, the Assembly was organized without fanfare and the deputies 
consciously kept their voices down so that only the ministers and not 
the public would hear them. When it became clear that the king had 
no intention of  honoring any of  the Assembly’s recommendations, 
in frustration, the magistrates decided to take the issue outside the 
Palais, to the people, where they had often found favor in the past, 
albeit in situations less fraught with risk. They hoped that this act of  
impudence would somehow provoke the king to assume his respon-
sibilities.
The arrêt infuriated the king and his ministers; Sunday, approxi-
mately thirty-six hours after its passage, the council annulled it, save 
 71 Conseil Secret, 20 Jan. 1769, AN, X1b 8957; Recueil, 263–65; Hardy’s Journal, 20 Jan. 1769, BN, 
mss. fr. 6680, fols. 208–209; Lettres Ossolinski, 23 Jan. 1769 BHVP, mss. 627, fol. 209.
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for the clause launching an investigation into maneuvers.72 The Par-
lement knew very well, the king was made to say in the accompany-
ing message, that “His intention was to change nothing” in the  liberal 
laws. The parlementary arrêt would have done nothing less than 
“destroy the liberty of  this commerce.” Deftly, the king refused to be 
drawn into a discussion of  the merits of  his subsistence policy and 
the effects of  the cherté, turning the issue instead into one of   obedience. 
Once again the Parlement had dared to deliver a “stroke against the 
legislative power of  His Majesty.” The king sought to discredit the 
sovereign court by explaining its opposition to liberalization in terms 
of  its notorious record of  resistance to the will of  the government on 
a host of  important matters. It was hardly surprising that a company 
of  magistrates which had systematically obstructed reform during a 
half  century would place “obstructions” in the way of  commerce. On 
the liberty issue as on all the others, the king implied, the motive of  
the Parlement was political self-aggrandizement and its intention was 
to undermine the power of  the throne.
Whether or not this charge was generally true across the century 
is a question which merits re-examination; in this instance at least, 
it was patently spurious. Far from seeking to limit the authority of  
kingship, the Parlement sought to prevent its erosion. The Parlement 
was concerned with its own destiny only indirectly, to the extent that 
it perceived that a diminution of  royalty meant a loss, not a gain, in 
influence for the sovereign courts. The determination of  the king to 
regard the quarrel as merely another partisan political confrontation 
made it less likely than ever that the government would relent on 
liberalization. For if  the king deserted liberalization he would appear 
to be ceding, not to good sense, but to parlementary pressure. It was 
precisely to spare the king this embarrassment that the Parlement 
had convoked the Assembly of  Police, an institution which histori-
cally had played a non-partisan role.
Nor was disobedience the only misconduct of  which the Parlement 
was guilty. The king sharply condemned it for demagogy and agita-
tion, for recklessly affecting “expressions tending to interest the People 
[in the affair], to excite their minds, and to augment their anxieties 
about the present and the future.”73 Similar charges were levelled in 
 72 Conseil Secret, 23 Jan. 1769, AN, X1b 8957; Hardy’s Journal, 24 Jan. 1769, BN, mss. fr. 6680, 
fol. 209; arrêt du Conseil, 22 Jan. 1769, BN, Coll. Joly 1111, fol. 25.
 73 An anonymous contemporary writer went a step further accusing the Parlements of  Paris 
and Rouen of  using “grand words of  public welfare” and passing measures likely “to worry, 
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1775 by the friends of  Turgot when his effort to reintroduce liberal-
ization encountered difficulties not unlike those faced by the govern-
ment at the end of  the sixties. The “aim’ of  the Parlement’s “bread 
assemblies,” warned Condorcet, “is to please the populace.”74 The 
“motive” of  the Parlement, wrote the abbé de Véri in reference to 
an arrêt which asked the king to take steps to place bread at a price 
within the reach of  the consumers, was “a corporate interest: the 
desire to inveigle the good will of  the people in presenting itself  as 
their father.”75
There is no question that the Paris Parlement assiduously cultivated 
its popularity in the eighteenth century, a practice which the govern-
ment naturally resented and feared. But one must not assume that its 
popularity was either insidiously acquired or easily retained, or that 
the Parlement embraced the subsistence issue merely to enhance its 
prestige. All the evidence indicates that the magistrates were genuinely 
concerned for the safety of  the social and political order; if  they had 
been motivated exclusively or even primarily by a lust for acclaim from 
below, they would not have approved the liberal innovations in 1763–
64, they would not have waited so long before speaking out or initi-
ated their protests with such restraint, and they would not have been 
divided amongst themselves on the issues. That, in fact, the Parlement 
was popular suggests either that the public was stupid and gullible, as 
the king’s party liked to believe, or that it had a fairly clear idea of  its 
interests. In 1768–69, as in 1775, the “people” did not await a signal 
from the sovereign court to become “interested” and involved in a ques-
tion which concerned their material life. If  the magistrates became the 
“fathers” of  the people, it was because the people had been orphaned; 
the Parlement had no need to “inveigle” favor. “All Paris is parlemen-
taire,” Mercier later remarked. Since they had “no other organs,” he 
continued, “the people thus see in the parlement the assembly of  mag-
istrates ready to speak for them & to defend them.”76
 embitter, provoke the people to rise” at a time when they were “already only too disposed 
to revolt.” Instead of  attempting to “calm” and “control” the people as they were supposed 
to do, the Parlements manipulated them for political advantage, “inciting them indirectly to 
commit acts of  violence.” “Réflexions sur les principes des parlemens de Paris et de Rouen 
par rapport au commerce des bleds,” Arch. AE, France 1375, fols. 293–304.
 74 Condorcet to Turgot, 1775, in Henry, ed., Correspondance Condorcet-Turgot, 211. Cf. Arthur 
Young’s admonition in his Travels, ed. by J. Kaplow, 386.
 75 Abbé de Véri, Journal, ed. by J. de Witte, I, 293 (26 May 1775).
 76 Mercier, Tableau, X, 281–82, 288. On the souvereign courts as “protectors of  the people,” 
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At the end of  January 1769, Hardy noted in his journal that the 
royal reply to the parlementary arrêt “excited the murmurs of  the 
People” who believed that liberalization—they subsumed everything 
under the term “exportation”—was the source of  the crisis and that 
the council’s firm support for this policy meant that hard times would 
continue. Hardy also reported the rumor—another avatar of  the 
famine pact persuasion, tailored to fit the needs of  the moment—that 
Trudaine de Montigny composed the reply and that he put so much 
fervor into it because because he had a large share in the clandestine 
export enterprise, which sustained and profited from the cherté.77
Another observer, who had been sanguine about the prospects for 
a change in government policy in December, wrote in early February 
that it was certain that “nothing will be altered.”78 In a bitter rejoinder 
redolent of  the tone of  the remonstrances of  the early sixties, written 
not by a young Turk from the Enquêtes, but a distinguished jurist of  the 
grand chambre, Gars de Frémainville, dubbed “the Roman,” the Par-
lement denounced liberalization as “a badly conceived and dangerous 
system” and promised to wage a relentless struggle for the application 
of  its arrêt.79 Repulsing the charges of  inciting popular passions, the 
Parlement contrasted its “language of  truth and humanity” with the 
king’s lack of  compassion and his unwillingness to examine the facts. 
Despite the government’s campaign against the local police reaction 
and its solemn warning that it would not tolerate any official interfer-
ence with the freedom of  trade, the magistrates announced that they 
would encourage the officials within their jurisdiction to take firm 
action to unmask and repress “the odious maneuvers which tend to 
procure or maintain the cherté of  grain and bread.”
New representations submitted in mid-March developed the Par-
lement’s thesis that the king had abdicated his leadership.80 Instead 
 this matter. Remonstrances of  the Cour des Aides, 18 Feb. 1771, cited by Flammermont, 
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(Paris, 1821), 348.
 77 Hardy’s Journal, 24 Jan. 1769, BN, mss. fr. 6680, fol. 209.
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of  asserting his authority and presence in matter of  subsistence and 
grain commerce, he averted his eyes; he established neglect and non-
vigilance as a fixed “principle of  administration.” Liberty seemed to 
have imposed more imperious inhibitions on the exercise of  king-
ship than police ever placed on the movement of  grain. Instead of  
formulating a supply policy geared to meet the needs of  the people, 
the government left all the choices to the proprietor of  grain, “under 
the illusory pretext”—the keystone of  the liberal arch—“that his pri-
vate interest, properly understood, must lead him to the common 
good.…” Instead of  insisting upon publicity, the king invited the 
merchants to cloak their operations in a “veil” of  “mystery,” even 
as he shrouded the management of  his own finances in secrecy. For 
the Parlement, the “principle” and “end” of  the grain trade was “to 
assure the subsistence of  the people,” but for the government it was 
to create wealth—wealth which the court considered “absolutely fic-
tional,” for its counterpart was widespread misery. The Parlement 
took a stand that we would call populationist, arguing, as Mirabeau 
had before his conversion to physiocracy, that population, not wealth, 
was the true measure of  a nation’s “force and its power.” 
Like the government, the Parlement hardened its position. Whereas 
before it had been willing to accept the notion that liberalization might 
very well have made sense in the context of  the years 1763–64 and that 
the origins of  the crisis were, as the ministry insisted, “physical” and 
psychological, now it regarded the reforms as fatally flawed from the 
beginning and the great misfortunes that followed as the direct “result,” 
not of  the weather or of  “weak spirits,” but of  the “new system.” 
Even the king’s grain distribution for which the Parlement had always 
expressed effusive gratitude—and which more than any other single 
factor spared the government a major upheaval in the capital—no 
longer escaped criticism. The court considered it a contradictory and 
prodigal policy to expend enormous resources from the public treasury 
to buy foreign grain, while letting national grain find vent abroad. This 
time the king did not bother to reply to the parlementary barrage and 
the Parlement, convinced that it was hopeless to pursue the matter in 
further remonstrances, abandoned its public campaign.
IV
In 1763, the government appeared to be politically as well as economi-
cally bankrupt. It had just suffered at the hands of  the parlements a 
defeat as humiliating as the one it sustained in the foreign war ending 
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that same year. Despite many encouraging signs of  expansion—easier 
to perceive in retrospect than they were for contemporaries to see—
important sectors of  the economy languished. In the preceding decade 
the Contrôle-Général had changed hands a half-dozen times. The 
parlements quite rightly accused the government of  ineptitude, arbi-
trariness, and corruption in management, and the government no less 
persuasively charged the sovereign courts with self-regarding obstruc-
tion of  urgently needed reforms. It often appeared that both sides were 
resigned to the well-rehearsed impasse. Successive ministers followed 
the routine of  submitting substantially the same proposals, with slight 
cosmetic disguises, time and again and the parlements responded 
reflexively with the familiar shibboleths. The parlements were obdurate 
and irascible, but the government behaved almost as perversely, refus-
ing to accept the magistrates, in fact if  not in right, as serious political 
interlocutors, despite their obvious ability to thwart government initia-
tives, and preferring on many occasions confrontation and stalemate 
to negotiation and transaction. Royal prestige was at a low ebb, as the 
reactions to the Damiens affair and to the end of  the war and as the 
vignettes of  the diarists testified. In 1763, the government of  Louis XV 
desperately needed a new beginning, a breath of  fresh life.
Liberalization provided the government with the opportunity to 
strike out on a new course. It had the merit not only of  addressing 
itself  directly to a number of  pressing problems, but of  being politi-
cally viable. It had the prestige of  scientific formulation; it was not a 
brusque improvisation. It drew its sanction from nature’s law; it was 
not the product of  ministerial opportunism. It was not an incidental 
or short-run reform with a fixed expiration date or a mere technical 
adjustment in commerce; liberalization was a major, drastic reform, 
unprecedented in the cast which it took and meant to be permanent.81 
None of  the other “economic” reforms to which the government 
turned after mid-century—land reclamation, enclosure, the easing of  
restrictions on manufactures, etc.—had the extraordinary resonance 
and the sweeping multiplier effects of  liberalization. Geared specifi-
cally to promote agriculture and revitalize the economy, liberalization 
marked the first triumph of  the new political economy, whose logic 
portended further changes in the approach to public administration. 
The government believed that success in economic reform would 
help clear the way for fiscal and institutional reforms. In any event, 
 81 Liberalization was, as the Parlement of  Provence noted, a “coup d’état.” Remonstrances, 
26 June 1769, B. 3677, A.D. B-du-R.
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a generous increase in national wealth would improve the financial 
situation of  the government and give it greater freedom of  action. 
The new political economy staked out an untouched, neutral ground 
for cooperation between crown and constituted bodies. By framing 
reform in terms of  liberal discourse, the government hoped to avoid 
fatal squabbles over authority and constitutional law. The liberal laws 
had an immaculate conception and pointed the way towards a new 
relationship between king and parlements, provided both were willing 
to cede to the arbitration of  natural law and utility.
Over the years, albeit usually for different reasons, parlementaires 
and reformers had assailed the excesses of  the administrative mon-
archy: its proliferation of  controls and controllers, its relentless offi-
ciousness, its rapacity, its subordination of  a vast range of  public and 
private activities to proto-bureaucratic regulation. The decision to 
renounce the old grain police was the most radical and significant 
departure from the mold of  the administrative monarchy made in the 
Old Regime. Liberalization inverted the old priorities and redefined 
the traditional idea of  responsibility. Provisioning was no longer the 
business of  government; and business, not provisioning, was the chief  
purpose of  agriculture.
The government was not oblivious to the perils of  the liberal policy. 
That it was willing to risk so much suggests how important it regarded 
the reforms. Anticipating some difficulties, it took certain precautions 
where it felt most vulnerable. The ministry exempted Paris from the 
liberal legislation and readied the king’s grain machinery in case of  
emergency. It could not, however, foresee a series of  short harvests 
and it did not expect that liberalization would arouse such bitter and 
widespread opposition from below and from above. Yet the govern-
ment refused to make any concessions. There were few major issues 
on which it showed such grim determination to prevail virtually at any 
cost. The king and his ministers had found a reform in which they 
believed and they clung to it longer than anyone could have predicted.
If  the liberal approach, in a sense, took public policy out of  the 
sphere of  politics, the renunciation of  traditional royal paternalism 
and state intervention politicized the subsistence question. Grain 
scarcity and high prices, which might have passed in other times as 
disruptive but inevitable facts of  life, became widely associated with 
royal policy. In a similar conjuncture in the mid-seventies, after Tur-
got reintroduced the liberal measures and the Paris area was con-
vulsed with the chain of  subsistence mutinies known as the Flour 
War, the Paris Parlement told the king:
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It was, Sire, in envisioning this system … as destructive of  all police that it was easy 
to see why the dearths anterior to liberty were accompanied by almost no trouble, 
while the recent chertés had successively occasioned movements in all your provinces; 
the peoples, tranquil then under the protection of  the regulations, blamed only the 
seasons for the misfortunes, which they have believed since they should blame on the 
rules of  the new administration.82
To be sure, the Parlement’s analysis was tendentious; dearths often 
caused popular disturbances and the people were never tranquil about 
their bread. But the incidence of  disorder was incomparably greater in 
the sixties (and in the seventies) than during any other time in the reign 
of  Louis XV, and the government was implicated in a way that it never 
had been before. What distinguished the famine pact or plot persuasion 
of  the sixties from earlier conspiratorial visions was precisely the politi-
cal element, the formal complicity of  the government. The mobiliza-
tion of  the people and the police into a powerful force of  outraged and 
puzzled opposition graphically illustrated the sense of  betrayal they felt. 
Turgot scoffed at the credulity and paranoia of  the feeble-spirited, but 
he himself  ascribed the Flour War to a sinister and venal plot involving 
the police and the people.83 To vindicate liberalization, he became, in 
Linguet’s harsh words, “the calumniator of  his own subjects.”84
In the sixties the government explained popular upheavals and 
police malaise in terms of  “prejudices,” which it chose to see as a 
form of  ignorance rather than a way of  life. To account for the police 
attitude, there is no need to impute either sordid or high-minded 
motives. They simply could not deal with the situation according to 
the instructions which the government gave them. On the one hand, 
they felt that those instructions were ill-advised and unwarranted 
and, on the other, they could not hold the people responsible, mor-
ally or criminally, for their expressions of  fear and frustration. The 
 82 Remonstrances, 2–4 March 1776, in Flammermont, ed., Remontrances du Parlement de Paris 
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 83 On the plot thesis, see Dupont to Prince Carl Ludwig, 15 Jan. 1783, in Knies, ed., 
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permissive father offered his people a roi-laboureur, but they demanded 
a roi-boulanger. The paternal king had been cruel in his punishment of  
subsistence usurers and magnanimous in his assistance to the needy 
innocent. The permissive monarch seemed to indulge the malefac-
tors and even his charity was suspect. When he distributed the king’s 
grain, he was called roi-marchand de blé and accused of  speculating on 
the people’s hunger.
In 1763–64 the Paris Parlement gave its approbation to liberaliza-
tion, albeit with less enthusiasm than some of  the other sovereign 
courts. For more than four years after the May Declaration, it made 
no public statement or private overture concerning liberalization. It 
withdrew its support for the reforms as a result of  the prolonged sub-
sistence crisis which began in 1765 and which provoked serious dis-
ruptions throughout its jurisdiction. The course of  events persuaded 
the Parlement that the liberal reforms were largely responsible for 
the acuity, the breadth, and the persistence of  the crisis. Charged 
with the execution of  the “grand police” and the maintenance of  
law and order, the court was deeply impressed by the general outcry 
of  the local officials. It regarded the popular revolts not as criminal 
outbreaks, but as legitimate and inevitable consequences of  suffering 
and anxiety and as signs of  a grave flaw in the public administration.
In reference to the grain riots of  the mid-seventies, Condorcet 
wrote contemptuously of  the people who “removed wheat by force, 
paid for it the price they desired, and believed their expedition legiti-
mate because they had the Right to Live.” 85 To be sure, the Parlement 
did not condone collective consumer extortion any more than it did 
extortion by individual grain dealers. But, implicitly, it recognized that 
the people had a right to existence—not Morelly’s sociopolitical right 
to a portion of  the commonwealth, but Montesquieu’s moral right 
to a reasonable chance for survival. The right to existence was not a 
meal ticket, but the right to compete for subsistence in a situation in 
which there was a rough proportion between the means and the ele-
mentary needs of  most of  the people. The vast majority of  consum-
ers were poorly armed for this struggle. The government’s task was 
to assure their competitiveness by protecting them against the avarice 
and spoliations of  the owners and traders. The government itself  was 
to be victualer only in the last resort; indirectly,  however, to prevent 
 85 Condorcet, Lettre d’un laboureur de Picardie à M. N.***, auteur prohibitif  (Paris, 1775), in E. Daire 
and G. de Molinari, eds., Collection des principaux économistes, XIV, 487.
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catastrophes, it had to play an active distributing role by managing 
scarcity and regulating the allocation of  supplies.
The government guaranteed the right to existence in return for the 
submission of  the citizenry. The government had an obligation to honor 
this right, not only for the sake of  justice, but to assure the survival of  
the society as a whole. In the Parlement’s conception, social life was 
not founded on an underlying harmony of  interests, but on a delicate 
balance of  conflicting and contradictory interests, needs, and ambi-
tions which could be kept in uneasy equilibrium only by the mediation 
of  an agency hostage to no single party. Harmony was neither natural 
nor ineluctable; the government had to arrange it. In the Parlement’s 
view, the public interest could not be defined and realized through the 
concourse of  a multitude of  private interests. It was the function of  the 
public interest to channel the private interests in a direction that was 
generally useful. The Parlement believed that the highest public inter-
est was subsistence because it was the precondition for social cohesion. 
The experience of  the sixties seemed to be a graphic illustration of  this 
lesson. In other matters, the court vigorously defended the sovereign 
claims of  private property, especially against the aggrandizement of  the 
state. It refused, however, to accept an unqualified and absolute idea of  
property when that idea clashed with the exigencies of  provisioning. It 
tacitly rejected the notion that property was a natural right anterior to 
all forms of  social organization and superior to the claims of  society 
as a whole. It stood as the defender of  what we have called the police 
tradition. Nor did it stand there alone. The Paris Parlement’s analysis, 
if  not all its specific recommendations, could have served as a platform 
for the whole antiliberal movement of  the sixties and seventies.
Lofting a trial balloon for Herbert’s liberalization scheme in 1755, 
a reviewer in the Journal de Trévoux had written: “It is not incompat-
ible, this liberty, with the monarchical government.” Fifteen years 
later, Galiani told his friend Suard: “In every government, the grain 
legislation gives the tone of  the spirit of  the government … if  you 
tamper too much with the administration of  grain in France, if  you 
succeed, you alter the form and the constitution of  the government.”86 
The Paris magistrates did not perceive liberalization, like their Rouen 
 86 Journal de Trévoux, (Oct. 1755), 2601–02; Galiani to Suard, 8 Sept. 1770, in Asse, ed., Lettres, 
I, 138–39. For an analysis of  Galiani’s view, see below, chapter 12. On the relationship 
between liberty and monarchy, see also Linguet’s Réflexions des six corps de la ville de Paris 
sur la suppression des jurandes (N.p., 1776), 2 and L. Beffroy, Rapport fait au nom de la Section des 
Subsistances chargée de combattre les économistes (Paris, 1792), 3–4.
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colleagues, as a threat to the form or constitution of  the government, 
at least not in the short run. But they did believe that liberalization 
fundamentally changed the relationship between state and society, 
estranging the one from the other and placing them both in jeopardy. 
In the Parlement’s view, state and society were interdependent and 
intertwined. In the liberal conception, the state functioned on the 
margin of  society, abandoning it largely to its own devices. By insti-
tuting liberalization, the Parlement alleged, the state renounced its 
responsibilities to society. Liberalization upset the balance of  society 
and at the same time announced that it was no longer the duty of  
the government to maintain this balance. The Parlement decried the 
advent of  the spectator-state because the magistrates believed that 
it would lead to chaos and social disintegration. By abrogating all 
the rules of  conduct, the government lost view of  its very purpose; 
laissez-faire, the court argued, was ultimately an anti-social policy.
Although it had fiercely combatted the bloated king of  the admin-
istrative monarchy, the Parlement rejected the lean king of  liberal-
ism. For years and years it had relentlessly tried to limit the power of  
the king. Now it exhorted the monarch to exercise his authority with 
vigor. In this sense, the Assembly of  General Police stands as a séance 
de flagellation in which the king and the deputies switched roles.
Chapter X
THE GOVERNMENT, THE PARLEMENTS, 
AND THE BATTLE OVER LIBERTY: II
I
Unlike most of  the great political battles of  the Old Regime, the 
struggle over the liberal reforms did not find the government on 
one side and the parlements on the other. There were parlements 
on both sides of  the question. Nor were the courts that took a stand 
against liberalization along with the Paris Parlement united in their 
views or bound by a sense of  common interest. There is no evidence 
that the opposition companies of  Dijon, Bordeaux, Rennes, Rouen, 
and Paris coordinated their attacks or corresponded, as they did on 
many other issues, to plan strategy and exchange ideas. Each par-
lement was concerned specifically about the fate of  its own ressort. 
The Breton magistrates appear to have calculated their policy with-
out regard to the situation of  the other courts. Liberalism had deep 
roots in the Rennes Parlement and it was vigorously seconded by the 
Estates of  Brittany, which had close ties with the court and which 
remained committed to the reforms at least until 1770.1 The Par-
lement hesitated a long while before moving against liberalization, 
and then tried to take a position which would not foreclose the possi-
bility of  a return to liberty when conditions improved. The Bordeaux 
court oscillated between liberal and police positions, depending far 
less on a global conception of  political economy and administra-
tion than on short-term factors which affected the supply situation 
of  the territory.2 If  the Paris Parlement struck a more universal pose, 
it was because it habitually pretended to speak for the whole nation, 
 1 On Brittany, see Letaconnoux, Commerce des grains en Bretagne, 41, 87–88, 91, 194–95, 197 
and Bachaumont, Mémoires secrets, XIX, 74 (19 May 1769).
 2 See, for example, a magistrate’s letter to the Bordeaux IN., 23 Sept. 1766, C. 1425, A.D. Gir.; 
Terray to First President, 26 July 1773, C. 1441, ibid.; M.-F. Pidansat de Mairobert, Journal historique 
de la révolution opérée dans la constitution de la monarchie françoise (London, 1776), IV, 401 (14 Dec. 1773).
452 BREAD, POLITICS AND POLITICAL ECONOMY
to the chagrin of  its sister-parlements, and because the provisioning 
of  Paris depended upon circumstances throughout the kingdom.
The case of  Rouen best illustrates the contradictions and the brittle 
solidarities which characterized inter-parlementary relations and grain 
policies. In the course of  the public debate, the courts at Rouen and 
Paris became allies in the struggle against liberalization. Indeed, the 
Rouen Parlement launched the early assault with its usual vivacity and 
in a sense prepared the ground for Parisian intervention. Yet there were 
important differences in outlook between the parlements which should 
not be obscured by their common hostility to the liberal reforms. While 
they assailed liberalization, the Rouennais also attacked the policy by 
which the ministry systematically favored Parisian provisioning as if  no 
one else had to fear or suffer the consequences of  scarcity and steep 
prices. This was an old but smoldering issue, fanned by the subsistence 
crisis and left to burn itself  out by the liberal ministry.
We have already shown what deep resentment the primacy which 
the central government gave to Paris provisioning aroused in the rest 
of  France. In 1773, well after the liberal reforms were abrogated, upon 
a continuing background of  serious revolts especially in the south and 
southwest, the minister of  war solemnly warned the royal council 
against “a fatal principle of  government which seems unfortunately to 
gain credit more and more and which appears capable of  igniting the 
four corners of  the kingdom, to wit, that we worry very little about the 
provinces provided the capital is provisioned.”3 This “fatal principle of  
government” had thrived during the liberal period despite the fact that 
it ran counter in every respect to the spirit of  the reform. To be sure, the 
government would have liked to subjugate the capital to the common 
law of  the market. But the Laverdy ministry rested its whole strategy for 
phase one of  liberalization upon its ability to insulate and contain Paris 
while the rest of  the kingdom adjusted to the liberal regime. Through-
out the liberal period and especially after 1767, the government made 
a point of  treating Paris more or less in the traditional way. Although 
the liberal parlements denounced Parisian egotism in vitriolic terms, 
the most resounding expression of  rancor and indignation came from 
Rouen, a sovereign court in the opposite camp.
For centuries Paris and Rouen had been rivals in the competition 
for subsistence and the contest for staking out hinterland. Although 
the Rouennais could not arrest Parisian aggrandizement, its access to 
 3 Hardy’s Journal, 19 May 1773, BN, mss. fr. 6681, fol. 192.
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the sea and to coastwise and foreign trade gave the Norman city 
options and advantages which the capital could not easily usurp. One 
can find instances in which the Rouen municipality importunately 
solicited grain supplies from Paris, but far more frequently the capital 
had to rely on Rouen’s willingness to serve as entrepôt for the massive 
supplies imported in time of  dearth.4
Rouen profited materially from this role until the moment when 
her own supplies became short, at which time the city became ner-
vous and resentful of  its semi-colonial status. The central govern-
ment, viewing the provisioning of  the capital as a national responsi-
bility of  the utmost urgency, sternly reproved Rouen’s repeated desire 
to give first priority to its own needs. In 1725, for example, the Con-
troller-General did not hesitate to argue that Paris was simply more 
important than Rouen, while the Procurator General of  the Paris 
Parlement badgered the intendant of  Normandy to accelerate trans-
shipments and rebuked him for countenancing diversions.5 In 1752 
Rouen suffered a subsistence revolt during which crowds of  insur-
gents pillaged boats loaded with grain marked “for the provisioning 
of  Paris.”6 Four decades later, Parisian revolutionaries denounced the 
“bad will” of  the Rouennais whom they accused of  hoarding grain 
expressly to deny the capital.7
Toward the end of  March 1768, as we have noted, subsistence 
troubles convulsed a large area of  Normandy. Although the exact 
path of  contagion is not clear, the riots seem to have spread from 
place to place, infecting a different town every day, in the kind of  pat-
tern which the Flour War later made famous. Elbeuf, Darnétal, La 
Bouille,  Marmomme, Gournay, Bourgthéroulde, and Louviers were 
among the major points of  disorder. In their genesis and their modes 
of  action, these riots were no different from the scores of  others that 
buffeted the kingdom during this time. The populace rose in order 
 4 Usher, Grain Trade, 50, 53–55; E. Boutaric, Actes du Parlement de Paris (Paris, 1863), I, lxiin 
(25 May 1522). Cf. the Controller-General’s warning to the Rouen intendant against 
encroaching upon the Parisian supply area during a time when Normandy was experiencing 
serious shortages. Moras to de Brou, 31 Jan. 1757, C. 104, A.D. S-M.
 5 CG to Duc de Luxembourg, 4 Aug. 1725, AN, G7 34; De Gasville, IN. of  Rouen, to PG, 
21 Aug. 1725, BN, Coll. Joly 1117, fols. 82–83.
 6 E.J. F. Barbier, Journal d’un bourgeois de Paris sous le règne de Louis XV, ed. P. Bernard (Paris, 
1963), 251 (May 1752).
 7 R. Cobb, “Les Disettes de l’an II et de l’an III dans le district de Mantes et la vallée de la 
Basse-Seine,” Mémoires de la Fédération des Sociétés Historiques et Archéologiques de Paris et de l’Ile-
de-France, III (1951), 240. Cf. M. Levainvillain, “Rouen et la région rouennaise,” C. Bloch, 
et al., Les Divisions régionales de la France (Paris, 1913), 236–38.
454 BREAD, POLITICS AND POLITICAL ECONOMY
to protest against exorbitant prices, and penury and inconsistency of  
supply, and in order to stem the outflow of  grain from the commu-
nity. For weeks, there had been premonitions of  trouble at Rouen, the 
provincial capital. At every level of  society, men were “murmuring” 
against “exportation,” by which they meant the removal of  grain for 
shipment elsewhere, whether in France or abroad.8
Miromesnil, the First President of  the Rouen Parlement, lamented 
the burgeoning misery and the persistent upward spiral of  bread 
prices. That city dark bread (pain bis) had risen to 3 sous the pound was 
surely an ominous sign. In a tone of  stoic resignation rather than out-
rage, Miromesnil wrote his friend Laverdy, the Controller-General: 
“I see that there arrives every day [quantities of] grain at Rouen of  
which in truth the greatest part is destined for Paris.”9 Although he 
personally considered the grumblings from below to be innocuous, 
the chief  magistrate observed that an intense social fear and expecta-
tion of  violence gripped the upper elements of  Rouen society:
The people are tranquil enough but the big merchants [négocians], the persons of  dis-
tinction, and especially quite a large number of  Messieurs of  the Parlement tremble; 
they still remember the riot of  1752, and you know that one is not easily cured of  fear.
He dismissed reports of  imminent insurrection and popular move-
ments as false alarms and idle rumor.10 Certainly he was surprised 
several days later when a fierce riot broke out at Rouen lasting for 
almost a week. Large crowds pillaged grain storehouses and bakeries 
and engaged the forces of  order in several bloody encounters.11
If  there is little evidence to suggest that the mutineers specifically 
felt themselves to be victims of  Parisian colonialism, there is no doubt 
that the Rouen magistrates blamed their troubles in large measure on 
the policies of  the liberal ministry. We have already traced the path 
which led from the Parlement’s illegal regulatory arrêt immediately fol-
lowing the riots through a spring and summer of  increasingly vehe-
ment opposition. In October the Rouennais vented their rage in two 
extraordinary letters to the king which revealed just how poisoned the 
 8 Miromesnil to Laverdy, 2 Feb. 1768, in LeVerdier, ed., Correspondance Miromesnil, V, 79. 
Cf. Trudaine’s characterization of  popular attitudes toward “exportation.” Trudaine to 
Miromesnil, 13 May 1768, ibid., V, 200.
 9 Miromesnil to Laverdy, 23 Feb., 1768, ibid., V, 96.
 10 Miromesnil to Laverdy, 18 March 1768, ibid., V, 122.
 11 Rouen Parl., Conseil Secret (1767), 23 March to 1 May, 1768, A.D. S-M.; Hardy’s Journal, 
28 March 1768, BN, mss. fr. 6680, fol. 152; Lettres Ossolinski, 28 March 1768, BHVP, mss. 
627, fol. 127.
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atmosphere had become. In addition to ascribing the social and eco-
nomic crisis that afflicted Normandy directly to liberalization, the let-
ters gave voice to the kind of  charges which Leprévost de Beaumont 
would soon immortalize as the pacte de famine. Indeed, according to Lep-
révost, the news of  the Rouen accusations quickened his determination 
to expose the plot and helped convince him that he could safely share 
his suspicions with the civic-minded Norman magistrates.12
If  Rouen, like Paris, had been the beneficiary of  large injections 
of  the king’s grain, perhaps the Rouen magistrates, like their Pari-
sian colleagues, would have been less avid to find clues of  criminal 
maneuvers in royal conduct. In any event, by these sensational impu-
tations, the Rouen court underscored how urgently a change in pol-
icy was needed. The crucial matter for these magistrates was that 
liberalization, with or without illicit activities secretly undertaken by 
royal agents, was a calamity, responsible for the dearth and the social 
troubles. On this fundamental point they shared the view of  their 
counterparts in the capital. But there is no doubt that the discrimina-
tion practiced by the royal government in favor of  Paris envenomed 
the attitude of  the Rouennais. Liberalization had failed to free the 
provinces from the Parisian grip and, in addition, it made them even 
more vulnerable than before by abolishing the police powers which 
they once used to defend themselves. The odor of  a plot merely con-
firmed other evidence that the king was not meeting his responsibili-
ties toward his subjects.
Rouen, more than other places and certainly more than Paris, 
seemed to be victim of  royal negligence. To be sure, the Norman Par-
lement acknowledged that Rouen was a commercial city which derived 
its reputation and much of  its wealth from serving as a place “of  passage 
and of  entrepôt.” But were there no limits, the Parlement wondered, on 
the duties which this trading vocation imposed? For over a year, since 
the beginning of  1767, the inhabitants of  the city have suffered hun-
ger, deprivation, and uncertainty. Everyday they witnessed the arrival of  
 12 It is interesting to note that Léprevost considered the ultraliberal Dauphiné Parlement 
to be the only court besides Rouen which merited his confidence. Like the Rouennais, 
the Dauphinais had given a prominent place in their declarations to the denunciation of  
officially fostered monopoly. For Leprévost this was obviously the crucial issue. Apparently 
it did not matter for him that the Norman Parlement blamed these illicit operations on 
the general abandonment of  the police regime while the Dauphiné magistrates blamed 
them on its persistence in many quarters. Though it is misinformed, Leprévost’s perception 
suggests another dimension of  ambiguity in the alignment of  the parlements on the grain 
issue. Dénonciation, pétition et rogation du sieur Leprévôt de Beaumont, 2–3.
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grain which remained only long enough for conditioning and transfer to 
boats bound for Paris. It was proper, the magistrates allowed, to ask the 
city to serve as a granary for Paris, “but, Sire,” they addressed the king,
to strip her bare of  what is physically necessary, to reduce her to dearth in order to 
procure abundance elsewhere, to make her the Magazine of  the most essential of  
goods without regard for her needs, to refuse her the Natural Right to share in her 
warehouse deposits [similar to the natural right which consumers claimed to grain 
“born” in their “place”] is to act against the intentions of  Your Majesty.
It is “so difficult” for those of  us in the provinces to get your ear, the 
magistrates protested. Why do you ignore our pleas? “All the subjects 
of  your empire are equally dear to you,” they felt obliged to remind 
the monarch.13
This pathetic complaint made no impression upon the government, 
which had become inured to such effusions in times of  stress. Within 
a week of  the March 1768 riot, Laverdy had reiterated that his priori-
ties were immutable: “Above all it is necessary to assure us the passage 
of  the Seine: otherwise Paris will lack.”14 Several times in the course 
of  the next few months the government either authorized the city to 
draw on Paris-bound stores or dispatched boats downstream from the 
capital to Rouen. Miromesnil expressed gratitude, but made it clear 
that “we understand perfectly the importance of  supporting the pro-
visioning of  Paris.” A nearly perfect king’s man with a great talent for 
obedience and self-abnegation, the First President could not contain 
his irritation when the Controller-General suggested in mid-May that 
Rouen was abusing Parisian largesse. “… Never was any shipment for 
Paris ever held back, even during the riot,” he wrote indignantly; “par-
don this little apology but you must see that I am far removed from 
discouraging the commerce, crossing your operations, or hindering 
the subsistence of  Paris.”15
Despite his protestations of  fidelity, Miromesnil endured another 
 13 Lettres et suppliques to the king, 15 and 29 Oct. 1768, Conseil Secret (1767–1768), A.D. S-M.; 
Mercure Suisse (Oct. 1768), 241–245.
 14 Berulle to Choiseul and Laverdy, 13 June 1768, B. 2316, fol. 123 and Dauphiné Parl. to 
Louis XV, 12 July 1768, Recueil Giroud, XXV, 47, A.D. Isère; Laverdy to Miromesnil, 29 
March 1768, in LeVerdier, ed., Correspondance Miromesnil, V, 138. Even as the Parlement 
insisted on the prosperity wrought by liberalization, in another letter to the king it asked for 
an easing of  the fiscal burden on the province as a result of  a succession of  mediocre-to-bad 
harvests. 13 May 1767, B. 2313, fol. 296, A.D. Isère.
 15 Miromesnil to T. de Montigny, 10 May 1768, in LeVerdier, ed., Correspondance Miromesnil, V, 
191. Miromesnil to Laverdy, 16 May 1768, ibid., V, 207–208.
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scolding in August, this time from Trudaine de Montigny, chief  of  
the provisioning department, who lectured in terms ill-becoming 
an outspoken liberal, on the necessity of  “preventing the particular 
interest” of  Rouen from “being preferred” to the interest of  the capi-
tal. Any impediment placed in the way of  the flow of  grain to Paris, 
Trudaine explained, would be “a true disaster for the chose publique,” 
the commonweal:
We find ourselves, my dear colleague, in a cruel fix for the provisioning of  Paris. We 
are told that the Chamber of  Commerce of  Rouen wishes to purchase by act of  
authority [a sort of  eminent domain] two cargoes of  Danzig wheat destined for the 
supply of  the capital… which we cannot deny ourselves without the greatest harm.
What is interesting about Trudaine’s letter is that he tried to make 
his case not on the basis of  the traditional primacy of  Paris in the Dela-
marist scheme of  things, but on the grounds of  liberty of  trade. On 
the one hand, he half-implored, half-commanded Miromesnil “in the 
name of  God” not to “suffer that the precautions taken for the capital 
be disrupted.” On the other, he contended that the grain in question 
was the private property of  merchants who would surely discontinue the 
service if  they could not dispose of  their goods as they pleased. Neither 
argument, the one from necessity and solicitude or the one from liberty, 
had any merits in the eyes of  the Rouen Parlement, or indeed any other 
police authority constrained to martyr itself  for the sake of  the capital. 
For Trudaine and the government, however, it was crucial to sustain the 
idea that it was not so much for Paris as for the successful prosecution of  
the liberal reforms that the capital’s old privileges were maintained. If  
the provinces persisted in their age-old complaints against the tyranny 
of  Paris, the government wanted them to know that their sacrifices were 
worthier than ever before, for they were made not on the discredited 
altar of  prejudice and police, but in honor of  freedom and nature.16
II
On the other side, in the liberal camp, stood the Estates and the 
Parlement of  Languedoc and the Parlements of  Provence and 
Dauphiné, hailed by the économistes as “illustrious defenders of  the 
Fatherland” for their “striking and reasoned positions.” In the midst 
 16 T. de Montigny to Miromesnil, 9 Aug. 1768, ibid., V, 230–31.
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of  the Paris onslaught against liberalization, when the government felt 
beleaguered and the économistes felt demoralized, these corps publicly 
and effusively expressed their gratitude to the monarch for his commit-
ment to the reforms and exhorted him “to cede to none of  the [antilib-
eral] demands.”17 Though little prodding was needed, the ministry itself  
solicited at least some of  these declarations of  fidelity.18 There is some evi-
dence to suggest that the liberal parlements, on their own account, coor-
dinated action or at least exchanged ideas and information.19
Precisely why these parlements chose and were able to support lib-
eralization so vigorously and consistently is a question that merits 
careful local study.20 Although it is well-known that the magistrates of  
these courts invested heavily in agriculture and were actively involved 
in the grain trade, there is no reason to believe that a differential 
analysis of  personal fortune would be any more helpful in explain-
ing their attitudes than those of  the officers of  the other sovereign 
courts whose socioeconomic interests appear to be quite similar. A 
more fruitful line of  inquiry would lead to an examination of  regional 
economic, geophysical, and climatological differences.21 Each of  the 
 17 Ephémérides du citoyen (1769), I, 69, 197, 198; Journal économique (April 1771), 179. Cf. 
Bachaumont, Mémoires secrets, XIX, 73–74 (19 May 1769). 
 18 See, for example, de Latour to CG, 8 July 1768 and T. de Montigny, 16 July 1768, C. 
2420, A.D. B-du-R. Cf. P.-Albert Robert, Les Remontrances et arrêts du Parlement de Provence au 
dix-huitième siècle (Paris, 1912), 588n.
 19 See, for example, the démarches of  Louis de Sausin, counselor in the Dauphiné Parlement, 
described by the historian of  that court as “one of  the most refined and cultivated minds 
in the Company.” In August 1768, he congratulated the First President of  the Aix court on 
the eloquence of  his letter to the Controller-General. Citing an “urgent need” for a further 
statement by the liberal forces, he sent his Provence counterpart a copy of  the Dauphiné 
July letter to Louis XV. He continued to exchange information and invite comment on the 
grain issue until December, when he made a trip to Avignon apparently to consult with 
representatives of  the Provence Parlement. There is some indication drawn from earlier 
experiences that Sausin regularly consulted sister-courts on major affairs of  the day. Sausin 
to First President of  Aix (?), 6 Aug. and 23 Dec. 1768, C. 2420, A.D. B-du-R.; Egret, 
Parlement de Dauphiné, I, 32, 135, 203, 207 and II, 29–30.
 20 One of  the outspoken antiliberals at the Assembly of  General Police, the parlementaire 
Hocquart, intimated that soaring prices would soon make the liberal parlements less 
enthusiastic for the new regime. Recueil, 191.
 21 See Galiani’s geopolitical explanation of  parlementary divisions. Dialogues, ed. by 
Nicolini, 249. It is interesting to note that in 1740 D’Argenson reported that while the 
rest of  France suffered misery, there was abundance in Languedoc, Provence, and 
Dauphiné. Mémoires, ed. by Rathery, III, 221 (10 Nov. 1740). In 1768, the Dauphiné 
Parlement readily admitted to having suffered “three consecutive years” of  harvests 
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liberal provinces, bordering the sea or the frontier, seems genuinely 
to have benefitted from liberalization. Future investigation must dis-
cover precisely how widely and how unevenly the gains were shared—
socially, politically, and geographically. The persistent friction between 
the municipality and the Parlement of  Toulouse suggests one collec-
tive line of  cleavage.22 Whatever pattern of  distribution emerges, it is 
significant that the three regions were generally spared the turmoil 
endemic in the northern half  of  the kingdom since 1765–66.23
The public pronouncements of  the liberal parlements were a 
compound of  physiocratic doctrine and regional economic pride. 
In the summer of  1768, the First President of  the Dauphiné Par-
lement, speaking for the entire court, told the king that the reforms 
had brought agricultural and commercial prosperity and abun-
dance and asked him to lift the remaining restrictions on the grain 
trade, especially those concerning exports, so that the full effects of  
an “unlimited” liberty could be enjoyed. The Dauphiné magistrates 
were not oblivious to all the talk of  monopoly in the air. Like their 
colleagues in Paris and Rouen, they considered monopoly to be the 
great “enemy” and the chief  cause of  past dearths. But unlike its sis-
ter courts, the Dauphiné Parlement viewed monopoly as a product of  
the police regime, which only “a general, total and protected liberty 
could uproot forever.” The irreversible export suspension mechanism 
in the July Edict, the court told the king, encouraged manipulative 
practices—“interior monopoly”—which paralyzed the trade. If  the 
government could not remove all the “barriers” to freedom at once, 
then at least it should modify the law to permit exports to begin again 
automatically from an embargoed station once the price dropped for 
three consecutive markets below the cut-off  ceiling. The Ephémérides 
published the Dauphiné letter with an enthusiastic endorsement.24
 “worse than they have been for a long time.” But it insisted that the prices nevertheless 
remained below the prices characteristic of  “the time of  prohibitions.” Arrêté, 12 July 1768, 
C. 2420, A.D. B-du-R.
 22 L. Viala, La Question des grains et leur commerce à Toulouse au 18e siècle, 72–75. Cf. M. Bordes, 
L’Administration provinciate et municpale en France au dix-huitième siècle, (Paris, 1972).
 23 That is not to say that there were not “local crises” in these regions. See, for example, 
J. Godechot and S. Moncassin, “Démographie et subsistance en Languedoc du XVIIIe 
siècle au début du XIXe siècle,” Bulletin de l’histoire économique et sociale de la révolution française 
(1964), 35–36. In Languedoc, too, there were anti-cherté and anti-export riots in 1765 at 
Montpellier, Pezenas, Agde and Béziers and in 1766 at Narbonne. C. 2908, A.D. Hér. and 
(?) to IN., 10 May 1767, C. 117, A.D. H-G.
 24 Berulle, First President, to CG, 13 June 1768 and Dauphiné Parl. arrêté and letter 
to king, 12 July 1768, C. 2420, A.D. B-du-R.; Journal économique (Aug. 1768), 352; 
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Shortly after the Assembly of  General Police and in stark contrast 
to its recommendations, the same Parlement reiterated its plea for an 
extension of  liberalization in an avis ghost-written by a Rouen mag-
istrate-économiste named Bigot de Sainte-Croix, who also wrote essays 
against the dangers of  Colbertism and the abuses of  the guilds.25 
Dupont called it “one of  the best conceived, best thought out, best writ-
ten treatises ever made,” and the Ephémérides found “three centuries of  
distance between this memoir of  the Parlement of  Grenoble and those 
published by the adversaries of  liberty.”26 The magistrates of  Grenoble 
proudly characterized their stand as “modern” and inveighed against 
the “erroneous” precedents invoked to justify a stultifying and anach-
ronistic policy of  prohibitions. Champions of  law and tradition in so 
many bitter struggles waged against the government, these parlemen-
taires discovered that the “order of  nature” was an infinitely better 
guide than the “order of  purely factitious legislation.”
Liberty was not merely a matter of  convenience. Both social and 
political organization derived from the laws of  nature. “There is a law, 
Sire,” the Parlement declared, “anterior to civil laws, a law founded 
immediately by Nature, whose maintenance must be the single end 
of  all social institutions, a law by which and for which you reign, it is 
the sacred law of  property.” Since property was an empty right unless 
owners had the freedom to dispose of  it as they pleased, it was the 
duty of  the government, through the person of  the king, to guarantee 
the “liberty” as well as the “security” of  property.
So confident were the magistrates in these fundamental, unim-
peachable axioms, from which everything necessarily had to follow, 
that they were willing to concede, unlike many of  their fellow liberals, 
that the kingdom was actually plunged into crisis, an inevitable “crisis 
of  passage” from a prohibitive to a permissive regime. But they were 
determined not to allow the crisis, which was accidental and ephemeral 
 Bachaumont, Mémoires secrets, XIX, 9 (3 Aug. 1768); Mercure historique (Sept. 1768), vol. 165, 
pp. 281–295; Éphémérides du citoyen (1768), VII and (1769), VI.
 25 The avis took the form of  a letter addressed to Louis XV dated 26 April 1769. Citations 
below are from the manuscript copy in the parlementary registers, B. 2314, A.D. Isère. 
It was published in the Ephémérides du citoyen (1769), VII, 109–256. The Dauphiné court also 
addressed an arrêté to Louis XV on 20 Dec. 1768 importuning him to make no changes in 
the liberal laws before consulting with “the people of  the kingdom” through the Parlement. 
Sausin to (?), 23 Dec. 1768. A.D. B-du-R.
 26 Dupont, “Discours prononcé à la clôture de la huitième année des assemblées économiques 
chez M. le Marquis de Mirabeau,” 13 May 1774, in Knies, ed., Dupont Correspondance, 
II, 199. See also Ephémérides du citoyen (1769), V, 236–39 and J. Egret, Le Parlement de Dauphiné, 
I, 161–85.
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in nature and scattered in incidence, to be used to impugn the eter-
nal truths which formed “the essential and constitutive principle of  
society.”27 First of  all, “the evils” of  the crisis were far more likely “the 
product of  the old Regulations still subsisting,” rather than of  the lib-
eral legislation. Moreover, the magistrates did not regard the ascription 
of  responsibility as the crucial matter. It was the function of  the king 
to “judge” positive laws “by their conformity to the natural order and 
to the essential laws of  justice,” rather than “by confronting … positive 
laws with the facts [of  daily life].” A wise monarch, therefore, would 
not hesitate in choosing his course, for a wise monarch understood that 
he had no choice. He would not be deterred by the crisis. Committed 
to govern according to nature’s laws, he would support the liberal laws 
because they approximated the laws of  nature; indeed, he would even 
try to make these positive laws conform more rigorously to nature’s 
model by liberalizing them further.
Viewed in this light, the liberal laws were unassailable. “Should the 
social order be contrary to the order of  nature?” asked the parlemen-
taires of  Grenoble. Since their answer was a resounding no, there 
was no need for them to entertain the claims of  “different policed 
societies,” which sought to “restrict” natural rights “on the pretext of  
removing a dangerous liberty from individuals.” Nothing was more 
dangerous than trifling with natural law. The only “limits” on the 
rights of  property were formed by the property rights of  others. But 
consumer “need,” the Parlement pointed out in a phrase which cap-
tures the essence of  liberalism, “is not a title of  property.” The empty 
stomachs of  the people did not entitle public authorities, as Linguet 
later contended, to infringe upon the property rights of  grain own-
ers. For grain was the same as any other property, undistinguished 
by the fact that it was universally needed. “It is only in the case of  
the Cultivator [read grain owner as well as tiller of  the soil],” com-
plained the magistrates, “that the empire of  Justice ceases, giving way 
to oppression and to violence.” The paradoxical idea that “the citizen 
who is most useful to society” should become “the victim of  the social 
order” horrified them. They viewed the violation of  natural law by the 
police, who turned flawed positive laws against property, with as much 
alarm as they had regarded the king’s violation of  constitutional law. 
Despite the apparent tranquility which such action might procure, for 
 27 Elsewhere in the avis the Parlement averred: “Local and transient disadvantages disappear 
before the sublime eye of  the Legislator which embraces the universality of  places and 
times.…” B. 2314, fol. 91, A.D. Isère.
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the Parlement of  Dauphiné this policed “social order” was chaos: 
“confusion and disorder.” Whereas the Parlement of  Paris assailed 
liberty for introducing war between owners and consumers, the court 
at Grenoble contended that they fell into “a state of  war” only when 
liberty was suppressed. A “happy harmony” would prevail in soci-
ety when “each individual enjoyed the greatest possible liberty in the 
exercise of  his property rights” and when socioeconomic relations 
were mediated exclusively through the “purely natural” workings of  
competition, a “stronger and surer” protector of  the public interest 
“than all the prohibitive regulations.”
The order of  nature, in the view of  the Parlement, delimited the 
power of  the ruler, even as it defined the rights of  the citizens. The 
enormous merit of  these natural limits, unlike those drawn from the 
controversial archive of  fundamental law, was that the king graciously 
accepted them. Unlike positive law, which could be made to rationalize 
any act of  sovereign power, a commitment to natural law precluded 
“arbitrary” actions of  any sort. Without renouncing the classical par-
lementary arguments against royal despotism, on the liberty issue the 
Dauphiné court came close to accepting the new contractual relation-
ship proposed by Louis XV.
While the Paris Parlement censured the monarch for failing to 
fulfill his fundamental duties, the Grenoble Parlement retorted that 
those pretended duties were in fact abuses of  power, or “arbitrary 
institutions.” The traditional brand of  royal paternalism and inter-
ventionism was no less contrary to the natural order than the “bar-
barous” style of  the old police. It was not within the province of  the 
king to be victualer or price regulator to the nation. The Grenoble 
magistrates considered such a conception of  kingship as “impos-
sible,” “unjust,” and “ruinous.” The monarch’s authority and his 
responsibilities stopped with the protection of  the sacred rights of  
liberty and property. The efforts of  their adversaries to “arouse the 
paternal heart of  Your Majesty … by the touching depiction of  the 
misfortunes that the cherté causes” deeply alarmed the Dauphinais. 
Louis XV must resist “a false commiseration,” inspired by “preju-
dice” rather than a genuine “sentiment of  humanity,” even as he 
rejected the “false combinations” of  the police sophists. Though 
the king did not foresee “the dangerous consequences,” already his 
“tenderness” for his subjects has led him astray. In the guise of  a 
“welfare” project, the distribution of  royal grain has resulted in the 
restriction of  trading freedom, the violation of  the property rights 
of  many owners and traders, the disruption and in some places the 
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paralysis of  commerce, the pillage of  whole provinces, and the prop-
agation of  rumors and suspicions of  maneuvers, which tarnished 
the reputation of  the government and the reforms. The King’s grain 
itself  was the source of  the biggest monopoly afield in the late sixties, 
“a double monopoly [directed] against the people and against the 
Sovereign himself.” Though they did not cite it by name, when the 
magistrates mentioned the “legal monopoly” in the Paris area they 
meant the Malisset company and they charged that it had turned 
(inevitably) against the public interest because it ran against the nat-
ural order. By driving off  competition, interrupting circulation, and 
hoarding, the company became itself  “the principal cause” of  the 
dearth rather than its remedy. Even as it aggravated the dearth, royal 
intervention continued to teach “the people to hold the government 
responsible for the dearth”—a doubly disastrous policy. Thus the 
“crisis of  passage” from police to liberty had urgent lessons in king-
ship for Louis XV to assimilate. For royal intervention was not only 
morally and politically wrong—the distribution of  king’s grain was 
no less arbitrary and deplorable than the issuance of  lettres de cachet—
but it was also pointless and deleterious. If  liberty were to survive 
the crisis, the interlude of  “tenderness” had to give way to a time of  
realpolitik.
Above all, suggested the Grenoble magistrates, the antiliberal 
movement must be placed in proper perspective. First of  all, it was 
centered in the Paris region and in Normandy, areas which had never 
really implemented the liberal legislation or given the liberal idea a 
chance.28 It was no wonder that the capital took the lead in the cam-
paign against liberty, for its inhabitants, who lived in a sordid and use-
less world of  luxury, rentes, tontines, offices, lotteries, stocks, and paper 
wealth, were “accustomed from infancy to the yoke of  regulations and 
nursed, as it were, at the breast of  prohibitions”; as a result of  their 
bad “education,” they can see the liberty of  the grain trade only as 
a “frightening novelty.” But there was no need for France to tremble 
merely because Paris raised its voice. Like the federalists of  the Revo-
lution and the “regionalists” of  the 1970’s, the Dauphiné magistrates 
rejected the pretension of  the capital to impose its will upon the nation. 
To the demands of  the Assembly of  Police, they opposed “the wishes 
of  all the Provinces of  Your Kingdom, of  all the owners of  land, of  
all the cultivators and the inhabitants of  the countryside, 10,000,000 
 28 Note the way in which the avis attempts to explain away the Normand case and thus isolate 
Paris as if  it were not only the symbol but also the only genuine and ineluctable source of  
antiliberalism. See, for example, ibid., fol. 118.
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men.…” These men pointed to the true moral and economic char-
acter of  the nation, which was primordially agricultural. Agricultural 
France was the exclusive source of  the nation’s real wealth and its real 
virtue as well. To the mercantilism which denatured state and society 
by trying to make France “an industrial and commercial nation,” the 
Grenoble Parlement opposed a rural fundamentalism, an alloy of  the 
old-style Christian agrarianism and the new mood of  agrarian capi-
talism, which perceived the “true manufacture” of  the nation in “the 
cultivation of  its lands.”
The prohibitive regime, based on a low price policy, had led to “the 
total decay of  agriculture.” Liberalization “restored hopes,” gave “a new 
life” to the rural economy, and signified the beginning of  “the regenera-
tion of  the body politic.” It marked “the most memorable epoch of  your 
reign,” the magistrates told the king. No one should underestimate its 
importance in terms of  its long-run implications, as well as the immedi-
ate rush of  prosperity which it generated. For, the Parlement reminded 
the reformer-monarch, “everything is intimately linked to this vast opera-
tion whose consequences embrace the [entire] social order and without 
which there is no reform possible, either in the physical or the moral sphere.” 
This of  course was precisely the wager which Louis XV had made in the 
dismal years at the beginning of  the decade; no one knew better than he 
how much was riding upon the success of  liberalization. As a solid sign 
of  his good faith, at the very moment when the liberal regime seemed 
most imperilled, the Dauphiné magistrates asked the king, for his own 
hopes as well as for the sake of  the ten million faithful, to demolish all the 
relics of  the Old Regime and “to build upon the ruins of  the prohibitive 
laws a simple and general law which establishes in Your Kingdom the 
absolute and unconditional liberty of  the grain trade.”29
The Assembly of  Police made the Estates of  Languedoc extremely 
anxious about the future of  liberalization. Proud to have been “the 
first to solicit” the reforms, they had waited patiently for the govern-
ment to give liberty its fullest expression by removing all limits in the 
grain trade. Exactly a year ago, the Estates, through their permanent 
agents at Versailles, mounted a concerted effort to induce the govern-
ment to quash the restrictions on exportation. Now the syndic general 
reported, not only that he had failed to win an extension of  liberty, 
 29 Clever, vigorous, and brilliantly written, the Dauphiné avis was generously plundered by 
the économiste Roubaud for his refutation of  the arguments of  the Assembly of  Police, 
Représentations aux magistrats (Paris, 1769).
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but that “on the contrary what is taking place in Paris at this moment in 
regard to this matter gives us reason to fear that circumstances peculiar 
[to Paris] which should have absolutely no bearing on this province are 
leading up to [the announcement of] some new general police regula-
tion which will be extremely harmful [to us].” Though they had never 
been happy with an “incomplete” liberty, the sudden prospect of  losing 
everything terrified the deputies. The aim of  the “supplications,” which 
the Estates addressed to Louis XV in December, was not to win more 
liberty, but to preserve at all costs what had already been obtained.
The Estates urged the government not to succumb to the pressure to 
judge liberalization from the Parisian vantage point. The situation was 
far less critical, they claimed, in the rest of  the kingdom where prices 
were “honest.” Moreover, the Parisians were the authors of  their own 
distress. By insisting on the maintenance of  the police regime with the 
“thousand obstacles” it placed in the way of  commerce, they assured 
themselves of  dearth and high prices. What enraged the Estates was 
that the Parisians now “dare accuse the liberty which they did not 
practice and impute to it the effects which it could have prevented.” 
This argument, though it completely misapprehended the Paris situa-
tion, had great allure for the liberals because it enabled them to believe 
that liberty had not been given a fair chance. By conserving “the old 
regulations,” the Estates intimated, Paris not only wounded itself, but it 
also prevented the implementation of  liberty in a vast area in the inte-
rior of  the kingdom. Paris served as an alibi for the liberals (especially 
for Turgot a few years later), just as liberty served as a scapegoat for 
Paris. In this whole affair, the Parisians were the real provincials, for the 
“desire of  the nation,” the Estates informed the government, was for 
an extension, not an abridgement, of  liberalization.
The traditional solutions proposed by the Parisians, besides 
threatening the interests of  the kingdom as a whole, were them-
selves contradictory and doomed to failure, the Estates pointed 
out. The Parisians said they wanted to make the markets abun-
dant, yet they made the markets as attractive to frequent as the 
state prisons. They desired to promote the grain trade, yet they 
subjected the merchants to harassment and dishonor. They wanted 
to prohibit exports, yet at the same time they refused to tolerate 
domestic stockpiling. They railed against monopoly, yet they cre-
ated conditions which made commercial competition impossible 
and thus rendered monopoly inevitable. The very notion of  police 
was “odious” to the deputies of  the Estates. It bespoke privilege, 
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corruption, favoritism, tyranny, and the transgression of  the most 
sacred rights, especially “the inviolable right of  property.” The king, 
concluded the Estates, had a clear choice to make: between freedom 
and oppression, nature and artifice, prosperity and stagnation, real 
wealth and the superficial glitter of  luxury, the economy of  non-inter-
vention and the ruinous waste of  paternalism, a self-sufficient people 
and a helpless, dependent people, France and Paris. Nor should the 
government forget how much its own needs were bound up in the 
grain question. If  Languedoc were “deprived” of  the “natural right” 
of  liberty, the Estates bluntly threatened, “it would not be able to pay 
the [fiscal] impositions which become more onerous each day.”30
In a separate address to the king, the Parlement of  Languedoc 
emphasized the practical advantages of  liberalization.31 Before the 
reforms, the magistrates wrote, our people were burdened with a 
chronic surplus, which they could not dispose of  profitably. As prices 
lagged, agriculture stagnated and the countryside lost population. 
Liberalization had a remarkably tonic effect. “Serenity” replaced 
“misery,” agriculture flourished, and—a result to which the king 
could hardly be indifferent and one which parlements were usually 
loathe to admit—it became easier to collect taxes.32 To give us the 
reform measures, the king had to brave an infinity of  “prejudices, 
ancient maxims, interested sophisms.” Be as courageous now as you 
were then, implored the Languedoc Parlement, stand your ground 
firmly, for “the suppression [or] the least suspension of  the liberty of  
the grain trade would be [for our people] the most deadly blow, the 
most terrible of  punishments.”
Like the other liberal corps, the Provence Parlement viewed with 
 30 Deliberations of  the Estates, 3 Dec. 1767, C. 2410 and 13 Dec. 1768, C. 2411, A.D. H-G. The 
“supplications” were published in the Ephémérides (1769), I, 199–212. The fiscal threat became 
increasingly prominent in the liberal argument as the risk of  a royal volte-face burgeoned. “If  
exportation had not taken place during the past three years,” the archbishop of  Narbonne 
reminded the Controller-General, “Languedoc, Guyenne, and all the neighboring provinces 
which comprise more than half  of  the realm would surely not have been able to pay their 
impositions.” 16 Dec. 1768, AN H 887. Cf. the “Lettre d’un gentilhomme des états de 
Languedoc à un magistrat de Rouen sur le commerce des bleds.” (1768), C. 774, A.D. L-A.
 31 “Lettre du Parlement de Toulouse au Roi …,” Ephémérides du citoyen (1769), III, 182–98.
 32 Cf. the remark of  the Procurator General of  the Dauphiné Parlement to the intendant of  the 
province: “The Controller-General must have observed that despite the cherté of  grain, despite 
the mediocrity of  the harvests, the king’s revenues have come in much more readily than in 
the years during which a sterile abundance made the multitude of  grain harvested useless.” 
Vidaud to Pajot, 29 June 1770, Q 4 (2), fol. 59, Bibliothèque municipale de Grenoble.
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mounting alarm the gathering momentum of  the antiliberal 
campaign. In the spring of  1767 the magistrates worried about the 
impact which the “accidents” suffered by a number of  provinces would 
have upon royal policy.33 A little over a year later, the First President, 
in response to a ministerial request for a public expression of  support, 
wrote an open letter to the Controller-General emphasizing Provence’s 
attachment to the liberal reforms.34 We cannot remain silent, the let-
ter stated, when “a law so long solicited by our very humble prayers 
is [so sharply] attacked.” The Provençal magistrates understood that 
Louis XV was in a bind. Tremendous pressure, generated in the name 
of  compassion and humanity, was building up for a change in policy. 
Normally, it is true that “authority is too solidly entrenched in France 
to cede to popular impressions.” It was, however, extremely difficult to 
resist these “clamors” on “such a delicate matter as subsistence.” Prej-
udice and passion clouded the merits of  the issue and cast a shadow 
over the remarkable accomplishments of  liberalization. Representing 
the enlightened and productive part of  the nation, the Parlement of  
Provence spoke up to tip the scales back into balance.
In this same letter, the First President also sought to reach the mem-
bers of  the sovereign courts who opposed liberalization. He recalled 
to them how useful parlementary solidarity had been in the past in 
exposing “the error” to which even “the greatest monarchs” were sus-
ceptible. We have not forgotten that it is the duty of  the parlements 
to criticize aberrations in royal policy: “God forbid that we should 
[appear to] combat this maxim.…” But it is also the responsibility of  
the parlements, continued the First President, “to assure the stabil-
ity of  the laws when they have been meditated and examined with 
the greatest care.” The May and July reforms were just such laws. 
Because they broke so radically with tradition, they required the most 
energetic application in order to win public confidence. Since “noth-
ing was more capable of  fixing ideas than the concert of  all the magis-
trates,” the fissures in parlementary solidarity wrought by liberalization 
were especially lamentable. Communicate to us the specific objections 
of  the parlementary critics of  liberalization, the First President told 
the Controller-General, and we will work to change their minds.
The more the Provence Parlement learned about the opposition, how-
ever, the more pessimistic it became about the prospects for conciliation 
and the more militant a posture it took. Provided by the government 
 33 Parlementary deliberation, 27 April 1767, B. 3676, A.D. B-du-R.
 34 Letter of  8 July 1768, C. 2420, A.D. B-du-R.
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with a list of  “questions,” which the antiliberal courts had raised regard-
ing the reforms, the Provençaux replied in a long letter addressed to the 
king, just at the time that the Assembly of  Police convened in Paris.35 
They reported grimly that the “principles” of  the critics were “directly 
contrary to our own” and beyond accommodation. “They see it as an 
interest of  state to keep grain below the natural price [while] we believe 
that Justice and Political wisdom require that property be respected 
and that the trade be left free,” wrote the Provençal magistrates; “they 
wish to put us back under the yoke of  prohibitive laws [while] we bless 
the moment that the nation was freed from them.” Not only were the 
liberal and antiliberal parlementaires “divided on principles in a specu-
lative sense,” but in addition “they viewed the observable facts with a 
different eye.” The magistrates “who are prejudiced against the new 
police believe that it is condemned by experience itself, they see misery 
spread by it and the population diminished day by day [while] the oth-
ers insist on the contrary that its success has met the expectations of  the 
Sovereign Legislator, that it has prepared the way for the prosperity of  
this Empire.…”
With no hope of  bridging the enormous gulf  that separated it from 
its adversaries, the Provence Parlement turned instead to the attack in 
order to show the king that there were no legitimate grounds for retreat-
ing from liberalization. The Rouen and Paris accusations were false, the 
Parlement asserted; the price rise was not “the work” of  liberal policy. 
It resulted rather from “accidents” of  international incidence which 
brought dearth to Spain, Portugal, and Italy, reduced the northern 
European and American harvests to mediocrity, and forced the British 
to import on massive scale for the first time in almost a century. More-
over, “it was always anticipated that the passage from prohibitions to 
liberty would be a time of  crisis” for segments of  the population. This 
crisis was seriously and unexpectedly aggravated by these accidents of  
weather and circumstance “that no human prudence could have fore-
seen.” (Unlike their confreres in Grenoble and Toulouse, the magis-
trates of  Aix seemed satisfied with a naturalistic explanation; they did 
not lay stress on the “artificial” quality of  the crisis and account for it by 
means of  a police-remnants thesis.) Nor should the long-term promise 
of  liberalization be misconstrued. On this matter the Provençaux took 
 35 Letter to the king, 21 Nov. 1768, B. 3677, A.D. B-du-R. (dépôt Aix). There is also a copy 
in the Marseilles dépôt, C. 2420. The Ephémérides du citoyen published the letter in (1769), II, 
138–96. On the liberalism of  the Provence court, see P.-A. Robert, Remontrances … Provence, 
351, 502–503, 585–608.
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a more sober and candid stand than many other liberal apologists. It 
was never claimed that the new system would “guarantee” us against 
scarcities. It assured us only that the inevitable crises would be attenu-
ated and that we would be far better protected than we had been under 
the police regime, which inhibited both production and distribution. 
Accidents, which in the past produced dearths, partly as a consequence 
of  police mediation, would in the liberal world result in nothing more 
serious than chertés. Unlike their critics, the magistrates of  Provence con-
sidered cherté, in the light of  the advantages of  the system which engen-
dered it, to be a “tolerable” social burden.
The advantage of  liberalization, which they extolled above all 
others, was “the universal resurrection of  agriculture,” marked by 
a major increase in production and income. This vision of  rural 
regeneration, the magistrates suggested, must temper our grief  for 
urban distress. Let us be realistic social engineers, they proposed: 
would it be “so great an evil if  the excessive number of  useless 
artisans who escape farming in order to corrupt themselves in the 
cities suffered some reduction?” It was high time to teach urban 
consumers that “the privilege of  having cheaper bread” than their 
fellow citizens living elsewhere was not an “unquestionable right” 
of  the cities. Arrogant even in misery, Paris acted as if  only its poor 
counted. Now it was time to take pity on the “cultivator-people” 
who had experienced “the most horrible misery” for years and 
years under the old system, but whose suffering was “less visible and 
less well-known” than the occasional hardships of  the capital. The 
Provence Parlement did not strain, like many of  the partisans of  lib-
erty, to show that the new system would be universally beneficent. 
It was not embarrassed to see liberalization as a policy strictly cast 
to stimulate agriculture and to regard it as the rightful vengeance 
of  the countryside upon the city.36 Every law had its unfortunate 
effects, argued the parlementaires, utilitarians in the circumstance. 
The business of  government was to choose the laws which do the 
most good for the most people. Liberty was bound to do the most 
good because it sprung from the dictates of  nature. By far the most 
numerous group, its chief  beneficiaries, “the owners and the culti-
vators,” were also those who form the nation properly speaking”; 
the others were “merely hired hands.” 
 36 The Provençaux also regarded liberalization as the proper vengeance of  agriculture upon 
industry, although this theme was much less salient in liberal literature than one might have 
been led to expect. See the deliberations of  the Parl. of  26 June 1769, B. 3677, A.D. B-du-R.
470 BREAD, POLITICS AND POLITICAL ECONOMY
Politically, the liberal regime suited the Provençaux because it 
reduced the margin for arbitrary royal action, a goal which parlemen-
taires everywhere had pursued single-mindedly during the whole 
century. The laissez-faire doctrine meant that there were certain 
things which it was not within the power or right of  government to 
do. The government must remain at all times “neutral between the seller 
and the buyer.” The nation had far more to gain than to lose if  the king 
abstained from interfering with subsistence matters. By recognizing 
the natural limits of  governmental activity, the Provence Parlement 
absolved the king of  the responsibilities which the Paris magistrates, 
among others, insisted he must fulfill. “The government,” declared 
the Provence court, “is much more responsible for the evil that it does 
by arbitrary institutions than for those which it cannot prevent or 
anticipate in letting things go following the natural course.” Cherté, as 
Louis XV had told the Parlement of  Paris, had “physical” causes; it 
was susceptible to natural, not political, remedies.
To be sure, the tough-minded Provençaux understood that enlight-
enment did not come easy, especially to the blind: “up to a point it 
was necessary to treat popular opinion on the subsistence question 
with extreme care like the eyes from which cataracts have just been 
removed.” Yet “this system of  condescension” developed by the min-
istry—the limits built into the reform laws, the distribution of  king’s 
grain, and, most recently, the arrêt of  October 1768 offering bounties 
on imports—had dangerous implications. For one thing, it interfered 
with private speculation and the workings of  the market, the only 
arbitration on which the kingdom should rely. Worse were its psy-
chological and political consequences, for it “accustoms the people 
to believe following the old prejudice that the government has some 
sort of  obligation” to intervene. Each concession, the Provence Par-
lement warned, emboldened the critics of  liberalization and made it 
easier for them to extort another. This is not the time, the magistrates 
conceded, for us to make further demands for more liberty; though 
this and other reforms are necessary to assure the “prosperity of  the 
State,” they must await the passing of  the “ferment.” By the same 
token, however, it is not the time for the government to show weak-
ness. Show us, the Provençaux exhorted, “a judicious steadfastness.”
The expressions of  parlementary support buoyed the confidence 
of  the government. From its inception, the king had insisted that 
liberalization was a popular program, instituted in response to the 
demand of  the nation; he had no intention of  conceding the battle 
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for public opinion to the Paris magistracy. Implicitly, the king rec-
ognized the liberal parlements as spokesmen for the interests of  the 
people residing in their jurisdictions, a political relationship between 
constituted bodies and constituents which he had never before admit-
ted and which he contined to contest in the case of  Paris. From the 
vantage point of  1762–63, when Toulouse and Grenoble took the 
lead in fiercely defying the royal will, it would have been hard to 
imagine that the King would publicly seek the measure of  his gov-
ernment’s popularity and wisdom in the acclaim of  these same sover-
eign courts. To be sure, all the issues of  the time were not of  a piece; 
there was nothing monolithic about eighteenth century politics. A 
parlement could praise the king in an avis and revile him in a remon-
strance bearing the same date. But there was an unusually warm feel-
ing between the king and the liberal parlements. The earnest desire 
of  these courts to preserve liberalization made them unwilling to risk 
a falling out with the government.
Nothing more effectively undermined the Paris Parlement’s posi-
tion than the refusal of  its sister-courts to confirm its analysis of  the 
public interest, the causes of  the crisis, the mechanism of  liberaliza-
tion, the purpose of  the grain trade, the subversiveness of  the new 
political economy, the boundaries between public and private respon-
sibilities, and the nature of  kingship. The collective appeal of  the 
Assembly of  Police was meant to isolate the king, but the solidarity 
of  three of  the most important judicial companies with the govern-
ment tended instead to isolate the Paris Parlement, to give its angry 
complaints a parochial air, and to reduce the Paris problem to smaller 
proportions. The deep discord among the parlements, and the 
extremely harsh posture taken by the liberal courts toward the capital, 
aggrieved the Paris magistrates as much as it delighted the ministry. 
The Parisians anticipated the liberal dissent but they expected that 
it would be more restrained. They were shocked that the liberal 
magistrates so warmly embraced not a number of  specific reform 
clauses, but the entire system which their Paris confreres had found 
so detestable and dangerous. It was hardly a propitious sign for inter-
parlementary relations that the Paris court tried to suppress the pub-
lic distribution of  the Dauphiné avis.37
 37 Bachaumont, Mémoires secrets, XIX, 143 (22 Dec. 1769).
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III
Along with the liberal parlements, the économistes, the leading pro-
pagandists and theoreticians of  liberalization, raised their voices in 
support of  the government. For several years after the triumphs of  
1763–64 they had conducted a low-key campaign in favor of  a vig-
orous implementation of  the reform laws. They had also asked for 
new measures in the direction of  an even greater  liberty, but they 
had not pressed the matter too insistently in order not to embar-
rass the government during the delicate transitional period.38 
While awaiting the opportunity to chronicle the felicitous results 
of  liberalization, the économistes turned to other aspects of  political 
economy.
During this time Letrosne was the only major figure who wrote 
extensively about the grain trade. His The Grain Trade, Always Use-
ful, Never Harmful (1765) was ambivalent in mood, on the one 
hand, sublimely confident of  the scientific validity of  the physio-
cratic doctrine and of  the universal social utility of  the bon prix 
(the people may have to pay a little more for their bread, but they 
will be “richer” and it will be a “better bread”) and, on the other, 
deeply pessimistic about the prospects of  convincing “the people” to 
share his understanding or his faith. The people, “blinded by preju-
dice,” could not be reached “by way of  education,” but only through 
“example.” Letrosne was worried that the public officials at the local 
level who had to set the example would themselves turn against lib-
erty, either because they, too, had “a blindfold across their eyes” or 
because they had a vested stake in the old system: “But if  these per-
sons who are supposed to reassure them [the people] by their words 
and examples are themselves People in this matter, isn’t it to be feared 
that they will spread alarm instead of  dissipating it?” Letrosne hoped 
that public men would find in his combative essay compelling reasons 
for resisting the impulse to become “People” and for embracing the 
liberty doctrine.39
 38 A number of économistes criticized the limits placed on liberty but their manner was 
extremely sober and reserved. See, for example, Dupont’s “Au sujet du cabotage,” Journal de 
l’agriculture, du commerce et des finances (July 1766), 187–204 and Anon., “Quatrième mémoire 
pour la concurrence dans le fret,” ibid. (Sept. 1766), 116–117, 132–133.
 39 G.-F. Letrosne, La Liberté du commerce des grains, toujours utile et jamais nuisible (Paris, 
1765), 8–19, 39, 47, 91–92. In the same year Letrosne published several other 
pieces in which he denounced “the malady … of  wishing to regulate everything.” See 
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It was not until the middle of  1767, however, that the économistes 
became genuinely alarmed by the turn of  events.40 Mirabeau and 
Baudeau joined Letrosne in writing major essays on liberty and the 
state of  the kingdom for the Ephémérides.41 The common themes were 
the idea that the reform laws were not the cause of  rising prices and 
subsistence disorders, a plea against ceding to “panic terrors” echoing 
Letrosne’s earlier warnings, and an argument in favor of  a stronger 
dose of  liberty to counteract the remnants of  the police system which 
still obstructed circulation. The following year the physiocratic jour-
nal bulged with articles defending liberalization and calling upon the 
ministry to hold the line in face of  the growing opposition.42 Shortly 
before the Assembly of  General Police, in a piece meant to reinforce 
the morale of  the liberals, Letrosne quite rightly pointed to the seri-
ous divisions of  opinion in the antiliberal camp which, he hinted, 
would result in their ruin by their own hand.43
At about the same time the abbé Baudeau wrote a series of  Avis in 
which, interspersed between recipes for a hearty bread of  the people 
and an essay in which he gave the dubious physiocratic cachet to the 
process of  economic milling, he launched a violent attack on the police 
for its failure to execute the liberal laws. The time of  relative modera-
tion in public discourse had passed. Baudeau carefully developed the 
line which the government had already pointed to in its exchanges 
with the Paris Parlement and which Roubaud, Dupont, Turgot, and 
other liberals further embroidered in the next few years. Baudeau 
urged “the people” not to be “deceived” about the real causes of  the 
subsistence difficulties. It could not be the fault of  liberty because we 
have never enjoyed more than “a half-liberty.” Much of  the problem 
 “Sur les avantages de la concurrence des vaisseaux étrangers pour la voiture de nos grains,” 
Journal de l’agriculture, du commerce el des finances, I (July 1765), especially 106–107, 114–115 
and “Réponse à la lettre de M. Girard,” ibid., III (Nov. 1765), 43–48, 72–73.
 40 In fact the attitude of  many liberals remained astonishingly serene and confident despite 
burgeoning social unrest and economic dislocation. See, for example, the Gazette du commerce, 
de l’agriculture et des finances, 28 June and 5 July 1766.
 41 N. Baudeau, “Recherches politiques sur les terreurs populaires que cause le bon prix des 
grains …,” Ephémérides du citoyen, II (1767), 19–48; [Mirabeau], “Lettre sur l’entière liberté 
du commerce des grains,” ibid., VIII (1767), 102–32; LeTrosne, “Lettre sur l’entière liberté 
du commerce des grains,” ibid., XI (1767), 119–33. See also the call upon liberals to close 
ranks in “Lettre de M.D. à un Magistrat du Parlement de Bourgogne,” ibid., XI (1768), 7, 
15–16, 26–27.
 42 See all twelve volumes of  the Ephémérides for 1768.
 43 Letrosne, Lettres à un ami sur les avantages de la liberté du commerce des grains, et le danger des 
prohibitions (Amsterdam, and Paris, 1768), 10–11.
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results simply from bad harvests but much of  it was also the fruit 
of  police subversion and “the lack of  liberty, the remnants of  reg-
ulations, conditions, vexations, and contraints.…”44 According to 
Bachaumont’s Mémoires Secrets, the abbé sent a copy of  his Avis to 
every member of  the Paris Parlement toward the end of  October 
1768.45 We have seen how little impression it seems to have made on 
their way of  thinking about the crisis.
The économistes bitterly resented the Assembly of  General Police, 
which occurred the following month. The assembly marked the begin-
ning of  the end of  physiocracy in its first life, for from the end of  1768 
until the ascension of  Turgot to the Contrôle-Général the school was 
in decline and disfavor. Until the meeting of  the assembly, lamented 
Mirabeau, “We had been the friends of  men [the title of  one of  Mira-
beau’s best-known works was L’Ami des Hommes] … and suddenly we 
were denounced as agents of  authority and of  monopoly [and] some-
one called us corrupt and mercenary.…”46 The broader political 
implications of  the assembly troubled Turgot more than the attack on 
the économistes: “I cannot understand how the police could have the 
 44 Baudeau, Avis au peuple sur son premier besoin (Amsterdam, and Paris, 1768), and Avis aux 
honnêtes gens qui veulent bien faire.… (Amsterdam, and Paris, 1768).
For the argument that the source of  the problem in France in the late sixties was too little 
liberty or an imperfect liberty, see also [Baudeau], Lettre sur les émeutes populaires (Paris, 1768), 
43; Dupont to Prince Carl Ludwig, Correspondance Dupont, ed. by Knies, II, 141; “Avis des 
Députés du Commerce,” Oct. 1769, AN, F11 715; Roubaud, Représentations, 49, 210–211; “De 
la liberté du commerce des grains,” Ephémérides du citoyen, I (1769), 62–64; Turgot, “Septième 
lettre sur le commerce des grains,” 2 Dec. 1770, in Oeuvres, ed. by Schelle, III, 341.
For the insistence that bad harvests were the major “physical” cause of  the troubles, 
see: Roubaud, Représentations, 106–107, 114–15, 118; Roubaud, Récréations économiques.… 
(Amsterdam, and Paris, 1770), 190; Journal économique (April 1769), 177; Turgot, 
“Cinquième lettre sur le commerce des grains,” in Oeuvres, ed. by Schelle, III, 298; 
[Dupont], “Observations sur les effets de la liberté…,” Journal économique (July 1770), 333–
34; Suard to Galiani, 6 Aug. 1770, “Lettere inedite di G.B. Suard all’abate Galiani,” ed. by 
F. Nicolini, in Mélanges de philologie, d’histoire et de littérature offerts à Henri Hauvette (Paris, 1934), 
465; St.-Florentin to PG, 16 Oct. 1768, AN, O1 410; Anon., “Réflexions sur les principes 
des parlements de Paris et de Rouen …,” Arch. AE, France 1375, fols. 293–304.
Linguet energetically disputed what he considered to be a self-serving contention: “It is 
false that from 1764 through 1768 there were three bad harvests.” Du Pain et du bled, 164–65.
 45 Bachaumont, Mémoires secrets, XIX, 27–29 (20 Oct. 1768) and XIX, 31 (Dec. 1768). Cf. 
Galiani to d’Epinay, 27 July 1770, Lettres, ed. by Asse, I, 117.
 46 Discours de Rentrée (1776–77), cited by Weulersse, Mouvement physiocratique, I, 183–84n. Cf. 
the remarks of  the subdelegate of  Avesnes in the Hainaut who reviled the physiocrats as 
“certain mercenary writers” bent on deceiving the public. “Réflexions sur l’édit du mois de 
juillet 1764” (ca. Oct. 1770), C. 6690, A.D. Nord.
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stupidity to confirm the prejudices of  the people.”47 At first the Par-
lement planned to keep the minutes of  the Assembly secret. Once it 
became clear, however, that the government would make no conces-
sions, the court apparently authorized publication. By the early spring, 
the minutes and other antiliberal propaganda in book form were distrib-
uted in Paris. According to Baudeau, it was soon in “everyone’s hands.”48
The Assembly of  General Police elicited an elaborate refutation 
from a leading économiste, as well as public expressions of  solidarity with 
the government from the liberal parlements. Roubaud’s Representations 
to the Magistrates remains the most comprehensive statement on liberal-
ization that the physiocrats made.49 Although none of  the arguments 
was fresh, they were written with a sense of  political urgency and 
with specific reference to the events of  the past few years. Roubaud 
denounced the “spirit of  the old administration” which dominated the 
police Assembly. Everyone should know that the “old regime” which 
it “exalted” was responsible for destroying agriculture, depopulating 
the countryside, diminishing public revenues, hampering commerce, 
dividing the nation into “enemy peoples,” and causing and prolong-
ing dearths. (“Yes, every time that the police reached out its hand 
to restore abundance by force, subsistence faded away and the dearth 
increased.”) Yet Roubaud saw signs in the assembly that “light” was 
gradually breaking through: “It seems that, in this Assembly, the pro-
hibitive regime was praised only as the past is often praised, without 
a desire, at least not a manifest one, to see it reborn, at least not 
completely.” After all, there was a general awareness of  the need to 
“repair” agriculture and a general willingness to abandon “a great 
part of  the old Regulations.” For Roubaud, the striking “diversity” 
and “contrariety” of  opinion at the Assembly was a clue to the fun-
damental defect in the police system as well as a source of  encourage-
ment to the liberal camp.50
The lack of  unity at the assembly underlined the intellectual barren-
ness of  the police system. The assembly reflected the characteristics of  the 
 47 Turgot to Dupont, 4 Jan. 1769, in Oeuvres, ed. by Schelle, III, 54.
 48 Hardy’s Journal, 10 May 1769, BN, mss. fr. 6680, fol. 233; Baudeau, “Lettres … à un 
Magistrat du Parlement de Paris,” Nouvelles éphémérides, I (1775), 23. On the transmission 
of  news of  the Assembly, see also: C. 2420, A.D. B-du-R.; (?) to First President, Bordeaux 
Parl., 17 Dec. 1768, C. 1427, A.D. Gir.
 49 See the celebration of  Roubaud’s work and further criticism of  the Assembly of  General 
Police in Ephémérides du citoyen, II (1769), 122–25 and VI (1769), 210–11.
 50 Roubaud, Représentations, 16, 283–84, 391–93. Cf. ibid., 466–68.
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system: “capriciousness,” “variability,” “vacillation,” and recourse to 
“arbitrary” solutions for want of  principles. What the police system 
lacked most of  all, in Roubaud’s view, was “fixed and certain prin-
ciples” which would have spared the Assembly lengthy debates and 
anguished hesitation.51 For the police, government was a complex, 
difficult, and approximate affair, but for the économistes, because they 
had self-evident principles (revealed and “determined by their evi-
dence”), it was “easy, simple, natural.” The “science of  government” 
was the “science of  the natural order.” The natural order was founded 
upon the “laws of  nature,” the first of  which was the “inviolable and 
imprescriptible” right of  property “instituted by God when he created 
man.” While the police claimed that the right of  property and the cor-
ollary right of  liberty sometimes threatened the right to exist, from an 
entirely different perspective Roubaud argued that the property right 
“is identical to the right to exist.” The “purpose” and the “aim” of  “all 
human societies,” as Dupont maintained, was to protect property.52
Nor could liberty be divided or compromised. Roubaud scorned 
the notion, reaffirmed by the assembly, that police and liberty were 
compatible: “the liberty of  commerce is reconcilable with the Regu-
lations as personal liberty is reconcilable with slavery.” If  the govern-
ment followed the “original” and scientific principles of  administra-
tion, it would acknowledge that “the full, entire, general, unlimited 
and indefinite liberty of  the grain trade is uniquely and sovereignly 
just, useful and necessary in perpetuity.” Without any foundations in 
nature and without any immutable guidelines, Roubaud concluded, 
the recommendations of  the assembly would merely reestablish the 
“violence and tyranny” of  the Old Regime.53
From this analysis, it followed that grain was simply another object
 51 See the very similar view of  the Dauphiné Parlement, avis and letter to king, 26 April 1769, 
B. 2314, fol. 100, A.D. Isère.
 52 Dupont, “Vrais principes du droit naturel,” Ephémérides du citoyen, III (1767), 167; Dupont, 
ed., Physiocratie (Paris, 1767–68), I, xc; Dupont, “Observations sur les effets de la liberté …,” 
Journal économique (Aug. 1770), 348.
For similar views on the rights of  property and liberty, see: J.-P.-L. Luchet, Examen d’un 
livre qui a pour titre: “Sur la législation et le commerce des bleds” (N.p., 1775), 17, 40–41; Baudeau, 
Avis au premier besoin, 72–73; Condillac, Le Commerce et le gouvernement in Collection des principaux 
économistes, ed. by Daire and Molinari, XIV, 421; Journal helvétique (June 1768), 605; Mercure 
de France (Aug. 1769), 132; Lemercier de la Rivière, L’Intérêt général de l’état, 64–65, 290–91, 
377–78; Condorcet, Sur la liberté de la circulation des subsistances (1792) in Oeuvres de Condorcet, ed. 
by A.E. O’Connor and M.F. Arago, X, 363–64; G.-J.-B. Target, Observations sur le commerce 
des grains (Amsterdam, 1775), 26–27.
 53 Roubaud, Représentations, 7–8, 363, 379, 392–95, 398–400.
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of  property without any special burdens or privileges as the police 
contended. Grain, Letrosne had written, must be considered “like 
every other merchandise” (like cloth, said St. Mars; like wool or 
shoes, Benjamin Fanklin wrote). “The property of  grain,” Turgot 
complained, “is regarded as less sacred than that of  any other goods.” 
From the police point of  view, however, it was precisely because they 
considered grain more sacred than any other good that they could not 
allow its disposition to be decided purely in terms of  individual rights 
and interests. Nothing more clearly marks the chasm between the 
liberal world of  the future and the corporate world of  the past. Only 
a vigorous and substantial grain trade, argued Roubaud, can distrib-
ute grain in deficit areas and equalize and stabilize prices, in time 
and across space. But, he cautioned, unless grain is given the status 
of  an ordinary good and the merchant allowed to do with it what 
he pleases the commerce will remain small, local, and undepend-
able. The police not only deprived the merchant of  his rights; they 
also ruined his reputation by treating him publicly as “a brigand and 
an executioner” and teaching the people to distrust and hate him. 
“Instead of  begrudging the merchant his profits, interfering with his 
speculations … anathematizing his so useful and so honorable pro-
fession,” Roubaud contended, “a wise, just and good Government” 
would not fail to “protect, encourage, reassure [and] favor” him. For 
all its well-known disdain for commerce, physiocracy reserved a spe-
cial place for “this class of  subjects so salutarily situated” between the 
producer and the consumer of  grain.54
Implicitly, the Assembly reaffirmed the old police idea that the 
government owed the consumers their subsistence. Nothing could be 
more erroneous and more dangerous, the économistes charged. Like the 
liberal parlements, Roubaud argued that “the Government owes the 
people” nothing but “good laws.” When they lacked bread, the people 
 54 Ibid., 19–21, 112–13, 396, 451–54; Roubaud, “De l’histoire des subsistances,” Journal de 
1’agriculture, du commerce, des arts et des finances ( Jan. 1772), 64; Letrosne, Lettres à un ami, 15; 
Saint-Mars, Le Spéculatif, ou dissertation sur la liberté du commerce des grains (Amsterdam, and Paris, 
1770), 37; B. Franklin, “Sur le prix du blé et sur l’administration des pauvres,” from the 
London Chronicle (1766) in Collection des principaux économistes, XIV, 659–61: Turgot, “Septième 
lettre sur le commerce des grains,” 2 Dec. 1770, in Oeuvres, ed. by Schelle, III, 323.
For similar views see Journal économique (May 1754), 66–67 and (Sept. 1770), 388; Condillac, 
Le Commerce et le gouvernement in Collection des principaux économistes, ed. by Daire and Molinari, XIV, 
421; Journal encyclopédique (15 April 1775), 228; Encyclopédie méthodique (Paris, 1793), Agriculture, 
III, 370.
Lemercier de la Rivière conceded that grain was unlike any other commodity, but made 
his case for a total liberty of  trade precisely on the grounds of  the urgency of  distributing it 
rapidly and efficiently. L’Intérêt général, 164–65.
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should turn their heads to God; instead, the police taught them to 
look to the government “as if  it made abundance or dearth to its 
liking; as if  it were cultivator or merchant; as if  it had to furnish 
wood and clothing when people suffered from cold.” (The économistes 
lauded God the father in approximately the same proportion that 
they reviled the paternal state.) In this fashion the police aroused false 
hopes and assumed responsibilities which they had no right or man-
date to undertake. What the government must do as a general rule in 
dealing with social problems and specifically in coping with a subsis-
tence crisis is nothing—nothing at all.55
The revolt of  the local police and the convocation of  the Assem-
bly of  General Police provided compelling evidence, in the view of  
the économistes, that the authorities, “frightened by the cries of  the peo-
ple,” had panicked. Instead of  combatting “popular fears,” Roubaud 
claimed, the police “shared them and erected them into Regulations.” 
As Condorcet later remarked, “fear is at the origin of  almost all human 
stupidities, especially political stupidities.” If  the authorities themselves 
did not resist these “vain terrors,” what chance could there be of  re-
educating the people, a process which Baudeau, most forcefully among 
the physiocrats, insisted was necessary in order to modernize the soci-
ety and the economy.
The point was not to be indifferent to popular outcries. The same 
Roubaud who emphasized that “needs were not rights” took umbrage 
at the Assembly’s insinuation that the physiocrats were cruel and 
heartless. We have pity for the people, but a “thoughtful and enlight-
ened pity,” he explained. “In sharing and relieving their troubles, 
let us beware of  their prejudices,” he added; “suffering leads them 
astray.” If  you want to be “the fathers” of  the people, Roubaud urged 
the parlementaires, “well then! treat them like children who are dear 
to you but who do not know what is best for them.” Unschooled in 
political economy, the people cannot know “what their true interests” 
are. It is up to the magistrates to “disabuse” them of  “false opinions” 
 55 Roubaud, Représentations, 7, 34, 44–46, 428; Weulersse, Mouvement physiocratique, I, 528. See 
also Weulersse, La Physiocratie sous Turgot et Necker, 109, 310 and La Physiocratie … Louis XV, 84, 
86, 91; Baudeau, “Suite des avis au peuple,” Ephémérides du citoyen, X (1769), 19; Condorcet, 
Le Monopole et le monopoleur, in Collection des principaux économistes, ed. by Daire and Molinari, 
XIV, 463. Cf. Gournay’s disdainful attitude toward “la bureaumanie” or “la bureaucratie” 
which has a strikingly modern ring. Grimm, Correspondance littéraire, ed. by Tourneux, VI, 
30 (July 1764). The lawyer Target also had a horror for administration. G.-J.-B. Target, 
Observations sur le commerce des grains (Amsterdam, 1775), 43 and passim.
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and “enlighten them.” Teach them, for example, as Baudeau sug-
gested, that what the “vulgar uninformed” called cherté was really the 
“bon prix,” the salvation of  agriculture and the guarantee of  future 
subsistence. As for wages, Roubaud, following Quesnay, had nothing 
to offer the people but the iron law of  subsistence level adjustment 
and the vague reassurance (about which Turgot and Condorcet were 
less optimistic) that wages would promptly follow prices.56
Of  course there were people and there were people, or so at least 
the économistes tried to suggest. While on one level they preached a 
universal solidarity of  interests among all people in all places, on 
another they divided the people, for polemical purposes, into camps 
of  different interests. Like the liberal parlements, first they divided 
them into the people of  the countryside (solid, forbearing, produc-
tive, austere, and submissive) and the people of  the cities (generally 
useless, often indolent and dissolute, spasmodically turbulent, and in 
any case less precious than their cousins in the flat country). Then, 
in the hope of  laying claim to a larger universe of  support and for 
the sake of  focusing upon a more manageable enemy, they divided 
the people into the people of  France, i.e., the provinces, the over-
whelming bulk of  the kingdom, and the people of  Paris (parasitical, 
spoiled, self-regarding).
The themes in both cases were very much the same; it was merely 
a question of  redrawing the boundaries. One is no more likely, said 
Roubaud, to “find the sources of  joy in tombs than one is to find 
 56 Roubaud, Représentations, 44–46, 104, 272, 368, 381–82; Mercure de France (Aug. 1769), 129; 
Baudeau, Avis au premier besoin, 123–29; Baudeau, “Sur les terreurs populaires,” Ephémérides 
du citoyen, II (1767), 22, 33, 48; Condorcet, Le Monopole et le monopoleur in Collection des principaux 
économistes, ed. by Daire and Molinari, XIV, 463, 468; Quesnay, “Grains,” in Diderot, et al., 
Encyclopédie, VII, 831; Weulersse, Mouvement physiocratique, II, 327; Turgot, “Septième lettre 
sur le commerce des grains,” 2 Dec. 1770, in Oeuvres, ed. by Schelle, III, 346–48.
On the économiste attitude toward the people, see also: Letrosne, La Liberté toujours utile, 19, 
84–85, 89 and Lettres à un ami, 17–18; Mirabeau, cited by Weulersse, La Physiocratie … Louis 
XV, 67–68; Dupont, “Observations sur les effets de la liberté,” Journal économique (July 1770), 
333; Abbé Morellet, Théorie du paradoxe (Amsterdam, 1775), 109. Cf. Diderot to Necker, 
10 June 1775, Correspondance Diderot, ed. by G. Roth, XIV, 144–45; “Lettre de M.D. à un 
Magistrat du Parlement de Bourgogne,” Ephémérides du citoyen XI (1768), 26–27.
On the “right to exist,” see Condillac, Le Commerce et le gouvernement and Condorcet, Le 
Monopole et le monopoleur, both in Collection des principaux économistes, ed. by Daire and Molinari, 
XIV, 421, 487.
On the physiocratie wage theory, see also Letrosne’s remarks in Journal de l’agriculture, du 
commerce et des finances, I (Aug. 1765), 80; Spengler, French Predecessors, 202–209; René Savetier, 
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the sources of  prosperity in cities.” Composed of  “the excrement of  
the countryside,” “eternally sterile” but “forever devouring,” the city 
was an aberration in the national scheme of  things and it was no 
accident that police was essentially an urban contrivance. “By what 
right,” asked Condorcet, “is the inhabitant of  the countryside sac-
rificed to the one of  the big cities?” Under the cover of  what they 
call police, the économistes charged, the cities exploit and oppress the 
productive heartland of  the nation. Parisians were especially guilty 
of  tyranny and egotism but, just as the state is not composed exclu-
sively of  cities, so the capital, Roubaud assured the bone and sinew 
of  France, “is not our universe.” The Assembly of  General Police 
could fool no one by trying to pass off  the voice of  Paris as the “voice 
of  God.” It was hardly surprising that an assembly representing the 
capital would reach such false and vicious conclusions, hostile to the 
development of  agriculture, the true source of  national wealth and 
well-being. “If  there was one place in the kingdom,” wrote Baudeau, 
“from which it was difficult to see liberty act & justify the new laws, it 
was the capital, constantly subjected to the old Regulations, infested 
with passions ardent and contrary to the national interest.…” If  
Paris suffered now it was because the capital enjoyed too little, not 
too much, liberty in the provisioning trade; indeed, as a result of  the 
special “condescension” it demanded in the reform laws, it caused 
neighboring provinces to suffer as well. As Mirabeau was said to have 
remarked some years later, “Paris will be fed when Paris will pay.”57
 57 Roubaud, Représentations, 48, 52–53, 61–63, 73, 88, 105, 380, 385–86, 436–37; Condorcet, 
Le Monopole et le monopoleur in Collection des principaux économistes, ed. by Daire and Molinari, 
XIV, 465; Mirabeau, cited by Weulersse, La Physiocratie … Louis XV, 158–59. See also 
Letrosne, Réflexions sur les mœurs (Orléans, ca. 1765); “Lettre de Mr. Dupont …,” Journal 
de l’agriculture, du commerce et des finances, VII (Nov. 1766), 207–208; Parl. of  Provence, letter 
to king, 10 Nov. 1770, B. 3677, A.D. B-du-R.; arrêt of  Parl. of  Languedoc, 14 Nov. 1772, 
AN, AD XI 39; G.-J.-B. Target, Observations sur le commerce des grains, 33; Arthur Young, 
Travels, ed. by Kaplow, 389; Voltaire to M. de la Harpe, 10 March 1769, in Oeuvres complètes 
de Voltaire, ed. by Moland, XIV, 283; letter from Voltaire “à l’Auteur des Reprèsentations 
aux Magistrats,” 1 July 1769, published in Mercure de France (Aug. 1769), 134; Dupont, 
“Observations sur les effets de la liberté,” Journal économique (Aug. 1770), 341; Ephémérides du 
citoyen, VI (1769), 222; Anon., “Mémoire sur l’exportation des grains,” (1764), BN, mss. fr. 
14296, fol. 18; Turgot, “Lettre circulaire aux officiers de police,” 15 Feb. 1766, C. 479, A.D. 
Haute-Vienne; Baudeau, Avis au premier besoin, 94–95; Antoine Rivarol, Oeuvres complètes, ed. 
by Chênedollé and Fayolle (Paris, 1808), IV, 80n.
Note how dramatically the revolutionary experience transformed Condorcet’s view of  
Paris and its place: Sur le préjugé qui suppose une contrariété d’intérêts entre Paris et les provinces (1790) 
in Oeuvres de Condorcet, ed. by A. C. O’Connor and M.F. Arago (Paris, 1847), X, 134, 147.
Illustration 6. Grain and Bread: 1. farmer. 2. harvesters. 3. threshers. 4. miller. 5. baker. 
Deutsches Brotmuseum, Ulm/Donau.
Illustration 7. Bakeshop. Note devices for sale on credit: the “tailles” in the hand of  the 
baker-boy and the register kept by the baker’s wife. Encyclopédie.
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 58 Roubaud, Représentations, 24, 437–48.
 59 St.-Florentin to Roubault [sic], 9 June 1769, AN, O1 411.
 60 Bachaumont, Mémoires secrets, XIX, 31 (Dec. 1768).
The économiste argument was tenuous but the syllogism rang true, 
especially in a time of  dearth when feelings were raw and vulnerable: 
the interests of  Paris are contrary to those of  the nation at large; Paris 
hates liberty and loves police; therefore, liberty is in the national inter-
est and police is contrary to it. The premises of  the syllogism were 
politically attractive not only to the liberals but to the antiliberals like 
the Rouennais as well. For the latter, however, the conclusion was 
utterly unpalatable.
Like the liberal parlements, the économistes at the end of  1768 aimed to 
counteract the impression which the Assembly of  General Police made 
on opinion and identify the opposition with urban and especially Pari-
sian interests. But whereas their allies in the magistracy generally agreed 
that it was an inauspicious moment to make further demands upon the 
ministry, they stressed the urgency of  moving into the second phase 
of  liberalization even while the results of  the first phase were under 
attack. The stroke of  bad harvest luck could not continue indefinitely, 
so their argument went, and the best way to protect ourselves against 
future problems would be to make liberty more “perfect” and more 
“complete” than it had been under the 1763–64 reforms. Roubaud’s 
book was also meant to defend the honor of  the physiocratic school. We 
are not subversives or system-mongers, the abbé wrote indignantly, but 
scientists devoted to the public good, “philosophes who profess only one 
science, the science par excellence, it is true, the science proper to man, 
the science of  kings and of  subjects, the science of  the social order.” 
The “regulatory code” put forth by the Assembly of  General Police 
was the real incarnation of  “system, that is to say, a corpus of  arbitrary 
combinations disposed to give to things a forced course.”58
Roubaud wrote his five hundred page book in a remarkably short 
time and had the satisfaction of  seeing it appear only a few weeks after 
the published minutes of  the Assembly began to circulate.59 For the 
moment there was a truce in the war of  words, though in the back-
ground the abbé Galiani was busy finishing his devastating Dialogues on 
the Grain Trade, a work which may have been partially inspired by the 
Assembly of  General Police. While they anxiously awaited the 1769 
harvest, the économistes placed all their hopes in the liberal parlements, 
the royal council whose majority they believed still regarded liberaliza-
tion with favor, and the determination of  Louis XV to “stand firm.”60
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IV
The government drew encouragement from the staunch public dec-
larations of  the liberal parlements and the press campaign in its favor, 
but it found a more palpable source of  strength in the apparent rever-
sal of  the upward price movement.61 Even as the Parlement of  Paris 
was translating the recommendations of  the Assembly into formal 
remonstrances, the prices of  bread, flour, and wheat had begun to 
drop. From the apex of  16½ to 17 sous the four pound loaf  in Novem-
ber 1768, bread fell to 14½ in January, 14 in late March, 13 in May, 
12 in July, and 10½ in January 1770, the lowest it had been since 
the summer of  1767. Between January 1769 and January 1770, the 
common price of  wheat dropped from 27 livres the septier to 21 and 
the best white flour slipped from 68 livres the sack to 50 livres. The 
downward course appears to have resulted from the continuing dis-
tribution of  king’s grain, the prospect of  a return to the old grain leg-
islation spurred by the Paris Parlement’s campaign which frightened 
hoarders into releasing supplies, the expectation of  an excellent har-
vest produced by the “fine appearances” in early spring, and, finally, 
the harvest itself  which, albeit far from a triumph, was nevertheless 
the best in the recent past. The government believed that the worst 
was over and the diminution of  the prices blunted the urgency of  the 
antiliberal parlementary appeal. With an air of  extraordinary self-
assurance and optimism that was not destined to last, the Controller-
General Maynon d’lnvau wrote the First President of  the Parlement 
of  Dauphiné that “the good effects that this liberty has produced … 
confirm His Majesty more and more in the firm resolution to main-
tain it … and even to extend it as soon as the circumstances appear 
favorable.…”62
This fresh burst of  confidence induced the new ministry to make 
claims for the first stage of  liberalization which the government had 
never made before. “These laws [of  1763–64] rendered the grain 
trade an absolute liberty,” the ministry informed its correspondents.63 
In letters to intendants the Controller-General Maynon and his aides 
Trudaine de Montigny and Albert continued to insist that dearth 
could be conquered only through “the natural path of  commerce.”64
 61 See tables 1, 2 and 3 below.
 62 Maynon to Berulle, 22 May 1769, B. 2314, fol. 121, A.D. Isère.
 63 CG to de Fontette, IN. of  Caen, 1769, AN, F12* 153, fols. 48–52.
 64 See, for example, CG to DuCluzel, IN. of  Tours, 10 Sept. 1769, ibid., fol. 59 and C. 96, 
A.D. I-et-L.; Maynon d’lnvau to Monthyon, 30 Oct. 1769, C. 906, A.D. P-de-D.
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When local officials took measures that infringed upon the 
liberty, the central government acted quickly to quash them. A 
Rouen merchant successfully appealed a 500 livres fine imposed 
upon him by the Rouen police for buying in a market that used 
to be off  limits to dealers. Since the “abolition of  the prohibitive 
regime,” Maynon reminded the police, you may no longer inter-
fere with “the natural activity” of  commerce.65 The bailliage of  
Coutances condemned a grain merchant for depriving the com-
munity of  grain by making purchases on the highway instead of  
in the public purview at the market. The Controller-General con-
demned the procedure as a “formal violation of  the laws of  the 
Kingdom,” which
do not distinguish purchases made on the highways from those made in the 
granaries or marketplaces … [the liberal laws] have solemnly proscribed all  
Table 1. Wheat, flour, and bread prices 1769 Paris (Halles)
Date Wheat (septier)  
in livres and sous
White flour  
(325 livres sack)  
in livres and sous
Best loaf   
(4 livres) in sous  
and deniers
Min. Max. Common Min. Max. Min. Max.
11 Jan. 22 32–10 27 48 68 14 14–6
28 Jan. 24 32–10 28 60 67 14 14–6
8 Feb. 26 32 29 50 66 14 14–6
25 Feb. 22 33 28–10 55 66 13–6 14–6
8 Mar. 24 30–10 28 44 65 13–6 14–6
25 Mar. 22 32 28 40 64 13–6 14
22 Apr. 22 30 26 43 63 13 14
10 May 16 27 22–10 50 62 13 13–6
24 May 21 26–10 24 40 58 12–6 13
7 June 23 28–5 25–10 40 57 12–6
24 June 23 28–15 26 37 55–10 11–6 12–6
5 July 20 25 22–10 36 55 11 12–6
22 July 20 25 23 32 55 11 12
26 Aug. 22 28–15 26 36 55 11 12
6 Sept. 22–5 25 43 58 11 12
11 Oct. 22 28 25–10 40 57 11–6 12
8 Nov. 19 26–5 25 44 56 11–6 12
25 Nov. 20 27 23 44 55–10 11 11–6
6 Dec. 20–5 25–5 22 36 54 11 11–6
30 Dec 19 24 21 32 51 11 11–6
Source: B.N., Collection Joly de Fleury, 1143. 
 65 CG to de Crosne, 5 Nov. 1769, C. 103, A.D. S-M.
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the obstacles and all the regulations which by preventing the circulation [of  grain] 
halted the reproduction of  subsistence and which in the false idea of  preventing short-
age led necessarily to establish it forever in the kingdom and to cast the people into 
famine.66
While the Paris Parlement characterized liberalization as the out-
rider of  famine, Maynon’s government warned that it was the police 
Table 2. Wheat, flour and, bread prices 1770 Paris (halles)
Date Wheat (septier)  White flour  
(325 livres sack)  
Best loaf   
(4 livres) in sous  
and deniers
Min. Max. Common Min. Max. Min. Max.
3 Jan. 20–10 23–5 21 40 51 10 11
13 Jan. 20 25 22–10 35 50 10–6 11
24 Feb. 26–10 22 20 36 45 10 10–6
24 Mar. 18 24 20–10 39 48 10 10–6
21 Apr. 20 23 21–10 36 47 10 10–6
12 May 23–10 28 25–10 40 56 11 11–6
9 June 26 28–5 27 39 56 11 11–6
30 June 25 31–5 28 43 60 12 12–6
11 July 25 34 61 68 13 13–6
21 July 27 32–10 60 67 13–6 14
1 Aug. 29–10 33 59 66 13–6 14
22 Aug. 30 35 62 67 13–6 14
1 Sept. 29 35–10 64 70 14–6 14–6
12 Sept. 30 36–10 64 70 14–6 15
19 Sept. 28 37 64 73 15 15–6
10 Oct. 25 34–10 68 74 15 15–6
31 Oct. 26 31 62 68 14–6 15
7 Nov. 20 29 62 66 14 14–6
14 Nov. 26 36 55 62 13–6 14
28 Nov. 24 29–10 57 62 12–6 13–6
5 Dec. 25 30 57 62 12–6 13
26 Dec. 25 31 58 63 13
1771
26 Jan. 26 30–10 58 63 13
27 Feb. 26 30 56 60 12–6 13
23 Mar. 28 29–10 55 60 12–6
Source: B.N., Collection Joly de Fleury, 1428, 1429.
 66 CG to de Fontette, 1769, AN, F12* 153, fols. 48–52.
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Table 3. Paris bread prices from baker registers 1770–1774 (4 pound white 
loaf  in sous and deniers)
Date Pigeot Houdart Lecocq Bernier




May 10–6, 11, 11–6 11, 11–6 11–6
June 11–6, 12 12 12, 13, 13–6 12–6
July 12–6, 13–6 13 12–6, 13, 13–6 13, 13–6, 14
Aug. 14 14 14, 14–6 14–6, 15
Sept. 15 15, 16 15, 15–6, 16 15–6
Oct. 15, 15–6 16, 15 15–6, 16 16
Nov. 14–6, 14, 13–6 16, 15, 14 15, 14–6, 14 15–6, 14–6
Dec. 13 14 14, 13–6 14
Pigeot Houdart Chantal
Jan. 1771 13 14 13–6, 14
Feb. 13 13–6 13–6, 14
March 13 13–6 13
April 12–6 13 13
May 12–6 13 13
June 12–6 13 13







Jan. 1772 12 12–6
Feb. 11–6, 12 12
March 12 11–6, 12 12
April 12 11–6 12, 11–6
May 12 11 11–6, 11
June 11 10–6, 10 10–6, 10
July 10–6 10–6
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Table 3. Continued 
actions tending “to alter the liberty of  commerce” which threatened 
“to starve the people.”67 The Controller-General urged police officials 
to do everything in their power to facilitate and protect the “specula-
tions” of  the merchants, for they were the only source of  salvation. It 
was neither wise nor “necessary,” he maintained, for the government 
to undertake supply operations. “Only commerce can and must fur-
nish,” he wrote; “any provisioning made by authority would only drive 
it off, exclude competition, and augment the dearth.” Not only did 
Maynon refuse to provide government subsistence aid to the provinces 
but he made it clear that the government discountenanced any local 
 67 CG to de Crosne, IN. of  Rouen, 9 Aug. 1769, ibid., fols. 54–55.
Garmont Avé Lecocq Morin






July 11–6 11–6 12
Aug. 11–6, 12 11–6 12–6
Sept. 12, 12–6, 13 12, 12–6 12–6, 13
Oct. 13 13 13
Nov. 13 13 13
Dec. 13 13 13
Lecocq Morin












Source: Archives Seine-Paris, registres: D5B6 4481, 1647, 1829, 84, 4837, 82, 3064, 1939.
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self-help enterprises in which public officials played a role. Limit your 
activities, he told them, to “exciting and encouraging the négociants 
so that they bring their speculations your way.”68 To promote these 
speculations, the Controller-General asked the intendants to publi-
cize widely the schedule of  import bounties established at the end 
of  October 1768.69 Though he preached strict execution of  the law, 
Maynon himself  groped for loopholes in order to postpone the closing 
Table 4. Paris wheat prices, 1760–1780 (per septier, in livres tournois and 
fractions)
Years Average Annual  
Wheat Prices,  
Contrôle-Général  
(AN, F20 105)
Chapitre de Paris  
table of  Halles price  
at Martinmas (Nov.)  
every year (AN, L530)
A. Arnould, De la 
balance du commerce 
(Paris, 1791),  
III, Table 16
1760 17.85 18.00 19.80
1761 13.75 13.50 15.90
1762 13.80 17.00 16.05
1763 13.05 13.00 15.90
1764 12.30 15.25 15.55
1765 16.00 20.00 18.30
1766 16.85 19.50 20.40
1767 20.75 26.00 22.05
1768 27.50 37.50 32.80
1769 24.10 25.50 32.40
1770 26.55 30.00 29.05
1771 25.70 29.50 33.45
1772 21.55 26.75 28.20
1773 24.60 29.00 29.50







 68 CG to Dupleix, IN. of  Amiens, 9 Aug. 1769 and to Monthyon, IN. of  Auvergne, 10 Sept. 
1769, ibid., fols. 52–53, 57; CG to DuCluzel, 2 Nov. 1768, C. 94 and 10 Jan. and 10 and 
17 Sept. 1769, C. 96, A.D. I-et-L.
 69 CG to IN. of  Champagne, 4 Nov. 1768, C. 418, A.D. Marne; CG to DuCluzel, 5 Nov. 
1768, C. 94, A.D. I-et-L.; intendant’s notes, ca. Nov. 1768, C. 81, A.D. C d’O.
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of  ports where prices had passed the export ceiling.70 Since both poli-
cies sought to bolster a free grain trade, Maynon saw no inconsistency 
between subsidizing imports and fostering a continued drain of  domes-
tic supplies.
For those who looked at France through the eyes of  Paris, the 
recoiling of  prices in 1769 masked the fact that almost everywhere 
else in the kingdom the crisis was expanding and deepening. In the 
classical mechanism of  this cereals-dominated economy, what began 
as a subsistence crisis swelled, unevenly but implacably, into a general 
economic crisis.71 Unequal in bad times as in good, the rhythm of  
the cyclical price rise varied from place to place. Measured against 
the national mean, the Parisian maxima were precocious. Even as 
the spiral seemed to taper off  in the Paris area (and to some extent 
in Normandy as well), the prices in other regions climbed steeply. 
On a national scale, 1770 marked the height of  the crisis. In many 
places the plateau of  high prices persisted until the middle of  the 
decade. The immediate cause of  the crisis in most places was a series 
of  harvest failures, but other long-term factors such as demographic 
expansion, monetary inflation, climatological change, and pressures 
of  international scope seem to have come into play.
Directly and indirectly, liberalization nurtured and exacerbated 
the crisis by creating a feverish climate of  speculation, opening 
new commercial outlets, disorganizing the distribution system, and 
spreading fear and uncertainty. Everywhere the grain price served 
as the “barometer” for the whole economy. The precipitous decline 
in cereal production led to a severe contraction in purchasing 
 70 CG to IN. of  Bordeaux, 31 March 1769, C. 1427, A.D. Gir.
 71 See Labrousse, Esquisse, his La Crise de l’économie française, especially the preface, and the 
sections he contributed to F. Braudel and E. Labrousse, eds., Histoire économique et soeiale, II, 
385ff. For the “general crisis” of  1770, see Histoire économique et sociale, II, 408, 414–16, 489, 
536–555. The “flare-up of  prosperity” discerned by Goubert, Tarrade, and other scholars 
in the years following the end of  the Seven Years’ War must have been short-lived in many 
places and sectors. See Goubert in Histoire économique et sociale, II, 76 and Jean Tarrade, Le 
commerce colonial de la France à la fin de l’ancien régime (Paris, 1972), I, 7–8. Though Marseille 
suffered a severe crisis in the early seventies, according to Charles Carrière it was “finan-
cial” in nature, without any clearcut relation to the grain question. Négociants marseillais au 
XVIIIe siècle (Aix-Marseille, 1973), I, 455. Carriére is reacting against the almost irresistible 
historiograph-ical propensity for a quasi-grain-determinism in explaining eighteenth cen-
tury economic history. But it seems to me that the case for sectorial autonomy is overdrawn 
when it leads to a sort of  causal compartmentalization. On the international dimensions of  
the crisis, see W. Abel, Massenarmut und Hungerkrisen im vorindustriellen Deutschland (Göttingen, 
1972), 46–54 and Crises agraires en Europe (Berlin, 1935; Paris, 1973), 25, 286, 339, and passim.
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power, widespread unemployment in the countryside and in the 
cities, lagging wages, serious indebtedness, an extraordinary wave 
of  business failures affecting petty artisans as well as great finan-
ciers, and an industrial recession, most acute in the pilot textile 
sector. Second in severity only to the disasters of  1788–89, the gen-
eral economic crisis of  1770 inaugurated a troubled “intercyclical” 
period of  almost two decades bringing a half  century of  expansion 
to a close on a note of  recurring agricultural and industrial adver-
sities. In the early years of  the seventies, the rest of  the kingdom 
suffered the same sort of  misery and disorder of  which Paris and 
Rouen had been complaining since the late sixties. The curés and 
intendants in many parts of  France recorded a sharp increase in 
the mortality rate.72
Just as the economic crisis was reaching a crescendo, the gov-
ernment faced a grave fiscal crisis. Unwilling to believe that the 
economic situation was as bad as the reports indicated—it tended 
to regard them as products of  antiliberal propaganda—the gov-
ernment nevertheless could not avert its eyes from the fiscal pre-
dicament which threatened to paralyze its operation. The finan-
cial problem was not a cyclical counterpoint to a prevailing trend. 
It was chronic, built-in to the political and administrative institu-
tions of  the monarchy and to the social structure.73 The parlements 
thwarted the efforts of  the government to rationalize the fiscal sys-
tem, extend the tax base, impose the burden equitably, and estab-
lish uniform and efficient collection procedures. The government 
itself, at least until the last third of  the century, made little effort to 
 72 See P. Goubert’s analysis in Labrousse and Braudel, eds., Histoire économique et sociale, II, 76–78. 
It is of  course extremely difficult to date with precision the onset, apex, and passing of  this 
crisis. It manifested itself  in many different ways, without concern for logic or consistency, in 
different places. Administrators sometimes announced its arrival or celebrated its departure 
prematurely. In some instances—one thinks especially of  parts of  Normandy—the crisis 
appeared to make two or three visitations. Obviously a great deal of  research must be 
undertaken at the local as well as the regional level before the character of  the crisis or crises 
is fully known to us. For a beginning, see Masson to IN., 5 July 1770, C. 299, A.D. Aube; 
état d’apparences, 5 July 1771, C. 84, A.D. Somme; Monteymard to IN., 25 Oct. 1771, C. 
423, A.D. Marne; Geslin to IN., 8 May 1772, C. 1726, A.D. I-et-V.; Ateliers de Charité, C. 
591, A.D. Aisne; de Vandoul to IN., 21 April 1773, C. 2914, A.D. Hér.; Auron to IN., 5 July 
1773, C. 1440, A.D. Gir.; de Badoine to IN., 22 Oct. 1773, C. 89, A.D. Orne; Toulouse 
municipal accounts, 1773, C. 412, A.D. H-G.; C. 2626, A.D. Cal.; Letaconnoux, Le commerce 
des grains en Bretagne, 140–141; J. Godechot and S. Moncassin, “Démographie et subsistances 
en Languedoc,” 34, René Baehrel, Une croissance: la Basse-Provence rurale (Paris, 1961), 75–76.
 73 See, for these questions, Marcel Marion, Histoire financière, I; René Stourm, Les Finances de 
l’ancien régime, I; and J.F. Bosher, French Finances.
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adapt the fiscal administration to its needs. With few exceptions, the 
government fell back upon short-term, flimsy solutions, which sus-
tained it by postponing the reckoning to another time. Periodically, 
the government found itself  in desperate straits and had to seek a 
new accommodation or invent new expedients. The last major revi-
sion of  fiscal affairs occurred in 1763. It was meant to circumvent 
an impasse, not to be durable. Another crisis was in the making as 
soon as the preceding one had been quelled.
That it erupted, however, in 1770 and proved to be so violent seems 
to be directly related to the general economic crisis. Business distress 
and uncertainty made money, like grain, scarce. The financiers suf-
fered setbacks and the government found it difficult to obtain large 
doses of  fresh credit. Measured against the claims on the treasury—
one should say, more precisely, treasuries—the increased revenue 
which Laverdy said liberalization produced was a mere trifle. Maynon 
D’Invau had a 55,000,000 livres deficit, eighty millions in arrears, and 
was meeting the needs of  1769 with the anticipated receipts of  1770. 
“The finances of  Your Majesty,” the Controller-General confessed to 
the king, “are in the most horrible state of  ruin.”74 Facing imminent 
bankruptcy, Maynon resigned in December 1769. With him passed 
the last hope of  liberalization.
 74 Marion, Histoire financière, I, 246. Several contemporary observers depicted Maynon as 
a simple tool or “creature” of  Choiseul and attributed his downfall to the machinations 
of  Maupeou, who was determined to purge the ministry entirely of  Choiseul’s influence. 
Pidansat de Mairobert, Journal historique, 389–90; Moreau, Mes souvenirs, ed. by C. Hermelin, 
I, 187; Lebrun, Opinions, 27.
Chapter XI
FROM POLITICAL ECONOMY TO  POLICE: 
THE RETURN TO APPREHENSIVE 
 PATERNALISM
The government’s inability to stem the generalization and deepening 
of  the crisis at the very end of  the decade doomed liberalization. The 
new Controller-General, Terray, metaphorically portrayed the liberal 
experience as “the flood” and imagined his responsibility, in part, as 
channeling the waters back into their natural reservoirs and building 
dikes capable of  withstanding future inundations of  any sort. But he 
did not take a nostalgically antediluvian approach to the task—at least 
he tried not to. The problem was that de-liberalization did not bring 
instant recovery. Terray enjoyed virtually no respite from subsistence 
troubles during his four-year tenure and the subsistence troubles gen-
erated other political and economic problems which compounded 
the difficulty for him.
The discussion of  his administration is divided into three parts 
which mark the boundaries of  this and the following two chapters. 
The first concerns the return to a police regime, a transition not eas-
ily effected, and the nature of  Terray’s short- and long-term goals. 
The second examines the Controller-General’s efforts to apply his 
subsistence policy throughout the kingdom during the years 1771–74 
and the reactions of  a broad spectrum of  opinion to it. The third 
explores Terray’s use of  the king’s grain, a vital instrument in his 
attempt to parry the ongoing dearth, and the political costs of  gov-
ernment intervention on the supply side.
I
The abbé Joseph Marie Terray, “the best mind in the parlement,” a 
fifty-five year old clerical counselor from a modest bourgeois family 
which ascended slowly into the Robe during the last part of  the reign of  
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Louis XIV, became the new Controller-General.1 The departure of  
Maynon, a friend of  the physiocrats and a stout defender of  the liberal 
reforms, did not signify a determination within the royal council to 
change the grain policy. It was motivated by the financial imbroglio, 
not the subsistence crisis, two problems whose relationship at this point 
in time the king’s advisers did not clearly perceive. Although Terray 
had expressed serious doubts about the May declaration at the time 
of  registration, he had asked his colleagues to give it a fair chance. He 
had not taken an active role in the parlementary campaign against 
liberalization. Throughout his career as rapporteur of  royal legisla-
tion he had shown singular talent for mediating between the desires 
of  the sovereign court and those of  the king. At the end of  1769 it was 
expected that he would devote all of  his energies to the herculean task 
of  restoring a semblance of  order to the crown’s finances, leaving the 
subsistence question in the hands of  the liberals Trudaine de Mon-
tigny and Albert who remained in charge of  the grain department. 
Choiseul, whose influence in the council had not yet been undercut 
by Maupeou, detested the économistes but remained a partisan of  liber-
alization.2 At the moment Terray came to power, prices in Paris were 
still declining and the Parlement had lapsed into silence.
In the provinces, however, there was little warrant for subsistence 
optimism. A new wave of  grassroots reaction against liberalization 
broke over the kingdom, reaching from Normandy across the heart 
of  France to Franche-Comté and touching large areas of  the cen-
ter, the southwest, and the south. Exasperated by years of  unremit-
ting pressure and uncertainty, the local police groped desperately to 
uncover supplies and unmask “infamous monopoly.” In violation of  
the national laws, authorities in many towns and bourgs issued sen-
tences and ordinances prohibiting the removal of  grain or allowing 
removals only upon the award of  a special license, denying outsiders 
the right to purchase, banning all off-market exchanges, requisition-
ing supplies and obliging merchants to furnish quotas, imposing fixed 
 1 Gazette de France (23 dec. 1769), 418; Lebrun, Opinions cited by Girard, L’Abbé Terray, 30; 
M.-F. Pidansat de Mairobert, L’Observateur anglois, ou Correspondance secrète entre mylord all’eye et 
mylord all’ear (London, 1784), I, 89. See also Marmontel, Mémoires, ed. by Tourneux, III, 91 
and Jobez, La France sous Louis XV, VI, 460–61.
 2 I share Weulersse’s view of  Choiseul’s general attitude. Mouvement, I, 225–26. For an 
opposing view, see Girard, Terray, 70n.
While he seemed to defer to Trudaine de Montigny’s judgment on grain affairs, Terray 
labored from the beginning to force him out of  office. See J.-M. Augeard, Mémoires secrets de 
J.-M. Augeard, ed. by E. Bavoux (Paris, 1866), 66.
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buying priorities, forcing dealers to relax their price demands by refus-
ing them the right to withdraw unsold grain, forbidding stocking, and 
making inspections and inventories of  private granaries. As usual, 
the liberal press exaggerated and distorted the picture for political 
reasons, but there was nevertheless an element of  truth in the shrill 
outcry of  the Gazette de l’Agriculture, du Commerce, des Arts et des Finances 
that everywhere “commerce is hampered, proscribed, repelled” by 
the resurgence of  “high police.”3
In response to the protests against the cherté several parlements took 
measures aimed at provisioning the towns and preventing the drain-
age of  grain from their regions. In January 1770 the Bordeaux court 
ordered all grain owners in the provinces of  Limousin and Périgord to 
bring grain to market and banned all transactions in the granaries or 
the countryside. determined to close loopholes, several months later 
the council acting as a parlement in Alsace ordered, in addition to req-
uisitions and mandatory market exchanges, searches, and inventories. 
during the course of  the year, without authorization from the central 
government, the Parlements of  dombes, Alsace, Lorraine, and Metz 
segregated their jurisdictions from the rest of  the kingdom by unilater-
ally imposing embargoes on the departure of  any grain from within 
their boundaries. An arrêt of  the Besançon court, though it ostensibly 
forbad only exports abroad, had the same effect. Like its eastern neigh-
bors, Burgundy was the scene of  frequent popular disorders. In an 
effort to stem the price rise and restore tranquility, the Parlement for-
bad grain to leave the capital city of  dijon, required merchants wishing 
to deal there to register with the municipality, banned certain specula-
tive  practices such as trading in futures, and imposed a form of  requi-
sition. All these measures, in turn, encouraged (indeed, in some cases 
enjoined) local authorities to resurrect old controls. At the same time, 
a number of  intendants, especially in the eastern provinces, began to 
press for a modification of  the liberal laws.4
 3 See, for example, the cases in Sermaize-les-Bains, Caen, Bayeux, Angoulême, 
Fontenay-le-Comte, Tours, Amboise, Orléans, Saumur, St. dizier, Joinville, Rodez, 
and in towns in the Poitou, Guyenne, Auvergne, Berry, and Lorraine. Royal council 
arrêts de cassation 12, 19 Aug. 1770, AN, F12 6; CG to Turgot, 10 April 1770, AN, F12 
154; royal council arrêts de cassation, 9, 28 May and 24 June 1770, C. 774, A.d. L-A.; 
CG to IN. of  Champagne, 10 July 1770, AN, F12 153; CG to IN. of  Champagne, 24 
May, 2 June 1770, C. 417, A.d. Marne; duCluzel to officers of  Amboise, 11 May 
1770, author’s private collection; CG to La Galaisière, 10 July 1770, AN, F11 153; 
C. 908 and C. 910, A.d. P-de-d.; Gazette de l’agriculture, du commerce, des arts et des finances 
(7 July 1770), 506, (10 July 1770), 517–18, and (26 Jan. 1771), 59.
 4 Arrêts du Conseil, 19 Feb., 4 Aug., 31 Oct., 4 dec, 1770, AN, F12 6; CG to 
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In dealing with each of  these cases, the Controller-General main-
tained a staunchly liberal posture. In part this was the result of  the 
presence of  Trudaine de Montigny and Albert who ran the grain 
department. Yet, even after Terray forced them out of  the ministry in 
the summer of  1770, the government continued to take what passed 
for a liberal stand in response to specific instances of  police reaction. 
From the beginning it is clear that he did not share the all-embracing 
faith of  Trudaine and Albert in the efficacy of  liberty. On strictly 
practical grounds, however, he consistently favored the freest possible 
movement of  grain within as well as among different provinces. In 
order to enable surplus areas to succor deficit areas and deficit areas 
to unburden surplus areas, it was necessary to guarantee open cir-
culation in the interior. Though the family image habitually used to 
describe the fraternal relations which were supposed to exist between 
the various parts of  the kingdom had an old-fashioned ring, the aim 
of  this policy was wholly modern: the interdependence of  the com-
ponents of  the realm was a measure of  its unity, its political coher-
ence, and its national strength. Indeed, one of  the liberal arguments 
pitched to appeal to statemakers was the idea that liberalization would 
create stronger ties of  national unity even as government played a 
far less prominent role in mediating between regions, between cities, 
and between town and country. Terray, to be sure, did not associate 
unification with nonintervention, but the prospect of  watching the 
kingdom disintegrate into myriad quasi-autonomous, enemy camps 
under the impact of  dearth and doubt made him shudder along with 
the most unblenching liberals.
Unlike the liberals, Terray believed that, on many occasions, it was 
in the general interest for a province or an area to be closed or for trad-
ing relations to be artificially modified in some other fashion. But, he 
insisted, only the central government was in a position to determine 
when such steps were expedient. Nor was this only a matter of  reserv-
ing the decision to the central government because it was infinitely 
better informed than anyone else and thus in a position to make a 
better decision. Terray was as much concerned about settling the cru-
cial political question of  the competence to make decisions as about 
 Bertin, 10 June 1770, AN, F12 153; dijon Parl. arrêts, 4, 18 July 1770, C. 81, A.d. C d’O.; 
Girod, “Les Subsistances en Bourgogne à la fin de l’ancien régime,” Revue bourguignonne de 
l’enseignement supérieur, XVI (1906), viiin; CG to Amelot, 1 Aug. 1770, AN, F12 155; Mercure de 
France ( July 1770), 195–97; Besançon Parl. arrêts, 10 May and 20 Nov. 1770, B. 2174 and 20 
Aug. 1770, B. 3270, A.d. doubs; de la Corée to Terray, Sept. 1770, C. 844, A.d. doubs.
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assuring the quality of  decisions. The police reaction might very well 
constitute evidence that there was something very wrong with the law 
but it was not the prerogative of  parlements or local authorities (or, for 
that matter, of  the consumer-people) to abjure or remake the law on 
their own initiative and by their own devices. Regardless of  the circum-
stances, the Controller-General could not afford to give the impression 
that the government would tolerate local and regional particularism, 
vigilantism, or other forms of  subsistence home rule; to the govern-
ment, administrative and political anarchy, whatever its causes, was as 
abhorrent as social anarchy was frightening. Liberalization, inciden-
tally, became an awkward and inopportune test of  the political sys-
tem. Terray could not ignore the oft-repeated liberal charges that 
the government had lost control of  the situation, that it was not able 
(not merely unwilling) to command obedience, that it was reckless. 
(In retrospect the liberal accusation seems both ironic and true: the 
government of  Louis XV was not strong enough to govern absolutely 
or, what amounted to the same thing, it was not strong enough abso-
lutely not to govern.) Thus Terray had to teach the rebel parlements 
and local authorities a lesson even as he had to administer a lesson to 
rebel consumers. But that did not mean that he was prepared to cling 
to a grain policy in which he did not believe merely because it was 
the government’s inherited legal responsibility; unlike many of  the 
enlightened ministers of  the eighteenth century, Terray had no taste 
for pyrrhic victories.
On the grounds that they were contrary to the May and July laws, 
illegitimate assertions of  power, and, in addition, likely to do more 
bad than good, Terray had the council annul the measures taken 
by local authorities (that is to say, the local measures which were 
denounced formally to the government—which surely represented 
only a small portion of  the illegal acts of  local authority). They were 
“dangerous examples” certain to “intensify the dearth” by driving off  
suppliers, further alarming the public, and encouraging competition 
and strife between neighboring communities.5 “Instruct your substi-
tuts,” the Controller-General wrote the Paris Procurator General, 
 5 CG to IN. de Pont (Moulins), 23 June 1770 and to IN. Cypierre (Orléans), 29 May 
1770, AN, F12* 153, fols. 303, 327; CG to IN. Amelot (dijon), 5 Aug. 1770 and to 
IN. of  Metz, 25 April 1770, AN, F12* 155, fols. 6, 30–31; and the references in the 
preceding note. Even after he moved to an overtly antiliberal position, Terray continued 
to demand the annulment of  police measures which he judged inappropriate. In 
June 1772, for example, the Nantes municipality, which had battled so passionately 
for total liberty in the sixties, forbad the “export” of  any grain from the city and 
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that they must leave to the grain trade all liberty, that if  they should alter it they would 
drive away the very commerce upon which they must count in this moment for all their 
subsistence and which flees the places where it sees obstacles or blows of  authority.6
Terray also pressed the intendants to enjoin municipal officials “to 
protect the liberty of  trade and circulation.” Yet while the intendant of  
Tours gently consoled the town fathers of  Amboise with the assurance 
that the ministry has taken “the most effective measures for the provi-
sioning of  the provinces,” the Contrôle-Général reiterated the theme 
upon which Maynon had dwelled: the people and the police must learn 
to understand that private commerce, not government, supplies grain. 
Less than a year before Terray began a massive expansion of  the king’s 
grain operations, his office told the intendant of  Brittany that it was 
the intention of  the king to “cease all provisioning operations made by 
the efforts of  the government.”7 The new Controller-General inspired 
little confidence on the local level, at least in the beginning. Nor is it 
surprising to discover instances where the authorities openly defied the 
council by reissuing the cancelled sentences and ordinances in slightly 
altered form. To discourage police recidivism, the council added to its 
arrêts of  invalidation a clause holding the chief  police officer person-
ally responsible in his private capacity for costs, damages, and interest 
arising from further repetitions.8
The government rebuked the parlements in similar fashion. The 
royal council quashed the “embargo” arrêts of  the courts of  Lorraine, 
dombes, Alsace, Metz, and Burgundy on the grounds that they were 
illegal, ill-conceived, and inopportune, tending “directly to destroy the 
liberty of  circulation in all the extent of  the kingdom,” to cut “the ties 
which unite all the subjects” of  France, and “to authorize in the mind 
of  the people … the prejudice against liberty of  shipments.” Charging 
that its intervention had already driven up prices “considerably” in less 
than a month’s time and carried the people to the brink of  panic, the 
government suppressed the marketing controls revived by the Alsace 
court. Similar regulations reimposed by the Bordeaux Parlement 
 hinterland to other areas. The council quashed the measure on the grounds that it was an 
“abuse of  authority” contrary to the interests of  both the king and his people. Arrêt of  17 
June 1772, C, 774, A.d. L-A.
 6 Terray to Joly, 5 May 1770, BN, Coll. Joly 1148, fols. 22–23.
 7 CG to duCluzel, 9 May 1770 and duCluzel to officials of  Amboise, 11 May 1770, author’s 
private collection; CG to d’Agay, 10 Feb. 1770, AN, F12* 153, fol. 108. Cf. CG to Juges-
Consuls of  Nantes, 27 May 1770, ibid., fol. 267.
 8 See, for example, arrêt du conseil, 19 Aug. 1770, AN, F12 6.
Illustration 8. A mill designed for the process which Malisset called “economic milling.” 
P.-J. Malouin, Descriptions et détails des arts du meunier, du vermicellier, et du boulanger (Paris, 1767).
Illustration 9. Leprévost de Beaumont, the citizen who denounced the “famine plot,” 
languishing in prison. Bibliothèque Nationale.
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were annulled for “spreading alarm and terror and inciting the own-
ers of  grain to use all the means and detours to hide their grain,” that 
is, for causing the very hoarding which the magistrates claimed they 
wanted to prevent.9
Instead of  taking “dangerous” and “useless” measures on their own 
account, the Controller-General urged the parlements to apply directly 
to the central government for advice and remedies. Terray protested 
vehemently when the Besançon court named a special commission to 
deal with grain affairs. He asked the First President to do everything in 
his power to make sure that the commission “sits in inaction and that it 
takes no act of  authority: otherwise you will see the price increase still 
more and the grain flee, go into hoards, or perhaps lack totally.” Yet, 
in return for the quiescence he sought, it is not at all clear that Terray 
was able to deliver the help he pledged, at least not until he began 
to back his promises with the distribution of  government grain. One 
of  the grievances of  the Besançon magistrates was that grain pur-
chased for the urgent provisioning needs of  Franche-Comté was being 
intercepted in Burgundy and allocated for local use there. Committed 
to the principle of  free internal circulation, the Controller-General 
assured the Besançon Parlement that he would take steps to guarantee 
the movement of  grain into their province. But would the dijon court 
agree to honor the principle and to aid in supplying Franche-Comté 
at the risk of  depleting its own jurisdiction? Parlementary solidarity 
stopped short of  sharing scarce subsistence.10
II
A torrent of  riots heralded the soudure despite excellent portents of  
the coming harvest.11 The “whole town” of  Herman in Auvergne 
 9 Arrêts du conseil, 4 Aug., 31 Oct., 4 and 21 dec. 1770, AN, F12 6; CG to Bertin, 10 June 1770, 
F12* 153; arrêts du conseil, 19 Feb. and 27 July 1770, AN, Ad XI 39; Gazette de l’agriculture, du 
commerce, des arts et des finances (10 July 1770), 518 and (28 Aug. 1770), 629.
 10 CG to Grosbois, 29 May 1770 and CG to Amelot, La Galaisière, Rouillé and Maupeou, 24 
May 1770, AN, F12 153; de la Porte to de la Corée, 2 dec. 1770, C. 844, A.d. doubs. Cf. 
directeur des vivres at Besançon to IN. of  Champagne, 11 May 1770, C. 299, A.d. Aube. 
The Parlement of  Metz, on two different occasions, tried to set up permanent subsistence 
commissions, similar in structure and function to the Parisian assemblies of  police, to deal 
with all matters concerning provisioning. deliberations (registres secrets), 23 July 1770, B. 469, 
fol. 37 and 17 June 1771, B. 470, fol. 65, A.d. Moselle.
 11 The Gazette de l’agriculture, du commerce, des arts et des finances reported an expectation of  a
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 assembled, armed with rocks, to prevent the removal of  40 septiers of  
grain in March. At Mauriac in the same province, consumers also tried 
to stop “the export of  their subsistence.” Though the market was alleg-
edly “well-furnished,” large numbers of  dijonnais were in a violent 
and defiant mood in mid-May. Wandering bands ambushed grain 
wagons while others threatened to burn the city hall and pillage the 
marketplace. People at nearby Auxonne made similar efforts to block 
the outflow of  grain and force more of  it on the market. With tacit 
assistance from the police, a crowd at Tours attacked a passing grain 
boat. In an attempt to prevent grain removals, consumers transformed 
the marketplace at Tulle in the Limousin into a battleground, one of  
many which scarred the jurisdiction of  the Bordeaux Parlement that 
summer. “Furious” that prices continued to rise, consumers at Camb-
rai demonstrated in the streets. To defend their grain against outsiders, 
the inhabitants of  Loing, near Gray, turned to violence. Enraged that 
“their provisions were being taken away,” a part of  the Besançon citi-
zenry rose up in the market. Later in the year the people of  Besançon 
rioted again, shouting “they want to starve the city, we must not let one 
single grain wagon leave.” For almost three days crowds roamed the 
streets carrying sticks and pitchforks, insulting the police, and hunt-
ing for grain. The people treated those who were arrested as heroes 
and martyrs; they organized alms collections to help those “who were 
detained for having intercepted grain for the public good.”12
In August bread rioting buffeted Lyons. The Lyons experience 
illustrated why consumers had recourse to violence: because it 
worked, or at least appeared to work. Immediately after the ferment, 
the bread price in France’s second city declined, probably as the result 
of  administrative action. Terray understandably wanted the rioters 
to draw a different moral from their experience. At Lons-le-Saunier 
(Franche-Comté), for example, after a crowd pillaged the town’s 
storehouses, the Controller-General called for “an example capable 
 “quite generally abundant harvest.” (24 July 1770), 547. Though he was less sanguine 
about the prospect for real abundance, the intendant of  Picardy foresaw a crop comfortably 
sufficient to meet needs. draft to CG, 24 Sept. 1770, C. 83, A.d. Somme.
 12 Chaumeit to IN. (?), 26 March 1770, C. 908, A.d. P-de-d.; Sd to IN. (?), 12 March 1770, 
C. 907, A.d. P-de-d.; CG to First President, dijon, 19 May 1770 and to Amelot, 20 May 
1770, AN, F12 153; arrêt du conseil, 9 May 1770, C. 774, A.d. L-A.; arrêts of  Bordeaux Parl., 
11 Aug. 19 Sept. 1770, uncatalogued, A.d. Gir.; Taporten to IN., 15 July 1770, C. 5976, 
A.d. Nord; deliberations, Besançon Parl., 31 Aug. and 20 Nov. 1770, B. 3270, A.d. doubs; 
Lettres Ossolinski, 6 Aug. 1770, BHVP, mss. 628, fol. 67.
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of  containing the people and preventing them from resorting in the 
future to such excesses.” Yet he viewed the motives of  the insurgents 
with far more sympathy than had Laverdy and he did not press with 
his predecessor’s zeal for pitiless repression. Terray hesitated between 
sending king’s grain and king’s troops to troubled areas; in the end, in 
many instances, he seems to have dispatched both.13
during the course of  the summer and early fall disturbances 
marred  the peace in Upper and Lower Normandy, the Hainaut, 
Picardy, Anjou, the Touraine, Auvergne, the Nivernais, Alsace, and 
Lorraine.14 Some of  the most serious rioting occurred in Cham-
pagne. Alarmed at the prospect of  seeing their market depleted, 
consumers at Troyes demonstrated in order to prevent further 
removals, force the price down, and settle a score with a prominent 
dealer on whom they blamed much of  their distress. At St. dizier a 
trader known for siphoning grain out of  the community was forced 
to “abandon [his] grain to the discretion of  the people” when they 
attacked his drivers and threatened to burn his granaries. Crowds 
prevented the departure of  grain wagons from Joinville. At Sainte-
Menehould the “lowly people promised to let no grain go.” The 
police took note of  similar threats at Chaumont. The consumers at 
Bar-sur-Seine won a victory when the police, in order to dissipate a 
swelling riot, passed measures guaranteeing consumers first access 
to the market and ordered the sale of  stored grain at a fixed price 
below the current. Here, as in dijon, the people rose up to prevent 
the removal of  grain not by greedy speculators but by “the people 
of  the countryside” who came to the city in search of  subsistence. 
With nowhere to turn, the country folk felt increasingly desperate. 
 13 CG to First President, dijon Parl., 19 May 1770 and to Amelot, 20 May 1770, AN, F12 153; 
arrêts of  Bordeaux Parl., 11 Aug., 19 Sept. 1770, uncatalogued, A.d. Gir.; Lettres Ossolinski, 
6 Aug. 1770, BHVP, mss. 628, fol. 67; CG to de Flesselles and to de la Verpillière, 23 Aug. 
1770, AN, F12 155, fols. 27–29; CG to PG of  Besançon Parl., 9 Sept. 1770, AN, F12 155.
 14 CG to dupleix, 16 Aug. 1770 and CG to Jullien, 28 Aug. 1770, AN, F12 155, fols. 20, 38; 
lieutenant of  police of  Caen to Miromesnil, 20 July 1770 and Fontette to Terray, 21 July 
1770, C. 2653, A.d. Cal.; dehauld to IN., 19 dec. 1770, C. 5976, A.d. Nord; Gazette de 
l’agriculture, du commerce, des arts et des finances (3 July 1770), 500–501; François Lebrun, Les 
Hommes et la mort en Anjou, 139–40; C. 908, C. 910, A.d. P-de-d.; Journal politique ( July 1770, 
second quinzaine), 55–56; Lettres Ossolinski, 23 July 1770, BHVP. mss. 628, fol. 65; daniel 
Mornet, Les Origines intellectuelles de la révolution française (Paris, 1954), 445.
On the disorders, subsistence difficulties, and “mortalités” in eastern France in 1770–
1771, see; C. Pfister, “Le Magasin de blé à Nancy et la révolte de 1771,” Revue historique de la 
Lorraine (1906), 77–92 and F.Y. Lemoigne, “La Crise frumentaire de 1770–71 à Metz, Nancy 
et Strasbourg,” Bulletin de la Société d’Histoire Moderne (71st year, 15th series, number 3), 305.
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A delegation of  thirty “workers” [ouvriers]—future rioters—from 
a hamlet near Bar visited the fiscal procurator to complain that 
no one would sell them grain or bread. The procurator asked for 
authority to search local homes and storehouses with a brigade of  
the constabulary. At Reims, in July, “troops of  people” intercepted 
grain traffic on the roads and raided convents and other places sus-
pected of  keeping grain stocks. Continued violence obliged Choi-
seul to send troops, who remained in garrison for several weeks. 
To placate consumers, the municipal authorities agreed to review 
all grain transactions and to buy grain for resale to the public, 
presumably at discount. Not long afterward, the police at Vitry, 
in the aftermath of  a price-fixing and grain-blocking riot, began 
purchasing grain in the countryside for sale on the Vitry market 
below the current.15
Nor was the Paris region spared social conflagration.16 Price-fixing 
mutinies erupted throughout the Brie. At Coulommiers “the popu-
lace, after many tumultuous remarks, on its own authority fixed the 
price of  wheat at 2 livres 10 sous the bushel and forced the fermiers 
to give it at this price instead of  at 3 livres several sous which was 
the going rate.” At nearby Faremoutiers, after imposing a price on 
the laboureurs, a crowd rampaged through the streets and invaded the 
houses of  persons suspected of  hoarding grain. According to the fis-
cal procurator, it might have become a “bloody revolt” if  the Mother 
Superior of  a local convent had not distributed a copious quantity of  
wheat “to this starved people for a price much below that at which it 
was sold at the last market.” At Meaux, as in the rest of  the Brie, the 
cherté was crushing, there was a gaping “disproportion” between the 
 15 C. 1908, A.d. Aube; CG to Rouillé d’Orfeuil, 10 July 1770, AN F12 153; Mathieu to 
Goutier, 16 July 1770, C. 414, A.d. Marne; Masson to IN., 5, 17 July 1770 and IN. to CG, 
28 July 1770, C. 299, A.d. Aube; Reims municipality to IN., 12 July 1770 and Choiseul to 
IN., 2 Sept. 1770, C. 414, A.d. Marne; Lettres Ossolinski, 29 Oct. 1770, BHVP, mss. 628, fol. 
93; Heuvrard to IN., 3 Oct. 1770 and CG to IN., 14 Oct. 1770, C. 416, A.d. Marne.
 16 For the next four paragraphs: Farquel to PG, 20 July 1770, BN, Coll. Joly 1157, fols. 80–81; 
Cordenier to PG, 23 July 1770, ibid., 1151, fols. 52–53; Canelle to PG, 21 July 1769, ibid., 
1151, fols. 55–56; CG to Bertier de Sauvigny, 1, 9 Aug. 1770, AN, F12* 155, fols. 1, 10; 
memoir to PG from Lagny, July 1770, BN, Coll. Joly 1150, fols. 33–36, 47, 51; Petition of  
Simon Lenormand, et al. to PG, July 1770, ibid., 1150, fol. 44; Ganneron to PG, 18 June and 
23, 27 July 1770, ibid., 1149, fols. 118–19, 123–24, 126; petition of  “laboureurs et fermiers 
de la province du Mulcien,” 27 July 1770, ibid., 1151, fol. 61; Canelle to PG, 23 July 1770, 
ibid., 1151, fol. 59; CG to Chancellor Maupeou, 26 July 1770, AN, F12* 153, fol. 375; CG 
to Bertier de Sauvigny, 10, 26, 30 July 1770, ibid., fols. 353, 375–76, 380; CG to duc de la 
Vrillière, 28 July 1770, ibid., fol. 377; Beaufils to PG, 22 July 1770, BN, Coll. Joly 1149, fols. 
112–113; “Grains,” July 1770, AN, 80 AP 19 (Bertier de Sauvigny papers).
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needs of  the consumers and the available supplies, and unemploy-
ment and mendicancy were swelling the floating population. Toward 
the end of  July, a large band of  frustrated buyers “made themselves 
masters of  the sale and of  the price of  grain” at the market. Although 
they had sufficient force on hand to suppress the uprising, the author-
ities deemed it more prudent not to intervene.
At Lagny, “furious” consumers who “seemed to have concerted 
among themselves before the opening of  the market” attacked the 
laboureurs and then decided “to fix by private authority the price of  
grain” at 26 to 28 livres when the current was 35 livres the septier, Paris 
measure. On the day of  the riot the royal procurator managed to be 
absent and the maréchaussée refused to act on the strange and spurious 
grounds that “these facts were not of  its competence.” The citizens 
who denounced the revolt to the Procurator General—probably a 
group of  fermiers—explained it in terms of  the sort of  plot thesis which 
Turgot embellished and made famous several years later. The rebels 
were “of  the scum of  the people”—a phrase the police authorities 
usually avoided, partly out of  compassion, partly because subsistence 
riots were hardly ever the work of  the totally downtrodden or devi-
ant—and since they obviously could not afford to pay for grain even at 
fixed prices, it was safe to “presume” that “this money was furnished 
by other more wealthy individuals” who had some sinister interest in 
disturbing the social order. Among those arrested for the Lagny rising 
were several wine-growers who blamed the malaise of  the consumers 
on a different kind of  conspiracy, a local famine plot mounted by the 
producers and the notables against the people: “It is the fermiers, millers 
and bakers of  Lagny and the officers of  police who by a reprehensible 
concert will cause the little people to die of  hunger.” The week after 
the revolt, grain again was “prodigiously dear,” almost provoking “a 
second riot.” An atmosphere of  calm did not return until the lieuten-
ant general of  Lagny officially fixed the grain price at the end of  July.
To prevent a throng of  angry women from assaulting the laboureurs 
and pillaging their supplies, the royal procurator at dammartin fixed 
the price at 22 to 24 livres, 8 to 10 livres below the current. He ascribed 
the agitation in his market to the “long cherté ,” the responsibility for 
which he assigned squarely to the laboureurs who “believe themselves 
to be authorized in virtue of  the declaration of  the King of  1763” to 
withhold grain from the market, sell on samples, and introduce secret 
agents to bid against the bakers and consumers in order to drive the 
price higher.
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The laboureurs supplying Meaux and dammartin bitterly protested 
in a collective petition against the arbitrary and violent reception 
which greeted them at the markets and threatened not to return there 
again. They were frightened by rumors, of  the kind which would 
later mark the Great Fear, that bands of  “leagued persons” would 
terrorize them at home, rob them, and even burn them out. The 
thought of  the approaching season heightened their apprehensions, 
the fears of  the haves against the rootless have-nots:
… being near harvest-time, their Province will [soon] be filled with Strangers who 
come from the provinces of  Brie, Champagne, Lorraine, Burgundy and other places 
to work here, and a part of  whom would be capable of  joining this [local] populace 
and together cause the greatest disorders.
The laboureurs demanded that the government assure their liberty and, 
above all, their security. Faced with the threat of  empty markets, the 
royal procurator at Meaux implored the Procurator General to call 
upon “superior” authorities to assure the provisioning of  the markets.
The harvest, judged to be “excellent” in the Paris region, did not 
check the upward course of  prices. Between two market-days in Sep-
tember, the laboureurs at Brie-Comte-Robert raised the price from 36 
to 41½ livres the septier. Although they were known to have ample sup-
plies, they brought to offer for sale less than half  of  what they usually 
displayed in a “mediocre” year. An angry crowd at the grain stalls 
spat and cursed at the laboureurs, assaulted them, and tried to take 
their sacks. The feeling in the area, transmitted by the royal procura-
tor, was that the augmentation would continue unabated so long as 
the laboureurs were allowed to buy and sell freely. Authorities in the 
Beauce and the Pays Chartrain, where transactions and prices fol-
lowed the same pattern, expressed similar sentiments.17
In many places outside the Paris region, the harvest was insuffi-
cient or worse. Reports of  “terrible maladies,” “the appalling mortal-
ity rate,” and “extreme misery” circulated throughout the kingdom. 
Like their fathers and grandfathers in 1740–41 and 1709–10, the 
most impoverished journaliers, unable to obtain secondary grains, were 
forced to eat stuffs that one dares not call ersatz: “grass like the animals,” 
roots, various forms of  bark. Bitter weather, following a succession of  
bad harvests, deprived the people of  Alsace of  their last resources. In 
 17 Procurator of  Brie-Comte-Robert to PG, 13 Sept. 1770, BN, Coll. Joly 1153, fols. 8–9 and 
1154, fols. 43–44; B. 3989, A.d. E-et-L.
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the first eight months of  1770 the price of  wheat doubled at Nancy.18 
In the generality of  Caen, the ever-widening disparity between prices 
and wages reduced the people to desperation. “The price of  our labor 
is no longer enough to buy bread,” wrote the subdelegate of  Cambrai 
in the summer of  1770. “All goods have increased in price following 
the price of  grain,” observed another subdelegate in the same gen-
erality, “while the wage of  the workers has remained, in our region, 
at the level it was before the [liberal] Edict.” The result was a sort of  
class struggle between “the most wealthy but at the same time least 
numerous portion of  the nation,” which supported and profited from 
liberalization and the impoverished majority who “detested” the rich 
and “cried out passionately against the [liberal] law.”19
In a tone at once lugubrious and indignant, a subdelegate in 
Auvergne urgently requested assistance:
We are on the eve of  witnessing one of  the most horrible famines; there will be risings 
against the rich. I am doing everything in my power to pacify as much as I am able but 
the dearth is too violent; a host of  people in this area have died and are dying every 
day for want of  food.… While so many of  the miserable perish in the countryside, 
luxury and self-indulgence go on just the same in the big cities.
Elsewhere in the province municipal officials and curates announced 
that “whole families were dying of  hunger.” The subdelegate at Riom 
warned that, given their “state of  weakness,” the people would surely 
succumb to “maladies.” “It is the most fatal misery that man has ever 
known,” wrote a sergeant, “the men are beginning to emigrate and 
the women and children to die.” “Three quarters of  the inhabitants 
of  this community can no longer provide for their subsistence,” wrote 
the city fathers of  Maurs. Another subdelegate reported that desper-
ate people were abandoning their children: “I found one exposed at 
my door yesterday and the number increases every day.” While certain 
Auvergnats turned in extremis to infanticide, in the Hainaut, according 
to the subdelegate of  Valenciennes, the poor began to imitate the rich 
 18 Journal politique ( July 1770, second quinzaine), 55; Malyot to PG, 20 dec. 1770, BN, Coll. Joly 
1157, fol. 92; Regnaud, “Histoire des événemens arrivés en France,” BN, mss. fr. 13733, fol. 
27; Sd of  Haguenau, état de récolte, 1770, C. 391, A.d. Bas-Rhin; C. 364, A.d. Meurthe-
et-Moselle.
 19 First échevin of  Caen to Miromesnil, 21 July 1770, C. 2653 and Besnardière of  St.-Lô 
to Malafart, 28 July 1770, C. 2673, A.d. Cal.; Buillaboz to IN., 22 July 1770, C. 5976, 
A.d. Nord; Sd of  Avesnes, “Réflexions sur l’édit du mois de juillet 1764,” ca. Oct. 1770, 
C. 6690, A.d. Nord.
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by seeking to avoid having children, “so miserable” did this life on 
earth appear to them in the years around 1770. The intendant of  
Auvergne estimated, at different moments during the course of  the 
summer, that between 150,000 and a half-million people in the prov-
ince needed assistance in order to survive. At Riom there were 3,500 
beggars; one third of  the population of  Giat was reduced to men-
dicancy; charity alone sustained 2,000 “impoverished” at Aurillac.20 
Encouraged by Terray, who provided substantial sums from the royal 
treasury, intendants in Auvergne, Burgundy, Champagne, the Sois-
sonnais, and elsewhere organized public works projects and opened 
“ateliers de charité” to provide employment.21 Nor were the poor 
always consoled by the offer of  assistance, for they did not always 
understand it. Traditionally suspicious of  the far-off  government, the 
people and the village priests of  the mountain country of  Auvergne 
were terrified by the administrative questionnaires which the inten-
dant circulated in order to learn more about the state of  their exis-
tence. They were “persuaded that all the needy families would be 
sent to Guiana” as punishment for having fallen into misery.22
Voltaire deplored the onset of  “famine”: “I have a desire to carry 
my protests to the Ephémérides des Citoyens.”23 Madame d’Epinay and 
other friends of  Galiani kept the abbé, disconsolate since his recall 
from France, informed on the details of  the “very great dearth” 
spreading across the kingdom.24 “It is no longer time to descant, it is 
 20 Rynet to IN., 4 May 1770, and IN. to CG, May 1770, C. 912, A.d. P-de-d.; dubat to IN., 
27 June 1770, C. 918, ibid.; curé of  St. Priest to IN., 7 July 1770, C. 920, ibid.; destait to 
IN., 2 July 1770, C. 919, ibid.; Chevalier de Manoux (Combraille) to IN., 9 July 1770, C. 
920, ibid.; municipality of  Maurs to IN., 12 April 1770, C. 911, ibid.; Verdier (Aurillac) to 
IN., 20 March 1770, C. 908, ibid.; Monthyon to Terray, 15 March 1770, C. 912, ibid.; Sd 
of  Valenciennes to IN. of  Hainaut, Oct. 1773, C. 6690, A.d. Nord.
 21 Monthyon to CG, 14 May and 14 Aug. 1770, C. 924, P-de-d.; CG to Amelot, 4 Nov. 1770, 
C. 3363, fols. 71–72 and Amelot to élus des Etats de Bourgogne 17 Nov. 1770, C. 3355, fol. 
107, A.d. C d’O.; C. 591, A.d. Aisne; Gazette de l’agriculture, du commerce, des arts et des finances 
(12 Jan. 1771), 26; municipality of  Troyes to Rouillé d’Orfeuil, 1 July 1770, C. 1909, A.d. 
Aube. See also J.-L. Harouel, Les Ateliers de charité dans la province de Haute-Guyenne (Paris, 1969).
 22 Bugnet to first secretary of  IN., 30 March 1770, C. 909, A.d. P-de-d.
 23 Voltaire to comtesse d’Argental, 7 dec. 1770, in Correspondence, ed. by Besterman, vol. 77, 
pp. 135–36 (# 15782); Voltaire to Louis Gaspard Faliz, 7 dec. 1770, ibid., vol. 77, p. 137 
(# 15783). Cf. Voltaire to comte de Schomberg, 6 Jan. 1771, ibid., vol. 78, p. 14 (# 15917) 
and Voltaire to Mme. d’Epinay, 16 Jan. 1771, ibid., vol. 78, p. 32 (# 15938).
 24 Mme. d’Epinay to Galiani, 30 June and 22 July 1770, in La Signora, ed. by Nicolini, 71, 75; 
d’Epinay to Galiani, 29 Oct. 1770 in Mémoires et correspondance de Madame d’Epinay, ed. by 
J.P.A. Parison, (Paris, 1818), III, 382–84.
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time that you [begin] thinking about bread and the cruel dearth which 
threatens you by retracting a bad law that you have made,” the Nea-
politan wrote to Suard and, beyond him, to the French nation. “Ah! I 
was a Cassandra,” he added, “I was not believed and my prophecies are 
[now] accomplished.”25 “M. the intendant Turgot is very disconcerted,” 
the baron d’Holbach related, after describing the “dreadful dearth” in 
the center and southwest, “and I do not doubt that he will renounce the 
beautiful theory of  exports without limits.” The philosophe-impresario 
woefully underestimated Turgot’s ideological tenacity, though he rightly 
pointed out that the situation in the Limousin embarrassed the inten-
dant and taxed his energy and resources. despite his scruples, Turgot 
sponsored official supply operations in his generalité, partly with funds 
which the government, despite its solemn commitment to discourage 
public sector provisioning, provided for many intendants.26
Parisians once again saw the mercuriale reverse itself, reflecting the 
unrest in the hinterland. The new price spiral caused bitter disappoint-
ment, for 1769 had ended on a note of  relative optimism. For the first 
time in over two years, Hardy had noted in december, the consumer 
paid less than 3 sous the pound for the four-pound  loaf.27 Between 
February and June 1770, however, the common price of  wheat at the 
Halles rose from 20 to 28 livres the septier. The best white flour increased 
20 livres from 45 to 65. At Gonesse wheat went from 19½—21½ livres 
in February to 34½—38 livres in early October. Beginning in late 
April, bread began inexorably to follow the course of  wheat and flour. 
At the end of  August, Hardy recorded the four-pound loaf  at 15, the 
level of  december 1768, an inexplicable and unwarranted augmenta-
tion, for the harvest was “abundant … much prettier this year than it 
has been seen for almost ten years.”28 The police noted with concern 
the reappearance of  seditious placards on the walls. (“If  bread is not 
diminished and if  the affairs of  State are not put in order, we are 
twenty against one bayonet.”)29
 25 Galiani to Suard, 14 July 1770, in Correspondance, ed. by Perey and Maugras, I, 193. Cf. 
Galiani to Holbach, 31 July 1770, in Lettres, ed. by Asse, I, 113.
 26 Holbach to Galiani, 3 June 1770, in Amicie Corrispondenti Francesi dell’ abate Galiani, ed. by 
Nicolini, (Naples, 1954), 198; CG to Turgot, 5 Aug. 1770, AN, F12* 155, fols. 7–8; L. Cahen, 
“Le Prétendu pacte de famine,” Revue historique, 176 (Sept.–Oct. 1935), 209. Cf. Linguet’s 
attack on Turgot’s ostensibly inconsistent position on government provisioning operations. 
Annales, VI, 304–305.
 27 Hardy’s Journal, 13 dec. 1769, BN, mss. fr. 6680, fol. 276.
 28 Ibid., 28 April, 5 May, 14 July, 19 Aug. 1770.
 29 Ibid., 11 Sept., 26 dec. 1770.
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Albert, in a letter to Sartine in early May, insisted that the price 
increase was due merely to “a transient cause” and must occasion 
“no uneasiness.” He attributed it to bad weather, heavy seas, and 
flooding on the rivers, which impeded navigation and delayed the 
arrival of  foreign grain. As a result, Albert maintained, a number of  
deficit provinces were obliged to seek grain within the Parisian provi-
sioning crowns, thus momentarily forcing the price up. His  argument 
is rather strained, for it is unclear how these unnamed provinces 
could have managed to direct their buyers on such short notice and 
in such large numbers into the Paris zone. Nevertheless, the letter 
is revealing, for it gives some indication of  the magnitude of  for-
eign purchases made either by private speculators or by government, 
local and regional, or by a combination of  private enterprise and 
public backing. In the last two weeks of  April, 27,000  septiers, Paris 
measure, reached Nantes. On a single day in May a fleet of  25 large 
ships arrived with 75,000 septiers of  Baltic grain. Another 200,000 
septiers, mostly from danzig, were expected imminently at Nantes 
and still more grain was en route to St. Malo and Rouen.
“It is thus certain,” Albert assured Sartine, “that the subsistence for 
Paris will increase as a function of  the diminution of  the demand made 
by the other regions, and that the price will diminish in the same pro-
portion.” In addition to the increased pressure on Paris supplies, the 
inclement weather had resulted in an acute short-term flour shortage, 
exposing the capital to suffer despite the availability of  wheat. Flooding 
waters halted the operation of  the mills and the conversion of  flour. Bak-
ers bid the price of  flour out of  proportion to the price of  wheat. With 
the return of  temperate weather, the mills could be expected to resume 
normal production and the price of  flour to fall in line with wheat.30
If  one trusts Mercier, the habit of  “placarding” seems to have been lost after the seventies: 
“Formerly, it was common enough to find some critical placards on the affairs of  the day. 
So much surveillance was put into the pursuit of  the bill-posters that this usage has become 
impracticable.” Untroubled by a major subsistence problem after 1775, the vast majority of  
Parisians remained indifferent to public affairs, according to Mercier. Tableau de Paris, VI, 85–87.
 30 Albert to Sartine, 10 May 1770, AN, F12* 153, fols. 201–205. According to the “négotiants 
de Nantes,” almost 400,000 septiers of  grain plus hundreds of  thousands of  pounds of  
rice entered Nantes between January and June 1770. See their mémoire, ca. Oct. 1772, 
C. 774, A.d. L-A. Lassalle, a Nantes trader, told the intendant of  Auvergne that 18 
large grain vessels arrived in the first three weeks of  April and 50 more ships in the last 
2 weeks of  May. Lassalle to Monthyon, 23 April 1770, C. 911 and 30 May 1770, C. 915, 
A.d. P-de-d. Albert’s report of  Nantes’ arrivals was also confirmed by the intendants 
of  Tours and Brittany. duCluzel to CG, 9 May 1770, author’s personal collection and 
d’Agay to CG, 10 May 1770, C. 1718, A.d. I-et-V. Cf. also Paul Jeulin, L’Evolution du port 
de Nantes (Paris, 1929), 241.
 FROM POLITICAL ECONOMY TO  POLICE 507
Parisian authorities were less confident about the immediate 
future than the co-director of  the grain department. The “sub-
sistence of  Paris” did not increase as Albert promised, not even 
after the harvest. The Prévôt des Marchands Bignon and Sartine 
both expressed their alarm to Terray. The Lieutenant General 
denounced “maneuvers” and “removals” which diverted supplies 
from the capital and suggested the need for police intervention.31 
Cautiously, without sanctioning recourse to the “authoritarian 
way,” Terray, in September, asked the intendants of  the five gen-
eralities surrounding the capital to “invite the  laboureurs” to supply 
the markets that formed the chain of  the Parisian supply  system, 
markets which were not attracting enough grain to satisfy the 
demands of  the bakers and traders. “You must not act towards 
them by constraint,” the Controller-General instructed, “but only 
by the method of  invitation.” Invitation, however, in this instance 
clearly meant pressure, a form of  moral intimidation. The sub-
delegates were to speak personally to the laboureurs, make lists of  
the names of  those who agreed to cooperate, and keep a record 
“of  the success which they will have had” to be transmitted to the 
central government.32
At the same time Sartine called upon the government to increase 
the dose of  foreign grain to be placed at the Paris market. Terray 
agreed to provide from foreign and domestic sources enough grain 
to “fill the vacuum” left by the failure of  private commerce.33 In the 
course of  the next year the king’s grain operations grew even larger 
than they had been at the end of  the sixties. Major Paris area traders 
like Malisset, who had clients throughout the realm, were suddenly 
obliged to suspend all their provincial shipments in order to concen-
trate their supplies in the capital.34
While awaiting an injection of  fresh supplies, Sartine tried to shield 
the public from the full impact of  the price rise by rigidly control-
ling the price of  bread. Controls had remained in force throughout 
1769 despite the marked improvement in the price situation and the 
bakers had continued to protest bitterly against the injustice of  the 
constraint. They felt that they should be permitted to compensate for 
 31 Sartine to Joly, 26 Sept. and 4, 10 Oct. 1770, BN, Coll. Joly 1109, fols. 206–208; Sartine to 
CG, 10 Nov. 1770, AN, F12* 155, fol. 89; CG to Bignon, 29 Oct. 1770, ibid., fol. 69.
 32 CG to intendants of  Amiens, Soissons, Orléans, Champagne and Paris, 21 Sept. 1770, AN, 
F12* 155, fol. 47.
 33 Sartine to Joly, 30 Aug. 1770, BN, Coll. Joly 1428, fol. 240.
 34 J.-B. Malisset to Monthyon, 16 July 1770, C. 921, A.d. P-de-d.
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the sacrifices they made in 1768 by selling at a price slightly higher 
than the level warranted by the downturn of  the following year. The 
police, on the contrary, believed it was imperative to enable the con-
sumers to profit materially from the remission of  the cherté after two 
years of  constantly high prices.
As the grain price dropped in the spring of  1769, Sartine instructed the 
commissaires to require the bakers to reduce bread in proportion. In May, 
with the ceiling set at 13 sous, the vast majority of  bakers conformed, but 
not without expressing their resentment. In the district of  the commissaire 
Coquelin, for example, 25 bakers offered their four-pound loaves between 
12 and 13 sous while four claimed that “the merchandise was still rising” 
and thus it was “impossible to give it at 13 sous.” Although the top flour 
price momentarily rose from 55 to 58 livres the sack in early September 
before turning downward again in October, Sartine rejected the bakers’ 
demand for an adjustment, fixing the ceiling at 12 sous and arresting three 
bakers who vociferously contested his decision and increased the price 
without his authorization. “My intention,” he told the commissaires, “is 
that the bakers of  your market be informed of  this punishment which 
awaits them if  they are as audacious as the others.”
The Lieutenant General ordered the commissaires to be at the 
markets beginning at dawn and to remain there until after the “prin-
cipal sale” was completed at mid-day. If  any bakers attempted to 
raise the price, they were to be arrested “after the market”—Sartine 
did not want to risk provoking an incident while the crowds of  con-
sumers thronged the bread-stalls. Another arrest took place toward 
the end of  October when a faubourg St. Antoine bakeress selling 
at the Halles rejected a buyer’s bid of  12 sous—the maximum—and 
demanded an extra six deniers for the four-pound loaf. On the whole, 
however, Sartine reported that “everything is tranquil” at the end of  
the year.35
Save for an episode of  recalcitrance at the very beginning of  the 
new year, the police encountered little resistance from the bakers dur-
ing the first four months of  1770.36 Wheat continued to decline and 
Sartine gently scaled the price of  bread down to 10½ sous. In May, 
the mercuriale bounded upward and the bakers vehemently demanded 
 35 Sartine to Goupil, 6 April 1769, Arsenal, mss. Bastille 10277; Sartine to Coquelin, 29 May 
1769, AN, Y 13728; Sartine to Grimperel, 29 May 1769, AN, Y 13397; Sartine to Goupil, 
4 Sept. 1769, Arsenal, mss. Bastille 10277; procès-verbal, 21 Oct. 1769, AN, Y 12618.
 36 Sartine to Goupil, 4 Jan. 1770, Arsenal, mss. Bastille 10277.
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redress. Albert, despite his hardline liberalism and his abhorrence of  
commercial controls, urged Sartine to “contain” the bakers. While 
Albert regarded the cupidity of  grain merchants as the proper source 
of  commercial motivation, he denounced the “avidity” of  the bak-
ers as the “moral cause” of  the upturn in flour prices. (Five years 
later, when the Controller-General Turgot named him to the Lieu-
tenant General of  Police in the aftermath of  the Flour War, Albert 
threatened to hang the first baker who stopped making bread out of  
 dissatisfaction with the draconian price maximum he imposed.)37 Sar-
tine rejected Albert’s analysis and considered his advice to be wholly 
unrealistic. “The progressive augmentation which makes itself  felt 
on wheat and flour,” wrote the police chief, “forces me to permit the 
bakers to increase their bread by two liards [one-half  sou] for the four 
pounds at the first market.”
For the remainder of  the year, Sartine found himself  compelled to 
retreat.38 “It appears to me more than impossible to prevent an increase 
of  two liards per four-pound bread at the next market,” he wrote at the 
end of  August when the price had already climbed to 14 sous. In mid-
September, he informed his commissaires that he could not “dispense 
with according to those bakers who demanded it permission to raise 
their price another two liards” in view of  the “continuing” increase in 
the prices of  wheat and flour. “If  the bakers of  your department have 
not asked for an augmentation,” he added, somewhat quixotically, “you 
will tell them nothing.” At the end of  the month, bread climbed to 
15½ and 16 sous, skidding off  to 13 sous at Christmas, the level around 
which it was to remain during the next year. The conduct of  the bakers 
generally pleased Sartine. The only trouble he had with them in the 
second half  of  1770 occurred in december when a number of  mar-
ket bakers sold above the price ceiling and “excited” their confreres to 
emulate their defiance of  the police will. They received remarkably 
light punishments—verbal reprimands and 200 livres fines—either 
because Sartine no longer regarded their disobedience as a serious 
threat or because he sympathized with their difficulties.39
 37 Albert to Sartine, 10 May 1770, AN, F12* 153, fol. 205; Bachaumont, Mémoires secrets, XXX, 
292 (22 July 1775). Nicknamed “Albert Honni,” he was not a popular police chief. Moreau, 
Mes souvenirs, II, 257.
 38 Sartine to PG, 9, 13 June 1770, BN, Coll. Joly 1428, fols. 227–28; Sartine to Goupil, 10 
June 1770, Arsenal, mss. Bastille 10277; Sartine to PG, 22 Aug. 1770, BN, Coll. Joly 1428, 
fol. 308; Sartine to Goupil, 17 Sept. 1770, Arsenal, mss. Bastille 10277.
 39 Sartine to Trudon, 29 dec. 1770, AN, Y 15114; Chambre de Police (Châtelet), 
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Pointing to the proliferation of  disorders throughout the kingdom 
and the aggravation of  the cherté, Terray asked the royal council in 
mid-July 1770 to indicate publicly its concern over the deteriorat-
ing situation.40 By an arrêt of  the fourteenth of  the month, the coun-
cil reaffirmed the controversial liberal Edict of  July 1764 and in the 
same breath formally prohibited the export of  any wheat, rye, or 
barley outside the realm on the grounds that the price of  grain had 
surpassed throughout the kingdom the suspension point specified 
in the 1764 law. The fact that the council took pains to complicate 
and obscure a relatively simple matter suggests that there was still 
an influential party in its midst prepared to accept a momentary 
setback, but unwilling to repudiate the new regime and the law 
that spawned liberalization. Without this pressure, the government 
could have merely declared the suspension sine die of  exportation 
without reference to the earlier legislation. On the other hand, if  
it desired nothing more than to stem the actual drainage of  sup-
plies outside the kingdom, an arrêt du conseil was superfluous, for the 
prohibitive clause in the Edict of  July 1764 had already automati-
cally stopped exports in every part of  the kingdom save for some 
outposts in the east.41
The primary purpose of  the arrêt was political and psy-
chological. In Terray’s reading, public opinion held exports 
responsible for the prolonged distress. Although they did not 
understand precisely how it worked, the people—not only 
the little people, for educated observers like Hardy and more 
than a handful of  magistrates and police officials shared their 
view—believed that the dearth would continue as long as 
the government refused to pronounce formally on the export 
 ca. Jan. 1771, AN, Y 9474. Cf. the similarly indulgent treatment accorded refractory bakers 
in 1771: Chambre de Police, ca. Oct. 1771, AN, Y 9474 and Sartine to Trudon, 14 Nov. 1771, 
AN, Y 15114.
 40 Gazette de France (20 July 1770), 238; Gazette de l’agriculture, du commerce, des arts et des finances 
(24 July 1770), 548; there are copies of  the arrêt in C. 2592, A.d. Cal. and C. 6689, 
A.d. Nord. Cf. Girard, Terray, 38ff. and Musart, Réglementation du commerce des grains, 129. 
Exportation of  flour was not officially suspended by the central government until the end 
of  November, several weeks after it prohibited the outflow of  oats and legumes. CG to 
farmers-general, 12 Aug., 5, 22 Nov. 1770, AN, F12* 155, fols. 12, 73, 81.
 41 In fact there is evidence to suggest that there were numerous exceptions to this putatively 
universal export embargo. See, for example, officiers de l’amirauté to IN. (?), 15 dec. 1770, B. 
5646, A.d. C-M.
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question. “The principal good that this prohibition will produce in 
the provinces of  the interior,” explained the Controller-General, 
“will be to console the people and to make them see that the cherté 
does not come from the exports to which they attribute it.”42 By 
removing the ostensible root-cause of  the alarm, Terray hoped to 
calm public anxieties, convince the public that the government 
was not (or at least no longer) party to a plot to profit from their 
suffering, and to placate the critics of  liberalization. In order to 
reach the public, he repeatedly urged the intendants to give the 
arrêt the widest possible publicity.43 Terray also calculated that the 
arrêt would discourage speculators and grain owners from with-
holding their stocks in the hope that the ports and export stations 
would soon reopen. With no other prospective outlets, he told a 
provincial magistrate, they will now shift their attention to the pro-
visioning of  the interior.44
If  Hardy bespoke a widespread sentiment, then Terray could take sat-
isfaction. “Perhaps they [the ministers] have begun to see the disastrous 
consequences and results of  Exportation,” commented the book-seller 
in recording the news of  the arrêt.45 Yet the reaction of  the subdelegate 
at Valenciennes suggests that a good deal more was expected from the 
Controller-General. “At first,” the subdelegate told his intendant, the arrêt 
“raised a sensation and appeared surely to mean the return of  abundance 
at the halle.” But once it was “closely examined” by the speculators, they 
realized that “at bottom it placed no obstacle in the way of  their cupid-
ity.” By the end of  July the halle was less well supplied than before the 
arrêt. The only way to restore order, concluded the subdelegate, was for 
the king to restore the “regulations” governing internal trade.46 Other 
officials, in the royal administration and the parlements, similarly urged 
the Controller-General to prepare an all-embracing regulatory law mov-
ing far beyond the confines of  the July arrêt.47
 42 Terray to Turgot, 5 Aug. 1770, AN, F12* 155, fol. 8.
 43 Terray to IN. of  Tours, 15 July 1770, C. 94, A.d. I-et-L.; Terray to IN. of  Champagne, 15 
July 1770 and IN. to Terray, 2 Aug. 1770, C. 418, A.d. Marne.
 44 Terray to First President of  the Sovereign Court of  Nancy, 30 July 1770, AN, F12* 153.
 45 Hardy’s Journal, 18 July 1770, BN, mss. fr. 6680, fol. 172.
 46 Sd to Taboureau, 26 July 1770, C. 6690, A.d. Nord. If  one is to believe Fontette, 
intendant of  Caen, the July suspension ban did not succeed in “tranquilizing the people.” 
“Réflexions,” ca. Oct. 1770, C. 2523, A.d. Cal.
 47 See, for example, the magistrates of  Schlestatt to the IN. of  Alsace, 22 Nov. 1772, C. 390, 
A.d. Bas-Rhin and the deliberations of  the Metz Parl., 9 Aug. 1770, B. 469, fol. 42 (registre 
secret), A.d. Moselle.
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Turgot, the intendant at Limoges, vainly sought permission not to 
publish the arrêt in his généralité for fear that it would inspire a frenzy 
of  xenophobia, blocking not the flow of  grain abroad, but circula-
tion within the interior. Turgot’s fears, though doctrinaire in spirit, 
were by no means groundless. In the popular mind, export meant the 
removal of  grain anywhere outside its immediate sphere of  origin, 
and a number of  local judges and sovereign courts had already taken 
measures to place an embargo on the transport of  grain outside their 
jurisdictions. deeply committed to the principle of  free internal cir-
culation, Terray understood the risk and promised to act vigorously 
to prevent the paralysis of  circulation: “one cannot abuse this arrêt 
to place obstacles to the outflow of  grain from each généralité, article 
two expressly consecrating the liberty of  movement throughout the 
interior of  the kingdom.”48
Yet Turgot was perfectly correct in interpreting the arrêt, despite 
its formal concessions to the liberals, as a victory for reaction. Now 
that the ministry had officially banned exportation it would be virtu-
ally impossible to reestablish it on a national scale in the foreseeable 
future by means of  a global permissive law. If  exportation was indeed 
the towering symbol of  liberalization, the way seemed to be practi-
cally clear for a further shrinkage of  liberty. “It is full of  respect for 
the [law of] 1764,” Madame d’Epinay told Galiani in reference to the 
arrêt du Conseil of  July 1770, “and when you come down to brass tacks 
it destroys it from top to bottom.”49
There is no doubt that Terray was already contemplating a more 
fundamental de-liberalizing measure aimed not so much at reassuring 
the public as at re-equipping the police to assume responsibility for the 
orderly provisioning of  the markets. Shortly before the arrêt of  14 July, 
Trudaine de Montigny and Albert left the government. Their relations 
with the Controller-General had become strained over the manage-
ment of  subsistence affairs and their departure increased Terray’s free-
dom of  action. Terray personally assumed the direction of  the grain 
 48 Terray to Turgot, 5 Aug. 1770, AN, F12* 155, fol. 8. On Terray’s concern to prevent the 
export ban from serving as a pretext for stifling liberty in the interior, see CG to La Galaisière, 
1, 10 July 1770 and CG to First President of  Metz Parl., 30 July 1770, AN F12 153.
 49 Mme. d’Epinay to Galiani, 22 July 1770, in La Signora, ed. by Nicolini, 75. Cf. the attitude 
of  the Provence Parlement which fully understood the psychological aim of  the arrêt (“the 
uselessness of  this arrêt renders it suspect”) and which understood that, by reaffirming the 
July 1764 Edict, “the way was found to destroy it under the guise of  executing it.” Letter to 
Louis XV, 10 Nov. 1770, B. 3677, A.d. B-du-R.
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department. In an exchange with the Paris Parlement at the end of  
July, the government indicated that a “new regulation” was being 
prepared. The council continued to quash the ordinances and arrêts 
issued by local officials and the sovereign courts, which it regarded as 
infringements on royal authority and impediments to the free circula-
tion of  grain within the realm. But, at the same time, Terray made 
clear in his correspondence with provincial magistrates that the grain 
legislation was under review.
At the end of  August, just a few weeks before Terray completed 
his grain project, the Parlement of  Paris promulgated a regulatory 
arrêt which the council did not annul. It seems certain that the Par-
lement knew that the arrêt would pass unopposed and it is probable 
that  Terray gave it his blessing in draft if  he did not in fact collaborate 
in its  composition. Smoothly and without éclat, the Parlement achieved 
everything for which it had battled so ferociously and abortively in 
1768–69. Arguing that the “excessive cherté of  grain perpetuates and 
renews itself  each day” and that it was the “result of  monopolies and 
hoarding [which] continue in the midst of  the most favorable harvest,” 
the Parlement considered it “indispensable” to intervene “to prevent 
the present crop from being taken away from the People, reducing them 
to the harshest extremities in depriving them of  their subsistence.”
Although it did not effect a total return to the old police regime—
both the Assembly of  General Police and the Parlement had decried 
the occasional excesses of  the traditional system—the arrêt specifically 
abrogated many of  the liberties granted by the declaration of  May 
1763 and unleashed the local police by restoring their generous dis-
cretionary powers. Anyone, regardless of  profession or status, could 
still enter the grain trade, but henceforth he or she would be required 
to register with the local police name, “quality” (socio-professional 
rank), address, places of  storage, and the same information regarding 
any associates with whom the prospective merchant shared the busi-
ness. In addition, the trader would be obliged to keep a record-book, 
“in good and due form,” of  all purchases and sales of  grain and flour, 
a requirement which a number of  registrants found difficult to fulfill 
given their inability to read and write.
The thesis that the grain merchant was in some sense a public 
servant triumphed in the arrêt: it enjoined him to bring “a sufficient 
quantity” of  grain regularly to the market(s) he furnished. “In case 
of  necessity,” it empowered the police to “force” the merchants 
with magazines in their jurisdictions to supply the  marketplaces. 
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Nor could dealers buy or laboureurs sell grain futures, grain still in 
the ground, or grain not yet placed in the barns or storehouses; 
all contracts made to these ends were pronounced void. The par-
lementary arrêt did not, however, restrict all transactions to the 
public markets, the constraint which the merchants in the days 
before liberalization found more vexatious than any other. Pre-
sumably, the magistrates felt that the local officials would have 
enough leverage over the merchants without a formal off-market 
ban. Such a restriction, in any event, would not have applied to 
merchants serving the capital who had always been permitted to 
scour the countryside and buy in the granaries.
Finally, as Terray would have wished, the arrêt instructed the police 
to “maintain, with the greatest care, the free circulation of  grain in 
the kingdom.” The phrase “in the kingdom” rather than the more 
legally accurate “in the ressort of  the Parlement of  Paris” was not 
merely a tiresome emblem of  the court’s overmighty pretensions. The 
latter formula might have been construed as an invitation to obstruct 
the free passage of  grain on the suspicion or pretext that it was des-
tined for shipment outside the Paris boundaries. If  for no other rea-
son than to protect the supply lines of  the capital, which depended 
upon resources within and outside the ressort, the Parlement wanted 
to prevent interference with grain movement.50
The government’s failure to quash the Paris arrêt, following hard 
upon its formal suspension of  exports, plainly signalled the direction 
in which royal policy was moving. during the next five months at 
least two other parlements passed regulatory arrêts fashioned after the 
Paris model. Though the government did not relish this proliferation 
of  parlementary intervention, it did not annul the arrêts in question. 
Instead Terray urged the magistrates to delay execution and “to defer 
taking precautions which might perhaps be necessary to take concern-
ing the grain trade” in anticipation of  a general regulatory law dealing 
with all aspects of  the grain problem which the king pledged to issue 
shortly.51 A major reversal in public policy was imminent. The new 
policy promised to bring order not only to the grain trade but to the 
 50 BN, Coll. Joly 1109, fols. 184–85; ibid., 1111, fol. 144; Hardy’s Journal, 29 Aug. 1770, BN, 
mss. fr. 6680, fol. 179; Lettres Ossolinski, 6 Aug., 3 Sept. 1770, BHVP, mss. 628, fols. 67, 77; 
Journal politique (Sept. 1770, first quinzaine), 50; des Essarts, Dictionnaire, I, 22–23.
 51 Amelot to Mesnard de Cornichard, 20 dec. 1770, AN, H 187; Gazette de l’agriculture, du 
commerce, des arts et des finances (12 Jan. 1771), 27; CG to First President of  Conseil Supérieur 
d’Alsace, 21 Sept. 1770, AN, F12* 155, fols. 46–47.
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police of  the grain trade as well. In the future, parlementary and local 
initiatives would be politically superfluous as well as unwelcome.52
The local police welcomed the Paris arrêt with enthusiasm. For years 
they had been lobbying for a revival of  their authority. In violation of  
the law and the express prohibitions of  the king, many of  them had 
taken action on their own account, in the course of  the past several 
years, in order to provision their markets and to restrict the freedom 
of  the dealers. In the late sixties, they implored the Procurator Gen-
eral to seek a modification of  the liberal reforms. In the months before 
the August arrêt, when prices soared and riots erupted throughout the 
Paris region, they again besieged Joly de Fleury with letters groping 
for authorization and encouragement to take measures which they 
believed to be urgently necessary, but which they knew to be against 
the law. His town in a “critical” situation in mid-July, the fiscal procu-
rator of  Saint Florentin in Champagne asked: “Could I, My Lord … 
prohibit individuals from selling to others than the inhabitants and bak-
ers of  this city, have inspection visits made in all the granaries, reduce 
everyone to his provision, and constrain them to expose and sell the rest 
on the market?”53 Similarly, the royal procurator at Tonnerre, “fearing 
some outbreak,” inquired if  he could “as he did in 1740 and 1742,” 
compel all the laboureurs, fermiers and bourgeois owners in the radius of  
three leagues around the town to bring their grain to market.54
Before the August arrêt Joly could not tell them what they wanted to 
hear, at least not frankly and confidently. In September, however, when 
the royal procurator at Gallardon complained that the laboureurs were 
buying in the markets for regrate or hoards instead of  supplying grain 
and justifying their conduct “on the pretext of  the free trade in grain,” 
Joly told him to announce that the trade was no longer free, at least 
not in the sense that they understood it.55 In response to other reports 
of  laboureur and merchant maneuvers from Montlhéry,  Rambouillet, 
Sézanne, Méry, Meulan, Sens, Charly, Brie-Comte-Robert, and 
elsewhere, the Procurator General urged repression.56 In October, 
 52 See, for example, Terray’s hostility to the initiatives taken by the Besançon court to intensify 
the grain police. Terray to First President, 10 dec. 1771, B. 2850 and Terray to. IN., 
22 Aug. 1772, C. 354, A.d. doubs.
 53 Billebaute to PG, 16 July 1770, BN, Coll. Joly 1152, fol. 10.
 54 Heuvrard to PG, 11 July 1770, ibid., fol. 75.
 55 Royal procurator of  Gallardon to PG, 29 Aug. 1770, ibid., 1153, fol. 73.
 56 Prévôt of  Montlhéry to PG, 8 Sept. 1770, ibid., 1153, fol. 13; royal procurator of  
Rambouillet to PG, 1 Sept. 1770, ibid., fol. 14; officers of  the bailliage of  Sézanne to PG, 4 
Jan. 1771, ibid., 1155, fol. 23; royal procurator of  Brie-Comte-Robert to PG, 13 Sept. 1770, 
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when the Tonnerre procurator again asked permission to coerce 
the suppliers, Joly cheerfully authorized him “to force the laboureurs 
to  furnish the market.”57 To deal with refractory merchants, Joly 
instructed the police to use fines and threats of  arrest, confiscation, 
and exclusion from the trade.
To depict the police campaign against the traders after the August 
arrêt as a sort of  grain terror would be to misrepresent its nature and 
exaggerate its scope and aims. Most of  the local officials appear to 
have acted with moderation. Yet it is clear that in some places, the 
police struck out mercilessly against the suppliers. After years of  
eclipse and frustration, the police seemed to relish their revenge. 
At Mantes, for example, the officials conducted an anti-monopoly 
inquisition, making numerous seizures and arrests, investigating the 
most trivial complaints with unwonted assiduity, and resuscitating 
sixteenth and seventeenth century prohibitive legislation which the 
law of  May 1763, still operative albeit modified, had abrogated.58
The Paris Parlement set the example in the hunt for monopolists. 
Even before the August arrêt, it had opened an investigation—its third 
major probe since 1768—and had made several arrests. Monopoly 
of  course embraced an extraordinarily wide range of  offenses, from 
petty regrate and rumor-mongering to large-scale international specu-
lation. The king and the Parlement disputed the existence of  monop-
oly in 1768 because they did not subscribe to the same definition of  
the notion. From the liberal perspective, almost everything which had 
once been stigmatized as monopoly was a legitimate manifestation of  
self-interest. In good times, the authorities tolerated many of  the prac-
tices which they vilified as monopoly in periods of  stress and shortage.
The singularity of  the Paris situation, since the late sixties, according 
to many of  the critics of  liberalization, was that there were adequate 
supplies available—supplies which were diverted from the markets for 
criminal motives. If  natural failure by itself  was insufficient to account 
for a dearth, then it must be considered the work of  monopoly. Witness 
the reasoning, in October 1770, of  Rolland de Challerange, a sixty-nine 
year old counselor in the Paris Parlement promoted to the Grand’-Chambre 
a year earlier, in his interrogation of  a suspected grain monopolist:
 ibid., 1153, fol. 8; royal procurator of  Charly to PG, 14 Sept. 1770, ibid., fol. 9; PG to judges 
and procurators of  Méry and Meulan, Sept. 1770, ibid., fol. 13; royal procurator at Sens to 
PG, 29 Sept. 1770, ibid., fol. 15.
 57 PG to procurator of  Tonnerre, 21 Oct. 1770, ibid., 15.
 58 Ibid., 1151, fols. 7–49.
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Represented to him [the accused] that the persistent cherté of  grain after a harvest 
which everyone agrees to be of  good quality and which would be sufficient to put 
bread at a price much below its present level can only come from illicit and secret 
maneuvers to keep grain forever at a very high price in order to make a greater profit 
at the expense of  the people who lived much more easily without the monopolists and 
other merchants who made a commerce that can be regarded as murderous. That it 
is these clandestine purchases which have given rise in many places to murmurs of  
the people to these complaints against the merchants and to riots which can have the 
most disastrous consequences.59
The Procurator General repeatedly asked his substituts to report evi-
dence of  maneuvers to his office. In September 1770, Sartine pre-
pared a questionnaire for the royal and fiscal procurators in the Paris 
supply crowns in which he asked them, “to what do you attribute 
the present cherté?” and hinted that he would not be surprised if  the 
answer were “monopoly.”60
The records of  at least one parlementary monopoly case have sur-
vived. The “monopoly,” first detected at Mantes but encompassing a 
much larger area, involved at least six different dealers based at Poissy, St. 
Germain-en-Laye, Houdan, LaRocheguyon, and Mantes. The Parlement 
had reason to believe that there existed “a society of  persons who bought 
as much grain as they could and at a higher price than it should have 
been selling and this in the hope that by making the price of  grain rise it 
would make more considerable profits.…”61 One of  the accused was a 26 
year old retail grain dealer who exercised certain police functions at the 
Mantes market, including the inspection of  entering grain, ringing the bell 
for the opening and closing of  business, and short-term storage of  unsold 
merchandise. The examining magistrates charged him with collaborating 
with the monopolists, permitting them access to the market before other 
traders, and accompanying them on sub rosa buying missions. The accused 
firmly denied that he was part of  any conspiracy “to deprive the people of  
its subsistence.” When asked if  he had heard of  the parlementary arrêt of  
August, he replied affirmatively, but claimed that it did not apply to him 
because he was not a wholesale grain trader or an associate of  one.
Another suspect had entered wholesale grain trading shortly 
after the passage of  the liberal laws in the mid-sixties with a 300 livres 
advance from his father. The accusation that he was “one of  the 
 59 Interrogation, 24, 25 Oct. 1770, AN, X2B 1312. On Rolland, see Bluche, Origine des 
magistrats, 374.
 60 Sartine to Joly, 20 Sept. 1770, BN, Coll. Joly 1109, fols. 195–96.
 61 “Affaire des bleds,” 13, 20, 27 Oct. 1770, AN, X2B 1312.
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principal authors of  the augmentation of  grain and of  the continued 
cherté of  bread” he characterized as neither “true nor plausible.” While 
the indictment charged that he had, in concert with others, purchased 
more than 6,000 sacks of  grain from laboureurs and hoarded them in secret 
caches during the past six months, the merchant pictured himself  as a 
petty, blatier-type trader whose operations were neither “mysterious nor 
clandestine.” He insisted that he never sought more than “a small profit” 
from the rapid turnover of  small quantities exchanged “at the current 
price” and that since his commerce was “so imperceptible” he could not 
possibly have caused the “sensation” for which he is held responsible. Are 
you aware, the magistrate queried him, of  the August arrêt devised 
in order to halt the progress of  the illicit paths by which the price of  grain was main-
tained much higher than it should have been … and in order to give the grain mer-
chants rules to conduct their commerce and make it impossible for them to abuse it 
to the detriment of  the people?
The merchant replied that “he had heard that an arrêt of  the court of  
parlement was cried out but that he does not know what it contains 
not knowing how to read and no one having read it for him.” His 
commerce was so small that he esteemed that it “does not merit that 
he be given or take the quality of  grain merchant” and thus he had 
not registered like the others. In any case, the defendant added, the 
arrêt no longer applied to him because he had decided to renounce 
the grain trade in order to deal in apple cider.
It hardly seems accidental that this trader embraced the grain 
business when the government abolished the rules of  conduct and 
abandoned it when they were reimposed. Whether this means that 
he had an abject and dishonest character, as the police suggested, or 
a shrewd mind and a sensitive nature, as the liberals might have con-
tended, is subject to dispute. Nor do we know if  many other liberty-
made merchants left the trade at the end of  1770 in disgust with the 
police revival. despite their zeal and bravado, the magistrates do not 
seem to have been able to marshal sufficient evidence to make a for-
mal case against any of  the putative monopolists, although many of  
them languished in prison while the investigation continued.
At the very moment that the Paris Parlement issued the August 
arrêt, its sister court at Besançon launched a furious onslaught against 
“monopoly,” “hoarding,” and other “odious crimes” which denied the 
people “life’s first substance.” Merchants who withheld grain “in the 
hope of  making themselves masters of  the price and of  making great 
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profits before the next harvest” would no longer be able to find pro-
tection in the right of  property. Such trading practices were nothing 
less than “theft and usury.” To stamp out such abuses, the Parlement 
published an arrêt voiding all sales of  futures and ordering an all-out 
campaign against monopolists. A companion arrêt sought to prevent 
illicit exports undertaken on the pretext of  provisioning the frontier 
regions. The millers in particular were stigmatized for practicing this 
fraud. Numerous arrests were made in the next few months.62
The Parlement at Metz organized a similar campaign. Already in 
May it had convoked an “assembly of  general police” to consider 
ways to quiet the “spirit of  rebellion” which possessed the people 
as their subsistence became less and less certain. Given the “exces-
sive price” of  grain and its rarity, one magistrate told the assembled 
chambers, the people had “just worries” which it was the duty of  the 
court to assuage. The people blamed their misery on “monopoly”; 
the “great rumor” in the summer of  1770 was that the “hoarders” 
would devour the whole crop before it reached the markets. The 
Parlement adopted this analysis, at first in order to placate public 
opinion, but later because the evidence seemed to show that it cor-
responded to reality. Resuscitating legislation which had been abro-
gated by royal decree, toward the end of  July the court banned all 
purchases of  grain futures and ordered the Procurator General to 
open a broad inquiry into the phenomenon of  “monopoly.” In the 
fall the Chambre des Vacations stepped up the investigation in the hope 
of  securing exemplary indictments. On the motion of  a magistrate 
who was shocked by signs of  monopoly, which he perceived at the 
Metz city market, the Parlement convoked the municipal authorities 
just before Christmas in order to impress upon them the urgency of  
“preventing maneuvers” and repressing socioeconomic crime.63
IV
At the end of  december, the government finally issued its long 
awaited grain arrêt which, in the words of  Hardy, “ordered nothing 
 62 deliberation of  Besançon Parl., 20, 21 Aug. and 7 dec. 1770, B. 2174 and B. 3270, 
A.d. doubs. Cf. Supplique Forquenot, Jan. 1772, B. 4463, ibid.
 63 deliberations, (registres secrets), Metz Parl., 17 May, 12, 19, 20 July, 17 Oct. and 22 dec. 
1770, B. 469, fols. 22–23, 33, 36, 37 and Vacations, fol. 2 and B. 470, fol. 24, A.d. Moselle. 
Nor did the Parlement’s anti-monopoly energy flag with the passage of  time. See, for 
example, 17 June 1771, B. 470, fol. 65, ibid.
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other than the confirmation of  everything which the Parlement of  
Paris had decreed by its arrêt rendered on the same subject in the 
month of  August last.”64 A draft version of  the new law had been 
ready as early as mid-September. Terray needed time to circulate the 
project to solicit the reactions and recommendations of  magistrates 
and intendants, but there was no doubt in his mind about the sub-
stance of  the changes to be made—they had already been foreshad-
owed in August—and it is reasonable to assume that he would have 
wanted the law to take effect rapidly in view of  the continued disor-
ders throughout the kingdom, especially in the east and northeast.65
It seems probable that the delay between the elaboration and the 
promulgation of  the de-liberalizing law was linked to the acute tensions 
between the crown and the parlements over the d’Aiguillon affair and 
the internal struggle for power between Maupeou and Choiseul. Pre-
cisely what the relationship was between Terray’s law and the burgeoning 
political crisis is difficult to determine. Was it merely a coincidence, in the 
complex flurry of  great events which marked the turn of  the year, that 
the king submitted the letters patent destroying liberalization to the Paris 
Parlement only a few days before he issued lettres de cachet which destroyed 
the Parlement as it had been traditionally known? Was there political 
significance as well as poetic justice in this double climax: a striking tri-
umph for the Parlement followed immediately by a staggering defeat? 
The sovereign court had campaigned passionately for a restoration of  
the old-fashioned monarchy of  authority, and Louis XV, casting aside 
his drab liberal vestments, offered the Parlement resounding proof—far 
more than it had bargained for—that the old-style monarch, paternal 
and despotic, had returned. Could it be argued that the government 
timed the two events to deprive the Parlement of  the fruits of  its victory, 
to emphasize to the public that the repudiation of  liberalization was a 
decision judiciously reached by the council rather than an act of  weak-
ness and a concession to the court? Yet the Parlement had already won 
its point in August and the other sovereign courts, including those which 
sided with the king on liberalization, also reeled under Maupeou’s coup.
Was the double climax orchestrated to strike a double blow against 
 64 Hardy’s Journal, 29 dec. 1770, BN, mss. fr. 6680, fol. 197.
 65 The draft version of  the new ban reached all the intendants by the first week of  October. 
Terray urged them to rush their comments to him in order to enable him to present a law 
for registration in the parlements immediately upon the rentrée in early November 1770. For 
copies of  the draft and covering letters, see C. 417, A.d. Marne; C. 1431, A.d. Gir.; C. 89, 
A.d. Orne; C. 94, A.d. I-et-L.; C. 844, A.d. doubs.
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Choiseul, who was believed to favor liberalization and to be a sup-
porter of  the parlements? Choiseul played an ambiguous role in the 
early days of  both the Brittany affair and liberalization: both ques-
tions merit further investigation. Yet it is hard to grant much weight 
to the claim, alleged by some contemporaries, that Choiseul incited 
parlementary resistance to royal policy on many different issues in 
the sixties.66 The parlements needed no prod to oppose the policies 
of  the government. Nor was it in the foreign minister’s interest to 
weaken the authority of  the government, especially if  he hoped to 
restore French fortunes abroad. On the other hand, as we shall see 
in a moment, Maupeou tried to profit from the subsistence crisis by 
blaming it on the liberal ministries in which Choiseul was believed to 
have played a leading role. According to Hardy, the arrêt of  december 
1770 by which the government repudiated liberalization “is regarded 
as a political tactic of  the council to induce the public to believe that 
the duc de Choiseul Minister newly disgraced had the greatest responsibil-
ity for the grain cherté.”67
It could be argued that the de-liberalizing law was a cynical politi-
cal measure meant to appease the public and put it in a more hos-
pitable mood to receive the news of  the stroke against the sovereign 
courts. Sartine warned the Chancellor against preparing “a storm 
at this most untimely moment.” The Lieutenant of  Police intimated 
that he could not answer for the reaction of  the people “who were 
already in misery from the cherté of  bread” and who were now “going 
to see their suffering brought to the limit” by the projected coup.68
If  other Parisians shared Hardy’s view, then it appears that observers 
 66 On Choiseul’s special relation with the parlements, see Besenval, Mémoires, I, 366; Mercy 
to Marie-Thérèse, 23 Jan. 1771 in Correspondance secrète entre Marie-Thérèse et le comte de Mercy-
Argenteau, ed. by A. d’Arneth and A. Geoffroy, (Paris, 1875), I, 126–27; Flammermont, 
Maupeou, 173, 109, 153, 187–89, 228; Charles Vatel, Histoire de Madame du Barry (Versailles, 
1883), I, 444; abbé Georgel, Mémoires, I, 199.
 67 Hardy’s Journal, 29 dec. 1770, BN, mss. fr. 6680, fol. 197 (my italics).
 68 Cited by Flammermont, Maupeou, 110n.
There was considerable tension between Sartine and Maupeou. The Lieutenant General 
opposed the coup and refused to appear with other councillors of  state before the new 
Parlement. Later we shall see that he also had serious flare-ups with Terray. According to 
Moreau, it was only “the confidence of  the public which kept him in place.” If  Maupeou did 
not dare discard him, he nevertheless cast him in a “sort of  disgrace.” That he ascended to the 
ministry along with Turgot after the death of  Louis XV suggests that his differences with the 
triumvirate were well known in political circles. See Moreau, Mes souvenirs, ed. by C. Hermelin, 
I, 262, 422; Pidansat de Mairobert, Journal historique, VI, 54 (10 June 1774) and VI, 61 (18 June 
1774); Pidansat de Mairobert, L’Espion anglais, I, 286–87; and Flammermont, Maupeou, 284–85.
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began to make a connection between the subsistence question and 
the Triumvirate’s political plans by the late fall of  1770. Through-
out the sixties, Hardy had never questioned the motives of  public 
authorities who labored so zealously to lower the price of  bread in the 
capital. But on Saturday, 17 November 1770, after noting that “the 
exempts [police agents] roam the markets and arrange for the bread to 
be put at 13½ instead of  14 sous,” Hardy wrote:
it is feared, however, that this diminution was only momentary and … that it had 
for its aim the project formed by the chancellor to bring violent blows against the 
parlement upon its return [from recess] and to deprive it of  the resource of  the dis-
content of  the people occasioned by the cherté of  bread.69
It would have been perfectly reasonable for any government, includ-
ing one which did not intend to bring the Parlement down, to try to 
“deprive” it of  an issue which gave it great leverage and which was in 
any case an embarrassment to the administration. Yet it seems quite 
plausible that Maupeou pressed Sartine to make extraordinary efforts 
to reduce the bread price in preparation for his coup.
In Paris the dearth was a political onus to the government, for it was well 
known that the Parlement had for several years vigorously opposed the lib-
eralization policy in the name of  cheaper bread. In certain of  the provinces, 
however, especially at the seats of  the liberal parlements, Maupeou could 
exploit the dearth to political advantage. There is some indication that the 
chancellor launched a propaganda campaign meant explicitly to portray 
the parlementaires as the authors of  the subsistence crisis, as men who 
sacrificed the public interest to personal greed on the solemn grain ques-
tion as blithely as they had on other matters of  general concern. In a letter 
written in the spring of  1771, the President de Brosses of  the Burgundy 
Parlement, one of  the most distinguished provincial magistrates in the 
kingdom, asked: “What do you have to say about the fabrication [by which 
the government] persuaded the people throughout the whole kingdom 
that the parlements had caused the famine, having been the promoters 
of  the grain export edict [of  1764]?” Maupeou’s tactic alarmed the Presi-
dent. “You could not believe,” he continued, “how much this innocent 
artifice is used in order to win support for our destruction, and it does not 
work badly.” Elsewhere he referred to the “ridiculous” and “base” rumor 
spread by “emissaries dispatched throughout the kingdom” that the “par-
lements run the grain monopoly.…” The charge was bitterly ironic to 
 69 Hardy’s Journal, 17 Nov. 1770, BN, mss. fr. 6680, fol. 188.
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de Brosses because he was sure that, if  anyone practiced grain maneuvers ,it 
was the government itself. Maupeou was trying to deflect the famine plot 
suspicions away from the government and towards the parlements and 
he was successful, de Brosses esteemed, because “the people of  the cit-
ies,” who “abhor exportation,” are ready to believe anyone who promises 
that the dearth will soon end.70
“To prepare the Provinces for the commotion,” claimed one of  the 
leading anti-Maupeou “journals” of  the seventies, “emissaries of  the 
Chancellor have for some time been spreading the rumor that it was 
the parlements which were the cause of  the cherté of  grain in the prov-
inces.” The word was spread that it was “in part to punish them for 
the Monopoly which a great many of  their members secretly oper-
ated that they were being suppressed.” What worried the parlemen-
tary party was that “these insinuations had taken deeply in the minds” 
of  the people. “Far from expressing the least attachment to these 
Magistrates, whom they once regarded as their Fathers,” the people 
“ardently wish a change which they hope will result in their happi-
ness.” Everywhere the people were ready to “abuse” and “insult” the 
exiled parlementaires, as in fact they did at Besançon.71
“The people could not conceive that the dearth was due to acciden-
tal causes,” noted an observer in Franche-Comté; “they blame it on the 
grain monopoly and on the export of  grain to Switzerland.” Already 
in 1770 a councillor in the Besançon Parlement had stood accused 
before his colleagues of  hoarding grain and promoting higher prices 
for speculative purposes. Maupeou, assisted by the First President of  
the court, allegedly turned the climate of  opinion to political advan-
tage by fostering the idea that the magistrates were “the authors of  the 
monopoly and of  the cherté in the City and the Countryside.” After the 
departure of  the exiled parlementaires, lamented only by the wealthier 
elements of  the population, the issue continued to agitate the citizenry. 
A pitched battle erupted between the sons of  the exiled magistrates 
and the sons of  the Maupeou surrogates. The latter renewed the “atro-
cious charge” that the old court had caused the dearth while the former 
denounced a conspiracy to besmirch the old court involving, inter alia, 
“a momentary maneuver” by which prices were lowered to smooth 
 70 Letters of  de Brosses, 16 May and Sept. 1771, cited by J.-T. Foisset, Le Président de Brosses, 
histoire des lettres et des parlements au 18e siècle (Paris, 1842), 315–16, 321–22. On de Brosses’ 
cautious attitude toward liberalization, see ibid., 378–79. On Maupeou’s use of  the cherté, 
see also Flammermont, Maupeou, 425–26.
 71 Pidansat de Mairobert, Journal historique, II, 147 (24 Sept. 1771). Cf. ibid., II, 146 (23 Sept. 
1771) and II, 194 (25 Oct. 1771).
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Maupeou’s assault on a once popular institution.72 Though it is pos-
sible that individual members were implicated in speculative activi-
ties, directed against the court as a corporate body the charge seems 
strangely awry, especially in light of  the Besançon Parlement’s critical 
posture toward liberalization.
Objects of  the same accusation, the Rouen parlementaires must 
have viewed it with utter incredulity, for no corps had cried out ear-
lier or more violently against the liberal reforms, the dearth, and the 
crimes of  monopoly. The people of  Rouen apparently had a nuanced 
and selective memory and a taste for scapegoats. According to Terray, 
the people remembered “that it was this Company [the Rouen Par-
lement] which addressed the first representation demanding the unlim-
ited export of  grain”—it was true, in the exuberant wake of  the Edict 
of  July 1764—and thus “the people rejoiced publicly” when Maupeou 
struck at the Rouen court, “believing that this Company earned it as 
a consequence of  the excessive cherté of  bread which the new form of  
administration [i.e., liberalization] had occasioned.” It was the Chan-
cellor, of  course, who had coached the people’s memory by organizing 
a propaganda campaign on the eve of  his coup aimed at discrediting 
the magistrates.73 At the same moment, an observer at Grenoble noted 
that “our Poor Parlement is in Extremis and by its own fault (if  the sen-
timents of  the People should prevail), for, according to them, it is the 
Parlement which is the cause of  the grain cherté .…”74
On the eve of  the Maupeou coup, the Parlement of  Aix detected 
a plot linking Terray’s projected new grain law and the struggle over 
the Brittany affair. Though their suspicions lacked the concreteness of  
the charges later formed at dijon, Besançon, and Aix, they turned on 
the same basic notion: that there was a ministerial conspiracy afoot to 
win over public, especially popular, opinion and neutralize it politically 
at a very crucial juncture in royal-parlementary relations by discredit-
ing and dismantling the liberal system and introducing a new law that 
carried the explicit promise of  lower prices. “It is not possible to doubt, 
Sire,” the Aix magistrates told Louis XV, “that some hidden interest 
which we have not yet unraveled presides over this maneuver.” In a rare 
moment of  generosity, the Parlement intimated that sincere concerns 
 72 Ibid., II, 116–17 (5 Sept. 1771); A. Estignard, Le Parlement de Franche-Comté (Paris, 1892), I, 
380–81 and II, 211–13.
 73 Terray to the comte de Périgord, 25 Nov. 1772, C. 2912, A.d. Hér.; Floquet, Histoire du 
parlement de Normandie, VI, 422, 638–39.
 74 Mélanges Letourneau, June 1771, IV. 1458, Bibliothèque Municipale de Grenoble.
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inspired some of  the critics of  liberalization. But what distinguished 
the promoters of  Terray’s de-liberalizing campaign was precisely the 
fact that they were “partisans of  bad faith who know the truth and who 
wish to stifle it.…” Though they knew that liberty was not really at 
fault, for iniquitous political reasons they made it “odious” by blaming 
it for the dearth and for public misery. If  things work out as the Terray-
Maupeou faction hopes, 
the Regulation [Terray’s forthcoming december law] will have the merit of  having low-
ered prices in a year of  abundance. The vulgar imbecile [the people, especially the urban 
crowd] will not perceive the maneuver at all, they will attribute the cherté to the new police 
[i.e., to liberalization] and abundance to the restoration of  [police] regulations.75
We cannot say with confidence whether Maupeou’s campaign was 
really of  the scope that de Brosses and others suggested and whether 
it had the effects they indicated. Surely it was a cunning idea, for no 
issue was more explosive than the grain issue, especially among the 
urban people.
It may indeed have been partly responsible for the fact that Mau-
peou’s parlementary suppressions and reforms were received with such 
relative tranquility by most of  the provincial populations.76 But the royal 
de-liberalizing legislation was the necessary concomitant to Maupeou’s 
propaganda campaign, the proof  of  the government’s good faith. For 
if  the government had not issued Terray’s new law at the moment of  
the parlementary reforms, the public might have connected the Mau-
peou coup with grain maneuvers and continued subsistence distress 
even as the Chancellor tried to link the parlements with dearth and 
monopoly. Without the december de-liberalizing law the Maupeou 
coup might have been seen, especially in the cities which sheltered 
antiliberal parlements, as a new, more insidious phase of  the vicious 
plot symbolized by the famine pact. Although this argument, like the 
suspicions of  the Provence Parlement, has the merit of  drawing a direct 
 75 Letter to Louis XV, 10 Nov. 1770, B. 3677, A.d. B-du-R.
 76 Bastard-d’Estang, Parlements, II, 492. Cf. ibid., II, 446–47.
If  one is to judge by the efforts of  the Metz court, the parlementaires were determined 
not to allow the subsistence issue to be turned against them again. Positing a subsistence 
mentality which will always cause the people to react to stress in the same fashion, one of  
the presidents proposed a plan aimed at shielding the Parlement from any “pact” suspicions. 
By demonstrating to the people through repeated public actions (inquiries, regulatory arrêts, 
etc.) that “you are taking care of  their Subsistence,” he told his colleagues, you will be 
“blessed” by public opinion. See deliberations, 17 June 1771, B. 470, fol. 65 (registre secret), 
A.d. Moselle.
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connection between the grain and the constitutional crisis, it can do 
no more than help to explain the timing of  de-liberalization. Regard-
less of  the outcome of  the parlementary question, Terray was plan-
ning to repudiate the liberal reforms. After the August 1770 arrêt it was 
merely a matter of  time before the era of  liberalization formally came 
to an end.
It should be noted that the Paris Parlement, in its last hours, also tried 
to make political capital out of  the grain question.77 Understandably, 
the court did not want to be deprived, as Hardy put it, of  an issue on 
which it had expended so much energy and which had served to reaf-
firm its popularity with the people of  the capital. But the Parlement 
itself  had dampened the issue with its arrêt. When, in early december 
1770, in response to Maupeou’s disciplinary edict, it raised the ques-
tion of  the prolonged dearth, the misery of  the people, and the failure 
of  the government to publish its long-promised general de-liberalizing 
law, the court’s position was no longer credible. It was too late. It was 
widely known that Terray’s measure was forthcoming. The parlemen-
tary maneuver was a transparent diversionary ploy. It warned the gov-
ernment that it still faced serious subsistence problems, but Terray knew 
very well what he had to do to deal with the situation. It reminded the 
government that the Parlement commanded a devoted following, but 
the ministry refused to be intimidated by the vague threat of  a popular 
disturbance in favor of  the court.
Theoretically, conditions were favorable for a popular demonstra-
tion. The price of  bread was still high in the beginning of  1771 and 
the Maupeou reforms were decried everywhere in the capital. A poster 
found on walls in various parts of  the city captured the general mood: 
“Bread at two sous.—Chancellor hanged or Revolt in Paris.”78 It is often 
alleged, somewhat smugly, that people do not revolt for bread alone. In 
this instance, they had a political issue as well as a material or economic 
one. Sometimes it is more difficult to explain why a revolt did not take 
place than to explain why one did occur. As a deterrent, Maupeou orga-
nized a fairly massive display of  force in the capital. doubtless many 
persons did not know exactly what to make of   Maupeou’s actions. In 
the past, after all, the Parlement had always been recalled after exile. It 
was not entirely implausible to imagine that an accommodation would 
be reached. The parlementaires themselves were unprepared to invite 
 77 Flaramermont, Maupeou, 135.
 78 Poster cited by ibid., 425–26 and Vatel, du Barry, II, 43.
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the population to revolt violently. discontent with Maupeou was rife 
in the capital, but there was no leadership to mobilize it and give it 
direction. Finally, it is possible that the affections of  Parisians for the 
Parlement did not run as deeply as I have suggested or that after more 
than three years of  acute subsistence distress and anxiety the people 
were emotionally and physically drained.79
Although the Parlement raised the grain smokescreen in a desperate 
effort to gain some time, liberalization was no longer really a matter of  
concern to the magistrates. From September 1770 onwards, the parle-
ments were fighting for their survival over a different matter. Maupeou 
hinted broadly that he would settle for nothing less than total submission 
and the sovereign courts rediscovered the pressing need for solidarity.80 
In the polarization generated by the Maupeou offensive, attitude toward 
liberty was no longer a mark of  party. Choiseul, who had supported lib-
eralization, stood as the champion of  the Paris Parlement.81 The liberal 
Trudaine de Montigny, like many others associated with the community 
of  philosophes, deplored the coup, despite his disdain for the antiliberal 
parlementaires.82 Voltaire energetically backed the government against 
the sovereign courts, although he had become increasingly skeptical of  
liberalization. The debate over liberalization was a question of  how to 
rule; the debate over the liquidation of  the d’Aiguillon quarrel quickly 
became a question of  who was to rule. The Parlement of  Paris, in the 
battle over the liberal reforms, had never challenged the right of  the king 
to change the grain laws; it challenged his wisdom and warned that he 
was undermining his authority. The d’Aiguillon affair raised fundamen-
tal constitutional questions about the location and exercise of  authority.
If  liberalization cannot be considered a cause of  the  Maupeou 
coup, it nevertheless helped create the conditions which  prepared the 
way for the rupture between crown and  sovereign courts. Firstly, it 
 79 On the discontent in Paris and the fear of  revolts, see Besenval, Mémoires, I, 376 and 
Flammermont, Maupeou, 216–17, 250–52. Cf. Mercier, Tableau de Paris, VI, 27.
 80 Cf. in this regard the militantly liberal Parlement of  Provence’s pointed admonition to the 
government in November 1770: “that His [the King’s] Parlements, animated by the same 
zeal, can be divided on a political question concerning the interest of  the state without 
prejudicing the essential union formed among them by the identity of  functions, the link of  
the same sentiments, common ground and solidary duty.…” Alluding to the Brittany affair, 
the court warned that, when “the laws [are] in danger and the Constitution of  the State 
threatened by a fatal change,” the parlements will always stand together. deliberation, 
10 Nov. 1770, B. 3677, A.d. B-du-R.
 81 Flammermont, Maupeou, 153ff.
 82 Ibid., 235–36.
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rekindled a climate of  acrimony between the government and several 
of  the parlements. The goodwill earned by the liberal courts could 
not purchase redemption for the Parlements of  Paris and Rouen, 
which engaged the monarch in a vituperative debate for several years. 
Although they advanced no constitutional claims in these exchanges, 
they pretended to speak for and represent the will of  the people, a 
pretension which the crown rightly found offensive and threatening.
Secondly, the prolonged grain crisis provoked a general economic 
crisis which caused serious and widespread social disorder and placed 
great strain on the finances of  the government. Liberalization had 
begun on a sanguine note. The government had hoped that it would 
generate a wave of  prosperity which would relieve some of  the politi-
cal and financial pressure it felt and clear the path for further reforms. 
Liberalization did not cause but it ended in economic disaster. The 
government was deeply disappointed with the results and resentful 
of  the parlements’ charges that it was responsible for the misery of  
the people and the recession of  the economy. Faced with subsistence 
disorders throughout the kingdom, in 1770, the government also had 
to deal with the question of  its own solvency. The parlements had 
already expressed their hostility to Terray’s initial financial measures 
and they were certain to resist any serious effort to reform the fis-
cal structure.83 The anticipation of  parlementary resistance to the 
Controller-General’s program helped to seal the fate of  the sovereign 
courts. Maupeou would have had more difficulty and less support in 
seeking to provoke a confrontation with the parlements had there not 
occurred an economic crisis of  great magnitude and had liberaliza-
tion fulfilled the ambitions of  its architects.
If  the socioeconomic disorder associated with liberalization facili-
tated Maupeou’s drive against the sovereign courts, there is also some 
evidence that the prolonged cherté reinforced the parlementary will to 
resist in the provinces. The Brittany Affair (1765–70) began after an 
extended period of  low and/or declining cereal prices. Low prices 
meant diminishing income for a substantial bloc of  the nobility. Just 
as the Brittany Affair began to take shape, the short-term price trend 
sharply reversed itself: from the subsistence point of  view we saw the 
consequences as early as 1765. Even as rising prices hurt the bulk of  the 
population, they enhanced the economic position of  the Breton nobles 
 83 C.F. Lebrun, Opinions, rapports, cited by John Rothney, ed., The Brittany Affair and the Crisis of  
the Ancien Régime (New York, 1969), 272.
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who controlled the Rennes Parlement and dominated the Estates. Lib-
eralization gave them solid grounds to anticipate a continuing upward 
price-movement or at worst a stabilization around a new high level 
(the bon prix of  the économistes). By strengthening the fortunes and the 
prospects of  the noble political elite, liberalization may have helped 
to sustain the Brittany Affair and encourage hard-line parlementary 
opposition.84 This argument, it should be emphasized, does not explain 
parlementary attitudes. The attitudes themselves cannot be understood 
in terms of  a short-run model of  material betterment leading to ris-
ing expectations and growing pugnacity. The argument can, however, 
help to explain why the climate was favorable for political resistance in 
 Brittany as well as in some of  the other provinces.
There is still another connection between liberalization and the Brit-
tany Affair, which inspires less confidence because it is serpentine and 
strained.85 It is more a personal than a political link, joining two of  the 
most prominent figures of  the decade of  the sixties, doctor Quesnay, 
the physiocratic founding father, and La Chalotais, the Procurator 
General of  Rennes, the one known for his intellectual contribution to 
the liberty movement and the other for his central role in the Brittany 
 84 This tack is suggested by Meyer, Noblesse de Bretagne, I, 513. See also on the relationship 
between the economic crisis and the Maupeou coup, the luminous remarks of  P. de 
St.-Jacob, “Histoire économique et sociale dans les archives de la Juridiction-Consulaire de 
dijon,” Bulletin de la Société d’Histoire Moderne, 56th year (Oct. 1957), 7.
 85 This argument is drawn from the fragmentary memoirs of  Lenoir, who succeeded Sartine 
as Parisian Lieutenant General of  Police. Lenoir’s recall of  detail is remarkable, for he 
wrote years after the fact. Even more striking is his extraordinary insight: he understood 
the politics of  the Old Regime, both high and low. Though he had strong feelings about 
the conduct of  affairs in the last decades before the Revolution, his presentation was on the 
whole fair-minded. It was marred less by a lack of  balance or a desire to settle scores 
than by an abiding sense of  discretion about what he observed and overheard. Just as he 
did not spend his tenure as Lieutenant General collecting chronique scandaleuse, so he did 
not spend his retirement recollecting it. It is worth emphasizing that he did not consider 
the La Chalotais-Quesnay episode as petite histoire. He suspected that it may have been 
of  enormous importance, though he cautiously avoided a full-blown interpretation of  
its relationship to the Brittany Affair, perhaps because he felt he did not possess all the 
necessary information. Lenoir, it must not be forgotten, played an important role as a special 
royal commissioner in the persecution and prosecution of  La Chalotais. See mss. 1423, 
piéces 34ff., Bibliothèque Municipale d’Orléans. This episode is the subject of  a recent 
article by Michel Antoine, “En Marge ou au cœur de l’affaire de Bretagne? Intrigues et 
cabales de M. de la Chalotais,” Bibliothèque de l’Ecole des Chartes, CXXVIII (July–dec. 1970), 
369–408. Antoine is a remarkably erudite and perspicacious historian, but his analysis is 
flawed by a bitterly anti-parlementaire bias—not surprising from the leading authority on 
royal government in the eighteenth century. On the Quesnay-La Chalotais link, see also 
Henri Carré, La Chalotais et le duc D’Aiguillon (Paris, 1893), 21–22, 67, 173n.
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Affair.86 In the early sixties La Chalotais frequented Quesnay’s apart-
ment at Versailles. Politically ambitious, the parlementaire also 
thought of  himself  as a philosophe, a title to which his part in the 
campaign against the Jesuits and his celebrated essay on education 
gave him a genuine claim. An established philosophe, Quesnay, per-
haps under the tutelage of  Madame de Pompadour, developed a keen 
interest in politics. It is well known that at various times he promoted 
Mirabeau and Lemercier for ministerial posts.
Now it appears that Quesnay decided to invest all his hope in La 
Chalotais; at about the time of  liberalization, the two men began 
to talk seriously about ways to make La Chalotais a minister. Their 
maneuvers are said to have aroused the ire of  Choiseul, who already 
disliked Quesnay (and was much less discreet about his feelings after 
the death of  their mutual protectress, Pompadour, in 1764) and who 
felt threatened by La Chalotais’ political ambitions. In order to dis-
place Choiseul and catapult La Chalotais to the head of  a new minis-
try, Quesnay and La Chalotais allegedly tried to win Louis XV’s favor 
through the good offices of  a new mistress. After that failed, they pur-
portedly attempted to pressure the monarch—indeed, to blackmail 
him—by threatening to reveal parts of  an intimate correspondence 
between Louis and his lover, which would have seriously embarrassed 
the crown.87 Fortunately for the king, the plot was uncovered and an 
early analogue to the “affair of  the diamond Necklace” averted.
This story, embedded in the interstices between the great events 
of  the sixties, is intriguing, though the evidence and the interpreta-
tion are by no means wholly convincing. If  it is true, it could help 
explain Louis XV’s personal appetite for punishing La Chalotais and 
his decision to quash the case entirely without, however, clearing the 
Procurator General’s reputation or releasing him from detention.88 It 
 86 As we have indicated, La Chalotais was one of  the leading spokesmen for the liberal 
movement; in fact, he was more widely identified with liberalization in the public view than 
was Quesnay. See, in this regard, the testimony of  a Paris merchant who was “convinced 
that the nation owes the first rays of  [grain] liberty” to La Chalotais. “Lettre d’un négociant 
de Paris à un commercant de Nantes,” 15 July 1768, C. 775, A.d. L-A.
 87 On several occasions, La Chalotais suggested that he did not collaborate in the plot but 
that it was the idea of  Quesnay alone and the work of  one Sieur Reynie, chef  des gobelets 
du Roi, “one of  these low intriguers, of  whom there are so many at Versailles.” Reynie, 
remarked the Procurator General, is one of  the valets used by the Economistes.” Though 
he equivocated on this point, Lenoir seemed inclined to believe that if there was a plot to 
catapult La Chalotais to power, then the Breton magistrate was personally involved. Mss. 
1423, pieces 34ff., Bibliothèque Municipale d’Orléans.
 88 In the campaign of  support for the Brittany court, the liberal parlements pictured 
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would also help account for Choiseul’s willingness to force the issue 
against La Chalotais and the Breton court despite the fact that he 
despised d’Aiguillon, who was as menacing a political rival as the 
Procurator, detested the Jesuits, who were d’Aiguillon’s friends and 
La Chalotais’ enemies, and sympathized with the parlements, all of  
which supported La Chalotais.
Viewed upon this background, it could be argued that two of  
the most important leaders of  the liberty lobby, Quesnay and La 
 Chalotais, motivated by a desire for political power (presumably to 
use in the service of  the new political economy), were responsible 
not for creating the Brittany Affair but for giving it the peculiar form 
it took. In this same light there are several conjectures one could 
make about the impact of  the cabal upon the liberalization experi-
ence. It is possible that Choiseul’s failure to play a major role in the 
execution and defense of  the liberal reforms was related to his fear 
and dislike of  the two intriguers. He might have calculated that a 
successful liberalization program would jeopardize his position by 
enhancing Quesnay’s influence with the king and thus La Chalotais’ 
chances of  entering the government. The exposure of  the plot might 
have cooled Louis’ ardor for the liberal policies so closely associated 
with the Quesnay faction. Unlike his collaborator, Quesnay was not 
punished for his part in the conspiracy, but he did lose favor with the 
king. Although he was the likely candidate to succeed to the vacant 
post of  first royal physician in 1770, he was passed over for the honor. 
The intrigue proves that at least one of  the “speculative” économistes 
was perfectly capable of  practicing hard-nosed, earthy politics.
All of  this is rather far-fetched; it reads too much like A Glass of  
Water. A good deal of  clarification will be required before the cabal 
thesis can be fairly assessed. Yet between Pompadour on the one side 
and du Barry and the Cardinal de Rohan on the other, the rudi-
ments of  the story do not seem implausible. There are of  course far 
more compelling reasons for the repudiation of  liberalization and for 
the constitutional crisis to which the Brittany Affair led. But, without 
restoring court politics to center stage, it is perhaps worthwhile to 
remember that the events of  the sixties and seventies were not always 
the product of  prices and principles.
 La Chalotais not only as a martyr-victim of  royal oppression but as a philosopher-statesman 
who served the king and the nation zealously by taking the lead of  the liberty movement in 
the early sixties. See, for example, the dauphiné Parl. to Louis XV, 26 April 1769, B. 2314, 
fol. 115, A.d. Isére.
532 BREAd, POLITICS ANd POLITICAL ECONOMY
V
Terray’s grain law, rendered public in december and submitted to 
the parlements in January, was considerably more restrictive of  lib-
erty than the August arrêt of  the Paris Parlement whose dispositions 
it confirmed.89 It was not a minimal offering grudgingly designed to 
mollify the critics of  liberalization. Terray voluntarily renounced more 
than they demanded. For all practical purposes, the new regulatory law 
effected a complete return to the old police regime. To be sure, Terray 
retained the freedom of  internal circulation, yet this principle was not 
in itself  alien to the police tradition. In two separate articles (numbers 
eight and nine), he forbade “all individuals from placing obstacles in the 
way of  the free circulation of  grain and flour from one place to another, 
or from province to province, in the interior of  our kingdom … on pain 
of  being pursued extraordinarily as a perturber of  the public peace,” 
and he prohibited all police officers, including seignorial judges, from 
opposing “the free circulation of  grain from province to province on 
any pretext whatsoever.” Translated into functional terms, the first of  
these articles, vague and prolix, declared that collective actions to pre-
vent the removal of  grain from a given place or to intercept convoys 
were against the law. This was not a legislative milestone. Riots had 
always been against the law, even in the dark ages before liberty. Surely 
Terray did not imagine that he could deter by proclamation frightened 
and frustrated people from attempting to capture fleeing grain supplies 
in a time of  dearth. It appears that this clause was meant primarily 
to reassure merchants that the retreat from liberalization did not give 
consumers the license to spoliate dealers any more than the freedom of  
trade gave traders the right to abuse consumers.
The second of  these free trade articles, even more nebu-
lous than the first, prohibited the police from obstructing traf-
fic. Ostensibly the aim of  this clause was to prevent local officials 
from making policy on their own initiative as they had frequently 
done during the course of  1770 and before—that is, to prevent 
them from committing in the name of  law and order actions 
which, if  undertaken by simple citizens, would result in their 
condemnation as “perturbers” of  order. Convinced that it was 
 89 For the text of  the arrêt and the accompanying lettres patentes of  11 Jan. 1771, see AN, H* 
1874, fols. 106–107; BN, Coll. Joly 1111, fols. 31–34 and 1109, fols. 241–242; C. 81, A.d. 
C d’O.; Arch. AE, France 1368, fols. 302–303.
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necessary for the well-being of  the nation, Terray moved to restore 
the old police regime without, however, turning it over completely 
to the local authorities for their use. He harbored “the fear”—it was 
not an exclusively liberal anxiety—“of  re-animating the pretensions 
of  the officers of  police whose indiscreet zeal causes bad more often 
than it operates good.” The Controller-General did not want de-lib-
eralization to foster an epidemic mood of  decentralization or revive 
and legitimize habits of  particularism, though he knew that a deal 
of  this was inevitable. Controlling the police concerned him even as 
the business of  controlling grain and grain merchants preoccupied 
him. Indeed, the Procurator General of  the Paris Parlement sternly 
reproached Terray for adding a clause to the draft version of  the 
article regarding the police which would have held local authori-
ties financially responsible, in their private persons, for any losses 
or damages caused by “illegal” sentences rendered by them. The 
Procurator complained that Terray treated the police in harsher and 
“more rigorous” terms than he treated the profit-hungry traders and 
the monopolists. “The laws of  honor and obedience to the Sovereign 
are laws which seem sufficient” to contain the police, he concluded. 
Terray remained skeptical of  this curiously idealized conception, 
not in the least perhaps because it seemed to protect the freedom 
of  action of  local authorities who were more nearly integrated into 
the parlementary network of  parallel administration over which the 
Procurators General presided than into the royal provincial admin-
istration. But he did not wish to stigmatize or demoralize the local 
police upon whom, after all, he would have to depend. The offend-
ing clause did not appear in the final version which became the 
december law.90
The spirit of  this police containment article ran counter to the tenor 
and the substance of  the other seven articles of  the law which reim-
posed controls on the grain trade. These other articles gave the police 
a thousand pretexts to hamper the movement of  grain for the sake of  
provisioning; indeed, in a number of  instances, the royal arrêt positively 
enjoined them to channel the flow in useful directions. Moreover, it is 
significant that the article on the police forbade them to obstruct inter-
provincial trade, not circulation “from place to place.” Now the only 
authorities actually in a position to impede interprovincial  circulation 
 90 Terray to IN. of  Burgundy, 22 Sept. 1772, C. 81, A.d. C d’O.; BN, Coll. Joly 1109, fols. 
222–27.
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were the intendants, creatures of  the Controller-General, and the par-
lements, all of  which paid at least lip service to the ideal of  free internal 
movement, not the horde of  local officials whose caprice and impetu-
osity worried liberals and nonliberals alike. It was not Terray’s purpose 
to obscure the sense of  the regulatory law by taking away from the 
police with one hand what he gave them with the other. The police 
article was meant as a cautionary note to local officials to mind their 
own business, follow the lead of  the ministry in grain affairs, and use 
their authority frugally and temperately.
Only constant attention to subsistence affairs by the Controller-
General could make this moral restraint effective. Terray did not 
believe that the task of  the government ended with the publication 
of  the grain law. It was clearly his intention, henceforth, to play a 
major role in determining grain policy. This was the real significance 
of  his commitment to freedom of  internal trade. Terray viewed sub-
sistence as a national problem. Within the severe limits imposed by 
the rudimentary nature of  transportation and communication and 
the labyrinthine administrative structure which could not pass for 
a bureaucracy, Terray planned to deal with subsistence as if  there 
were a national market. Free trade was neither an invitation to a Brie 
trader to divert his grain to Lyons while the demands of  the capital 
were still not satisfied nor to a Brie procurator to harass merchants 
in a time of  plenty: both procedures were illogical and gratuitous, 
counter-productive in the jargon of  our own time. Free trade did not 
mean trade free of  controls; it meant facilitating the distribution of  
supplies by the simplest and most efficient course. Free trade did not 
mean freeing the government from responsibility; it was Terray’s way 
of  declaring that subsistence was preeminently a matter of  public 
rather than private interest, central rather than exclusively local con-
cern. It was an assertion of  national unity and purpose as well as an 
affirmation of  economic and social solidarity among the constituent 
parts of  the kingdom.91
Terray’s liberty was not, as the Provence Parlement charged, simply a 
 91 Cf. the passionate pleas of  the Bordeaux intendant to protect internal liberty (“which has 
saved so many parishes from the horror of  famine”) from the onslaught of  both “the people 
and the officers of  justice or police.” To Terray, 16 Oct. 1770, C. 1431, A.d. Gir.
It is also worthwhile noting the intendant’s argument that, regardless of  the law, free 
internal circulation will not really come about and produce salutary results by linking the 
different parts of  the kingdom in a truly national market and equalizing prices across space 
and time until the state undertakes an enormous effort to improve navigation and build 
and repair roads.
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hollow rhetorical phrase meant to sustain a useful fiction.92 Yet lib-
erty just as surely was not the leitmotif  of  the december law. On the 
contrary, its aim, Louis XV was made to say in the pithy introduction 
which took the place of  a preamble, was “to repress the abuses which 
trouble this [grain] commerce by renewing certain dispositions of  
the old regulations which concern it.” Terray distinguished sharply 
between two kinds of  liberty: a liberty accorded grain to circulate 
freely throughout the kingdom, which he consistently demanded and 
defended, and a liberty granted traders to deal as they pleased, which 
he considered dangerous and unacceptable. On countless occa-
sions the Controller-General warned intendants and lesser officials 
that “obstructions” placed in the way of  commerce would produce 
“difficulties” in provisioning and lead to “misery.” His repeated pro-
testations that “it was never our intention to hamper trade” as a con-
sequence of  the restoration of  controls were sincere.93 But Terray 
feared the power which ownership of  grain bestowed and he could 
never overcome (though he tried) a deep delamarist distrust for all 
those who dealt in this commerce.
The grain trade, in Terray’s estimation, inevitably generated abuses. It 
was fatuous to imagine that it could or would police itself. Given their con-
trol over subsistence, dealers exercised an extraordinary sort of  authority 
over society, which had no means to call them to account. Left to them-
selves, Terray felt, they would press their advantage to disastrous extremes. 
Even as the liberals argued that police by its nature was incapable of  mod-
eration, so the Controller-General maintained that grain dealers, unless 
checked, ineluctably damaged the public interest. “Only surveillance can 
stop Monopoly,” the gravest abuse, he contended. Grain could not be 
allowed to become “an object of  speculation for the rich”—precisely the 
liberal goal, from Boisguilbert to Turgot. The problem with the reforms of  
1763–64, in Terray’s view, was that they “opened up an excessively great 
cupidity, they stirred the desire to get rich on the traffic of  a commodity 
of  indispensable necessity,” an enterprise which he regarded as morally 
wrong and politically untenable. Since it had lost “the spirit of  purity” the 
grain trade could not post its own guarantees of  good conduct.94
 92 Provence Parlement to Louis XV, 10 Nov. 1770, B. 3677, A.d. B-du-R.
 93 Terray to dupleix, 9 Sept. 1771, C. 84, A.d. Somme; Terray to St.-Priest, 21 Oct. 1772, 
C. 2912, A.d. Hér.; Terray to Rouillé d’Orfeuil, 10 Nov. 1772, C. 416 and 29 May 1773, 
C. 417, A.d. Marne; Terray to Amelot, 1 Aug. 1772, C. 81, A.d. C d’O.; Terray to 
Esmangart, 12 June 1773, C. 1441 and 1 March 1774, C. 1442, A.d. Gir.
 94 Terray to Rouillé d’Orfeuil, 27 Sept. 1772, C. 417, A.d. Marne; Terray to 
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Through the reestablishment of  a control system, backed by strin-
gent penalties, the Controller-General hoped to force the trade into 
the open and dissuade the grain owners and dealers from practicing 
tyranny, extortion, or fraud. Four of  the first seven articles reiterated 
points of  the parlementary arrêt of  August with only minor modifica-
tions. The first three concerned general conditions of  admission to the 
trade. All persons entering the trade were required to register on pain 
of  500 livres fine which “cannot be forgiven or reduced” as such penal-
ties often were in the old regime. dealers forming “societies” had to 
draw up contracts before notaries or other public officials and register 
them along with the standard information, or else face the same fine. 
Though Terray claimed that he wished “to dispel the idea of  what is 
called inquisition” in police matters and to allay “the fear of  infringe-
ment upon individual liberty,” he insisted that “the public interest” 
demanded “vigilance” and “precautions.” The “first substance” of  the 
popular diet “had to be, as it were, continually under the eye of  the 
People and under those of  the Administrators.” In order to assure this 
visibility, the dealer and his business had to be “known.”95
Two other articles dealt with trading practices. Liberalization had 
legitimized enarrhement, an extremely difficult transaction for the police 
to unmask, which enabled traders to gain control of  a portion of  the 
winter market by making downpayments on future harvests in the pre-
ceding spring and thus exercise an inflationary influence on prices the 
year round. Article seven once again made it a crime, which, along 
with the purchase of  grain that was en route to market for public 
sale, was punishable by a 3,000 livres unnegotiable fine, annulment 
of  the deals contracted with loss of  advances paid out, deprivation of  
the right to continue to engage in grain commerce, and even corpo-
ral punishment. Unlike the parlementary arrêt, Terray’s law did not 
explicitly empower the police to compel dealers and cultivators to 
supply the markets. But article six restricted all business to the public 
marketplaces, implicitly requiring traders and laboureurs to furnish those 
markets and authorizing the police to make certain that they were 
appropriately provisioned.
 INs. of  Amiens and Brittany, 1 Aug. 1773, C. 86, A.d. Somme and C. 1653, A.d. I-et-V.; 
Terray to archbishop of  Toulouse and to comte de Périgord, 25 Nov. 1772, C 2912 A.d. Hér.
 95 Terray to IN. of  Amiens, 1 Aug. 1773, C. 86, A.d. Somme. Protests from intendants 
persuaded Terray to exclude from the final version of  the registration article the obligation 
to keep formal business ledgers subject to police inspection. See “Observations sur le projet 
de déclaration,” C. 1431, A.d. Gir.
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The mandatory market clause was the most important article in 
Terray’s law. during liberalization, the market had become merely 
an arena of  convenience with no institutional status, an unpredictable 
bivouac rather than a sacred meeting ground. For the sake of  the sup-
ply system, as a means of  control, and in deference to popular habits, 
Terray restored the market to its traditional dignity as sole concourse 
of  buyers and sellers. In principle, the concentration of  supplies on 
the market would assure a regular, predictable, visible supply, facilitate 
exchanges between buyers and sellers, and expose them to constant 
scrutiny. Without a fixed market system, the police could not possibly 
wage a successful war against monopoly. Moreover, once grain was at 
the market the owners were subject to myriad pressures from the pub-
lic and the police, which tended to limit considerably their opportuni-
ties for committing “abuses.” The mandatory market clause aroused 
considerable controversy in 1770, as it had before and as it would con-
tinue to do, within the police camp itself. For the intendant of  Cham-
pagne it was the very heart of  things, without which the police of  pro-
visioning could not operate. Concern for the “invincible repugnance” 
it would inspire in the grain-owning community, however, caused the 
intendant of  Bordeaux to have serious reservations about its wisdom. 
Liberty and the obligation to furnish the market, Fontette of  Caen 
categorically averred, could not be reconciled in practice: they were 
“absolutely contradictory” demands.96
Terray himself  had equivocal feelings about the market article. The 
draft version of  the article specifically required grain owners to supply 
the nearest markets on a regular basis, but it did not proscribe off-mar-
ket transactions. The Controller-General included the ban in the law 
as the result of  pressure from administrators such as the intendant of  
Champagne. To preserve a measure of  flexibility, he did not fix man-
datory and crushing penalties as he did in article seven; violators were 
to be pursued according to the seriousness of  the case, to be defined 
locally and circumstantially. In addition, this restriction to the market 
would not affect “merchants for the provisioning of  Paris” who had 
 96 IN. of  Champagne to CG, 22 Oct. 1770, C. 417, A.d. Marne; “Observations,” C. 1431, 
A.d. Gir. Cf. the critical posture of  the juges-consuls of  Nantes, “Mémoire,” Oct. 1770, 
C. 774, A.d. L-A. Since the interdiction of  enarrhement was implicit in the prohibition of  all 
off-market transactions, it is not clear why Terray insisted on a separate article seven. See 
the shrewd remarks of  the police of  Chaumont who interpreted Terray’s tactics to mean 
that he would tolerate certain kinds of  off-market business. “Résultat des observations …,” 
C. 417, A.d. Marne; Fontette, “Observations,” Oct. 1770, C. 2623, A.d. Cal.
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always enjoyed a “tolerance,” written into law in 1737, to canvass 
the countryside and buy in the barns and granaries. Although it was 
phrased in general terms, it seems likely that the market requirement 
was aimed at the merchants who bought for purposes of  resale, the real 
operators of  the grain trade, not the little men, the modest cultivators 
whose plight Voltaire exposed in the Quarante Ecus. It is significant that 
the market restriction was not demanded by the Parlement, but by the 
procurators of  the marginal hinterland towns who feared they would 
be bypassed if  they had to depend on mere commercial magnetism 
rather than coercion in order to attract supplies.97
Whereas the parlementary arrêt did not challenge anyone’s free-
dom to enter grain commerce, article four of  the december law 
expressly forbad all police and judicial officers, all farmers, receiv-
ers, clerks, cashiers, and “other interested parties having the man-
agement of  our finances” to engage directly or indirectly in grain 
traffic on penalty of  confiscation of  the merchandise, 2,000 livres 
fine and, should the case merit it, corporal punishment. The aim, 
of  course, was to try to reduce corruption, eliminate conflicts of  
interest, and inspire public confidence in the public administration 
as well as the trade. The Paris Procurator General, a sharp critic of  
the excessive power and independence of  the financial milieu, per-
suaded Terray to exclude all persons involved in “finance.”98 Either 
because he simply did not think it was necessary or because he did 
not wish to exclude men with considerable amounts of  liquid capi-
tal from engaging in legitimate grain commerce, the Controller-
General had not mentioned the gens de finance in the draft article. 
On the other hand, the intendant of  Alençon argued boldly, albeit 
without success, in favor of  permitting all police officials to enter the 
trade on the pragmatic grounds that they would do it surreptitiously 
 97 See the appeals of  the procurators of  Chevreuse and Angerville-la-Gaste who felt that the 
August parlementary arrêt did not go far enough. They demanded a renewal of  the Royal 
declaration of  1723 whose main purpose was to concentrate exchanges on the public 
markets. Letters to PG, 14 Sept. 1770, BN, Coll. Joly, 1157, fol. 75 and (?), 1770, ibid., 1148, 
fols. 65–66. At the Assembly of  General Police, Séguier explicitly stated that it was not 
necessary to resurrect the 1723 declaration in its entirety. See his frequent interventions in 
the Recueil.
 98 BN, Coll. Joly 1109, fols. 222–27. The intendant of  Lille favored a total exclusion of  public 
officials from the grain trade in order to restore public confidence in local administration: 
“It is not enough that they [local authorities] are not allowed to abuse their functions; it is 
even more important that they not be suspected of  doing so by the people in order not to 
lose the people’s confidence.” Taboureau to Terray, 27 Oct. 1770, C. 6690, A.d. Nord.
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despite the law if  they could not do it openly and legally and that in 
some places the officials were the only persons with sufficient funds 
and ability to undertake this commerce.99
Finally, another article resurrected a heavily dated model of  police-
defined commercial roles which had not been widely respected even 
in the days before liberalization. Article five prohibited laboureurs and 
fermiers from buying grain for purposes of  stockage or resale (as cul-
tivators their vocation was to sell their own produce, not to traffic) 
and bakers and millers from selling grain (as artisans, their task was 
to transform grain into flour and bread, not to deal as merchants). 
More than ever before, this rigid categorization of  function no longer 
fitted the facts of  commerce, at least in the Paris region. The lines 
separating the professions of  grain merchant, mealman, and miller 
had become blurred: millers found that they could not survive unless 
they speculated in grain; grain merchants increasingly had to turn 
to flour processing in order to retain their clienteles; certain fermiers 
made more money as traders than as planters and it was no longer 
an absolute rarity to find a laboureur or a baker who owned a mill. To 
be sure, the Controller-General had no intention of  dismantling the 
commerce of  the Paris area, but if  he succeeded in enforcing these 
restrictions elsewhere the effect would be to retard the rationalization 
and modernization of  the trade. In their comments on the draft proj-
ect, several intendants pointed out that this article would jeopardize 
the well-being of  a host of  petty laboureurs who needed to buy grain not 
for speculation but for their own subsistence.100
VI
While the december law unequivocally indicated what the government’s 
new policy would be, its sure and stringent cast obscured the way in which 
the Controller-General conceived the grain problem. Though he took a 
starkly antiliberal position, he did not arrive there in a heedless, reflexive 
manner. In the eighteenth century, the preamble of  laws often served as 
 99 Jullien to CG, Oct. 1770, C. 89, A.d. Orne. The intendant of  Champagne and the juges-
consuls of  Nantes took similar positions. Rouillé to Terray, 22 Oct. 1770, C. 417, A.d. 
Marne and “Mémoire,” Oct. 1770, C. 774, A.d. L-A. Cf. Fontette’s sanguine argument that 
the police “are too afraid of  the people to undertake this [grain] trade.…” “Observation,” 
Oct. 1770, C. 2623, A.d. Cal.
100 “Observations,” C. 1431, A.d. Gir.; Rouillé d’Orfeuil to CG, 22 Oct. 1770, C. 417, A.d. 
Marne; Fontette, “Observations,” Oct. 1770, C. 2623, A.d. Cal.
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a sort of  philosophical declaration in which the government explained 
the genesis and purpose of  its policy. Terray’s successor Turgot made the 
genre famous, though he was hardly the first to use it. To introduce the 
december law, Terray drafted a free-speaking preamble which caused 
him considerable trouble and which clearly reveals that he did not regard 
the police solution as a panacea.101 Persuaded that de-liberalization was 
politically necessary, nevertheless he was not certain that it would really 
work in the long run, nor was he oblivious to the damage that it might 
do. “We shall not dissimulate,” Terray wrote in the preamble, “that we 
hesitated on the precautions to take.”
If  we have reason to believe that too great a liberty in the interior grain trade is one of  
the principal causes in the extreme variation of  the grain price, and affords too great a 
facility to hoarding, monopolies, and sequestration of  the said grain, we also fear that 
hindrances [la gêne] placed in the way of  commerce will cause the grain price to fall to 
a level capable of  discouraging the owners and cultivators by depriving them of  the 
means to make the expenditures necessary not only for the improvement but for the 
simple cultivation of  their lands.
The “example of  past centuries”—the terrain of  precedent and his-
tory which had been violently contested by the liberals and their 
critics—served only to reinforce the Controller-General’s doubts. 
Failures and inconsistencies marred the records of  both liberal and 
prohibitive regimes in past time. “Thus we cannot be assured,” con-
cluded Terray forthrightly, “that the law which we have prepared will 
be able fully to remedy the disadvantages and procure all the advan-
tages of  the one side and of  the other.”
The Controller-General’s access of  candor provoked trenchant 
criticism, which induced him to drop the preamble from the final ver-
sion of  the december law. Afraid that the preamble would “inspire 
anxieties in the people,” duCluzel, intendant of  Tours, recommended 
“that it would be better to be silent on the disadvantages of  badly 
run administration in previous centuries [and] to speak in a tone that 
was affirmative and full of  confidence.” The intendant of  Bordeaux 
reproached Terray for dealing too frankly with monopoly. By present-
ing monopoly as one of  the chief  causes of  the ongoing dearth and 
by admitting that the government had done nothing till now to com-
bat it, the intendant feared that Terray would encourage “the people” 
(already “too inclined” to think in these terms) to believe in some sort 
101 draft preamble, Oct. 1770, C. 94, A.d. I-et-L.
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of  famine plot involving public authority. The “uncertainty” of  the 
preamble, warned Fontette of  Caen, would “increase anxieties.” By 
acknowledging that the measure was historically and economically 
bound to be inadequate, the ministry “in a way justifies in advance the 
excesses to which it is to be feared the people will resort.”102
The Procurator General Joly de Fleury also insisted upon the 
enormous significance of  language and mood in the law. The pre-
amble undermined the aim of  the december law, which was “to reas-
sure and give confidence to the consumers.” It is “dangerous,” Joly 
continued, to present “the regulations whose object is to guarantee 
subsistence to everyone at a just and moderate and accessible price” 
as “laws of  hindrance [gêne] and constraint.” It is “the consumers 
… who must be consulted to learn if  they call these regulations by 
the name of  hindrance and constraint.” Only “the smallest number” 
of  citizens is interested in promoting the idea that police regulations 
are “hindrances” and thus ought not to exist. Joly solemnly advised 
Terray to offer no encouragement to this elite of  cultivators, own-
ers, “spéculateurs de cabinet,” and “spéculateurs de pratique” who 
“coolly conceive in their imaginations plans for increasing the wealth 
of  the State by means which cause their fellow men to perish from 
hunger and which [in truth] impoverish the kingdom.…”103
despite the reproaches of  the Procurator General, who gently 
accused him of  internalizing économiste propaganda, Terray continued 
to think of  the police controls that he believed were necessary as gênes, 
hindrances, or constraints, which unquestionably inconvenienced the 
grain owners and interfered with their freedom to dispose of  their 
property. He believed that the liberals had an argument of  substance 
and he put their case as fairly and objectively as was possible in the 
climate of  1770. Yet in the final analysis Terray shared Joly’s populistic 
view, his “hesitation” to the contrary notwithstanding. At the end of  
the draft preamble he made the choice from which he recoiled at the 
beginning: “the number of  consumers being greater and less well-off  
than that of  the proprietors and cultivators, our paternal solicitude 
102 “Réflexions sur la loi…,” ca. Nov. 1770, ibid.; IN. of  Bordeaux to CG, 16 Oct. 1770, 
C. 1431, A.d. Gir.; Fontette, “Observations,” Oct. 1770, C. 2623, A.d. Cal. The intendant 
of  Lille also criticized the preamble for its “diffuseness” and lack of  “clarity.” Taboureau 
to Terray, 27 Oct. 1770, C. 6690, A.d. Nord. Cf. the intendant of  Champagne’s apparent 
satisfaction with the preamble. To CG, 22 Oct. 1770, C. 417, A.d. Marne.
103 BN, Coll. Joly 1109, fols. 211–212.
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must make us incline rather in their favor.”104 Though he continued 
to worry about its economic implications, all things considered he felt 
that it was the right choice, not merely one that was circumstantially 
expedient.
Terray justified his choice of  the consumers over the producers in terms 
of  both the salus populi ethic and the doctrine of  raison d’état, two political 
conceptions that clashed more often than not, but which converged on 
the grain question. He rejected the idea that wealth could be calculated 
without regard to the social costs of  amassing it. The liberals failed utterly 
to take account of  the people in making their policy. Ultimately what mat-
tered for Terray was less the fact that the people were “the most necessi-
tous of  the King’s subjects” than the fact that they were “unfortunately the 
most numerous.”105 Like Joly de Fleury, the Controller-General believed 
that the French monarchy, unlike a military despotism, simply could not 
function when the majority of  citizens were not only reduced to a chroni-
cally miserable and precarious existence, but also alienated from author-
ity on the grounds that it was improvident, unjust, and perhaps evil. Like 
Necker, Terray had no illusion about the resilience of  the social structure 
or the immutability of  social relations. For the sake of  social and political 
stability, the government had to consider the interests of  the people.
The people “reason little and badly,” but they had a lucid sense of  
their chief  interest—subsistence. Terray understood the subsistence 
mentality, its expectations, its propensity to view the world conspirato-
rially, the limits of  its patience, and its potential explosiveness. It was 
folly for the government to think that it could turn its back upon the 
people and disqualify itself  from dealing with provisioning, the most 
sensitive of  all social operations. The sign of  flaw or failure in grain 
policy was when the price became “too dear for the people.” Admin-
istrative distinctions between cherté and famine made no difference to 
consumers: “it is all the same to the people whether grain is [too] dear 
or whether it is completely lacking.” The people were unwilling and 
unequipped to deal with prolonged bouts of  cherté, whether they were 
the consequence of  government policy, monopoly, or natural disas-
ter. Such cherté generated a vicious circle of  disorders, which became 
greater in intensity and incidence the longer they persisted: a sharp 
rise in prices stimulated panic fears which in turn helped make grain 
104 In addition to the preamble, see Terray’s “Mémoire” in AN, K. 908.
105 Terray to comte de Périgord, 25 Nov. 1772, C. 2912, A.d. Hér.
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more scarce which led to “seditious movements” which launched the 
cycle again unless the government intervened decisively.106
Liberalization, in Terray’s view, produced just such a vicious circle. It 
threw the old trading system into chaotic disarray, increased the leverage 
of  the rich over the poor whose wages tended to decline even as prices rose 
spectacularly, and at the same time paralyzed the administrative appara-
tus which in similar crises in the past had come to the aid of  the majority. 
Because normally everything favored the producers, Terray argued that 
the normal policy of  the government had to favor the consumers. By tak-
ing measures to “conserve the commodity of  first necessity for the people,” 
the Controller-General hoped to restore order; by convincing the people 
“that the King is incessantly working for their relief  by continually oversee-
ing its subsistence,” he hoped to restore confidence along with tranquility.107
Asked “at what price should wheat be set for the common interest 
of  the laboureurs and the inhabitants,” the procurator of  Crépy-en-
Valois replied that there was no common interest, thus underscoring 
a dilemma almost as familiar and intractable for us as it was for Old 
Regime administrators:
The price of  wheat could not be fixed at the same level for the common interest of  the 
laboureurs and inhabitants because the laboureurs have an interest different from that of  the 
inhabitants, especially of  the workers [ouvriers] charged with family who prefer to buy wheat 
at 12 livres the septier or 15 1. at most; whereas the laboureur who has always until now sold his 
grain at 24, 28, and 29 1. the septier [Paris measure] would not find his interest in selling it 
at only 12 or 15 livres, which means that one cannot fix a price for the interest of  the two.108
despite the distance and the level of  sophistication which separated 
them, the Controller-General saw the problem in very much the same 
light as the local police official. “One party, wrote Terray, 
proposed to abolish all the laws and to leave everything to the free will of  the propri-
etors of  grain. Grain, they say, is their possession, they must be masters to sell it when, 
where, how and at the price they wish. The other demands the rigorous execution of  
the hindrances [gênes] established by the old laws, because, they retort, grain cannot 
be compared to any other good or merchandise.
106 Terray to jurats of  Bordeaux, 16 May 1773, C. 1441, A.d. Gir.; Terray to IN., 28 Sept. 
1773 and memoir, probably by St.-Prest, ca. Sept. 1770, ibid.; Terray to IN. of  Champagne, 
28 Sept. 1773, C. 419, A.d. Marne.
107 Terray to IN. of  Brittany, 1 Aug. 1773, C. 1653, A.d. I-et-V.; memoir by St.-Prest (?), Sept. 
1770, C. 1441, A.d. Gir; Terray to IN. of  Brittany, 26 Feb. 1773, C. 1684, A.d. I-et-V.; 
Terray to IN. of  Amiens,? Aug. 1773, C. 86, A.d. Somme.
108 Second Tableau, BN, mss. fr. 8128, fol. 60.
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Man needs bread every day. Thenceforth, the grain owner, if  he holds it hoarded 
away, becomes too much the master of  the price, he can and he is tempted to abuse 
it. It is thus that the most antithetical maxims are often founded in good reasons and 
that the disputes become interminable and the discussions unsolvable.109
The “opposition of  interests” between consumers and grain owners, 
each of  whom had their own “justice,” impressed Terray deeply. So 
fundamental was it that he despaired of  effecting a genuine reconcili-
ation. Instead of  reconciliation, the Controller-General talked a great 
deal about “balancing” interests, even as we discuss balancing the differ-
ent interests of  rival nations in raw terms of  power adjustment and sta-
bilization. From Terray’s perspective, however, balancing, in the nature 
of  things, meant favoring the people-consumers, given their inherent 
disadvantages in the struggle with producers and owners. (Remember 
that it was also in the name of  “balance” that Louis XV gave liberty to 
the owners and cultivators in 1763–64 against whom the old-fashioned 
paternal monarchy was said to have systematically discriminated.) As 
a general rule, Terray rejected any grain policy which was “useful to a 
small number [but] fatal to the majority of  inhabitants.”110
Yet Terray was a realist and a finance minister very much concerned 
about creating wealth and expropriating as much of  it as possible for 
the government. Moreover, with a few exceptions, he revered property 
rights, he felt that owners should be properly compensated for their 
goods (he always insisted that he sought the “moderation” of  prices, 
not their “dirt-cheapness”), and he wanted to encourage investment, 
especially in agriculture, not only for the sake of  subsistence requirements, 
but because agriculture held the key to the expansion of  the entire 
economy. In this regard he was a confirmed Sullyist. The problem was 
to find a way to promote agriculture without jeopardizing the well-
being of  the consumers and the tranquility of  society. Liberalization 
and the high price program were unacceptable, not as growth stimu-
lants (unlike many critics of  liberalism, Terray readily conceded that 
the high price incentives of  liberalization had in fact been a boon to 
agriculture,) but as political and social policy because of  their disastrous 
109 Terray papers, cited by Jobez, Louis XV, VI, 405–406.
110 Terray, “Mémoire,” 1 Aug. 1773, C. 1653, A.d. I-et-V.; Terray to Monthyon, 1 Aug. 1773, 
C. 181, A.d. P-de-d.; Terray to comte de Périgord, 25 Nov. 1772, C. 2912, A.d. Hér. Cf. 
d’Agay to Turgot, 20 Sept. 1774, C. 87, A.d. Somme and L.-J. Bourdon des Planches, 
Projet nouveau sur la manière de faire utilement en France le commerce des grains (Brussels, 1785), 12.
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side-effects. Terray groped for the developing nation’s elixir: a growth 
strategy requiring only limited sacrifices. The king had already “given 
different laws in favor of  land drainage and clearing” and the Controller-
General pledged, in earnest but vague words, “to employ all the means 
possible to support the cultivation of  the lands.” Preoccupied with one 
crisis after another, Terray never managed to elaborate a systematic 
 policy of  agricultural development geared to a regime of  moderate-to-
low prices.111
To afford the consumers protection, in Terray’s estimation, it was 
not enough to repudiate liberalization and restore the police. To meet 
immediate needs, he believed that it was urgent to mount a major 
government-sponsored and administered victualing effort, the organi-
zation and operation of  which we shall examine shortly. For the long 
run, it would be necessary to establish a system of  planning the alloca-
tion of  scarce supplies and of  dealing with shortages. In Terray’s view, 
the central government had to commit itself  to an unwavering policy 
of  subsistence management instead of  spasmodic and sensational 
interventions in emergencies. Logistically and financially, he felt it 
would be impossible to erect “abundance” organizations on the model 
of  Joseph’s Egypt or contemporary Geneva.112 Commerce, as always, 
would retain first responsibility for provisioning the nation. Nor would 
it be possible, no matter how deeply government became involved, 
to avert catastrophes brought on by unpredictable and unavoidable 
harvest accidents. But if  the government could not prevent dearths, it 
could prepare ahead to combat them and it could attempt to place the 
whole structure of  provisioning on a more solid foundation.
It is not too much to say that Terray’s long-term ambition was to con-
trol the grain trade and the provisioning system throughout the realm. 
This idea preoccupied him not only because he viewed subsistence as 
the most important single business of  administration, but also because 
he believed, no less intensely than the économistes, that “all the other 
branches of  political economy are intimately tied to it.”113 To become 
111 draft preamble, C. 94, I-et-L.; Terray to comte de Périgord and to archbishop of  Toulouse, 
25 Nov. 1772, C. 2912, A.d. Hér.; Terray to IN. of  Tours, 18 Sept. 1773, C. 95, A.d. I-et-L. 
On Terray’s “physiocratic” enthusiasm for agricultural development, see P. de St.-Jacob, 
Les Paysans de la Bourgogne du nord, 347ff.
112 Though Terray did not pursue the notion systematically, at one point he proposed 
resuscitating the plan requiring every religious house in the realm to stock an extra year’s 
grain which would serve as an emergency civil reserve. See Terray to de la Corée, 15 July 
1772, C. 354, A.d. doubs.
113 Terray to First President, Bordeaux Parl., 21 dec. 1773, C. 1441, A.d. Gir.
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master of  subsistence was to gain control over the entire economy; 
such mastery, joined to the political stability it would assure, would 
give the government extraordinary opportunities for shaping the 
course of  the kingdom’s future. This prospect intoxicated Terray; 
though he ordinarily had a healthy sense of  his administrative limi-
tations, when he thought about grain he often succumbed to an all-
embracing vision of  bureaucratic rationalism and centralism. He 
had a notion of  “the general subsistence,” a fresh and rather daring 
conception, at least for an administrator.114 By this he meant that he 
viewed the burden of  provisioning as a whole, as a national enter-
prise. He thought of  subsistence in terms of  an aggregate supply pool 
susceptible to manipulation from the center. “General subsistence” 
required a general subsistence policy which depended not merely 
upon uniform national laws, but also upon an unremitting effort at 
the center to control and coordinate provisioning operations. Instead 
of  waiting passively for subsistence needs to present themselves, 
the Controller-General proposed an ongoing provisioning offensive 
which would insert the government squarely into the day-to-day busi-
ness of  monitoring grain movement, allocating supplies, supervising, 
adjusting, and planning. Ultimately, Terray’s goal was the same which 
the liberals assigned to laissez-faire: the equalization of  prices across 
time and space (for Terray the “just price,” for the liberals the “bon 
prix”) and the stabilization of  supply in relation to local demand.
In some ways Terray’s notion of  control was as far removed from 
the traditional police way as it was from the liberal system. Previ-
ous ministers had assumed, understandably, that control, and thus 
any truly systematic program of  prophylaxis, was beyond their grasp. 
Subsistence was a matter of  state, to be sure, but it was to be worked 
out as a general rule on the local level. Characteristically, the central 
government intervened fitfully, by convulsion, rather than regularly, 
by habit or plan. Often high officials hesitated, lapsing into what I 
have called the paralysis of  discretion and postponing action until 
it was too late. In the field there were practically as many different 
“police” as there were different communities, different regions, and 
different administrative institutions. The field police operated on the 
same laissez-faire principle which was denied to commerce, presum-
ably according to the logic that each police, left to pursue its own 
interest, would contribute to the general subsistence interest.
114 Terray to INs. of  Brittany and Bordeaux, 26 Feb. 1773, C. 1684, A.d. I-et-V. and C. 1447, 
A.d. Gir.
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Terray reacted with equal horror to commercial and to police 
laissez-faire, though he was politically astute enough to realize that 
the latter would be far more difficult to curtail than the former. He 
groped for a third way, an alternative both to the chaos of  liberty 
and to the babel of  police. This third way—Terray’s vision of  con-
trol—implied not a repudiation of  the police ideology—the Con-
troller-General remained a delamarist in outlook—but rather a 
far-reaching rationalization of  operation, which both the merchants 
and the local authorities were bound to find distasteful. Strictly local 
traders were unlikely to be affected by Terray’s scheme, save to the 
extent that it insulated them a bit against police harassment. Mer-
chants who dealt on a wider scale, however, would have to resign 
themselves to a quasi-partnership with the central government 
which they would surely find constrictive, and probably profitable 
as well. Police would begin at the top. Local action would not be 
forbidden, but in theory police from above would gradually obviate 
police from below. A sort of  Copernican revolution would trans-
form the police of  provisioning. The local police would acknowl-
edge that their community was not at the center of  the universe, 
that there were other communities in a similar situation linked 
together as interdependent parts of  a single whole, and that they 
were all dependent on the government in the center of  the universe. 
The enormous moral and administrative onus of  provisioning 
would no longer remain almost exclusively in the hands of  local and 
regional authorities. Terray would stand as a sort of  guarantor of  
just and efficient distribution in ordinary times as well as an unfailing 
victualer of  last resort in emergencies.
Terray argued that he was “the only one” who could conduct a 
“general subsistence” policy because only the Controller-General 
“sees the whole picture” and “holds the reins” of  authority capable of  
commanding action throughout the realm. No one was better placed 
than he to determine the “general interest” and the best means of  serv-
ing it. Given his vantage point, he believed that he was well-equipped 
to channel the flow of  grain from surplus to deficit areas, to “direct 
speculations” in the most useful and efficient fashion, to manipulate 
buyer and seller psychology (generally to “calm” anxious consumers 
and “frighten” and “demoralize” hoarders), and to plan for contin-
gencies. Though Terray’s scheme implied a permanent commitment 
to government intervention on the supply side (the king’s grain), he 
insisted that his first aim was to cooperate with private commerce and 
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facilitate its mission.115 He would alert merchants to opportunities 
they could not see for themselves and he would dissuade them from 
undertaking fruitless or redundant operations.116
This was in part the rationale the Controller-General used when 
he sought to increase his control over interprovincial (especially 
coastwise) trade in 1772 and 1773. “The négociant of  Languedoc who 
wishes for example to make a shipment to Provence,” Terray asked, 
“is he sure that there are not traders in other ports who have already 
launched and executed the same speculation?” “If  I allow him to go 
ahead with his project,” Terray reasoned, “I expose him to a certain 
loss.” But, by requiring all merchants to seek a license from him, the 
Controller-General claimed that he could guarantee them all a profit 
and at the same time arrange for the efficient distribution of  sup-
ply.117 In fact, from the end of  1770, well before he entertained the 
idea of  imposing new kinds of  licenses, Terray tried to orchestrate 
private speculations according to a more or less global provisioning 
plan. In order to emphasize the ways in which his type of  control 
differed from the old-style police, the Controller-General pointedly 
remarked that his decisions to promote this or that speculation would 
be based on objective indicators rather than on privilege, patronage, 
or favoritism. So important were all these matters that Terray prom-
ised that he would deal with them personally, entering “all the details 
… despite the extent of  my occupations.” Not only did Terray pledge 
to “take care of  everything,” but he asserted that he would do it bet-
ter than anyone else because, given his grasp of  “the ensemble,” he 
knew more about the real needs and resources of  the different places 
of  the kingdom than their own regional and local officials:
I know how much grain can [safely] be drawn from your province, how much its sur-
plus might amount to. I know the areas toward which commerce should be directed, 
don’t worry, I will prevent glut and price stagnation … as well as dearth.118
115 On this commitment to a permanent king’s grain operation, see below, chapter thirteen 
and also Terray to IN. of  Brittany, 26 Feb. 1773, C. 1684, A.d. I-et-V.
116 Terray to archbishop of  Narbonne and Toulouse, 25 Nov. 1772, C. 2912, A.d. Hér.; Terray 
to IN. of  Bordeaux, 4 May 1773, C. 1441, A.d. Gir.
117 Terray to archbishop of  Narbonne, 25 Nov. 1772, C. 2912 and Terray to IN. of  Languedoc, 
20 Nov. 1772, C. 2911, A.d. Hér.
118 Terray, “Mémoire,” 1 Aug. 1773, C. 1653, A.d. I-et-V.; Terray to IN. of  Burgundy, 1 Sept. 
1772, C. 81, A.d. C d’O.; Terray to IN. of  Languedoc, 20 Nov. 1772, C. 2911, A.d. Hér.; 
Terray to archbishop of  Toulouse and Narbonne, 25 Nov. 1772, C. 2912, A.d. Hér.
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For Terray, savoir was pouvoir. “It is only through knowledge of  the 
ensemble of  resources and needs that one can direct operations to 
advantage,” the Controller-General wrote. The key element in his 
strategy was control through the collection, centralization, and analysis 
of  information, from every corner of  the kingdom and from certain 
foreign quarters as well. The refrain of  letter after letter emanating 
from his bureaus was that good data was the best police. He envisaged 
something approaching a total tracking system dealing with demand 
as well as supply. He wanted constantly “to be in a position to follow 
grain from the place of  its departure [after harvest] to that of  its con-
sumption” and to follow the demographic vicissitudes of  every area of  
France. The very concept of  conducting a “general subsistence” pol-
icy would founder without the regular and prompt arrival of  reliable, 
homogeneous, comparable, and comprehensive information. With this 
data, Terray believed that he would be able to make the right deci-
sions, to direct transfers from places of  glut to places of  penury without 
arousing panic fears and in the shortest possible time, to project a map 
of  likely crisis areas and scenarios of  relief, to avoid misplaced specula-
tions, and to determine quickly whether extraordinary (public rather 
than commercial) supplies would be necessary and through what chan-
nels they could most efficiently and economically be arranged.119
Remembered today as one of  the founders of  modern French sta-
tistical surveying and data-management, Terray vigorously sought to 
improve both the system of  information-gathering and the quality of  
the intelligence. He regarded the old collection procedures as deeply 
flawed. No one, save the clerks in the Contrôle-Général, seemed to 
take the matter seriously and the clerks, for their part, did not always 
ask the right questions. Very often information on harvest prospects, 
on the crops, and on prices was inaccurate, incomplete, or it arrived 
too late to enable the government to take the “necessary precautions.” 
Shortly after taking office, the Controller-General asked the inten-
dants to provide more detailed information on expectations (espérances) 
including quality differentiation and price projections. Mere statistics 
on the market reports did not satisfy him: “the price accounts … must 
119 Terray to archbishop of  Toulouse, 25 Nov. 1772, C. 2912, A.d. Hér.; Terray to Rouillé 
d’Orfeuil, 28 Sept. 1773, C. 419, A.d. Marne; Terray to IN. of  Brittany, 22 Feb. 1774 
(second letter that day), C. 1684, A.d. I-et-V.; Terray to Amelot, 18 May 1773, C. 77, A.d. 
C d’O.; Terray to Chazerat, 9 Sept. 1773, C. 181, A.d. P-de-d. Cf. Terray to de Crosne, 
6 Aug. 1770, AN, F12* 155, fol. 19; R. Mols, Introduction à la démographie historique des villes d’Europe 
du XIV e au XVIII e siècles (Gembloux, 1954–56), I, 56; P. Clément, Portraits historiques, 380.
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always contain observations on the causes of  price variations.” In fact, he 
was avid to know “everything concerning the grain trade.” In addition to 
the regular harvest and price information, in the spring of  1770 he asked 
the intendants for “statements of  the subsistence necessary for life” in each 
generality, accompanied by “statements of  the comparison of  the persons 
who must consume it.” The intendants, for the most part, ignored his 
request, “doubtless,” he surmised, “because they took it for the expression 
of  a passing interest” linked to continuing provisioning difficulties. The 
next year he devised a “new model” for harvest reporting, more detailed, 
more exigent, more demographic in content than ever before. Repeatedly, 
he complained that he was poorly informed and that he lacked “precious 
details” of  both a quantitative (production-consumption) and qualitative 
(state of  the grain trade) data and he rebuked intendants and subdelegates 
for their slovenliness and procrastination.120
In the second half  of  1773, at a time when he felt he was on the brink of  
restoring subsistence stability to the kingdom, Terray proposed a compre-
hensive new plan for collecting data which he hoped would lay the founda-
tion for a successful general subsistence policy. “My idea,” he wrote, “was 
to learn on the one side the production of  all the generalities and on the 
other the population in order to know each year, by a comparison of  [the 
aggregate of] subsistence with the number of  consumers, what the status 
of  each generality would be in terms of  its needs or its surplus.” This was 
a more elaborate version of  the request he had vainly made in 1770, this 
time in the form of  a detailed memoir endorsed by the hand of  Louis XV 
and submitted to the intendants as a formal administrative directive to be 
implemented immediately. In the past, the Controller-General explained, 
we have settled for muddled, misleading, and truncated intelligence. The 
accounts of  harvest expectations and of  the crop yields, for example, have 
always been reported in nebulous terms of  “half  years,” “three-quarter 
years,” “good years,” etc. “But,” asked Terray, 
what is the quantity of  grain indicated by these denominations? We don’t know. What 
is the proportion between the harvest and the consumption needs of  the generalities? 
We know even less about this.
120 Terray, “Mémoire,” 1 Aug. 1773, C. 86, A.d. Somme; Terray to Amelot, 31 May, 14 June 
1770, C. 77, A.d. C d’O.; Terray to Rouillé d’Orfeuil, 2 July 1771, C. 379, A.d. Marne; 
IN. of  Languedoc to Sds, 8 July 1771, C. 119, A.d. H-G.; Terray to Sénac de Meilhan, 
5 March 1771 and 26 May 1772, C. 196, A.d. C-M.; Terray to Taboureau, 17 dec. 1771 
and 18 Feb. 1772, C. 8277, A.d. Nord; Terray to Monthyon, 30 June, 12 Aug. 1772, 
C. 2445, A.d. B-du-R.; Terray to Rouillé d’Orfeuil, 27 Sept. 1772, C.417, A.d. Marne; 
Terray to Fontette, 27 Feb. 1771, C. 2624, A.d. Caen.
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Habitually, we have relied upon the price as a surrogate indicator both 
of  the supply and of  the relationship between supply and demand. In 
Terray’s view, however, the price was a poor “barometer” because the 
price changed not only with changes in supply and demand, but as a 
result of  “fears, hopes, sales, purchases.” Since bad information has 
often misled us, the Controller-General argued, “it is thus time now 
for us to make things clear and for that two bases are necessary, the 
first the population or the number of  consumers and the second the 
quantity of  productions.”121
Through their subdelegates and other trusted agents, the inten-
dants were to launch two sorts of  perennial inquiries. Since an annual 
“arithmetical census” was a practical impossibility, the registration of  
vital events would serve as a substitute indicator of  population changes. 
Production figures, Terray conceded, would be more difficult to pro-
cure. Officials could construct an index based on the tithe return (very 
much as historians trying to determine production do today) or they 
could use a measure based upon “charrues,” or ploughs, the practice 
the Controller-General preferred, but which depended on normative 
“common year” estimations of  yield-to-seed likely to flaw compari-
sons and translate rather crudely into numbers. Though officials were 
bound to encounter many difficulties at first, Terray assured them that 
assiduity and experience would enable them to improve their tech-
niques and to advance “by degree to the point of  precision and perfec-
tion that is possible to attain.” Think, he marveled, how much better 
we will come to know the kingdom and how much this knowledge will 
enhance our ability to “direct subsistence aid according to needs that 
we will have foreseen in advance.”
Though it may strike our computer-dulled imagination as a baga-
telle, Terray’s project was a prodigious undertaking in his time. Not 
only did it raise complex technical and logistical problems, but it also 
sparked administrative and political controversy. The parlements and 
the provincial estates, under whose gaze functioned many of  the local 
officials upon whom would devolve the responsibility for data collec-
tion, were hostile to any extension of  royal control in the provinces. This 
allergy to centralization even seemed to affect some intendants, who felt 
uneasy about the intrusion of  the Controller-General into the intimate 
life of  their jurisdictions. They understood that the better informed 
the central government was, the fewer decisions would be left for 
121 This and the following paragraph are based upon Terray’s “Mémoire,” 1 Aug. 1773, which 
can be found in A.d. Somme (C. 86), A.d. I-et-V. (C. 1653), and A.d. P-de-d. (C. 181).
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them to make. They complained that Terray’s project demanded more 
sophistication than they could muster among their subordinates, that 
it required a great deal of  data that could not be obtained, and that 
its problematic results would not be able to justify the investment nec-
essary to operate it. Or, like the intendant of  Bordeaux, they objected 
on the grounds that “detailed researches” would arouse the “mistrust 
of  the owners and cultivators” and provoke “sensations” in the public 
mind.122 Nor did the precedents for energetic execution by the inten-
dants augur well. A royal declaration in 1736 requiring civil registra-
tion of  baptismal, nuptial, and burial data produced extremely disap-
pointing results. More recently, Terray himself  witnessed the insouci-
ance with which intendants were capable of  regarding instructions.123
Prominent among the critics of  Terray’s plan were the partisans 
of  liberalization. When one of  their leading spokesmen, Turgot, suc-
ceeded Terray as Controller-General, one of  his first acts was to sus-
pend sine die the collection of  all production data (he continued to 
solicit population information because “it did not cause the same dif-
ficulties”). Officially, he justified his repudiation of  the Terray system 
on the grounds that it was too “complicated,” that the information it 
yielded inspired “no confidence” and was of  “little utility,” and that 
the procedures employed were “dangerous,” presumably because 
they “cast alarm among the people.” Turgot’s real motive, however, 
had nothing to do with the allegedly bad quality data or the troubles 
of  collection. He rightly understood that information implied con-
trol and that in certain circumstances information might even compel 
action. Since the liberals decried any sort of  governmental involve-
ment in grain affairs at any time, they regarded Terray’s intelligence 
system as a trap. Information collection itself  was intervention. If  it 
was of  “little utility,” it was because the liberals did not want to use it; 
if  it was “dangerous,” it was because it threatened to ensnare them in 
problems about which they wanted to know nothing.124
Since Terray survived as Controller-General for less than a year 
122 Terray to Esmangart, 12 Nov. 1773, C. 1439, A.d. Gir. Cf. the similar position of  the 
intendant of  Brittany, reinforced by the peculiar political circumstances of  this pays d’état in 
the early seventies. To Terray, 8 Oct. 1773, C. 1653, A.d. I-et-V.
123 Terray, “Mémoire,” 1 Aug. 1773, C. 86, A.d. Somme.
124 Turgot to Amelot, 21 Sept. 1774, C. 77, A.d. C d’O; Turgot to Taboureau, 27 Sept. 1774, 
C. 8273, A.d. Nord; Turgot to Chazerat, 27 Sept. 1774, C. 181, A.d. P-de-d; Rey, Du 
Commerce des bleds (Paris, 1775), 55–57. Cf. the similar attitude of  the Estates of  Languedoc, 
deliberations, dec. 1768, C. 2411, A.d. H-G.
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following the introduction of  his data project, it is extremely diffi-
cult to determine the degree of  execution it actually began to enjoy. 
For every intendant like Esmangart of  Bordeaux who delayed and 
obstructed, there were others such as the Bertier de Sauvigny of  
Paris, Julien of  Alençon, and Amelot of  Burgundy who cooperated 
fully. One would like to imagine, too, that there were a number of  
subdelegates like Gehier of  Bar-sur-Aube who shared Terray’s vision 
of  a comprehensive statistical network and information organization 
capable of  forecasting difficulties, matching supply and demand, and 
assisting in other administrative matters. Gehier proposed his own 
data collection plan which he called “the dream of  an homme de bien” 
and he likened his motivation to the reformist-humanitarian zeal 
which inspired his hero, the abbé de St.-Pierre.125
The subdelegates, of  course, were crucial intermediaries in the col-
lection process, for they linked the syndics of  rural communities and 
the municipalities of  the towns with the intendant. In Burgundy they 
received a printed instruction sheet from the intendant outlining the 
procedure in copious detail, stressing the importance and the novelty 
of  rigor and precision (the crop indicators, for instance, “will not be as 
they have been heretofore, vaguely designated in ideal fraction.…”), 
and insisting upon the urgency of  acting with dispatch (“The King 
gave the order to do this in his own hand.”). Calling upon them to prac-
tice prudence and discretion, the intendant warned them to be pre-
pared to face “obstacles” and “infidelities” from the “inhabitants of  
the countryside,” who were “always disposed to suspect evil” and who 
might view the inquiries as “dangerous investigations into their tax-
paying capacities.”126
The subdelegates in turn prepared instructions for the syndics and 
other local agents who would actually gather much of  the data. Pitched 
on a far simpler plane than the intendant’s directive, they are interest-
ing for the trouble they take to discuss the government’s motives. The 
syndics were told that the ministry’s aim, on the one hand, was “to pre-
vent grain from [ever again] rising to a price which exceeds the facul-
ties of  the poor Journalier [the rural analogues to the urban consumers 
whom the liberals pretended did not exist]” and, on the other, “to favor 
agriculture.” In other words, interests would somehow be balanced. In 
addition, the subdelegates promised the syndics “unequivocally” that 
125 Gehier to IN. of  Champagne, 23 Oct. 1773, C. 299, A.d. Aube.
126 “Mémoire sur les états à former…,” Nov. 1773, C. 77, A.d. C d’O.
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the data collection had absolutely no fiscal purpose. Unfortunately, we 
do not know how convincing the syndics found this presentation.127
The merits of  Terray’s idea, its modernity and its breadth, were 
also its chief  shortcomings. Partly because of  the severe limitations 
of  communications and partly because of  the insufficiently national 
and bureaucratic nature of  the administration implanted throughout 
the realm, his government was simply not equipped to execute the 
information-gathering task as he imagined it. Terray’s enthusiasm 
gave him the illusion that his data system could conquer time as well 
as space and will. Once the collection machinery was in place, the 
Controller-General boasted to Louis XV, “Your Majesty will then be 
able to command reports from one moment to another regarding each part 
of  the Administration of  his Kingdom and evaluate them with confi-
dence.”128 To be sure, Terray did not remain in office long enough to 
give the system a proper trial. Moreover, it was hardly auspicious to 
introduce it in the midst of  grave social, political, economic, and fis-
cal disorders. The Controller-General never had in hand the amount 
and quality of  data which might have given him a commanding edge 
in dealing with dearth. The claim Terray made that “I see the ensem-
ble of  the movement of  grain” was a bit of  wishful thinking and a 
bluff  designed to increase his administrative leverage.
Moreover, the Controller-General underestimated the problem of  
establishing effective regulatory mechanisms and enforcing distribu-
tion decisions made at the center. The short-term exigencies of  cri-
sis management in some ways eddied against his control ideal. The 
same structural factors that impeded information-collection made 
it extremely difficult to integrate local communities into a global 
interest system. Terray could never convince an intendant or a local 
official that he knew more about their needs than they did. When 
it affected their freedom of  action, intendants and the field police 
did not like “gênes” any more than did the merchants and laboureurs. 
The Controller-General, I have suggested, viewed subsistence as a 
national problem, but he was, alas, probably the only administrator 
in France to see it in these terms.
127 Sd to syndics, 20 dec. 1773, C. 81, A.d. C d’O.
128 Terray, “Mémoire,” 1 Aug. 1773, C. 86, A.d. Somme.
Chapter XII
POLICING THE GENERAL  
SUBSISTENCE, 1771–1774
I
Many monographs will have to be written before one can properly 
assess the impact of  Terray’s policy. De-liberalization wrought no mir-
acles. It did not herald the general return of  abundance and it did not 
restore universal social tranquility. Even in those places which enjoyed 
a marked change of  fortune after the end of  1770, it would be difficult 
to show that the improvement in conditions was due to the reinstitu-
tion of  controls. Yet there is no question that Terray’s law buoyed the 
morale of  the police, infusing them with a sense of  confidence that 
they had not felt for years. There were still frequent denunciations of  
“disorders” and “monopolies” in the trade, but the police no longer 
complained that they were impotent to act; they once again located the 
source of  the vice in the malice and greed of  the dealers rather than 
in the laws, and they resorted to “the usages of  authority” when neces-
sary to furnish their markets.1 There is some evidence that consumers 
in parts of  the Hainaut and the Paris region received the news of  the 
government’s regulatory law with enthusiasm.2 An observer in Cham-
pagne reported that the break with liberalization helped to “revive” 
the “courage” of  the people.3 Large numbers of  merchants began to 
register with the police in order to secure permission to traffic in grain.4
As always, execution of  the law depended heavily upon the parle-
ments; in this regard the Maupeou purge changed very little. It was 
 1 See, for example, Dépêches, 16 June 1771, AN O1* 413, fol. 393; 19 Sept. 1772, AN, O1* 
414, fols. 853–55; and 26 June 1774, AN, O1* 416, fols. 407–408.
 2 Terray to Taboureau, 16 Jan. 1771, C. 5977, A.D. Nord.
 3 “Administration des grains,” BN, mss. fr. 11561, fol. 6.
 4 AN, Y 9648. Cf. 8 March 1771, Archives Seine-Paris, D5B6 4910.
The Paris municipality reconstituted its clientele of  licensed suppliers. It issued new 
credentials to qualified merchants and their hinterland commissioners and no longer had 
cause to bemoan defections from the ranks. See Ordonnance de Police, Bureau de Ville, 21 Feb. 
1771, AN, F11 264; deliberations of  the Bureau, 21 Feb. 1771, AN, H* 1874, fols. 116–17.
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precisely in order to assure the widest possible diffusion and enforce-
ment that Terray had the December law enveloped in letters patent 
requiring registration. Though a number of  courts, such as the Parle-
ments of  Paris and Metz, gave their approbation without difficulty, it 
should not be imagined that registration was either universal or uncon-
tested. None of  the liberal parlements endorsed the letters patent. By 
not insisting on registration at the beginning of  1771, the government, 
after a fashion, discharged its debts to these courts for having supported 
the king’s position on the grain question so fervently in the sixties. Aware 
that it would take a “combat of  authority” to secure registration and con-
vinced that a forced registration would serve no purpose, Terray decided 
to wait for the evolution of  events and opinion to cause the liberal courts 
to gravitate toward the police system on their own.5
Yet the liberal parlements, which behaved predictably, were not 
the only ones which failed to comply amiably with Terray’s wishes. 
The increasingly tense political climate may have encouraged recal-
citrance. After the experience of  the sixties, when the central gov-
ernment revealed that it could not be counted upon in a subsis-
tence crisis, a number of  courts may have felt that they could deal 
with the problems more efficiently on a regional scale without for-
mal collaboration or coordination with the ministry. The Brittany 
court refused registration until February 1774, when it accepted a 
diluted version. Nevertheless, in November 1771, the Parlement 
issued a regulatory arrêt purely on its own authority which bore a 
striking resemblance to Terray’s December law. Presented as an anti-
dote to “monopoly,” which perpetuated a dearth that threatened 
the well-being of  the people, the arrêt reserved even less freedom 
for commerce than the royal measure. It provoked violent opposi-
tion throughout Brittany from the spokesmen of  the powerful liberty 
lobby, which united the land and the sea. The négociants of  Nantes 
warned that if  they were subjected to police constraints, particularly 
the obligation to keep books (these international merchants claimed 
to do business on good faith, sans écrits! ) and to deal on the public 
markets, they would quit the grain trade and deprive the kingdom 
of  a “precious subsistence entrepôt.” It appears doubtful that this 
parlementary arrêt was vigorously enforced. Nor did Terray press the 
matter of  registering the royal Declaration with the Parlement. In his 
 5 Terray to St.-Priest, 26, 28 May 1771, C. 2909, A.D. Hér.; Terray to Pajot, 31 Oct. 1771, 
AN, F11 223; Terray to Sénac de Meilhan, 21 Dec. 1773, C. 2421, A.D. B-du-R.
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correspondence with the intendant, the Controller-General acted as 
if  the provisions of  the December law were applicable in Brittany as 
in any other part of  the realm.6
Similarly, while he asked the intendant of  Bordeaux to assess the 
prospects for enforcing a simple arrêt du conseil without registration, 
Terray began long and sometimes strained negotiations with the Par-
lement for a text which it would find acceptable. In the beginning, 
in return for their cooperation, he was willing to allow the magis-
trates a wide latitude to “reform” and interpret the law as circum-
stances required. But over the next several years, as the subsistence 
situation in the south of  France got worse rather than better, Ter-
ray became increasingly adamant that the Bordeaux court conform 
exactly to the December law and the magistrates became increasingly 
unhappy with the Controller-General’s management of  provisioning 
affairs. Attacked by the Parlement repeatedly in 1773 for allegedly 
“blocking the free circulation of  grain” and “destroying” the grain 
trade in order to protect a “privileged” band of  government-backed 
speculators—Bordeaux’s version of  the eternal famine plot!— Terray 
grew impatient and angry. Announcing that he would henceforth 
deal “specially” with the intendant regarding subsistence matters, the 
Controller-General decried the Bordeaux magistrates’ “desire to play 
a role” as astringently as Laverdy had denounced the Rouen and 
Paris initiatives in the late sixties.7
The Rouennais themselves, both despite and because of  their anti-
liberal zeal, also managed to vex Terray. In the arrêt by which they 
registered the law shortly after their Parisian colleagues in January 
1771, they proposed certain “modifications,” at least one of  which 
the ministry found wholly unacceptable. Despite their obsession 
with commercial “abuses,” the Rouen magistrates wanted laboureurs 
to have authorization to engage in trade, ostensibly in order to pro-
mote blatier-style, small-scale provisioning. Though Terray became 
increasingly disillusioned with the role of  the laboureurs over the next 
few years, the demand for this indulgence was so widespread in the 
 6 “Arrêt et règlement de la police générate,” 5 Nov. 1771, C. 774, A.D. L-A.; “Mémoire des 
juges-consuls de Nantes,” ibid.; Terray to IN. of  Brittany, 30 Sept. 1772, C. 1691, A.D. 
I-et-V.; Genard to IN., 25 Feb. 1772, C. 1725, ibid.; IN. to Terray, June 1774, C. 1653, ibid.
 7 Terray to Esmangart, 22 Oct. 1771, C. 1432, A.D. Gir.; Terray to Esmangart and First 
President of  Bordeaux Parl., 21 Dec. 1773, C. 1441, ibid.; Terray to First President, 26 July 
1773, C. 1441 and 5 Nov. 1773, C. 1442, ibid.; Pidansat de Mairobert, Journal historique, IV, 
401–404 (14 Dec. 1773).
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beginning of  1771 that he ceded to it. The Rouen court also demanded 
the legal abolition of  the flour trade, save for the colonies, on the 
grounds that it encouraged fraud in quantity and quality and that it 
had even caused disease and death in the way it had been practiced 
in the sixties. The flour trade, however, had grown enormously dur-
ing the previous decade, especially in the Paris area. Terray bluntly 
told the Rouen court that he would do nothing to stifle it, though he 
remained uneasy about miller involvement in grain traffic.8
While he plainly did not relish them, the Controller-General did 
not challenge the modifications instituted by the Dijon Parlement in 
the act by which it endorsed the letters patent in early February. Like 
the Rouennais, the Dijon magistrates reserved the right of  laboureurs 
and fermiers to engage in trade (presumably with grain of  their own 
cultivation, a condition which would be practically impossible to 
enforce) and, in addition, it stipulated that cultivators and proprietors 
would be able to sell their own grain off  the market in their barns and 
granaries.9 The Parlements of  Besançon and Metz made their regis-
tration contingent upon the government’s acceptance of  very similar 
changes in the law.10 Allowing for these modifications, which did not 
radically alter the character of  the law, Terray secured registration 
for a vast part of  the kingdom comprising all of  France north of  the 
Loire and the large segment of  central France which belonged to 
what used to be, ante-Maupeou, the Paris jurisdiction.
Though he was anxious to establish clearly a new national law which 
would define the government’s attitude toward grain and help create a 
new psychological climate, it was not Terray’s intention at the beginning 
of  1771 to demand an exacting, rigorous execution of  every clause, at 
all times, in all places. First of  all, he knew that this could be impos-
sible: “a general law,” he wrote, “cannot be enforced with precision in 
all the provinces … in all circumstances.…” Furthermore, an inflexible 
approach would be undesirable. In order to make the law effective, the 
king’s agents had to be in a position to adjust the “disadvantages” of  
the law, apply it “more or less strictly” as their “prudence” dictates, and 
“repair the abuses which could arise from a false interpretation.”11
 8 18 Jan. 1771, Rouen Parl., Conseil 1770, fols. 60, 63, and remonstrances, 25 Jan. 1771, 
fols. 65–82, A.D. S-M.; C. 103, ibid. Cf. arrêt, conseil supérieur of  Bayeux, 24 Nov. 1772, 
C. 2600, A.D. Cal.
 9 B. 12 138, fol. 64, A.D. C d’O.
 10 Deliberations, 20 March 1771, B. 2174, fol. 21, A.D. Doubs; deliberation, 19 Jan. 1771, 
Metz Parl., B. 40 and B. 470, fol. 31 (registre secret), A.D. Moselle.
 11 Terray to DuCluzel, 28 Jan. 1771, C. 94 and 25 Feb. 1771, C. 95, A.D. I-et-L.; 
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The Controller-General was not indifferent to the wave of  criti-
cism which certain provisions of  the law provoked, especially those 
concerning mandatory market sales and the interdiction of laboureurs. 
Certain objections could perhaps be discounted, for they came from 
political and ideological adversaries: Turgot’s, for example, or those of  
his colleague Pajot, the intendant of  Dauphiné, who shared the liberal 
stance of  that province’s parlementaires. It was less easy, however, to 
dispose of  the reservations of  friends such as Cypierre, the strong-
willed intendant of  the Orléanais, who had militated so vigorously for 
a police revival in the late sixties.12 “It seems to me,” Cypierre wrote,
that it is appropriate to follow the spirit of  this law [of  December 1770] rather than 
sticking to the letter: its spirit is very just; taken at the letter, however, it goes too far, 
hampers and fails to meet the goal that it set.
Only a few years after his campaign to unmask those who veiled their 
monopolies in the sacred garb of  property rights, Cypierre was not 
embarrassed to speak in defense of  owners and cultivators who sold 
their own grain (rather than grain belonging to commerce, i.e., acquired 
second-hand through purchase) off  market on the grounds that to do 
so was “a natural right attached to property, [a] legitimate right in 
the social order.” Nor did it require the large vistas of  an intendant to 
make this analysis of  the December law and this distinction between 
right and abuse. A minor police official at Reims later remarked that 
he had systematically “closed his eyes” upon the mandatory market 
clause because it was “contrary to the natural right of  property.”13
In opting for a supple, conditional application of  the market clause in 
the law, Terray inclined less to these theoretical arguments than to their 
practical concomitants: the claim that there were no markets nearby 
and that “the little people would die of  starvation” if  country sales 
were all forbidden; the appeal to local history and customary usage 
which proved that such transactions had commonly occurred before 
 Terray to Rouillé d’Orfeuil, 14, 28 Jan. 1771, C. 417, A.D. Marne; Terray to Jullien, 7, 28 
May 1771, C. 89, A.D. Orne; Terray to Blair de Boisement, 20 Feb. 1771, C. 553, A.D. 
Bas-Rhin.
 12 Turgot, “Lettres sur le commerce des grains,” in Oeuvres, ed. by Schelle, III, 265ff; Pajot to 
Terray 31 Oct. 1771, AN, F11 223; Cypierre, Réflexions and Terray to Cypierre, 7 May 1771, 
published by Louis Guérin, L’Intendant Cypierre et la vie économique de l’Orléanais, 199, 207. Cf. 
the intendant of  Picardy whose past record and present attitudes were similar to Cypierre’s. 
To Terray, Oct. 1773, C. 86, A.D. Somme.
 13 “Résultat des observations des officiers de police des différentes villes … sur l’exécution,” 
C. 417, A.D. Marne.
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liberalization without precipitating trouble; and the contention that the 
law should aim specifically at policing “professional traffickers” rather 
than all grain holders. On the basis of  this last idea the Controller-
General tentatively agreed to “tolerate” (by which he explicitly meant 
provisionally “closing one’s eyes” rather than “authorizing formally”) 
small-scale commerce by laboureurs, many of  whom purchased grain for 
their own subsistence or for seed. Nor was he willing to make  exceptions 
only for marginal buyers and sellers. When two international traders 
from Caen complained that they could not successfully conduct their 
import operations if  they were obliged to rush their grain straight to 
market, the Controller-General assured them, albeit cautiously, that 
they could count on a generous measure of  freedom to delay market-
ing provided no supply emergencies developed.14
Finally, as the text of  the law itself  suggested, Terray was worried 
about “resuscitating the pretentions of  the [local] officers of  police.” 
His “fear” of  provoking them to take “excesses” encouraged the 
 Controller-General not to insist upon an unbending execution. “I think 
that it might be necessary,” he instructed the intendant of  Tours, “to 
remind the police officials of  the motives which should determine them 
not to enforce the new grain regulation rigorously.” When the police of  
a Champagne town halted a convoy and set a price below the current 
for public sale on the market, the Controller-General condemned them 
as vigorously as Laverdy had ever denounced local authorities at the 
height of  their reaction against liberalization. Nor did he hesitate to ask 
the royal council to quash a brutal Caen police sentence which unfairly 
fined and dishonored a local laboureur and tithe-farmer who had in fact 
been supplying the market regularly. On the other hand, the Controller-
General rushed to back up local authorities when they fell victim to 
what he considered to be unjust criticism for applying the law.15
It is difficult to make a general assessment of  police conduct vis-à-vis 
the December law. For each case of  overzealousness—in the Bordeaux 
 14 Ibid.; Terray to DuCluzel, 7 May, 15 Oct. 1771, C. 95, A.D. I-et-L.; Taboureau to SDs of  
Hainaut, 28 March 1771, C. 6689, A.D. Nord; memoir of  Burgundy IN. to SDs, ca. Oct. 
1771, C. 81, A.D. C d’O; Terray to Fontette, 7 May 1771, C. 2624, A.D. Cal.; Terray to 
IN. of  Bordeaux, 28 Jan. 1771, C. 1432, A.D. Gir.; Moisson and Le Cavelier fils to Terray, 
16 March 1771 and his reply of  26 March, C. 1653, A.D. Cal.
 15 Terray to Amelot, 22 Sept. 1772, C. 81, A.D. C d’O.; Terray to Rouillé d’Orfeuil, 28 
Jan. 1771, C. 417, A.D. Marne; Terray to DuCluzel, 30 April 1771, C. 94, A.D. I-et-L.; 
Esmangart to Terray, 2 Nov. 1771, C. 1432, A.D. Gir.; Terray to Rouillé d’Orfeuil, 26 
March 1771, C. 421 and 29 May 1773, C. 417, A.D. Marne; arrêt du conseil, 18 Aug. 1772, 
C. 2601, A.D. Cal.
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area, for example, where the intendant appears to have lost control of  
the local police once they were unleashed—there seems to be a case 
of  overindulgence—in Alençon, for instance, where a subdelegate 
rebuked the royal procurator for “tolerating” secret deals or in Cham-
pagne where another subdelegate blamed continuing subsistence dif-
ficulties on the indifference of  the local police and the maréchaussée to 
the December law. The Champenois called for a multiplication of  
“ad hoc police commissions” not only in order to increase surveil-
lance of  the grain trade, but also in order to assign “watchdogs to 
watch the watchdogs.”16 In other parts of  Champagne, however, the 
local authorities regularly “shut their eyes” to violations of  the law 
with the approval of  the intendant, for the violations in fact facilitated 
local provisioning. In these places it was clear that police aims were 
best achieved by “allowing the freedom of  buying and selling grain to 
subsist as before.”17
In one town in the Hainaut, the police and the merchants entered 
into a mutually profitable accord which put them both outside the law. 
The police tolerated private sales in granaries; in return the traders 
supplied the town with sufficient amounts of  grain to meet its needs. 
Taboureau, the intendant, strongly disapproved such transactions; few 
intendants enforced the December law with such determination. Con-
vinced that the “crushing misery” suffered by his province was the 
result of  commercial maneuvers, he urged his subdelegates to “worry 
the monopolists” by “an indefatigable surveillance.” Taboureau per-
sonally pronounced judicial sentences against law-breaking merchants 
in his campaign to suppress all off-market dealings.18
In several towns in Alençon and Champagne, fiscality and venality 
rather than concern for provisioning inspired police rigor. In order 
to maximize the opportunity for collecting fees charged for all trans-
actions on the marketplace, authorities vigorously prosecuted the 
clause banning off-market business. Here the law was executed in 
exacting fashion for the wrong reasons.19 Yet in their reports to the 
 16 Intendant’s circular, 5 June 1773, C. 1439, A.D. Gir.; Soalhat to IN. of  Alençon, 31 Oct. 1773, 
C.89, A.D. Orne; Gehier to IN. of  Champagne, 29 Oct. 1773 and 4 Jan. 1774, C. 299, A.D. Aube.
 17 “Résultat des observations …,” C. 417, A.D. Marne.
 18 Contamine (Givet) to Taboureau, 29 Dec. 1773, C. 6690, A.D. Nord; Taboureau to SDs, 
19 Dec. 1771, C. 5977, ibid.; ordonnances of  IN., 23 Dec. 1771 and 3 Feb. 1772, C. 6689, 
ibid.; Taboureau to Hennet, 7 Nov. 1773, C. 6690, ibid.
 19 Ibid.; état, Nogent-le-Rotrou, C. 90, A.D. Orne.
A great deal of  local level work will have to be done before we can evaluate the 
importance of  fiscality, in commercial as well as political terms, at the marketplace. 
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ministry, the intendants of  Brittany, Picardy, Hainaut, and Caen had 
high praise for the performance of  the local police in their generali-
ties. In Burgundy, where the intendant educated local authorities with 
detailed instructions explaining the operations of  the regulatory law 
and the measure of  severity to apply in different situations, the results 
also appear to have been favorable.20
If  Terray had had his way, every local official would have acted 
more or less in the style of  Trippier, royal procurator of  Bar-sur-Aube:
Here is how I interpret and execute the letters patent. I have the prévôtal clerk keep a reg-
ister containing the declarations of  those in the grain business in order to be in a position 
to oblige them, in a time of  pressing need and absolute necessity, to provision the market.
I prevent as much as I can illicit transactions made before the opening of  the 
market, this Monopoly of  those who buy and resell immediately and at a higher price 
without even removing the grain they first bought. I have it announced by the beat of  
the drum that it is forbidden to buy grain for commerce in the villages and hamlets of  
the countryside where there are neither markets nor fairs.
Nevertheless, Trippier allowed the laboureurs to sell to consumers for 
their subsistence needs in villages outside the market nexus. As long 
as merchants waited until consumers and bakers had satisfied their 
needs, the procurator allowed merchants to buy and remove as much 
grain as they wished provided they indicated the places of  storage in 
their declarations to the police. Trippier seemed to understand the 
Controller-General’s conception of  and expectations for the Decem-
ber law. Remarkably, hardly a month after the law went into effect, 
this official was able to pretend that it “has produced abundance in 
our markets and some diminution in the prices of  grain which [nev-
ertheless] remain very expensive.”21 Not all local and regional reports, 
to be sure, were so sanguine. The overall picture is checkered. But 
there seems to have been a general satisfaction on all levels of  police 
with the flexible, empirical approach which Terray took.
 In 148 marketplaces in Brittany, for which an annual “produit” was recorded, the total of  
fees collected for marketing and measuring “rights” was 52,395 livres. Nobles comprise the 
largest single social group among the holders, followed by members of  the royal household, 
including the king, and by ecclesiastics. See the appendices of  Letaconnoux, Le Commerce des 
grains en Bretagne.
 20 IN. of  Brittany to Terray, ca. May 1774, C. 1653, A.D. I-et-V.; Reply to Terray’s inquiry, 
ca. Oct. 1773, C. 86, A.D. Somme; Taboureau to Terray, 4 Aug. 1774, C. 6690, A.D. Nord; 
Fontette to Terray, 14 Oct. 1771, C. 2624, A.D. Cal.; Amelot, “Mémoire concernant les 
grains,” Oct. 1771, C. 81, A.D. C d’O.
 21 Trippier to Rouillé d’Orfeuil, 19 Feb. 1771, C. 299, A.D. Aube.
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II
In the spring of  1771 Terray himself  was cautiously optimistic 
about the prospects for bringing subsistence problems under con-
trol. Though he worried that the circumstantial, uneven application 
of  the law could cause confusion, the reasonably smooth transition 
back to the police system encouraged him. There were few reports 
about panic in the merchant community and the consumer-public 
seemed calmer than it had been in quite a while. If  prices remained 
high, despite a harsh winter and a busy spring sowing, many places 
reported a marked attenuation in the amplitude of  market-to- market 
variation. All of  this led Terray to claim, only months after the prom-
ulgation of  the December law, that it “was working,” even as the 
liberals had rushed to celebrate the swift accomplishments of  the 
reforms of  1763–64.22
Yet events during the course of  the next few years forced Terray to 
revise his estimation and to reconsider his attitude toward the execu-
tion of  the regulatory measures. For there were still hard times to 
come. Mediocre to bad harvests in much of  the kingdom belied the 
hopes raised by propitious spring appearances, which themselves had 
helped to reinforce the mood of  confidence inspired by the return 
to regulation. The tableau of  “the most horrible misery” painted by 
Fontette, intendant of  Caen, could have applied to a dozen other 
generalities.23 Assisted by instructions and funds from the central gov-
ernment, intendants in the stricken areas opened ateliers de charité and 
expanded other public works projects.24 In Paris wheat prices rose 
sharply during 1771 and police reported considerable ferment in the 
bread markets. In May Hardy noted that a thirty year old pregnant 
woman cut her own throat when a baker refused to give her credit.25 
A riot at Nancy sent shock tremors throughout Lorraine.26 In Brit-
tany the situation deteriorated dramatically between the fall of  1771 
and the spring of  1772.
 22 Terray to INs. of  Caen, Tours, and Bordeaux, 7 May 1771, C. 2624, A.D. Cal.; C. 95, A.D. 
I-et-L.; C. 1432, A.D. Gir.
 23 Fontette to Terray, 14 Oct. 1771, C. 2624, A.D. Cal. Cf. Monteymard to IN. of  Champagne, 
25 Oct. 1771, C. 423, A.D. Marne and état de récoltes, 1771, C. 84, A.D. Somme.
 24 C. Bloch, L’Assistance et l’état à la veille de la Révolution (Paris, 1908), 201–202.
 25 Hardy’s Journal, 1 May 1771, BN, mss. fr. 6680, fol. 256. On Paris prices see M. Baulant, “Le 
Prix des grains à Paris,” Annales: E.S.C., XXIII (May–June 1968), 520–40. For a different 
index, see Labrousse, Esquisse, 113.
 26 Deliberation of  Metz Parl., 17 June 1771, B. 470, fol. 65 (registre secret), A.D. Moselle.
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“The misery of  the people is very great,” the subdelegate of  Qui-
mper informed the intendant. “Almost all [the peasants] are spec-
ters ready to expire,” wrote the substitut of  a parish near Rennes.27 
During this same period a series of  riots aimed at preventing grain 
removal and forcing down the price of  bread broke out in the gener-
alities of  Brittany, Caen, and Tours.28
Though prices remained dear, a relatively good harvest in 1773 
brought a measure of  tranquility to Picardy, Champagne, and neigh-
boring areas in the north and northeast.29 But from Alençon came 
grisly reports of  “starvation,” “epidemic and popular diseases,” 
record “mortalities” (seven heads of  family allegedly “died of  misery” 
during the year in one village), persistently high prices, and lagging 
wages—eight to ten sous a day—insufficient to support the smallest 
and most frugal families.30 Massive unemployment due to the col-
lapse of  the silk-lace and other textile industries compounded the 
continuing subsistence crisis in Caen and surrounding areas.31 After a 
year during which the four-pound loaf  in Paris fluctuated around ten 
sous, a price which authorities considered manageable, cold and wet 
weather in the late spring and early summer of  1773 menaced the 
harvest and caused the bread price to mount. Though not a disaster, 
the crop proved to be disappointing and bread soared to thirteen sous 
in late September. Large doses of  king’s grain helped to bring down 
the prices by the end of  the year.32
 27 DuRun to IN., 11 Feb. 1772, C. 1725 and Geslin to IN., 8 May 1772, C. 1726, A.D. I-et-V.
 28 C. 1653, A.D. I-et-V.; C. 2665 and C. 2684, A.D. Cal.; Terray to DuCluzel, 24 Sept., 
10 Dec. 1771 and 12 Aug. 1772, C. 97, A.D. I-et-L. There was also at least one major 
uprising in the generality of  Champagne during this time. Terray to Rouillé d’Orfeuil, 
9 Oct. 1772, C. 109, A.D. Meuse.
 29 Paillot (?) to IN. of  Champagne (?), 6 June 1773, C. 1179, A.D. Aube; reply to enquête, 
Oct. 1773, C. 86, A.D. Somme. On the eve of  the harvest, however, the intendant of  
Champagne reported that acute subsistence “anxiety” was widespread in his jurisdiction. 
Several grain riots flared up, the most serious in the town of  Vaucouleurs where bands 
of  soldiers from the army garrison, seconded by local women, prevented the removal of  
several grain wagons and forced market sales of  the grain at a fixed price below the current. 
Rouillé to Terray, 20 May 1773 and Rouillé to police of  Vaucouleurs, 24 May 1773, C. 109, 
A.D. Meuse. The current of  grain riots affected neighboring areas as well. See, for instance, 
the arrêt of  the cour souveraine of  Lorraine, 4 Dec. 1773, A.D. Moselle. Less than a year 
before, the town of  Vaucouleurs had experienced a similar upheaval which was allegedly 
led by the mayor and an officer of  the maréchaussée. Lieutenant general of  police to SD (?), 
21 Sept. 1772, and mayor to IN., 21 Sept. 1772, C. 109, A.D. Meuse.
 30 DeBadoire to IN. of  Alençon, 22 Oct. 1773, C. 89, A.D. Orne.
 31 C. 2626, A.D. Cal.
 32 Sartine to Trudon, 14 Nov. 1771,13 March, 13 April, 14, 22 Sept. 1772, AN, Y 15144; 
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During the course of  1773 the major center of  subsistence diffi-
culties shifted southward. The Poitou suffered “extreme misery” and 
popular disorders, provoked, according to one observer, by mysteri-
ous “removals” of  grain from the province. In order to communi-
cate to the king the degree of  their hardship, a group of  peasants is 
said to have sent Madame du Barry a sample of  the awful substance 
that passed for their daily bread. The “specter of  famine” terrorized 
Provence. Throughout Guyenne prices surged, supplies were impos-
sible to procure through normal channels, and consumers everywhere 
were near panic. “No work and no bread” was how one official char-
acterized the situation in Languedoc; the subsistence crisis triggered 
a more general economic crisis: “the dearness of  all goods prevents 
the consumption of  our cloths.”33
The Midi had its Flour War in the spring of  1773. A blaze of  riots 
scorched the entire area from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic. “We 
learn from all sides,” wrote the Toulouse subdelegate, “that the peo-
ple are rising because of  the grain cherté.” The process of  “contagion” 
impressed observers everywhere. “Begun at Aix, imitated at Toulouse 
and other cities of  Languedoc,” noted Terray, the riots “moved on 
from place to place” until they reached Bordeaux.34 At Toulouse the 
people—predominantly women, many of  them armed with 3-feet long 
poles—pillaged the marketplace for grain. The merchants, “seized 
with fear, fled and barricaded themselves in their houses.” Municipal 
officials reestablished calm by fixing the price of  grain at 16 livres, six 
livres below the current price.35 There were other outbreaks at Albi, 
Castres, and Montpellier. Troops were called to quell several of  the ris-
ings; at Montauban alone, eight people were killed and at least a dozen 
 procès-verbal, Machurin, 25 April 1772, AN, Y 12622; Hardy’s Journal, 7 July, 29 Sept. 
1773, BN, mss. fr. 6681, fols. 208, 229; Anon., “Mémoire,” (8 Aug. 1773), AN, F11 265.
 33 Pidansat de Mairobert, Journal historique, IV, 186 (31 May 1773); ibid.; IV, 162–63 (4, 7 May 
1773); René Baehrel, Une Croissance: La Basse-Provence rurale (Paris, 1961), 75–76; Esmangart to 
Terray, 10 June 1773, C. 1435 and Aurou to Esmangart, 5 July 1773, C. 1440, A.D. Gir.; de 
Vandoul (?) to St.-Priest, 21 April 1773, C. 2914, A.D. Hér.; C. 412, A.D. H-G.; J. Godechot 
and S. Moncassin, “Démographie et subsistances en Languedoc du XVIIIe siècle au début du 
XIXe siècle,” Bulletin de l’histoire économique et sociale de la Révolution française (1964), 34.
 34 Terray to St.-Priest, 5 May 1773, C. 2914, A.D. Hér.; Raynal to St.-Priest, 19 May 1773, 
ibid.; Marquis de Bertand to St.-Priest (?), 1 Aug. 1773, C. 2915, ibid.; Terray to First 
President, Bordeaux Parl., 5 Nov. 1773, C. 1442, A.D. Gir.; BN, mss. n.a. 4389, fol. 1527 
(Albertas).
 35 Raynal to St.-Priest, 28 April 1773 and de Vandoul to St.-Priest, 21 April 1773, C. 2914, 
A.D. Hér.; Journal historique et politique des principaux événements (20 May 1773), 55.
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wounded.36 Beginning in May there was what one official called a 
“revolutionary” situation in the Guyenne. The city of  Bordeaux expe-
rienced, in Voltaire’s words, “a murderous sedition.”37 The news sur-
prised as well as horrified Terray, for he believed, on the basis of  his own 
calculations, that the city had ample provisions for several months.38 A 
“spirit of  vertigo” seized people along the Garonne and in other areas 
in the generality. At least twenty-three separate riots erupted between 
May and August, many of  them spreading from one town or village 
to another in a snakedance of  violence and pillage.39 The Bordeaux 
Parlement demanded troops and Terray called for a “severe” punish-
ment of  the leading mutineers but a lieutenant of  the maréchaussée, on 
duty at Bergerac, scene of  a tumultuous uprising, warned that repres-
sion was not the answer to the problem: “10,000 armed soldiers will 
never have as much effect here as 5,000 sacks of  grain, and I repeat to 
you aloud, we need grain, grain, grain, and with grain peace will be 
made, for otherwise you will never make peace with the people.…”40 
Terray’s colleague Monteynard, the war  minister, shared this view: 
 36 SD at Albi to St.-Priest, 27 April 1773, C. 2914, A.D. Hér.; Terray to St.-Priest, 10 May 
1773, ibid.; La Vrillière to St.-Priest, 15 May 1773, ibid.; Pidansat de Mairobert, Journal 
historique, IV, 180 (26 May 1773); Hardy’s Journal, 29 April, 19 May, 1 June 1773, BN, mss. 
fr. 6681, fols. 185, 195–98; Dupont to Prince Carl Ludwig, 1773 in Knies, ed., Dupont 
correspondance, II, 147.
 37 Voltaire to duc de Richelieu, 4 June 1773 in Besterman, ed., Correspondence, vol. 85, p. 119 
(# 17331). Cf. P. Caraman, “La Disette des grains et les émeutes populaires en 1773 dans 
la généralité de Bordeaux,” Revue historique de Bordeaux, II (1910), 297 and passim.
 38 Terray to Esmangart, 16 May 1773, C. 1441, A.D. Gir. Terray’s surprise temporarily shocked 
him into considering a plot thesis to explain the Bordeaux risings similar to the one which 
Turgot made into a veritable principle of  government after the Flour War. Terray to First 
President, 19 May 1773, C. 1441. Turgot later blamed the agitation in the Guyenne in 1773 on 
the “false measures” taken by Terray. Turgot to Esmangart, 24 May 1775, C. 1448, A.D. Gir.
 39 All the archival references that follow are from A.D. Gir.: Casteljaloux municipality to 
SD, 18 May 1773, C. 1435; Robert to Esmangart, 18 May 1776, C. 1446; Dumogues to 
Esmangart, 8, 15 July 1773 and Bonner to Esmangart, 9 July 1773, C. 1437; Municipality 
of  Bergerac to Esmangart, 23 May 1773, C. 1437; Terray to Esmangart, 27 April 1773, 
C. 1441; Esmangart to mayor of  St. André, 16 May 1773, C. 1436; Affonen (Moissac) to 
Esmangart, 11 May 1773, C. 1437; municipality of  Cenac, 25 July 1773, C. 1437; officiers 
of  Libourne to Esmangart, 19 May 1773, C. 1435; Esmangart to chevalier de Ferrette 
(Langon), 20 May 1773, C. 1435. Cf. Pidansat de Mairobert, Journal historique, IV, 172, 175 
(18, 20 May 1773) and Caraman, “Disette,” Revue historique de Bordeaux, III (1911), 299ff.
 40 Terray to First President, 19 May, 1 June 1773, C. 1441, A.D. Gir.; lieutenant de la 
maréchaussée to Esmangart, 25 May 1773, C. 1437, ibid. Terray was accused—unfairly, 
I think—of  being more interested in repression than “in procuring bread for the 
malcontents.” Pidansat de Mairobert, Journal historique, IV, 176–77, 180 (23, 26 May 
1773). Though it is true that the Bordeaux contagion angered him more than any 
other episode of  insurgency during his ministry, he labored strenuously, after as before 
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“It was not troops,” he advised the king, but bread which ought to 
be sent “to the riot areas.”41 Meanwhile a rumor circulated in Paris 
that the Controller-General would be disgraced as a result of  these 
farflung disorders.42
Had Terray been able to persuade himself  that the subsistence 
troubles and the unrest of  1771–73 were primarily the result of  harvest 
failures, and thus beyond government prevention or remedy, in all likeli-
hood he would not have abandoned his moderate stand on the inter-
pretation and execution of  the regulatory law of  December 1770. But 
the news of  misery, shortage, and riots was accompanied by ominous 
reports, from a plethora of  sources, of  “abuses” in the grain trade and 
“violations” of  the law. Grain owners everywhere practiced “maneu-
vers” with impunity, profiting from the indulgence of  officials who did 
not enforce the law rigorously and “deceiving” authorities who had tried 
to remain vigilant. Dealers were making false declarations or failing to 
register the names of  associates. Individuals “claiming to be blatiers, most 
of  them unknown,” were stripping the markets bare, without bargaining 
for price and apparently with the intention of  holding the grain in stor-
age until the prices mounted further. More substantial merchants were 
making huge purchases, both on and off  market, and placing the grain in 
secret storehouses. Buying and selling in their granaries and on the road, 
trading on samples, and taking payment for futures, the laboureurs were 
said to be in the forefront of  illicit operations. Terray had no doubt that 
the dearths signalled in many places were “artificial” rather than “real.” 
A nightmarish vista of  chaos rudely interrupted his dream of  eventual 
control of  the provisioning trade.43
Nor did the Controller-General escape criticism for what some 
observers regarded as a policy of  excessive leniency. Less than a 
 the riots, to find supplies for the Guyenne. Terray to Esmangart, 25 May 1773, and Terray 
to First President, 26 July 1773, C. 1441, A.D. Gir.
 41 Hardy’s Journal, 19 May 1773, BN, mss. fr. 6681, fol. 192.
 42 Ibid. Though the Midi experience of  1773 was the last great wave of  riots Terray 
encountered, it should be mentioned that there were scattered outbreaks the following year 
in many places in the south and at Tours, Cherbourg, etc. See, for example, Hardy’s Journal, 
2 March 1774, BN, mss. fr. 6681, fol. 303; Journal historique et politique (10, 30 March 1774), 
415, 446 and (10 April 1774), 57; Terray to Esmangart, 29 April, 3 May 1774, C. 1442, 
A.D. Gir.; C. 2681, A.D. Cal.
 43 Terray to Esmangart, 7 May 1771, C. 1432, A.D. Gir.; Trippier to Rouillé d’Orfeuil (?), 
12 Aug. 1771, C. 299, A.D. Aube; Terray to Dupleix, 9 Sept. 1771, C. 84, A.D. Somme; 
Amelot, memoir to SDs, Oct. 1771, C. 81, A.D. C d’O; Genard to IN., 25 Feb. 1772, 
C. 1725, A.D. I-et-V.; Terray to Rouillé d’Orfeuil, 9 Nov. 1772, C. 1179, A.D. Aube; Terray 
to IN., 20 Nov. 1772, C. 106, A.D. S-M.
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year after he had destroyed the liberal reforms, even as his enemies 
assailed him as a ruthless tyrant, Terray found himself  charged by 
some administrators with tolerating too much liberty. A commit-
tee of  inquiry composed of  four members of  the Enquêtes section 
of  the Paris Parlement made the most striking statement of  this 
position. The fact that subsistence difficulties persisted despite the 
return to controls could only mean, in their view, that the restored 
police was too flaccid and unexacting, not only in execution 
but in conceptualization as well. Demanding new legislation bet-
ter suited to combat cherté, these parlementaires attacked not only 
the abuses of  liberty but the principle of  free internal circulation 
itself, “perhaps the primary cause of  the misfortunes that France 
has suffered for such a long time.” Their specific recommenda-
tions, some of  which curiously mimicked Terray’s own view of  con-
trol, were neither fresh nor compelling; the Parlement as a whole 
refused to join the issue by adopting the committee report.44 But 
the general theme of  the Enquêtes’ protest, in large part because 
it echoed sentiment held by field officials at all levels of  adminis-
tration, clearly made an impression upon the government. Just as 
the liberals had called for more and better liberty when liberaliza-
tion began to founder toward the end of  the sixties, so these mag-
istrates cried out for more and better police in the aftermath of  the 
police reaction.45 Even as this and other demands were being reg-
istered, the Controller-General, under the pressure of  events, was 
moving toward a policy of  ever-expanding rigor and regulation.
Terray made his new goal “the general and literal execution” of  the 
law, especially the controversial articles regarding market transactions 
and laboureur trade. Immediately after the promulgation of  the Decem-
ber law, wrote the Controller-General, “I insisted with less force upon 
the necessity of  selling grain on the markets” because I then thought 
that “this was the best means to use for reestablishing order and 
 44 BN, Coll. Joly 1111, fols. 144–46 (Aug. 1771).
 45 Among the demands for a more rigorous and comprehensive police, see DuCluzel report. 
ca. June 1771, C. 94, A.D. I-et-L.; Rouillé d’Orfeuil to Terray, 14 May 1772, C. 418, A.D. 
Marne; SD of  Châlons and Châteaupotier, “Résultat des observations des subdélégués…,” 
C. 417, A.D. Marne; SDs Champassais and Bond to IN. of  Alençon, 13 Oct. 1773, C. 89, 
A.D. Orne; SD of  Valenciennes to IN. of  Hainaut, ca. Oct. 1773, C. 6690, A.D. Nord; arrêt 
du 12 Sept. 1772, Cour souveraine de Lorraine, C. 38, A.D. Moselle; deliberations, Metz Parl., 
17 June 1771, B. 470, fol. 65 (registre secret), A.D. Moselle; deliberations, Feb. 1771, Conseil 
supérieur d’Alsace, C. 553, A.D. Bas-Rhin.
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police in this sphere.” In many areas, however, this toleration resulted 
in confusion and monopoly instead of  order and police. Owners 
hoarded instead of  coming to market or dealt clandestinely “and in 
the midst of  abundance or at least of  sufficiency [of  supply] we heard 
the cries of  need.” The lesson was clear: the mandatory market clause 
was the keystone of  the provisioning and control systems; without it, 
they broke down. In letter after letter the Controller-General insisted 
upon “the absolute necessity of  executing article six [i.e., the market 
clause] rigorously” and of  subjecting dealers who defied the law to 
“severe punishment.” So serious was the Controller-General about 
making the market the unique theatre of  commercial transactions 
that he tried to deny the Paris merchants their “time-immemorial 
right,” written into law in the 1730’s, to buy in the countryside.46
By their abuse of  the law and indifference to their public respon-
sibilities, Terray suggested, the grain dealers had in a sense forfeited 
their claim to liberty. The purpose of  the “liberty of  the grain trade” 
was to encourage agriculture and to enable the producers to draw 
a return “proportional” to their investment. Now “if  they had con-
ducted themselves in a manner exclusively to fulfill this goal, no one 
would have anything to complain about,” the Controller-General 
allowed. But the problem was precisely that “they veered far away 
from this goal.” Fascinated by the prospects for self-aggrandizement, 
they “were guided only by their personal interest,” a state of  mind 
and business as alarming to Terray as it would have been reassuring 
to a Laverdy or a Turgot. In Terray’s view the grain trade was above 
all a public service, a subsistence service. The turn to rigor made it 
plain that the government did not intend to allow grain to become 
“an object of  speculation for the rich because it must be employed 
first in [meeting the needs of] consumption.” The obligatory market 
clause would enable the “people to stand witness” to all provisioning 
transactions but “the eye of  the government” would also roam the 
countryside to uncover “monopolies.”47
 46 Terray to IN. and to First President of  Bordeaux, 21 Dec. 1773, C. 1441, A.D. Gir.; Terray to 
IN. of  Provence, 18 Sept. 1773, C. 2421, A.D. B-du-R.; Terray to IN. of  Tours, 18 Sept. 1773, 
C. 95, A.D. I-et-L.; Terray to IN. of  Franche-Comté, 18 Sept. 1773, C. 354, A.D. Doubs; 
Terray to Rouillé d’Orfeuil, 30 Oct. 1772, C. 299, A.D. Aube; Terray to Rouillé d’Orfeuil, 
 7 March 1774, C. 419, A.D. Marne. Not long after it modified the December law to enhance 
the freedom of  dealers, especially laboureurs, the Dijon Parlement found it necessary to pass an 
arrêt banning all off-market transactions, 25 March 1771, C. 81, A.D. C d’O.
 47 Terray to IN. of  Alençon, 2, 18 Sept. 1772, and 10 Nov. 1773, C. 89, A.D. Orne; IN. of  
Alençon to SDs, 9 Sept. 1772, ibid.; Terray to Amelot, 2 Sept. 1772, C. 81, 
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Terray’s concern about the grain trade overshadowed his fears 
about the excesses of  the local police. He ordered local and regional 
authorities not merely to give the December law “the severest execu-
tion” but to step beyond its specific injunctions in order to ferret out 
those who “would deprive the public of  its subsistence.” The Control-
ler-General also tried to involve himself  personally in the details of  
enforcement: he wanted to know of  instances of  enormous purchases, 
“multiple sales” of  the same grain, and hoarding; he denied the request 
of  an Anjou official to permit trading on samples; he inquired into the 
activities of  regraters in a small town in the Hainaut; he proposed a 
buying schedule for the tiny market of  Richelieu in order to prevent 
merchants from removing all supplies before consumers could buy.48
The dealers who emerged as the chief  villains in Terray’s cam-
paign for rigor between 1771 and 1773 were not the “merchants”— 
ostensibly because they registered with the police and were subject to 
more or less constant scrutiny—but the laboureurs and laboureur-fermiers 
who were legally prohibited from engaging in grain trade and who 
were more difficult to police given their amphibious role as produc-
ers and distributors. Liberalization, according to Terray’s analysis, 
had transformed the laboureurs, economically and psychologically, from 
simple suppliers to professional traders. “Enriched by high prices,” the 
laboureurs “became more avid for gain” than ever before and more inter-
ested in grain maneuvers. Their wealth emboldened them by sparing 
them of  the urgent need for cash, thus enabling them to hoard grain 
until prices climbed to “exorbitant” levels. Moreover, these laboureurs 
bought grain from other cultivators and dealers on the pretext that they 
needed grain for seed or subsistence.49 Aiming at making themselves 
“masters of  the good and thus of  the price,” they practiced “a veritable 
 A.D. C d’O.; Terray to archbishop of  Narbonne, 25 Nov. 1772, C. 2912, A.D. Hér.; Terray 
to IN. of  La Rochelle, 1 July 1772, C. 196, A.D. C-M. Though he tended increasingly to 
view the grain merchants in adversary terms, the Controller-General was never indifferent to 
their well-being. He demanded, for example, a thorough investigation of  charges made by a 
Champagne merchant that townspeople, inspired by a “feeling of  impunity,” vandalized his 
house, threatened the lives of  his children, interrupted his trade, and confiscated his grain. 
Petition of  Louis Carmouche, Sept. 1772 and CG to IN., 4 Oct. 1772, C. 109, A.D. Meuse.
 48 Terray to Cluzel, 10 March 1772 and 28 Sept. 1773, C. 95, A.D. I-et-L.; (?) to Terray, 10 March 
1771, C. 94, ibid.; Terray to Taboureau, 2 Sept. 1772, C. 5977, A.D. Nord; Terray to Rouillé 
d’Orfeuil, 27 Sept. 1772, C. 417, A.D. Marne; Terray to Taboureau, 15 July 1772, C. 8277, A.D. 
Nord; Terray to IN. of  Alençon, 15 Oct. 1771, and IN. to SDs, 18 Oct. 1771, C. 89, A.D. Orne.
 49 Terray to IN. of  Alençon, 18 Sept. 1773, C. 89, A.D. Orne; Amelot, “Mémoire concernant 
les grains,” ca. Oct. 1771, C. 81, A.D. C d’O; Terray to Rouillé d’Orfeuil, 18 Sept. 1773, 
C. 419, A.D. Marne; Paillot to Rouillé d’Orfeuil, 23 Oct. 1773, C. 1179, 
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monopoly.” As a result of  lax execution in the beginning or the excep-
tions which certain Parlements imposed upon the December law, the 
laboureurs believed or pretended that the law did not apply to them. Ter-
ray held the laboureurs responsible for much of  the cherté which plagued 
the kingdom between 1771 and 1773 as well as the popular disorders 
“which would not have taken place” if  the suppliers had not forced 
the consumers “to pay an excessive price for the commodity of  first 
necessity.”50 In his call for rigor the Controller-General emphasized the 
need not only to repress their illicit dealings and flush the laboureurs out 
of  the trade but also to discipline them to supply the nearby markets 
on a regular basis. In addition, he recommended fiscal pressure to force 
the laboureurs onto the markets by having the receivers of  the taille press 
for exact, punctual payments. Finally, he hoped to be able to increase 
the share of  the taille to be paid by the “rich” laboureurs who “have prof-
ited excessively from the sale of  their grain” and to reduce the obliga-
tion of  the poor rural day-workers. It is a revealing mark, however, of  
the administrative and social organization of  the Old Regime that the 
finance minister was not in a position to effect such a change in the allo-
cation of  taxes on his own.51
It is difficult to determine exactly whom he meant when Terray 
inveighed against the rich laboureurs. Despite requests from subordi-
nates for a criterion of  identification (“what quantity of  land under 
cultivation can imprint the quality of  laboureur?” asked the police offi-
cials of  Sézanne), the Controller-General never defined the term.52 A 
laboureur represented anyone from the countryside who produced some 
grain of  his own and acquired other grain from purchase, rents, fees, 
etc. Surely in some instances those who passed as “laboureurs” must have 
been tithe collectors or farmers of  ecclesiastical and/or seigneurial 
dues or seigneurs of  one kind or another. It is striking that in assailing 
 A.D. Aube; Terray to Fontette, 9 Sept. 1771, C. 2624, A.D. Cal. Cf. the complaints of  local 
police against laboureur abuses. For example, Guerin at Bonnet to SD of  Joinville, 26 Nov. 
1773 and SD at Vaucouleurs to IN., 8 March 1774, C. 110, A.D. Meuse.
 50 Terray to Fontette, 7 May 1771, C. 2624, A.D. Cal.; Terray to Esmangart, 18 Sept. 1773, 
C. 1441, A.D. Gir.; Terray to IN. of  Alençon, 10 Nov. 1773, C. 89, A.D. Orne. Cf. the 
Lieutenant of  Police of  Caen’s description of  the rich laboureurs-fermiers as “bloodsuckers.” 
To Miromesnil, 20 July 1770, C. 2653, A.D. Cal.
 51 Terray to Rouillé d’Orfeuil, 28 Sept. 1773, C. 419, A.D. Marne; Terray to DuCluzel, 
15 Oct. 1771, C. 94, A.D. I-et-L.; Terray to Esmangart, 5 Sept. 1770, C. 1431, A.D. Gir.; Terray 
to Monthyon, Sept. 1770, C. 925, A.D. P-de-D.; Terray to Fontette, 8 Sept. 1770 and Fontette’s 
reply, 16 Sept. 1770, C. 2623, A.D. Cal.; Terray to Taboureau, 7 April 1772, C. 8277, A.D. Nord.
 52 “Résultat des observations des officiers de police …,” C. 417, A.D. Marne.
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the landed and producer interests, Terray never referred specifically 
to the great rentiers of  the land—many of  whom were involved in the 
grain trade, albeit often indirectly—save in his bitter clashes with the 
liberals of  the south and southwest.
Nor are we yet equipped to take the measure of  Terray’s claim 
that the laboureurs, as a whole, benefitted enormously from the high 
prices of  the period 1764–74. He was neither the only nor the first 
administrator to call attention to the secondary effects of  laboureur 
“opulence.” Under the liberal ministry, in the exchanges with the 
Paris Parlement on the grain question between the fall of  1768 and 
the summer of  1769, Louis XV alluded several times to the newly-
acquired “affluence” which induced the laboureurs to suspend provi-
sioning. The  laboureurs of  course denied that they gained nearly as 
much as certain officials suggested from liberalization and its after-
math. They blamed the cherté of  the seventies on “the excessive price 
to which the leases have been carried”—the consequence of  the sharp 
rise in prices of  the mid-sixties—and on the general inflation of  costs 
which they argued outstripped grain in many instances.53 There is no 
doubt that leases rose substantially in most places, in some cases by 
more than 50 percent, in the years following the liberal reforms and 
that high prices encouraged “the laboureurs who had enriched them-
selves” to undertake what one subdelegate called the “réunion des 
fermes.”54 The subdelegate of  Avesnes in the Hainaut urgently called 
for the “division of  the fermes” throughout northern France. “Most of  
these fermes,” he claimed, were “too rich [and] too closely linked with 
unions cemented both by interest and by family ties.” Given the ease 
with which they could “form among themselves societies, systems, 
 53 Borondon, SD of  Lisieux, to IN. of  Alençon, 17 Nov. 1773, C. 89, A.D. Orne.
 54 Crosne to Terray, 26 Jan. 1772, AN, F11 223; Dupleix to Terray, 28 Jan. 1772, ibid.; reply to 
Terray enquête, Oct. 1773, C. 86, A.D. Somme; SDs of  Bernay, Billesuche, and Nogent-le-
Rotrou to IN. of  Alençon, 12, 13 Oct. 1773, C. 89, A.D. Orne; C. 3215, fols. 622–25, A.D. 
C d’O.; Flesche to Taboureau, 28 Sept. 1770, C. 6690, A.D. Nord.
I have encountered only one instance in which an official denied that leases have risen and 
he himself  prefaced his remarks by admitting that this would “appear incredible.” Revanoc 
(St.-Malo) to Fontette, 1 May 1770, C. 2673, A.D. Cal. The subdelegates of  Cambrai and 
Valenciennes claimed that “the cherté ruined the fermiers more than it enriched them.” The 
owners were the real benefactors of  the price and lease rise. Reports to the IN., ca. Oct. 
1773, C. 6690, A.D. Nord. Cf. the retrospective view that the laboureurs were “duped” and 
ultimately “ruined” by the liberal experience. L.-J. Bourdon-Desplanches, Projet nouveau sur la 
manière de faire utilement en France le commerce des grains (Brussels, 1785), 34–36.
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or monopolies,” the fermiers were in a position to “reduce the poor 
people to die of  hunger.”55
A number of  officials described a vicious circle, from which they 
perceived no issue, in terms sympathetic to the cultivator-lessees:
The great evil was done in the first years of  the export system. The land increased in 
value, the price of  leases followed the same progression; during this time royal taxes 
increased considerably and the price of  foodstuffs and other merchandise became 
excessive … The cherté of  grain coming [today] from the dearness of  leases, the first 
cannot be checked while the second persists.56
Though it appears that in some areas the upward revision of  leases was 
made contingent upon the maintenance of  liberalization, many local 
officials agreed with the Toulouse Parlement that the laboureur-fermiers 
signed long-term leases “on the faith of  the stability of  the Declaration 
of  1763 and the Edict of  July 1764” and warned that the laboureurs-
fermiers would neither be able to pay their rents nor their taxes if  prices 
fell back to “the old level.”57 Preoccupied with the provisioning side of  
the matter, the Controller-General did not pay enough attention to the 
squeeze that threatened many cultivators. But before we can evaluate 
Terray’s attitude toward the laboureurs and make sense of  the constraints 
which operated on them, we need systematic local studies of  leases and 
land transactions of  all sorts as well as socially and economically dif-
ferential analyses of  the so-called laboureur universe.
Unlike the committee of  the Enquêtes, the Controller-General did 
not believe that the December law was “insufficient” to deal with pro-
visioning problems provided that it was energetically and intelligently 
applied. In the hope of  making the law more efficient, in the fall of  
1773 Terray introduced a significant modification concerning enforce-
ment procedure. An arrêt du conseil invested the intendants with a major 
part of  the legal responsibility for the execution of  the regulatory law.58 
Heretofore the participation of  the intendants was exclusively admin-
istrative and political: they supervised local management, explained 
 55 Report to IN., ca. Oct. 1773, C. 6690, A.D. Nord. Most of  the other subdelegates here 
perceived a tendency toward continuing subdivision rather than concentration of  fermes.
 56 Reply to Terray enquête, Oct. 1773, C. 86, A.D. Somme.
 57 Arrêt, Parl. of  Toulouse, 14 Nov. 1772, AN, AD XI 39; SDs of  Argentau, Lisieux and de 
Mortagne, 13, 14, 28 Oct. 1773 to IN. of  Alençon, C. 89, A.D. Orne. Not surprisingly, the 
magistrates of  Aix saw things in the same fashion as their Languedoc confreres. Letter to 
Louis XV, 10 Nov. 1770, B. 3677, A.D. B-du-R.
 58 Arrêt du Conseil, 29 Oct. 1773, AN, AD, XI 39.
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the law to subordinates, and transmitted orders and information, but they 
had nothing to do with the disposition of  cases arising from the violation 
of  the law, a judicial matter devolving upon the conventional institutions 
of  local justice. Henceforth, however, the intendants were to indict and 
judge persons accused of  violations of  the December law, thereby circum-
venting the entire judicial apparatus, with appeals receivable only by 
the royal council. Yet the wording of  the arrêt was ambiguous on certain 
counts. It was not clear whether intendants would have jurisdiction over 
all such offenses and, more important, whether they would exercise not 
merely preemptive but also exclusive jurisdiction. In explanatory letters 
Terray insisted that the arrêt neither encroached upon parlementary jus-
tice nor “stripped local and royal judges of  the jurisdiction over offenses 
which might be denounced before them,” but he did not provide any 
machinery for a division of  authority.59 As in many other domains of  
old-regime public life, there were now to be ordinary and extraordinary 
channels for the execution of  the law: a regular, front-line system abso-
lutely vital for the maintenance of  order in the grain trade and an alter-
nate, shadow system enabling high officials to intervene locally at their 
discretion without regard to form.
Terray’s aim was to escalate the war against grain maneuvers. 
Though it is extremely tempting to read the arrêt as a censure of  the 
local police, the evidence suggests that the Controller-General was 
relatively pleased with their performance, all things considered.60 
Surely he had no interest in alienating them, for he recognized that 
the role that they played in provisioning was crucial. He believed, 
however, that local authorities were simply incapable of  dealing with 
certain kinds of  “abuses,” especially those committed by  traders who 
 59 Terray to IN. of  Alençon, 10 Nov. 1773, C. 89, A.D. Orne; Terray to IN. and First President 
of  Bordeaux, 21 Dec. 1773, C. 1441, A.D. Gir.
 60 A month before the promulgation of  the arrêt, Terray launched a searching and imaginative 
inquiry concerning every aspect of  the subsistence situation. It is possible that the arrêt was 
partly inspired by the findings of  this enquête. Yet the extant answers submitted by intendants 
and lesser officials do not suggest that Terray had cause for serious misgivings about the 
local police. On the contrary, their conduct was more often praised than reproached. The 
enquête clearly emphasized, however, that the “speculative system” still existed and that prices 
were still “higher than they should be.” There are copies of  the questionnaire addressed 
to the intendants, 28 Sept. 1773, in: C. 1441, A.D. Gir.; C. 95, A.D. I-et-L.; C. 86, A.D. 
Somme; C. 89, A.D. Orne; C. 419, A.D. Marne; C. 1653, A.D. I-et-V. There are scattered 
answers in the same places. Biollay’s conspiratorial interpretation of  the arrêt seems to me 
to be utterly unfounded in fact and mistaken in the assumptions about local and regional 
administration on which it is based. Biollay, Pacte, 191–92.
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operated in several different jurisdictions at once, playing one off  
against the other.61 The intendants clearly had more power and range; 
a number of  them were anxious to become more directly involved in 
grain police in order to be in a better position to deal with subsistence 
questions and probably urged Terray to accord them jurisdiction.62 
Theoretically, in addition to reducing the opportunity for offenders 
to escape apprehension, the intendants would limit their chances 
of  evading serious punishment by simplifying and speeding up the 
indictment and trial procedures. The prospect of  pursuit across juris-
dictional lines and of  stiff, summary sentences in a Star Chamber 
ambience, Terray calculated, might have a deterrent effect upon 
speculators and monopolists. The intendants’ jurisdiction would also 
enable the Controller-General to exercise far more direct influence 
on repression than he was equipped to do before.63 Finally, by arous-
ing the jealousy of  local officials—a risky business, to be sure—the 
arrêt might make them more alert and assiduous.
We do not know how well the new procedure worked or exactly how 
much it was used. In practice, everything depended upon the initia-
tives taken by the intendants whom Terray exhorted to action. Sev-
eral intendants expressed enthusiasm for it. D’Agay of  Picardy had no 
doubt that it would permit him to expose the frauds of  “eager specula-
tors” who have hitherto succeeded in “eluding the law.” Four days after 
the issuance of  the arrêt, Amelot of  Burgundy pronounced a crush-
ing sentence condemning a fermier to a 2,000 livres fine for engaging in 
the trade, the first of  many sentences which were to appear under his 
name. Terray himself  claimed that the attribution of  jurisdiction to the 
intendants resulted in a significant curtailment of  off-market trading 
and laboureur speculation. Yet several intendants opposed the Control-
ler-General’s strategy because they felt it was needless and overbearing. 
And although we have testimony from only one court, it is extremely 
doubtful that the other parlements welcomed another arbitrary and 
irregular alteration of  the existing judicial system.64
 61 Cf. the remark of  the subdelegate of  Valenciennes that merchants managed to elude and 
confound local judges by manipulating “the rules of  procedure.” To IN., ca. Oct. 1773, 
C. 6690, A.D. Nord.
 62 See, for example, Taboureau to Terray, 4 Aug. 1774, ibid., A.D. Nord.
 63 See, for instance, Terray’s effort to increase the fine imposed on a merchant judged “guilty 
of  monopoly.” To de la Corée, 3 Feb. 1774, C. 355, A.D. Doubs.
 64 IN. of  Picardy to Terray, ca. Oct. 1773, C. 86, A.D. Somme; Terray to Taboureau, 
10 Nov. 1773, C. 6690, A.D. Nord; ordonnance, Nov. 1773, C. 81, A.D. C d’O.; Terray to 
IN., of  Brittany, 26 Dec. 1773, C. 1671, A.D. I-et-V.; Terray to First President, Bordeaux, 
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Among the “abuses” or “maneuvers” which most preoccupied 
the Controller-General between 1771 and 1773 were illicit exports. 
Legally, all exports were forbidden after the arrêt of  July 1770, yet 
myriad reports reached the government of  secret grain outflow. In 
addition to its intrinsic importance—after all, France was short of  
grain at this time—the export issue concerned Terray because of  
the enormous sway it had over public, especially popular, opinion.65 
Nothing frightened the people more than the idea of  exportation 
of  their subsistence and they were quick to seize upon the slightest 
and most dubious sign as proof  that illegal and immoral maneu-
vers were being practiced. The Controller-General admitted that 
many accounts of  clandestine exports were unfounded, the prod-
uct of  popular fear and an unwillingness or inability to distinguish 
between large-scale internal traffic and shipment abroad. Yet Ter-
ray had convincing evidence in hand that export fraud was rampant. 
Coastal and frontier traders used “every imaginable practice” to 
evade the law.66 To combat this drain, he asked for more exacting 
surveillance by the intendants, the subdelegates, and the clerks of  
the General Farm bureaus. In August 1771, by an arrêt du conseil, he 
renewed the July suspension and ordered the establishment of  day 
and night patrols along the borders of  the eastern provinces. At the 
end of  the year he asked the intendants for detailed information on 
all grain leaving their generalities, especially grain headed towards 
the ports or frontiers, grain allegedly of  foreign origin and thus sub-
ject to legal re-export, and grain which had to travel in ships along 
 21 Dec. 1773, C. 1441, A.D. Gir.; IN. of  Brittany to Terray, May 1774, C. 1653, A.D. 
I-et-V. Compare the latter’s pretext for not executing this arrêt—because the Parlement had 
not registered the antecedent law of  23 Dec. 1770—with the pretext adduced by Fontette, 
intendant of  Caen, for not executing the December law itself—because it was registered 
by the Parlement and therefore its enforcement had nothing to do with him. Fontette to 
Terray, 14 May 1771 and Terray to Fontette, 7, 28 May 1771, C. 2624, A.D. Cal.
 65 For Terray’s preoccupation with public opinion and exports, see his revealing letter to 
Taboureau, 10 March 1772, C. 3745, A.D. Nord.
 66 Terray to de la Corée, 10 Nov. 1770, C. 844, A.D. Doubs; Terray to Rouillé d’Orfeuil, 
28 Nov. 1770, C. 418, A.D. Marne; Terray to Dupleix and to Fontette, 9 Sept. 1771, 
C. 84, A.D. Somme and C. 2624, A.D. Cal.; Terray to DuCluzel and to Jullien, 15 Oct. 
1771, C. 95, A.D. I-et-L. and C. 89, A.D. Orne; Terray to Esmangart, 10 March 1772, 
C. 1434, A.D. Gir.; Terray to First President, Besançon Parl., 14 April 1772, B. 2850, A.D. 
Doubs; Terray to Lefèvre de Caumartin, 9 Sept. 1771, C. 5977 and 9 Nov. 1772, C. 3745, 
A.D. Nord. One of  the indirect techniques used by Terray to discern illicit exportation was 
the study of  prices. A sharp disparity between interior and port prices especially at the full 
moon when “contrebandiers” could work most effectively raised suspicions of  fraudulent 
export. Terray to Fontette, 12 Nov. 1771, C. 2624, A.D. Cal.
 POLICING THE GENERAL SUBSISTENCE, 1771–1774 577
the coasts in order to reach putative destinations in the interior of  the 
kingdom.67
Persuaded that coastal trade was the greatest source of  export 
fraud, Terray imposed a series of  rigorous controls meant not only 
to keep him abreast of  the flow of  grain, but also to empower him 
to determine where it would go. The regulation of  coastwise trade 
reflected Terray’s long-run desire to impose control and collect data 
as well as his immediate interest in repressing a dangerous trading 
abuse. In the spring of  1771 he asked maritime intendants to impose a 
visa on grain leaving their ports for domestic destinations which could 
be verified upon arrival.68 So long as a merchant applied to a sub-
delegate or a clerk of  the Farm for a certificate of  transit, or acquit à 
caution, he received it automatically. Claiming that this method lacked 
sufficient rigor to guarantee against fraud, the following year Terray 
introduced a drastic change requiring coastwise traders to apply for 
individual licences directly to the intendant. In principle, the Con-
troller-General said, he expected the intendants to refuse “no permits 
solicited” in this fashion. In each instance, however, the intendant had 
to inform the Controller-General of  the request.69 Though it was not 
certain that the intendant would have to await the minister’s opinion 
in every single instance before granting the permit, there is no doubt 
that Terray now had the means to deny requests, assess their utility 
upon a background of  the “ensemble” of  the trade, and “direct,” 
or rather redirect, shipments toward destinations designated with a 
high priority. “By this means,” wrote the  Controller-General, “I will 
know those who are in the commerce [and] it will be easier for me to 
handle fraud.” While he was quite earnest in his desire to eliminate 
fraud, the goal of  preventing illicit exports was partly a pretext for the 
Controller-General to centralize real decision-making authority and 
reduce the gap between his ambition of  control and his actual power 
to influence private provisioning operations.70 In addition to arming 
him against fraud, “this police [of  permits] has another advantage,” 
Terray conceded: “it puts me in a position to supervise the operations 
 67 Arrêt du Conseil, 24 Aug. 1771, AN, AD XI 39; Terray to Fontette, 17 Dec. 1771, C. 2624, 
A.D. Cal. Cf. Terray to IN. of  Alençon, 1 Sept. 1772, C. 89, A.D. Orne.
 68 Terray to Fontette, 5 March 1771, C. 2624, A.D. Cal.
 69 Terray to Amelot, 1 Sept. 1772, C. 81, A.D. C d’O.; Terray to Taboureau, 1 Sept. 1772, 
C. 3745, A.D. Nord; de Boynes to officiers de l’amirauté, La Rochelle, 20 Sept. 1772, 
B. 5646. Cf. C. 2625, A.D. Cal.
 70 On Terray’s abiding fear of  illegal exports, see his letter to the IN. of  Bordeaux, 25 Jan. 
1774, C. 1447, A.D. Gir.
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of  the négociants whose badly organized speculations were an evil that 
it was necessary to destroy and still more to enlighten the négociant and 
to help him succeed in his enterprises by indicating to him the places 
where supplies were most needed.”71
The Controller-General correctly predicted that the introduction 
of  “this formality which appears perhaps constrictive to commerce” 
would cause widespread “umbrage.” The most virulent protests came 
from Languedoc, for whose large-scale grain-traders coastwise “inter-
nal” commerce was a matter of  economic survival, now that exports 
were no longer permitted. Given the obligation to reveal all the details 
of  “our speculations” and to await the issuance of  licenses, our com-
merce “will fall into a sort of  inaction,” the Narbonne négociants com-
plained. In the wake of  our ruin, agriculture will be crippled again, they 
pointedly warned the finance minister, “depriving the cultivators of  the 
means of  paying their taxes .…” The archbishop of  Narbonne bitterly 
reproached Terray for failing to appreciate the needs and interests of  his 
province. Practically speaking, he asked, “how do you expect a business-
man to make the least useful speculation when he must wait at least 21 
days for a license that he is not even sure will be granted in whole or in 
part?” With Voltairean acerbity, the archbishop of  Toulouse mocked 
the system, which required a trader desiring to transport “several bush-
els of  tare to feed pigeons” to seek a permit. Striking at the very core 
of  Terray’s program and his pretensions, the archbishop questioned the 
minister’s ability to grasp and to manage the ensemble of  things: “We 
are a bit far removed for you to be able to direct the speculations of  our 
commerce.” Perhaps because they knew from their own professional 
experience how pernicious administrations governed by favoritism, 
privilege, and patronage were, both prelates made a point of  denounc-
ing the licensing system for its inevitable corruption: “Angels would not 
be immune and there is nothing further removed from angelic purity 
than the bureaux of  any intendant.” Since Terray was not famous for 
his cherubic qualities, it is doubtful that his reply that he and not subordi-
nate officials would make all decisions reassured the archbishops. Simi-
lar protests were addressed to the ministry by the Estates of  Brittany.72
 71 Terray to comte de Périgord and to archbishop of  Narbonne, 25 Nov. 1772, C. 2912, A.D. 
Hér.
 72 Petition of  Narbonne négociants to Terray, ca. Nov. 1772, C. 2912, ibid.; syndic of  merchant 
community of  Béziers, 4 Oct. 1772, C. 2917, ibid.; archbishops of  Narbonne and Toulouse 
(separately) to Terray, 12 Nov. 1772 and Terray to Archbishop of  Toulouse, 25 Nov. 1772, 
C. 2912, ibid.; Etats de Bretagne, “Mémoire,” ca. Oct. 1772, C. 774, A.D. L.-A.
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The Controller-General rejected this criticism as an expression 
of  a parochial and crudely selfish viewpoint. Moreover, he claimed 
that the other interested provinces “complied with the new police” 
without suffering any commercial penalties.73 Yet the fact that the 
 Controller-General substantially modified this new police less than 
half  a year after he instituted it indicates that opposition was fiercer 
than he admitted and that execution was difficult. Whereas the licens-
ing method introduced in 1772 derived simply from an administrative 
instruction sent to the intendants, by an arrêt du conseil of  February 
1773 Terray gave it formal legal footing with precise procedural stipu-
lations and a hierarchy of  penalties for violations. Henceforth coast-
wise trade could only take place between ports possessed of  admiralty 
courts. An elaborate double certification and inspection system would 
theoretically keep the intendants and the ministry alerted to all grain 
movements by sea and reveal any fraudulent maneuvers.74
Terray apparently backed off  from his demand that all applica-
tions for permits be submitted to him for approval. The text of  the 
arrêt seemed to indicate that a subdelegate could deliver an acquit à 
caution on his own authority. There was no question, however, about 
the Controller-General’s power or willingness to block the issuance of  
permits when he desired. For example, toward the middle of  1773 he 
prohibited traders in Rouen or Le Havre from engaging in any coast-
wise trade at all for fear that such a permission would entice them to 
buy in the Parisian provisioning zone and thus bring “cherté, desola-
tion, and trouble to the capital.”75 Though he was concerned about 
illicit exports, Terray’s main aim again was control: “to reconcile the 
liberty of  trade with the security of  public subsistence.” Once again, 
critics, this time most vocally from Bordeaux and Brittany, protested 
that the constraints placed upon commerce made business virtually 
impossible.76 Terray’s repeated demands for “the most literal execution 
 73 Terray to archbishop of  Toulouse, 25 Nov. 1772, C. 2912, A.D. Hér. As a concession to the 
traders, Terray permitted unlicensed albeit certified coastwise trade within the same province 
of  shipment up to 100 charges, measure of  Marseille. To St.-Priest, 19 Oct. 1772, ibid.
 74 Arrêt du Conseil, 14 Feb. 1773, C. 1649, A.D. I-et-V. and B. 5646, A.D. C-M. As in 1772, 
Terray exempted traders shipping within the same province from the full burden of  the 
control system. Terray to INs. of  Bordeaux and Brittany, 9 March 1771, C. 1441. A.D. Gir. 
and C. 2582, A.D. I-et-V.
 75 Memoir, probably by St.-Prest, ca. Sept. 1773, C. 1441, A.D. Gir.
 76 Reply to remonstrances of  Bordeaux Parl., Oct. 1773, C. 2915, A.D. Hér.; négociants of  
Tréguier to IN., 1773, C. 1675 and officiers of  Cordemais to IN., 20 Oct. 1773, C. 1684, 
A.D. I-et-V.; memoirs of  the négociants of  Nantes to Boynes and to Terray, April–May 1773, 
C. 774, A.D. L-A.
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of  this arrêt” and his frequent complaints that the “essential formali-
ties” were not faithfully practiced suggests once more that he did not 
obtain universal compliance.77
Opposition to illegal exports did not necessarily bespeak an irre-
ducible hostility to the idea of  allowing exportation at a future time. 
In 1771 Terray sent a circular letter-questionnaire to the intendants 
which was voluntarily ambiguous in intention.78 On the one hand, he 
wanted to dissipate any fears which subsisted on the part of  the con-
sumers and any illusions which traders still entertained that exports 
might soon be permitted again. Disabused of  misleading notions, the 
people would have faith in the government and dealers would aban-
don the hoards they formed in the hope of  future high-price outlets. 
On the other hand, though the day when exportation would again 
be authorized might be “far off,” the Controller-General made a 
point of  not intimating that it was unlikely that exports would ever be 
allowed. His purpose was to avoid providing the liberals with incen-
tives for further demoralization and alienation. He believed, as the 
intendant of  Brittany later remarked, that “the announcement of  a 
perpetual prohibition would have managed needlessly to inspire ter-
rors and strike a fatal blow against agriculture and the clearings that 
it is in the greatest interest of  the State to multiply.”79 To make it 
clear that he still had an open mind, Terray asked the intendants to 
indicate the ceiling price limit at which it would be wise to suspend 
exports when the freedom to trade abroad was reestablished.80 During 
 77 Terray to IN. of  Brittany, 22 Feb. 1774, C. 1684, A.D. I-et-V.; Terray to IN. of  Bordeaux, 25 
Jan. 1774, C. 1447, A.D. Gir.; Terray to IN. of  La Rochelle, 25 Jan., 8, 22 Feb. 1774, C. 191, 
A.D. C-M. On the failure of  officials to send the “discharges” of  the acquits to the Contrôle-
Général, see also C. 193, A.D. C-M. Criticized by certain regions and interests for stifling 
interprovincial trade by excessive regulation, Terray was implicitly reproached by others for 
failing to put a halt to illicit exports. See, for example, the efforts of  the Cour souveraine 
de Lorraine to stem fraudulent grain drain. Arrêt, 26 Nov. 1773, C. 38, A.D. Moselle.
 78 Terray to INs., 1 Oct. 1771, C. 84, A.D. Somme; C. 418, A.D. Marne; C. 1432, A.D. Gir.; 
C. 3745, A.D. Nord.
 79 IN. to Terray, ca. May 1774, C. 1653, A.D. I-et-V. Cf. the plea of  the intendant of  Hainaut 
to “destroy all hope of  exportation.” Taboureau to Terray, 4 Aug. 1774, C. 6690, A.D. Nord.
 80 Of  the fifteen intendants whose responses to Terray’s query I have, seven favored or 
acquiesced in the idea of  allowing future exports up to a ceiling cut-off  price of  eight 
livres or less the quintal, approximately one-third below the 1764 mark. The intendants 
of  Bordeaux and Dauphiné saw nothing wrong with resurrecting the July Edict as it 
was written. The intendants of  Languedoc and Brittany were willing to compromise on 
the ceiling, fixing it at ten livres or ten livres ten sous. The intendant of  Alençon proposed 
a supple tariff  system which would preserve grain necessary for subsistance while 
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the next few years, however, Terray’s attitude toward exportation 
evolved in the same unsparing sense as his view of  the police of  inter-
nal trade and his conception of  subsistence control. By 1773, he had 
virtually ruled out the possibility of  passing a general permissive law, 
regardless of  the ceiling price and regardless of  economic conditions, 
and he said as much to the intendants without concern for offending 
liberal sensibilities. Given the burden and uncertainty of  provisioning, 
our chief  responsibility, he maintained, we should face up to the fact 
that exportation will be “forever prohibited” save in the fleeting after-
math of  a gargantuan harvest when France choked on her surfeit.81
III
Though the record is not without blemishes and ambiguities— Terray 
was the first to admit that the situation was still “dangerous” and that 
bread was still “too dear for the people”—by the middle of  1773 
his ministry succeeded, through a combination of  police activism, 
massive government supply intervention, and improving weather, 
in bringing subsistence peace, if  not subsistence security, to a large 
part of  the realm. The south and southeast, including the provinces 
of  Aquitaine, Languedoc, Provence, and Dauphiné, were the major 
exceptions. None of  the parlements which operated in these jurisdic-
tions had registered the December regulatory law when it was first 
promulgated. The Controller-General was tempted to believe that 
the grave provisioning difficulties each suffered was directly the result 
of  the failure of  the province to adopt the police line and submit to 
his subsistence management.
In the sixties the Bordeaux Parlement had taken a generally cautious 
yet opportunistic stand on the grain question. Responding warmly to 
liberalization, the court quickly manifested prohibitionist feelings once 
the provisioning situation began to worsen. Alternately concerned 
about public opinion and the general welfare on the one side and 
regional economic interests on the other, the Parlement tended to avoid 
 allowing exports. All of  these replies are in AN, F11 223 with the exception of  the following: 
Fontette to Terray, 14 Oct. 1771, C. 2624, A.D. Cal.; IN. of  Amiens to Terray, 18 Feb. 1772, 
C. 84, A.D. Somme; Rouillé d’Orfeuil to Terray, 14 May 1772, C. 418, A.D. Marne. Cf. the 
attitudes of  a group of  subdelegates in C. 89, A.D. Orne.
 81 Terray to Rouillé d’Orfeuil and to Esmangart, 28 Sept. 1773, C. 419, A.D. Marne and 
C. 1441, A.D. Gir.
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ideological commitments. 82 As we have seen, it refused to adopt 
the December law in 1770–71, though later it praised its general 
purposes. Relations between the Controller-General and the court 
approached the breaking point in the summer of  1773 at the very 
moment that the province reeled under the impact of  one of  the most 
serious subsistence crises it had known in generations. Although nei-
ther underestimated the suffering and dislocation that it caused, both 
Terray and the Parlement characterized the problem as “a sort of  
artificial famine,” a needless crisis, objectively unwarranted. Perceiv-
ing things in the manner of  their confreres at Toulouse or Aix, the 
Bordeaux magistrates blamed the troubles upon Terray’s administra-
tion which “hypocritically” refused to honor its pledge to promote 
free internal circulation. Hampered by a “host of  formalities” and by 
Terray’s refusal to grant all the coastwise permits sought by local mer-
chants, commerce could not perform its central function of  transfer-
ring grain from surplus to deficit areas. Not unlike the Rouennais in 
1768, the Bordelais magistrates hinted that the ministry favored its 
own merchant “protégés” who sent the province only small doses of  
high-priced and often “corrupted” grain.
The Parlement’s position infuriated Terray, not in the least because he 
had labored earnestly to provide Bordeaux with large amounts of  grain 
from domestic and foreign sources. For him, the dearth was “factitious” 
because of  “general apprehensions” and “false ideas which have won 
over minds” which in turn were the fruit of  parlementary bumbling and 
local police miscalculation. In blistering language he warned the magis-
trates to leave subsistence policy to him and provisioning policy to royal 
officials. Reminding them that when they implored him for king’s grain 
not long ago, he supplied it promptly, he threatened that future “royal 
graces,” if  “unmerited,” would be denied. If  you fail to obey,
I will publicize throughout the province the examples of  benevolence that the King has 
shown for his people [i.e., king’s grain], the immense sacrifices he has assumed in his char-
ity in order to procure them relief; the impossible situation in which the ill-considered steps 
of  your Company has placed him; and finally the people will be told that if  from now on 
they have any [subsistence] needs, they must address themselves to the Parlement.
Lacking the wherewithal and the experience to play the fatherly role, 
the Bordeaux Parlement lowered its voice. Terray continued to  supply 
 82 See, for example, First President to IN., 23 Sept. 1766, C. 1425 and intendant’s marginal 
note, 31 Oct. 1768, C. 1427, A.D. Gir.
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grain through the second part of  1773 and dealt exclusively with the 
intendant on matters concerning the police of  the grain trade.83
The relations between the central government and the three “lib-
eral” provinces are perhaps more interesting because of  the role their 
parlements had played in the preparation and implementation of  
the reform laws of  1763–64. Of  the three sovereign courts, only the 
Grenoble Parlement betrayed signs of  weakening resolve in the first 
years of  Terray’s ministry. A disappointing harvest in 1770 and a short 
crop in 1771—estimated by the intendant at “one-half  a common 
year”—combined with growing evidence of  public disenchantment 
with its attitude induced the court to modify its stance.84 Vidaud, the 
Procurator General of  the court, was a strong supporter of  liberal-
ization whose ideas resembled those of  his Breton counterpart, La 
Chalotais. The business of  government, in economic matters, was 
“the encouragement of  liberty.” “I find in the silence of  the whole 
province on the [question of] free [grain] circulation,” he wrote con-
fidently in June 1770, “the most complete proof  of  its utility.” Con-
vinced that a “prohibitive law” would be “dangerous,” he vigorously 
opposed the arrêt du conseil by which Terray suspended exports the fol-
lowing month.85 Yet Vidaud found himself  obliged to cede to pressure 
from local police authorities, who claimed that they could not provi-
sion their towns without resorting to certain constraints. I understand 
“your difficult situation,” he wrote one local official, on the one hand 
the law [i.e., the liberal legislation of  1763–64] wishes that you give 
the grain trade the greatest freedom and on the other this very liberty 
snatches away at the gate of  your city the grain that is supposed to 
supply the market.” On the one hand, he continued, you want “to 
procure for the people a necessary subsistence” and, on the other, 
“you are afraid of  measures which will be disapproved by your supe-
riors or which will tend to drive the grain merchants away.” If  you 
are desperate—if  your market, that is, suffers “total dearth,” Vidaud 
authorized him and other officials to “force the hoarders to furnish 
 83 Pidansat de Mairobert, Journal historique, IV, 401–405 (14 Dec. 1773); Terray to the First 
President, 26 July 1773, C. 1441 and 5 Nov., 7 Dec. 1773, C. 1442, A.D. Gir.; Terray to 
Esmangart, 12 Nov. 1773, C. 1439, ibid.
 84 On the harvest situation, see II. C. 51, A.D. Isère. For an example of  the criticism aimed 
at the court, see 26 June 1771, Miscellanea Letourneau, IV, fols. 14, 59–60, Bibliothèque 
Municipale de Grenoble.
 85 Vidaud to Pajot de Marcheval, 29 June 1770, Q 4 (2), fols. 58–59, Bibliothèque Municipale 
de Grenoble.
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the markets,” to fix the sale of  their grain at the current price, and to 
ban regrating.86
In September 1771, upon the request of  the Procurator General, 
the Parlement ordered the execution of  the July 1770 arrêt which 
Vidaud had denounced fifteen months earlier.87 Though the mag-
istrates declined to approve the major regulatory law of  December 
1770, Vidaud indicated that the court would be willing to seek a 
compromise which would reconcile what he called “the usages of  
the province” with the exigencies of  police control.88 By the begin-
ning of  1774, the intendant Pajot, who shared the liberal posture of  
the Parlement, began to call for the enforcement of  the regulatory 
laws of  23 December 1770 and 29 October 1773.89
In a desperate effort to forestall the promulgation of  Terray’s regu-
latory law, the magistrates of  Aix had written a long and passionate 
letter to Louis XV in November 1770.90 None of  the arguments was 
fresh but they were given a more doctrinaire cast and a more system-
atic expression than ever before. Having “seen the dawn of  a new 
day,” the parlementaires begged the king not to “enslave” them again. 
They reassured Louis XV that his reform policy was not the cause of  
the troubles that the kingdom has had to face. These were the prod-
uct of  natural, ephemeral causes, aggravated by the bad faith of  the 
“subaltern” police who conspired with the cowardly populace to vio-
late and discredit the liberal laws. Liberalization made economic and 
political sense. The magistrates tantalized the king with the prospect of  
royal fiscal recovery, which the agricultural prosperity engendered by 
liberty would make possible. To favor consumers over producers and 
the cities (“scourges of  society”) over the countryside in “the conflict 
of  interest” which opposed them was “to invert the essential order of  
Societies and the Constitution of  the State in particular.”
 86 Vidaud to the juge d’Embrun, 29 Oct. 1770, Q4 (2), fol. 137, Bibliothèque Municipale de 
Grenoble. Cf. Vidaud to Berlet, 31 Dec. 1770, ibid., fol. 158.
 87 Arrêt, 7 Sept. 1771, Recueil Giroud, XXV, 97, A.D. Isère.
 88 Vidaud to Maupeou, 8 Sept. 1771, Q 5, fol. 2, Bibliothèque Municipale de Grenoble. Cf., in 
this same spirit, the arrêt of  the Parl., 23 March 1774, Recueil Giroud, XXVI, 14, A.D. Isère.
 89 Intendant’s note, 17 Feb. 1774, C. 48, A.D. Isère. The same year also witnessed the first serious 
effort of  the central government to execute the December regulatory law in the generality of  
Auch. The government must have enjoyed some success, for the liberal militants of  the Société 
d’Agriculture d’Auch complained bitterly that the enforcement of  the legislation struck a “mortal 
blow” against agriculture and the grain trade. “Observations,”, 24 Aug. 1774, AN, H 72–73. 
Ironically, just as he was completing the reconquest of  the “south,” Terray suffered disgrace.
 90 Letter to Louis XV, 10 Nov. 1770, B. 3677, A.D. B-du-R.
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The Parlement stressed the political lessons to be learned from this 
conflict and from the liberalization experience. The duty of  the state 
was to enforce the laws of  nature, the foremost of  which guaranteed 
the rights of  property and liberty. It was not up to the state to provide 
subsistence: “this is the personal care of  each individual.” It was not 
legitimate for the state to violate property rights on “moral” grounds 
because moral principle “has little application in politics and com-
merce.” A political philosophy bred of  “this sort of  communion of  
goods and needs” led straight to “the reign of  the arbitrary.” Noth-
ing was more dangerous in the eyes of  the magistrates, not only of  
Aix but of  all of  the parlements, who had made this the theme of  
remonstrances on every subject of  public life. The more responsibil-
ity the state assumed, the bigger it got and the further it reached in 
social and economic life, the more arbitrary and the more dubious 
its authority became. To prevent the monarchy from degenerating 
into abuse and corruption, the king had to resist the pressure of  the 
people who understood nothing in politics save that the government 
was accountable for everything and the pressure of  the administra-
tors who were interested only in “extending their authority” and pla-
cating their constituents.
If  Terray were permitted to impose his regulatory legislation, the 
Parlement of  Provence solemnly warned Louis XV, the kingdom could 
look forward only to “universal disorder.” Presumably, then, the events 
of  the next few years did not surprise the liberals. While the Control-
ler-General blamed the disorders in part on the abuses and excesses of  
liberty, Dupont found their origin “in the public prohibition of  expor-
tation with all the clauses which accompanied it,” in the xenopho-
bia of  intendants who obstructed the circulation of  supplies, and in 
the futile and wasteful operations of  the king’s grain company which 
frightened away or ruined the private grain speculators who were the 
only reliable source of  relief.91 At one time the return of  tranquility 
had seemed to be the prerequisite for a return to liberalization. Now 
it was the vista of  persistent turmoil that buoyed liberal hopes, for it 
was bound to discredit the ministry. The magistrates of  Aix continued 
to criticize Terray’s restrictive measures and to demand a new, “per-
petual” law authorizing exportation without which internal liberty 
was “illusory.” Even as the Controller-General poured huge amounts 
of  the king’s grain into the region in 1773–74 in an effort to parry 
 91 Dupont to Prince Carl Ludwig, 1773 in Knies, ed., Dupont correspondance, II, 147.
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the dearth, the Parlement reproached Louis XV for sponsoring mea-
sures “contrary to your own principles.”
Certain practical matters, however, induced the Aix magistrates to 
bargain with Terray even as they eagerly awaited his fall. They were 
anxious to preserve the “foreign port” status of  Marseilles, which had 
been threatened by the December law and subsequent arrêts. Mar-
seilles’ freedom to export and import regardless of  the national law 
had always been a key element in the regional grain trade, both as an 
outlet for domestic production and a source of  foreign supplies, and 
in the fabrication of  Mediterranean fortunes. In return for conces-
sions meant to preserve Marseilles’ character, the Parlement appar-
ently agreed not to contest the rules Terray established for internal 
trade and the efforts he made through the royal administration to 
keep markets supplied.92
In the spring of  1771, Terray was hopeful that the force of  circum-
stances would gradually bring the Parlement of  Toulouse around to 
his way of  thinking about grain police, because it was already clear 
that the jurisdictions in which the courts had registered the December 
law “suffered fewer abuses in the grain trade” than the others.93 The 
magistrates were, however, unyielding; the more demanding the Con-
troller-General became in his insistence that Languedoc conform to his 
instructions, the more combative they became in their resistance. Like 
the other spokesmen for regional economic interests, the parlemen-
taires regarded Terray’s coastwise trading regulations of  1772 as a vir-
tual act of  war. As if  nothing had transpired in the previous eight years 
and the will of  the royal government were unknown, in November the 
Parlement issued an arrêt not only ordering the most vigorous execution 
of  the Declaration of  May 1763 and the Edict of  July 1764, but also 
asking the king to “suppress the limitations” included in those laws in 
order to render liberty “invariable and unconditional.”94 The arrêt cov-
ered a great deal of  ground, appealing on the one side to the “sacred 
law” of  property sprung “immediately from nature” and threatening 
on the other a sort of  fiscal blackmail which had become a staple of  
 92 Deliberation of  Parl., 20 Oct. 1770, B. 3677, A.D. B-du-R; arrêt du Conseil, 12 Sept. 1773, 
AN, AD XI 39; Terray to IN., 21 Dec. 1773, C. 2421, A.D. B-du-R.
 93 Terray to St.-Priest, 26 May 1771, C. 2909, A.D. Hér.
 94 Arrêt of  Toulouse Parl., 14 Nov. 1772, AN, AD XI 39. There are also copies in C. 89, 
A.D. Orne and C. 2912, A.D. Hér. In fact, the merchants of  Languedoc, till the end of  
1772, seem to have acted exclusively “on the faith of  the disposition of  the Edict of  July 
1764 registered in all the courts.” See the petition of  the Narbonne négociants to Terray, ca. 
Nov. 1772, C. 2912, A.D. Hér.
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Languedocian liberalism.95 Since the only laws it recognized as valid 
expressions of  the royal will were the reforms of  1763–64, the Par-
lement regarded Terray’s measures as “illegal steps” contrary both to 
positive law and the “solemn laws” of  the “essential order” of  things. It 
denounced the consumerist policy which favored the parasitical urban-
dwellers over the cultivator who “because of  his utility [was] more 
worthy of  the beneficence … of  the Sovereign King.” Decrying the 
renascent paternalism of  the government, the court went on to state 
the liberal doctrine in its starkest form:
The King only owes liberty, security and protection to His peoples … he owes them 
no subsistence whatsoever: this must be the price of  their work and their industry.
Within two weeks, Terray had the arrêt quashed, rebuking the 
Parlement sternly for its haughtiness and its lack of  social con-
science.96 Now the monarch was not to be denied the role that he 
had so vehemently rejected only three years earlier. The Toulouse 
Parlement, Terray declared, had no right “to deprive His Majesty 
of  the happy advantage which his supreme authority gives him 
to watch over the subsistence of  the subjects.” To be sure, it was 
“the duty” of  the monarch “to maintain [his subjects] in the free 
usage of  their properties” but not at the cost of  “exposing the indi-
gent portion of  his subjects to lack the food of  first necessity .…” 
The king could not regard cherté as the bon prix, the right price, because, 
for the mass of  poor people, there was no difference between famine 
and cherté. Like the économistes, the Toulouse magistrates made “incred-
ible assertions” and broadcast “dangerous” principles such as the 
notion that “the more grain exported abroad the greater will be the 
abundance in the interior.” Surely Terray understood that the idea 
was not at all farfetched in the long-run perspective. But the implica-
tions of  this policy for consumers here and now were catastrophic. In 
a moral sense the magistrates were just as guilty as the grain manipu-
lators who contrived speculations and monopolies in the pursuit of  
exorbitant profits gained at the expense of  the consumers. The magis-
trates, charged Terray, let themselves “be seduced by avid proprietors 
who will never find their grain sold dearly enough.” Merely to espouse 
 95 For other examples of  fiscal blackmail, see archbishops of  Narbonne and Toulouse to 
Terray, 12 Nov. 1722 and négociants of  Narbonne to Terray, ca. Nov. 1772, C. 2912, A.D. Hér.
 96 Arrêt du Conseil, 29 Nov. 1772, AN, AD XI 39.
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liberty in the absolute manner of  the Toulouse Parlement was, in this 
view, tantamount to signing a famine pact.
There should be no question about the nature of  royal politics, the 
Controller-General told the Parlement: they are interventionist and pater-
nalistic. They follow not from natural laws and theories of  government 
but from the king’s perception, through the control and data-collecting 
apparatus, of  “the ensemble of  the general needs of  his State.” No one 
else was in a position to determine “the general good.” Nor was any “indi-
vidual tribunal” equipped to tell him what he could or could not do to 
deal with any given problem. The only principle that governed the king’s 
action was his commitment to the public interest. Not long before Louis 
XV had been made to take a very different stance. In the liberal sixties 
he had reviled the example of  his predecessors in the name of  a higher 
truth and “denounced the “hindrances” which fettered freedom as vio-
lations of  inviolable rights and laws. In the arrêt annulling the Toulouse 
action Louis promised, “following the example of  his august predecessors 
… to place hindrances upon the grain trade whenever the hindrances 
are [considered] indispensable.” Nor would Terray allow the magistrates 
to nourish the self-serving illusion that the king had two political bodies, 
an immutable one committed to high principles and solemn laws and 
an inconstant and vulnerable one which lent itself  to arbitrary actions 
effected by his unscrupulous ministers. Speaking for Louis XV, the Con-
troller-General made it clear that the “King administrator” and the “King 
legislator” were one in thought and action. The government’s brisk and 
forceful reply to the Toulouse arrêt, according to one report, “caused the 
greatest ferment” in the Parlement and throughout the province.97
In correspondence with the leading figures in Languedoc, Terray 
reiterated the rebuke. In his view, there were two camps confronting 
each other: the party of  “cupidity” and “self-interest” on the one side 
and the party of  “the general well-being” and “the love of  the people” 
on the other. The magistrates, he wrote the archbishop of  Narbonne, 
“let themselves decide by the desire to see their revenues increase 
rather than by the dread of  seeing the misery of  the people increase.” 
“One would believe,” he told the archbishop of  Toulouse, “that they 
prefer the increase of  the income of  the rich to the subsistence fac-
ulty of  the poor.”98 All the other arguments the Controller-General 
 97 Pidansat de Mairobert, Journal historique, III, 372–73 (18 Dec. 1772). Cf. Viala, La Question 
des grains à Toulouse, 82–83.
 98 Terray to the archbishops of  Toulouse and Narbonne and the comte de Périgord, 25 Nov. 
1772, C. 2912, A.D. Hér.
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dismissed as rhetorical devices designed to mask parlementary greed. 
Not only was this greed morally despicable; it was also politically 
shortsighted. For the people, Terray hinted, would one day exact their 
revenge. In subsistence affairs, for Terray as for Necker, and for other 
officials who felt tremors from below, there was one prudent rule to 
follow: “I will always favor in this matter,” Terray declared, “the inter-
ests of  the multitude for whom grain is the principal and often the sole 
food and whose uprisings when bread is lacking can dissolve empires.” 
The magistrates of  Toulouse deluded themselves into believing that 
the inhabitants of  their province were better off  than Frenchmen in 
the parts of  the kingdom subjected to the police regime. If  they 
could not hear the “groaning” of  their own people it was because 
their cupidity had dulled their sensibilities. Social conflict would prob-
ably one day prove to be sharper in Languedoc than in other places 
because “the inhabitant of  the countryside in this province is rarely a 
landowner and [he is] more subordinated and more dependent than 
in any other province.”99 The parlementaires, for their part, took Ter-
ray’s moralizing no more seriously than he took their theorizing. Even 
as he denounced them for greed, so they intimated that the govern-
ment’s policy was devised to serve the interests of  an officially-backed 
“Monopoly.” From their perspective, all the talk about the consumer 
interest was meant to veil these maneuvers.
Terray claimed that he “foresaw” the dearth which became critical 
in Languedoc the following year, though it is not certain if  he man-
aged to foresee it because he was so well informed or because he knew 
that it was bound to occur as a sort of  retribution for a refractory 
province. Like the shortages in other parts of  the south, he viewed 
this dearth as largely artificial: “Subsistence is not at all lacking in 
your province,” he wrote the somewhat skeptical intendant in May 
1773 on the eve of  the Midi’s Flour War. The cause of  the problem 
was “avidity”: first the avidity of  the magistrates who had refused to 
arm the province against subsistence dangers and then the avidity of  
the “négociants”—the very ones who had complained so vociferously 
about Terray’s “formalities”—and other dealers who hoarded in an 
attempt to drive up prices.100
 99 Terray to comte de Périgord, 25 Nov. 1772 and Terray to archbishop of  Narbonne, 5 Dec. 
1772, C. 2912, ibid.
100 Terray to St.-Priest, 5, 10, 11 May 1773, C. 2914, ibid. Cf. Terray’s warnings the year 
before against allowing too much grain from leaving the province. To St.-Priest, 19 Oct. 
1772, C. 2912, ibid.
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In the eyes of  the Toulouse parlementaires, the Controller- 
General’s way of  dealing with the dearth must have seemed at best 
ambiguous and at worst incoherent. On the one hand, he proposed 
a Delamare-type investigation by local police to discover the names 
of  the principal hoarders and the location of  their storehouses. Pre-
sumably the purpose was to put the authorities in a position to req-
uisition supplies and set the rhythm of  the trade. On the other hand, 
in a letter to the Procurator General, Terray solemnly condemned 
municipal officials who interrupted “the free circulation of  grain … 
on the pretext of  assuring the subsistence of  their city” and asked 
that orders be given to the substituts “to favor and even excite this 
free circulation.” Nor did the supply operations conducted by the 
agents of  the central government inspire confidence, though they 
did provide huge amounts of  urgently needed grain. Once again 
the Controller-General found himself  suspected of  giving orders to 
obstruct the speculations of  Languedoc’s own merchants in order 
to promote the enterprises of  his protégés.101 Relations remained 
strained between the Parlement and the Controller-General. Hard 
times did not sap liberal ardor in Languedoc. Like their colleagues 
at Aix and Grenoble, and the économistes who believed they glimpsed 
the end of  the desert on the horizon in 1773–74, the magistrates of  
Toulouse anxiously awaited the next ministerial turnover in antici-
pation of  another round of  liberty.
IV
Although its voice was never completely silenced and it retained 
enough vitality to achieve a remarkable comeback several years later, 
the physiocratic movement was deeply wounded during the retreat 
from liberalization.102 The advent of  Terray, marking the end of  a 
decade of  liberal ministries, and the persistence of  the subsistence cri-
sis, set in a broader context of  socioeconomic disarray, encouraged the 
development of  a vocal “philosophical” countercurrent, an antiphys-
iocracy untainted with ordinary Delamarism or parlementarism. To 
be sure, physiocracy had been criticized from within the philosophical 
101 Terray to St.-Priest, 26 April and 11, 15, 19 May 1773, C. 2914, ibid.; Terray to PG, 
18 May 1773, C. 2914, ibid.
102 On the decline of  the physiocrats, see the works of  Weulersse; in particular, his Mouvement 
physiocratique, I, 241.
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camp before, but never so widely, so acrimoniously, and with such 
merciless concreteness as in the seventies. For the experience of  lib-
eralization enabled the anti-économistes to attack physiocracy not only 
for its theories but for its policies and its politics as well, not for fanci-
ful blueprints to the future but (fairly or unfairly) for tangible results 
already registered.
Now it is true that the économistes had an astonishing variety of  
interests and the range of  their genius made them vulnerable to 
attack on many grounds. They were assailed for their conception 
of  productive activity and the net product, for their single tax plan, 
for their vision of  “legal despotism,” for their insufferable man-
ner. (“Crush them, and pound them, and reduce them to dust and 
ashes!” exhorted Hume; they are “the most chimerical and most 
arrogant [set of  men] that now exist, since the annihilation of  the 
Sorbonne.”)103 But the other matters of  political economy, though 
they inspired lively polemics and contributed eventually to the justly 
deserved reputation of  the physiocrats for intellectual audacity 
and originality, paled in significance next to the grain question. It 
was “the fermentation excited in France for the last two years on 
the occasion of  the cherté of  grain,” as the Mémoires Secrets noted 
in 1770, which propelled the économistes from relative obscurity to 
 notoriety. (Was Mirabeau merely flattering himself  when he wrote 
that “invoking my name in the streets of  the city Rouen was the 
secret of   getting stoned [by the crowd]”?)104 It was the grain issue 
that observers continued to consider “the principal object” of  the 
physiocratic group.105 In the years following liberalization, a grow-
ing band of  anti-physiocrats denounced the économistes not simply for 
being pretentious, ridiculous, or wrong—com monplace accusations 
in the Enlightenment—but for being dangerous, for having caused 
damage, for preaching a philosophy of  famine and disorder.
Jarred by the Assembly of  General Police, the économistes were 
routed, in their own estimation as well as in the eyes of  other con-
temporaries, by a single “bomb,” as its creator called it, launched 
by the abbé Galiani.106 The bomb was the Dialogues sur le commerce 
103 Hume to Morellet, 10 July 1769, in The Letters of  David Hume, ed. by J. F. Y. Grieg (Oxford, 
1932), II, 205.
104 Bachaumont, Mémoires secrets, XIX, 171 (18 April 1770); Mirabeau’s “discours de rentrée” for 
1776 in G. Weulersse, ed., Les Manuscrits économiques de Quesnay et de Mirabeau (Paris, 1910), 132.
105 F. Métra, Correspondance secrète, I, 323 (20 April 1775).
106 Galiani to d’Epinay, 18 Nov. 1769 in Correspondance, ed. by Perey and Maugras, I,36.
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des blés, a series of  eight sprightly dialogues, set in Paris beginning 
in mid-November 1768, between the Chevalier de Zanobi, through 
whom the author speaks, and the Marquis de Roquemaure and the 
President, who are tempted by the fashionable liberalism of  the day.107 
Composed in the months following the Assembly of  Police, corrected 
and prepared for publication by Diderot, endorsed by Sartine but 
delayed by Maynon’s ministry which appointed a zealous Quesnayite 
as censor, the Dialogues appeared almost immediately after the nomi-
nation of  Terray to the Contrôle-Général. (The économistes promoted 
the idea that Terray ordered them to measure for the price of  100 
louis.)108 Galiani, an Italian classicist, political economist, and dip-
lomat, whose wit and effervescence had made him the toast of  the 
Parisian salon circuit, was not in the capital to witness the explosion 
he anticipated. For a diplomatic matter apparently unrelated to the 
grain question, Choiseul had demanded his recall in 1769.109
The Dialogues were not Galiani’s first encounter with grain affairs. In 
the fifties he had translated an Italian work on grain conservation tech-
nology and, while in service at Paris at the very time France inaugu-
rated liberalization, he was deeply involved in efforts to find grain sup-
plies for his famine-stricken homeland. During his sojourn in France he 
became a friend of  Trudaine de Montigny and frequented other liber-
als. It is not impossible that Galiani sympathized with liberalization at 
the beginning, but there is no hard evidence to prove it.110 Writing in 
107 Although the first edition sold out rapidly, the Dialogues did not have a second edition until 
1795. Brunetière, who seems to miss the whole point of  the work, takes this as evidence 
that Galiani’s “success was not so striking after all.” Etudes critiques sur l’histoire de la littérature 
française, 2nd series (Paris, 1897), 241.
108 Bachaumont, Mémoires secrets, VII, 252 (20 Dec. 1774); Pidansat de Mairobert, Journal 
historique, VI, 376 (21 Dec. 1774). Voltaire also alluded to this possibility. Voltaire to Turgot, 
12 Jan. 1770 in Correspondence, ed. by T. Besterman, vol. 74, p. 28 (# 15100).
109 On Galiani’s background, his relations in Paris, and the origins of  the Dialogues, see: the 
introductions and commentary in the edition of  the Dialogues edited by F. Nicolini and the 
edition of  the autograph manuscript entitled Dialogues entre M. le Marquis de Roquemaure, et 
Ms. le Chevalier Zanobi, ed. by Philip Koch in Analecta Romanica, XXI (1968); P. Koch, “The 
Genesis of  Galiani’s Dialogues sur le commerce des blés,” French Studies, XV (Oct. 1961), 314–23; 
Maria Valania, L’Abbé Galiani et sa correspondance avec Madame d’Epinay (Milan, n.d., ca. 1932), 
11–13; Henri Valentino, Une Femme d’esprit sous Louis XV: Madame d’Epinay (Paris, 1952), 300; 
L. Perey and G. Maugras, Une Femme du monde (Paris, 1883), 394. Diderot Correspondance, ed. 
by Roth, V, 31 and IX, 54; Mercure de France (June 1771), 169–71; d’Epinay to Galiani, 26 
July 1769 in La Signora d’Epinay, ed. by Nicolini, 19; d’Epinay to Galiani, 4 Nov. 1769 in 
Nicolini, “Lettere inedite,” Mélanges Hauvette, 469; Galiani to Suard, 15 Dec. 1770 in Lettres, 
ed. by Asse, I, 188; Galiani to d’Epinay, 18 Sept. 1769 in Lettres, ed. by Asse, I, 13.
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1770, Galiani himself  claimed that he had presented his “system” to 
Choiseul and Trudaine de Montigny as early as 1763–64. 
The Dialogues did not affect the mercuriale but they had a profound 
impact on the philosophical community. Celebrated in the salons for 
his “gaiety,” it is not surprising that Galiani’s book seemed to be as 
much admired for its style as for its substance.111 Nor did the inevi-
table comparison with the turgidity and ponderousness of  the physio-
cratic style turn to his disadvantage. “But more than 300 pages in 
little print on the grain trade!” exclaimed Suard,
That struck me as frightening. I have been so disgusted by the jargon and the tiresome 
repetitions of  the économistes, the exportists, the libertyites, etc.! But having barely finished 
the first 4 pages [of  the Dialogues] I was swept up till the very end without being able to do 
anything else. I found the question presented with wholly new viewpoints .…112
Voltaire, Madame d’Epinay assured her “little abbot,” was “intoxi-
cated with your book.” Indeed, the Patriarch told Diderot that he 
found in it a mixture of  Plato and Molière: “No one has ever rea-
soned better nor more amusingly.”113 Turgot lamented that Voltaire 
was “talking complete nonsense about economics and given up to 
all the sophistries of  Galiani.”114 Economistes disdainfully greeted the 
“comic” elements as proof  that the abbé was not serious and that he 
was incapable of  treating “profound” questions.115
One has the impression that the intellectual community and the 
political class which had followed the grain question with interest and 
then with alarm were waiting for a book like Galiani’s Dialogues. What 
accounted for the success of  the book was neither the wit, though 
110 P. Koch makes the case for Galiani’s early liberalism. “Genesis,” French Studies, XV (Oct. 
1961), 314–23. Cf. Galiani to Tanucci 13 Aug. 1764 in Lettere di F. Galiani al marchese B. 
Tanucci, ed. by A. Bazzoni (Florence, 1880), 128.
111 D’Epinay to Galiani, 11 May 1771 in La Signora d’Epinay, ed. by Nicolini, 173; Diderot to 
Mme. de Maux, April or May 1769, Correspondance, ed. by Roth, IX, 46; Diderot to Sophie 
Volland, 25 Nov. 1760, ibid., III, 268.
112 Suard to Galiani, 6 Aug. 1770 in Nicolini, “Lettere inedite,” Mélanges Hauvette, 464. Cf. Suard’s 
critique of  Galiani’s political conservatism, Suard to Galiani, 14 Oct. 1770, ibid., 467.
113 D’Epinay to Galiani, 25 Oct. 1770 in Mémoires et correspondance de Madame d’Epinay, ed. by J.-P.-A. 
Parison, III, 381; Voltaire to Diderot, 10 Jan. 1770, Correspondance Diderot, ed. by Roth, X, 18–19. 
Cf.: Voltaire to Turgot, 12 Jan. 1770, Voltaire’s Correspondance, ed. by Besterman, vol. 74, p. 28 (# 
15100); Voltaire to d’Argental, 24 Jan. 1770, ibid., vol. 74, p. 47 (# 15116); Voltaire to Suzanne 
Necker, 6 Feb. 1770, ibid., vol. 74, p. 81. (# 15144). Yet Voltaire was a bit troubled by Galiani’s 
penchant for “despotism.” Voltaire to d’Alembert, 25 Jan. 1770, ibid., vol. 74, p. 51 (# 15120).
114 Turgot to Dupont, 5 July 1771 in Oeuvres, ed. by Schelle, III, 491.
115 Ephémérides du citoyen, IV (1770), 177–84.
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it eased the burden of  argument considerably, nor the freshness of  the 
content, for most of  Galiani’s conclusions and caveats could be found in 
the minutes of  the Assembly of  General Police or in the parlementary 
papers. Rather it was the fact that the case against liberalization was 
made, with exquisite timing, not by a police official or an administrator 
or a magistrate, not even by a renegade or eccentric philosophe, but by 
a philosophe who spent Wednesday evening at Geoffrin’s, Fridays at 
the Neckers’, and Thursday and Sunday with the Encyclopedist circle 
at d’Holbach’s or d’Epinay’s, and by a philosophe known to have had 
warm relations with the liberals. It was, in addition, the confidence 
inspired by his tone, which was on the whole quite moderate vis-à-vis 
the économistes, and by his obvious familiarity with many of  the techni-
cal aspects of  the grain problem. It was also the clarity and persua-
siveness with which he crystallized the issues, not for the profane, but 
for people like Voltaire and Diderot who were very well informed but 
genuinely perplexed by the grain question. Galiani enabled his read-
ers to despise Terray while generally approving his grain policy and to 
love liberty while reproving the liberals. Finally, as Galiani knew better 
than anyone, it was the cherté itself  which brought him converts.116
To be fully understood, the Dialogues must be viewed in the context 
of  the ongoing crisis and its political and economic origins, not as a 
round in a salon feud. They were a response to the crisis; it was in 
this vein that readers appreciated them and reacted to them. In addi-
tion to hinting at its causes, Galiani suggested how it could have been 
avoided and what might be done to combat it. But, despite his boast, 
he had no “system.” Or rather, like Necker, who later drew heavily on 
his work, Galiani found his system in an Antisystem. He liked to say 
that “I am for and not against… yes, I am for and my whole book aims 
at this for,” but it is always what he was against which surges forth. He 
was against “this spirit of  enthusiasm and system which spoils every-
thing,” the “fanaticism” in public administration which was good only 
for “starting riots,” and any policy which declared itself  absolute and 
universal. He spoke for what the économistes not unreasonably regarded 
as the traditional and arbitrary approach to government: for empiri-
cal, flexible, cautious, and contingent administration.117 He was deeply 
116 Galiani to d’Epinay, 13 Nov. 1770 in Lettres, ed. by Asse, I, 174. But Galiani was afraid that 
the praise, like the bite, of  such supporters as Fréron could be fatal. Ibid., and Année littéraire, 
I (1770), 291–300.
117 Galiani to Sartine, 27 April 1770, in Lettres, ed. by Asse, I, 63–64; Galiani to 
Morellet, 26 March 1770, ibid., I, 81–83. Cf. Galiani to Baudouin (after whom the 
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suspicious of  general principles, the search for which the économistes 
rightly regarded as one of  the distinctive features of  the Enlighten-
ment. Grimm correctly saw that the major point of  the Dialogues was 
that “a general rule could not be established for so complicated a ques-
tion as that of  the grain trade.…”118
On virtually every important question, Galiani took issue with 
the économistes. The President, taking the physiocratic stance, says 
that “it is necessary to let nature act.” The Chevalier sternly warns 
him against “trusting her.” Nature is immense, infinite, omnipotent; 
we are “insects, atoms, nothings.” Instead of  trying to conform to 
Nature, “our job down here is to combat her.” Indeed, the Chevalier 
claims, everything we achieve and enjoy in life is a product of  a hard-
won triumph in this struggle. But, objects the President, I thought 
that “nature left to herself  would bring everything into equilibrium.” 
What you say, retorts the Chevalier, is wonderfully true in theory but 
woefully wrong in practice. The natural equilibrium theory does not 
take account of  the time dimension; it works by balancing inequali-
ties by theoretical compensations and it uses “average terms which 
never exist except in meditation.” For man who is small and frail 
and whose needs require immediate gratification, what matters is the 
“short space of  his life” during which he cannot count on uncertain 
compensations if  he is to survive.
Now let us apply this theory to the grain trade, says the Chevalier. 
Nothing is truer than that prices left to adjust themselves in liberty 
will tend toward equilibrium even as free circulation will diffuse grain 
wherever there are consumers with money. But beware, the Chevalier 
warns, that it takes time to send word from a deficit town to a surplus 
town that grain is lacking and still more time for this grain to arrive. 
“The theory goes well but the problem goes badly,” for after a week 
of  waiting “this insect called man” will die of  hunger. Nature “is too 
great a Lady” to have to bother with the care of  our tattered bodies: 
“Let’s leave to her the care of  great movements, the great revolutions 
of  empires, the long run [even] as she has that of  the stars and the 
elements.” Our business, concludes the Chevalier, is “politics [which] 
 President in the Dialogues was modelled), 20 April 1770, ibid., I, 53 and Galiani to d’Epinay, 
6 Nov. 1773 in Galiani Correspondance, ed. by Perey and Maugras, II, 274–76.
118 Grimm, Correspondance littéraire, ed. by Tourneux, X, 515 (Dec. 1774), my emphasis. Cf. 
Galiani to d’Epinay, 6 Nov. 1773, Galiani Correspondance, ed. by Perey and Maugras, II, 274: 
“Now, general theories and nothing are approximately the same thing.”
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is nothing other than the science of  preventing or parrying short-run 
movements set in motion by extraordinary causes.…”119
Galiani’s conception of  political economy as a “science of  administra-
tion” was closer to the police than to the physiocratic view. First of  all 
there was nothing at all “evident” about how to conduct public adminis-
tration. The goal of  political economy was to “do good for men” but to 
every good there is attached some evil and man himself  is an unpredict-
able variable: there is no “fixed and constant” element in the equation. 
Rather than the application of  absolute principles, political economy is 
always a task of  “approximation,” of  “finding the greatest possible good 
with the least possible evil.” To strike the right mark, this approximation 
has to be based on a precise knowledge of  the circumstances peculiar to a 
given problem. “The science of  details,” Galiani told Madame d’Epinay, 
“is the only useful one.” In the Dialogues the Chevalier remarks that police 
is an affair of  detail.” When it sticks to “particulars,” it is effective; when it 
“becomes universal, it is converted into a hindrance.”120
Implicit in Galiani’s view of  public administration was a conserva-
tive idea which was inherent in the traditional notion of  police. Ulti-
mately the public good was defined as the preservation of  society or the 
mitigation of  those strains which are built-in and constantly threaten 
the structure of  society. Thus, Galiani, like the police, accepted the 
notion that “liberty and property are sacred rights”—by itself  this 
was hardly a revolutionary conception in the Old Regime. Unlike the 
économistes, however, who insisted that these rights could never legiti-
mately and usefully be violated, the Chevalier said: “nothing must 
119 Galiani, Dialogues, ed. by Nicolini, 221–23. For a similar view, see Necker, Sur la législation 
et le commerce des grains, 393–94. Cf. Galiani’s letter to Madame d’Epinay in which he wrote 
scornfully of  the économistes who have “so often said that nature left to herself  was so beautiful, 
worked so well, put things in balance, etc.” 23 June 1770, in Lettres, ed. by Asse, I, 92.
 Einaudi argues that the économistes and Galiani shared the same goal of  a progressive 
society and saw the relation between man and nature in very much the same way. But to make 
his case he is obliged to diminish the physiocrats in a curious way: “But it happened only 
too often that the physiocrats … forgot about the fundamental principles of  their methods.” 
L. Einaudi, “Einaudi on Galiani,” in H.W. Spiegel, ed., The Development of  Economic Thought: 
Great Economists in Perspective (New York, 1952), 67–68.
120 Galiani, Dialogues, ed. by Nicolini, 215–220, 291; Galiani to d’Epinay, 6 Nov. 1773 in 
Galiani Correspondance, ed. by Perey and Maugras, II, 274. Cf. F. Nicolini, ed., Il Pensiero 
dell’abate Galiani (Bari, 1909), 149. For a strikingly similar conception of  good public 
administration, see Necker, Sur la législation et le commerce des grains, 210, 237–38, 303–405. 
Cf. Linguet, Canaux navigables (Amsterdam, 1769), 154–55 and Du Pain et du bled, 215; 
Grimm, Correspondance littéraire, ed. by Tourneux, X, 516–17 (Dec. 1774).
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trouble them, save for the bonds which tie us to society.” For the sake 
of  the general interest, for example, for the maintenance of  social 
stability and the prevention of  general disaster—indeed, for the sake 
of  property itself  in the long run—the government could interfere 
with these rights whenever necessary.121
Provisioning was one of  those urgent matters of  public interest. 
Like the police, Galiani believed that private commerce must assume 
the major burden of  distribution and that internal trade should be 
unencumbered by restrictions on circulation. Like the physiocrats, 
and a number of  police officials as well, he favored the development 
of  a community of  powerful grain merchants who dealt on a large 
scale. But he was deeply impressed with the technical difficulties and 
the uncertainties of  the grain trade and he was not confident that 
merchant cupidity, if  it triumphed over nature’s obstacles, would 
always serve the general interest. Like the President d’Aligre at the 
police Assembly, the Chevalier distinguished two vastly different, 
rival approaches to the subsistence question: the one of  “our ances-
tors” who “envisaged grain as an object of  administration” and the one 
recently in favor by which grain was made into “an object of  commerce.” 
Grain, Galiani felt, could not be treated as an object of  commerce 
because it was different from any other item in trade. His reasoning 
followed the traditional police line: grain was a matter of  life and 
death; demand for it was inelastic and always urgent; “as the matter 
of  first necessity and the first concern in the civil order of  societies,” 
argued the Chevalier, “it belongs to politics and to reason of  state.” 
The government, through its police, had to intervene as often as nec-
essary to assure the regularity and adequacy of  provisioning.122
121 Galiani, Dialogues, ed. by Nicolini, 199–200. For similar views on the limitations of  the 
rights of  private property and their relation to the rights of  society as a whole, see Necker, 
Sur la législation et le commerce des grains, 362–63, 381–89; Béguillet, Traité des subsistances, 805; 
Desaubiez, Le Bonheur public, 10; Journal économique (April 1, 1775), 52–54; Diderot, Apologie 
de l’abbé Galiani, in Oeuvres politiques, ed. by P. Vernière (Paris, 1963), 85, 118; and especially 
Linguet who moved even closer to the police view than Galiani in Réponse aux docteurs 
modernes, part III, 63–64 and Annales, VII (Nov. 1779), 229–30.
122 Galiani, Dialogues, ed. by Nicolini, 30, 170, 172–74. “Bread is something else,” Galiani 
told Madame d’Epinay, “it belongs to police and not to commerce.” 7 Aug. 1773, in 
Lettres, ed. by Asse, II, 77. For similar views on the special nature of  grain and bread, 
see: Mably, Du Commerce des grains, in Collection complète des æuvres de l’abbé Mably, ed. 
by G. Arnoux (Paris, 1794–95), XIII, 262–63; Béguillet, Traité des subsistances, 804–
805; Linguet, Réponse aux docteurs modernes, part III, 52–56; Linguet, Du Pain et du 
bled, 54; Linguet in Annales, VII (Nov. 1779), 226–28, 232–33; Aubert, “Réflexions 
simples et pratiques sur le commerce des grains” (1775), BN, mss. n.a. 4433, 
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Now Galiani was not an apologist for every police practice allegedly 
devised to promote provisioning. He was hostile to price controls and 
generally discountenanced any infringements upon liberty at the mar-
ketplace. He claimed to share the économiste horror of  “the arbitrary” 
in government. He did not trust local police officials whom he believed 
were characteristically excessive in zeal and unreliable in judgment. 
He disapproved of  the stigmatization of  the grain merchant. He 
detested absolute prohibitions as much as he loathed absolute liberty. 
Though Galiani insisted upon the need for wide discretionary lati-
tude, he favored “fixed” laws over the “variable” legislation, special 
derogations, and individual authorizations on which the old police 
had depended. On the crucial question, however, of  the relationship 
of  government to the provisioning process there was no ambiguity in 
Galiani’s position. The government should involve itself  as often as 
necessary and without a guilty conscience. Indeed, in regard to pre-
venting or combatting dearth through victualing or stocking opera-
tions, Galiani was a less inhibited Josephist than the French police.123
Ideally, of  course, the need for spectacular governmental interven-
tions, Galiani believed, would be infrequent in a well-policed state. 
Such a state would never have followed the liberalization policy 
adopted by France in 1763–64. Galiani viewed the July law as one of  
the major causes of  the subsistence crisis. Like the police, he was skep-
tical about the possibility of  separating the “superfluous” from the 
“necessary” in the grain supply for a given time. The 1764 law permit-
ted France to be “plundered” and, given the facility of  foreign outlets, 
drained grain from the interior and halted internal circulation. The 
experience of  the sixties, moreover, exposed as a myth the idea that 
France could depend on speedy and generous distress-assistance from 
her neighbors. As for agriculture, Galiani argued somewhat tortuously 
that it would not truly benefit from the export price and market incen-
tives. The export-related profits would be siphoned off  by a host of  
non-producing intermediaries while the resultant “dear bread” pol-
icy would “starve the people” and “harm industry,” which Galiani 
believed to be as real a source of  national wealth as agriculture.
 fols. 10–12; remonstrances of  the Paris Parl., March 1776, in Flammermont, ed., 
Remontrances, III, 304.
123 Nicolini, ed., Il Pensiero dell’abate Galiani, 202; Galiani, “Mémoire to Sartine” (1770) in 
Lettres, ed. by Asse, I, 411–15; Galiani to d’Epinay, 13 Nov. 1773, in Lettres, ed. by Asse, II, 
102–103; Galiani, Dialogues, ed. by Nicolini, 279–80.
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“Everything is linked” in a “political state” as in a machine, Galiani 
liked to say. Above all, wise administrators had to avoid “sudden jolts 
and movements”—the political consequences of  ideological absolut-
ism and fanaticism—because they “break the links and the springs 
and the machine is destroyed.” “Do you know,” asked the Chevalier, 
“that I regard this sudden steep increase in the value of  grain as the 
most violent and dangerous shock that one can give to the state?”124
“Their system,” wrote Galiani in reference to the économistes, “pro-
duced a famine that my book could have prevented.”125 But liberaliza-
tion had other implications, more subtle and equally as perilous. For 
Galiani, liberalization itself  represented a profound political transfor-
mation and portended an even more sweeping kind of  political change. 
By liberating grain, the government also gave the people the freedom, 
and thus the responsibility, to look out for their own subsistence. “The 
liberty of  providing for one’s food brusquely given to someone long 
accustomed to not having to worry about it,” remarked the Chevalier, 
“is a deadly gift.” Historically, Galiani contended, the extent of  a mon-
arch’s responsibility for provisioning has varied roughly in proportion 
with the amount of  civil liberty his system of  rule afforded his subjects. 
Thus it was no surprise, for example, that the despots were the great 
victualers, assuring cheap abundance for ultimately ignoble ends. “And 
what do you conclude from this?” asked the Marquis. “I conclude,” 
said the Chevalier sarcastically,
that we must bless heaven and judge ourselves fortunate to have seen with our own 
eyes the time where in a monarchical country the confidence between the Sovereign 
and the subjects has reached such a point that this Sovereign, cheerfully, voluntarily 
with satisfaction and complaisance discharges himself  from the most delicate and 
sensitive care…The French have for too long been treated like all the other peoples. 
They enjoyed a more gentle fate in other centuries, they were the children of  a good 
father but they were minor children whom it was necessary to think about feeding.
124 Galiani, Dialogues, ed. by Nicolini, 169, 186–88, 244–63, 282; Galiani, “Mémoire to 
Sartine” (1770), in Lettres, ed. by Asse, I, 411–15. Galiani, it should be noted, favored the 
maintenance of  the legal right to export on a permanent basis but through a law which 
helped render it relatively unattractive for economic reasons. See Dialogues, 254–61. Later 
Galiani protested that his proposition to subject exports to a duty had been misunderstood. 
He claimed that he envisaged the duty as a temporary expedient. See Galiani to Baudouin, 
23 April 1770 and to Suard, 8 Sept. 1770, in Lettres, ed. by Asse, I, 70, 138–43. Yet his 
attitude toward exportation was not clear even to his close friends. See Diderot to Sophie 
Volland, 12 Nov. 1768, Diderot Correspondance, ed. by Roth, VIII, 216.
125 Galiani to Caraccioli, 15 July 1773, in Lettres, ed. by Asse, II, 69.
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“Medals, statues and triumphal arches” should mark the legislation by 
which the people were declared “major,” “emancipated,” and thus free 
to assume responsibility for their subsistence. Like the Paris Parlement, 
Galiani interpreted liberalization as the renunciation by the king of  his 
traditional role. The new policy radically altered the relationship between 
government and people. “Peoples,” the Chevalier imagined the liberal 
monarch to proclaim to his subjects, “your fidelity has so deeply merited 
my confidence that no suspicion will henceforth upset it and the precau-
tions will become superfluous for me [to take].…” Whatever the conse-
quences, the king went on to say, I will not take responsibility for them:
I feel that if  you see the price of  food rise, you will not blame me. You will recognize 
in it the inevitable effect of  the contrariety of  seasons, or even the felicitous increase 
in your wealth and the circulation of  money.126
The question for Galiani was whether this new “mutual confidence” 
based on liberty was appropriate in a monarchy like France and 
whether indeed it could sustain the royal system as it had heretofore 
been known. For “in every government,” he told Suard, “grain leg-
islation takes the tone of  the spirit of  the government.” Thus grain 
liberalism in England seemed as reasonable to Galiani as it had to the 
Advocate General Séguier, given the constitution peculiar to England. 
The relationship between grain police and politics posited by Galiani 
had a corollary which he viewed as cause for genuine alarm: “he who 
dares to change entirely the administration of  grain in France, if  he 
succeeds, will have changed at the same time the form of  government.” 
Like the Paris Parlement, Galiani questioned whether liberty was com-
patible with the French system and with French society as it was struc-
tured. Without any preparation, in the early sixties, the king repudiated 
obligations which in the past he had always assured, less in deference 
to the people than in the interest of  his own rule. The immediate result 
was chaos, confusion, resentment, and misunderstanding. In the long 
run, liberty presaged further “upheaval,” which Galiani did not discuss 
in the Dialogues but promised facetiously to treat in a new dialogue to be 
appended to a new edition of  his book “in the form of  apocalypse.”127
126 Galiani, Dialogues, ed. by Nicolini, 229–33, 237–242.
127 Cf. the Prince de Conti’s apocalyptical allegory on the vogue for and risks of  liberty. A dog 
dirtied the floor of  the salon where the Prince was receiving at tea. When a huissier rushed 
in to chase away the dog before the beast had finished its business, the Prince interceded: 
“Stop, liberty, liberty, totál liberty.” Cited by A. Neymarck, Turgot et ses doctrines (Paris, 1885; 
Geneva, 1967), II, 193n.
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His description of  this process of  further upheaval was extremely 
sketchy but it suggested a view very much like the one developed at 
length by Necker several years later in his On the Legislation and the Com-
merce of  Grain. The monarchy, Galiani reasoned, “depends essentially 
on the inequality of  ranks [conditions], the inequality of  ranks upon 
the low price of  foodstuffs, the low price on [police] constraints.” 
Liberty would upset the existing constitution of  France in two ways, 
both of  which involved social conflict. The first, upon which Necker 
insisted more heavily than Galiani, would result from the hatred of  
the have-nots, who suffered from high prices, for the haves. The sec-
ond would result from the capitalist ethos which liberty inculcated. 
Liberty would eventually enrich the peasantry, which would develop 
confidence in itself  and revolt against an oppressive, arbitrary and 
discriminatory social and political system. The upshot would be “the 
republican form [of  government] and the equality of  ranks which 
it cost us six thousand years to destroy.” Galiani’s vision was indeed 
apocalyptic, overdrawn, and unsophisticated in its socioeconomic 
analysis but in its most general outlines it was not entirely removed 
from the kind of  world which the physiocrats themselves dreamed 
of  making.128
Galiani’s Dialogues inaugurated a decade of  sustained criticism of  
liberalization and of  what the Neapolitan called “economystifica-
tion.”129 Many of  the ideas he developed or touched upon reappeared 
in works by more than a dozen different authors: his repugnance for 
économiste absolutism and universal speculation, the conviction that 
grain had to retain a special status, his sense of  the fragility of  society 
and the interdependence of  its parts, the belief  that equilibrium was 
128 Galiani to d’Epinay, 3 June 1775, in Galiani Correspondance, ed. by Perey and Maugras, II, 
409; Galiani to the comte de Schomberg, 19 May 1770, in ibid., I, 139; Galiani to Suard, 
8 Sept. 1770 and Galiani to d’Epinay, 2 Jan. 1773 and 22 Jan. 1774, in Lettres, ed. by Asse, 
I, 138–39 and II, 2–3, 109–110. In the letter to Schomberg cited above, Galiani alluded 
to the revolts of  the late sixties, the pacte de famine, and the alliance between people and 
parlements who together appealed for “despotism” to come to their assistance. In a letter 
to Morellet, Galiani insisted on the importance of  the question of  “the relations between 
the form of  government and the manner of  provisioning.” 26 May 1770, in Correspondance, 
ed. by Perey and Maugras, I, 159.
 On the abdication of  kingly responsibility, see also: Necker, Sur la législation et le commerce 
des grains, 134–35; Linguet, Du Pain et du bled, 81; Séguier’s remarks in Recueil, 114–15 and as 
cited by Weulersse, La Physiocratie sous Turgot et Necker, 214–15; and De Maistre’s comments 
cited by A. Boland, Traité pratique de boulangerie (Paris, 1860), 128.
129 Galiani to d’Epinay, 23 Sept. 1780, in Galiani Correspondance, ed. by Perey and Maugras, 
II, 600.
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neither inevitable nor natural but had to be battled for, and his view 
of  the multiple sources of  national wealth. Each of  the critics, of  
course, had his own special concerns. Linguet and Mably empha-
sized the question of  social justice and the rights of  the dispossessed; 
Diderot, Mercier, and Briatte stressed the moral rather than the politi-
cal side of  the subsistence issue; Necker devoted most of  his attention 
to the political and administrative dimensions; Grimm never tired of  
pointing to the philosophical flaws in the way the économistes looked 
at the world; Béardé de l’Abbaye insisted on economic matters while 
Béguillet focussed on technical as well as social considerations.130
Virtually all of  them, however, shared Galiani’s view that physioc-
racy was dangerous, that it was “a Mississippi, a Jansenism, a Fronde, 
a crusade, even one of  those epidemic diseases of  the spirit by which 
the French nation is sometimes attacked and which causes cruel rav-
ages until the calm of  reason returns.”131 For Linguet, their most fero-
cious and relentless scourge, the économistes were a “dangerous sect” 
whose “murderous” goal was to institute the reign of  “dear bread” 
and to “make gold from human blood.”132 Diderot admired them for 
their insatiable curiosity and their intellectual courage in 1769 but by 
the early seventies he denounced them for a cruel conception which 
exposed the nation to misery and famine.133 Béguillet considered 
them “dangerous” for defying “the first law of  all societies,” the salus 
populi.134 Briatte, whose book on eighteenth century poverty deserves 
to be better known, assailed the “preachers of  the dangerous system 
130 For the full references to these works, see Institut National d’Etudes Démographiques. 
Economie et population: les doctrines françaises avant 1800, bibliographie générale commentée (Paris, 
1956). There is unfortunately no first-rate study of  the so-called anti-physiocrats. Jean 
Airiau’s L’Opposition aux physiocrates à la fin de l’ancien régime (Paris, 1965) is superficial 
and unreliable. Two of  the major figures. Linguet and Necker, have very recently 
been studied by D. G. S. Levy (forthcoming) and H. Grange, Les Idées de Necker (Paris, 
1974). In some ways the angry condemnation of  the physiocrats by lower level field 
administrators is more impressive than the more elegant and articulate onslaught of  
the “professional” critics. See, for instance, the “réflexions” of  the SD of  Avesnes, ca. 
Oct. 1770, C. 6690, A.D. Nord.
131 Galiani, “Mémoire to Sartine” (1770) in Lettres, ed. by Asse, I, 412; Galiani to Sartine, 
27 April 1770, ibid., I, 63. Galiani also referred to the économistes as “bloodsuckers of  
hemorrhoidal veins.” Galiani to Suard, 8 Sept. 1770, ibid., I, 142.
132 Linguet, Réponse aux docteurs modernes, part III, 80 and part II, 110, 112–13. Cf. his Du Pain et 
du bled, 213–14 and Canaux navigables, 156–57.
133 Diderot in Grimm, Correspondance littéraire, ed. by Tourneux, VIII, 373–74 (15 Nov. 1769); 
Diderot to Sartine, 10 March 1770, in Diderot Correspondance, ed. by Roth, X, 32–33; Diderot, 
Apologie de Galiani, 17 and passim.
134 Béguillet, Traité des subsistances, 838n.
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of  dear bread.”135 For their arrogance, for having given “the most 
unbridled cupidity the signal to starve the kingdom,” and for having 
“struck the people with a calamity,” Mercier felt confident that “equi-
table history” would “punish” the économistes.136 Although we cannot 
follow here the thread of  the post-Galiani criticism and its relation-
ship to changing political and economic conditions—specifically to the 
ministries of  Turgot and Necker which in a sense mimicked the experi-
ence of  1763–74–it is important to note its virulence, its continuity, and 
its scope.137
Of  the physiocratic replies and defenses, which were just as impas-
sioned and equally as prolific, we can deal only with those pertaining 
specifically to Galiani’s work. So alarmed were the économistes by the 
positive impression they feared the Dialogues made on the public that 
they sent forth three of  their leading spokesmen to refute them.138 
Roubaud conceded that his Récréations Economiques ou Lettres … à 
M. le Chevalier Zanobi were really superfluous since he had “refuted 
in advance” all of  Galiani’s feeble and familiar objections in his 
Réprésentations aux Magistrals of  the previous year. With this attitude, 
it is not surprising that the Récréations turned out to be tiresome and 
uninspired. Roubaud reaffirmed the claims that liberty would pre-
vent dearth and would eventually assure a cheap as well as a regular 
bread supply, that a child could govern with a single law of  nature 
as guide, and that property by definition could not conflict with the 
135 J.-B. Briatte, Ofrande à l’humanité, 161.
136 Mercier, Tableau de Paris, VIII, 162 and VI, 232.
137 Turgot’s advent brought a temporary truce, for he had devoted friends in both the économiste 
camp and among its enemies. Galiani predicted disaster for Turgot’s “system” in September 
1774 and eight months later thanked God that he was not in Paris during the Flour War: 
“I would have perhaps been put in prison as the author of  the Revolt.” Galiani to d’Epinay, 
17 Sept. 1774, in Lettres, ed. by Asse, II, 150–51; Galiani to d’Epinay, 27 May 1775 in Galiani 
Correspondance, ed. by Perey and Maugras, II, 406. Another abbé, named Saury, was in fact 
arrested on Turgot’s orders (along with a number of  other clerics who allegedly stirred up 
their flocks) for having written a pamphlet in which he warned that if  the liberal system were 
reinstituted “it could happen that the people would revolt.” F. Métra. Correspondance secrète, I, 
362–63 (24 May 1775) and Jean Saury, Réflexions d’un citoyen sur le commerce des grains (Paris, 1775). 
Necker, whose book on the grain trade appeared opportunely at the very moment that the Flour 
War erupted, was not disturbed by the authorities, though they regarded him as an agitator.
138 Roubaud, Récréations économiques, ou lettres de l’auteur des “Représentations aux magistrats” à M. le 
Chevalier Zanobi, principal interlocuteur des “Dialogues sur le commerce des blés” (Amsterdam and 
Paris, 1770), iii, vi; Grimm, Correspondance littéraire, ed. by Tourneux, IX, 81–82 (July 1770); 
Ephémérides du citoyen, IV (1770), 177–84; Bachaumont, Mémoires secrets, XIX, 168–69 (18 
March 1770).
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general interest. He denied responsibility for the crisis that accompa-
nied liberalization, arguing that liberty never really had a chance in 
the adverse circumstances of  the late sixties. Galiani, in his estima-
tion, was a derivative thinker, a Delamarist and mercantilist bedecked 
in modern dress. Roubaud stressed a theme which echoed through 
all the replies to the Dialogues: that Galiani was an apostate to the 
Enlightenment, not merely an enemy of  the new political economy; 
that he deserved to be banished from philosophical circles for seeking 
only to “deepen prejudices and increase fears.”139
Infuriated by this “atrocious calumny,” Galiani vainly asked Sar-
tine to suppress Roubaud’s book. The Lieutenant General consoled 
Galiani with the assurance that it was not worth the trouble, for no 
one was reading it.140 Nor did the refutation prepared by the other 
économiste abbé, Baudeau, stir much interest. Though less tedious than 
Roubaud’s, it did nothing more than rehearse the points the author 
had already made in his Avis of  1768.141
The third major refutation of  the Dialogues from within the physio-
cratic school was contributed by Lemercier de la Riviére, a former 
parlementaire and intendant whom Quesnay regarded as a genius 
capable of  becoming prime minister and whom Diderot at one time 
compared favorably to Montesquieu.142 The ample title of  Lemer-
cier’s work betrays its argument: The General Interest of  the State, or the 
Liberty of  the Grain Trade demonstrated as being in conformity with natural 
law, with the Public Law of  France; with the fundamental laws of  the kingdom; 
139 Roubaud, Récréations, xiv, 13, 16, 58, 97n, 147, 161, 185, 190.
140 Galiani to d’Epinay, 27 July and 4 Aug. 1770, in Lettres, ed. by Asse, I, 116, 120; d’Epinay 
to Galiani, 24 Aug. 1770 in La Signora d’Epinay, ed. by Nicolini, 89; d’Epinay to Galiani, 22 
July 1770, cited by Koch in his edition of  the Dialogues, 321.
141 Baudeau, “Lettres de M. l’abbé Baudeau … à M. l’abbé G*** sur ses dialogues anti-
économistes,” Ephémérides du citoyen, XII (1769), 107–28. It is possible that Baudeau prepared 
a more substantial refutation which the government suppressed, though the evidence for 
this rests uniquely on Bachaumont, Mémoires secrets, VII, 252, (20 Dec. 1774). Doubtless it 
would have pleased Galiani to know in advance that both the économiste abbots, Roubaud 
and Baudeau, would be exiled for seditious writings in August 1776. See Arsenal, mss. 
Bastille 12448.
142 On Lemercier de la Rivière, see Charles de la Rivière, “Mercier de la Rivière à St. 
Petersbourg en 1767,” Revue d’histoire littéraire de France, 4th year (15 Oct. 1897), 581–
602; Bluche, L’Origine des magistrats, 268; Weulersse, Mouvement physiocratique, I, 103, 127; 
Lermercier de la Riviére, L’Ordre naturel et essentiel des sociétés politiques, ed. by E. Depitre (Paris, 
1910), introduction. On Diderot’s enthusiasm for Lemercier, see Diderot to Damilaville, 
July 1767 and Diderot to Falconet, July 1767, in Diderot Correspondance, ed. by Roth, VII, 
75–77, 94. For Voltaire’s demurrer, see Voltaire to Damilaville, 16 Oct. 1767, Voltaire’s 
Correspondence, ed. by Besterman, vol. 67, p. 101 (# 13584).
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with the common interest of  the Sovereign and of  his subjects in all times; with 
the Refutation of  a new system published in the form of  “Dialogues on the Grain 
trade.” Far more than a rebuttal of  Galiani, the essay was a synthesis 
of  all the basic économiste propositions with an effort to integrate such 
rich ideas as absolute freedom of  the grain trade and a single land tax 
into a unitary, coherent design.
The aim of  the entire scheme was to increase national wealth and 
the proofs Lemercier adduced for its validity were almost theocratic 
in mood and method. The physiocratic touchstone of  “evidence,” 
disdained by Galiani, was in Lemercier’s perception God-given and 
available for everyone to grasp. His starting point was natural law, 
which he saw as the “immutable laws of  divine justice,” the first 
of  which was the right of  property, “sacred” and “inviolable.” He 
denounced Galiani’s view of  conditional property and his suggestion 
that private property and the general interest could be in conflict. 
“Anything which disturbs property and liberty,” Lemercier main-
tained, “attacks the essence of  society [itself].” Galiani was dishonest, 
naive, and wishy-washy; he was an enemy of  the countryside and 
agriculture and a partisan of  manufactures; worst of  all, he was intel-
lectually a dwarf  next to the économistes, a man of  levity rather than 
of  science, utterly ignorant of  the “first truths” and the “immutable 
principles of  the social order.” Lemercier felt confident that phi-
losophes would have no trouble unmasking Galiani as an imposter. 
Beyond them, he addressed his appeal to the magistrates of  the king-
dom, his confreres. He deplored the fact that the different parlements 
were “not in agreement” on liberalization. He hoped that once the 
foundations of  the new political economy were made clear to them 
they would unite behind liberty in the name of  the general interest.143
Galiani deeply resented the General Interest for its innuendoes and 
insults.144 It is not clear whether he envisioned some sort of  riposte 
from the time when the first économiste refutations began to appear. 
But in June 1770 he learned of  an event which stirred his imagination 
as well as his horror and provided him with the allegorical substance 
for a reply to Lemercier. The event was the Parisian catastrophe of  
30 May 1770 which occurred in the midst of  an official celebration in 
the royal square in honor of  the marriage of  the dauphin. A sudden 
143 Lemercier de la Riviére, L’Intérêt général, 1–16, 21–22, 64–65, 163n, 286, 290–91, 306–17, 
322, 326–27, 330–31, 356–57, 367, 373–78, 402.
144 Galiani to d’Epinay, 5 Jan. and 6 March 1771 in Lettres, ed. by Asse, I, 196, 219–20. Cf. 
Galiani to d’Epinay, 5 May 1770, ibid., I, 68–69.
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stampede for place sent waves of  panic through a crowd estimated 
at 400,000 people; at least 133 people were crushed or stomped to 
death; hundreds of  others were wounded.145 Galiani trembled at the 
news. It was less a mark of  his wit than of  the depth of  outrage at 
économiste doctrine and style that he wrote d’Epinay immediately upon 
learning of  the disaster:
I accuse, Madame, the économistes. They have preached property and liberty so much, 
they have criticized the police, order, the rules so much; they have said so often that 
nature left to herself  was so beautiful, worked so well, put herself  in equilibrium, etc. 
that finally, convinced that they were proprietors of  the pavement and that they had 
the liberty to walk, everyone wanted to profit from [these rights].146
That, for Galiani, was where “the long preaching” of  the économistes 
had led. “In truth,” he added, “were I in Paris … this event would 
have sufficed as my reply to the économistes.” The lesson he drew was 
that any place offering “full liberty” would attract a great crowd 
including “crooks, grand monopolists in watches and snuff-boxes,” 
who would conspire “to profit from the free-for-all [bagarre].” “What 
I tell you is not a joke,” Galiani insisted : “Meditate and you will find 
the exactitude of  the comparison.”147
The phrase bagarre—brawl or free-for-all—from this letter became 
the working title for short satire of  Lemercier’s General Interest which 
Galiani promised to publish but which he never completed. Long 
assumed lost and only recently recovered, the Bagarre (or a large frag-
ment of  it) is a raw verse-by-verse parody with the text of  Lemercier 
on one side of  the page and Galiani’s burlesque on the other.148 It is 
sometimes strained and heavy-handed and frequently hilarious but 
its most striking quality is a certain viciousness of  attitude. The real 
bagarre was social disorganization, social dissolution, chaos; it erupted 
in the markets and towns in the sixties and seventies in response to 
grain shortage, high prices and terrible fears; it threatened not merely 
the public order in a multitude of  scattered places but the very essence 
of  the social order. Liberty, the brand of  liberty promoted by the 
économistes, was the cause of  bagarres.
145 AN, Y 15707; J.-B. Dénisart, Collection de décisions nouvelles, III, 530; Holbach to Galiani, 3 
June 1770 in Amici e Corrispondenti francesi dell’abate Galiani, ed. by F. Nicolini, 199.
146 Galiani to d’Epinay, 23 June 1770 in Lettres, ed., by Asse, I, 92.
147 Galiani to d’Epinay, 25 Aug. and 13 Oct. 1770, ibid., I, 126–27, 155.
148 Galiani to d’Epinay, 16 March 1771 and 24 June 1775, ibid., I, 219–20 and II, 205. On the 
“lost” Bagarre, see Koch’s edition of  the Dialogues, 332–33.
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The government itself  commissioned a refutation of  Galiani’s 
 Dialogues by the abbé Morellet. It caused a stir because the author 
was an intimate friend of  Galiani and because Terray ordered its 
suppression immediately after its publication in 1770, probably as a 
slight to Choiseul, one of  its sponsors.149 Substantively, the work was 
unworthy of  the tempest it excited. It was a faithful rendition of  the 
physiocratic theses with the standard emphasis on the primacy of  
property in the social and natural orders. Whereas Galiani argued 
that a rigorous and unconditional application of  property rights 
could threaten social stability, Morellet maintained that “everything 
becomes  arbitrary and changeable and society tends towards disso-
lution” when the rights of  property were placed in doubt. Morellet 
bluntly denied that the government had any responsibility for assur-
ing subsistence and criticized the king’s grain operations as excessively 
costly, wasteful, and inimical to commerce. Disdainful of  Galiani’s 
relativism, his empiricism, and his insistence upon detail, which, like 
Lemercier, he attributed to Galiani’s lack of  true principles, Morellet 
claimed that liberty must be operative in all circumstances.
As a corollary to this proposition, in the most original part of  his 
essay, Morellet vigorously denied that there was a direct relation-
ship between a nation’s political system and its social structure on 
the one hand and its grain administration on the other. He accused 
Galiani of  “apologizing” for the police resistance to liberalization 
and for the brutal and backward style of  administration associated 
with the police regime. In Morellet’s assessment, Galiani revealed 
himself  to be not merely an anti-économiste but an anti-philosophe 
as well.150 When he became Controller-General in 1774 Turgot 
avenged Terray’s blow against Morellet. With an enthusiastic cover-
ing letter endorsing Morellet’s “very solid” position and urging its 
149 Morellet, Mémoires, ed. by Lemontey, 2nd edition, I, 191–92, 194; Condorcet to Turgot, 10 
March 1770 and 10 May 1770 in Correspondance inédite de Condorcet et de Turgot, 1770–79, ed. 
by C. Henry, 2, 13; Diderot, Apologie de Galiani in Oeuvres politiques, ed. by Vernière, 69n, 71; 
Diderot to Sartine, 10 March 1770 in Diderot Correspondance, ed. by Roth, X, 32–33; Arthur 
Wilson, Diderot (New York, 1972), 555; Grimm, Correspondance littéraire, ed. by Tourneux, 
X, 514 (Dec. 1774); Bachaumont, Mémoires secrets, VII, 252 (20 Dec. 1774). Cf. Turgot’s 
decision to distribute the refutation to all the intendants, circular, 10 Dec. 1774, Oeuvres, ed. 
by Schelle, IV, 228–29.
150 Morellet, Réfutation de l’ouvrage qui a pour titre: “Dialogues sur le commerce des bleds” (London, 1770), 
49–50, 69–71, 106–111, 240–49, 254–56, 319–20. Morellet claimed that Galiani’s Dialogues 
were aimed not at development of  principles of  political economy but at settling a score with 
Choiseul for having expelled him from France. Mémoires, ed. by Lemontey, 2nd edition, I, 192.
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 dissemination  throughout the realm, Turgot sent hundreds of  copies 
of  the Refutation to the intendants. It thus became one of  the most 
widely distributed tracts of  liberal propaganda of  the seventies, serv-
ing not only as a belated rejoinder to Galiani but as an apology for 
Turgot’s own liberalization program.151
Either because he was enraged by Morellet’s foray against a mutual 
friend or because he wanted to test out on paper the solidity of  his 
own intellectual conversion to an anti-économiste posture, Diderot 
wrote a refutation of  Morellet’s refutation entitled Apology for the abbé 
Galiani which was not published during his lifetime. The issues as well 
as the persons involved moved Diderot deeply; his tone was pitilessly 
cruel and ironical. It was Morellet, not Galiani, who was “no philos-
ophe.” He was a “man sold to the ministry,” a “vile and low rogue.” 
His chief  defect was his reasoning: it was “abstract,” “utopian,” and 
indifferent to social realities and human needs. In Diderot’s view, 
Morellet, and through him the économistes, suffered from many of  the 
flaws with which the Taines, the Faguets, and the other modern ene-
mies of  the Enlightenment have taxed the philosophes in general. On 
socioeconomic and political questions, at least, Diderot felt safer with 
Galiani’s uncertain and variable empiricism than with the économiste 
search for a “general principle” from which to deduce everything 
else. Diderot found “in the sciences, in the métiers a method which 
is precisely the opposite of  yours.” He would begin with “individual 
cases” and after accumulating, comparing, and evaluating different 
cases arrive at “more or less general notions” or “theories.” But it 
is “the facts … which serve as stages for climbing, and not abstract 
speculations as steps for descending.”152
A methodology totally unfitted to the social sciences led the écono-
mistes dangerously astray even as it had led France to near-disaster in the 
late sixties. It beckoned Morellet to write reassuringly about a “possi-
ble” or potential surplus as justification for allowing exportation. But, 
remarked Diderot, “I eat badly when I have only potential bread.” It 
led Morellet to an utterly abstract, arithmetic conception of  dearth as 
if  dearth were an orderly, predictable process, as if  one dearth were 
like all the others. “You don’t have the first notion of  what happens in 
a dearth time,” Diderot charged, for dearth was “a tumultuous conflict 
151 Turgot to INs., 10 Dec. 1774 in C. 2420, A.D. B-du-R.; C. 1442, A.D. Gir.; C. 2916, A.D. 
Hér.; C. 2627, A.D. Cal. Cf. Pidansat de Mairobert, Journal historique, VI, 376 (21 Dec. 1774).
152 Diderot, Apologie de Galiani, 78, 97, 113.
Illustration 10. Manuscript page of  Galiani’s “lost” work, La Bagarre, a parody of  
Lemercier de la Rivière’s L’Intérêt général. Bibliothèque Nationale.
Illustration 11. Current price listing illustrating the international character of  the grain 
trade at Marseilles. Private collection.
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of  fear, of  avidity, or cupidity.” Morellet’s fine principles led him to 
a contempt for the people and for “the notions of  the people.” After 
all, asked Diderot, “isn’t it their instinct for what is advantageous to 
them which should be at the base of  your sermons on liberty?” It is 
true, Diderot conceded, that Galiani “fears the people”, but when “it 
is a question of  bread, only a drunkard would not be afraid of  them.”
In a passage in which he came close to justifying popular subsis-
tence violence, Diderot likened grain to air or water as an article of  
elemental necessity. He also compared it to a case of  quinine hoarded 
by an owner who refused to sell except at a price above popular 
means, despite the fact that a dangerous epidemic fever raged at the 
moment. In an allegory strikingly redolent of  many grain and bread 
riots which had taken or were to take place in the eighteenth century, 
Diderot wrote that the people would break down the hoarder’s door, 
take the drug they needed to save themselves, and leave a reasonable 
amount of  money in exchange. “What?” asked Diderot, “Is an epi-
demic fever a more dangerous disease than dearth and hunger?”153
Nor would Diderot accept the économiste argument for the inviola-
bility of  property. “Isn’t the sentiment of  humanity more sacred than 
the right of  property?” he wondered. None of  the public authorities 
responsible for provisioning would have disputed Diderot’s claim that 
the absolute physiocratic concept of  property was “a Tartar prin-
ciple, a cannibal [principle] and not [the principle] of  a policed man 
[un homme policé].” 154
Product of  a grave subsistence crisis, Galiani’s Dialogues questioned 
some of  the basic assumptions and called attention to some of  the omi-
nous implications of  liberalization and of  the new political economy. 
Before 1770, the voices of  opposition to the new system were the voices 
of  the past, of  the police, the magistracy, and the people—not the 
voice of  philosophy. For the philosophes, unity of  purpose, at least on 
major questions, had been of  the utmost importance in the campaign 
against the tyranny of  authority and tradition. Galiani sounded the 
alarm within the philosophical community at a critical moment when 
a group of  philosophes called économistes, who had managed for the 
first time in the eighteenth century to have an important part of  their 
program adopted by the government, came under severe attack from 
153 Ibid., 75–76, 84, 115, 117–21. Cf. Journal économique (1 April 1775), 57–59.
154 Diderot, Apologie de Galiani, 85, 87, 90, 99, 118–19.
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a coalition of  interests which the philosophes had always distrusted. 
Instead of  rushing to the aid of  the embattled champions of  liberty—
not the old-style liberty, which was still used to defend encrusted 
p rivilege, but a vision of  liberty that was very much in the main-
stream of  Enlightenment thought—Galiani repudiated them. Galiani 
assailed their science and their politics, not through occasional sallies 
but in a full-scale frontal assault and not in rarefied terms of  theory 
but upon a background of  a national crisis. The économistes took pride 
in moving the Enlightenment a giant step closer to the everyday real-
ity of  social and economic problems, in radiating light into the mar-
ketplaces and farms, and in founding what one close observer of  the 
republic of  letters called “a practical Politics.” Galiani confronted 
them on their own terrain and found a gaping incongruity between 
their broadest aims and their means. The Dialogues helped to open a 
breach in the philosophical party, to make the crisis of  liberalization 
into a crisis of  the Enlightenment as well.
Diderot’s Apologie de l’abbé Galiani is a symbol and a symptom of  
that breach. The liberalization experience transformed his warm 
sympathy for physiocracy into deep skepticism and intellectual and 
moral distaste. The grain issue was important enough on its own to 
give the debate enormous significance. But for Diderot, it opened 
a larger question which had far-reaching implications: what were 
to be the foundations of  the political science and the social science 
of  the future? Were a political science and a social science possible? 
How were the needs of  a capitalist economy to be reconciled with the 
humane ideals which the Enlightenment embodied?
The appearance of  Galiani’s Dialogues brought something of  the 
disarray of  society into the salons. A Diderot-Grimm-Necker group, 
frequently supported by Holbach and Voltaire, opposed a Turgot-
Condorcet-Dupont branch of  the philosophical family. To be sure, 
the division was not always clear-cut. If  Diderot remained cool to 
Turgot, Voltaire welcomed his rise to power with genuine enthusiasm. 
Moreover, the other great issue of  the hour, the constitutional strug-
gle, resulted in another split which did not follow the same lines. Vol-
taire wrote Maupeou’s apology even as Diderot composed Galiani’s, 
while a number of  liberals and anti-économistes deplored the despotic 
fashion in which the parlementary problem was handled. If  we are to 
make sense of  the underlying unity of  the Enlightenment, it will be 
necessary to look more closely at the fissures in the philosophical party 
which developed in the seventies and at the impact of  social, economic, 
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and political crisis on the thinking of  the established leaders and of  
the coming men of  the post-Ferney generation.155
V
Though Galiani told a correspondent that he was sure of  “the 
hatred of  M. Turgot for my Dialogues,” the intendant of  Limousin 
took no direct part in the controversy over the work.156 Even as the 
public debate raged, however, Turgot made his views known to the 
Controller-General through administrative channels in a series of  
unusually frank and detailed letters written in the fall of  1770, which 
began as a point-by-point critique of  Terray’s proposed regulatory 
law, but developed imperceptibly into a brilliant essay on the the-
ory and practice of  grain administration. Turgot’s purpose was to 
warn Terray against pursuing a reactionary course. He analyzed the 
nature of  national wealth, examined the basic principles of  political 
economy, used historical and comparative examples, adduced price 
and harvest statistics, and assessed the policies of  previous regimes in 
order to invest his conclusions with “the evidence of  a mathematical 
demonstration.”
155 On the connection between the encyclopedist and the économiste branches and the idea 
of  “stages” of  the Enlightenment, see the suggestive remarks attributed to Pidansat de 
Mairobert, Avertissement to Bachaumont’s Mémoires secrets, ed. by P.-L. Jacob (Paris, 1883), 
11. On the “confusion” in the public mind between the different “philosophical sects” 
and especially between the encyclopedists and the économistes, see Weulersse, La Physiocratie 
sous Turgot et Necker, 15–16. Many philosophes were both encyclopedists and économistes; the 
confusion reached its zenith at the ascension of  Turgot to the ministry. On the careful and 
petulant distinction Mirabeau always drew between these two groups and for the dislike 
he had for philosophes in general, see his “Discours de rentrée” (1776) in Weulersse, ed., 
Manuscrits économiques de Quesnay et Mirabeau, 138–39. Writing on the causes of  the French 
Revolution, the administrator-writer Sénac de Meilhan insisted upon the common goals 
of  the économistes and the philosophes. In an important argument which merits careful 
consideration. Sénac de Meilhan assimilated the struggle for liberty of  the press to the 
campaign for liberty of  the grain trade, viewing both as manifestations of  the same 
subversive spirit. Des Principes et des causes de la révolution en France (Paris, 1790), 28.
156 Galiani to d’Epinay, 24 Sept. 1774, in Lettres, ed. by Asse, II, 152. Cf. Galiani’s remarks after 
learning of  the Flour War: “I hope that this event will have taught M. Turgot and M. l’abbé 
Morellet to know men and the world.…” to d’Epinay, 27 May 1775, in Galiani Correspondance, 
ed. by Perey and Maugras, II, 406. It was precisely for this knowledge of  “the world and 
men, the human heart [and] the nature of  society” that Diderot admired Galiani. Diderot 
to Sartine, 10 March 1770, in Diderot Correspondance, ed. by Roth, X, 32–33. In a circular to 
the intendants on 10 Dec. 1774 Turgot characterized Galiani’s arguments as “objections that 
little-educated persons make against the liberty of  the grain trade.” C. 2916, A.D. Hér.
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Total liberty, Turgot argued, served the interests of  the State and 
of  every section of  the citizenry. It meant prosperity for the entire 
 agricultural nation, not merely an elite of  rich owners as Terray 
charged. With liberty, agriculture would thrive, expand, create new 
jobs, circulate new wealth, and increase the fund of  subsistence and 
the revenue of  the government. Liberty was “the only preservative 
against dearth, the sole means of  establishing and conserving between 
the prices of  different places and different times this just level inces-
santly troubled by the inconstancy of  the seasons and the unevenness 
of  the harvests.” The people would discover a new security, a cer-
tainty, and predictability of  subsistence which they had never before 
known. In 1740 as in 1768 and 1770, it was “lack of  liberty and not 
liberty” which produced the dearths.
“If  there has ever been a time,” Turgot intoned, “when the most 
entire, the most absolute liberty, the liberty most unencumbered with 
any sort of  obstacle was necessary, I daresay it is now.” Given the psy-
chology of  human motivation, the vast size of  the kingdom, and the 
futility and extravagance of  government intervention, commerce was 
the only dependable and efficient source of  supply. Terray’s planifi-
cation and allocation scheme was a chimera, materially and morally 
incapable of  realization. Already the limitations placed on trade have 
prevented merchants from concentrating capital, establishing networks 
of  correspondence, and forming the private hoards which are the only 
true granaries of  abundance. To place further restraints on the trade 
would be to paralyze it completely. To brand the merchants as monop-
olists, “to denounce them to the people as the authors of  the dearth,” 
and to “deliver them to a terrible inquisition” instituted by an “igno-
rant or ill-intentioned” police was a foolish, demagogic, and vain policy 
which would merely serve to perpetuate the crisis and reinforce the 
“blind” prejudices which united consumers and officials.
The Paris Parlement along with the Controller-General on the one 
side and the liberal parlements on the other both had assumed that 
there was a fundamental disjuncture between the interests of  consum-
ers and proprietor-dealers. Each party called for the sacrifice of  the 
interests of  the other on the grounds that the interests it represented 
were of  a higher order and of  greater utility to the state. Rejecting 
their common premise, Turgot took a more politic position, consis-
tently maintaining the view that there was an ineluctable, underlying 
harmony of  interests which liberty could actuate and through which 
advantages would result for all.
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Yet, in the end, he demanded the greater sacrifice of  the people. 
For even if  he could sincerely promise that they would not starve—at 
least not in the long run, one must add—he still asked them to aban-
don a way of  thinking and a system of  values through which they 
made sense of  their uncertain lives. The foremost “prejudice” of  the 
people was the expectation that the government would in the last 
resort provide for their subsistence. According to Turgot, the Con-
troller-General ceded to the popular demand, proclaiming a policy 
by which he “personally engaged himself  to procure abundance no 
matter what happens.” In deference to the popular mentality, Terray 
made the government hostage for a ransom it could never pay or 
which it would have to pay forever. In his place, Turgot would have 
shown the people the naiveté and the sophistry of  their ideas. He 
would have taught them the laws of  nature and the limits of  public 
administration. He would have reminded them that “the government 
is not the master of  the seasons” and that “it does not have the right 
to violate the property of  the laboureurs and the grain merchants.” 
He would have told them in 1770, as in fact he later did in 1774–75: 
“What you ask me for is an injustice.” The “Letters on the Grain 
Trade” adroitly restated the liberal case and announced, four years 
in advance, the program of  Turgot’s ministry and another chance for 
liberalization.157
157 Turgot to Terray, “Lettres sur le commerce des grains,” 30 Oct., 2 Dec. 1770, in Turgot, 
Oeuvres, ed. by Schelle, III, 266–354. On Turgot’s view of  the “blindness” of  the people, see 
also his letter to the IN. of  Toulouse, 19 Sept. 1774, C. 2916, A.D. Hér. and his more nuanced 
“lettre circulaire aux officiers de police,” 15 Feb. 1766, C. 479, A.D. Haute-Vienne.
Chapter XIII
THE KING’S GRAIN AND THE RETREAT 
FROM LIBERALIZATION
Whereas Laverdy used the king’s grain to facilitate the transition from 
a police to a liberal regime, Terray used it to facilitate the transition 
from a liberal to a police regime. There are of  course other important 
differences and many striking similarities between the government 
grain operations of  the sixties and of  the seventies: we explore some 
of  them in the pages that follow. 
This chapter begins with an examination of  the situation inherited by 
Terray when he replaced Maynon d’lnvau at the end of  1769. It consid-
ers the broad outlines of  the new Controller-General’s strategy before 
turning to several case studies of  victualing enterprises. The operations 
launched under Terray’s aegis were far greater in scale and ambition 
than the provisioning activities undertaken in the sixties in the shadow of  
liberalization. The men involved were in the main much more like Leray 
de Chaumont than Pierre Malisset, bankers and négociants rather than 
bakers and millers. Instead of  signing a contract with a group of  sup-
pliers, Terray created a quasi-governmental organization called a régie. 
This chapter focuses on the practices and problems of  the régie. Of  the 
many troubles encountered or generated by the régie, the most serious 
concerned its reputation in the eyes of  the public: we shall see that the 
famine pact persuasion did not die with the demise of  the liberals, even 
if  it changed somewhat in tone and emphasis. The last third of  the chap-
ter is devoted to denouement—not only the outcome of  the king’s grain 
administration under Terray, but in a more general sense the unraveling 
of  some of  the questions which have preoccupied us from the outset.
I
Maynon d’lnvau passed the king’s grain operation to Terray in a highly 
equivocal state. Maynon, as we have seen, would have liked to abjure 
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the government supply role completely. Like the économistes, he 
regarded official grain dealings as improvident, unavailing, and 
inimical to the development of  a powerful, autonomous grain trad-
ing community serving the general interest according to the laws of  
nature. He warned his intendants that they could not count on the 
central government for assistance and he announced that he would 
not renew the provisioning connections with several provinces which 
the ministry had arranged.
But the operations of  Leray de Chaumont (under the names of  sev-
eral straw men) and of  a handful of  Atlantic armateurs and Mediterra-
nean négociants had proceeded too far to permit a brusque liquidation of  
their affairs. More king’s grain had been purchased, was en route, or was 
already in public magazines than Maynon had anticipated. The gov-
ernment felt obliged to honor the contractual commitments its agents 
had made in the interior and abroad. Moreover, as a result of  his own 
fears and pressure from his colleagues (probably Choiseul and Saint-
Florentin), Maynon was unwilling to raze entirely the Parisian reserve 
structure and abandon the capital to the fate of  the marketplace.
Throughout 1769 foreign and domestic grain and flour continued 
to reach Paris from Corbeil and its affiliated entrepôts, now placed 
directly under the control of  Trudaine de Montigny’s grain depart-
ment and managed for the king by Doumerc, a grain merchant who 
had worked for Leray. In principle Corbeil was to be phased out as 
a Paris storehouse once its current sources of  supply had dried up. 
To replace Corbeil as an emergency Paris provisioning fund, Maynon 
signed an agreement with Daure, an experienced victualing hand 
and aspiring minor functionary, to establish a grain and bread sup-
ply system for the Gardes Françaises and other troops garrisoned in the 
capital which would be capable, on very short notice, of  diverting 
substantial amounts of  its stocked grain and flour to the Halles in a 
moment of  urgent need. By the time Terray arrived at the Contrôle-
Général, Daure had already launched his enterprise and the Corbeil 
provision had begun to dwindle, though we do not know (and Terray 
may not have known precisely) how much king’s grain remained in its 
magazines or what quantities, ordered long before, had yet to arrive 
there. Nor is it clear what interest the government may have had in 
the large quantities of  foreign grains which Albert announced were 
reaching Nantes in the first half  of  1770.1
 1 For these cargo arrivals, see C. 775, A.D. L-A.
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The abrupt deterioration of  the subsistence situation towards the 
end of  the spring persuaded Terray to take a more active part in the 
provisioning process. It was too late in the harvest year to mount a full-
scale victualing campaign. Compelled to improvise, Terray later openly 
regretted that he had not acted sooner; he regarded the 1770 experi-
ence as irrefragable proof  of  the necessity of  planning well in advance. 
Terray pressed Daure to increase his reserve and accelerate his ship-
ments to the market. Daure bitterly resented the stiff  conditions which 
the new ministry imposed. When he had stocked a considerable surplus 
in 1769, the Parisian police had not called upon him for aid. Now at an 
extremely difficult moment he would be required to buy in competi-
tion with a host of  merchants all claiming authority from the govern-
ment. Daure deplored the revival of  official buying operations which, 
he admonished, would dissuade independent suppliers from furnish-
ing the capital and which, incidentally, ravished his special privilege.2 If  
Daure did not become the Malisset of  the seventies, however, it was less 
because of  his ideological reservations than his managerial ineptitude. 
Terray had no confidence in his ability to assume major responsibilities.
The Controller-General turned instead to Daniel Doumerc, a 33 
year old native of  Montauban. Son of  a businessman, he arrived in 
Paris in 1766, established himself  as a merchant on the make for any 
lucrative affair, and joined the service of  Leray de Chaumont, which 
brought him in close touch with royal provisioning affairs. In the late 
sixties, while serving as secretary to Leray and advising Sartine on 
provisioning matters, he conducted his own grain commerce. One 
finds him exporting wheat from the port of  Dieppe and importing 
rye, at the government’s request, for sale at Caen. In 1770, after the 
royal council removed onerous import duties, Doumerc speculated in 
the purchase of  Carolina rice, perhaps in expectation that the king, 
who maintained rice in a magazine at St. Germain for distribution 
to the poor in time of  dearth, would buy it from him for public use. 
After Malisset’s disgrace, Trudaine placed the Corbeil installation 
under Doumerc’s management as agent of  the government. In June 
or July 1770, Terray invited Doumerc to make large-scale grain pur-
chases in behalf  of  the government.3
 2 For Daure’s agreement, see above: Chapter 11. Also, AN, F12 1299a; Daure to St.-Florentin (?), 
20 June 1775, AN, O1 361; Daure, “Mémoire” (1771), AN, F11 264; “Accounts,” AN, F11 1195.
 3 BN, Coll. Joly 1140, fols. 47–49; Roubquin to Sartine, 16 Jan. 1769, AN, y 12618; 
CG to Doumerc, 1 May 1770, AN, F12* 153; CG to farmers-general, 5 Nov. 1770, 
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years later, when it was his turn to come under fire for alleged fraud 
and malversation, the fate of  virtually all official entrepreneurs, Dou-
merc denied that he had solicited the place as royal grain broker or 
that he had promised croupes to influential courtiers. According to Dou-
merc, the operation began initially as a semi-private affair, funded by 
himself  and a single associate, Sorin de Bonne, a 45-year-old Dauphi-
nois who conducted a vast array of  business interests from a superb 
Parisian mansion once owned by the Joly de Fleury family. Unlike 
Doumerc, who came from a modest family and who married a wood 
merchant’s daughter, Sorin appears to have married into wealth and 
status and to have been enmeshed in the elite world of  finance from 
the beginning of  his career. He had relations with the Pâris broth-
ers, the great victualing and banking family, an interest in military 
provisioning (food, fodder, clothing, and powder), a share in several 
tax farms, and a large portfolio of  rentes. In 1771 he placed a million 
florin loan in Holland for the government upon Terray’s request. To 
Doumerc’s grain expertise, Sorin joined the prestige, the international 
connections, and the practical experience of  a financier with one 
foot planted in the public domain and the other in the private sector.4 
It is unclear how he came into contact with Doumerc, who certainly 
frequented a different milieu. It is possible that Terray fused the con-
nection even as Laverdy had attached Malisset to Leray de Chaumont.
Shortly after Terray first asked Doumerc and Sorin to undertake 
grain purchases, he converted their affair into a régie in order to keep a 
tight rein on their activities and spare them the dilemma of  having to 
choose between protecting their investment and serving the interests of  
the government. Although they were to make advances when Terray 
lacked liquidity, all their dealings would be for the king’s account. Dou-
merc acquired the title of  “Director of  grain coming from abroad.”5 
In addition to arranging the purchase and distribution of  all foreign 
grain, he and Sorin also managed domestic buying operations in the 
 AN, F12* 155, fol. 72; CG to duchesse d’Aiguillon, 12 Dec. 1770, ibid., fol. 141; interrogation, 
5,9 May 1775, Arsenal, mss. Bastille 12447; IN. of  Rouen to (?), 8 June 1767 and Laverdy 
to IN., 7, 22 June 1767, C. 103, A.D. S-M.; Trudaine de Montigny to Fontette, 26 July 
1768, C. 2652, A.D. Cal.; C. 921, A.D. P-de-D. Doumerc began supplying Auvergne with 
rice as early as 1768; he continued to furnish rice until mid-1773. C. 1095, C. 916, C. 921 
and C. 1131, A.D. P-de-D. The inventory of  régie papers seized in September 1774 records 
5 July 1770 as the date of  Doumerc’s initial “soumission” to Terray. AN, y 15383.
 4 Saisie, Commissaire Chenon, May 1775, AN, y 11441; interrogation, May 1775, Arsenal, 
mss. Bastille 12447.
 5 Malisset, “Mémoire Justificatif,” AN, F11 1173.
618 BREAD, POLITICS AND POLITICAL ECONOMy
king’s name. To provide a base for these dealings, the government 
became proprietor of  the entire Corbeil establishment in 1771.
II
In the early stages, during the summer and fall of  1770, Terray could 
not depend on the nascent Doumerc and Sorin enterprise to con-
duct all public operations. The directors of  the régie brimmed with 
confidence. They offered to contract with local governments for the 
supply of  grain at “moderate” prices and they pledged “to try to 
satisfy everybody.” They could not, however, promise delivery until 
the spring of  1771 at the earliest.6 Meanwhile, for the provisioning of  
the capital and adjacent areas, the ministry continued to issue small 
commissions, many of  which were filled by local merchants who had 
been part of  the Malisset network. Leray de Chaumont provided sev-
eral large shipments until he had completed his obligations by early 
1771.7 The government offered extraordinary bonuses to négociants 
throughout the realm who undertook imports on their own initiative. 
In May 1770 Louis XV issued a special declaration of  gratitude to 
honor the community of  Nantes traders for their service to the cause 
of  national subsistence.8
Though later he would ruthlessly insist on centralizing purchas-
ing for the sake of  efficiency and economy, for the moment Terray 
encouraged local and regional officials to contract on their own with 
merchants to supply grain for a commission and a guarantee against 
loss. Turgot made wide use of  this option, relying less on Limou-
sin merchants than on international traders based at Nantes. While 
he, too, turned to the Nantes import specialists, the intendant of  
Auvergne also sought to stimulate local initiatives by offering a 600 
livres bonus for every 400 septiers of  wheat or rye brought in from 
 6 Sorin and Doumerc to IN. of  Champagne, 21 Dec. 1770, C. 416, A.D. Marne.
 7 “Mémoire en défense de Brochet de St.-Prest,” ca. Oct. 1774, Oeuvres de Turgot, ed. by 
Schelle, IV, 191.
 8 Contrôle-Général to juges-consuls of  Nantes, 27 May 1770 and to IN. of  Bretagne, 10 
Feb. 1770, AN, F12* 153, fols. 267, 108; Mémoires des négociants de Nantes, Oct. 1772 
and March 1773, C. 774 and C. 775, A.D. L-A.; d’Agay to Terray, 10 May 1770, C. 1718, 
A.D. I-et-V. Terray continued to offer incentives to négociants who undertook provisioning 
operations on their own even after he had organized the governmental victualing system. 
See Terray to IN. of  Languedoc, 28 May 1771, C. 2909, A.D. Hér.; Terray to IN. of  
Provence, 28 May 1771, C. 2433, A.D. B-du-R.; Terray to IN. of  Rouen, 18 Sept. 1771, C. 
106, A.D. S-M.; Terray to First President, Bordeaux Parl., 19 July 1772, C. 1441, A.D. Gir.
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outside the  generality. The merchants who responded to the urgings 
of  Taboureau, the intendant of  the Hainaut, ran enormous risks in 
their buying operations, for they sought supplies in the low countries 
where exports had recently been forbidden. Taboureau also received 
permission from Choiseul to “borrow” grain in emergencies from 
the military stores in the frontier garrisons. The intendant of  Poitiers 
commissioned a Mortellerie grain trader and a broker at the Halles 
to procure grain for his jurisdiction. The municipality of  Troyes bor-
rowed 30,000 livres to finance purchases. The mayor of  Saintes per-
sonally managed the grain-buying expeditions for his town and later 
obtained authorization to impose a tax on all persons, including the 
“privileged” and “exempt,” in order to reimburse the municipality’s 
advances. The assembly of  notables at Amiens offered cash incentives 
to laboureurs who furnished the market. Négociants at Nantes revived the 
patriotic society, which had mobilized a fund of  240,000 livres for the 
purchase of  grain for the needy in 1768. Though they did not institu-
tionalize their activities in the manner of  their Breton counterparts, 
the merchants of  La Rochelle assisted the city government in simi-
lar fashion. Besides contributing a portion of  their judicial income 
for poor relief, the Rennes parlementaires announced a loan “in the 
name of  the court” for 90,000 livres to buy grain and empowered 
localities to purchase grain with public revenues. At Dijon, the magis-
trates appointed commissioners to buy grain for public distribution.9
Inevitably, buying agents working for different governmental 
and institutional units found themselves in competition for limited 
resources. Deploring this fratricidal rivalry, which led buyers to “outbid 
one another without limit,” Terray urged them to buy with care and 
preferably to buy abroad where their confrontations would have a less 
direct impact on domestic markets. The Controller-General blamed 
the cherté which afflicted the Lyonnais, Franche-Comté, and Burgundy 
toward the end of  1770 on the insouciance of  the agents who had 
purchasing commissions “in behalf  of  the different cities.” It is inter-
esting to note that Terray criticized these official purchases in exactly 
 9 Lasalle to Monthyon, 23 April 1770, C. 911 and SD of  St.-Flour to Monthyon, 23 June 
1770, C. 918, A.D. P-de-D.; Terray to Taboureau, 23 June 1770 and Choiseul to Taboureau, 
26 July 1770, C. 6690, A.D. Nord; C. 189 and C. 191, A.D. C-M.; Gazette d’agriculture, du 
commerce et des finances (7 July 1770), 507 and (24 July 1770), 547; Maynon d’Invau to Durat, 
26 Oct. 1768 and arrêt of  Brittany Parl., 3 May 1770, C. 775, A.D. L-A.; IN. of  Brittany to 
CG, ca. June 1774, C. 1653, A.D. I-et-V. Cf. the purchases of  Châlons-sur-Marne, HH.2 
and HH.3, A.D. Marne.
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the same terms that Turgot and the économistes criticized royal grain 
operations: “their commissioners, having no interest in the thing, buy 
[grain] for governmental corps which themselves have no interest in 
it.” Without “interest,” or some form of  investment in the affair, to 
restrain them and give them the right incentives, these buyers were 
unlikely to function with frugality and efficiency. Obviously the Con-
troller-General felt confident that he could have done better had he 
managed the purchasing operations. Unlike the liberals, he did not 
believe that public buying was inherently and universally flawed. “The 
abuse,” he maintained, was peculiar to “this sort of  [local] administra-
tions.”10 Terray asked the intendants to attempt to coordinate public 
purchasing within each generality in order to reduce the incidence of  
conflicts between cities or hospitals or other corps.
Sometimes the intendants themselves clashed. The most curious 
instance involved two of  the most vehemently liberal confreres, Mon-
thyon of  Auvergne and Turgot of  the Limousin. Monthyon com-
plained that he had information that Turgot was launching official 
buying expeditions in Auvergne. With considerable irritation, Turgot 
denounced this as “an absurd tale.”
I would have to be quite an imbecile to use government money so badly, in the way 
that your Auvergnats suppose. It is in Danzig, in Holland, in Nantes, in Marans, and 
in Bordeaux that our merchants buy and not in Auvergne.
To be sure, Turgot added, it is quite likely that traders from the Limousin 
in their “private” capacity have been buying in Auvergne just as it is prob-
able that certain Auvergnats have been hunting grain in the Limousin. 
This is perfectly proper, concluded Turgot: “Liberty and God for all.”11
During this difficult time Terray never turned his back on a request 
for aid. While he urged officials to “make do” on their own until he 
could organize a provisioning system, the Controller-General engaged 
the central government to help those authorities who could not make 
satisfactory arrangements, “my intention being to assure the subsis-
tence of  the people .…”12 He flooded the kingdom with copies of  the 
 10 Terray to IN. of  Champagne, 5 Nov. 1770, C. 416, A.D. Marne; Terray to First President, 
Parl. of  Besançon, 5 Dec. 1770, B. 2850, A.D. Doubs. On the Controller-General’s irritation 
with internecine grain warfare, see also his rebuke of  the Lyonnais. Terray to Amelot, 
22 Sept. 1770, C. 81, A.D. C d’O. Cf. the intendant of  Burgundy’s bitter complaint that 
Albert had sabotaged or at least impeded the provisioning of  his generality. Amelot to 
Mesnard de Cornichard, 13, 22, 26 Dec. 1770, AN, H 187.
 11 Turgot to Monthyon, 13 April 1770, C. 910, A.D. P-de-D.
 12 Terray to DuCluzel, 3 May 1770, C. 96, A.D. I-et-L.; Terray to Bertin, 4 Oct., 5 
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curé of  St. Roch’s recipe for an “economical rice soup” along with 
vast amounts of  imported rice. It is difficult to say just how effective 
this rice assistance was. At Montpellier and in parts of  the Dauphiné, 
for example, it was consumed without hesitation. In Auvergne, how-
ever, one subdelegate characterized it as a “foreign foodstuff  which 
was not to the taste of  our inhabitants” and another suggested that it 
would work only if  it were prepared and distributed in immediately 
edible form to the people. In the countryside the suspicion lingered 
that rice was “too light” and not nourishing enough to “put the peas-
ants in shape to work.”13 Terray also encouraged the substitution of  the 
potato for grain consumption. He circulated instructions on its proper 
use, urged that it be sold on the market right alongside grain and flour, 
and later prohibited its export. Of  limited diffusion, the potato seems 
to have won more favor in the northern than in the southern part of  
the kingdom.14 When royal grain supplies were available, the Control-
ler-General directed them to the places where the need was greatest. 
Thus king’s grain from Corbeil brought a measure of  relief  to remote 
Auvergne. Despite resistance within his own grain department, Terray 
pledged to find supplies for Burgundy and Champagne. In addition, 
he provided substantial sums of  money for the expansion of  public 
works projects which sprung up throughout the realm in the next few 
years. In the first half  of  1770, for instance, Monthyon received 75,000 
livres for the creation of  jobs in Auvergne. For a day’s labor men received 
12 sous, women 10 sous, and children 6 to 8 sous.15
Opportunities on foreign markets where the French usually procured 
grain in hard times were extremely limited. The grain crisis of  1770 had 
international dimensions. The harvests in Poland and lower Germany 
ranged from mediocre to catastrophic. Prices at Danzig, one of  the 
major entrepôts, were soaring. The spread of  plague in Poland seriously 
 Dec. 1770, AN, F12* 155, fols. 49, 136–37; C. 915, A.D. P-de-D.; élus to Amelot, 26 Nov. 
1770, C. 3363, A.D. C d’O.; Amelot to Mesnard de Cornichard, 17,22 Dec. 1770, AN, H 
187; Terray to Rouillé, 5 Nov. 1770, C. 416, A.D. Marne.
 13 Terray to Monthyon, 4 Jan. 1770, C. 906, A.D. P-de-D.; C. 47, A.D. Isère; Pages to 
Monthyon’s secretary, 13, 20 May 1770, C. 913, A.D. P-de-D.; Ruynet to Monthyon’s 
secretary, 5 June 1770, C. 917, A.D. P-de-D.
 14 Bacalan, “Observations,” (1768), AN, F12 650; Monluc to Monthyon, 17 March 1770, 
C. 908, A.D. P-de-D.; Taboureau to SD, 15 Nov. 1772, C. 6689 and SD at Quesnoy to 
Taboureau, ca. Oct. 1773, C. 6690, A.D. Nord.
 15 Elus to Amelot, 26 Nov. 1770, C. 3363, A.D. C d’O; Amelot to Mesnard de Cornichard, 
17, 22 Dec. 1770, AN, H 187; Terray to Rouillé d’Orfeuil, 5 Nov. 1770, C. 416, A.D. 
Marne; Terray to Monthyon, 28 Feb. 1770, C. 907 and 8 June 1770, C. 915, A.D. P-de-D.; 
Monthyon to Terray, 14 Aug. 1770, C. 924, A.D. P-de-D.
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impeded circulation. In September, a Rouen merchant reported that 
Holland, where Doumerc and Sorin initiated their first purchases in 
the summer, had prohibited the export of  grain. The King of  Prussia 
followed suit. The English market was still closed and Italy had not 
yet fully recovered from several years of  penury.16 When Sartine pre-
sented to the government a merchant named Pascaud, who claimed 
that he could procure more than 3,000 sacks of  flour on short notice 
in the La Rochelle-Bordeaux area for the provisioning of  Paris, the 
king’s council did not hesitate to give its approval. Pascaud’s deal-
ings, undertaken independently of  the Contrôle-Général, led to seri-
ous tensions between the Lieutenant General of  Police and the grain 
department and reinforced Terray’s desire to concentrate all the pur-
chases in a single régie.
Like Leray de Chaumont, whose path he crossed several times, 
Antoine Pascaud had an adventurous and controversial career in pub-
lic and private commerce in both the old and the new worlds. In the fif-
ties Pascaud lived in Canada where he acted as royal agent for the sup-
ply of  cod and wood for the French colonies. Uprooted by the Seven 
years’ War, he moved briefly to New England before settling temporar-
ily in the Caribbean whence he contracted to supply the royal planta-
tion with slaves and other goods. Accused of  accounting irregularities 
and fraud in the estimation of  the “quality” of  the slaves he furnished, 
Pascaud returned to France where he was arrested, presumably as a 
result of  these charges. After a sojourn of  seven months in the Bastille, 
which completed the “ruin” of  his business, he was exiled, in 1768, to 
familial lands in southwest France. Sartine apparently was instrumental 
in effecting Pascaud’s rehabilitation. It is quite possible that Pascaud’s 
provisioning offer was part of  an effort to win grace and to reestablish 
his credit in both the private and public sectors.17
Pascaud found conditions to be less propitious for grain and flour 
purchases than he had imagined when he arrived at La Rochelle in 
September 1770. He encountered a host of  prospective buyers and 
learned, with some consternation, that a number of  négociants who 
 16 Turgot to Terray, 25 Oct. 1770, in Oeuvres de Turgot, ed. by Schelle, III, 144–45; CG to 
Garriez, 9 Sept. 1770, AN, F12* 155, fols. 40–41. Nor, according to Terray, did the situation 
improve dramatically the following year: floods in Germany, “mediocre” harvests in 
Italy, excessively high prices in Holland, export embargo in Poland. Terray to IN. of  Rouen, 
18 Sept., 15 Oct. 1771, C. 106, A.D. S-M.
 17 AN, E 330 (colonies). One wonders whether Pascaud was related to the Pacaud (Pascaud 
according to the archives de la Chambre du Commerce of  La Rochelle) who sat as a député de 
commerce in the 1760’s. See the Almanach royal (1766), 171.
 THE KING’S GRAIN AND THE RETREAT FROM LIBERALIZATION 623
had conducted foreign operations for the king’s account had been 
waiting a long time to be paid. Instead of  committing himself  per-
sonally to make the promised flour purchases, Pascaud arranged to 
receive what we might call a finder’s fee and contracted with a lead-
ing local négotiant, Sieur Goguel, a secretary of  the king and president 
trésorier de France at the La Rochelle bureau, to supply the flour, not 
in the king’s name, but on his own account, with royal guarantees 
against loss and a commission.
To avoid causing alarm, which might be reflected in unfavorable 
price fluctuations, Goguel kept the purpose of  his mission secret. 
Since Terray had not yet begun to coordinate buying on the national 
scale, Goguel faced competition from other public buyers, from pri-
vate businessmen like himself  discreetly acting for intendants, munic-
ipalities, or public assistance institutions, and private speculators 
masquerading as legitimate victualers. Pascaud related that another 
prominent négociant, in a “malicious coup,” almost ruined Goguel’s 
chances by announcing his intention of  buying 10,000 sacks of  flour 
just when Goguel was about to place his orders. Goguel managed to 
purchase 3,354 sacks, more than half  of  which was shipped to Paris 
by water via Rouen in October and the rest in February 1771.
The odyssey of  this flour thrusts into relief  the perils and difficulties 
of  subsistence commerce in the pre-industrial age.18 Bad winds and 
weather delayed the ships for five to seven months. The quality of  the 
flour deteriorated radically during the long transit, obliging Sartine to 
dispose of  some of  it to starchmakers and the rest to bakers at a price 
consonant with its “very inferior” value. Goguel lost over 66,000 livres, 
for which he sought reimbursement along with payment of  his com-
mission. Ascribing the fatal delay in arrival to “diverse unfortunate 
events,” Sartine exonerated Goguel in generous terms, praising his 
spirit of  public service (“his only motive”) and vouching for his “good 
management.” Despite the Lieutenant General’s recommendation for 
a prompt settlement of  the account, Terray ordered an investigation, 
calling into question Goguel’s honesty as well as his commercial acumen. 
Eventually the account went for expert evaluation to Leray de Chau-
mont who knew as well as anyone the pitfalls of  the victualing business. 
Leray found a “prejudice” of  only 3 livres 19 sous 7 deniers against the 
 18 On the overwhelmingly complex problems of  provisioning logistics and the uncertainties 
of  transportation, see, for example, d’Agay to Terray, 10 May 1770, C. 1718, A.D. I-et-V. 
and Terray to First President, Bordeaux Parl., 5 Nov. 1773, C. 1442, A.D. Gir.
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crown and concluded that the money claimed by Goguel was “quite 
legitimately due him.”19
While Goguel took charge of  the domestic flour deal, Pascaud 
obtained approval, through Sartine’s patronage, to make purchases 
for the provisioning of  Paris in Naples and in the Papal States where 
he claimed grain was “abundant” in contrast to its penury in north-
ern Europe.20 He was to start buying immediately, in September and 
October 1770. Beginning in March of  the following year, 10,000 sep-
tiers were to reach Paris each month for five months, from the time 
when old grain began to be scarce through the critical soudure period. 
The arrangement seemed at this time to be attractive to the govern-
ment, for Doumerc and Sorin had not yet organized their buying net-
work and Pascaud agreed to make all the advances in an engagement 
similar to the one accepted by Goguel. To facilitate Pascaud’s mis-
sion, Sartine personally requested the intendant of  Provence to assist 
him (“I take a special interest in everything concerning him”), without 
revealing the nature of  Pascaud’s business. Also upon the Lieutenant 
General’s request, Choiseul instructed French diplomats in Italy and 
Sicily to second Pascaud’s dealings in every way possible.21
As often happened in foreign buying campaigns, Pascaud fell far 
behind schedule. At the end of  May 1771, Sartine and Saint-Floren-
tin (now the duc de La Vrillière), Secretary of  State for Paris affairs, 
asked the naval minister Boynes to dispatch four ships from the royal 
navy to Civitavécchia to accelerate the shipment of  Pascaud’s grain 
to the capital. Boynes cheerfully agreed to provide the transport but 
then countermanded his order after receiving a raging letter from 
Philippe Brochet de Saint-Prest, the intendant of  commerce named 
by Terray to replace Trudaine and Albert in the grain department.22
 19 AN, H 1669.
 20 St.-Prest to Boynes, 4, 18 June 1771 and “Réponse du Sr Pascaud,” ca. end of  June, 1771, 
AN, F11 265.
 Is it possible that Galiani, who sent Sartine a memoir on subsistence management and kept 
in touch from Naples through Madame d’Epinay, assisted the Paris Police chief  in arranging 
grain purchases in Italy? In September 1770, he wrote from Naples: “I am engaged here 
trying to persuade [the government? the merchant community?] to give help in grain to 
France this year, better, more extensive, and more efficient than that which she furnished us 
in 1764 .…” To D’Epinay, 1 Sept. 1770, in Lettres, ed. by Asse, I, 130. Cf. Galiani to same, 
22 Sept. 1770, ibid., I, 148.
 21 C. 2452, A.D. B-du-R.; France, 1366, fols. 246–50, Arch. AE. 
 22 Boynes to St.-Prest, 31 May, 3 June 1771, AN, F11 265.
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Saint-Prest attacked Pascaud for abusing the terms of  his contract, 
but the real reason for his opposition to the extraordinary naval assis-
tance seems to be the fact that Pascaud operated outside the system 
that the ministry had begun to erect around Doumerc and Sorin and 
that his interests clashed with those of  the régie’s correspondents. Saint-
Prest charged that Pascaud’s grain would not reach the capital in “use-
ful time” before the harvest. He claimed that Pascaud had purchased 
200,000 charges of  grain (the charge, 250 pounds, was slightly bigger 
than the Paris septier), 150,000 more than he was authorized to provide, 
and that the navy would have to equip a veritable fleet of  12 frigates at 
tremendous cost to transport them. Reports from the scene indicated 
that Pascaud had bought low quality grain; shipped in the hot summer 
months, it would rot in the hold and arrive at Paris “burning” and in 
urgent need of  repair. On this enormous provision, “without having 
been useful to the State,” Pascaud would enjoy an “exorbitant” profit of  
2,083,330 livres. By rescuing him with naval vessels, Saint-Prest contin-
ued, the government would become his accomplice and undermine its 
right to challenge his accounts and penalize him for his extreme tardi-
ness. “If  you persist in sending ships to Italy,” the intendant of  commerce 
warned the minister, “you will perpetuate and accredit the indiscreet 
rumors that this man spread there upon his arrival [when] he announced 
himself  as the necessary man who was sent abroad to save his country 
from inevitable famine.” His braggadocio caused the price to rise and 
discouraged other French merchants from seeking supplies in the same 
areas. These merchants, all of  whom came from Marseilles, would view 
the dispatch of  ships as “a mortification” and “an affliction” and would 
surely lose interest in gathering further provisions.23
This was the heart of  Saint-Prest’s case, and unless it is assumed 
that he was secretly protecting a number of  Doumerc-Sorin’s allies—
the Guys Company, for instance—it was wholly inconsistent with the 
government’s provisioning policy and the kingdom’s grain require-
ments. Saint-Prest took the side of  the “merchants of  Marseilles” who 
were not in the government’s service against a man commissioned by 
the government to buy grain for the capital. If  Paris urgently needed 
grain, and other parts of  France clamored for assistance, it made no 
sense to try to sabotage a provisioning mission in mid-course even 
if  the merchant in charge revealed himself  to be inept or dishon-
est. A minister with no ulterior motives would have first made every 
 23 St.-Prest to Boynes, 4, 18 June 1771, ibid.
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effort to facilitate the delivery of  the grain and then, as the govern-
ment had often done in the past, subjected the merchant to a decade 
of  inquisition and reproach. Allegedly demoralized by Pascaud’s 
dealings, Saint-Prest’s Marseillais had nevertheless been able to buy 
and ship home some 200,000 charges of  grain. Unless they could 
dispose of  their grain, he feared, their commerce would stagnate. 
The government could buy their grain for far less money than Pas-
caud’s venture would ultimately cost and distribute it more rapidly 
and effectively. What seems extraordinary in Saint-Prest’s letters is 
the suggestion that the Marseilles merchants could not find an outlet 
at a time when the central government was besieged with requests 
for supplies. Why it should not have been possible to use both the 
Marseilles grain and Pascaud’s provision he did not say. Nor did the 
intendant of  Provence, who also urged Terray to give preference to 
the merchants of  Marseilles who were “choking” on the abundance 
of  their grain holdings.24
Sartine, as Pascaud’s sponsor, understandably took umbrage at 
Saint-Prest’s attack. But he replied in remarkably sober terms, ignor-
ing the implicit censure of  his judgment and emphasizing what he 
felt to be the real issue. Although he has always been “exact” in his 
dealings with me and he received excellent references from French 
diplomats in Italy who watched him at work, said the Lieutenant 
General, Pascaud’s fate is not what concerns me. “The only thing 
that interests me,” he wrote, “is our provisioning.” Quite rightly, Sar-
tine believed that his assessment of  the Paris situation should be val-
ued more than that of  anyone else. As a result of  the acute dearth in 
Burgundy and other provinces, which forces us to share our supplies 
with them, the price at the Halles “increases every day.” There is 
absolutely no question that Pascaud’s grain “will be extremely useful 
to us. Even if  the last of  his provision did not reach us until Novem-
ber, it would still be of  great assistance because the new grain of  the 
harvest always reaches us very late and the old grain will surely be 
exhausted long before then. “In urgent terms, Sartine pressed Boynes 
to reverse himself  again and send the four ships “without delay.”25
 24 De La Tour to Terray, 30 Jan. 1771 and to Amelot, 10 April, C. 2452, A.D. B-du-R.
 25 Sartine to Boynes, 15 June 1771, AN, F11 265. A year later Sartine wrote that Pascaud “has 
conducted himself  with all the intelligence, zeal, and disinterest possible [and] that it is 
partly to him that we owe the current diminution in the price of  bread.” To Boynes, 9 May 
1772, AN, E 330 (colonies).
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Pascaud defended himself  in a detailed rebuttal which Sartine circu-
lated through the ministry. His provision would not arrive too late to be 
useful. Twenty-five thousand septiers from Naples, already at sea, would 
arrive in July and August, “epoch when the provisioning of  Paris is the 
most difficult.” Grain departing from Rome would be on the Paris mar-
ket by September, “time when the sowing prevents the laboureurs from 
threshing and frequenting the markets.” He had purchased, as com-
missioned, 50,000 charges, not 200,000 as Saint-Prest pretended. He 
would need 4 rather than 12 ships and he would help defray the freight 
costs by paying the government 50 livres the tonneau, approximately 
15 livres less than he would ordinarily have to pay for private transit. 
He appealed to the navy for transport only because of  “the penury of  
merchant shipping.” His profit, Pascaud insisted, would be “very mod-
est,” 64,000 livres, or less than 4 percent of  the anticipated revenue 
from sales, “barely enough” to cover his expenses. The accusations 
that he had behaved indiscreetly in his Italian purchases he character-
ized as premeditated calumnies. He hinted that he was the victim of  
a plot inspired by jealous rivals and orchestrated by Saint-Prest. To 
mask their own avarice and enhance their commercial position, they 
contrived to embarrass him and ruin his operation.26
The outcome of  the Pascaud affair remains obscure. Boynes told 
Saint-Florentin, who favored Pascaud, that he would not make a final 
decision until he had consulted the other ministers. Sartine and Saint-
Prest both appear to have courted D’Aiguillon, minister for foreign 
affairs, even as they had sought the protection of  D’Aiguillon’s prede-
cessor and rival, Choiseul. Pascaud’s grain eventually reached Paris, 
though it is not clear if  he used government or private shipping.27 His 
patrons were sufficiently powerful to assure him a continued, albeit 
subordinate, role in the king’s grain operations. In late 1771 and 
early 1772 Pascaud helped to provide supplies for Rouen, working in 
collaboration with the powerful Feray merchant family and with the 
intendant. Between 1772 and 1773 he returned to Italy several times 
to purchase grain “for the account of  the government,” perhaps now 
under the direction of  Sorin and Doumerc.28 According to Pascaud, 
these operations were not “grain speculations”: “I never practiced 
commerce in grain nor surely will I ever in the future.” Surely all 
 26 “Réponse du Sr Pascaud,” AN, F11 265.
 27 The Journal politique (Aug. 1771, second quinzaine), 61 reported “many boats” on the river 
between Rouen and Paris bearing king’s grain in August 1771.
 28 See Pascaud to IN. of  Rouen, 7 July 1771 and Sartine to IN., 19 Jan. 1772, C. 106, A.D. S-M.
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the great old-regime victualers—Samuel Bernard, Isaac Thellus-
son, the Pâris brothers—conceived of  their role in the same way. 
What Pascaud did was “to execute the orders of  the ministry” for 
the “relief  of  the people.” Invited by a Breton correspondent to par-
ticipate in an illegal export venture under the cover of  the king’s 
grain enterprise, Pascaud rejected the suggestion without flinch-
ing: such a scheme was “against my fashion of  thinking” as well 
as “far removed from the ministry’s line of  thinking.”29 In May 
1774, Pascaud’s “intimate friend” and business associate, Verdil-
hon, who had served as an intermediary between Sartine and Pas-
caud in 1771, suffered a massive 4,000,000 livres bankruptcy which 
allegedly brought 24 other major commercial houses down with it. 
The litigation provoked by the affair tied up a large quantity of  grain 
which Pascaud and Verdilhon had imported.30
The quarrel over Pascaud strained relations between Terray and 
Sartine. Despite the Lieutenant General’s endorsements, the Control-
ler-General refused to settle the accounts from Pascaud’s Paris opera-
tions on the grounds that Pascaud had not adequately explained the 
disposition of  “enormous sums.” Terray made his displeasure with 
Sartine public, intimating that the Lieutenant General was more 
deeply and suspiciously involved in the grain dealing than he cared to 
admit. Rumor implicated Terray himself  in numerous grain specula-
tions and he was not, remarked the abbé de Véri, “unhappy to spread 
the veil of  monopolist which covers him in the eyes of  the public to M. 
de Sartine, reputed to be an honest man.”31 Doubtless the Controller-
General’s offensive pleased Maupeou, who could never forgive Sar-
tine for his failure to cooperate in the parlementary purge. Curiously 
enough, the économiste abbé Baudeau, one of  Terray’s severest critics, 
helped to spread the charge that the Lieutenant General of  Police had 
a hand in “the grain monopoly.”32 In the spring of  1775, at the very 
 29 Pascaud to Desruisseaux, 1 July, 5 Aug. 1772 and 29 June, 8 Sept. 1773, II B 53, A.D. 
Morbihan. (I am deeply indebted to Professor T. Le Goff  of  york University for all the 
Morbihan references.)
 30 “Chronique,” 18 April 1774 and Guys (?) to Sorin (?), 27 May 1774, AN, F11 1191; Boynes 
to St.-Prest, 31 May 1771, AN, F11 265.
 31 Véri, Journal, ed. by J. de Witte, I, 151. Cf. J.-N. Moreau, Mes souvenirs, ed. by Hermelin, II, 
187–89 and Oeuvres de Turgot, ed. by Schelle, IV, 17.
 32 F. Métra, Correspondance secréte, II, 17 (1 July 1775); Moreau, Mes souvenirs, ed. by C. Hermelin, 
II, 17, 209–10; Galiani to d’Epinay, 27 July 1770, Lettres, ed. by E. Asse, 1,116–17. Baudeau 
was also reported to have accused Sartine of  helping to plan the anti-Turgot Flour War. 
Pidansat de Mairobert, Journal historique, VII, 332.
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moment that he ordered the arrest of  Doumerc and Sorin and the 
“purification” of  their accounts, the Controller-General Turgot 
instructed the treasurer of  the grain department to pay Pascaud 
300,000 livres, without, however, indicating which operations the pay-
ment was meant to cover.33
The American war opened for Pascaud, as it did for Leray de 
Chaumont and Daure, a whole vista of  fresh opportunities. Sartine’s 
appointment to the key post of  naval and colonial secretary assured 
Pascaud many lucrative commissions. Beginning in 1774–75, “he 
was charged with buying ships, arming them, stocking others, hav-
ing them disguised under neutral colors, and taking responsibility 
for the transmission of  supplies and food for the colonies.” Sartine 
assigned him a number of  extremely delicate missions involving the 
introduction of  funds into England “for secret expenses” and the 
supply of  French colonial ports with foreign monies and with gold 
and silver for commercial and military needs. Pascaud continued 
these massive banking operations, involving scores of  millions of  
dollars, into the 1780’s. One is not wholly surprised to discover that 
Leray was one of  his partners in this venture for several years. In 
addition to all this, Pascaud conducted a provisioning operation 
from the leading Atlantic and Mediterranean ports of  the kingdom 
to keep French colonies supplied with flour, beef, and other goods.34 
In the mid-eighties Pascaud allegedly helped Calonne to place a 
major government loan and collaborated with this minister in an 
international conspiracy aimed at toppling some of  Europe’s most 
powerful banking and mercantile houses. According to this same 
source, Pascaud died in 1786 in bankruptcy.35 That was not, how-
ever, the opinion of  the government auditors responsible for verify-
ing a decade’s tangled accounts. Though they reproached Pascaud 
for careless bookkeeping, they praised the general conduct of  his 
affairs, his zeal, and his discretion, and declared his estate credi-
tor of  2,951,642 livres. What sweet revenge for the calumnies of  
1770–71!36
 33 Compte, April–May 1775, AN, F11 1195. Elsewhere the sum in question is said to have 
been 240,000 livres. Oeuvres de Turgot, ed. by Schelle, IV, 196–97.
 34 AN, E 330 (colonies).
 35 J. Bouchary, Les Manieurs d’argent à Paris à la fin du 18e siècle (Paris, 1939–40), I, 156–57.
 36 AN, E 330 (colonies).
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III
By the beginning of  1771, Terray had concentrated the bulk of  
royal purchases in the hands of  Doumerc and Sorin. Although 
he formed a special council to advise the ministry on subsistence 
affairs and oversee the operations of  the régie, he did not convoke 
it often nor did he bother to keep its members well-informed.37 
Nor did the Controller-General reorganize the grain department 
to adapt it more efficiently to the task of  determining and verifying 
needs, controlling distribution, and reviewing accounts. Despite 
the magnitude of  the operations and his intention to continue pro-
curing supplies on an occasional basis after the crisis passed, Ter-
ray made no effort to give the grain administration a bureaucratic 
structure. Whereas in finances he labored to establish a rational 
division of  labor and accountability, in grain he left the lines of  
responsibility blurred. Theoretically, the grain bureau, headed by 
the 34 year old ex-parlementary counselor Saint-Prest, and com-
posed of  a handful of  clerks, had charge of  the day-to-day victual-
ing business as in the time of  Machault and Laverdy.38 But Terray 
often bypassed it, personally handling many of  the details of  the 
purchases and sales and dealing directly with Doumerc and Sorin. 
His relationship with them was remarkably informal. Frequently 
he gave them verbal instructions which were never confirmed in 
writing. He does not appear to have harassed them incessantly for 
explanations of  their actions. Unlike the Controller-General Orry, 
who managed the government’s grain dealings on the assumption 
that everyone would try to cheat him, or Trudaine de Montigny, 
who treated Malisset as a delinquent, Terray seems to have trusted 
Doumerc and Sorin.
Immediately after the crop was taken each year, the Controller-
General and his advisers analyzed the results, projected likely supply 
against demand, and designed the overall subsistence strategy for the 
 37 “Mémoire en défense de B. de St.-Prest,” ca. Oct. 1774, Oeuvres de Turgot, ed. by Schelle, IV, 
191; Pidansat de Mairobert, Journal historique, IV, 204–205 (22 June 1773).
 38 Trudaine de Montigny allegedly “asked the king to be discharged in the future from the grain 
department” in June. Terray to IN. of  Bordeaux, 11 June 1770, C. 1431, A.D. Gir. Terray 
dismissed him sometime before autumn and personally assumed control of  the department. 
St.-Prest did not become titular head until early 1772. Amelot to Mesnard de Cornichard, 
22 Dec. 1770, AN, H 187; Terray to INs. of  Champagne and Provence, 18 Feb. 1772, C. 
379, A.D. Marne and C. 2445, A.D. B-du-R.; IN. of  Languedoc to Toulouse SD, 26 Feb. 
1772, C. 2063, A.D. H-G.; Terray to IN. of  Bordeaux, 14 Oct. 1773, C. 1442, A.D. Gir.
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harvest year—concrete measures to be taken immediately and flex-
ible contingency plans to be implemented in case of  necessity. In 
August 1772, for example, given the generally good harvest in the 
north and east, it was expected that direct supply intervention would 
be necessary only in the south, the southwest, the Lyonnais, Brit-
tany, and as always, for safety’s sake, the Paris region. A year later, 
the grain department drew up an elaborate provisioning plan based 
upon an evaluation of  the previous year’s efforts, an assessment of  
international as well as domestic market factors, and an examination 
of  political and psychological as well as technological variables that 
affected grain distribution. The forecast resembled the predictions 
of  1772: Burgundy, part of  Normandy, and the Dauphiné joined the 
Paris area and the provinces of  the south and west as likely candi-
dates for subsistence support. The plans paid more attention to chart-
ing out a geography of  demand than to mapping out sources of  sup-
ply. The assumption seemed to be that if  a region genuinely needed 
grain somehow the grain would be procured. Nevertheless, the plan-
ners made an effort to appraise supply alternatives, to rank them in 
terms of  economic and political cost, and to match them with specific 
areas of  need. The instructional outlines addressed to the victualers 
were supple; they gave Doumerc and Sorin considerable autonomy 
in executing their mission. As a rule the directors of  the régie decided 
where to buy (though Terray told them where to sell), they chose their 
own agents, and they made their own financial arrangements.
The plans were noteworthy for their imagination and their ambi-
tion but overall resource planning—the construction of  hypotheses 
rather than of  granaries—was of  limited use in dealing with sub-
sistence uncertainties. Indeed, the very notion of  planning, as we 
understand it, was an anachronism in an age before bureaucracy and 
easy long distance communication. Victualing tended to degener-
ate into a highly empirical operation under the pressure of  changing 
circumstances and fresh information. This tendency was reinforced 
by a desire to avoid irrevocable commitments until the last possible 
moment in order to test their relevance. Nor did Terray’s staff, like 
some of  our modern planners, stubbornly cling to the plan well after 
it was clear that it could not work, as if  to show displeasure with real-
ity for not conforming to their scenario. They simply abandoned it in 
practice, though Terray found it politically useful to sustain the illu-
sion of  a plan in order to create the impression of  control where in 
fact there was confusion.
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The extreme paucity of  extant papers precludes a searching exami-
nation of  the operations of  the régie. Between 1771 and 1774, Doumerc 
and Sorin spent approximately 15,000,000 livres on grain purchases for 
the government. We do not know how much money the government 
received from the sales of  the king’s grain but it is certain that its losses 
were in the millions. The régie paid a 2 percent commission on the pur-
chase price to an original buying agent, say Francois Rottenburgh at 
Danzig, and a further 2 percent on the value of  the merchandise plus 
expenses incurred to a commercial house which received and processed 
the grain or flour in France, say Plantes at Rouen or Feray or Baudry 
and Boulongne at Le Havre. In addition, the régie covered the costs of  
shipping, insurance, conditioning, and storage of  the merchandise. Like 
the Malisset company Doumerc and Sorin were entitled to a 2 percent 
commission for their services, though it is not clear whether they earned 
it twice, once on the purchase and again on the sale.39
There is no satisfactory way to appraise the grave charges, which 
Turgot later made, that most of  the king’s grain was purchased in the 
interior rather than abroad, thus driving up prices, destroying local 
commerce, and aggravating the cherté.40 Pascaud claimed that the min-
istry wanted its victualers to do their shopping abroad and that he never 
made any purchases in the interior. But Pascaud did not speak for the 
régie.41 Fragments of  correspondence in the papers of  the Bertier de 
Sauvigny family (intendants of  the généralité of  Paris) give numerous 
examples of  domestic purchasing operations. In the fall of  1770 or in 
early 1771, Doumerc wrote to one Noireau, an innkeeper in a Bur-
gundy hamlet where the Bertier family owned considerable amounts 
of  land, that the régie had “a continual need of  grain for the upkeep of  
the King’s Magazines and I would like to be able to draw some from 
your area provided the prices allow it.” He offered to absorb all the 
grain that Noireau could procure and he promised to send replace-
ment grain from the régie’s stock if  the area should suddenly find itself  
short. The manner in which the arrangement actually worked out is 
not entirely clear. We know for certain that Doumerc sent government 
 39 According to their critics, Sorin and Doumerc not only claimed a double commission on 
sale as well as on purchase but, as a result of  phantom companies they created and named 
as intermediaries in their bookkeeping, they actually collected as much as 8% commmission 
on many transactions. See “Réponse au mémoire des Sieurs Sorin et Doumerc,” ca. 1774–
75, AN, K 908.
 40 Oeuwes, ed. by Schelle, IV, 188.
 41 Pascaud to Desruisseaux, 8 Sept. 1773, II B. 53, A.D. Morbihan.
 THE KING’S GRAIN AND THE RETREAT FROM LIBERALIZATION 633
grain for sale in the local markets upon the request of  Bertier on a num-
ber of  occasions between 1771 and 1773. It cannot be determined, 
however, how much grain Noireau bought for Doumerc and whether 
his instructions to buy remained in effect even after the régie began to 
send grain into his area. In a letter addressed to Bertier in June 1771 
Doumerc complained that local inhabitants were inhibiting the efforts 
of  his agents to buy grain in other areas of  Burgundy.
More than two years later, in a note meant for himself, or his secre-
tary, the substance of  which we know reached Doumerc, Bertier wrote:
Grain is diminishing in price a great deal in these areas [presumably near his Bur-
gundian estates]. It would appear useful to make purchases there. Speak to Doumerc 
about this.
Had a note such as this fallen into the hands of  a Leprévost de Beau-
mont or of  anyone else who had reason to distrust the government 
or its grain operations, it would have been taken as evidence of  a 
famine-pact plot or at least of  a highly suspect form of  speculation. 
On the surface, such an inference is not wholly implausible, though, 
to be sure, one would need to marshal a great deal more proof  before 
drawing up an indictment. On the other hand, it is possible to explain 
Bertier’s remark in terms that are not incriminating. It may have 
been “useful” to force the price up in order to reduce losses on the 
sale of  the king’s grain. Or it may have struck Bertier as a propitious 
moment to replenish the stock of  the royal magazines now that prices 
were falling. In whatever way one interprets Bertier’s note, however, it 
does lend some credence to Turgot’s critique of  the régie’s operation.42
On a partial accounting register of  the 1772 operations, a great 
many purchases appear to have been made within the kingdom. 
Grain and flour procured at Soissons, Châlons, Etampes, Bray, Pre-
sle, and Amiens surely were of  French origin.43 Malisset is listed for 
selling 80,000 livres worth of  flour to the government in 1772, prob-
ably only a small part of  what he supplied during the lifetime of  the 
régie. Dure, one of  Malisset’s former commissioners, also bought for 
 42 All the following references are from AN, 80 AP 19 (Bertier de Sauvigny papers): Doumerc 
to Noireau, Sept. 1770 or early 1771; Doumerc to Rives, 19 Jan. 1772; Doumerc to B. de 
Sauvigny, 5 Sept. 1772; Terray to B. de Sauvigny, 4 June 1771; Doumerc to B. de Sauvigny, 
3 June 1771; memo by B. de Sauvigny, 11 Sept. 1773.
 43 AN, F11* 5. According to this register, during the course of  1772 the régie expended 
4,092,359 livres in the purchase of  grain and flour. From the sale of  this merchandise, the 
régie realized 2,550,019 livres.
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the régie in the interior.44 But we cannot be certain that grain pur-
chased at St. Malo, Nantes, Bordeaux, and Marseilles did not come 
from abroad in private hands. The same recordbook indicates grain 
purchases at Danzig and several hundred thousand livres worth of  
flour imported from “Nouvelle-york,” “Balthimore,” and “Phila-
delphie.” The régie conducted extensive buying operations in Italy, 
North Africa, and the Levant assisted by the French diplomatic 
and consular corps. Doumerc and Sorin charted the availability of  
supplies on the international market in detailed “tableaux” for the 
“north,” the “ocean,” and the Mediterranean.45
The fact is that the government had to intervene much more mas-
sively on the supply side than it had anticipated during the year fol-
lowing the 1772 harvest. Though every effort was made to procure 
grain abroad, unfavorable political and economic conditions in the 
leading foreign markets compelled the government to order purchases 
throughout the interior in a desperate effort to transfer the “national” 
surplus from the north, northeast and east to the south, southwest, and 
west.46 The régie’s correspondents interfered with internal grain circula-
tion in countless ways. They scoured the kingdom for supplies, arous-
ing resentment all along their path. “We cannot deny all the difficulties 
that had to be overcome in order to make purchases in the interior of  
the kingdom,” conceded a report drafted by the grain department;
the people became alarmed [and] even the courts and administrators complained and 
failed to cooperate; the precautions taken by the government were seen merely as an 
exclusive privilege accorded to individuals; justice was not done to the views which 
inspired the officials in charge; monopoly! was cried out, [though] unjust and without 
foundation these cries produced fermentation which once born is very difficult to check.
 44 Archives Seine-Paris, D5B6 531; AN, F11* 5 (Feb. 1772). See, for other commercial relations 
in the Paris region, the faillite of  Louis Leroy, 26 May 1773, Archives Seine-Paris, D4B6 
47–2845.
 45 Guys (?) to Sorin and Doumerc (?), 23 May 1774, AN F11 1191; “Instructions,” 8 Sept. 
1773, ibid.; Sorin and Doumerc to Guys, Dec. 1773, ibid.
Two of  the merchant-brokers used by Sorin and Doumerc for foreign purchases, 
Montaudouin, liberal militant, polemist, and international trader of  Nantes, and Drouin 
of  Saumur, had supplied grain for the généralité of  Limoges at the request of  its intendant 
Turgot in 1770. See Turgot to CG, 9 March 1770 and Turgot to Bertier de Sauvigny, 
13 Jan. 1770, in Oeuvresde Turgot, ed. by Schelle, III, 137, 253. Cf. Dumas, Tours, 347–48.
 46 St.-Prest (?), “Mémoire,” Sept. 1773, C. 1441, A.D. Gir.; Anon., “Mémoire,” 20 April 
1773, AN, K 908. Despite adverse circumstances, the government managed to buy large 
quantities of  grain and flour in Sicily, the Baltic, and New England. St.-Prest to d’Aiguillon, 
21 Dec. 1772, France 1740, fols. 56–57, Arch. AE; Terray to IN. of  Rouen, 9 Jan. 1772, 
C. 106, A.D. S-M.
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This climate of  fear and uncertainty paralyzed private commerce. Mer-
chants protested that they were denied access to their ordinary sources of  
supply and that they were driven away from their usual outlets by unfair 
outside competition. The régie’s buying agents created in their wake a 
current of  “artificial dearth” that aggravated real distribution difficul-
ties. At the time it seemed clear that those purchases had to be made and 
they were justified by the crucial services they rendered in many places. 
They proved, however, to be costly in every sense, the grain department 
report concluded frankly, and, ultimately, “the kingdom suffered more 
than its position should have caused us to fear.”47 
The indiscretions and incompetence of  some of  the régie’s agents, 
as a number of  officials charged, probably were responsible for some 
of  the disorders that accompanied the grain purchases. But given 
the enormous scale and range of  the operations and the recent his-
tory of  subsistence problems, it is hard to imagine how the régie could 
have avoided causing ferment. In the end what mattered above all 
was Terray’s fierce determination to provide urgently needed supplies 
whatever the risks and difficulties involved. Without any precise notion 
how he would fulfill his pledge, the Controller-General guaranteed the 
Toulouse capitouls, the Bordeaux intendant, and other deficit-area offi-
cials in the course of  1772–73 that “you will not lack subsistence.” He 
assured the administrators of  surplus regions that they had nothing to 
fear from buying incursions into their territory. Indeed, he promised he 
would authorize such purchases only so long “as they did not trouble 
public order” or cause “price rises.” yet the Controller-General pressed 
intendants unremittingly to assist the régie’s commissioners regard-
less of  short-term consequences, vaguely promising  recompenses for 
compliance and menacing retribution for disobedience. Only when 
complaints threatened to have major repercussions—such as in Bur-
gundy in March 1773—did Terray have the régie recall its agents. 
When he could not count on the protection of  the intendant or some 
other highly placid provincial official, he ordered the secret dispatch 
of  buyers with instructions to effect their purchases rapidly without 
revealing their aims to anyone. Nor did the Controller- General shrink 
from lying in the name of  public good. He categorically disavowed, 
in a letter to one intendant, anyone who claimed to be “charged with 
 47 St.-Prest (?), “Mémoire,” Sept. 1773, C. 1461, A.D. Gir.; St.-Prest, “Mémoire en défense de 
B. de St.-Prest,” in Oeuvres de Turgot, ed. by Schelle, IV, 190–94; AN, F12 727; interrogation 
of  Doumerc, May 1775, Arsenal, mss. Bastille 12447; Doumerc to Rives, 18 June 1773, 
AN 80 AP 19 (B. de Sauvigny papers).
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 undertaking a grain operation for the king’s account.” Only when that 
same intendant surprised Terray with irrefutable proof  that a négotiant 
was  maintaining a royal flour stock did the Controller-General, with-
out apology and with obvious annoyance, acknowledge “that I had 
hoped to keep that secret.…”48
The experience of  1772–73 left its mark upon the grain department 
and the régie as well as on public opinion. In the planning scenario com-
posed in September 1773 for the following harvest year, the government 
explicitly renounced “official” grain purchasing in the interior (save for 
the constitution of  the Paris safety-valve stock) in order to “avoid fermen-
tation.” Though such a procedure was contrary to Terray’s desire for con-
trol, the plan envisaged “charging the intendants to find [their own] mer-
chants to draw the necessary grain from the interior” if  private commerce 
fell short of  the task. As if  to repent for having brutalized commerce in 
1772–73, the plan took as its leitmotif  the need to maintain, “with the 
greatest care and by all available means, free circulation in the interior.” 
To be sure, the government would intervene, as circumstances required, 
on the supply side, but only with the stocks of  foreign grain—projected 
at 700,000 septiers—stored in the principal ports.49 At about the time that 
the grain department approved the plan, Terray personally addressed 
himself  to the merchant community which remained hesitant to launch 
grain speculations “for fear of  being undermined in their operations by 
individuals claiming to be under orders of  the administration.…” The 
Controller-General promised that “no order from me will be given which 
concerns the acquisition of  grain in your province.” Reiterating his non-
intervention pledge, several months later Terray assured the intendant 
of  Languedoc of  his desire to see “commerce regain full confidence.”50 
When the secretary to the intendant of  Burgundy proposed that the cen-
tral government take complete charge of  the distribution of  royal grain in 
that province, Terray uncharacteristically refused. Given the state of  pub-
lic opinion, he preferred to see local brokers assume the task of  marketing 
the foreign grain which the king would deliver.51
 48 Terray to Toulouse capitouls, 26 April 1773, C. 2914, A.D. Hér.; Terray to Esmangart, 
31 March 1773, C. 1441, A.D. Gir.; Terray to Amelot, 6 Oct., 8 Dec. 1772 and 9 March 
1773, C. 81, A.D. Cd’O.; Terray to Esmangart, 25 Nov. 1773, C. 1442, A.D. Gir. On the 
persistence of  administrative suspicion of  the Controller-General’s buying plans, see IN. of  
Hainaut to Terray, 4 Aug. 1774, C. 6690, A.D. Nord.
 49 C. 1441, A.D. Gir.
 50 Terray to Chambers of  Commerce of  Marseilles and Montpellier, 1 Sept. 1773, C. 2915 
and Terray to IN., 3 Feb. 1774, C. 2916, A.D. Hér.
 51 Contrôle-Général to Robert, 18 June 1773, C. 81, A.D. C d’O.
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Terray honored the spirit of  his pledge if  not the letter. Régie agents 
did make domestic purchases, more or less clandestinely, in the course 
of  the year.52 The scale of  their operations, however, was far more 
modest than it had been in 1772–73. More favorable conditions on 
some of  the major European grain markets following the harvest of  
1773 encouraged the government to eschew domestic buying. Still, 
the government did not escape the sort of  reproaches it had elicited at 
the zenith of  its internal purchasing activities. Terray’s pious renuncia-
tions did little to dissipate the fund of  suspicion which he developed 
over the previous few years. For certain critics it made no difference 
whether the provenance of  the bulk of  the king’s grain was national 
or foreign: one form of  intervention was virtually as pernicious as the 
other. Nor was it always clear whether the grain which the govern-
ment moved from one part of  the kingdom to another was domestic 
or foreign. If  merchants could be relatively sure that they would not 
have to compete with government commissioners for the purchase of  
grain, nevertheless they still had to worry about encountering king’s 
grain when they were ready to market their stocks.
Fragments of  surviving correspondence suggest that Doumerc and 
Sorin planned their missions carefully and kept in regular contact 
with their key representatives. For the 1773 provisioning operation 
in the Midi each agent had precise instructions on the course to fol-
low. The directors insisted on the need for discretion, to avoid arous-
ing the suspicions of  the public and the outcries of  private dealers. 
Four different agents at Marseilles were to distribute the first ship-
ment of  20,000 charges. The prime agent, Bourguignon, was to “give 
the impression” that the grain was his personal “speculation” rather 
than the property of  the government. Through “simulated sales,” he 
would pass it on as circumstances required to the other Marseilles 
commissioners and to agents of  Aix and other areas in the interior.53 
To meet unanticipated needs, Doumerc and Sorin told the buyers 
at home and abroad to neglect no attractive source of  supply: “it 
is better to have 10,000 charges more than 5,000 less.”54 No other 
instruction could have better captured Terray’s victualing ambitions 
nor better demonstrated the fidelity with which the régie directors 
implemented the Controller-General’s conception.
 52 See, for example, procès-verbal drawn by Toulouse SD, 2 Oct. 1774, C. 2916 and Béziers SD 
to Languedoc IN., 31 Oct. 1774, C. 2917, A.D. Hér.
 53 “Instructions,” 8 Sept. 1773, AN, F11 1191.
 54 Sorin and Doumerc to Guys, 10 Aug. 1773, ibid.
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While they placed no formal ceiling on the price which the buyers 
could pay for prospective king’s grain, in the selling phase they insisted 
on economy and prudence. The aim of  the operation was to provide 
help, without, however, destroying independent dealers or convulsing 
the market. The gradual return of  abundance would gently depress 
prices. The king’s grain was not to be used in a blitzkrieg maneu-
ver to restore prices to pre-dearth levels overnight. Victualing may 
have been incompatible with grain liberation but Sorin and Doumerc 
were not oblivious to the political and economic implications of  gov-
ernmental intervention. “By marching alongside commerce,” wrote 
Doumerc and Sorin, “we have reason to hope that the prices of  the 
sales will answer for the prices of  the purchases: the contrary would 
announce that there is no need and it would be necessary to cease or 
suspend shipments to the places which promise losses.”
While the régie directors kept close watch on all the aspects of  the 
mammoth provisioning operation, not all the agents who comprised 
the network knew in fact that they were working for Sorin and Dou-
merc. In the hope of  simplifying their dealings and making them 
appear as inconspicuous and innocuous as possible, Sorin and Dou-
merc purposely kept a considerable number of  their agents at the 
base in the dark about the specific nature of  the business. This was 
a calculated risk founded on the premise that news of  government 
involvement usually had adverse commercial and political effects. 
Besides promoting discretion, the tactic of  secrecy enabled the régie to 
manipulate its unknowing agents with greater ease, to appeal strictly 
to their interest without encumbering the profit incentive with extra-
neous considerations which could lead them astray, and to make 
communications between the center and the field more efficient by 
rationalizing the lines of  authority.
On the other hand, this disingenuousness had disadvantages. Lack 
of  information about the purposes of  their task handicapped the 
agents in buying and selling at certain junctures, forcing them to pay 
more and accept less than they could have done. It is hard to believe 
that the instructions they received did not raise suspicions in the minds 
of  some of  the agents, thus causing them to act with less zeal than 
they might have otherwise. Finally, this practice clearly attenuated the 
amount of  direct control which Sorin and Doumerc could exercise, 
especially in the auditing of  accounts. The régie became dependent on 
a number of  middle-level brokers who were generally neither wealthy 
enough to answer for the failures or infidelities of  the agents at the base 
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nor cunning enough to prevent them. The régie’s use of  blind commis-
sions resulted in considerable embarrassment and anguish for many 
of  the agents when Turgot came to power and set about investigat-
ing and closing down the victualing organization. The régie’s papers 
revealed that Embry of  Agde, Liron of  Lunel, Gottis of  Béziers, and 
Mergue of  Montpellier, among others, were all part of  the network. 
yet each faced perjury charges when he vigorously—and truth-
fully!—denied ever having heard of  or dealt with Sorin and Doumerc 
of  Paris.55
The régie’s commissioners varied widely in background, wealth, range, 
and size of  business. At the bottom of  the hierarchy were myriad hum-
ble brokers—not blatiers by any means but not imposing entrepreneurs 
either. The “blind” agents fell into this category along with the local com-
missioners who supplied Paris from domestic sources. An intermediate 
rank was held by the chief  regional correspondents who managed the 
blind commissions at the same time that they bought and sold in their 
own right for the régie. The agent responsible for domestic operations in 
Languedoc, for example, was Perrouteau, a very substantial merchant 
from Montauban. While he conducted the régie’s distribution and stock-
age program, Perrouteau engaged in grain commerce on a grander scale 
than ever before. Expanding his dealings to include flour production and 
trade, he established a quasi-industrial milling operation geared for colo-
nial as well as high-grade domestic provisioning and magazines through-
out the province. Like Malisset, whom he resembled in a number of  
ways, Perrouteau did not bother to distinguish carefully between royal 
grain and flour and the stocks with which he dealt in his own name. The 
fact that his agents were not aware that they were more often than not 
operating for the régie facilitated and compounded the confusion. Ulti-
mately it invited charges of  fraud and malversation.56
The third general type of  commissioner employed by the régie was 
the international trader or banker. In its most prestigious embodiment, 
this type of  agent would resemble a Leray de Chaumont drawn by the 
lure of  adventure and profit or a Samuel Bernard, more or less ear-
nestly responding to a call to civil charity. It could hardly be said that 
agents of  this sort worked for the régie. In fact, Terray himself  seems 
 55 See, for example, Embry to St.-Priest, 30 Sept. 1774, C. 2916, A.D. Hér.; Liron to same, 
17 Nov. 1774, C. 2916, ibid.; Gottis to same, 2 Oct. 1774, C. 2917, ibid.; Mergue to same, 
8 Nov. 1774, C. 2916, ibid.
 56 Gorsse to Turgot, 3 Oct., 15 Dec. 1774, C. 2916, ibid.; Turgot to St.-Priest, 26 Nov. 1774, 
C. 2916, ibid.; Etat Perrouteau, 30 Sept. 1774, C. 2917, ibid.
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to have been responsible for recruiting the handful who participated in 
the victualing operations of  his ministry. Bethmann of  Bordeaux played 
such a role in the 1770’s. Member of  a German banking family at Frank-
furt and represented in the principal European trading cities, Bethmann 
used his ability to marshal huge amounts of  capital and his international 
connections to launch a diversified import-export business centered at 
Bordeaux. During the Seven years’ War Bethmann earned the grati-
tude of  the French government for his banking services, a debt which 
the government partially repaid by favoring the commercial ventures 
of  the Bethmann company, several of  which involved grain and flour 
exportation. Honored with consular titles from Russia and Austria, Beth-
mann had links with the philosophical community through Grimm, an 
old friend from Germany, and Madame d’Epinay, whose feckless son he 
briefly received as a clerk in his office. Though commerce was said to be 
his all-consuming obsession and profits and losses his overriding preoccu-
pation, there is no reason to doubt his contention that his house accepted 
the régie’s commission to import flour and grain “to respond to the views 
of  humanity which appear to me to be the soul of  this operation.” Like 
Bernard, Thellusson, and Necker, Bethmann knew that philanthropy 
was good business as well as good works in a society where so much 
depended on favor, privilege, and reputation. He himself  had learned 
the lesson in 1749 when he imported English grain in the midst of  a ter-
rible dearth upon the request of  the Bordeaux town fathers.57
Except for special situations, the king’s grain had never been envi-
sioned, with Samuel Bernard in 1725, with Orry and Isaac Thellusson in 
1740, or with Machault and Courteille in the fifties, as an eleemosynary 
undertaking. The government became victualer to fill the gap which pri-
vate production and distribution could not cover. Habitually, the king’s 
grain was marketed at or just below the current price. Offers signifi-
cantly below “the current” usually meant that the government’s grain 
was of  inferior quality. In the fifties and sixties, local officials complained 
that the king’s grain was not used more decisively to combat the cherté. 
The unwillingness of  the government to dispose of  the extraordinary 
supplies with greater abandon reinforced suspicions that the king’s grain 
 57 Bethmann to Terray, 25 May 1773, C. 1441, A.D. Gir.; Bethmann to Courteille, s.d. 
[1758], C. 1666, A.D. I-et-V.; G. Maugras and L. Perey, Une femme du monde au 18e siècle, 
270–71, 274; J. Tarrade, Le Commerce colonial, I, 307; Herbert Lüthy, La Banque protestante, 
II, 114–15, 355, 720; Alfred Leroux, La Colonie germanique de Bordeaux (Bordeaux, 1918), 
I, 63–64.
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was a speculative, money-making enterprise. For the distribution of  the 
king’s grain in parts of  Burgundy, the régie instructed the local agents 
to sell slightly below the current, the “unique object” of  the operation 
being “to remedy the dearth.” The current price in this instance was 
itself  quite high and the yield from the sale of  king’s grain probably 
covered its cost.58
“Try not to lose,” Doumerc and Sorin urged the agents. The régie 
directors were not blithely indifferent, as Turgot claimed, to the bur-
dens of  the public treasury. But, they added, “not making money 
must not drive you away: we make a case for the cost margins only 
to parry the inevitable losses but we can also do without profits.”59 If  
the actions of  the Toulon agent were not atypical, it appears that the 
policy of  parsimony was respected. “We are not selling,” he reported 
in April 1774, “because the prices are low with respect to what the 
grain costs and because we have no grain which is likely to spoil.”60 At 
Bordeaux, despite their experience in international trade, the régie’s 
agents Bethmann and Desclaux made no decisions concerning mar-
keting without contacting the Contrôle-Générale.61
In the name of  economy, the directors of  the régie demanded that 
their agents submit detailed financial accounts promptly and at regu-
lar intervals. “We live in a time which demands the greatest exactitude 
[even] from the most orderly persons,” they wrote their Marseilles 
correspondent.62 When he recruited the innkeeper Noireau to serve 
as a buying and selling agent, Doumerc imposed only one condition: 
“you must keep accounts in the greatest detail and the greatest order 
so that I can always be in a position to judge the purposes of  your 
expenses and the amount of  grain you measure out.” From his rela-
tions with the intendant Bertier we know that Doumerc was insistent 
that the régie be paid rapidly for grain that it provided. “I am in the most 
pressing need [of  cash],” he wrote one agent, “my bookkeeping lan-
guishes, my money-box awaits your assistance.”63 Once they justified 
 58 The following letters are all from AN, 80 AP 19 (Bertier de Sauvigny papers): B. de Sauvigny 
to Rives, 10, 17 July 1770; B. de Sauvigny to Baudot, 17 Sept. 1770; régie to Baudot, 20 July 
1770. Cf. Sorin and Doumerc’s instruction to an agent at Vannes to sell “always following the 
current price.” To Desruisseaux, 29 Feb., 20 March, 26 April 1773, II B. 53, A.D. Morbihan.
 59 Sorin and Doumerc to Guys, 10 Aug. 1773, AN, F11 1191. Cf. Sorin and Doumerc to Guys, 
18 Sept. 1773, ibid.
 60 “Chroniques,” 25 April 1774, ibid.
 61 See Terray to Esmangart, 14 Oct. 1773, C. 1442, A.D. Gir.
 62 Sorin and Doumerc to Guys, 23 Oct. 1773, AN, F11 1191.
 63 The following references are all from AN, 80 AP 19 (Bertier de Sauvigny 
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their accounts and honored their obligations, the regie’s correspondents 
received their 2 percent commission plus costs. A Breton agent who 
persistenly demanded 3 percent found his billing reduced every time. 
Nor did he succeed in persuading the directors to join with him in, and 
thereby in a sense legitimize, a project for exporting grain—a project 
devised at the very time the government was engaged in an all-out war 
against dearth. Though they were later accused of  certain illicit activities, 
in this instance Sorin and Doumerc were unequivocal: “We reiterate to 
you that we will have nothing at all to do with an operation in the style of  
the one you spoke to us about.”64
IV
The régie’s most important correspondent in the south, Guys and 
Company, was one of  the most prominent commercial establish-
ments in Marseilles.65 Scion of  a family-based trading empire with 
interests in shipping, banking, textile manufacturing, and commerce 
of  all sorts stretching from Cairo and Constantinople to Amster-
dam and Copenhagen, Pierre Augustin Guys was a 51-year-old 
former deputy of  the Chamber of  Commerce and first échevin of  
Marseilles, his native city. In the sixties, he joined forces with Pierre 
Rémuzat, whose family had settled in Marseilles in the seventeenth 
century, and enjoyed a meteoric rise to wealth, status, and local 
political power, in part as a result of  successes in grain importing.
In November 1764, on Laverdy’s orders, Sartine dispatched two 
inspectors of  the Paris police to Marseilles to arrest Guys and his 
brother-in-law and sometimes partner, Etienne-Baltazar Gautier, a 
négociant with forty years experience, on suspicion of  illicit and abusive 
export of  grain. Under any circumstances it would have been unusual 
to embastiller two highly esteemed business and civic leaders. It was espe-
cially striking at the end of  1764, for Laverdy had just promulgated 
 papers): Doumerc to Noireau, n.d. (1771); état, 20 Aug. 1771; Doumerc to Rives, 1 Aug. 
1771; Doumerc to B. de Sauvigny, 5 Sept. 1772; Doumerc to B. de Sauvigny, 3 June 1771.
 64 Sorin and Doumerc to Desruisseaux, ? July, 25 Aug., 4 Sept. 1773, II B. 53, A.D. Morbihan.
 65 The following paragraph is based on the interrogation, Arsenal, mss. Bastille 12223 and 
Gaston Rambert, Histoire du commerce de Marseille (Paris, 1954–1966), IV, 363–64, 380–82, 
509–10. Cf. the erratic piece by H. Pellissier-Guys, “Le Séjour d’un négociant marseillais à 
la Bastille,” Provincia, III (1923), 18–34.
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the law authorizing exporting, a law motivated in part by his desire 
to induce men of  substance like Guys and his associates to undertake 
grain speculations.
The interrogation of  the prisoners revealed that the ministry sus-
pected them of  hoarding, lying, maneuvering to keep grain from the 
public, and attempting to suborn and bribe public officials. Gautier, 
later joined by Guys, was one of  approximately thirty Marseilles négo-
ciants who sought to profit from the grave scarcity and astronomically 
high prices, which afflicted Italy in the early sixties, by provisioning 
its major cities with grain from the interior of  France. He gathered 
thousands of  charges of  grain from as far away as Brittany and Nor-
mandy, not, he insisted, from the areas which normally supplied the 
markets of  Provence.
To export grain from Marseilles, which had a special commercial 
regime vis-à-vis the rest of  France and foreign nations, the trader had 
to solicit the approval of  the intendant and the city’s granary-victual-
ing organization, the bureau of  abundance, half  of  whose members 
were “notable négociants.” “In order not to obstruct commerce in a 
free city,” the bureau, according to Guys and Gautier, “shut its eyes to 
the outflow of  grain.” Guys claimed that the intendant De La Tour 
never denied permission for export to businessmen who had in the 
past rendered the province useful services. Gautier, however, reported 
that the intendant initially refused to sanction the exports.
Finally, after intense pressure from the negociants, De La Tour 
agreed to grant a limited number of  authorizations. He declined sev-
eral exotic gifts, including 100 bottles of  fine Malaga wine, which 
Guys and Gautier offered for his consideration and he would not 
allow his wife to accept a share in one of  the ships destined for Italy 
(his subdelegate, however, took a thousand-charge portion in the 
speculation). The other négociants turned to Gautier and Guys for help 
in securing one of  the few export licenses to be issued. Though they 
insisted that permits were not sold, Gautier and Guys admitted that 
they were “borrowed and exchanged” among the négociants. Gautier 
readily confessed that he followed the common practice of  loading 
one-fifth to one-quarter more grain than the permits allowed by brib-
ing the official measurers. The final accounting, Gautier maintained, 
will show that he and Guys will have lost money despite their “infinite 
care and attention,” for they appear to have purchased more grain 
than they could profitably sell. The government apparently decided 
that it did not have sufficient material to prosecute the two négociants. 
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Sartine released them from jail after less than two weeks but required 
them to remain in Paris while the investigation continued through the 
beginning of  the new year.
Seven and a half  years later, the Terray régie entrusted Guys and 
Company with the delicate task of  arranging the importation and the 
distribution of  large quantities of  grain in the Midi.66 On the whole the 
Guys connection seems to have worked admirably. Guys arranged for 
the purchase of  grain throughout the Mediterranean—surely no one 
had better contacts in the area—found capable men to take charge of  
the reception and marketing of  the grain, and advised the directors of  
the régie on the peculiarities of  the subsistence situation in the Midi. In 
1772 Guys personally visited Italy to assure the buying operations would 
proceed “without noise.” Fearing that the Italian authorities would soon 
ban exports as a result of  burgeoning subsistence problems of  their own, 
Guys purchased as much grain as he could locate. In a letter to the grain 
department, he promised to arrange the sale of  the grain in France “so 
as not to frighten or deter the individual speculator whose collabora-
tion is so necessary to keep up the distribution of  supplies.” Hailing 
the undertaking as a model of  its kind, Saint-Prest praised the “intel-
ligence” and “honesty” of  the Marseilles businessman.67 One of  the 
Guys-directed operations, however, went awry and provoked a scandal 
which seriously tarnished his company’s reputation and gave credence 
to doubts about the entegrity of  Doumerc and Sorin.
Guys commissioned a Sieur Feraud, an old Levant hand, to buy 
at least 10,000 charges of  grain in Greece and Turkey in the fall of  
1773. To facilitate his dealings, the government was to give him a vice-
consul’s post. Guys claimed that in order to guarantee Feraud’s dis-
cretion, he did not inform him that the purchases were to be made for 
the government. On the basis of  the testimony of  the French ambas-
sador at Constantinople, the government later contended that Feraud 
knew precisely the true nature of  his mission. Guys advanced funds to 
Feraud for the grain purchases, partly, it appears, in the form of  goods 
that he was to market at the ports where he debarked. For political and 
 66 Sorin and Doumerc to Guys, 10 Aug. 1773 and “Instructions,” 8 Sept. 1773, AN, F11 
1181; “Observations sur la correspondance du Sr Guys & Cie … compte actuellement en 
discussion” (dossier containing material compiled between 1774 and 1781) and “Mémoire 
pour les Srs Guys et Cie,” ibid. Rambert’s treatment of  the régie is highly unreliable and 
misinformed. Commerce de Marseille, IV, 364–65.
 67 Guys to d’Aiguillon (?), 14 Dec. 1772 and St.-Prest to d’Aiguillon, 21 Dec. 1772, France 
1740, fols. 54–56, Arch. AE.
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commercial reasons, Feraud found the conditions for grain purchase 
highly unfavorable. While he waited for a change in fortune, Guys 
suggested that he invest the grain money in other goods for shipment 
to France rather than “keep the funds inertly in the cashbox.” Feraud 
appears to have followed Guys’ advice. Ultimately, he sent only one 
shipload of  grain to Marseilles.
Guys claimed to have suffered huge losses in what the régie recognized 
from the beginning to be a high-risk undertaking. He insisted that the 
government should assume responsibility for the deficit. Albert, who 
returned to power with Turgot in mid-1774, refused to compensate 
Guys. Indeed, he demanded that the Marseillais reimburse the govern-
ment for sums improperly spent or unaccounted for.68 There is little 
doubt that Guys used the Feraud expedition for his own commercial 
purposes. Even if  he did not use royal funds to finance his non-grain 
speculations, he entangled his public charge and his private business, a 
practice that was extremely common among financiers and armateurs, 
but which undercut his moral position when he sought financial relief.
It is interesting to note that, at several junctures during their collab-
oration in 1773–74, Guys passed speculative tips on to Doumerc and 
Sorin and invited them to join ventures which he promised would be 
lucrative. In August 1774, they rejected a Guys proposition to invest 
in the purchase of  Dutch and Austrian wheat for private import and 
distribution. (Obviously Guys the trader was not afraid to compete 
against Guys the government agent/victualer!) “At any other time we 
would come in with pleasure,” they wrote apologetically, “but until 
we have finished the accounts we have with the Government, we 
do not permit ourselves any personal speculation on this article.”69 
Guys continued to seek vindication and compensation for the Levant 
operation through the next decade. The head of  the grain depart-
ment in the early eighties, Montaran, who also inherited the Malisset 
accounts, determined that Guys owed the king 64,082 livres. Shortly 
afterward, Guys and Company filed bankruptcy papers.70
 68 “Chronique,” 22 April 1774, AN, F11 1191. Albert accused Sorin and Doumerc of  
conspiring with Guys to divert government funds from grain buying to speculation in 
sugar, foreign currency and other commodities. Memoir to the king, 16 Oct. 1774, Oeuvres 
de Turgot, ed. by Schelle, IV, 187.
 69 Sorin and Doumerc to Guys, 23 Aug. 1774, AN, F11 1191.
 70 “Subsistances,” (1788), AN, F11 1173. In the 1780’s the government tried to recover other funds 
which remained due as a result of  the régie’s, sales (for example, the Ursulines of  Vézelay and 
the municipality of  Châlons-sur-Marne both owed sums for grains purchased) and advances 
(several Marseilles merchants). “Etats de Recette de Rouillé de l’Estang,” AN, F” 1195.
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V
Terray’s régie differed in many ways from the provisioning apparatus 
that Laverdy fashioned. The Malisset operation was established in 
a time of  relative serenity as a reserve fund to meet the emergency 
requirements of  the capital. Malisset created the Corbeil establish-
ment with the idea of  making it the center of  a vast industrial-com-
mercial complex serving public and private needs. The government 
planned to utilize it during a transitional period for specific, limited 
ends. From the beginning, the ministry viewed the enterprise with 
ambivalence. On the one hand, it could be justified as a political 
device contrived to buffer the capital against the dislocating effects 
of  liberalization, compounded by the uncertainties caused by har-
vest failure. On the other hand, it was a source of  embarrassment, 
a reflection of  the minister’s own doubts about the viability of  his 
program, and a lode-stone for popular fears and scurrilous innu-
endo. Malisset never enjoyed the full confidence of  the government, 
even after Leray and the other guarantors joined the organization. 
A hybrid creature, part company, part régie, its structural ambiguities 
inspired distrust and resentment on all sides. The enormous strain of  
trying to sustain liberalization, combat the hostile parlements, and 
deal with disaffected police officials and an anxious public prevented 
the government from making the Malisset enterprise an effective arm 
in the service of  its own policy.
In contrast, the Doumerc-Sorin operation had a less anguished 
beginning, though it was launched at the peak of  the crisis. Terray 
did not rush impulsively into the king’s grain business, but neither did 
he ulcerate about the legitimacy or wisdom of  his decision to move 
ahead. It seemed to him perfectly proper and necessary for the state 
to intervene; for Terray, there was no disjuncture between his gen-
eral grain policy and his resort to the king’s grain. He launched the 
operation not in anticipation of  future needs but to cope with pressing 
demands. For the provisioning of  Paris he inherited a superb installa-
tion at Corbeil, along with its branch magazines, as well as a network 
of  agents who had previously worked for Malisset. Doumerc himself  
had an intimate knowledge of  the merits and defects of  the Malisset 
system and of  the characteristics of  the Parisian supply lines. Infinitely 
greater in scope than the Malisset affair, the Doumerc-Sorin design 
stretched across the entire breadth of  the kingdom. Paris remained 
privileged, but no areas were off  limits, for purchases or for sales.
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The organization was unequivocally a régie, a wholly public affair, 
or rather as exclusively public as such undertakings outside the nor-
mal bounds of  administration could be in the Old Regime. The 
directors advanced no money and were permitted to derive no profit 
except through commission. Unlike Malisset, they had no personal 
investment to protect. Nor did the management of  the régie suffer 
the internal jealousies and dissension that characterized the Malisset 
company. Throughout their operations, Doumerc and Sorin enjoyed 
the full confidence of  the Controller-General.
There were, to be sure, certain similarities between the expe-
riences of  the Malisset company and Terray’s régie. Buyers com-
plained about the quality of  the régie grain just as they had ques-
tioned the “goodness” of  Malisset’s merchandise, though the 
incidence and intensity of  protests appear to have diminished. 
A shipment of  300 sacks sent to Beauvais emitted an offensive odor. 
On the basis of  an “essay,” or test, the police of  the comté-pairie con-
cluded that the bread produced by the suspicious grain, “without being 
as good as local wheat, would not be harmful to the people and would 
bring abundance to the area.” A rival police authority, the officers 
of  the royal bailliage of  Beauvais, conducted their own essay which 
revealed the grain to have been improperly stored and the bread to 
have a “bad taste” and, far more ominously, properties likely to gener-
ate “epidemic illnesses.”71 The Procurator General polled the parish 
priests of  the capital to investigate charges that bad grain was provok-
ing such diseases in the capital. The curé of  St. Sauveur reported an 
extraordinary number of  pleurisy attacks and putrid fevers, but he 
had no grounds for ascribing them to “bread of  bad quality.” While 
the curé of  St. Roch found bread to be “less good than usual,” he saw 
no evidence of  grain-induced illness in his circumscription.72
Throughout the seventies, rumors persisted that Corbeil specialized 
in supplying rotten or defective grain under the cover of  the king’s 
name.73 “I will not conceal from you,” the intendant of  Champagne 
 71 BN, Coll. Joly, 1158, fols. 81–96. In Aug. 1770, the doctors at the Hôtel-Dieu found the 
bread disagreeable but not deleterious to health. Deliberations of  the Bureau of  the Hôtel-
Dieu, 8 Aug. 1770, AAP, # 139. For a later episode concerning grain quality not directly 
related to the king’s supply, see Hardy’s Journal, 16 June 1774, BN, mss. fr. 6681, fol. 363.
 72 PG to curé of  St. Sauveur, 24 May 1771 and PG to curé of  St. Roch, 22 May 1771, BN, 
Coll. Joly 1111, fols. 131–32. Cf. Daure, “Mémoire,” 8 Aug. 1773, AN, F11 265.
 73 Lenoir, “Essai,” published by R. Darnton, “Le Lieutenant de police J.-P. Lenoir …,” Revue 
d’histoire moderne et contemporaine, XVI (Oct.–Dec. 1969), 618–19.
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wrote Sorin and Doumerc, “the fact that the people have worries 
about the quality of  your flour.” Although a local apothecary pro-
nounced it harmless, consumers suspected that the bread’s “crack-
ling” texture resulted from adulteration of  the flour with sand or 
chalk. Since we use only “very pure” wheat, replied Sorin and Dou-
merc, the defect must be the result of  an accident in conservation or 
fabrication for which we are not responsible. “Furthermore, Mon-
sieur,” they declared, “our Storehouses are open to the Public and to 
the Administration, and, we daresay, they are in very pure hands.”74
Nor did Terray’s grain operations escape the suspicions and accu-
sations of  speculations and monopoly which had discredited the pro-
visioning enterprise of  Laverdy. Even if  he had not inherited the trea-
sury of  stigma and mistrust traditionally associated with the king’s 
grain and replenished in the time of  Malisset and Leprévost, Terray, 
on his own, would have succeeded in sullying the reputation of  the 
régie. Politically, he did not reap great profit from the restoration of  the 
regime of  police paternalism. Although he unequivocally repudiated 
liberalization, he did not make an effort to show the nation how com-
pletely he had broken with the policies which many Frenchmen felt 
were responsible for the disasters of  recent years. Terray’s grain pol-
icy was in large measure a response to public pressures and demands 
but he did not for a moment consider acknowledging publicly the 
influence that the people had exercised on the decisions his minis-
try had made. Until the very end, Old Regime administrators main-
tained the fiction—necessary, to be sure, to preserve the face and the 
self-confidence of  a system both monarchical and absolutist—that 
government was the exclusive business of  the king and the council, 
not the concern of  the citizenry. Necker, the last Controller-General, 
was the first one bold (or reckless) enough to dabble in popular poli-
tics and to view the public, in the manner of  the parlements, as his 
constituency. Instead of  undertaking a campaign to clear the air on 
an issue which had preoccupied everyone for almost a decade, and 
demanding credit for renouncing a highly unpopular policy, Terray 
announced the change in a brief  and arid ukase which had no further 
development. He allowed doubts to persist concerning his intentions, 
doubts which crystallized around his use of  the king’s grain.
Moreover, other factors seriously militated against an entente 
between the ministry and the public. Who (besides Voltaire and one 
 74 IN. to Sorin and Doumerc, 31 Dec. 1770 and Sorin and Doumerc to IN., 12 Jan. 1771, 
C. 416, A.D. Marne.
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branch of  the divided party of  reform) could trust the motives of  
the government which struck the deadly blow against the sovereign 
courts? Who could have faith in the integrity of  a Controller-Gen-
eral, obsessed with fiscality, whose policies appeared to violate sacred 
agreements and to promise heavier tax burdens? (Not even Voltaire 
himself, who claimed that the abbé’s measures cost him some two 
millions.)75 Given Terray’s personal reputation for debauchery and 
avidity and his well-publicized, brutal steps to bring order to the 
finances—contemporaries called him “Cartouche,” the “hangman,” 
“bloodsucker,” “cannibal,” “bankrupter,” and “improbity personi-
fied”—it required little imagination to believe that he carried over 
these same qualities and appetites to the management of  the king’s 
grain.76 “Under Monsieur the abbé Terray,” wrote Choiseul, “one 
had the idea of  working the matter of  grain en finances,” a cryptic 
description of  an administration which seemed to lend itself  to double 
entendre.77
So long as the king’s grain operations remained shrouded in secrecy, 
the shift from a company to a régie form of  administration had no 
effect upon public opinion. With few exceptions, contemporaries per-
ceived no discontinuity between the operations of  Malisset and those 
of  Doumerc-Sorin. At Beauvais the bailliage police believed that the 
“company” which provided grain in 1771 was the “same company” 
which had furnished supplies in 1768. The Paris bakers buying at the 
Halles in 1773 referred to the “flour of  the company” in the same 
terms as they had five years before. The abbé de Véri, who had little 
sympathy for Terray’s policies, was one of  the few commentators to 
take the trouble to insist on the differences between the government’s 
relationship with Malisset and its association with Doumerc-Sorin. 
The régie was not conceived as a private enterprise, he emphasized; 
there was “no company” and “no contract.”78
 75 Voltaire to Mme. d’Epinay, 6 Nov. 1770, in Correspondence, ed. by Besterman, vol. 78, 
(# 15727).
 76 See, for example, Charles Collé to M de V***, 7 Aug. 1780, in Correspondance inédite de 
C. Collé, ed. by H. Bonhomme (Paris, 1864), 205; Bachaumont, Mémoires secrets, IX, 109 
(13 May 1776) and XI, 79 (31 Jan. 1778); Monthyon, Particularités et observations sur les ministres 
des f inances les plus célèbres depuis 1660 jusqu‘en 1791 (Paris, 1812), 150–53, 169. Cf. Afanassiev, 
Commerce des céréales, 254; Clément, Portraits historiques, 415; Augustin Challamel, Mémoires 
du peuple français depuis son origine jusqu’à nos jours (Paris, 1873), VIII, 355–57; E. Levasseur, 
Histoire des classes ouvrières, II, 549.
 77 Choiseul, Mémoires, ed. by Soulavie, I, 42.
 78 BN, Coll. Joly 1158, fols. 81–96; Letter of  mediator (arbitre) to juges-consuls, 
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The économistes, no longer inhibited by their alliance with the min-
istry, made no effort to dispel the rumors and uncertainties surround-
ing the régie’s operations. Dupont depicted a vast, ubiquitous company 
with emissaries in every province and foreign market, stifling all com-
petition from the private sector.79 That is to say, he pictured an opera-
tion of  a scope and magnitude which his colleagues-in-arms Roubaud 
and Baudeau had derided as inherently absurd and inconceivable 
when they undertook to defend Laverdy against similar charges in the 
sixties. In his letters to Terray in 1770, Turgot had warned that it was 
impossible to manage an honest, efficient victualing enterprise com-
patible with the functioning of  private trade and free of  the odor of  
monopoly. When he became Controller-General in 1774, as we shall 
shortly see, he did everything in his power to prove that his predictions 
had been well founded. After Terray’s fall, Condorcet openly accused 
the government’s agents of  having provoked the very dearths which 
they were supposed to combat.80 Condillac discerned no material dif-
ference between the old style monopoly “born of  the rules made for 
the grain police” and the “agiotage” of  the government’s commission-
ers. Both operations were fiscal and venal in nature and both exploited 
the public on the pretext of  serving its needs.81
Coquereau, one of  Terray’s most vitriolic critics, imagined a sce-
nario less elaborately staged but not vastly different from Leprévost’s.82 
The Controller-General “fomented” an “artificial famine” which 
lasted the whole time he was in office. While Terray manipulated 
prices by alternately permitting and prohibiting exports, Coquereau 
alleged, his agents purchased grain at low prices and resold it for 
“enormous profits.” “By the most criminal abuse of  the confidence of  
his Master,” Terray “made the King a monopolist and associated him 
with his infamous traffic.” Fascinated by the “little details,” Louis XV 
 29 March 1773, Archives Seine-Paris, D6B6 carton 6; Véri, Journal, ed. by J. de Witte, I, 
150.
 79 Dupont to Prince Carl Ludwig, 1773, in Knies, ed., Dupont Correspondance, II, 47. Later 
Dupont charged that it was “the former agents of  the company” who “spread the rumor” in 
1774–75 that “the system of  M. Turgot would make Paris die of  hunger,” thereby preparing 
the way for the Flour War uprising. Dupont to Carl Ludwig, 15 Jan. 1783, ibid., II, 356.
 80 Condorcet, Lettre d’un laboureur de Picardie, in Collection des principaux économistes, ed. by Daure 
and Molinari, XIV, 485.
 81 Condillac, Le Commerce et le gouvernement. in ibid., XIV, 417–19.
 82 Coquereau, Mémoire concernant … l’Abbé Terrai, 158–59. For a similar representation, 
see “Tableau du gouvernement intérieur de la France du 1 octobre 1771,” France 1366, 
fol. 233 and passim, Arch. AE.
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sat in his office, according to Cocquereau, charting the price fluctua-
tions in the markets throughout the kingdom. Characterizing Terray 
as the “master monopolist” of  France, another journalist charged that 
the “company” functioned with the blessing and “concert” of  the king 
himself.83 In 1789, the Moniteur took note of  the two techniques that 
Terray had employed to balance his budget: “bankruptcy” and “the 
grain monopoly.”84
Not all the charges against Terray were made after the fact, though 
many of  them had the transparent character of  political polemic and 
rationalization. “It is said,” Hardy related in his journal in May 1773,
that the sieur abbé Terray, Controller-General of  finances, suspected perhaps rightly 
of  favoring the Monopoly and the Exportation of  grain which occasioned the dearth 
and the cherté in different provinces, could very well suffer a disgrace.…85
Nor were the accusations of  exclusively (and suspiciously) Parisian 
provenance. Like the famine plot charges of  the sixties, they circu-
lated throughout the realm and in many instances took on a pecu-
liarly local character. “It is true, Monsieur,” one subdelegate declared 
to the intendant of  Alençon, “that the people attributed the grain 
cherté to the ridiculous idea that there existed a company exclusively 
charged with the provisioning trade of  the entire kingdom.” “But,” 
he added, as if  to reassure, “the people who suffer are always quick 
to judge.” More circumspect in his analysis, another subdelegate in 
the same generality denied that “there even appeared in my district 
the least appearance of  the reality of  this company,” but he had no 
doubt that certain individuals “with evil intentions” spread “various 
seditious absurdities which insult the government [and] give rise to 
[popular] murmuring.”86 The intendant of  Brittany reported the exis-
tence of  “rumor,” which “wins credence easily” concerning the oper-
ation of  “a company which has the exclusive privilege to engage in 
grain commerce in the interior of  the kingdom” and which organizes 
 83 Pidansat de Mairobert, Journal historique, III, 278 (9 Oct. 1772), IV, 278–79 (24 Aug. 1773), 
V, 97 (2 March 1774), VI, 17 (22 May 1774), and VI, 40 (1 June 1774).
 84 Buchez and Roux, Histoire parlementaire de la révolution française, II, 74–75.
 85 Hardy’s Journal, 19 May 1773, BN, mss. fr. 6681, fol. 192. Cf. ibid., 27 Sept. 1774 and 
H. Martin, Histoire de France, XVI, 298.
 86 SD at Argentau to IN., 13 Oct. 1773 and SD Bernay to same, 12 Oct. 1772, C. 89, 
A.D. Orne. A number of  other delegates were less impressed by the diffusion of  the 
conspiratorial rumor among the people. See the SDs of  Nogent-le-Rotrou and Billesuche 
to IN., 13, 25 Oct. 1773, C. 89, ibid.
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surreptitious exporting.87 Though similar rumors traveled through 
the Hainaut, according to the intendant they “were not widely 
accredited.”88 In Bordeaux “there is open talk of  a Company of  
Monopolists who maneuver for their own account and for that of  
the government which seeks to fatten itself  by starving the people.”89 
The specific character that public suspicions took worried the Metz 
Parlement less than the underlying process of  thought of  which they 
were an expression. Regardless of  the evidence, the people “will never 
believe that the high cost and scarcity of  a commodity of  first neces-
sity is the result of  [genuine] dearth.” They will “always attribute it” 
to some sort of  “roguery.”90
“Popular rumors” were worrisome but they were after all com-
monplace in the sociopolitical history of  the Old Regime and usually 
harmless provided they remained crude in conception and isolated 
in terms of  social incidence. What alarmed Terray in 1773, even as 
it had preoccupied Laverdy in 1767–68, was that “the Bourgeoisie 
of  the cities and even distinguished persons” as well as “the people” 
were “imbued with the false idea that there exists a company exclu-
sively appointed to undertake the provisioning of  the kingdom and the 
grain trade.”91 Events at Bordeaux provided the Controller-General 
with the most striking examples of  this phenomenon. The Parlement 
of  Bordeaux, like the Rouen court several years earlier, repeatedly 
denounced the existence of  “a pretended Company in Paris which 
had an exclusive privilege for the grain supply of  the kingdom.” The 
denunciations of  the magistrates reached a fever pitch at the moment 
that the rhythm of  delivery of  régie grain to the Bordeaux area was 
most intense—that is to say, from Terray’s point of  view, the Parlement 
evinced the meanest possible spirit at the very moment it should have 
 87 IN. to SD at Nantes, 15 Sept. 1773, C. 774, A.D. L-A. and IN. to Terray, ca. May-June 
1774, C. 1653, A.D. I-et-V.
 88 IN. to Terray, 4 Aug. 1774, C. 6690, A.D. Nord.
 89 Bethmann to Terray, 25 May 1773, C. 1441, and Terray to First President, Bordeaux Parl., 
5 Nov. 1773, C. 1442, A.D. Gir.
 90 Deliberations, Metz Parlement, 17 June 1771, B. 470, fol. 65 (registre secret), A.D. Moselle. 
Cf. the desire of  the Troyes municipality in 1789 “to avoid as much as possible [the] buying 
and selling [of] grain for the city because, if  it becomes known, this would bring the people 
to rise up against us because they would think that we were in this commerce to make money 
on them.…” Letter to CG (?), 10 May 1789, C. 1909, A.D. Aube. Surely many other town 
fathers and police officials drew similar lessons from the “pact” experience. Given the popular 
subsistence mentality, action and inaction seemed to be equally parlous options.
 91 Terray to IN. of  Picardy, 28 Sept. 1773, C. 86, A.D. Somme.
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expressed the warmest gratitude. He warned the court not to allow 
itself  “to be caught up by the charges of  the vulgar [people]; do not, like 
them, see monopoly in the help which has been sent to you by His Maj-
esty.” There was “no company authorized to engage in a grain trade 
harmful to the king’s subjects” but only “a few persons charged with 
the task of  meeting your needs [with grain] … which the Beneficence 
of  His Majesty caused to be brought from abroad at great expense and 
distributed at great loss for the assistance of  the people.” If  “you shout 
Monopoly and complain that private commerce is destroyed” when 
the government intervenes to help you, Terray admonished, then in the 
future the government will stay out of  your affairs and you will have 
relinquished your right to protection against dearth.92
Silencing the Parlement, however, was only one part of  the prob-
lem at Bordeaux. Though a number of  different versions circu-
lated, most of  the plot scenarios pointed to the distinguished inter-
national merchant-banker and local philanthropist, Bethmann. 
Accused of  belonging to “the company of  Monopolists” which mas-
terminded the terrible dearth that afflicted the Bordelais in 1773, 
Bethmann was obliged to hire twenty armed guards to protect his 
life and property, which were repeatedly menaced. The charges and 
threats jarred Bethmann profoundly, for he saw himself  as a pub-
lic benefactor who merited acclaim rather than obloquy. After all, 
he had agreed to participate in the régie in order to serve the king 
and the general interest without any view toward speculative profits 
and he felt that he had fulfilled his mission with “zeal” and “pre-
cision.” “If  it were only the transient outcry of  an aroused popu-
lace, I would let them shout,” wrote Bethmann, “I would have 
wrapped myself  up in my innocence, in the esteem of  honest per-
sons, in the confidence with which the government honors me, and 
I would have hoped that the people themselves would have rendered 
me justice once they had the time to calm down.” But what horri-
fied the négociant above all was that “the charges against me come 
from higher up and find supporters in all social ranks.” The “general 
prejudice” was that Bethmann was “a monopolist”: “on this point 
even some parlementaires were people.”
 92 Terray to First President, 19 July 1772 and 5 Nov. 1773, C. 1441 and 1442, A.D. Gir.; 
“Réponse aux remontrances du Parlement de Bordeaux,” Oct. 1773, C. 2915, A.D. Hér. 
The grain-plot mentality had an almost traditional place in the history of  the Bordeaux 
Parlement. See the court’s representations to Louis XV, ca. fall 1748, C. 1439, A.D. Gir.
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The “calumny,” its provenance, and its dissemination troubled 
Bethmann far more than the threats against his well-being. Though 
the phrase invites derision today, there is no reason to doubt the sin-
cerity of  this négociant’s impassioned claim that “my honor is dearer 
to me than my fortune and my life … it is impossible for me to live 
dishonored.” In “an instant” the famine plot accusation cost him an 
impeccable reputation that he had worked forty years to attain. Since 
his honor was stained “only for having served the state,” he turned to 
the state to assist him in salvaging it. “I must cleanse myself  in the eyes 
of  all Europe of  the crimes of  which I am accused,” wrote Bethmann 
to the Controller-General, and in order for me to do so you must lead 
the way. Though he did not specify exactly what he wanted—perhaps 
he himself  did not precisely know what would be necessary—it was 
clear that Bethmann would not stop until he felt himself  properly 
vindicated. He hinted that he would accept nothing short of  a full 
public disclosure and explanation of  the régie system and his role in 
it. If  the government failed to take the first step, Bethmann threat-
ened that he would—“by filing suit against his defamers, presenting 
to the courts and to the public the tableau of  the operations of  which 
I was head, proving the exactitude of  the tableau of  the correspon-
dence of  my firm with Messieurs Sorin de Bonne and Doumerc, and 
of  the testimony of  agents and brokers that I employed in the sale of  
the grain I received.” In effect, what Bethmann proposed was to cre-
ate another scandal to eclipse his own—a prospect that Terray was 
bound to find repugnant.
yet there was a very instructive lesson for the Controller-General 
to learn in Bethmann’s argument that his own rehabilitation had 
important political implications. By responding positively to his 
demands, Bethmann suggested, the state would not simply be serv-
ing an individual: “perhaps the interest of  the government, properly 
understood, should convince it to accord me in this unfortunate affair 
all the help, all the clarification which I might need.” For, the négociant 
emphasized, “this affair, to tell the truth, is an affair of  state.” Beyond 
Bethmann, trader and banker, the famine plot rumors directly impli-
cated the government. Regardless of  the outcome of  the Bethmann 
case—a single episode in an elaborate drama—sooner or later the 
government would have to face up to the “humiliating suspicions” 
which the citizenry entertained. By using his case as a vehicle, Beth-
mann reasoned, the government could offer a full explanation which 
would restore its credit in the public mind. “I know,” Bethmann 
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hastened to add, “that His Majesty does not owe any account of  his 
conduct to his peoples but
if  without compromising Himself, without lowering Himself  to the point of  justifying 
Himself; if  through my personal justification the people could be made to see that the 
Government that they slander, that they accuse of  monopoly, made the grain trade a 
ministerial affair only in order to assure subsistence to the unfortunate people in all 
parts of  the kingdom and to prevent individual monopolies from taking place; if  it were 
demonstrated that far from profiting, the Government has almost always lost on the sale 
of  grain of  which my firm handles [a part], and that nevertheless the losses did not stop 
it from sending everyone assistance in proportion to the need; Do you think, my lord, 
that that will not produce a good effect? Do you think that the people will not blush for 
having held an unjust prejudice against a beneficial and protective authority?93
Terray was much less sanguine about the blushing power of  the 
people; it was partly for this reason that he rejected the Bethmann 
plan. If  he had announced publicly that the government was in fact 
deeply involved in grain distribution for the sake of  the general inter-
est, there was a strong likelihood that no one would have believed 
him. Terray feared that such frankness would have promoted suspi-
cions instead of  dissipating them. Nor was the Controller-General 
comfortable with the idea of  appealing to the people to believe in the 
king and his ministers. Terray’s conception of  paternalism was no less 
generous than Bethmann’s but, by its very nature, it precluded a dia-
logue between father and children. In addition to its unsettling politi-
cal effects, nationwide publicity, in Terray’s view, would have made it 
more difficult for the régie to buy and sell economically and deterred 
independent suppliers from furnishing the market. Even as the plot 
rumors gained greater and greater currency, Terray clung to the idea 
that there was something to be gained from not officially acknowledg-
ing their existence. It was for this reason that he was extremely anx-
ious to preempt Bethmann’s “démarches d’éclat.” Though he knew 
better, the Controller-General tried to persuade the négociant that the 
rumors and accusations were of  minor significance, ephemeral “pop-
ular rumblings” not worthy of  his anxiety. Praising him warmly for 
his services and promising “tokens of  special protection” from the 
royal council, Terray nevertheless warned him not to make the issue 
a cause célèbre.94 At the same time the Controller-General enjoined 
 93 Bethmann to Terray, 25 May 1773, C. 1441, A.D. Gir.
 94 Terray to Bethmann, 5 June 1773, C. 1441, ibid.
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the First President (“for the sake of  the general good”) to try to sti-
fle the anti-Bethmann sentiment in the Parlement and he urged the 
intendant to use his influence to reassure Bethmann.95
Apparently a bargain was struck. In return for choosing the path of  
discretion, Bethmann was rewarded by the royal council, though in pre-
cisely what way we do not know. To restore Bethmann’s standing in the 
business community, Terray enlisted the cooperation of  the Bordeaux 
Chamber of  Commerce.96 Just as he was beginning to regain confidence, 
Bethmann suffered another rude blow upon Turgot’s rise to power. In a 
series of  legal actions that were widely publicized, the government sub-
poenaed the papers and sealed the warehouses of  all of  the agents of  
the régie. From Bethmann’s perspective these moves must have seemed 
calculated to prove that the suspicions against him had been exactly on 
the mark. Turgot assured him, however, that his management was not 
at all in question and his firm continued to engage—for its own account 
henceforth—in grain commerce and the myriad other exchanges which 
befitted an internationally known establishment.97
If  the Bethmann affair ended well from the government’s point 
of  view, nevertheless it offered no solution to the problem of  dealing 
with public opinion on the subsistence question. The problem dis-
turbed Terray deeply, even as it had disconcerted Laverdy six years 
earlier. Though he was ideologically more inclined to sympathize with 
the people in their subsistence terrors than his predecessor had been, 
Terray was no better prepared to deal with the subsistence mentality 
in political rather than purely humanitarian and moral terms. The 
plot persuasion was “making the government odious” in everyone’s 
eyes. Terray did not know how to convince “the people [who] attri-
bute the high price of  grain to a scheme devised to force them to pay 
dearly for their food” that such reasoning was utterly false. The fact 
that “they saw Monopolists everywhere, even in the help which they 
received,” stupefied him.98
The attitude of  the public struck the Controller-General as bitterly 
and tragically ironical. For “on the one hand, the government is con-
demned for causing the price to rise in order to profit by means of  an 
 95 Terray to Esmangart, 21 June 1773 and to First President, 5 June 1773, C. 1441, ibid.
 96 Terray to Chamber of  Commerce, 26 June 1773, C. 1441, ibid. Cf. the sarcastic commentary 
of  Pidansat de Mairobert, Journal historique, IV, 280–84 (24 Aug. 1773).
 97 Turgot to Esmangart, 23 Dec. 1774, C. 1442, A.D. Gir. Cf. Oeuvres de Turgot, ed. by Schelle, 
IV, 227.
 98 Terray, “Mémoire”, 1 Aug. 1773, C. 86, A.D. Somme and C. 1653, A.D. I-et-V.
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odious monopoly and, on the other, it is said that the government blocks 
[private] commerce by taking voluntary losses that individual dealers 
cannot bear.” If  we are accused at once of  “desiring to profit and con-
senting to lose” when we send help, “soon we will be accused of  neg-
ligence and of  abandoning the people to the greed of  the merchants 
if  we make no effort to provision.” In this situation it was extremely 
difficult to continue to govern. Though “it acts only for the good of  the 
people,” the government “is criticized on all sides for its activities.” No 
matter what we do for the people, Terray noted, “they always believe 
that we wish to do them harm or that we neglect them.” yet the Con-
troller-General did not reproach the people for their caprice or their 
ingratitude; he merely lamented it. Nor did he try to fix the blame 
for the plot rumors on a small band of  villains even as his successor 
would ascribe the Flour War to a mischievous cabal. Terray under-
stood that the suspicions came from the people, from their daily experi-
ence; though there were “evil-intentioned persons”—the économistes, for 
example, who labored to ruin Terray—they could do no more than 
“second the people’s way of  thinking on this matter.”99
His inability to find a clear way out frustrated and pained the Con-
troller-General. yet he resisted the temptation to abandon his subsistence 
policy in order to avoid casting further discredit on the government. “It 
would be an inexcusable weakness,” Terray wrote, “if  the fear of  evil gos-
sip stopped the administration from acting for the public good as it can 
and as it must act.” In September 1773, in a circular letter which resem-
bled the one Laverdy composed on a similar occasion in the fall of  1768, 
the Controller-General formally alerted the intendants to the danger of  
the famine-plot-monopoly rumors (as if  they needed to be warned) and 
exhorted them not to be intimidated into inaction by public opinion.100 
“It is your duty,” he instructed, “to undeceive those who are in the error” 
of  believing that the government is sponsoring a company” to control 
national provisioning for its own ends. But he could not tell the intendants 
how to do this. Those who “spread rumors with evil intentions” could 
be punished but what about all the others who gossiped and suspected 
innocently or instinctively? The Controller-General promised the inten-
dants that he would cut back drastically on domestic purchases, which 
led to many disturbances and appeared to give credence to the rumors. 
 99 Terray to INs. (circular), 28 Sept. 1773, C. 86, A.D. Somme; C. 1441, A.D. Gir; C. 95, A.D. 
I-et-L.; C. 419, A.D. Marne.
100 Ibid.
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By a kind of  negative reinforcement, Terray hoped that he could reduce 
the propensity to believe in the plot.101 Terray’s strategy hardly went 
to the core of  the matter. Following his lead, the intendant of  Brittany 
enjoined his subdelegates to “announce that the Council will not vary in 
the slightest in its commitment to the liberty of  grain circulation in the 
interior of  the kingdom.…”102 This was not the sort of  announcement 
that Bethmann had proposed and it was not the kind of  message which 
many people were likely to hear or heed.
The following year a trivial incident swelled into a major embarrass-
ment illustrating the danger of  a policy of  candor or, rather, of  incom-
plete candor. In the Almanach Royal of  1774, the yearbook of  adminis-
trative and judicial organization and information, following the list of  
the members of  the Royal Society of  Agriculture and preceding the 
enumeration of  the jurés crieurs, an ostensibly innocent entry read:
Treasurers of  Grain, for the Account of  the King, M. Demirlavaud rue St. Martin 
vis-à-vis la Fontaine Maubué.103
Ordinarily no one read the Almanach; it was used, like a phone directory, 
as a reference of  occasion. The word spread, however, that page 553 
contained an extraordinary revelation. Overnight, for the first time 
in its history, the Almanach became a best-seller and a cause célèbre. 
“This commission, found for the first time in this Catalogue, excited 
a great commotion in Paris,” Cocquereau noted with relish; “it was 
concluded that the rumors current for some time on the monopoly of  
grain by the government, that were rejected as odious & absurd, were 
only too well established, & that one must no longer hope to see this 
commodity fall to the [price] level where it had been.”104
Cocquereau was a hostile observer, but Linguet, a witness friendly 
to Terray, confirmed his testimony. Once the news of  the Almanach 
became known, “terrible cries arose: it was clear that the king was traf-
ficking in grain, it was clear that the stooge of  finance [Terray] was also 
the agent of  this infernal commerce.…” Linguet blamed the économistes 
for distorting the significance of  the Almanach entry and puffing it into 
scandalous proportion to discredit the Controller-General.105
101 Cf. Terray to Chambers of  Commerce of  Marseille and Montpellier, 1 Sept. 1773, C. 2915 
and Terray to IN. of  Languedoc, 3 Feb. 1774, C. 2916, A.D. Her.
102 IN. of  Brittany to Ballaye, 15 Sept. 1773, C. 774, A.D. L-A.
103 Almanach royal (1774), 553.
104 Cocquereau, Mémoires concernant … l’Abbé Terrai, 198. Cf. Pidansat de Mairo-bert, Journal 
historique, V, 44 (30 Jan. 1774).
105 Linguet, Annales, VI, 302.
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Mirlavaud was indeed the treasurer of  the king’s grain; he had 
held this post for many years.106 To administrators and others who 
dealt with the ministry he was well known, but as long as the king’s 
grain remained an official secret he was not supposed to celebrate 
his position publicly. How his name and title infiltrated the pages of  
the Almanach remains an enigma—an horrendous gaffe committed 
by a functionary not familiar with government policy or perhaps the 
fruit of  a plot or prank engineered to bedevil the ministry. The gov-
ernment reacted in characteristically ponderous fashion: it fired the 
censor charged with verifying the proofs and it punished the printer 
by closing his shop for three months. It could not, however, prevent 
Parisians from reciting the sprightly and subversive lines which com-
memorated the episode: 
Ce qu’on disoit tout bas est aujourd’hui public; 
Des présents de Cérès le maître fait traffic, 
Et le bon Roi, loin qu’il s’en cache, 
Pour que tout le monde le sache, 
Par son grand Almanach sans façon nous apprend, 
Et l’adresse et le nom de son heureux agent.107
In May 1774, not long after the affair of  the Almanach, Louis XV died. 
The nation, it appears, did not deeply mourn his passing. “The King 
had irretrievably lost the affection of  his peoples,” wrote the nouvel-
liste Métra. “Never was a prince less regretted than poor Louis XV,” 
commented Moreau, the royalist lawyer-writer.108 A torrent of  abusive 
epitaphs, some of  which circulated even before his death, took the 
king’s alleged grain speculations as one of  their leitmotivs and one of  
the chief  marks of  royal infamy. In prose: “here lies a King who gave 
us the system [of  John Law] in his infancy, war as he grew up, famine 
as he grew old, and the plague in his death.”109 In verse:
106 Mirlavaud symbolized the close connection between liberalization on the one hand and 
perceptions of  the famine plot on the other, for his post was created in 1764 specifically for “the 
collection of  duties imposed on the export of  grains” according to the July Edict. See Terray 
to INs. of  Brittany and Bordeaux, 26 Feb. 1773, C. 1684, A.D. I-et-V. and C. 1447, A.D. Gir. 
Turgot dismissed Mirlavaud in Nov. 1774. Turgot to St. Priest, 23 Nov. 1774, C. 2916, A.D. Hér.
107 Bachaumont, Mémoires secrets, VII, 121 (1 Feb. 1774). Cf. Révolutions de Paris (30 Jan. 1790), 34; 
Félix Rocquain. L’Esprit révolutionnaire avant la révolution (Paris, 1879), 309; Pierre Foncin, Essai 
sur le ministère de Turgot (Paris, 1877), 72; Pierre Clément and Alfred Lemoine, M. de Silhouette; 
Bouret; les derniers fermiers-généraux, étude sur les financiers du dix-huitième siècle (Paris, 1872), 161–62.
108 F. Métra, Correspondance secrète, I, 16 (7 July 1774); Moreau, Mes Souvenirs, ed. by C. Hermelin, I, 379.
109 In two slightly different versions, F. Métra, Correspondance secrète, I, 2 (4 June 1774) and 
Moreau, Mes Souvenirs, I, 379.
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Ci-gît le bien-aimé Bourbon, 
Monarque d’assez bonne mine, 
Et qui paye sur le charbon 
Ce qu’il gagne sur la farine.110
Shortly after his demise, someone put a sign on the new grain and 
flour building in the central markets of  the capital reading: “Store-
house for the king’s grain for rent.”111
VI
There is no doubt that Louis XV’s inglorious end and the circum-
stances surrounding it made a profound impression on his successor. 
The decline in royal prestige deeply worried Louis XVI. At his acces-
sion to the throne, he nurtured one overriding ambition: “I would wish 
to be loved.”112 To Sartine he confided the wish that “the poor always 
be able to eat bread at two sous [the pound].”113 The events of  the 
past few years—indeed, of  the past decade, gave these royal fancies a 
significance which ordinarily such hackneyed pieties would not war-
rant. To his shock, only weeks after he became king, Louis XVI found 
himself  accused by “the people” of  “having part like his grandfather” 
in the illicit profits of  the official grain monopoly. Stung by an anony-
mous letter informing him of  the existence of  a “contract” authorizing 
the speculations, he demanded clarification from his ministers. “This 
investigation,” wrote the abbé de Véri “will make him penetrate into 
the previous administration of  grain.…”114 Meanwhile Maurepas, his 
chief  counselor, had received at least one memoir denouncing Ter-
ray’s unspeakable operations. If  Maurepas encouraged the new king 
to pursue his inquiry it was purely for reasons of  court politics, for he 
himself  had served in the ministry many years before when Orry and 
his brother fell victim to the same sort of  charges now leveled against 
Terray and he must have known how groundless they really were. 
110 Cited by Bastard-d’Estang, Parlements, II, 508–509. Reviled for speculating on grain when 
he was prime minister during the dearth of  1725, the duc de Bourbon elicited a strikingly 
similar epitaph upon his demise in 1740. Gazetins de la police, 13–15 Feb. 1740, Arsenal, 
mss. Bastille 10167.
111 F. Metra, Correspondance secrète, I, 5 (4 June 1774).
112 Michelet, Histoire de France, XVI, 200.
113 Moreau, Mes Souvenirs, ed. by C. Hermelin, II, 2. Cf. Pierre, Marquis de Ségur, Au Couchant 
de la monarchie (Paris, 1909), I, 6.
114 Véri, Journal, ed. by J. de Witte, I, 150–51. Cf. Mornet, Origines intellectuelles, 402.
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Schooled by her mother and by the Austrian ambassador Mercy-
Argenteau, Marie-Antoinette pressed the king to give the new reign an 
auspicious beginning by breaking decisively with the suspect ways of  
Louis XV. She had a personal taste of  the popular mood at approxi-
mately the same time the king began to ask questions about grain pol-
icy. Promenading in the capital in July, she encountered a stark silence 
instead of  the huzzahs she wanted to hear. One person cried out: “Long 
live the King, provided that the price of  bread diminishes.”115 In a letter 
he wrote to Maria-Theresa in August 1774, Mercy-Argenteau explained 
one of  the steps taken by the queen to enhance her popularity. Perhaps 
the most striking thing about his remarks is the extent to which he sub-
scribed to the current version of  the famine pact persuasion:
The monopoly of  the provisioning of  grain had raised this good to an excessively high 
price and occasioned some tumult. yet this monopoly was going to be accorded again 
to the Company which profited from it and which paid quite a large retribution to the 
Royal Treasury. The King having consulted the Queen on this affair, … [he] prevented 
the renewal of  the monopoly, and when the public learns the source of  this decision 
[circumstance that I will have the means to make known], it is certain that that will 
have a great effect and infinitely increase the attachment of  the public for the queen.116
There were, to be sure, other matters of  great urgency facing the 
king. But it seems reasonable to contend that his desire to purge the 
government of  the stigma of  grain speculation was one of  the factors 
which persuaded him to accept Turgot, whose reputation as a bold 
spirit caused him some hesitation, as Controller-General. According 
to one source, when Louis XVI reached his decision toward the end 
of  August, he wrote the secretary of  state for the royal household:
Inform M. Turgot immediately that I appoint him Comptroller-General of  my 
finances. I place the greatest hopes on this choice for the welfare of  my people, whom 
the disastrous administration of  Abbé Terray has so much alarmed. Let M. Turgot 
come to see me tomorrow morning and bring with him the memoir on grains… 117
The new monarch’s decision suggests that he did not under-
stand Terray’s methods and goals and perhaps, too, that he believed 
the gossip about Terray’s culpability to be true. It also indicates that 
he did not grasp the implications of  Turgot’s program, especially in 
the short run. For contemporary observers tell us that it was Louis’ 
115 Hardy’s Journal, 21 July 1774, BN, mss. fr. 6681, fols. 384–85.
116 Mercy-Argenteau to Marie-Thérèse, 15 Aug. 1774, in Correspondance secrète entre Marie-Thérèse 
et le comte de Mercy-Argenteau avec les lettres de Marie-Thérèse et de Marie-Antoinette, ed. by Alfred 
d’Arneth and A. Geoffroy, II, 221.
117 Cited by S.K. Padover, The Life and Death of  Louis XVI (New york, 1963), 53.
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widely-publicized ambition to lower the price of  bread quickly and 
durably and that he was no less disappointed than were his subjects 
when that diminution did not come about.118 It was wholly gratuitous 
to presume that because Turgot was determined to undo Terray’s work 
he was thus committed to a policy of  cheap bread. It remained possible, 
however, for many months to come to ascribe persistently high prices to 
the continuing ill-effects of  Terray’s four-year tenure as grain minister.
Virtually the moment he took office, Turgot set out to dismantle the 
régie and discredit, with éclat, the policy behind it and the men who 
fashioned and executed that policy. The measures he took were widely 
publicized for maximum impact on opinion. Though Turgot himself  
had warned countless times against the dangers of  giving credence 
and authority to popular prejudices, his actions served to confirm the 
worst suspicions about Terray’s ministry. At the end of  August, the new 
Controller-General suspended Brochet de Saint-Prest from the post 
of  intendant of  commerce and chief  of  the grain department. Hardy 
viewed this act as Turgot’s message to the public that he was determined 
to expose “the cabal formed to make the poor people eat dear bread.”119
Rumors of  the day accused Saint-Prest of  skimming a fortune 
from the grain speculations which he managed. His lifestyle provided 
the circumstantial evidence that convicted him in the public mind. 
Known once as a man of  modest means who had been obliged to 
borrow heavily in order to purchase his post, he was now said to keep 
lavish train in a sumptuous townhouse staffed with a host of  domes-
tics and to spend vast sums on his wife’s wardrobe and his guests’ 
fantasies. Although there was no evidence that Saint-Prest actually 
profited from the régie’s operations, Turgot’s auditors allegedly found 
proof  that he had received or perhaps extorted a number of  gifts and 
a loan of  50,000 livres from Doumerc and Sorin, which he was not 
expected to repay. St. Prest, in a word, lacked “purity.”120
In a “memoir in defense of  himself,” Saint-Prest insisted that he played 
a relatively minor role in the grain affairs, that he performed his work 
sedulously and scrupulously, and that he had a “stainless reputation.” 
118 Hardy’s Journal, 10 Aug. 1774, BN, mss. fr. 6681, fol. 394; Pidansat de Mairobert, Journal 
historique, VI, 17 (22 May 1774); Bourdon-Desplanches, Projet nouveau, 4.
119 Hardy’s Journal, 28 Aug. 1774, BN, mss. fr. 6681, fol. 407.
120 Oeuvres de Turgot, ed. by Schelle, IV, 41–42, 194–95. Cf. Baudeau (?), “Chronique Louis 
XVI,” Révue rétrospective, III (1834), 40, 403 (14 May, 27 Aug. 1774); Coquereau, Mémoires 
concernant … l’Abbé Terrai, 223, 228; Véri, Journal, ed. by J. de Witte, I, 156; Foncin, Turgot, 
71–72; F. Métra, Correspondance secrète, I, 200–201 (18 Feb. 1775); Pidansat de Mairobert, 
Journal historique, VI, 162 (1 Sept. 1774).
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As head of  the grain department, he supervised “the correspondence 
relative to subsistence,” centralizing statistical data, assessing requests for 
assistance from intendants, and preparing status reports for the ministry. 
Concerning the management of  the régie, Saint-Prest claimed that “M. le 
Contrôleur-Général gave his orders directly to the commissioners: I had 
responsibility uniquely for the precautions taken for Paris,” an “immense” 
task but one which supposedly did not involve him in decisions to buy 
foreign grains. “On the basis of  these details, justified by documentary 
proofs, how is it possible for me to demonstrate more convincingly the 
falseness of  the rumor which has been spread that I arranged for the 
renewal of  the grain contract?” he asked. Contrary to what people imag-
ined, there was no company, no monopoly, no “contract”:
Orders were given to individuals to buy; they executed the orders; they accounted for 
their mission; on the presentation of  invoices, they received 2% commission on the 
purchase and as much on the sale; it was thus practiced during the administration of  
Messrs. de Machault, de Courteilles, de Trudaine, and D’Albert.121
Saint-Prest may very well have been as much a “scoundrel” as 
Mademoiselle de Lespinasse pretended.122 There is no doubt that 
he minimized the role he actually played in grain management, in 
the access of  humility provoked by Turgot’s indictment. His part in 
the Pascaud affair alone belies his contention that he had nothing to 
do with grain purchases abroad. Guys reported to “Mr. de St. Prest 
who is in charge of  this important mission” during his Italian grain-
buying expedition in 1772. Though he was often obscured by Ter-
ray, who immersed himself  in every aspect of  victualing operations, 
Saint-Prest’s correspondence reveals that he was the man to whom 
provincial administrators first looked when they sought to acquire 
more king’s grain or modify distribution procedures.123 It seems quite 
possible—it was after all not so unusual in the Old Regime or after-
ward—that he capitalized upon his public position for private advan-
tage. But he did not participate in a nefarious conspiracy, inspired by 
121 “Mémoire en défense de Brochet de St.-Prest,” in Oeuvres de Turgot, ed. by Schelle, IV, 190–
94; Pidansat de Mairobert, Journal historique, VII, 166 (13 March 1775).
122 Lespinasse to Guibert, 27 Aug. 1774, in Lettres de Mademoiselle de Lespinasse, ed. by E. Asse, 
(Paris, 1876), 93. Alluding to the dismissal of  St.-Prest and several others, Madame du 
Deffand wrote: “M. Turgot sweeps away all the garbage.” To Voltaire, 29 Aug. 1774, in 
Correspondance complète de la Marquise du Deffand, ed. by Lescure (Paris, 1865), II, 429. Cf. 
Sorhuet to Maupeou in Pidansat de Mairobert (?), Maupeouana, II, 102.
123 Guys to d’Aiguillon (?), 14 Dec. 1772, France, 1740, fol. 54, Arch. AE; St.-Prest to Robert, 
18 June 1773, C. 81, A.D. C d’O.
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the Controller-General, to speculate with the king’s grain, for no such 
plot existed. Saint-Prest passed rapidly into disgrace and oblivion. Even 
before he had a chance to vacate his splendid home, a prankster placed 
a sign over his door reading “Flour Mansion for rent.”
In early September, Turgot issued a momentous royal arrêt based upon 
his belief  in the natural and social primacy and the efficacy of  the rights of  
property and liberty. By this legislative act, he reestablished liberalization 
along the principles set forth in the Declaration of  May 1763, decried the 
grain policies of  his predecessors, and solemnly renounced government 
intervention in the provisioning of  grain. This arrêt was, as one observer 
put it, “a bitter satire of  the old administration.”124 At approximately the 
same moment, the story began to circulate in Paris that two fishermen 
residing on the outskirts of  the capital at Boulogne fished out of  the Seine 
one or two large packages of  documents wrapped in cloth and bound 
with rope weighted with a large stone to make them sink. Another pack-
age, similarly destined for the river bottom, was reported to have been 
dredged up near Passy. Somehow all these papers found their way to the 
Contrôle-Général. Allegedly, they concerned the grain operations of  the 
régie and contained highly incriminating evidence of  mismanagement, 
malversation, and illicit speculation; according to one observer, Sorin had 
them tossed in the Seine in anticipation of  a police search of  his offices.125
What extraordinary good fortune for Turgot to come into posses-
sion of  such evidence just two weeks after he discharged Saint-Prest 
on suspicion of  corruption and just days after he publicly denounced 
officially-sponsored victualing operations in the arrêt du conseil ! In terms 
of  their impact on public opinion, it made little difference whether or 
124 Pidansat de Mairobert, Journal historique, VI, 189 (21 Sept. 1774). The Paris Parlement 
registered it after considerable debate and with serious reservations. The Rouen court 
added modifications, salvaging for the police the authority to intervene when necessary. 
In a remarkable piece of  casuistry, utterly demolished by Turgot with a few pithy marginal 
comments, Miromesnil, once the First President of  the Rouen company but now Keeper 
of  the Seals and Turgot’s colleague, tried to justify the Parlement’s modifications on the 
grounds (a.) that they were harmless and (b.) that, without them, the Parlement would be 
alienated, the people alarmed, and the traders frightened into hiding by the prospect of  
having to face a united front of  magistrates and consumers. Ibid., VI, 361–62 (17 Dec. 
1774) and 381–82 (24 Dec. 1774); Moreau, Mes Souvenirs, ed. by Hermelin, II, 187; Oeuvres 
de Turgot, ed. by Schelle, IV, 217–19.
125 Hardy’s Journal, 30 Sept. 1774, BN, mss. fr. 6681, fol. 423; F. Métra, Correspondance secréte, 
I, 84 (29 Sept. 1774). According to another source, one set of  papers was found by several 
journeymen butchers and another by two ferrymen. Pidansat de Mairobert, Journal 
historique, VI, 205 (2 Oct. 1774).
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not these episodes really took place, for by the end of  the month they 
were generally known and believed to be true. (Although it admittedly 
“looked very much like a popular fairy tale,” one writer insisted that 
the story was “exact” in its facts.)126 In the subsequent investigation of  
the régie, no mention was ever made of  the fishy packages. But a ledger 
in the records of  the treasurer of  the grain department plainly records 
that Turgot ordered Albert, whom he had recalled to replace Saint-
Prest, to pay a “gratification” of  100 livres to the two Boulogne fisher-
men who had discovered “the two certain packages of  papers.”127 In 
their testimony, Sorin and Doumerc indirectly confirmed the existence 
of  these packets of  papers but they claimed that they had been planted 
by Albert in a maneuver designed to frame the directors of  the régie.128 
Either on the pretext of  this discovery or as a result of  the leads it 
provided, the ministry issued lettres de cachet authorizing the search of  
and the placing of  seals upon all the grain installations maintained by 
the régie in the Paris area and in the provinces as well. Between mid-
night and 1 A.M. on 24 September, a police team began its inspec-
tion at one of  the Paris convents used as a warehouse. They exam-
ined “papers, books, journals, letters, bills, registers … and gener-
ally all documents concerning the provisioning of  grain.” They were 
to try to learn where other records and other supplies of  grain and 
flour might be stored and they were “to have care to prevent any 
furtive removal of  papers, monies, or other active effects.” For some 
reason the police did not visit Sorin’s house and seize his personal 
papers until 5 October.129 Presumably, Doumerc suffered the same 
treatment. Although a number of  their subordinates were arrested, 
neither Doumerc nor Sorin, despite the report of  several observers, 
appears to have been detained or interrogated at this juncture.130 As a 
126 Pidansat de Mairobert, Journal historique, VI, 202 (29 Sept. 1774).
127 21 Nov. 1774, AN, F 11 1195. On Albert’s recall, his devotion to Turgot, and his militant 
liberalism (“great friend of  the sect”), see Turgot to Bordeaux IN., 21 Sept. 1774, C. 1442, A.D. 
Gir.; “Relation historique de l’émeute arrivée à Paris le 3 mai 1775,” in Pidansat de Mairobert, 
Journal historique, VII, 299; Alfred Neymarck, Turgot et ses doctrines (Paris, 1885), II, 154.
128 “Réponse au Mémoire des Srs Sorin et Doumerc,” ca. Sept. 1774, AN, K 908; Pidansat de 
Mairobert, Journal historique, VI, 247–48 (3 Nov. 1774).
129 23, 24, 28 Sept., 5 Oct. 1774, AN, y 12624; Hardy’s Journal, 27 Sept. 1774, BN, mss. fr. 6681, 
fol. 422; Regnaud, “Histoire des événements … depuis 1770 concernant les parlements,” 
BN, mss. fr. 13755, fol. 132; 23–24 Sept. 1774, AN, y 15383 (scellé).
130 Hardy and Monthyon both suggest that the directors of  the régie were jailed in the fall of  1774. 
Hardy’s Journal, 30 Sept. 1774, BN, mss. fr. 6681, fol. 423 and Monthyon, Particularités, 175–76.
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result of  these events, noted a commentator, “ the public is extremely 
satisfied with the vigilance of  the new Controller-General.”131
In the provinces, Turgot instructed the intendants to move with the 
utmost “celerity and secrecy” against the régie’s agents to make sure 
that they had no opportunity to destroy documents or conceal grain 
and flour stocks. In Languedoc, all the commissioners were taken 
by surprise; the authorities confiscated their papers and sealed their 
storehouses. Save in one instance, these merchants were cooperative, 
albeit baffled and worried about the government’s keen interest in 
their affairs.132 In La Rochelle, Moheau, the intendant’s first secretary, 
personally led the expedition against Jean Perry, a prominent négociant 
who held at least 300,000 livres worth of  régie grain. Preliminary inspec-
tion convinced Moheau that Perry’s books were “perfectly in order.” 
Worried about the effect that the news of  this inquiry would have 
upon his business, Perry pressed for a rapid hearing and discharge. “I 
worked uniquely in the capacity of  a simple agent, having no knowl-
edge of  the reasons behind the operations,” Perry wrote, and “I filled 
the duties that my position imposed with integrity and precision.”133
While the investigation proceeded, Turgot officially “suspended” all 
activities of  the régie.134 To give substance to the promises of  the Septem-
ber arrêt, he immediately began to dispose of  the grain and flour hold-
ings of  the régie, which, in the various depots throughout the kingdom, 
amounted to between 150,000 and 177,000 septiers. As a further gage 
of  his good faith and his devotion to the rule of  non-intervention in 
subsistence affairs, the new Controller-General named a second-rank 
career public servant to manage the dismantling of  the victualing sys-
tem: “Sieur Lentherie [Turgot’s nominee] is not a négociant who, as a 
function of  his fortune or the breadth of  his connections, might raise 
suspicions that he will be secretly charged with some new provisioning 
mission; he is a simple clerk delegated to terminate an operation that His 
Majesty has resolved not to renew.”135 This was a lesson that Turgot 
131 Pidansat de Mairobert, Journal historique, VI, 197 (25 Sept. 1774).
132 Turgot to St.-Priest, 22 Sept., 23 Nov. 1774, C. 2616, A.D. Hér.; St.-Priest to SD at Agde 
and subdelegate’s procès-verbal, 30 Sept. 1774, C. 2616, ibid.; Giristy to St.-Priest, 19 Oct. 
1774, C. 2616, ibid.; Turgot to IN. of  Montauban, 25 Sept. 1774, C. 118, A.D. H-G. Cf. 
Turgot to Esmangart, 23 Nov. 1774, C. 1442, A.D. Gir.
133 Turgot to Monthyon, 23 Sept. and 23 Nov. 1774, C. 189, A.D. C-M.; Moheau to Turgot, 
29 Sept. and 1 Oct. 1774, C. 189, ibid.; Perry to Monthyon (?), 1 Oct. 1774, C. 189, ibid.
134 “Observations sur la correspondance des Srs Guys et Cie … compte actuellement en 
discussion,” (ca. 1780), AN, F11 1191.
135 Turgot to Monthyon, 6 Oct. 1774, C. 189, A.D. C-M.
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took pains to make in numerous letters to administrators, magistrates, 
and businessmen. He wanted to “persuade all of  France” that the king 
“would never again violate the liberty [of  the grain trade].…”136 Nor 
was Turgot content to place full responsibility for the purging of  the 
régie in the hands of  subordinates. He crusaded for details as well as for 
principles. Personally supervising the audit and sale of  royal grain and 
flour, he vigorously challenged not only the accounts and final balance 
sheets of  former régie agents, but the pound-per-septier claims they made 
for losses due to aging, evaporation, over-heating, rotting, etc.137
In several memoirs written later in the fall, probably by Albert, the 
ministry accused Doumerc and Sorin of  having committed “malver-
sations and maneuvers.” Through a series of  banking and exchange 
devices, it was charged, the directors of  the régie diverted royal funds 
into private, unspecified speculations. Instead of  directly utilizing the 
12,000,000 livres they received from the treasury to pay for the grain 
they bought, they drew letters of  exchange on financial and commer-
cial houses in the major cities of  France and in London, Amsterdam, 
Danzig, and elsewhere in Europe, thereby freeing the royal advance 
for their own purposes. By a process of  “successive and perpetual 
renewal,” they drew new letters to pay for the old ones. They charged 
the burden of  interest and the costs of  these operations to the king. In 
addition, the memoirs alleged, Doumerc and Sorin extorted a sort of  
kickback from their correspondents by asking them, in effect, to lend 
their own money for the payment of  the grain they were commissioned 
to buy. At the present time, many thousands of  livres of  letters had not 
yet been paid. In principle, the report contended, the government should 
refuse to honor them and thus force Doumerc and Sorin into the ruin 
and disrepute they so richly deserve. But such a step would generate 
a chain reaction of  business failures, which would compromise many 
honest men and further taint the credit of  the government at home 
136 Turgot to Bordeaux Chamber of  Commerce, 19 Sept. 1774, C. 1441, A.D. Gir.; Turgot 
to IN. of  Bordeaux, 19 Sept. 1774, C. 1442, ibid.; Turgot to same, 24 May 1775, C. 1448, 
ibid.; Turgot to IN. of  Alençon, 19 Sept. 1774, C. 89, A.D. Orne; Turgot to Chambers of  
Commerce of  Toulouse and Montpellier, 2 Oct. 1774, C. 2916, A.D. Hér.; Turgot to IN. 
of  Languedoc, 19 Sept. 1774 and IN. to SDs, 30 Sept. 1774, C. 2916, ibid.; Turgot to IN. 
of  Brittany, 19 Sept. 1774, C. 1673, A.D. I-et-V.; C. 6691, A.D. Nord.
137 Mergue to St.-Priest, 1 Dec. 1774, C. 2916, A.D. Hér.; Delon to St.-Priest, 27 June 1775, 
C. 2917, ibid.; Turgot to St.-Priest, 4 April, 3 June 1775, C. 2917, ibid. Cf. Faure, Disgrâce de 
Turgot, 220–21 and Foncin, Turgot, 75.
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and abroad.138 It was charged that the régie directors may have siphoned 
off  into their own pockets millions of  the king’s livres, though no effort 
was made to justify this estimate.
In other aspects of  the régie administration, the directors were said 
to be guilty “of  yet more intolerable abuses.” Using royal funds, they 
mounted a private flour manufacturing venture—a “secret company” 
involving some of  their southern contacts—aimed at supplying the 
colonies. The Albert memoirs hinted that they had a share in the 
sugar and spice trade conducted by the Guys company in the Levant 
under the guise of  buying grain for the government. Instead of  pur-
chasing the king’s grain abroad as they were commissioned to do, they 
procured most of  their supplies in France at extortionate prices and 
at the cost of  aggravating the cherté and driving off  private trade. The 
ministry depicted the 1773 operation in the Midi as a fraud. The régie 
purchased grain in Marseilles and instead of  transferring it to the inte-
rior for distribution, sold it indifferently to anyone who would pay the 
price. Some of  this so-called foreign grain, it was intimated, actually 
was shipped to Spain, Portugal, and Italy. In still other instances, Sorin 
and Doumerc were said to have arranged or participated in fraudu-
lent exporting. They diverted royal grain for their own needs, empty-
ing storehouses that were supposed to be ready for emergency allo-
cation and ultimately replenishing them with inferior quality goods. 
The government indictment accused them of  fabricating pretexts for 
assigning excessive commissions to themselves or their nominees. In a 
word, the régie was nothing more than a racket, though one of  Albert’s 
clerks conceded that “it is rare to meet such refined thievery.” Had not 
Turgot come to power, it was likely that Sorin and Doumerc would 
have taken over military provisioning in 1774. By combining military 
and civilian supply into a single system, the government charged, they 
would have become “the absolute masters of  all the grain in the king-
dom and the most despotic of  monopolists.”139
138 Cf. the spate of  Marseilles bankruptcies in the spring and summer of  1774 linked to 
unhappy grain speculations. Pidansat de Mairobert, Journal historique, VI, 53 (10 June 1774).
139 “Mémoire au roi sur la conduite des Srs Sorin et Doumerck.…” in Oeuvres de Turgot, 
ed. by Schelle, IV, 185–90; and the memoirs and replies (1774–75) drafted by Albert’s 
office and by experts commissioned by Albert in AN, K 908. For the accusation that 
Terray furtively arranged to export grain under the cover of  his supply operations, 
see “Questions importantes relativement à l’affaire des bleds,” AN, K 908 and Oeuvres 
de Turgot, ed. by Schelle, IV, 43. Albert scoffed at the régie’s claim that some national 
grain was diverted to Switzerland in repayment of  earlier grain “loans” for the 
provisioning of  Franche-Comté and the Pays de Gex. yet there is some evidence which 
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Albert and his clerks made a number of  very grave charges against 
Sorin and Doumerc and, implicitly, against Terray, who was directly 
responsible for their actions. The most striking thing about them, 
however, was their vagueness and imprecision. Although Albert’s 
assessment of  the Malisset accounts had been excessively harsh and 
vengeful in spirit, it had been based on a painstaking, detailed exami-
nation and it had been abundantly documented with specific exam-
ples. The analysis of  the régie’s operations was incomplete, superfi-
cial, and largely rhetorical. It appears certain that Albert could not 
marshal the hard evidence necessary to substantiate his accusations. 
Whereas Malisset had kept his accounts badly and thus was vulnera-
ble when he demanded to be judged on his record, the régie’s accounts 
were “too neat.” They frustrated Albert’s clerks who insisted that “the 
interests of  His Majesty demand that we not content ourselves with 
an arithmetic operation but that we go to the principle, to the source of  
the purchases and sales.…” After all, there “was an art to drawing up 
[false] balance sheets” and Sorin and Doumerc were master crafts-
men. yet “the principle” had to be quantified and documented if  it 
were to serve to convict as well as to discredit.
The presumptions against Doumerc and Sorin were doctrinal and 
heuristic as well as circumstantial. For the memoirs condemned not 
only the “abuses which resulted” in fact from the régie’s operations, but 
also “the abuses … which will always result from any provisioning under-
taken for the account of  His Majesty: it will tend only to burden his 
finances, do harm to his peoples, raise the price of  their subsistence, 
corrupt it and lose it, and occasion dearth.”140 From this perspective, 
Sorin and Doumerc would have been guilty no matter how they man-
aged the régie because victualing “obstructed the liberty of  trade” and 
only this liberty could have performed the services which Sorin and 
Doumerc pretended to render. After having investigated the Malisset 
enterprise, Albert had concluded that he and his guarantors owed 
the government a certain amount of  money; after investigating the 
régie, he drew a general moral and political lesson, which could not 
be translated in livres and sous. Apparently for lack of  a persuasive 
case—surely not for want of  desire—the government took no action, 
 suggests that the régie’s claim was plausible. See Edouard Chapuisat, Necker (Paris, 1938), 37, 
49–51 and J. Flammermont, ed., Les Correspondances des agents diplomatiques étrangers en France 
avant la Révolution (Paris, 1896), 288.
140 “Mémoire au roi sur la conduite …,” in Oeuvres de Turgot, ed. by Schelle, IV, 185–90 and 
“Réponse au mémoire des Srs Sorin et Doumerg [sic],” AN, K 908.
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police or judicial, against Doumerc and Sorin. Finally, in early May 
1775, long after it seemed that the affair had been buried, they were 
arrested, along with the now-celebrated ex-treasurer of  the king’s 
grain, Mirlavaud.
What was singular about the arrest was that it transpired only a 
few days after the outbreak of  the Flour War, the chain of  major sub-
sistence riots that erupted in the hinterland and the capital in reac-
tion to yet another serious current of  shortages and high prices.141 
Unlike the Paris Parlement, observers such as Necker and Linguet, 
local police officials, and many parish priests, Turgot rejected the 
idea that they were spontaneous risings of  an alarmed people. He 
sensed a plot, some sort of  machination, though he was not cer-
tain precisely how it was organized.142 years later Dupont wrote 
that the “former agents of  the Company which had engaged in 
the grain trade” led the uprising against Turgot by “spreading the 
rumor” everywhere that “the system of  Mr. Turgot would cause 
Paris to die of  hunger.143 Another writer interested in grain ques-
tions viewed the Flour War as “the last convulsions of  monop-
oly.”144 Either because he suspected they may have had some hand 
141 On the Flour War, see: G. Rudé, “La Taxation populaire de mai 1775 à Paris et dans la 
région parisienne,” Annales historiques de la révolution française, 28th year (April–June 1956), 
139–79; Rudé, “La Taxation populaire de mai 1775 en Picardie, en Normandie, et dans 
le Beauvaisis,” ibid., 33rd year (July–Sept. 1961), 305–26; Rudé, The Crowd in History, 
1730–1848 (New york, 1964), 19–32; V. Lublinsky, “Voltaire et la guerre des farines,” 
Annales historiques de la révolution française, 31st year (April–June 1959), 127–45; Lublinsky, “Les 
Nouvelles données sur les troubles de mai 1775 à Paris, lettres et notices,” Voprosy Istorii, no. 11 
(1955), 113–17; Faure, Disgrâce de Turgot, 195–318. Though generally viewed as an eruption 
in the Paris region, the Flour War threatened to break out or spread to Flanders, Hainaut, 
Lorraine, and elsewhere. See the concern evinced by military and civilian officials: “Mémoire 
pour le maréchal de Muy,” 7 May 1775, Al/3701 and Bertier de Sauvigny to Turgot, 9 May 
1775, A1/3694, pièce 107 bis, Arch. Armée. On a modest scale, there was a harbinger of  and 
a dress-rehearsal for the Flour War at Metz in the fall of  1774. See Pidansat de Mairobert, 
Journal historique, VI, 215 (10 Oct. 1774), 235 (26 Oct. 1774), and 335 (7 Dec. 1774).
142 For contemporary evidence of  Turgot’s “plot thesis,” see: Bachaumont, Mémoires secrets, VII, 
123 (22 July 1775); F. Métra, Correspondance secrète, I, 351 (9 May 1775), and II, 302 (1 Jan. 
1776); J.G. Marmontel, Mémoires, ed. by M. Tourneux, III, 94–96; Moreau, Mes Souvenirs, 
ed. by C. Hermelin, II, 191–92; Al/3694, pièces 18, 86, and 105, Arch. Armée. The  efforts 
of  Turgot’s supporters to show that the rioters were mob rather than “people” is particularly 
interesting. F. Métra, Correspondance secrète, I, 345 (3 May 1775). Turgot expected trouble; in 
anticipation, he had a ready-made, universally-applicable plot thesis prepared from the time he 
took office. See his fear of  “maneuvers from all those who have an interest in preventing the 
success of  the principles of  liberty.…” To Esmangart, 30 Sept. 1774, C. 1442, A.D. Gir.
143 Dupont to Prince Carl Ludwig, 15 Jan. 1783, in Knies, ed., Dupont Correspondance, II, 356.
144 Rey, Du Commerce des bleds (Paris, 1775), 82.
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in the revolts, or much more likely in order to mount a diversion, find 
a scapegoat, remind the public of  his dedication to honesty in grain 
policy, and strengthen his hand at an extremely critical moment, Tur-
got ordered the incarceration of  the leading figures of  the disbanded 
régie. On 7 May the Mémoires Secrets observed that “the detention of  
these messieurs, who regarded themselves as already exonerated, 
undertaken at such a critical moment, would seem to indicate that 
they are suspected of  having some role in the present troubles.”145 Less 
than two weeks later, the same Mémoires noted that “there is grand 
appearance that the Sieurs Saurin and Daumer [sic] were put in the 
Bastille only for form’s sake, & to show the people that [the ministry] 
was busy trying to discover the authors of  the public calamities.”146 
Another observer was struck by the government’s frenzied efforts to 
prove the existence of  “a plot,” by its frustration at not finding “any 
trace of  evidence,” and by its unwillingness to see that “the instigators 
are only common men” and that the “real causes” are to be found in 
“misery, hunger, and despair carried to the extreme.”147
Albert, on the eve of  his nomination to the Parisian Lieutenance of  
Police in a reorganization provoked by the flour riots, personally inter-
rogated the imprisoned directors of  the régie. The record of  his strained 
exchange with Doumerc has survived.148 Albert asked him about the 
management practices he used and criticized his laxity in verifying 
the delivery of  supplies and the accounts of  his agents. In only one 
instance—an apparent discrepancy of  1,000 livres—did Albert challenge 
him on concrete grounds. Doumerc replied that he could not explain 
the matter without reference to his papers. “Did they not  sometimes 
145 Bachaumont, Mémoires secrets, XXX, 225 (7 May 1775).
146 Ibid., XXX, 242 (19 May 1775).
147 “Relation historique de l’émeute …,” in Pidansat de Mairobert, Journal historique, VII, 315. 
Cf. the verses which circulated in the aftermath of  the Flour War (ibid., VII, 329–30):
Est-ce Maupeou tant abhorré 
Qui nous rend le bled cher en France? 
Ou bien est-ce l’abbé Terrai? 
Est-ce le Clergé, la Finance? 
Des Jésuites est-ce vengeance, 
Ou de l’Anglois un tour falot? 
Non, ce n’est point-là le fin mot. 
Mais voulez-vous qu’en confidence 
Je vous le dise? … C’est Turgot.
148 Arsenal, mss. Bastille, 12447. Cf. yet another “perquisition et saisie” of  the regie’s papers, 
AN, y 11441.
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employ authoritarian measures [i.e. the government’s authority] to pre-
vent private traders from buying grain in order to reserve it all for them-
selves?” queried Albert. No, said Doumerc, we were not empowered 
to do that. Did they not export certain quantities of  grain and flour? 
No, rejoined Doumerc. How, then, asked Albert, attacking, can you 
account for the turning away of  three ships of  American flour in June 
1772 and another flour-laden vessel in June 1774? We had orders from 
the minister, explained the prisoner, adding that in the latter case it was 
because the foreign correspondent had not delivered the merchandise 
within the pre-arranged time limit. Doumerc did not satisfy Albert in 
answering the charge that he and Sorin had used the royal grain fund to 
launch a private banking and commercial affair. He refused to answer 
a question about an alleged secret contract with Guys of  Marseilles on 
the grounds that he had already fully explained the régie’s relations with 
its agents. At no point in the encounter did Albert ask Doumerc about 
anything pertaining to the Flour War.
A large part of  the interrogation focussed on the régie’s role in a 
private grain and flour trading company based in Montauban and 
operated by Perrouteau in association with Doumerc’s father. Clearly 
this was Albert’s strongest point and the issue which most discon-
certed Doumerc. Doumerc claimed that he could not “recollect” 
many of  the details. Nor could he explain exactly what links the Per-
routeau company had with the régie and what tasks it performed for 
it. Although he admitted that he lent his “credit” to the operation, 
he indignantly denied that he had funded it with the king’s money or 
that it functioned clandestinely for the personal profit of  Doumerc 
and Sorin. The Perrouteau affair seemed to offer Albert the sort of  
lever he had been so anxiously trying to find.
In the end, however, Albert could still not make a case that would 
stick against the régie directors. Despite repeated requests, Doumerc 
and Sorin could not obtain a formal statement of  the charges against 
them. Nor could their wives, who petitioned minister after minister 
for their release, win permission to visit them.149 Turgot did not con-
cede defeat until a committee of  members of  the royal council, cho-
sen by himself, determined that there were no grounds to hold them. 
They left the Bastille at the end of  June. According to one report, upon 
regaining their freedom Doumerc and Sorin demanded still another 
149 See the letters and petitions of  the wives in Arsenal, mss. Bastille 12447. Cf. Bachaumont, 
Mémoires secrets, XXX, 249 (28 May 1774). On their conditions of  imprisonment, see 
Charpentier, La Bastille dévoilée (Paris, 1789), IV, 44–48.
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investigation of  all their accounts in order to clear their names com-
pletely. Apparently, they received formal vindication the following year.150
The confrontation with Turgot did not leave a permanent stain 
on their reputation. Though Sorin disappeared from view, Doumerc 
enjoyed a successful career in private commerce as well as public ser-
vice.151 Béguillet, the subsistence commentator and crusader for mod-
ernization in the bread industry, praised him as a “good citizen” and 
“enlightened businessman” for developing a portable market scale 
capable of  measuring 1/192nd of  a Paris septier and thus assisting the 
buyer in determining the quality of  the grain. Doumerc continued 
to advise the government on provisioning affairs. On his suggestion, 
in 1784, the ministry began to build a “vast” grain magazine at Aux-
onne for military and civil grain storage. Throughout the eighties, he 
counseled the Paris Parlement, the Procurator General and the Con-
trollers-General on grain operations. He claimed a large share of  the 
responsibility for dealing successfully with a threatening subsistence 
situation in the Paris area in 1788. yet he insisted on the need to look 
“to the future,” beyond “the palliatives of  the moment.” His experi-
ence under Terray had made him an avid planner. In 1789, on the eve 
of  the Revolution, he had the title of  “general administrator of  sub-
sistence,” serving probably in the grain department of  the Contrôle-
Général. In the estimation of  Bailly, Paris’ first revolutionary mayor, 
no one was better equipped to administer the subsistence department. 
But the volatility of  opinion in the capital in the early months of  the 
Revolution drove Doumerc into hiding. Like other officials and dealers 
associated with provisioning affairs, he was terribly frightened by the 
executions of  Bertier de Sauvigny and Foulon and by the talk of  fam-
ine plot vengeance for the people. In 1791 he quietly re-emerged to 
become one of  the “general administrators of  military subsistence.”152
150 Lenoir papers, Bibliothèque Municipale d’Orléans, mss. 1421; Bord, Histoire du blé, 41. 
Bachaumont, Mémoires secrets, XXX, 284 (13 July 1774).
151 A police “scandal” report casts a curious sidelight on Doumerc’s private life, confirming 
Malisset’s charge that Doumerc had a considerable appetite for pleasure: “M. Doumergue 
[sic], courtier of  M. Trudaine de Montigny for the grain department [here the observer is 
using dated intelligence], has just received a lesson from the demoiselle Daguin who arranges 
for a part of  his great profits to flow back into commerce. This demoiselle, after having pinched 
him for some very fine furniture, a wardrobe closet, a great many jewels and a contract for 
a 600 livres rent, has given him notice and immediately replaced him with Sieur de Patarin, 
Spaniard, said to be a négociant, lodged in Paris, rue de Marl.” 20 Sept. 1771, in Camille Piton, 
ed., Paris sous Louis XV, rapports des inspecteurs de police au roi (Paris, 1910), 343.
152 Béguillet, Traité des subsistances, 164–65; “Mémoire sur l’approvisionnement 
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Doumerc’s one-time patron, the abbé Terray, enjoyed no such 
rehabilitation after his disgrace. According to Marie-Antoinette, the 
“people” could not contain their “extravagances of  joy” upon noti-
fication of  his dismissal in the summer of  1774.153 It is difficult to 
sort out and weigh the elements which conspired to discredit him: 
his association with Maupeou, scourge of  the parlements; his fiscal 
reforms; the revulsion (and jealousy) that his personal life inspired; and 
his management of  the grain question. Obsessed themselves with the 
subsistence problem, the revolutionaries remembered him not as the 
minister who spoke for the consumer interest against the aristocracy 
of  wealth, but as the Controller-General who turned provisioning into 
a lucrative business affair. For Camille Desmoulins, Terray was a Judas 
clothed in the motley robe of  Joseph, using the “same methods” the 
son of  Jacob employed to nourish Egypt in order “to starve France.”154 
Modern historians have challenged the Terray stereotypes and have 
generally viewed him, as a public man, in a highly favorable light.155
Historians were not the first, however, to undertake the task of  
revision. In Terray’s own time, a number of  commentators made a 
serious effort to render a balanced judgment of  his administration, an 
assessment which has strong claims to scholarly endorsement today. 
“In the epoch when the abbé Terray was a simple counselor in the 
Grand’Chambre,” wrote Moreau, “he drew attention by carrying the 
sacraments himself  to those Jansenists to whom the Archbishop of  
Paris, Beaumont, refused them.” Not long after, he became a shame-
less “libertine”; the “details” of  his debauchery horrified Moreau. 
“But if  he was one of  the worst priests that I ever knew,” added 
Moreau, “he was also one of  the best Controllers-General of  the 
reign of  Louis XV.…” He sought to “make himself  master of  the 
grain price” for the sake of  the public interest:
I do not know if  he was the inventor of  the depots established at Corbeil 
amidst the numerous mills which surround this city and which never cease to  
 de réserve ou greniers d’abondance,” AN, F11 222; Doumerc to Joly, 17 Feb. 1789, BN, 
Coll. Joly, 1111, fols. 198–205; AN, F11 1173–74; “Mémoire concernant la cultivation d’un 
grain dit Seigle de Russie,” AN, F10 226; Bailly, Mémoires, ed. by Berville and Barrière (Paris, 
1822), II, 71, 136.
153 Marie-Antoinette to Marie-Thérèse, 7 Sept. 1774, in Correspondance secrète, ed. by d’Arneth 
and Geoffroy, II, 229.
154 C. Desmoulins, Les Insignes meuniers de Corbeil (Paris, 1789), 2.
155 See, in addition to Marion’s Histoire financière, Faure, Disgrâce de Turgot, 216–23; Cahen, 
“Prétendu pacte,” Revue historique, CLXVI (Sept.–Oct. 1935), 195; and Girard, Terray, passim.
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function: what I know is that he used them to great advantage to set up a salutary 
equilibrium between the disadvantages of  sterility and of  abundance; in this respect, 
I considered him as one of  the good servants of  the King.156
Simon Linguet, defender of  pariahs and friend of  the underdog, 
viewed Terray’s achievements in a similar light. The abbé assumed 
his post at a time when the finances suffered “a disorder of  which it 
is impossible to form an idea.” Against enormous odds, in the face 
of  “frightening” difficulties, without concern for his own reputation, 
he implemented many important reforms. Heir to an immense defi-
cit, “the abbé Terray, so decried, burdened with so many insults and 
public execration, regarded as an avid man, liar, odious, even crimi-
nal in all the senses,” left the Treasury in a remarkably good state of  
health. His grain operations, which gave rise to further calumnies and 
legends, were sound and necessary measures devised to correct the 
damage done by the “flour fanaticism” of  the liberals. Terray “imag-
ined that prudent purchases and sales made with discretion could 
achieve the effect on the markets which one had been falsely led to 
expect from a [liberalizing] law.” Aiming at a more viable “balance” 
of  interests, he used the weight” of  the government to curtail and 
contain price “oscillations.” Linguet suggested that Terray may have 
used wrong methods and that some of  his subordinates may not have 
conducted themselves in irreproachable fashion. On the whole, how-
ever, he merits our gratitude, for he spared us from suffering a famine 
“as cruel” as there was reason to fear.
Ironically, after reviling Terray, Turgot found himself  obliged to 
imitate him. “After having so haughtily, so viciously, so cruelly, so 
unjustly censured his regime,” wrote Linguet, “it was necessary to 
return to it: solemn laws were promulgated to dispense grain from 
coming to the markets: it was necessary [afterwards] to force it there 
by secret orders.…” Not long after the Flour War, Turgot signed a 
contract—which Linguet interpreted as an indirect vindication of  
Terray—with the Leleu brothers, merchants who had assisted Albert 
156 Moreau, Mes Souvenirs, ed. by C. Hermelin, II, 34. For a similar evaluation, see Besenval, 
Mémoires, ed. by Berville and Barrière, I, 380.
157 On the Leleu arrangement, see Taboureau, Rapport au Roi (1777) (Paris, 1789); Accounts, 
AN, F11 1195; James Rutledge, Second mémoire pour les maîtres boulangers (Paris, [1789]), 10, 
22–23; Archives Seine-Paris, DC 625, fol. 118; Révolutions de Paris, (9–16 Jan. 1790), 16–17; 
Musart, Réglementation du commerce des grains, 135; F. Vincent, Histoire des famines à Paris (Paris, 
1946), 84–85; Faure, Disgrâce de Turgot, 412–14.
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in his investigation of  the régie, for the maintenance of  a flour stock at 
Corbeil for the service of  the Paris Halles.157 “From everything which 
precedes,” Linguet asked, “what is the result?”
That the abbé Terray was a prodigy of  virtue? I do not say that. That his administra-
tion was a model to propose to all of  his successors? Even less … I say simply that he 
was very badly judged … he had some talents and some defects: one has prodigiously 
exaggerated the latter and not rendered justice to the former.158
158 Linguet, Annales, VI, 157, 285–88, 298, 301–05.
CONCLUSION
Like many parts of  the Third World today, old-regime France was 
obsessed with subsistence—and for good reasons. Dependent for the 
most part on a single foodstuff  whose production and distribution 
were hostage to a host of  uncertainties, it is no wonder that the people 
of  this society agonized over their material life. They had no sense 
of  control over their environment—either the sociojuridical structure 
around which their lives were organized or the economic and physi-
cal circumstances in which they lived. Nor could the Enlightenment 
provide a dose of  confidence and courage powerful enough to reach 
the bulk of  the population. Not all the philosophical tracts on man’s 
earthly potential, nor all the manuals on the application of  vetch or 
the use of  sainfoin, nor all the inoculations practiced on the children 
of  princes could convince the “little people” of  the eighteenth century 
that they lived in a world on the verge of  mastering, or at least reach-
ing an accord with, nature. Subsistence, of  course, was not the whole 
story of  man’s predicament, but preoccupation with it was sufficiently 
universal and relentless to remind men every day of  the precarious-
ness of  their situation and of  their relative helplessness to change it.
Even as the marketplace, like the cemetery, was at the center of  
popular life in the Old Regime, so subsistence was always at the cen-
ter of  public concern. In the crudest terms, it can be said that fear of  
the people commanded attention to the people’s fears. Subsistence 
uncertainty and anxiety impelled government to give the highest pri-
ority to provisioning. But government intervened in the first instance 
not so much to reassure the people as to reassure itself. From top to 
bottom, officials believed that the social and political structures could 
not passively bear the strain or tolerate the risks of  scarcity. Subsis-
tence was the precondition to social order. Their assumptions about 
the psychology of  human motivation, the nature of  commerce, and 
the habits of  cultivators and suppliers convinced authorities that grain 
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distribution could not safely be left entirely to private initiative and 
the arbitration of  free market forces.
What nourished this ideology of  fear and mistrust, what made 
the governors, like the governed, timid and conservative, what made 
intervention necessary and inevitable, was above all the nature of  pre-
industrial society itself. Grain made a victim of  the government, just 
as it made a victim of  the people. Total dependence on the vagaries 
of  the harvest left government little margin in which to function. The 
myth of  abundance (which, to be sure, was not always and in all places 
a myth) could not alter the fact that deficits occurred frequently and 
that they often had an impact wholly out of  proportion to their real 
importance. Rampant particularism and primitive means of  trans-
portation and communication reinforced this tyranny of  grain. If  the 
police were often rigid and brutal and unpredictable, it was in large 
part because the material world with which they tried to deal, without 
the help of  what we call technology, was rigid and brutal and unpre-
dictable.
The point is that the police had no choice. With few exceptions, public 
authorities did not seek out responsibility for provisioning, say, as the 
central government sought to extend its exercise of  justice and fiscal-
ity. Imperiously, the need to intervene imposed itself; the government 
used controls because it saw no other way to assure subsistence and thus 
obtain the relative stability without which it feared it could not survive. It 
would be a mistake, in my view, to envision the police of  provisioning as 
a product of  statemaking or as a function of  absolutism. Rather, state-
making and the development of  absolutism were themselves limited and 
conditioned by the exigencies of  subsistence management. It is tempting 
to assimilate provisioning controls to other authoritarian, arbitrary and 
oppressive expressions of  absolutist rule, but the bastilles and the grain 
regulations of  the Old Regime, though they ended up serving many 
common ends, were very different kinds of  institutions. While the gov-
ernment had a number of  reasons for wanting to control the food supply, 
feeding the people was not one of  its deliberate totalitarian ambitions. 
On one level, then, police controls translated a political design: an 
unwillingness to court the risks of  disorder. On another even more rudi-
mentary level, however, the controls appear as consequences of  material 
conditions and social constraints which were to some degree indepen-
dent of  political will. Doubtless, the reformers were right in condemn-
ing the controls as impediments to growth or modernization. But they 
were in large measure the result, not the explanation, of  what we have 
come to call backwardness.
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Nor was the provisioning policy exclusively the product of  an 
urban consciousness peculiar to the large cities and divorced from 
the realities and needs of  an overwhelmingly agrarian world. In 
some cases, it was easier to supply the great cities than other areas 
and it was often possible to do so with greater reliance upon the 
open market. The subsistence preoccupation reached deeply into 
the countryside; the police of  provisioning in small towns, bourgs, and 
many villages was as vigorous as in the urban agglomerations. more-
over, there was no brusque discontinuity between urban and rural, non-
agrarian and agrarian in old-regime France, not even in the major cities.
We have had occasion to examine, in considerable detail, the orga-
nization of  police and the control apparatus it elaborated in order to 
assure provisioning. We have noted, too, the difficulty of  generalizing 
about the operation of  the police. It varied enormously from time to 
time, place to place, and hand to hand. The police were extremely paro-
chial because subsistence was primarily a local matter. more often than 
not, police operations were not well coordinated. Structural incoherence 
and communications gaps exacerbated the inevitable rivalries over hin-
terland and jurisdiction. The grain police was a preeminently circum-
stantial affair. There were certain controls built into the grain trade, but 
a large part of  the regulatory machine tended to lie dormant until acti-
vated by menacing supply, price, or weather conditions.
On the whole the grain police seems to have been more supple 
than is generally assumed. There is evidence that there was a generous 
tolerance of  officially prohibited trading practices in many places and 
perhaps even a growing climate of  de facto liberalization in the quar-
ter century before 1763, especially around the large urban centers and 
ports where grain and flour increasingly bypassed local markets en 
route to their final destination. There is little doubt that the police 
apparatus militated against the emergence of  large-scale trade con-
centrating vast amounts of  capital and dealing across great distances 
of  time and space. But there are also strong indications that the trade 
would have remained fragmented and relatively modest in magnitude 
regardless of  the police system, as a result of  the modes of  production, 
deeply-rooted local habits, and technological factors, which made grain 
and flour commerce extremely risky, costly, and cumbersome. In some 
ways, the police regime inhibited the development of  a more responsive 
market system, but in other ways it promoted the rationalization and 
integration of  the markets where the suppliers themselves resisted fresh 
currents of  commercialization. The police encouraged, for example, 
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the expansion of  credit facilities and the development of  factorage 
systems at the larger markets.
Nevertheless, as I attempted to show earlier, it would be absurd 
to pretend that the police system was genuinely hospitable to com-
merce. In many of  its particulars, the liberal bill of  indictment was 
well founded. It would not be hard to demonstrate that police con-
trols and interventions violated property rights, demoralized and con-
fused traders, jeopardized wide-ranging speculations, encouraged par-
ticularism, and led to inefficient and expensive distributive practices. 
It is true that police action often forced or induced grain to flee and 
thus drove prices up (though it is also true that on other occasions 
the same actions smoked grain into the open and depressed prices). 
It is true that the police style, in a sense, invited public disorder and 
helped to make the riot or demonstration a very effective consumer 
weapon. and it is true, as the liberals charged, that the police regime 
failed to prevent the recurrence of  dearths, though it must be added 
that the authorities never pretended that it could achieve this goal.
In response to cues from the police, and as a result of  their own 
instincts of  justice and survival, the consumers developed attitudes 
that helped them deal with subsistence uncertainties. These beliefs —
about the duties of  government, the wealth of  France, the motives of  
merchants, the causes of  dearth—served them in much the same way 
that myths, rites of  propitiation, and collective defense mechanisms 
helped other societies cope with chronic or extraordinary threats. This 
subsistence mentality taught the consumers how to interpret supply 
and price indicators in various circumstances, when to be suspicious 
and when to be patient, whom to blame and upon whom to rely. Natu-
rally, it varied in its particular manifestations from place to place, but 
like the different brands of  police, the subsistence mentality took its 
general coherence from a number of  commonly held assumptions. 
The most important concerned claims of  the people upon public 
authority—ultimately upon the king—and their expectation, repeat-
edly authorized and encouraged by officials at all levels of  administra-
tion, that government would intervene when popular subsistence was 
menaced in any prolonged or unusual fashion.
Over time, the provisioning policy acquired not merely conventional 
sanction, but a sanction that one is tempted to call sacrosanct. The con-
sumers embraced it with ferocity, for it was vital to their existence. The 
liberals quite rightly perceived this subsistence mentality as an enor-
mous obstacle to change. They denounced its components as so many 
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“prejudices” in very much the same way that critics of  traditional reli-
gious practices decried widespread “superstitions.” The prospects for 
freeing men from superstitions of  the spirit may have been better than 
for persuading them to abandon instincts concerning their material 
lives, if  only because spiritual surrogates were easier to come by in eigh-
teenth-century France than ersatz for bread (though, to be sure, for most 
people, rationalism was no more palatable or filling than rice).
In general, it is difficult to take issue with the liberal charge that the 
consumerist viewpoint perpetuated misleading and vicious stereo-
types about commerce, nurtured dangerous hopes among the people, 
and imposed enormous demands upon the government; that it was 
timorous, selfish, xenophobic, and anti-economic. Nor were the lib-
erals wrong in pointing out the existence of  a powerful tacit alliance 
between the police and the people. Dupont was right: under stress the 
police “became people,” that is to say, evinced unmistakable traces of  
the subsistence mentality. although it was not a genuinely comfort-
able or willingly acknowledged relationship for either, the alliance 
nevertheless served both their interests.
The subsistence problem was a powerful political force in the shap-
ing of  the Old Regime. It placed constraints upon government at all 
levels, especially the central government, and it mediated relations 
between the governors and the governed. moreover, it was construed 
as a political question, dimly and crudely by consumers who depended 
upon the government to heed its contract and more explicitly by the 
authorities who worried about containment and social control. Con-
sumers never perceived subsistence as an economic problem; for the 
police, it was a concern of  economic policy only incidentally and 
accessorily, in reluctant deference to the fact that grain was not the 
product of  spontaneous generation.1 (The wage side of  the equation 
had little bearing in this matter for either the active population of  
consumers or for the authorities.) Finally, subsistence was a politi-
cal question which stood outside the arena of  what we ordinarily 
call politics. Provisioning policy was not something to be defended, 
praised, or criticized. It was supposed to be beyond debate; it had a 
consensual, quasi-institutional status.
against this background, I stressed the radicalism of  the grain reform. 
1 See, in this connection, Turgot’s wry reminder to the local police that “the cobblestones of  the 
cities do not produce any [grain].” “Lettre circulaire aux officiers de police,” 15 Feb. 1766, C. 479, 
a.D. Haute-Vienne.
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It is hardly surprising to discover in the corpus of  eighteenth-century 
thought a number of  ideas that were profoundly subversive of  the 
old-regime way of  life; the Enlightenment is replete with them. But 
it does seem to me remarkable that a few of  these ideas, affecting the 
most delicate, most traditional, and, next to religion itself, the most 
sacrosanct sphere of  public and private life, passed into law.
The grain reforms were a devastating critique of  the police prac-
tices we have discussed. But they were not concerned, as royal reforms 
often were, with remedying specific defects. Ultimately, it is fruitless 
to confront the police and liberal arguments in these terms. The lib-
eral legislation demanded nothing less than a tabula rasa in subsistence 
affairs; it was an indictment of  the whole subsistence past, of  the pro-
visioning policy, of  the way in which the problem was posed.
a vast gulf  separated the new and the old ways. Laissez-faire 
meant the end of  subsistence primacy as a national goal and the 
end of  the special relation it implied between the government and 
the people. The new focus was on agriculture, the chief  source of  
national wealth as well as the source of  the kingdom’s food. Pro-
visioning was to be reduced to its proper status, as an offshoot of  
agriculture, and the producer was to replace the consumer as most-
favored-subject. To be sure, the consumers were not entirely ignored, 
for the new policy offered them the prospect of  an expanded agri-
culture, which would theoretically make dearth less likely, and a revi-
talized commerce, which would theoretically distribute grain more 
evenly, equalizing prices across time and space and attenuating their 
oscillations.
But the crucial fact for consumers was that prices would rise prac-
tically by royal declaration and that it was officially no longer to be 
the business of  government to assure their subsistence by the police 
of  provisioning. The entire police apparatus was to be dismantled, 
for it was now superfluous as well as vexatious. Commerce was to 
assume exclusive responsibility for provisioning, not as a service it 
owed society, but purely as a function of  its quest for profits, and 
it would police itself  through the purgative action of  competition. 
Imbalances would no longer be subject to administrative adjustment; 
as a result of  the underlying harmony of  interests, they would correct 
themselves naturally. In virtually every respect, the new way differed 
from the old—in its conceptions of  nature, liberty, property, competi-
tion, human motivation and the psychology of  interest, the proper 
role of  the state, and so on.
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The liberals tended to ignore the political aspects of  the subsis-
tence question, even as the police tended to neglect the economic 
ones. Implicit in the police view was the idea that there was only one 
meaningful time dimension, the short run—the dimension of  political 
time—and that all decisions had to be made within this framework. 
The liberals, on the contrary, averted their eyes from the present and 
immediate future in order to focus on long-range goals in the eco-
nomic dimension of  time. Persuaded that their principles were true, 
the liberals proceeded in the confidence that things would work out 
in the end, and that the end would justify the means. For reformers, 
the short run is often a trap. To break out of  the police cast of  mind, 
the liberals were obliged to look beyond. To do so required courage 
and resolution, though it may very well have been based upon serious 
miscalculations.
The government apparently presumed that it could disestablish 
the police and unilaterally disavow its traditional covenant with the 
people by a sweeping set of  laws. It explained and justified its action 
in simple terms (though, as we have seen, its motives in fact were 
highly sophisticated and ambitious): the old system was no longer 
useful and the old promises no longer binding because they had been 
founded on utterly false premises. The liberal king pretended to be 
accountable only to nature; natural law declared that subsistence 
could not be an affair of  state. But would the nation understand 
this reasoning? Would not the transition from bloated intervention-
ist state to lean spectator state be extremely difficult and costly?
There is no question that the government expected certain prob-
lems of  transition and acclimatization. Nevertheless, it had no strategy 
for dealing with them, except perhaps in the capital. By its own design 
and doctrine, provisioning was out of  its control. It would use author-
ity only to force grain to be free, not to force it to market on grounds 
of  social justice or expediency. yet the government was determined 
to repress (it could no longer think in terms of  preventing) disorders, 
for it had not lost its taste for tranquility along with its appetite for the 
police of  subsistence. Repression, by itself, was hardly a durable prin-
ciple of  social stability. During the Old Regime the stick had almost 
always been accompanied by the carrot; the one was usually not 
effective without the other. What after repression? The dilemma can 
be epitomized by the instructions that Turgot as Controller-General 
gave to the Lieutenant General of  Police at the time of  the Flour War, 
instructions which struck the police as mutually contradictory. On the 
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one hand: “Tend to the security of  the capital” and on the other: “Do 
not meddle with [the question of] bread.”2
as it turned out, the incidence and intensity of  popular unrest in 
the aftermath of  liberalization stunned the ministry. Even more shock-
ing was the frondeur spirit it encountered in the local administration. 
Local authorities had to answer for subsistence problems after 1763 as 
before, even as they had to answer for public order; vis-à-vis their con-
stituents and their superiors, liberalization did not free them from their 
traditional responsibilities. at Versailles, the king could turn spectator 
imperceptibly, but in the field it was far more difficult for officials to 
remain on the sidelines. Liberalization by itself  elicited a wide range of  
reactions from the local police: some were pleased, others indifferent, 
still others puzzled, startled, or horrified. But the subsistence crisis put 
the squeeze on all of  them and placed many of  them in a wholly unten-
able position. The government could provide them with little in the way 
of  concrete support, save for the occasional dispatch of  a maréchaussée or 
an army unit lodged in the area. Nor had the ministry consulted widely 
with local authorities before the promulgation of  the reforms in order 
to smooth the path for implementation. From the point of  view of  the 
grassroots police, this was liberalism by absolutist swagger. The gov-
ernment commanded and exhorted, but the incongruity between its 
instructions and local exigencies forced or prompted many officials to 
disobey, usually with reluctance and trepidation. Its estrangement from 
its own infrastructure of  local authority gradually placed the liberal 
ministry, too, in an untenable situation.3
The government knew that the reforms would have a deep impact 
on the popular milieu since they affected daily life so directly, but it 
did not know how to deal with popular opinion or with what we have 
called the subsistence mentality. It was not that the government was 
indifferent to public relations. On the contrary, it orchestrated the 
preparation of  the reforms to derive maximum political advantage 
from the idea of  associating the king with the nation. Though the 
monarchical system was not well suited for this kind of  politics, when 
liberalization came under attack, the king and the ministry appealed 
2 J.-N. moreau, Mes Souvenirs, ed. by C. Hermelin, II, 190.
3 It would be worth investigating whether there was any connection, intended or coincidental, 
between Laverdy’s municipal reform of  1764–65 and liberalization, whether this administrative 
reform facilitated or hindered the dismantling of  the police of  provisioning, etc. The answer 
doubtless lies in departmental and communal archives, but the point of  departure would be 
maurice Bordes, La Réforme municipale du Contrôleur-général Laverdy et son application (1764–71) 
(Toulouse, 1968).
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directly to the nation for support. But the nation which it addressed 
was not the bone and sinew that the government pretended it to be; 
the opinion which it cultivated and with which it felt at ease, the 
opinion which was acknowledged to be “queen” in the century of  
Enlightenment, was naturally an elite opinion, the opinion of  the 
educated, the men of  substance. This opinion was informed, it was 
accessible, especially through the written word, and in a number of  
ways it was easier to manipulate or to influence than inarticulate and 
elusive popular opinion. It would have been pointless for the liberal 
government to have hired a band of  Voltaires to write essays or grain 
catechisms promoting its policy, for they would not have reached the 
formless public of  consumers.
But suppose the government had found a way to address this pub-
lic: What could it have said? That natural law could be counted on? 
That higher prices would make the world safer for their children and 
their children’s children? That self-restraint under stress was a virtue? 
That the king, as a sign of  his confidence, had declared his children 
emancipated or major? The problem, from the liberal standpoint, 
was that the people “did not reason” on subsistence questions. Thus 
there was no easy way to discredit their old assumptions and to invite 
belief  in a new approach, which sprung from nature, but required a 
sophisticated, multivariate, rational analysis of  economic and social 
activity. The fact that the people clung to “prejudices” frustrated the 
liberals, but it reassured them at the same time, for it justified their 
unwillingness to give serious consideration to popular attitudes. These 
prejudices were unfounded, rationally and objectively. Popular fears, 
like many so-called dearths, were “artificial” and “unreal.”
There was a brutal edge to grain liberalism; perhaps there had to be. 
Pitted against the massive inertia of  tradition and the deeply-ingrained 
habits of  the people, it had to be unflinching and it was bound to seem 
cruel. Grain liberalism was founded on an ethos hostile to the domi-
nant values of  the society and it involved abrupt and jolting changes. 
Doctrinally, its own logic gave it an intransigent and cold-hearted cast. 
There was no place for old-style moral reckoning in the new politi-
cal economy. The discovery of  a social and economic science stood 
between the liberalism of  the sixties and the diffuse humanitarianism 
of  the Enlightenment of  the abbé de Saint-Pierre. Faith in the scien-
tific basis of  their analysis relieved the liberals of  a potential moral 
dilemma (though it did not resolve the political one). The prescriptions 
of  liberalism were not moral choices; they were imposed by the physical 
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laws of  nature, laws which were by definition just and inexorable and 
which were perforce anterior to any conception of  morality. The lib-
erals were men of  charity, but they believed that compassion had to 
be subordinated to the first principles around which society was orga-
nized. They warned against succumbing to sentimentality in dealing 
with the fundamental questions of  social and economic life. Senti-
mentality was the ally of  and the alibi for tradition and timidity. Good 
government had to be strong in self-restraint; it could not take its lead 
from the people.
The doctrine of  grain liberalism provoked a considerable amount 
of  criticism; we have had the occasion to examine some of  it in detail. 
The reproaches that stung the liberals most deeply were those which 
charged that they were indifferent to popular suffering, that they were 
inhumane. Whatever their doctrine later became, the leading theorists 
were not inspired by mean or unworthy motives. There is no reason to 
doubt the sincerity of  their commitment to human progress and their 
belief  in the capacity of  man to fashion a better world. It is easier for 
many of  us to sympathize with the poor of  the consumer army and 
with harried officials than with salon or state ideologues; it is easy to 
forget that the latter were locked in a struggle, aimed, in their view, at 
freeing man from the shackles of  the past, and that their doctrine was 
a program of  combat. It was not, however, liberalism’s attitude toward 
the people nor its apparent ferocity which troubled most contempo-
rary critics. Nor was it the doctrine’s refusal to recognize a social jus-
tice apart from the justice of  natural law which was stacked against the 
people or its allegedly scientific rationalization of  what we would call 
class interests. Lurking in the shadows of  the progress and prosper-
ity which liberalism promised to generate, these critics sensed chaos. 
It was not so much that the liberal program could pass only at the 
expense of  the people than that it would subject the whole society to 
progress by ordeal. The critics feared that the liberal future would be 
less desirable than the past, not only for the people but for everyone.
The range of  this criticism was enormous; on one point or another, it 
united men of  vastly different views. They included administrators who 
were primarily concerned about social equilibrium and writers who 
were interested in what later became called social and political science. 
at one extreme were old-fashioned conservatives, frightened by the 
spectre of  change, who assimilated grain liberalism to the broader quest 
for liberty undertaken by the Enlightenment in myriad other domains 
and denounced all of  them in one shrill cry. at the other extreme 
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were critics at home within the Enlightenment whose reactions were 
more arresting because they were far less predictable.
In this respect the attitude of  Diderot seems especially significant to 
me, though it would be wrong to make any flat claim for its represen-
tativeness in the philosophical community as a whole. In the early days 
of  physiocracy—the theoretical days—Diderot shared the enthusiasm 
of  the économistes for their exciting enterprise. Unlike his friend Grimm, 
who expressed contempt for their pomposity and dogmatism, Diderot 
admired their critical pugnacity, their boundless curiosity, and their 
search for universality. In the end, however, after the crisis of  the six-
ties, he recoiled in horror from their social program. The prospect of  
a society operating strictly according to the absolute laws of  property 
and liberty repelled Diderot because it was politically brittle and mor-
ally objectionable. What bothered him about physiocracy was not its 
legal despotism nor its single tax, but its underlying principles as they 
figured in its grain policy, its laissez-faire complaisance, its capitalist 
ethos. although Diderot’s position is not without ambiguities, it is safe 
to say that the encounter between liberal theory and old-regime habits 
in the late sixties and early seventies severely jarred him. Grain liberal-
ism was too radical for one of  the most radical of  philosophes.
The remarkable thing about grain liberalism, I have argued, was 
its radicalism. It broke violently with tradition and it crystallized, in 
embryo, many of  the powerful psychological, political, and socio-eco-
nomic forces which in the next three generations would drastically 
change France and much of  the Western world. yet the radicalism 
of  this liberalism depends to a large degree on the perspective of  the 
beholder. For it must not be forgotten that the liberal program drew its 
support from some of  the most reputedly traditional and conservative-
minded elements in French society: the major land- and grain-owners, 
including important segments of  the nobility, sword and robe. It was 
able to do this, not because it preached an enlightened, progressive 
philosophical doctrine—utilitarianism, individualism, the laws of  
nature, the worth of  liberty and the power of  evidence—but because 
it defined its liberalism in terms of  grain. In other forms, the liberalism 
of  physiocracy, like the ideas of  other philosophes, would have fright-
ened the proprietors and grain holders, not to mention the members 
of  the royal council and of  the sovereign courts. The political triumph 
of  grain liberalism was precisely its ability to link its fate to a powerful, 
traditional, and resurgent economic (and political) interest.
The proprietors and grain owners, unlike the économistes and some 
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of  their critics, did not believe that “tout se tient”—“everything is 
linked together.” They were not interested in systems nor did they 
worry about intellectual coherence. Grain liberalism for them 
meant, above all, higher prices and a better return. It had no uni-
versal dimension of  truth, no complex ideological content. Nor did 
it portend for them the revolt of  the police and the people, the dis-
mantling of  corporate bonds, the ascendency of  merit and parvenu 
wealth, the dislocation of  the traditional corporate structure, or any 
other nightmare of  social upheaval. Grain liberalism meant that they 
could have the best of  both worlds. It meant, for example, that the 
Parlement of  Toulouse could have liberty of  trade as sanctioned by 
nature, while retaining the liberty to extirpate heresy as sanctioned by 
God. The socioeconomic elites were prepared to join in a movement 
profoundly subversive of  their world because they did not understand 
it or because they did not take seriously its far-reaching implications.
moreover, it is virtually certain that the theorists themselves did not 
foresee the violent shocks that liberalism would produce in years to 
come. Galiani’s charges to the contrary notwithstanding, the leading 
économistes were not enragés—far from it. In their view society was stale-
mated, its development blocked by the bonds that tied it to the past. 
Were there compelling reasons for them, from a vantage point within 
the stifling atmosphere of  the Old Regime, to anticipate how dramati-
cally laissez-faire would change, not only the rules of  the game, but 
the game itself ? Was there any reason for them to suspect how cor-
rosive their brand of  liberty could or would become? Their adven-
ture was so parlous and so exciting precisely because they did not 
know where it would lead, though they undertook it, I think, with the 
belief  that it would not turn the world upside-down. For lack of  bet-
ter models, there was always the example of  England, a nation which 
seemed at first glance to have reconciled and integrated the goals of  sta-
bility and growth along lines not completely foreign to the liberal vision.
The liberals were groping for a formula for what we have come to 
call modernization. Indeed, from their standpoint, unlike other reform-
ers, they were not groping—on the contrary, they had found in nature 
the philosopher’s stone, which some had sought in magic potions that 
made base metal glitter (or more recently made seed grain multiply 
prodigiously) and which others had sought in piecemeal schemes of  
innovation. The peculiar merit of  grain liberalism was that it pro-
claimed that the road to modernization passed first through economic 
expansion, that this was the only way to remove the social and political 
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 blockages which clogged the channels of  the Old Regime. Superficially, 
the idea bears a certain resemblance to mercantilist doctrine, but the 
goals and methods of  liberalism and its conceptions of  the relation of  
state and society and of  the functions of  wealth were vastly different and 
its socioeconomic model infinitely more supple and dynamic.4 It is of  
at least symbolical significance that when the government of  1770–71 
repudiated grain liberalism and the economic road to  modernization, 
it turned again to the war against the parlements and to the worn polit-
ical-institutional road to modernization, a road more familiar to the 
ministers of  the Old Regime than the uncertain path of  liberalism, but 
one which proved time and again to be a cul-de-sac.
Thus it would be wrong to claim categorically that the liber-
als did not understand their society and attempt, in this fashion, to 
explain liberalization as an aberration, one of  those geometrical and 
abstract reforms which eighteenth century government produced in 
its stuporous cups after having imbibed too many drafts of  (bad) phi-
losophy. This was the view of  some of  the police apologists; later it 
became the standard interpretation of  many nineteenth- and twen-
tieth-century writers on the Enlightenment and the Old Regime. In 
the eyes of  its partisans, liberalization was politics geared to both 
profits and principles. One can hardly imagine, it seems to me, a 
doctrine that could better serve the restlessness of  the economic and 
intellectual elites of  the time than the new political economy, nor 
a program more neatly tailored to satisfy certain of  the economic 
needs of  pre-industrial France. If  the liberals, as I have tried to sug-
gest, were unwilling or unable to deal with some realities, nevertheless 
they had an ingenious plan for dealing with others. The prescription 
seemed to fit; that is why the government invested so much hope in it 
and transformed it into policy and law. But that does not mean, as we 
have seen, that the medicine did not have ominous contraindications.
Liberalization was short-lived; whether it did not survive because it 
did not work or for other reasons was hotly debated by contemporaries 
and is still subject to controversy. I am inclined to believe that it could 
not have worked in eighteenth-century France; that France was not 
yet ready for laissez-faire. Liberalization was bound to founderevery 
4 The antithesis mercantilism-liberalism is extremely misleading. The two doctrines had a 
great deal in common and many points of  intersection in old-regime policy and literature. 
an economist like Véron de Forbonnais, for example, served as a bridge between the two 
approaches and exerted considerable influence. although the context is rather narrow, see the 
useful remarks of  Paul H. Beik, A Judgment of  the Old Regime (New york, 1941) 266ff.
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time it came under stress and it was bound to come under stress fre-
quently, given the tyrannical hold of  grain, the inelasticity of  demand 
and the continued increase in population, the narrow aggregative 
margin between production and consumption and the frequent cases 
of  regional or local disproportion between them, the acute vulnerabil-
ity of  the whole production-distribution nexus to myriad accidents, 
the implacable constraints of  time and space, the disunity of  France 
as reflected in the persistence of  legal, commercial, administrative, 
and folk particularisms, the rigidity of  foodways, the uncertainty of  
international economic relations, and so on. The liberals argued that 
liberty could have progressively created the conditions prerequisite for 
its own success. In some ways I think they were right. Laissez-faire, for 
example, would ultimately have forced a unification of  weights and 
measures and could probably have produced the sort of  market orga-
nization and the trade factors equipped to respond effectively to sup-
ply and demand pressures. Whether by itself, however, it could have 
overcome the other obstructions or the fresh barriers that it was likely 
to generate as it gained momentum seems highly doubtful to me. For 
laissez-faire to have solved the subsistence problem, major technologi-
cal changes would have been necessary on both the production and 
distribution sides. all these elements remain apart from the short-term 
political, social, and psychological considerations, which proved to be 
decisive in the sixties and again in the seventies.
although in the early stages the liberals rushed to catalogue the 
putative achievements of  the reforms in stimulating agriculture and 
reinvigorating the grain trade, in the end they argued that the reforms 
had not received a fair trial. They claimed first that liberalization had 
been thwarted by a stroke of  bad luck: a series of  bad harvests. There 
is no doubt that there were short crops throughout the late sixties, 
though the opponents of  the reforms insisted, not implausibly, that the 
failures were not as bad or as general as the liberals claimed. yet, given 
past experience, it was not unreasonable to expect that the kingdom, or 
large parts of  it, would have to face harvest failures sooner or later. The 
constant threat of  meteorological accident had to figure in the liberal 
design, even as it weighed heavily on police thinking. Second, the liber-
als maintained that the reforms had been undermined by bad faith, that 
they had not been vigorously executed in many areas, and that they had 
been actively subverted in others. The evidence suggests that the laws, 
at least in the beginning, were widely implemented. The police did not 
brazenly refuse to execute royal will. Their revolt took shape slowly, 
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spasmodically, and painfully. moreover, the reforms were permissive, 
enabling laws; their success depended in considerable measure on the ini-
tiatives and the aggressiveness of  the traders and grain-owners. Indica-
tions are that they took advantage of  the new conditions on a broad scale. 
Still, it is clear that as the subsistence crisis worsened, the local authorities 
became increasingly unwilling to abide by the reform constraints and in 
some fashion or other many of  them violated the liberal laws. at the very 
moment the government declared that it was most urgent to execute the 
reform laws rigorously, the police refused to stand aside.
Third, the liberals claimed that the reforms themselves were incom-
plete and thus that liberal theory had been improperly served. This 
line permitted the économistes, after the fall of  the liberal ministry, to 
hold the government partly responsible for the failure of  the reform 
and to argue that a larger dose of  liberty would have done the job. 
Total liberty, however, was more a battle cry than a program. In terms 
of  domestic traffic, the law could not have granted a more perfect lib-
erty, save for its failure to assure the elimination of  all customs and fees 
barriers in and en route to markets. moreover, the liberals made far 
too much of  the restrictions that the government deliberately imposed 
on liberty. The Paris exemptions purchased some time for the gov-
ernment, but they failed utterly to insulate the capital or its hinter-
lands and they did not prevent the traders in the Paris region from 
responding to the blandishments of  liberty. The export ceiling never 
choked off  exportation completely; at many outlets it never came into 
play. Nor did it prevent the price from reaching and maintaining (in 
many areas surpassing) the international par sought by the liberals or 
dampen the optimistic commercial mood which the July Edict was 
intended to create. If  anything, the ceiling was higher than it needed 
to be to achieve the aims of  the government; a lower cut-off  point 
would have made the law politically more palatable at no real cost.
The government, as I have tried to demonstrate, had a great stake 
in the success of  the reform. It showed remarkable nerve in undertak-
ing it and it defended it stubbornly in the face of  increasingly serious 
disaffection and opposition. There are very few examples of  such 
determination in the history of  the eighteenth-century ministries. 
The government refused to compromise, nor was there any room 
for compromise. For there was no middle ground to occupy between 
police and liberty; or rather, the police regime had already appropri-
ated whatever terrain lay between controls and freedom. Liberalism 
was perforce extremism in the old-regime context.
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The Paris reserve operation was a very reasonable gamble to take. 
Had the ministry used it more decisively and managed it with greater 
care, it might have rendered the liberal cause a major service—at the 
price, to be sure, of  offending its liberal scruples. as it turned out, the 
king’s grain was of  vital importance to the Parisian supply system. Politi-
cally, the operation proved disastrous; it alienated an important segment 
of  public and police opinion, on the one hand, and liberal opinion, on 
the other. It did not, however, as certain liberal writers claimed, paralyze 
or undermine private commerce throughout the kingdom.
The subsistence crisis, which began in some places as early as 1765, 
interrupted the process of  liberalization and eventually led to its aban-
donment. It breached the gap between theory and fact, thrust the 
liberals on the defensive, and welded a strong opposition coalition. It 
was one of  the most severe crises of  this kind which the eighteenth 
century experienced; indeed, for most areas, it was the most cata-
strophic since 1709, and in some it was considerably worse than the 
situation proved to be in 1788–89. Eventually, it engulfed almost the 
entire kingdom; while it did not reach many areas of  the South and 
Southeast until the seventies, in certain portions of  the North it per-
sisted or recurred in one form or another for almost a decade.
The crisis was characterized by serious shortages of  grain, vio-
lent disruptions in the supply trade, and a doubling of  the price level 
(in some places a tripling), accompanied by wild oscillations around 
the new level. It was a political crisis from below and from above, in 
terms of  the repeated eruptions of  popular protest of  an incidence 
and intensity without parallel in the reign of  Louis XV and as a result 
of  the challenge which the emergence of  a powerful opposition force 
posed to the ministry. It was a socioeconomic crisis for vast numbers 
of  the laboring poor in cities and in the countryside, who suffered at 
best from belt-tightening and anxiety and at worst from hunger, panic, 
unemployment, uprooting, disease and death. Recent investigation 
intimates that mortality and morbidity, the most dramatic instances of  
the horrors of  dearth, may have been greater than usually supposed. 
yet these are not the sole and perhaps not the best indicators of  grave 
social troubles; more research will be necessary before we can mea-
sure the full disorganizing impact of  the crisis on daily life. Nor were 
the laboring poor the only segment of  society affected. By 1770–71, 
the grain crisis had provoked a general economic crisis, which dislo-
cated business life of  all kinds through a large part of  the kingdom.
I have suggested that this subsistence crisis was in many ways similar
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to others which preceded it. Leaving aside the question of  scale and 
intensity, there are familiar patterns of  genesis, spontaneity and conta-
gion, protest and accommodation, commercial fever and stagnation, 
market disorganization, seasonal price fluctuations, urban-rural and 
market-hinterland tensions, and so on. The major difference, again 
leaving aside the question of  magnitude, between this crisis and the 
others was that this dearth was preceded by a comprehensive grain 
reform. after the dearth began to make itself  felt, the government 
did nothing to contain it and tried to prevent other authorities from 
combatting it with traditional methods—not as a result of  what I have 
called the paralysis of  discretion, nor because it could not determine 
whether it was a “real” or an “artificial” dearth, nor because it lacked 
the resources or information to take measures, but because of  a con-
scious decision by which it had drastically altered its policy. The point, 
let me stress, is not that the government could have stemmed the crisis; 
one of  the themes of  this study is the tragic disproportion between the 
means at the disposal of  the police and the gravity and complexity of  
the problems with which they had to deal. Rather, it is that for the first 
time in the Old Regime the government chose to play a passive role.
Both in terms of  causes and effects, it is extremely difficult to disen-
tangle the reforms and the grain crisis. I have argued that liberaliza-
tion did not cause the dearth, but that it helped, directly and indirectly, 
to transform it into a crisis. The liberals denied any responsibility for it. 
They steeled themselves for the test; they felt, quite rightly within the 
terms of  their doctrine and policy, that whatever the consequences, 
they could not give ground or they would lose everything. They called 
for more liberty to fight the dearth and for more authority to contain 
the police and the people. Officially, the liberal line was that there was 
no crisis. yet others traced the origins of  the dearth directly to the 
reforms; the longer subsistence difficulties persisted and the longer the 
government refused to acknowledge the gravity of  the situation in the 
classical police fashion, the more convincing this analysis appeared, 
even to those who were disinclined to cast blame.
It required neither sophistication nor credulity to hold liberalization at 
least partly responsible for the subsistence difficulties. For one thing, 
higher prices were one of  the announced goals of  the reform and 
their consequences were supposed to be salutary for the whole nation. 
For another, liberalization, even without the burden of  short crops, by 
its very nature mimicked many of  the effects of  a traditional subsis-
tence crisis. as a result, it was almost inevitable that some observers 
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would mistake the one for the other. Historically, at least from the 
police perspective, subsistence crises were times when the ordinary 
supply organization broke down, when human vice preceded or com-
pounded nature’s ravages, when license created or aggravated the 
problem of  scarcity. Before harvest shortages declared themselves in 
many regions in the second half  of  the sixties, grain appeared to 
be rare and prices began to mount as traders and owners began to 
reassess their options in the light of  new opportunities. The market 
structure was not strong or supple enough to accommodate shifting 
patterns of  commerce without serious supply and price disturbances. 
Nor were the early signs of  uncertainty or trouble without disquieting 
effects on the attitudes of  police and consumers. These fears them-
selves began to act like self-fulfilling prophecies.
a great deal more must be learned about the operation of  the grain 
and flour trades in ordinary times before we can take stock of  the real 
influence of  liberalization from place to place. among the develop-
ments which are likely to be discerned and connected with the reforms 
are the entry of  new persons into the trade, including, on the one 
extreme, a horde of  micro-traders and, on the other, a handful of  men 
concentrating uncommon amounts of  capital and business expertise; 
the establishment of  regional markets bypassing local demand or new 
lines of  supply for metropolitan centers; and the elaboration of  new 
marketing facilities and new trading practices. apart from these “real” 
influences, we must take acount of  psychological factors which have a 
reality of  their own. There was, for example, the new spirit of  inde-
pendence and confidence evinced by owners and traders, as well as 
the buoyant expectations of  cultivators, which the liberal writers cel-
ebrated.5 Nothing better illustrates the antiliberal state of  mind than 
5 I have pointed out above how impatient the liberals were immediately after the promulgation 
of  the liberal reforms to find evidence of  its beneficent effect on agriculture—as a prod to 
clearing land, improving cultivation and increasing productivity. Baudeau suggested that 
the owners, fermiers and cultivators were keenly aware of  the influence liberalization was 
likely to have on land revenues in particular and on the rural economy in general. He cited 
an as example the fact that “shrewd fermiers” stipulated in writing that the conditions of  
their new or revised leases would be binding only so long as liberty prevailed as the law of  
the land. as a measure of  the psychological as well as the economic impact of  liberalization, 
it would be worthwhile testing Baudeau’s claim in the notarial and registration records. 
See N. Baudeau, Avis aux honnêtes gens qui veulent bien faire (amsterdam, and Paris, 1768), 37. 
There are also interesting indications in a major study which unfortunately reached me 
after completion of  the present work: Georges Frêche, Toulouse et la région Midi-Pyrénées au 
siècle des lumières (Paris: Cujas, 1974–75), 567. Cf. above, chapter 12 and P. de Saint-Jacob, 
Les Paysans de la Bourgogne du Nord, 347–95.
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the export question. For many officials and consumers, the permis-
sion to export was synonymous with the abolition of  all controls, and 
the removal of  any grain from the local environment meant export 
regardless of  the destination of  the commodity. Whether or not liber-
alization in fact drained a huge amount of  grain from France, as many 
critics claimed, became from this perspective immaterial, a superflu-
ous refinement of  analysis.
The evidence suggests that the nation was deeply divided over lib-
eralization. I have tried to chart some of  the lines of  division—politi-
cal, regional, social, economic, philosophical, administrative—but it 
would be worthwhile to explore these divisions more closely in future 
inquiry. I have depicted the popular and the police revolts as a grass-
roots movement for the recall of  the liberal reforms and for the resto-
ration of  traditional subsistence relations, but a good deal more must 
be learned about politics and, indeed, about government at the local 
level before we can be satisfied with this view. The composition of  the 
liberal lobby, both before and after the promulgation of  the reforms, 
is not well known. To a considerable extent, the lines of  division cut 
across the conventional sociojuridical cleavages of  the Old Regime. 
Past political record was not a reliable predictor of  attitude toward 
the reforms or toward the government. Nor was economic interest 
always a determining factor. Liberal theory focussed attention on the 
hiatus between city and countryside, but liberalization and the crisis 
built many bridges between urban and rural interests.
The experience of  the sixties and seventies casts light upon regional 
life and regional conflicts, subjects which have been neglected in studies 
of  old-regime political history. It is not easy to say what constitutes a 
regional interest or what renders it peculiar and it would be presumptu-
ous to imagine that a parlement or an estate or a chamber of  commerce 
or a society of  agriculture spoke for the interest of  a whole region rather 
than for corporate or privileged interests similar to others to be found 
throughout the kingdom. yet these institutions were self-consciously 
regional bodies; I think it would be a mistake to submerge their attitudes 
in an interpretive scheme which associated them with their counter-
parts elsewhere in France without any consideration of  regional idio-
syncracies or identification. In the same way, it would be a mistake to 
tax as parochialism every instance of  local or regional deviation from 
some standard set by modernizing, rationalizing commis in the bureaus 
of  the Contrôle-Général. Nor should the divisions wrought by the 
grain issue remain obscured by the conventional sociopolitical frames 
696 BREaD, POLITICS aND POLITICaL ECONOmy
in which we view the “age of  reform,” the “age of  enlightened despo-
tism,” or the royal-parlementary struggle featuring the union des classes.
another aspect of  center-periphery relations illuminated by the 
grain crisis was the hostility of  the provinces to Paris—the hostility 
not only of  the liberal regions, but of  such pillars of  antiliberalism 
as the Norman Parlement. While it did not take an explosive turn 
until after 1789, the hatred that parts of  France felt for Paris was not 
an invention of  the Revolution, nor was this hatred during the Old 
Regime purely a matter of  anti-urban moralizing or jealousy of  the 
capital’s prestige. Paris weighed heavily upon the rest of  France long 
before the Revolution. It would be worth-while to examine system-
atically the ways in which the provinces defended themselves. many 
provincials had the impression that the government could not see 
beyond Paris. The attitude of  Rouen suggests that hostility to Paris 
was not a veiled expression of  antagonism towards absolutism and 
centralization—a nostalgic affirmation of  provincialism—but a pro-
test against the ineffectiveness of  centralization and the failure to 
integrate the provinces into a united kingdom on a level of  equality.
all these matters are closely connected with the question of  the 
parlements. The parlements were, on occasion, spokesmen for 
regional concerns which transcended or had nothing to do with their 
corporate solidarities. They were, at least in some instances, capable 
of  treating political, social, and economic questions without refer-
ence to the narrow range of  motives usually ascribed to them. The 
parlements played an administrative and a local and regional political 
role which is easy to overlook in the national context. I have tried to 
suggest not that the parlements did not merit their reputation for ego-
tism and obstructionism, but that parlementary politics were much 
more nuanced than is generally supposed. Despite the kilometers of  
shelves of  parlementary records and the scores of  studies devoted 
to the courts, we know remarkably little about them as work-a-day 
institutions and about the magistrates as working members of  these 
institutions rather than as representatives of  a so-called social group. 
It seems to me that we must be more cautious in dealing with the par-
lements than we have been and more skeptical of  the slogans used in 
contemporary debate to describe them. The grain affair is perhaps 
the exception which confirms the rule. But it is also possible that the 
grain affair is only the most notable of  many exceptions.
In any event, as I argued at some length above, I think that the 
conventional view of  the sixties, which focuses almost exclusively on 
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fiscality, the constitutional and political struggle between crown and courts, 
and the preparation for the maupeou coup by way of  the Brittany affair 
must be substantially revised to take account of  liberalization and the gen-
eral crisis associated with it, which was in the foreground of  local and 
national preoccupations throughout the realm. I have tried to point out 
some of  the political consequences and implications of  this crisis; doubt-
less there are other paths to follow, especially in relation to the maupeou 
coup, in regard to the pressures that came into play on the regional plane, 
and in terms of  the reputation of  the king, attitudes toward kingship, and 
the effects of  the experience of  1765–75 on local administration and on 
what we might tentatively call popular political consciousness.
It would also be fruitful to reexamine Turgot’s ministry in the light 
of  the crisis spawned in the sixties. Viewed upon this background, the 
Flour War is something of  an anticlimax. Rather than a new beginning, 
Turgot’s ministry marks the resuscitation and extension of  the reform 
spirit of  the sixties. I have tried to sketch the way in which Turgot 
attempted to turn the subsistence difficulties and especially the discredit 
of  the government of  Louis XV to his advantage in preparation for the 
next phase of  liberalization.
The crisis of  the sixties also left a deep imprint on the thinking of  
Necker, Turgot’s outspoken critic and his most influential succes-
sor. Necker, too, we are beginning to remember, was a philosophe, in 
the sense that contemporaries understood that word, and a reformer. 
Though the Turgot-Necker dichotomy, like the Sully-Colbert opposi-
tion, drastically oversimplifies the issue, it does portray the broad range 
of  policy options available to the government in the last decades of  the 
Old Regime. But the choice between them was not a choice between 
light and darkness, the modern and the gothic, and so on. Finally, both 
the crisis of  the sixties-seventies and the Turgot-Necker tension suggest 
the need to reexamine, first, the notion of  enlightened despotism and, 
second, the political and social ideas of  the philosophes and their rela-
tion to the politics of  the last quarter of  the age of  Enlightenment.
The economic impact of  the crisis, apart from the subsis-
tence element, deserves more careful attention than I could give 
it. Surely it is not sufficient to characterize it simply as a cyclical 
setback in a long-term upswing, as has often been done, with-
out undertaking a more patient assessment of  its significance. 
In addition to a socially differential evaluation of  the conse-
quences of  the economic crisis, with special emphasis on the 
price-wage lag and the employment situation, we must have 
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a regionally differential picture as well. We also need a sharper sense 
of  the schedule and rhythm of  recovery, by sector as well as by place 
and by socioprofessional category. It would be worthwhile to exam-
ine the bearing of  the economic dislocation of  the late sixties and 
early seventies on the maupeou reforms, especially in reference to 
their implementation in the provinces. Terray’s brutality, too, would 
make more sense when viewed upon a background not only of  fiscal 
emergency, but of  severe economic crisis of  a broader nature.
De-liberalization marked a great moral and political triumph for the 
critics of  the reforms. It did not, however, bring an immediate end to 
the crisis, as many Frenchmen had been led to expect it would. Ironi-
cally, the result was to cast suspicion on Terray’s policy and intentions, 
despite the fact that he was a staunch exponent of  consumerism, and 
to salvage a glimmer of  hope and a measure of  grim satisfaction for the 
liberals, who were defeated, but not totally crushed.
Controls proved to be no more a panacea than liberty, especially 
since they were not accompanied by copious harvest surpluses. Recur-
rent short crops remained the chief  source of  the problem (which was 
international in dimension), but it was aggravated by the continued 
disruption of  the grain and flour trade. Not even grain dealers were 
immune to the effects of  the general economic crisis, which created 
an environment highly unfavorable to commercial exchanges, espe-
cially those involving risks, requiring credit, or covering large spans of  
time and distance. In some places, the process of  reimposing controls 
was hardly felt, but in others it buffeted or paralyzed the trade. De-
liberalization enhanced the climate of  economic uncertainty. at the 
same time, riots and demonstrations continued to reflect consumer 
dissatisfaction, frustation, and fear.
yet, from the police-consumer standpoint, there were positive signs 
associated with the restoration policy. Public disorder was less wide-
spread than it had been in the sixties and it tended to be most serious 
in those areas which were just beginning to feel the full intensity of  
the subsistence crisis and, to some extent, in those areas which were 
slowest to subject trade to regulation. De-liberalization filled the local 
authorities with confidence and gave them a sense of  mastery over the 
situation which they had not felt for years. There is evidence in some 
places that the public consciously joined in a sigh of  relief. Still, we 
must await further research before we can discern patterns and assess 
the consequences of  de-liberalization on the local plane. In some areas, 
the police appear to have been successful in reorganizing the trade, 
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reestablishing the centrality and the reliability of  the market, locat-
ing supplies, and quieting anxieties. In some places police restoration 
involved only minor adjustments, while in others it took the form of  a 
St. Bartholomew’s massacre. Nor is it clear that those authorities who 
practiced the restraint that was supposed to be the mark of  administra-
tive wisdom enjoyed better results than those who bludgeoned.
Restraint, nevertheless, was Terray’s watchword. While he had no 
inhibitions about public intervention, like other leading police figures, 
he believed that an authoritarian grain policy could do as much harm 
as it did good. The problem was to know when, where, and how to 
intervene most effectively and to prevent miscalculations or excesses on 
the part of  the police as well as the traders and owners. Implicit in Ter-
ray’s view was the idea that subsistence could not be considered from a 
strictly local perspective. It implied central control, over local admin-
istration as well as over the distributive mechanisms. In the end, as 
I attempted to show, Terray was unable to realize either aim, for simi-
lar reasons. He was the first Controller-General to think in terms of  
a national subsistence policy, but it remained nothing more than a 
vision, buttressed by a little more data than his predecessors had at 
their disposal. Beyond the desire to centralize decision making in the 
hands of  the royal government, Terray suggested nothing new: no 
long-term schemes for dealing with lean and fat years, no innovation 
in the strategy and tactics of  short-term regulatory or preventive poli-
cies, except perhaps in the use of  the king’s grain.
There are strong hints that Terray envisaged the king’s grain as 
a permanent, ongoing adjunct to central subsistence policy. In the 
past, after dearths, the government had hurried to rid itself  of  the 
king’s grain as rapidly as possible in order to recover as much of  its 
investment as possible, to save on maintenance costs, to avoid giving 
credence to suspicions of  maneuvers, and to remove royal supplies 
from competition with private commerce. machault, followed by the 
liberal ministers of  the sixties, kept a permanent reserve, but it was of  
modest proportions and it was destined exclusively for the capital. Ter-
ray’s operations were, of  course, undertaken in the midst of  dearth, 
not prophylactically, and they knew no geographical bounds, albeit 
the capital continued to be favored. Despite the financial and political 
burden, Terray considered the royal grain operations to be extremely 
useful. They allowed him to give substance to his desire to view the 
kingdom’s supply problem as a whole and they permitted him to inter-
vene tactically, to borrow from one place in order to assist another, 
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and to support local police in a decisive fashion. Like his predeces-
sors, he relied wholly on commerce for ordinary provisioning, but he 
wanted to be prepared to take direct action when difficulties arose. 
He played the role of  Joseph to the king’s desultory Pharaoh with less 
uneasiness than any other Controller-General.
I have characterized the grain victualer’s world in the eighteenth 
century as the counterpart of  our military-industrial complex (to be 
sure, the bankers, and before them the financiers, also had serious 
claims to this title). The “milieu” is not well known; it needs to be 
carefully studied, if  not as Lüthy did the Protestant banking estab-
lishment, for want of  documentation, then as mathiez exposed the 
revolutionary profiteers. The Bernards, Thellussons, Pâris brothers, 
Leray de Chaumonts, Sorins, and Doumercs comprise only the tip 
of  the iceberg. moreover, their operations are clouded in the mys-
teries and the highly-charged atmosphere of  famine plots and other 
machinations. The result is that we know little about their networks 
of  correspondence in France and in amsterdam, Danzig, London, 
the Levant, africa, and america; we do not know to what extent 
they really perturbed domestic trade; we do not know about the rela-
tions among different victualers, dependent on different (sometimes 
rival) institutions or assigned to different regions; we cannot gauge 
what share of  the provisioning burden they assumed. Victualing was 
an immensely complicated and onerous business. In retrospect, it 
seems less remarkable that the king’s grain operations were so badly 
managed in the sixties and seventies (and in 1725–26 and the early 
forties), than that they rendered as much service as they did. On a rel-
atively large scale, during the short term, and without any substantial 
institutional framework, they were the most effective disaster-relief  
agencies in the Old Regime.
It is impossible to deal with the king’s grain without touching upon 
the “famine pact.” From our perspective today, it is less important to 
debunk the “legend,” as historians have come to style it, than to under-
stand how it took root and what sustained it. I have tried to show that 
it was an integral and predictable part of  what I have called the sub-
sistence mentality and the dearth syndrome, and that it was of  great 
political as well as psychological significance. It required no particular 
gift for credulity to believe in the pact idea in its most rudimentary form. 
Nor is it wholly inexact to contend that the government did indeed 
speculate on grain, directly and indirectly, though always in the con-
text of  a victualing operation and never for exclusively fiscal or venal 
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motives. Through the stories of  malisset and Leprévost de Beau-
mont, I indicated how liberalization gave the pact idea a special 
political meaning. These charges contributed mightily to discredit 
Louis the Beloved. I suggested that they may also have had political 
implications which transcended the reputation of  the king. Ironically, 
de-liberalization did not purge the government of  the stain; the gov-
ernment continued to inspire deep mistrust, even as it restored the 
police, extended victualing operations, and fulfilled its paternalistic 
obligations. Before it became legend, the pacte de famine was a brutal 
fact of  life for kings, ministers, and consumers.
The experience of  the sixties and seventies did nothing to resolve 
or alter the subsistence problem in any fundamental way. Subsis-
tence continued to be an object of  worry and sometimes of  terror 
for many years to come. For those who believed in the efficacy of  
police, the restoration of  the old system was a source of  reassurance. 
It represented, however, a return to the status quo ante rather than an 
advance on a new front of  attack. There are some vague signs that 
the crisis might have had a chastening effect on the police. It did 
compel the police to take a serious look at themselves and to acknowl-
edge certain excesses and absurdities in organization and operation. 
But it led to no formal reform effort, and it is clear that the police 
continued to cling to the same assumptions and techniques upon 
which they had relied for the past half  century. Indeed, in some 
cases, the vivid memory of  the sixties led to a hardening rather than 
a softening of  attitudes on controls.
as a result of  the crisis, of  the sixties and seventies the subsistence 
question became a major issue of  political debate; it would never 
again fall under the hushed silence of  taboo or consensus. Liberaliza-
tion, I argued, desacralized grain; de-liberalization, for all the clamor 
it made, did not succeed in restituting to subsistence its once-sac-
rosanct status. The subject remained embroiled in controversy; the 
suspicions and the sensitivities, which usually abated as good times 
superseded dearth, persisted. although the government reaffirmed 
its old commitments, they no longer had the same axiomatic value. 
The eerily familiar replay of  events during Turgot’s ministry graphi-
cally underscored the realization that subsistence was not to be one 
of  the absolutes of  absolute monarchy in its old age.
Before the sixties, there was a kind of  subsistence unconsciousness: 
a dread fear of  the problem, but a sense of  resignation, a feeling that 
nothing could be done about it—at least nothing that had not been 
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done before. The liberalization episode helped fashion a subsistence 
consciousness—not only a political one, but a scientific one as well. 
Directly and indirectly, the crisis gave impetus to research on subsis-
tence problems, to studies of  foodways and ersatz possibilities, and 
to the introduction of  reform in the trade (a new emphasis on flour 
as opposed to grain commerce), in conservation of  grain and flour 
for the sake of  quality and productivity, in fabrication of  bread (new 
forms and new recipes), and especially in milling technology (the per-
fecting and the dissemination of  economic milling, which had a direct 
bearing on efforts to transform the provisioning trade and the bakery). 
To the chagrin of  the professionals of  the métier, the idea developed 
among savants and economic commentators that subsistence-making 
was too important to be left to the merchants, millers, and bakers, 
even as the police believed that distribution of  grain, flour, and bread 




The documents consulted are too numerous and dispersed to enumerate individually. For sources 
cited, the precise cotes are given in the notes. Here I shall indicate the categories of  materials 
I used in the various depots.
Archives Nationales (by series):
Y. Police archives including minutes and registers of  the audience of  the Chambre de Police; 
reports and procès-verbaux of  summonses, arrests, violations, etc.; visits, searches, and seizures; 
complaints of  citizens and of  tradesmen; guild papers; correspondence of  police officials; the 
papers and logs of  commissaires and inspectors of  police; criminal and police investigations and 
interrogations; market and price data; sentences and ordonnances; reports of  the maréchaussée; 
appraisals of  the state of  public opinion.
X. Archives of  the Paris Parlement including remonstrances, sentences, appeals, and espe-
cially the minutes and the registers of  the Conseil Secret.
F. Especially F10, F11, F12, which concern police, subsistence, agriculture, commerce, industry, 
and elements of  the correspondence between the Contrôle-Général and the intendants. There 
are also pertinent materials in F7.
G7. Correspondence between the Contrôle-Général and the intendants.
O1. Papers of  the royal household, dispatched from the Secretary of  State to officials in the 
field, administrative correspondence.
H. Deliberations of  the Bureau of  the Hôtel de Ville as well as other materials concerning 
the administration of  the capital.
K. Memoirs and papers concerning subsistence questions, dearths, the grain trade, etc. 
Series KK contains the important correspondence between Orry and his buying and distribut-
ing agents during the dearth of  1738–42, which proved useful to me for comparative purposes.
AP. I used a half-dozen “private papers” collections deposited in the AN, the most important 
of  which were the papers of  Maurepas, Duhamel du Monceau, and Bertier de Sauvigny.
Miscellaneous materials including certain marine colonial and consular papers and ele-
ments in the series AD, E, T, V, W, and Z were useful in a limited fashion.
Minutier Central (Notarial archives). Research in the inventaires après décès, marriage contracts, 
leases, apprenticeship contracts, constitution of  loans, divisions of  estates, business partnership 
agreements, and acknowledgement of  debts of  bakers, mealmen, millers, and traders led me to 
important materials bearing on the bread industry in the sixties and seventies.
Bibliothèque Nationale:
The material here is less easy to describe because it is not organized in logical series. The two 
most important and coherent “fonds” are the Joly de Fleury papers (arranged in a separate 
 “Collection”) which I used extensively for the whole eighteenth century and the Delamare 
704 BREAD, POLITICS AND POLITICAL ECONOMY
papers which are integrated in the manuscrits français. Composed of  administrative correspon-
dence reaching from the top to the bottom of  public life, market reports, investigations, procès-
verbaux of  riots and disturbances, legislation in draft and final form, discussion of  public events, 
etc., the Collection Joly de Fleury was of  invaluable assistance to me. The Delamare papers are 
a rich adjunct to the published Traité de la police, a guide to the evolving police tradition, and a 
source for the study of  subsistence problems between 1685 and 1730.
Of  the scores of  other documents in the BN which rendered service, the most important are 
the minutes of  the assemblies of  police (generally convoked by the First President), diaries and 
journals, miscellaneous market and price data, and several dozen mémoires written on the ques-
tion of  the liberty of  the grain trade. All of  these are catalogued in the manuscrits français and in 
the nouvelles acquisitions.
Although they are located in the “imprimés” section (because they are “printed” or pub-
lished materials), hundreds of  sentences, ordonnances, arrêts, declarations, and letters patent 
which bear on subsistence questions deserve to be cited under archival holdings. A manuscript 
index, still far from complete, is available in the hemicycle of  the main reading room.
Bibliothèque de l’Arsenal:
The material here, especially in the Bastille mss., is an indispensable complement to the police 
archives in the Y series of  the AN, in the Delamare and Joly de Fleury papers of  the BN, and in the 
Archives de la Préfecture de Police (which yielded little directly relevant to this study). The Bastille 
papers contain correspondence of  the Lieutenants General of  Police, reports and logs of  commis-
saires and inspectors, a multitude of  procès-verbaux of  crimes of  various kinds, reports on public opin-
ion in Paris, interrogations of  suspects and saisies of  papers, and information on the structure and 
operation of  the police. Outside the Bastille fonds, the Arsenal also has several important mémoires on 
grain questions as well as contemporary “histories” of  the leading events of  the reign of  Louis XV.
Bibliothèque Historique de la Ville de Paris:
I used a great many documents scattered through the manuscript collection, the most pertinent 
of  which were the “gazetins” and letters of  several private or semi-public individuals writing 
from Paris in the sixties and seventies. For an earlier period, the part of  the Marville papers 
which Boislisle did not publish are an invaluable guide to police activities. I also used the file of  
legislation and sentences to complement the holdings of  the BN and the AN. I found valuable 
material in the papers of  several eminent historians of  Paris which the BHVP now holds. The 
map collections of  this library are a precious source.
Archives de l’Assistance Publique:
These materials are extremely difficult to use because of  the lack of  adequate, up-to-date cata-
logues and a muddled system of  classification. I used the deliberations of  the bureau of  the 
Hôtel-Dieu, administrative correspondence emanating from the Hôtel-Dieu and the Hôpital-
Général, records of  admissions, the archives of  the paneterie and other data concerning grain 
purchases, bread-making and experiments with grain and flour.
Archives du Département de la Seine et de la Ville de Paris: 
This is an extremely rich and intelligently organized depot which contains a vast amount of  
material that has so far escaped systematic scrutiny by historians of  Paris and the Old Regime. 
 BIBLIOGRAPHY 705
I used a wealth of  miscellaneous family and administrative materials, correspondence, leg-
islation, etc. But the most important materials are the registration archives and the consular 
documents, especially the faillites of  bakers, millers, and merchants, the ledgers and business 
registers of  tradesmen of  all sorts, the reports of  arbitres in commercial disputes, the complaints 
of  merchants against other tradespeople, and the decisions of  the juges-consuls. These materials, 
in conjunction with notarial archives and the documents in the civil series of  the Châtelet, the 
Parlement, and the Parisian municipality (series Z in the AN), provide the basis for studying the 
“business” history of  the Paris region in the Old Regime.
Archives des Affaires Étrangères:
The Mémoires et Documents : France series contains a considerable amount of  legislative and 
administrative data, most of  which can be found in the other depots cited above. There are 
also specialized kinds of  administrative correspondence and occasional commentaries on public 
policy and current events which proved useful.
Archives Historiques de l’Armée:
Fragmentary information on the relations between civil and military provisioning, on the coor-
dination of  government purchasing, on the dispatch of  troops to quell grain riots and protect 
convoys and markets, etc.
Archives Départementales:
The major series of  interest in all these depots are B and C. B is the judicial series. It is com-
prised of  informations, depositions, briefs, petitions, appeals, trials and decisions, background data 
on civil as well as police and criminal matters, correspondence with the government and with 
other jurisdictions, documents concerning the registration and the application and enforcement 
of  legislation, etc. Virtually all the parlementary papers, including the extant secret registers of  
deliberations and decisions, are found in the B series.
C is the administrative series, an omnicompetent, residual category which seems to touch 
upon every aspect of  life in the Old Regime. The most useful materials here are the correspon-
dence which links, on the one hand, the intendants to the central government and, on the other, 
the intendants to local government. The series C is often bursting with information on agricul-
ture, industry, commerce, market organization, and the economy in general; on the execution of  
legislation, the local and regional police, the maréchaussée, and jurisdictional disputes; on public 
assistance, public order, and public opinion. One frequently encounters enquêtes of  various sorts, 
in unequal stages of  perfection, some of  which provide invaluable quantitative data as well as 
insightful commentary on the state of  local affairs.
In addition to the B and C series, in several of  the depots listed below I examined parts of  
D, E, notarial documents, and unclassified holdings. Once again, for specific cotes, readers are 
referred to the references in the footnotes.
The following departmental archives were consulted:
Aisne Loir-et-Cher
Aube Loire-Atlantique
Bas-Rhin Loiret (most of  C. destroyed)
Bouches-du-Rhône (Marseilles and Aix) Manche
Calvados Marne















The Bibliothèque Municipale and the Archives Municipales of  Bordeaux contain extremely 
important parlementary papers as well as administrative correspondence and miscellaneous 
information about the institutions and the social life of  the city and region. 
The Bibliothèque Municipale of  Orléans houses the papers of  the Parisian Lieutenant Gen-
eral of  Police Lenoir. They provide a rich source of  information on the organization and opera-
tion of  the police of  the capital, on the provisioning tradition, and on the attitude of  highly 
placed royal officials toward liberty and liberalization.
The Bibliothèque Municipale of  Grenoble conserves the papers of  the Procurator General 
of  the Dauphiné Parlement in the sixties and seventies. They complement and help elucidate the 
parlementary records in the departmental B series. In addition, this library has several illuminat-
ing contemporary diaries.
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Projet de magasins nationaux ou moyens d’éviter la disette des villes. Paris: Imprimerie Didot l’aîné, n.d. 
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